Missions to Tibet by Dr. Joe F. Leeker

First published on 29 May 2006, last updated on 10 July 2020

What happened before Already in 1949, that is during the final stages of the civil war in China, members of the Tibetan cabinet had asked Washington to help them in gaining membership in the United Nations – apparently as a way to avoid a possible takeover of Tibet by the Chinese Communists –, but US Secretary of State Dean Acheson “discouraged the idea, for fear that it might force Beijing’s hand and result in a quick takeover.”1 When Communist China invaded Tibet in October 1950, they quickly conquered the province of Kham. Fearing that the central plateau with Lhasa might be next to fall, some Tibetan officials petitioned the United Nations in November 1950 to take up its case against Beijing’s aggression, only to encounter deaf ears again, as did the Tibetan resistance leaders who requested the help of the US government in 1950.2 So, escorted by an entourage of 200, the Dalai Lama left Lhasa on 20 December 50 and fled to Yatung, close to the Indian princely protectorate of Sikkim, where he arrived in early 1951.3 During his absence from Lhasa, on 23 May 51, Tibetan emissaries that had been sent to Beijing just to negotiate, but that were not authorized to make binding decisions, signed a 17-point agreement with China that destroyed any hope of an autonomous Tibet. Knowing that the Dalai Lama would have to formulate a response to Beijing, on 2 June 51, Washington offered him US asylum (“provided both India and Ceylon proved unreceptive”), a US visa to his brother Thubten Norbu, and even military aid (“if India was amenable to transshipment”).4 As the political perspective depended on India’s approval, it seemed to be too uncertain, however, and then it came too late for the Dalai Lama to act. So in mid-August 1951, he returned to Lhasa, where Chinese troops were sighted shortly afterwards. “On 28 September, the Tibetan national assembly convened to debate the controversial seventeen- point agreement signed the previous May. Less than one month later, confirmation was sent to Mao Tse-tung that the kingdom accepted the accord. Tibet was now officially part of the People’s Republic of China.”5 On 13 February 52, Norbu visited the Department of State declaring, upon request of the Dalai Lama, that the Chinese were thus far correct and careful and that Norbu should not allow for any misunderstandings. Some months later, Norbu returned to the State Department, this time declaring that the Dalai Lama was willing to appear compliant with China’s wishes, but secretly organizing resistance against the Chinese. But as this point could not be verified, State Department officials preferred to do nothing. “Plans to come to Lhasa’s defense – overtly or covertly, verbally or physically – were shelved.”6 During the next few years, America’s only source of information about Tibet were occasional discussions of Embassy personnel in India with members of the royal family of Sikkim, although India was doing a lot to obstruct such contacts. As China knew that it could not sustain its presence in Tibet without a modern logistical network, they not only worked hard to complete this, but also retained the existing structure, including the Dalai Lama, and wooed the Tibetan aristocracy – until Beijing’s transportation network was completed. In the spring of 1955, the Dalai Lama and his entourage returned from Beijing, where they had

1 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.7. 2 Roger McCarthy, Letter to Prof. William Leary dated 19 February 93, formerly in: UTD/Leary/Ser.I, B8F14, now in: UTD/Leary/B46F12. 3 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.8-11. 4 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.8. 5 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.17. 6 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.19. 1

attended the inauguration ceremonies for China’s new constitution. With 2 roads inside Tibet and to China completed, the Chinese no longer felt the need to be tolerant towards the Dalai Lama: During his absence, the Chinese had introduced atheist doctrine in Tibetan schools (an affront to the Dalai Lama as religious head of the Tibetans) and started disarming villagers in eastern Tibet (an affront to Tibetan traditions) prior to the implementation of agrarian collectivization (an affront to the Tibetan aristocracy as land owners), so that even during his way back to Lhasa, the Dalai Lama received complaints about Beijing’s behavior from several Khampa leaders.7 These factors – atheist indoctrination, forceful disarming of the population, and rapid collectivization – led to a wave of violence against Chinese garrisons from late 1955 onwards, first in the Golok region of Amdo province, since January 1956 in the Kham province, where 23 clan leaders laid siege to several Chinese outposts. Beijing responded by sending some heavy Tu-4 bombers, and thousands of Khampas and Amdowas died in the air campaign. Having heard about all that violence, India’s Prime Minister Nehru sent an invitation to the Dalai Lama to attend the 2,500-year anniversary of the birth of Buddha that was to be celebrated in 1957. Nehru’s messenger was the crown prince of Sikkim who, after returning from Lhasa on 28 June 56, visited the US consulate in Calcutta. There, he told Consul General Robert Beams about horrific fighting taking place in eastern Tibet and, noting the absence of weapons among the Tibetan resistance fighters, he suggested channeling arms from East Pakistan to Tibet and even giving Tibetans fled to Burma and Thailand artillery and anti- aircraft training.8 It took State Department until 24 July 56 to find an answer, and that was the same as in 1951 – asylum could be granted to the Dalai Lama, but only provided that he first asked India for help; the idea of arms and training was not even mentioned in the response. In Lhasa, the Chinese authorities tried to restrain the Dalai Lama from travelling to India, but after Nehru had sent him an official invitation on 1 October 56, they conceded.9 There was, however, a reaction at Washington, but backstage. In September 56, CIA officer John Hoskins arrived at Calcutta as a new member of the US Consulate. The same month, the Dalai Lama’s brother Gyalo Thondrup, who had had a colorful life before coming to Calcutta, translated a report about Chinese cruelties that the governor of Gyantse had brought from Tibet in July, and sent the English version to Indian media and to the US Embassy at Karachi who forwarded it to other institutions, including the US Consulate in Calcutta. In November 56, John Hoskins got orders from Headquarters to contact Gyalo at Darjeeling.10 On 25 November 56, the Dalai Lama and his delegation arrived at New Delhi, but soon, it became clear that Nehru was against the Dalai Lama seeking asylum in India, as was the Chinese premier Zhou En-lai, who visited New Delhi several times. Despite all this, Gyalo and Norbu still insisted that their brother chose exile, but on his way back to Lhasa in January 57, the Dalai Lama consulted the state oracle at Kalimpong in Sikkim; it told him to return to Lhasa, but due to weather conditions, he had to remain in Sikkim’s capital Gangtok until the end of March 57.11 Since the second half of 1956, 27 young Khampa men had waited at Kalimpong in Sikkim for their chance to change things at home. While the Dalai Lama had told them just to wait, his brother Norbu had taken a picture of the group, and his brother Gyalo told them not to hope for assistance from Taiwan, but from the US. In the meantime, the CIA had assigned a

7 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.20-25. 8 “As far back as 1956, we began to receive reports indicating spread of Tibetan revolt against Chinese Communists through areas inhabited by Khamba tribes in eastern Tibet” (Notes for DCI Briefing of Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 28 April 1959, in: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP82R00025R000100060012-6.pdf ). 9 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.26-28. 10 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.29-33. 11 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.33-35. 2

case officer to Tibet, John Reagan, who, in January 57, scrambled to script a program of action, whose most important point was to find out how much armed resistance activity really existed in Tibet in order to be able to sketch an assistance plan.12 In February 57, Hoskins was ordered by Washington to immediately identify 8 – later corrected to 6 – Tibetan candidates for external training whose mission was to be to infiltrate their homeland and assess the state of resistance. It was Gyalo who chose the candidates; as Pakistan was Washington’s best ally in the area, the way of exfiltration was to be via East Pakistan. When Washington agreed in February 57, Pakistan’s President Mizra also agreed, and CIA case officer Edward McAllister was assigned to coordinating the operation from Dacca. After an adventurous trip from Palimpong in Sikkim to Kurmitola airfield in East Pakistan, all six Tibetan Khampas and CIA man John Reagan were picked up by the special missions C-118A operated by USAF’s Okinawa-based Det.1, 322nd TCS, Medium (Special), probably 51-3820.13 The entire group was flown to the CIA training station on Saipan island (Marianas) officially known as Naval Technical Training Unit,14 where they were trained in guerilla warfare techniques, espionage tactics, paramilitary operations, Morse communications, as well as use of the RS-1 shortwave radio and its hand-cranked generator during the summer of 1957.15 One who was impressed by the Tibetans was CIA training officer Roger McCarthy: “They were brave and honest and strong”, he said.16 While the Tibetans were trained on Saipan, CIA Headquarters gave cryptonyms to the emerging Tibetan Task Force (STCircus) and to the planned aerial operation (STBarnum), and assigned Far East Division’s air branch to work out details of STBarnum. On 20 June 1957, the National Security Council was informed about the situation in Tibet as one point of “Significant World Developments affecting US Security”.17 At CIA Headquarters, it was the air branch’s deputy Gar Thorsrud who selected the site of the first drop, a sandbar of the Brahmaputra located about 60 kilometers southeast of Lhasa, plus a second drop zone near Lithang in eastern Tibet, which was reputed to be an area of armed Khampa resistance.18 Thorsrud also selected the Polish crew from Wiesbaden and the aircraft, a B-17 that had been operated out of Taiwan on

