Missions to Tibet by Dr. Joe F. Leeker First published on 29 May 2006, last updated on 10 July 2020 What happened before Already in 1949, that is during the final stages of the civil war in China, members of the Tibetan cabinet had asked Washington to help them in gaining membership in the United Nations – apparently as a way to avoid a possible takeover of Tibet by the Chinese Communists –, but US Secretary of State Dean Acheson “discouraged the idea, for fear that it might force Beijing’s hand and result in a quick takeover.”1 When Communist China invaded Tibet in October 1950, they quickly conquered the province of Kham. Fearing that the central plateau with Lhasa might be next to fall, some Tibetan officials petitioned the United Nations in November 1950 to take up its case against Beijing’s aggression, only to encounter deaf ears again, as did the Tibetan resistance leaders who requested the help of the US government in 1950.2 So, escorted by an entourage of 200, the Dalai Lama left Lhasa on 20 December 50 and fled to Yatung, close to the Indian princely protectorate of Sikkim, where he arrived in early 1951.3 During his absence from Lhasa, on 23 May 51, Tibetan emissaries that had been sent to Beijing just to negotiate, but that were not authorized to make binding decisions, signed a 17-point agreement with China that destroyed any hope of an autonomous Tibet. Knowing that the Dalai Lama would have to formulate a response to Beijing, on 2 June 51, Washington offered him US asylum (“provided both India and Ceylon proved unreceptive”), a US visa to his brother Thubten Norbu, and even military aid (“if India was amenable to transshipment”).4 As the political perspective depended on India’s approval, it seemed to be too uncertain, however, and then it came too late for the Dalai Lama to act. So in mid-August 1951, he returned to Lhasa, where Chinese troops were sighted shortly afterwards. “On 28 September, the Tibetan national assembly convened to debate the controversial seventeen- point agreement signed the previous May. Less than one month later, confirmation was sent to Mao Tse-tung that the kingdom accepted the accord. Tibet was now officially part of the People’s Republic of China.”5 On 13 February 52, Norbu visited the Department of State declaring, upon request of the Dalai Lama, that the Chinese were thus far correct and careful and that Norbu should not allow for any misunderstandings. Some months later, Norbu returned to the State Department, this time declaring that the Dalai Lama was willing to appear compliant with China’s wishes, but secretly organizing resistance against the Chinese. But as this point could not be verified, State Department officials preferred to do nothing. “Plans to come to Lhasa’s defense – overtly or covertly, verbally or physically – were shelved.”6 During the next few years, America’s only source of information about Tibet were occasional discussions of Embassy personnel in India with members of the royal family of Sikkim, although India was doing a lot to obstruct such contacts. As China knew that it could not sustain its presence in Tibet without a modern logistical network, they not only worked hard to complete this, but also retained the existing structure, including the Dalai Lama, and wooed the Tibetan aristocracy – until Beijing’s transportation network was completed. In the spring of 1955, the Dalai Lama and his entourage returned from Beijing, where they had 1 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.7. 2 Roger McCarthy, Letter to Prof. William Leary dated 19 February 93, formerly in: UTD/Leary/Ser.I, B8F14, now in: UTD/Leary/B46F12. 3 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.8-11. 4 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.8. 5 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.17. 6 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.19. 1 attended the inauguration ceremonies for China’s new constitution. With 2 roads inside Tibet and to China completed, the Chinese no longer felt the need to be tolerant towards the Dalai Lama: During his absence, the Chinese had introduced atheist doctrine in Tibetan schools (an affront to the Dalai Lama as religious head of the Tibetans) and started disarming villagers in eastern Tibet (an affront to Tibetan traditions) prior to the implementation of agrarian collectivization (an affront to the Tibetan aristocracy as land owners), so that even during his way back to Lhasa, the Dalai Lama received complaints about Beijing’s behavior from several Khampa leaders.7 These factors – atheist indoctrination, forceful disarming of the population, and rapid collectivization – led to a wave of violence against Chinese garrisons from late 1955 onwards, first in the Golok region of Amdo province, since January 1956 in the Kham province, where 23 clan leaders laid siege to several Chinese outposts. Beijing responded by sending some heavy Tu-4 bombers, and thousands of Khampas and Amdowas died in the air campaign. Having heard about all