12 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.35-39. 13 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.39-45. 14 The memorandum (July 1961) from Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale, Pentagon expert on guerrilla warfare, to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, President Kennedy’s military adviser, on Resources for Unconventional Warfare, SE. Asia (at: https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/doc100.htm) says: “4). Saipan Training Station. CIA maintains a field training station on the island of Saipan located approximately 160 miles northeast of Guam in the Marianas Islands. The installation is under Navy cover and is known as the Naval Technical Training Unit. The primary mission of the Saipan Training Station is to provide physical facilities and competent instructor personnel to fulfill a variety of training requirements including intelligence tradecraft, communications, counter- intelligence and psychological warfare techniques. Training is performed in support of CIA activities conducted throughout the Far East area. In addition to the facilities described above, CIA maintains a small ship of approximately 500 tons' displacement and 140 feet in length. This vessel is used presently to provide surface transportation between Guam and Saipan. It has an American Captain and First Mate and a Philippine crew, and is operated under the cover of a commercial corporation with home offices in Baltimore, Maryland. Both the ship and the corporation have a potentially wider paramilitary application both in the Far East area and elsewhere.” The NTTU complex was built in 1951 and functioned until the late sixties as a training camp for agents to be sent to Indonesia, Korea, China, Tibet and elsewhere. Descriptions of the complex with photos, maps and personal memories can be found at http://www.pacificworlds.com/cnmi/memories/memory3.cfm, http://www.saipanstewart.com/essays/coldwar.html, http://www.deq.gov.mp/artdoc/Sec8art80ID698.pdf (about ordnance storage) and http://www.saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?newsID=42917 (the complex today). Saipan and Okinawa were the places where “Third Force” agents were trained (Lilley, China Hands, p.78). 15 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.47/8. 16 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.55. 17 See DDRS, 1996, F78, 1040; Prados, President’s secret wars, p.163; Robert T. Davis, U.S. Policy and National Security, Praeger, 2010, vol.II, p.390; NSC Summaries of discussion: The Eisenhower period (online at http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/trachtenberg/guide/nsc.html ) 18 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.55-57 3

overflights of China since many years.19 “In mid-September, the finalized plan was sent to CIA Director Dulles for signature.”20 “Finally approval, including oversight approval, was obtained for the training and infiltration of a small group of Tibetans as a test case.”21 This was probably also the moment, when US President Eisenhower approved the provision of covert help by the CIA, at least as a test destined to assess the real amount of resistance to be found in Tibet against the Chinese occupation. After several months of training on Saipan, the first six Tibetans were taken to Okinawa in September 1957 for parachute training.

B-17G 44-85531 disguised as “639”, taken at Clark in the fall of 1957 by Merle C. Olmsted (with kind permission from Merle C. Olmsted)

Upon consent of DCI Allen Dulles, a B-17 which had been stripped of all weapons and national markings, painted black, and modified with engine mufflers to shield the exhaust, and which belonged to the CIA air fleet based on Taiwan,22 was flown to Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines in mid-September 1957 in order to pick up and train the Polish air crew from Wiesbaden, code named “Ostiary”, that was to make the first infiltration flight into Tibet. After some conversion training at Clark done by instructor Robert Kleyla, who managed the CIA air fleet in the Republic of China, they all flew to Kadena, Okinawa, where the Tibetans had arrived in the meantime.23 In the meantime, another problem had been solved by James McElroy, head of the CIA’s aerial resupply section at Kadena Air Base: The T-10 parachutes had been modified and tested, and during the drops, the bundles were to be connected to the jumpers by a long nylon line. Then, after a short lesson about landing techniques, the Tibetans were outfitted with the modified parachutes.24 “All six of the first trainees made three familiarization jumps each on Okinawa, including two jumps from the ‘joe hole’ of a B-17, the chosen infiltration aircraft. All of these jumps were without reserve parachutes, reflecting that the blind drops into Tibet were without reserve parachutes in order

19 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.57-59. 20 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.59. 21 Roger McCarthy, Roger McCarthy, Letter to Prof. William Leary dated 19 February 93, formerly in: UTD/Leary/Ser.I, B8F14, now in: UTD/Leary/B46F12. 22 From 1951 to 1955, the CIA air fleet based on Taiwan was owned by Western Enterprises Inc. For Western Enterprises see: Holober, Raiders of the China Coast; Hagedorn / Hellström, Foreign Invaders, pp.169/70; Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.37/8, 55, and 58. Leary (Secret mission to Tibet, p.64) and Trest (Air Commando One, p.91) state that it was a CAT B-17, but CAT only leased one of Western Enterprises’ B-17s in 1952 for overflights over China and a second B-17 in 1953. In the late fifties, Western Enterprises had been succeeded by the NACC, another CIA front, and their B-17s flew with and in the colors of the Republic of China Air Force’s 34th Squadron. For details, see my file CAT, Air Asia, Air America – the Company on Taiwan III: Work for the US Government. 23 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.59. 24 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.59-60. 4

to lighten the jumper’s load. Two CIA trainers (McElroy and McCarthy) also jumped with this group a total of 7 times, all without a reserve parachute.”25

Assessing the situation from inside

In early October 57, the B-17 crewed by the “Ostiary” group carried the Tibetans from Kadena, Okinawa, to Kurmitola, an emergency Strategic Air Command recovery field outside of Dacca in East Pakistan.26 The following day, all of them boarded the B-17, which dropped 2 of the Tibetans (Athar, now named “Tom”, and Lhotse, now named “Lou”) to a large sandbar in the Brahmaputra River south of Lhasa.27 The supply bundle for the first 2 teams was suspended over the “joe hole” in the B-17, ready for a quick release triggered by the jump master. The jumpers, seated on the side, would immediately follow the bundle.28 Each team got a single bundle containing radio gear, extra crystals, and personal weapons, weighing some 114 kilos, but composed of 36 kilo-segments. The aircraft then turned east to the province of Kham to make the second drop, but had to abort it due to thick clouds, and returned to East Pakistan. After landing on the sandbar, “Tom” and “Lou” changed clothes and buried the rest except the hand weapons and one radio. When it turned out that the radio did not work, they followed the Brahmaputra, until they happened to encounter some of their Khampa friends whom they asked to inform the Khampa people they knew at Lhasa. Then they returned to their landing place, unearthed the spare radio and sent back to the CIA a message about what they had done the last 10 days.29 For the next months, they remained in the vicinity of Lhasa, until their main contact there, Khampa leader Gompo Tashi, left the capital in mid-April 1958 to attend a guerrilla rendezvous at Drigu Tso.30 In the meantime, the full moon phase was over, the remaining 4 Tibetans had to wait for the first week of November 57. This time, the B-17 headed directly towards the Lithang River in eastern Tibet. When the plane reached the drop zone, Tashi (named “Dick”) collapsed on the cabin floor and had to be flown back to East Pakistan, but later returned to Tibet overland

25 Roger McCarthy, Letter dated 3 December 97 to the editor of an article by Ken Dallison, “Secret Mission to Tibet”, copy to Prof. Bill Leary, formerly in: UTD/Leary, Ser.I, B12F1, now probably at UTD/Leary/B93F1. 26 Roger E. McCarthy, the CIA Case Officer who trained the first six Tibetans on Saipan in the summer of 1957 and who was directly involved in their return to Tibet by parachute in the fall of that year, points out the multitude of problems that had to be resolved: “This required the coordination and efforts of a select few people located in many areas and in a variety of activities, ranging from locating staging areas, selection of drop zones in Tibet, flight routes, outfitting the trainees for their return to Tibet, to developing a personnel parachute and cargo parachutes and delivery techniques equal to the demands of high altitudes, to appropriate clearance approvals not only from our own government but those of other governments such as East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and Thailand, etc.” (Letter by Roger E. McCarthy to Jim Keck, details kindly forwarded to the author by Jim Keck with kind permission from Roger McCarthy). 27 This first flight into Tibet is described in: Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.59-64. As Roger McCarthy states, “the first aircraft used in the overflight portion of the operation was a B-17 flown by a European crew. Parachute drops were made from the ‘joe hole’ in the belly of the aircraft, and the Tibetans made practice jumps from it on Okinawa. Jim McElroy and Roger McCarthy made extensive modifications to the T- 10-parachute, including test drops at Atsugi AFB in Japan, and developed the drop techniques for the cargo and personnel drops from the B-17. The B-17 was used on two flights in the fall of 1957 to infiltrate two teams of Tibetans and their equipment onto the drop zones selected by the respective team members. Staging involved support by Air Force Det.2 at Kadena, then under the command of Art Dietrich, who left no stone unturned to provide excellent support to the operation. Major Robert Kleyla, who had previous B-17 experience, helped provide crew training and flew the B-17, with the six Tibetans aboard to the staging area at Kermitola” (Letter by Roger E. McCarthy to Jim Keck, details kindly forwarded to the author by Jim Keck with kind permission from Roger McCarthy). 28 Roger McCarthy, Letter dated 3 December 97 to the editor of an article by Ken Dallison, “Secret Mission to Tibet”, copy to Prof. Bill Leary, formerly in: UTD/Leary, Ser.I, B12F1, now probably at UTD/Leary/B93F1. 29 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.60-65. 30 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.66-71. 5

via Sikkim. But the other 3 Tibetans – Wangdu (“Walt”), Wangdu’s servant Thondup (“Dan”),31 and Tsawand Dorje (“Sam”) – landed without injury, although some 14 kilometers away from the intended drop zone, buried their supplies, and happened to encounter a lone Khampa who brought them to a guerrilla camp. Returning to their cache site, they radioed word of their safe arrival only 48 hours after infiltration.32 They arrived in the middle of heavy fighting against great numbers of Chinese soldiers that, among others, killed former Saipan students “Dan”, “Sam”, and “Dick” in mid-195833 and eventually forced the entire Khampa regional guerrilla movement (called Chusi Gangdruk) to withdraw towards central Tibet and then south to Drugi Tso. Here, the Khampa refugees met the group coming from Lhasa. On 16 June 58, Gompo Tashi arrived there to oversee the inauguration of the National Volunteer Defense Army (NVDA) comprising some 1,500 guerillas, whose head he was made. More than once, Gompo Tashi and the surviving CIA agents dropped earlier sent urgent requests for weapons and ammunition back to Washington, and, when nothing arrived, they desperately tried to get some weapons by attacking Chinese outposts in the summer of 1958.34 The Agency, however, was reluctant to send weapons to the NVDA without better under- standing where they were headed. The problem was that the reports radioed by the Tibetan agents were not detailed enough. So “Tom” (Athar) was asked to come down to Calcutta for an interview. At Calcutta, Athar was asked very detailed questions by CIA men John Hoskins and Frank Holober. Based on this information, the CIA decided in the late summer of 1958 to proceed with limited material support and also to train a second group of Tibetans. While the first group of Tibetan agents were to act as eyes and ears in order to give the Agency a better understanding of what was happening in Tibet, the second contingent of Tibetans was to be trained as guerrilla instructors to help the resistance increase. In September 1958, the 303 Committee of the US Government approved an “initial endorsement of CIA covert support to Tibetan resistance”.35 The aircraft that had been used for the 2 drops made into Tibet in 1957 – Boeing B-17G 44-85531, msn 8440 – was mostly flown as “531”, but sometimes it was painted as “639” – probably that fake tail number was also used during the missions into Tibet in order to make the aircraft non-attributable. It was last flown in December 57 and then put into storage at Clark AFB where it was photographed in June 1958 by Merle C. Olmsted. When it was at Clark, it bore USAF insignia, probably in order to avoid attention.36 Its ultimate fate is unknown, but it was probably scrapped. Merle C. Olmsted recalls: “After it went into storage, I remember we got orders from USAF to remove the windshield assembly and other parts, which we did. I assume they went somewhere to go on another B-17. I think the airplane was still there when I left.”37 The salvage of the B-17 began in March 58 (removal of windshield and carburetors), when it had a total of 2,000 hours on it, and the remains of the aircraft were still at Clark in October 58.38

31 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.71. 32 For the November 57 flight see: Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.65. 33 So, of these original 6 trainees, 3 were killed in Tibet in 1958. Wangdu was killed by the Chinese on the Nepalese-Indian border in 1974. Lhotse died of natural causes in India in the mid-90s. Athar was living in New Delhi in 1993, where he was active in the Chushi Gangdrug (Roger McCarthy, Letter dated 3 December 97 to the editor of an article by Ken Dallison, “Secret Mission to Tibet”, copy to Prof. Bill Leary, formerly in: UTD/Leary, Ser.I, B12F1, now probably at UTD/Leary/B93F1). 34 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.71-73. 35 See Memorandum for the 303 Committee, Washington, 26 January 1968, in: FRUS 1964-68, vol.30, doc.342, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d342 ; see also Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.73/4. 36 E-mail dated 15 February 2004, kindly sent to the author by Leif Hellström. 37 E-mail dated 21 March 2004, kindly sent to the author by Merle C. Olmsted. 38 E-mail dated 26 March 2004, kindly sent to the author by Merle C. Olmsted. 6

Drops to Tibetan resistance groups

Not only the B-17 was no longer available, however, but the operation also needed a new type of crews, as the Polish contingent had suffered several fatalities during operation HAIK in Indonesia in the spring of 195839 and wanted to leave Asia and return to their former posting in Germany. As Taiwanese crews were politically unacceptable, American crews from CAT were proposed, who had many years of multiengine experience. Although by August 1953, US policy had formally prohibited the CIA from sending Americans on covert overflights,40 the CIA planners at the end won permission to use a CAT crew for Tibet.41

Former CAT B-17 “531” in storage at Clark Air Base in June 1958, without windshield (taken by Merle C. Olmsted – with kind permission of the photographer)

When CAT took over the job in the fall of 1958,42 they first sent in one of their C-54s,43 but this mission nearly ended in a disaster. The DC-4 took off from Kadena, Okinawa, flew to Kurmitola outside Dacca, East Pakistan, refueled, made the drop in Tibet, and returned to Kurmitola. The last leg from Kurmitola to Taipei had been calculated for 14 hours, but when the DC-4 did not appear at Taipei at the estimated time, CAT gave it up for lost and turned off the runway lights. But then, after more than 17 hours, the DC-4 turned up and landed on the darkened runway.44 Crew, aircraft and date of this flight are unknown, but as it preceded the first Tibet flight using the C-118A, it was probably made during the last days of September or the earliest days of October 1958.

39 For details about Operation HAIK see my file Working in remote countries, pp.94-105. 40 Fu / Pocock, The Black Bats, p. 18. 41 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.74. 42 The date of January 1958 given sometimes as the beginning of the C-118A flights to Tibet is based on a misinterpretation of what USAF pilot Larry Ropka had said in an interview given to Bill Leary in 1990 (in: UTD/Leary/B43F4). January 1958 was only the date when the new commander of the unit, Col. John W. Weltman, arrived, not the date of the first mission to Tibet. The OK from Washington to proceed with the Tibetan program had only been given in the fall of 1958. 43 Roger McCarthy, Letter dated 19 February 1993 sent to Prof. William M. Leary, in: UTD/Leary/B46F12. 44 Leary, Manuscript, p.303 (in: UTD/Leary/B19F3) who gives November 58, but this is probably wrong. 7

Then, in early October 1958,45 Col. John W. Weltman, head of the CIA air operations at Tokyo, ferried USAF C-118A 51-3820 from Tokyo to Kadena and handed it over to CAT Pilot in Command Capt. Merrill D. (“Doc”) Johnson who had been selected to fly the first mission on 6 October 1958.46 His crew members were Capts. William Welk and Al Judkins (co-pilots), Bill Lively (flight engineer), James Keck (navigator), Bob Aubry (radioman), and Andy Andersen, William Demmons, and Ray Schenck (PDOs – parachute dispatch officers or kickers).47 The aircraft (C-118A = DC-6 “3820”) belonged to the special cell (Detachment 1)

The mission to Tibet that “Doc” Johnson flew from 6 to 10 October 58 (Page from “Doc” Johnson’s log book kindly supplied by his son James on 18 February 2013) of the former 322nd TCS (Medium Special) of Kadena, Okinawa, by then renamed Detachment 2, 313th Air Division,48 and was bailed to CAT49 to continue these missions, that is airdrops of arms and other material to the Tibetan resistance groups. Preparations for the flight took some time. Former USAF pilot Lawrence Ropka, who had flown those C-118As out of Kadena, Okinawa, since the fall of 1957, recalls that the unit’s operations office was in a Quonset hut. In the back of the hut was a small room, portioned off, that contained two “Air Force” officers. He soon learned that there were certain pilots in the unit who flew C-118s and were considered a “semi-elite.” After a couple of months, he was invited into the back room to sign a secrecy agreement, after which he flew to some “strange places”.50 “There was a little house on the edge of Clark Field which contained a communications room. [Lawrence] Ropka was not allowed inside the room, but he would be given long telexes from SAC Weather Control. He also had some photographs, which he used to designate the drop zone. He then worked out a route backwards from DZ, using old WAC charts. They all spent the afternoon [that is of 5 October 58] with paint remover, trying to take the USAF marking off the C-118. It proved to be quite a job. In fact, they missed the first day on the moon phase. On the second day, a CAT crew (Doc Johnson?) flew the mission.”51