that violence, India’s Prime Minister Nehru sent an invitation to the Dalai Lama to attend the 2,500-year anniversary of the birth of Buddha that was to be celebrated in 1957. Nehru’s messenger was the crown prince of Sikkim who, after returning from Lhasa on 28 June 56, visited the US consulate in Calcutta. There, he told Consul General Robert Beams about horrific fighting taking place in eastern Tibet and, noting the absence of weapons among the Tibetan resistance fighters, he suggested channeling arms from East Pakistan to Tibet and even giving Tibetans fled to Burma and Thailand artillery and anti- aircraft training.8 It took State Department until 24 July 56 to find an answer, and that was the same as in 1951 – asylum could be granted to the Dalai Lama, but only provided that he first asked India for help; the idea of arms and training was not even mentioned in the response. In Lhasa, the Chinese authorities tried to restrain the Dalai Lama from travelling to India, but after Nehru had sent him an official invitation on 1 October 56, they conceded.9 There was, however, a reaction at Washington, but backstage. In September 56, CIA officer John Hoskins arrived at Calcutta as a new member of the US Consulate. The same month, the Dalai Lama’s brother Gyalo Thondrup, who had had a colorful life before coming to Calcutta, translated a report about Chinese cruelties that the governor of Gyantse had brought from Tibet in July, and sent the English version to Indian media and to the US Embassy at Karachi who forwarded it to other institutions, including the US Consulate in Calcutta. In November 56, John Hoskins got orders from Headquarters to contact Gyalo at Darjeeling.10 On 25 November 56, the Dalai Lama and his delegation arrived at New Delhi, but soon, it became clear that Nehru was against the Dalai Lama seeking asylum in India, as was the Chinese premier Zhou En-lai, who visited New Delhi several times. Despite all this, Gyalo and Norbu still insisted that their brother chose exile, but on his way back to Lhasa in January 57, the Dalai Lama consulted the state oracle at Kalimpong in Sikkim; it told him to return to Lhasa, but due to weather conditions, he had to remain in Sikkim’s capital Gangtok until the end of March 57.11 Since the second half of 1956, 27 young Khampa men had waited at Kalimpong in Sikkim for their chance to change things at home. While the Dalai Lama had told them just to wait, his brother Norbu had taken a picture of the group, and his brother Gyalo told them not to hope for assistance from Taiwan, but from the US. In the meantime, the CIA had assigned a 7 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.20-25. 8 “As far back as 1956, we began to receive reports indicating spread of Tibetan revolt against Chinese Communists through areas inhabited by Khamba tribes in eastern Tibet” (Notes for DCI Briefing of Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 28 April 1959, in: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP82R00025R000100060012-6.pdf ). 9 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.26-28. 10 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.29-33. 11 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.33-35. 2 case officer to Tibet, John Reagan, who, in January 57, scrambled to script a program of action, whose most important point was to find out how much armed resistance activity really existed in Tibet in order to be able to sketch an assistance plan.12 In February 57, Hoskins was ordered by Washington to immediately identify 8 – later corrected to 6 – Tibetan candidates for external training whose mission was to be to infiltrate their homeland and assess the state of resistance. It was Gyalo who chose the candidates; as Pakistan was Washington’s best ally in the area, the way of exfiltration was to be via East Pakistan. When Washington agreed in February 57, Pakistan’s President Mizra also agreed, and CIA case officer Edward McAllister was assigned to coordinating the operation from Dacca. After an adventurous trip from Palimpong in Sikkim to Kurmitola airfield in East Pakistan, all six Tibetan Khampas and CIA man John Reagan were picked up by the special missions C-118A operated by USAF’s Okinawa-based Det.1, 322nd TCS, Medium (Special), probably 51-3820.13 The entire group was flown to the CIA training station on Saipan island (Marianas) officially known as Naval Technical Training Unit,14 where they were trained in guerilla warfare techniques, espionage tactics, paramilitary operations, Morse communications, as well as use of the RS-1 shortwave radio and its hand-cranked generator during the summer of 1957.15 One who was impressed by the Tibetans was CIA training officer Roger McCarthy: “They were brave and honest and strong”, he said.16 While the Tibetans were trained on Saipan, CIA Headquarters gave cryptonyms to the emerging Tibetan Task Force (STCircus) and to the planned aerial operation (STBarnum), and assigned Far East Division’s air branch to work out details of STBarnum.