45 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.75, state that the first C-118A drop into Tibet was only in mid-October 58. As the USAF’s second “black” C-118A – 51-3822 (msn 43569) – had been forced down by Russian fighters over Armenia on 27 June 58 (Eastwood / Roach, Piston Engine Airliner Production List, p.336) and returned to Okinawa only in January 60 (Interview conducted by Prof. William Leary with Lawrence Ropka at Ft Walton Beach, FL, on 29-30 August 1990, transcript preserved at: UTD/Leary/B43F4), another C-118 was used for the overflights over Tibet, until it was finally replaced by C-130As. This C-118A was C-118A 51-3820 (msn 43567, also known as N6184M). Although it may have been returned to the USAF as 51-3820 by July 59, it is not listed on the microfilms of the AFHRA between July 64 and early 1967; then it appears on microfilm no. AVH-6 as returned from outside the USAF (code “GI”) on 67090, that is on 31 March 67; at that date, it was assigned to the 1045th Operational Evaluation & Training Group, Headquarters Command, Eglin, that is to the unit that really ran the Tibetan missions. 46 This date is evident from “Doc” Johnson’s log book, although several sources give mid-October or even November 1958 for the first C-118A flight to Tibet. 47 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.74/5. 48 Only that Kadena-based special cell (Detachment 1) of the 322nd TCS survived, when the 322nd TCS itself ceased to exist in November 57 (Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.271, note 17). 49 The USAF insignia on these aircraft were decals, “the plastic kind with the sticky backs. That [...] Air Force captain that usually came with the airplane to Kermitola always produced a set for the flight back to Clark” (E- mail dated 29 March 2002, sent by former CAT mechanic Bill Lively to former CAT/Air America Chief Navigator Jim Keck, kindly forwarded to the author by Jim Keck with kind permission from Bill Lively). 50 Interview conducted by Prof. William Leary with Lawrence Ropka at Ft Walton Beach, FL, on 29-30 August 1990, transcript preserved at UTD/Leary/B43F4. 51 Interview conducted by Prof. William Leary with Lawrence Ropka at Ft Walton Beach, FL, on 29-30 August 1990, transcript preserved at UTD/Leary/B43F4. 8

The flight itself was not very pleasant: The first night at Kurmitola was rather boring, as Gar Thorsrud observed, who had come from Washington and accompanied the group up to there. As the rear door could not be opened in flight, it had to be temporarily removed at Kurmitola. So the flight would be unpressurized and the cabin and the cockpit would be very cold, and everybody had to carry oxygen masks, which also caused some small mishaps.52 Jim Keck, CAT Navigator of the very first C-118A drop mission, remembers: “We got over the D.Z. and we were between layers of clouds. The pilot, Doc Johnson, kept turning in a circle with his wing low in the turn. The C-118 has only weather type radar and in a steep turn my radar scope only paints part of the screen. That part that’s on the inside of the turn. The picture becomes distorted and you can’t rely upon it until you roll out straight and level. As I couldn’t be of any help on the radar I asked the Flight Engineer, Bill Lively, to fold up his seat and I’ll come up and help look for the drop zone lights. It was my very first overflight and I had my seat pack type parachute on at all times. The first thing that happened was that I got the chute stuck in the small opening between the two pilots. [...] Lively unhooked me and I slipped forward so that I could see out of the windows. We had been in a steady turn for several minutes now. [...] We broke out of the clouds and directly straight-ahead we saw several huge snow covered mountains higher than we were. [...] I asked Doc to roll out straight and level as soon as he could, so I could use my radar. When he did, I was able to get a good fix from a mountain peak and gave him a new heading back to the D.Z. As we rolled out on this new heading, the clouds parted and we could see the ground. The co-pilot, Al Judkins, gave me several visual sightings and we made it to the drop zone. Those five fires looked wonderful!”53 The drop zone was near Drigu Tso lake, where all the guerrillas had convened earlier that year, and when the Tibetans opened the pallets, they found 200 Lee- Enfield rifles plus ammunition. As this was not enough for the entire guerrilla army, they immediately leaned on “Tom” to radio for another drop of weapons.54 The next flight was some weeks later, when the next moon phase came back. On a later flight, the static line cable ripped loose from its front anchor plate, malfunctioned and required multiple passes to complete the drop. “Yes, we most likely spread that load over a couple of miles, but there was nothing else we could do”, Jim Keck remembers who helped the kickers on that flight, but from the following flight on, a new “A” frame type anchor was installed.55 “During 1958, Ropka would be assigned to the project every month during the moon phase for 6 months […]. They operated out of Clark for a couple of months, then moved to Takhli (the C-118 had to make a refueling stop out of Clark at Dacca). There was nothing at Takhli except a long SAC recovery runway and jet fuel. The Thais provided a guest house. There were two hangars. The Thais turned it over to the USAF. One side was cleaned out and rooms were put in for operations and communications. They had to take everything that they needed from Okinawa in one airplane.”56 To sum up: Similar CAT / Air America-piloted C-118A flights to Tibet are known to have taken place in mid-October 58, in November 58 (when Air America was still called CAT Inc.), in mid-April 59 (after the company had been renamed Air America), in mid-May 59, and in June 5957 – a total of 10 missions to Tibet were flown in the C-118A until mid-1959.58

52 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.75/6. 53 Letter dated 12 August 2001 written by Jim Keck to the author. 54 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.76/7. 55 Letter dated 12 July 1997 written by Jim McElroy, CIA loadmaster in the Tibetan Program, to William Leary; details kindly forwarded to the author by Jim Keck with kind permission from Jim McElroy; and letter dated 12 August 2001, written by Jim Keck to the author. 56 Interview conducted by Prof. William Leary with Lawrence Ropka at Ft Walton Beach, FL, on 29-30 August 1990, transcript preserved at UTD/Leary/B43F4. 57 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp. 74-79; 80-105. 58 Leary, Manuscript, p.304, in: UTD/Leary/B19F3. 9

“Doc” Johnson’s log book states that he flew DC-6 “3820”59 from 6 to 10 October 58 and from 20 to 28 October 58 plus an anonymous DC-6 – probably the same aircraft – from 22 to 28 November 58. He also flew an unknown type of aircraft – probably still the same C-118A – from 16 to 24 May 59 and an unknown C-118 from 19 to 25 July 59 – probably 51-3820 all the time.60 For the second “black” C-118A – 51-3822 (msn 43569) – returned to Okinawa only in January 60.61 In “Doc” Johnson’s log book, all of these missions are officially declared as “local training” flights out of Kadena, Okinawa, but it is obvious that the USAF wouldn’t make its special mission aircraft available just for training. The mission of 6-10 October 58 lasted 17.5 hours, the one of 20-28 October 58 lasted 39 hours including 5 hours of instrumental flying, and the one of 22 to 28 November 58 lasted 29.5 hours, including 10 hours of instrumental flying.

The mission to Tibet that “Doc” Johnson flew from 20 to 28 October 58 (Page from “Doc” Johnson’s log book kindly supplied by his son James on 18 February 2013)

The mission to Tibet that “Doc” Johnson flew from 22 to 28 November 58 (Page from “Doc” Johnson’s log book kindly supplied by his son James on 18 February 2013)

In the meantime, things did not work well in eastern Tibet during the remaining months of 1958. Gompo Tashi had always maneuvered his rebels by the hundreds, so that – after some small victories (trucks ambushed, outposts overrun) – the Chinese, by reconnaissance planes, almost always knew where the Tibetans were bound and expected them with artillery fire. When some of Gompo’s horsemen left the main group, and when it was clear that the local population considered all of them as bandits, Gompo Tashi had to stop fighting. As to the rebel group still camping near Drigu Tso, they received more supplies the same way as before. But when some additional radios as well as 300,000 Indian rupees destined to pay message couriers arrived in November 58 coming down on a yellow chute that was immediately appropriated by “Tom” and “Lou”, this created envy and conspiracy theories. In December 58, “Walt” arrived with some stragglers from Lithang in Kham that the CIA had refused to supply. In an infuriated mood, the agents radioed to Washington that the rebel group in Kham had been crushed.62 Back at Washington, in mid-1958, Desmond FitzGerald, deputy of the CIA’s Far East Division, gave final authority to proceed with training for a second group of Tibetans. This time, the group was to be trained not on tropical Saipan, but in an abandoned WWII training camp near Leadville, Colorado: Camp Hale. As this location was not yet ready to move into, an interim training location was chosen: Camp Peary near Williamsburg, Virginia, called “The Farm”. In November 58, CIA man Tom Fosmire flew to Kurmitola to meet the new group of 10 Lithang Kampas, all recruited from the refugee community at Kalimpong,

59 For this C-118A of (51-3820, msn 43567) see the DC-6 file within my The Aircraft of Air America. 60 Pages from Doc Johnson’s log book kindly supplied by his son James on 18 February 2013. 61 Interview conducted by Prof. William Leary with Lawrence Ropka at Ft Walton Beach, FL, on 29-30 August 1990, transcript preserved at: UTD/Leary/B43F4. 62 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.77-80. 10

Sikkim. The special missions C-118A picked them up at Kurmitola and flew them to a strip inside the confines of “The Farm”. CIA training there was not only carried out by Tom Fosmire, but also by CIA legend “Tony Poe”. In March 1959, the entire group was flown to Camp Hale in Montana, before they were to leave for Tibet a couple of weeks later.63 “Things changed a bit in 1959. Weltman left and was replaced by his deputy, Art Dietrich. The operation had been run from Tokyo, with operating elements on Okinawa. The Tokyo office was closed and Okinawa became the Asian Air Office.”64 But apart from that, operations at Kadena went as usual. A side-note: Most people would perhaps think that on those thirteen-hour flights celestial navigation, that is measuring the height of the sun, moon, stars and planets, was used to find the drop zone, but Chief Navigator Jim Keck states that he used it very little: “This system works lovely when flying in dark nights over the vast Pacific. [...] But here you are over someone else’s country, everyone’s adrenaline is racing and you must listen to and plot every visual sighting from other crewmembers – it’s just too long to stay away from your navigation station. As a result I would only go to celestial when it was absolutely necessary. There is another reason. To get good celestial results the airplane must be on autopilot. [...] Most sextants will take two minutes to average out the autopilot. When somebody is hand flying, the airplane may be held slightly left wing low for most of the two minutes or it may oscillate back and forth without a constant attitude.”65 But the C-118A of the same squadron was also used on other flights, as it also picked up the exfiltrated Tibetans at Kurmitola, that is those men who had trekked down from the Himalayas and had been bused from Darjeeling to Dacca by CIA case officers, and then flew them to their training sites located at Saipan or elsewhere.66 And there were several more missions flown to Tibet in 1959 by the old C-118A: From “Doc” Johnson’s log book we know that he flew 41.8 hours out of Naha, Okinawa, between 16 and 24 May 59, including 12.5 hours of instrumental flying, and this must have been the C-118A mission mentioned by Conboy/Morrison.67 And the last C-118A mission to Tibet that “Doc” Johnson mentions in his log book was from 19 to 25 July 59; it lasted 36.3 hours and included 8.5 hours of instrumental flying.68 Both flights were part of a joined CIA-Republic of China effort to drop 4 Hiu Muslims – who had been recruited on Taiwan – into the province of Amdo in eastern Tibet (project STWhale). Their mission was to interrupt the Chinese stream of supplies that continuously arrived on a road that had been completed in 1955 and that ran from the city of Xining diagonally across Amdo before turning south towards Lhasa – a route that apparently was favored by convoys of the Chinese army. Both missions were flown with “Doc” Johnson at the controls, Truman Barnes as co-pilot, Jim Keck as navigator, Bill Lively as flight mechanic, Bob Aubrey at the radio, and Richard Peterson as PDO. The May-flight dropped the 4 Hiu agents, and the second flight dropped 8,000 pounds of supplies. Unfortunately, it later became clear that the agents had been captured, and that ended STWhale.69

63 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.84-89. 64 Interview conducted by Prof. William Leary with Lawrence Ropka at Ft Walton Beach, FL, on 29-30 August 1990, transcript preserved at UTD/Leary/B43F4. 65 Letter dated 10 July 2001, written by Jim Keck to the author. 66 At Saipan, the CIA operated a training complex between 1949 and 1962 that was called “Naval Technical Training Unit”, where Chinese Nationalists were trained for assaults on to the Mainland (Note about: E.J. Kahn Jr., A reporter in Micronesia, New York 1966, pp.39-40, in: UTD/Leary/B69F10). 67 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp. 98/9. 68 Page from Doc Johnson’s log book kindly supplied by his son James on 18 February 2013. 69 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp. 99-105. 11

The mission to Tibet that “Doc” Johnson flew from 16 to 24 May 59 (Page from “Doc” Johnson’s log book kindly supplied by his son James on 18 February 2013)

The mission to Tibet that “Doc” Johnson flew from 19 to 25 July 59 (Page from “Doc” Johnson’s log book kindly supplied by his son James on 18 February 2013)

An unknown CAT / Air America C-118A at Kurmitola, East Pakistan, in 1958/9 (with kind permission from Ken Conboy)

Generally speaking, things did not go well in early 1959. Although Gompo Tashi’s guerrillas succeeded in laying siege to some Chinese outposts in January, Chinese bombers forced them to retreat in February and to shift the majority of the troops towards Yarlung west of Kham. On 5 March 59, the Dalai Lama, who had been studying in nearby monasteries since mid-1958, returned to Lhasa. The same month, a rumor that the Chinese intended to abduct the Dalai Lama created an uprising in Tibet: “Fear that the Chinese were planning to kidnap Dalai Lama apparently touched off the revolt on 10 March in Lhasa (population 80,000). Thousands of Tibetan demonstrators then took the Dalai Lama into protective custody in his summer palace just outside Lhasa. Well-organized supporters knocked out a Chinese outpost manned by 80 soldiers, interrupted communications with Peiping, and plastered walls of Lhasa with posters declaring ‘independent kingdom of Tibet’”.70 The revolt was short-lived and ineffective, but, disguised as a peasant and accompanied by some family members and since the riverbank opposite Lhasa also by a small escort of rebels, the Dalai Lama was able to flee on 17 March.71 On 25 March, the Dalai Lama met “Tom” and his team near the Chongye valley, 30 kilometers north of Drigu Tso. “Tom” (Athar) immediately sent a radio message to the CIA on Okinawa informing them that the Dalai Lama was alive and well.72 Having arrived at the NVDA’s rear base at Lhuntse Dzong, the Dalai Lama initially

70 (Notes for DCI Briefing of Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 28 April 1959, in: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP82R00025R000100060012-6.pdf ). 71 “As late as 17 March, Dalai still hoped for peaceful solution, but when shells fell near summer palace, he decided to leave for India” (Notes for DCI Briefing of Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 28 April 1959, in: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP82R00025R000100060012-6.pdf ). 72 “At the 400th meeting of the National Security Council on March 26, 1959, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed developments in Tibet during his briefing on significant world developments. The 12

intended to wait there until he could return to Lhasa. But when he heard that the Chinese had dissolved the Tibetan government73 and that there was heavy fighting at Lhasa, he understood that the Chinese would try to capture him, and so he asked the CIA agents “Tom” and “Lou” to radio an immediate plea for Indian asylum. In Washington, policy makers agreed that the Dalai Lama’s exile in India was in US interest and sent a message to the CIA’s New Delhi station asking that it relay the plea directly to Nehru. On 28 March, the Dalai Lama and its entourage reached just 4 hours from the Indian border. There, “Tom” and “Lou” turned on their radio learned of New Delhi’s official consent via Washington. After saying goodbye to his NVDA escorts and to the 2 CIA agents “Tom” and “Lou”, the Dalai Lama and his 80- person entourage walked their way into India. “Tom” and “Lou” immediately asked for more weapons to be dropped to the Tibetans.74 “Dalai Lama’s 18 April statement at Tempur, India, attacking Chinese Communists and stating he left Lhasa of own volition refutes Communist claim he was abducted.”75 Inside Tibet, open war broke out between the Tibetan natives and the Chinese army, and while the Chinese troops frequently crossed the borders of Sikkim, Bhutan and India, resulting in continuous skirmishes, CAT planes continued to supply the rebels.76 After the Dalai Lama had entered India, he more or less openly requested Tibet’s independence as well as more aerial support for the Tibetan resistance fighters.77 The initial reaction of the US relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion of that date by S. Everett Gleason reads as follows: ‘The Director of Central Intelligence said that he would report first on the situation in Tibet as it had developed up to this hour. Beginning on March 10 at Lhasa there had occurred a series of events which led to the flight from Lhasa of the Dalai Lama whom the Chinese Communists were about to kidnap and carry off to Peiping. When the people of Lhasa became aware of these plans, thousands of Tibetans flocked to the city and took the Dalai Lama into protective custody. Disorders followed in Lhasa. A Chinese Communist strongpoint was captured. The Lama supported the rebel activity. Peiping at first tried a policy of leniency but subsequently was obliged to take strong measures. The rebels had abandoned Lhasa on March 24.’ (DCI’s Report on Tibet, National Security Council, meeting of 26 March 1959, Editorial note, FRUS 1958-60, vol.19, no.367, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v19/d367 ). 73 “Peiping dissolved the local Tibetan government on 28 March and replaced it with Communist-sponsored Preparatory Committee for Tibet. Chinese thus reversing policy which since 1951 had been that of working through local institutions and gradually replacing them with Communist organizations.” (Notes for DCI Briefing of Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 28 April 1959, in: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP82R00025R000100060012-6.pdf ). 74 The Dalai Lama left Lhasa on 17 March 59 and arrived in India on 1 April 59 (Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.90-93). Is has been suggested that the Dalai Lama was resupplied by repeated airdrops arranged by the CIA, because the party had left Lhasa without anything (Prados, John, Presidents’ secret wars, p.162), but this seems to be wrong, as Tibet Task Force CIA officer Frank Holober stated: “The CIA never had any plans for evacuating the Dalai Lama; we did not have that kind of contact” (Holober interview, quoted in Conboy / Morrison, cit., p.272, note 20). For the call for more weapons see Untitled Dept. of State message dated 2 April 1959, DDRS, # 1620-1985, quoted ib., p.273, note 30. 75 (Notes for DCI Briefing of Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 28 April 1959, in: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP82R00025R000100060012-6.pdf ). 76 Robbins, Air America, pp.90-98; Hagedorn / Hellström, Foreign Invaders, pp.169-74; Leary, Secret mission to Tibet, pp.62-66; Trest, Air Commando One, pp.91/2. Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, mentions C-118s flights into Tibet for mid-April 59 (p.97), mid-May 59 (p.104), and for June 59 (p.105). As has been shown above, “Doc” Johnson’s log book notes C-118A missions into Tibet between 16 and 24 May 59 (41.8 hours out of Naha, Okinawa, including 12.5 hours of instrumental flying), and between 19 to 25 July 59 (36.3 hours including 8.5 hours of instrumental flying). 77 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.94-97 for his activities in India; then also in a written message to the US Government: Acting Secretary of State memorandum for President Eisenhower, dated 30 April 1959, Subject: Message from the Dalai Lama: “I enclose herewith a paraphrased message from the Dalai Lama received through his brother, Gyalo Thondup, on April 23, 1959 for transmission to this Government. In this message the Dalai Lama thanks the United States Government for its help and makes two main requests. […] He also asks that the United States recognize the Free Tibetan Government and influence other countries to do so. In this connection, he emphasizes his determination to work for complete independence, regardless of the time required for ending the opposition of India, and declares that autonomy is not enough. Later in the message, 13

Government was to have Asian states, especially India find a solution,78 but President Eisenhower also allowed a continuation of assistance for Tibet according to existing authorizations.79 In late April 59, another C-118A flight, loaded with supplies, was waiting for departure at Kurmitola, when the NVDA in southern Tibet collapsed and a band of Khampa guerrillas fled to India, followed by CIA agents “Tom” and “Lou”. The CIA delayed plans to infiltrate the team already trained at Camp Hale as long as the situation in Tibet was unclear, and decided to select another team of Tibetans for training in the US. In May 59, CIA agent “Tony Poe” (Anthony Poshepny) picked them up at Kurmitola in the usual C-118A, and after some examinations, 20 of them were flown to Camp Hale.80 In the meantime, Washington received a lot of extremely alarming reports about the desperate situation among the anti-Chinese resistance in Tibet.81 In May 59, there were several discussions about what to do. At the Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting of 1 May 59, USAF Chief of Staff General Thomas G. White “mentioned the capabilities of the Air Force for resupply of the Tibetan rebels as well as the possibility provided by the geography for the use of air power to deny access to Tibet from China”; then General Charles P. Cabell, Deputy Director of the CIA, was asked to inform the group next he says that he has not had time to think the whole problem through. With reference to the Dalai Lama’s request for supplies, a separate memorandum will be furnished.” (Acting Secretary of State memorandum for President Eisenhower, dated 30 April 1959, FRUS 1958-60, vol.19, no.376, [emphasis is mine], omline readable at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v19/d376 ). 78 “We have informed Embassy New Delhi we think the US should take no action with respect to Tibetan refugees which would diminish the effect the revolt appears to be having in India. We anticipate, however, that a future substantial influx might produce requests from the Indian Government or private charities for international assistance. We think any US aid should be provided indirectly to avoid giving the Indians the impression our interest is political rather than humanitarian. Consequently, we believe it should be granted in response to an Indian request.” (Intelligence briefing notes for 1 April 1959, prepared for President Eisen- hower, FRUS 1958-60, vol.19, no.369, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v19/d369 ). 79 “As background to current developments in Tibet, I am submitting for your information this summary of […] Tibet. […] In light of the recent upsurge of Tibetan resistance and the flight of the Dalai Lama toward India, which have resulted in a complete break between the legitimate Tibetan authorities and the Chinese Communist government, plans are currently being made, within existing policy authorizations, […].” Allen W. Dulles (DCI’s Memorandum on Tibet, submitted to President Eisenhower on 1 April 1959, FRUS 1958-60, vol.19, no.368, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v19/d368 ). 80 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.97-99. 81 “Mr. Dulles said that the latest messages about the situation in Tibet clearly indicated that the dissidents or the patriots had been severely beaten by the Chinese Communists. As of now, the patriots had been pressed into a relatively small area of Tibet. The messages had a rather pathetic quality. The patriots had no food and no ammunition and they were requesting our intercession with the Indian Government to permit their passage into India. Mr. Dulles said that of course we would do all that we could to help them but it was a difficult situation. The Chinese Communists had put on a very effective military showing. They were making use of veterans of the Korean War and they were also making very efficient use of aircraft. It looked as though the rebel forces in the Khamba area had been pretty well knocked to pieces. The same was probably true of the rebel forces in the Lhasa area.” (DCI’s Report on Tibet, NSC, meeting of 23 April 1959, Editorial note, FRUS 1958-60, vol.19, no.371, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v19/d371 - emphasis is mine) – “Turning to Tibet, Mr. Dulles said that the Chinese Communists had been making an all-out effort to mop up the rebels and seal off the southern border. As a result, organized Tibetan resistance had disintegrated. The rebels had initially made the mistake of fighting in large groups; from now on they would probably discover that the essence of guerrilla warfare consists of fighting in small bands. In Lhasa many Tibetans had been killed and the young men had been rounded up and apparently headed for concentration camps. According to Nehru, some thousands of Tibetan refugees had crossed over into India. The President said that General Gruenther was hoping that the Indian Red Cross, with some help from the American Red Cross, would be able to care for these refugees.” (DCI’s Report on Tibet, National Security Council, meeting of 30 April 1959, Editorial note, FRUS 1958-60, vol.19, no.371, [emphasis is mine], online readable at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v19/d375 ). 14

time, “what was being done in Tibet”.82 In a memorandum to be submitted to President Eisenhower on 7 May 59, DCI Allen Dulles underlined that, as to supplies for the Tibetan resistance requested by the Dalai Lama, “preparations are under way”, but that after recent defeats it was first to be checked, if and where active resistance forces still existed in Tibet.83 At the Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting of 8 May 59, “General Cabell provided an operational briefing,”84 and there were some discussions as to whether support for the Tibetan resistance should be done covertly or even openly, in order to blame communism. Then the President stopped discussions saying that the State Department “should take the lead in such matters.”85 At the end, on 20 May 1959, the 303 Committee of the Eisenhower administration authorized an expansion of Operation STBarnum86: A total of about 500 to 700 Tibetans87 were to be trained in the isolated old Army base of Camp Hale in central Colorado, the first group of whom, i.e. of this expanded program, arrived early in August 59. They had crossed the border from Tibet to India by foot and had been smuggled to Kurmitola Air Base, East Pakistan, where CAT planes had picked them up and flown to Takhli and then to Kadena, Okinawa.88 From there, they were flown to Petersen Field, Colorado, by USAF C-118s or C-124s, from where they were taken to Camp Hale in buses that were blacked out. Training at Camp Hale included weaponry, self-defense, demolition, communications, and jumps from a weather service C-47 and then, at Colorado Springs, even jumps from a C-130 coming from Sewart AFB, TN.89

82 “General White had asked that the item on Tibet be put on the agenda. His question was whether the U.S. was doing all it can. He mentioned the capabilities of the Air Force for resupply of the Tibetan rebels as well as the possibility provided by the geography for the use of air power to deny access to Tibet from China. There was then a general discussion of the problem of overflight of other countries and of the general Asiatic reaction to the Tibetan uprising. It was agreed that General Cabell would provide a briefing at the following meeting as to what was being done in Tibet and the general line of approach being taken by the U.S. Government with respect to the Buddhist area.” (Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Washington, 1 May 1959, FRUS 1958-60, vol.19, no.279, [emphasis is mine], online readable at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v19/d279 ) 83 “SUBJECT: Dalai Lama’s Request for Supplies for the Tibetan Resistance. - With reference to the Acting Secretary of State’s memorandum of 30 April 1959, […] I wish to advise that preparations are under way […]. These preparations were inaugurated following your approval of the memorandum shown you by Mr. Gordon Gray on 30 March 1959. […] However, the recent setback which befell the Tibetan resistance forces south of Lhasa following the flight of the Dalai Lama has resulted in a delay […] pending receipt of fuller information as to the continuing existence and location of active resistance forces. Every effort is being made to identify and establish communications with such forces.” (DCI’s Memorandum on Tibet, submitted to President Eisenhower on 7 May 1959, FRUS 1958-60, vol.19, no.378, online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958- 60v19/d378 – emphasis is mine). 84 Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, 8 May 1959, FRUS 1958-60, vol.19, no.379, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v19/d379 ). 85 DCI’s Report on Tibet, National Security Council, meeting of 4 June 1959, Editorial note, FRUS 1958-60, vol.19, no.380, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v19/d380 . 86 See Memorandum for the 303 Committee, Washington, 26 January 1968, FRUS 1964-68. vol.30, doc.342, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d342 , which lists “Significant Previous 303 Committee Approvals”, including “b. 20 May 1959—initial approval of covert support to the Dalai Lama”. It was the Dalai Lama who had asked to support the resistance forces in Tibet [emphasis is mine]. 87 McCarthy (Letter dated 19 February 93 sent to William Leary, in: UTD/Leary/B46F12) says 500, Leary (Secret mission to Tibet. The CIA’s most demanding, most successful airlift, in: Air & Space, December 1997/January 1998, pp.62-71, p.66) says 700. 88 Leary, Manuscript, p.304, in: UTD/Leary/B19F3. 89 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.106-15. 15

Already in July 59,90 the C-11891 used on the airdrops into Tibet had been definitively replaced by USAF C-130As belonging to the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron, which was part of the 483rd Troop Carrier Wing, Naha, and then part of the 315th Air Division at Tachikawa. But before introducing the C-130As, CIA-man Gar Thorsrud had to convince the USAF that the C-130s were the right aircraft for the mission.92 Because of political sensitivities between Pakistan and India, the staging area for the flights into Tibet was moved from Kurmitola near Dacca to Takhli (S-05) in Thailand at the same time, so that from the beginning of the expanded program in July 59, all C-130A missions were flown out of Takhli. Some of these flights went as far north as 150 miles north of Lhasa.93 Since that time, Kurmitola was used only as an emergency recovery location for the C-130As. But in spite of this move, the multiple flights made to drop zones in Tibet were not interrupted.94 At that time, Major Art Dietrich was mission commander on Okinawa. Jim McElroy, CIA loadmaster to the Tibetan program, states that “he did an outstanding job, especially since we had to travel to Takhli Base without the support of a unit like Det.2. The Thai Air Force billeted and fed us the best they could.”95

An unknown Air America C-130A in 1959-60, after the USAF tail markings had been removed prior to an overflight of Tibet – reportedly taken at Kadena, Okinawa, but probably at Takhli, Thailand (with kind permission from Ken Conboy)

90 Leary, Secret mission to Tibet, p.68, gives July 59; these dates fit with the last known C-118A mission which had taken place in June 59. Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.117/8, state that the first C-130 drop of agents into Tibet took place on 18 September 59. 91 When Major Aderholt arrived at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, the 313th Air Division’s Detachment at Kadena had 2 C-118s and 3 C-54s (Trest, Air Commando One, p.85). According to an interview with B.G. Aderholt given to Prof. Bill Leary at Fort Walton Beach, FL, on 28-30 August 1990, Detachment 2 had even 5 C-54s (written version of the interview in: UTD/Leary/B68F9). 92 Interview with CIA-man Thomas G. Fosmire conducted by Prof. William Leary at Florence, SC on 28 December 1992, written resume, in: UTD/Leary/B45F4. 93 Interview with M. D. Johnson conducted by Prof. William Leary on 4 April 1981, written summary in: UTD/Leary/B43F1. 94 Letter by Roger E. McCarthy to Jim Keck; details kindly forwarded to the author by Jim Keck with kind permission from Roger McCarthy; letter dated 12 August 2001 written to the author by Jim Keck. 95 Letter dated 12 July 1997 sent by Jim McElroy to William Leary; details kindly forwarded to the author by Jim Keck with kind permission from Jim McElroy. 16

In July 1959, some 20 C-130As belonging to the 483rd TCW were based at Naha,96 and as many different aircraft were used on the airlift,97 probably most of these 20 C-130As were used at one time or another. The USAF unit that ran the airlift was then upgraded to Detachment 2, 1045th Operational Evaluation & Training Group, reporting directly to CIA headquarters,98 as the command and control of the operation rested completely with and by the CIA in Washington. Drop zones were proposed via clandestine radio communication with the CIA in Washington by the Tibetan teams on the ground in Tibet for review and approval by the CIA. The overflight paths in and out of Tibet were also the responsibility of the CIA in Washington. The types and amounts of equipment to be dropped were decided in Washington and coordinated with the CIA’s logistical base on Okinawa. The CAT crews and jump masters were briefed and debriefed by CIA officers at the launch and recovery sites. Crew selection for the overflight missions, however, was made by Robert E. Rousselot, Air America’s Director of Flight Operations at Taipei.99 Other operational planning was done by Al Wueste, while E. C. Kirkpatrick’s job was to arrange cover for the flights and to determine the degree of hazard for the pay – the highest pay was $1,500 for pilots in the flights to Tibet.100 The C-130s carried double flight crews.101 CAT and Air America crew members who flew in the airlift to Tibet included Merrill D. (“Doc”) Johnson,102 A.L. Judkins,103 Jack Stiles,104 Eddie Sims,105 and William Welk106 as pilots, Maury Clough107 as engineer, Bob Aubrey,108 and Harry Hudson109 as radio operators, Jim Keck,110 Leon C. Cartwright,111 Cyril (“Pinky”) Pinkava,112 and Thomas G. Sailer,113 as navigators, Roland H. (“Andy”) Anderson,114 Fred Barnosky,115 Ray Beasley,116 William R. Demmons,117 Darrel (“Yogi”)

96 See the USAF’ Assignment Records preserved by the AFHRA at Maxwell AFB, AL; the aircraft are listed in the C-130 file of this database. 97 Fax dated 14 June 2000, kindly sent to the author by Brigadier General Aderholt. 98 Trest, Air Commando One, p. 83. The insignia of Det.2 / 1045th OE&TG are depicted in: Conboy / Morrison, Shadow war, p.77. 99 Letter by Roger E. McCarthy, the CIA Case Officer who trained the Tibetans at Saipan, to Jim Keck; information kindly forwarded to the author by Jim Keck with kind permission from Roger McCarthy; letter dated 12 August 2001, written to the author by Jim Keck. 100 Leary, Interview with E. C. Kirkpatrick, dated 24 August 1980, transcript, in: UTD/Leary/B15F3. 101 Leary, Manuscript, p.304, in: UTD/Leary/B19F3. 102 Letter dated 17 January 1992, sent by Miles L. Johnson to Prof. William Leary, in: UTD/Leary/B69F11. 103 Interview with A. L. Judkins, conducted by Prof. William Leary on 9 September 1985, written resume, in: UTD/Leary/B43F3. 104 Interview with Neese D. Hicks, conducted by Prof. William Leary at Ashland, OR, on 3 August 1987, written resume, in: UTD/Leary/B43F2. 105 Roger McCarthy, Letter to Prof. William Leary dated 19 February 93, in: UTD/Leary/B46F12. 106 Letter dated 17 January 1992, sent by Miles L. Johnson to Prof. William Leary, in: UTD/Leary/B69F11. 107 Letter dated 17 January 1992, sent by Miles L. Johnson to Prof. William Leary, in: UTD/Leary/B69F11. 108 Letter dated 17 January 1992, sent by Miles L. Johnson to Prof. William Leary, in: UTD/Leary/B69F11. 109 Interview with Neese D. Hicks, conducted by Prof. William Leary at Ashland, OR, on 3 August 1987, written resume, in: UTD/Leary/B43F2. 110 Letter dated 10 July 2001, written by Jim Keck to the author. 111 Interview with Leon C. Cartwright, conducted by Prof. William Leary on 5 October 1987, written resume, in: UTD/Leary/B43F2. 112 Interview with Neese D. Hicks, conducted by Prof. William Leary at Ashland, OR, on 3 August 1987, written resume, in: UTD/Leary/B43F2. 113 Interview with Thomas C. Sailer, conducted by Prof. William Leary at San Francisco on 8 September 1985, written resume, in: UTD/Leary/B43F5: Sailer flew missions to Tibet in November and December 59 as well as in February, March, and April 1960. 114 Letter dated 17 January 1992, sent by Miles L. Johnson to Prof. William Leary, in: UTD/Leary/B69F11. 115 Letter dated 31 March 1992, sent by Miles L. Johnson to Prof. William Leary, in: UTD/Leary/B69F11. 116 Letter dated 31 March 1992, sent by Miles L. Johnson to Prof. William Leary, in: UTD/Leary/B69F11. 117 Letter dated 31 March 1992, sent by Miles L. Johnson to Prof. William Leary, in: UTD/Leary/B69F11. 17

Eubanks,118 Miles L. Johnson,119 Thomas G. (“Shep”) Johnson,120 Art Jukkala,121 John (“Tex”) Lewis,122 Richard A. (“Pete”) Peterson,123 and Ray Shank124 as Parachute Dispatch Officers (PDO’s). Neese D. Hicks first volunteered as a radio operator, but after a few flights he went to Ashiya, checked out on C-130s, and then flew trips to Tibet as a captain.125 But during the height of operations in the early months of 1960, there were about 12-15 PDO’s involved in the operation. Most flights would carry 3 PDOs, some carried 2, and on one flight there were even 4 PDO’s.126 For the Air America crews, there was a 24 hours notice. Then they would go to Kadena, receive a briefing there before leaving for Takhli. “There was a system of go-no go messages from headquarters at specific intervals: 24 launch alert, 12 hours, 6 hours, 2 hours, 1 hour, launch. If all was well, the message simply would say AFFIRM. These messages had to arrive for the launch to continue. They came from the Air Branch in Washington.”127 Drops were made upon a ground signal, and the fixed rule was no loitering in the drop zone. At first there were some problems with the cargo doors, but they were soon solved.128 “By mid-1959, multiple air drops were made in each full moon phase to designated drop zones in Tibet.129 For example, there were times when air drops were made to a single drop zone by three C- 130s flying in tail. In all drops to resistance forces, information was passed to the teams on the ground as to how many bundles were to be dropped. This enabled the teams to have a sufficient number of horses and yaks in place to clear the drop zone expeditiously. In the course of the operation, the cargo bundles were rigged by McElroy in a manner enabling the reception teams to load already slung packs onto the backs of the pack animals, approximately 85 lbs. to a side.”130 When more than one C-130A was used, the lead aircraft of the mission carried a special bundle on the tailgate ramp. This bundle contained special items such as money, radios, instructions, commo plans, etc. for the Agency team on the ground. This bundle was dropped a couple of seconds before the load. An orange and white parachute was used for identification. And indeed, several months no less than 5 C-130As were used on two consecutive nights, three aircraft on the first night and two on the second one, weather permitting. The mission crews would land, debrief, eat, and try to sleep in the hot, humid day,

118 Letter dated 31 March 1992, sent by Miles L. Johnson to Prof. William Leary, in: UTD/Leary/B69F11. 119 Letter dated 17 January 1992, sent by Miles L. Johnson to Prof. William Leary, in: UTD/Leary/B69F11. Miles Johnson made 15-16 flights to Tibet during the December 59 – April 60 period. 120 Letter dated 31 March 1992, sent by Miles L. Johnson to Prof. William Leary, in: UTD/Leary/B69F11. Shep Johnson made 9 flights to Tibet (Telephone interview with Miles L. Johnson conducted by Prof. William Leary on 18 July 1991, written version, at: UTD/Leary/B43F3). 121 Letter dated 31 March 1992, sent by Miles L. Johnson to Prof. William Leary, in: UTD/Leary/B69F11. 122 Letter dated 31 March 1992, sent by Miles L. Johnson to Prof. William Leary, in: UTD/Leary/B69F11. 123 Letter dated 17 January 1992, sent by Miles L. Johnson to Prof. William Leary, in: UTD/Leary/B69F11. Peterson made 15-16 flights to Tibet (Telephone interview with Miles L. Johnson conducted by Prof. William Leary on 18 July 1991, written version, at: UTD/Leary/B43F3). 124 Letter dated 31 March 1992, sent by Miles L. Johnson to Prof. William Leary, in: UTD/Leary/B69F11. 125 Interview with Neese D. Hicks, conducted by Prof. William Leary at Ashland, OR, on 3 August 1987, written resume, in: UTD/Leary/B43F2. 126 Telephone interview with Miles L. Johnson conducted by Prof. William Leary on 18 July 1991, written version, at: UTD/Leary/B43F3. 127 Written resume, p. 3, of an interview with B.G. Aderholt conducted by Prof. Bill Leary at Fort Walton Beach, FL, on 28-30 August 1990 (Interview dated 28-30 August 1990, in: UTD/Leary/B68F9). 128 Thomas C. Sailer, interview made with William M. Leary at San Francisco on 8 September 1985; professor Leary’s notes, preserved at UTD/Leary/B43F5. 129 “Operations took place five days before and five days after the full moon. The attempt was made to get in 9 to 12 flights during this period” (Roger McCarthy, Letter to Prof. William Leary dated 19 February 93, formerly in: UTD/Leary/Ser.I, B8F14, now in: UTD/Leary/B46F12). 130 Letter by Roger E. McCarthy to Jim Keck; details kindly forwarded to the author by Jim Keck with kind permission from Roger McCarthy. 18

then fly another mission that night.131 When more than one C-130 was used, the interval between the planes would be about 15 minutes.132 The CIA even made special leather boots for the Air America crews to wear on these overflights.133 As to the Tibetans, after a vigorous training program, the first group of them was ready in September 59. They were flown back to the CIA base at Kadena, Okinawa, then on to Takhli in Thailand, from where they were infiltrated into the Nam Tso area of Tibet for sabotage operations on 18 September 59.134 The main objective of these Tibetans was to mine the two major roads between Tibet and China and to cut communication lines, in order to slow down the flow of Chinese men and material into Tibet. From the log book of “Doc” Johnson, we know some details: Between 10 and 15 April 59 he had 35 hours of conversion training at Ashiya, Japan, home base of the C-130As. On 16 April 59 he ferried an unknown USAF DC-6 from Atsugi Naval Air Station, home of the CIA Japan, to Kadena. On 18 April 59, he flew a C-130 from Kadena to Clark (3.4 hours), then remained at Clark, and took another or the same C-130 back from Clark to Kadena on 23 April 59. This makes believe that between 19 and 22 April 59, another Air America crew flew the C-130 into Tibet and was later released on the return flight from Clark by “Doc” Johnson.135 It can only be guessed what “Doc” Johnson did at Clark Air Base from 19 to 22 April 59, which is not exactly the ideal place for recreation – perhaps he was on a flight to China that he wasn’t allowed to log.

The training mission to Clark on 18 and 23 April 59 (Page from Doc Johnson’s log book kindly supplied by his son James on 18 February 2013)

“The C-130 airlift began in July 1959 with cargo drops”.136 To prepare these new flights, the CIA organized some U-2 reconnaissance missions over Tibet. “Operation MILL TOWN, as the reconnaissance missions over Tibet were known, consisted of two missions staged from Cubi Point Naval Air Station on 12 and 14 May 1959. The photography revealed that Communist China had built new roads with supply and defense points. Agency photo- interpreters also discovered two large new airfields at elevations above 13,000 feet.”137 Already on 24 April 1959, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended that the following areas

131 Letter dated 12 August 2001, written to the author by Jim Keck; and letter by Jim McElroy, dated 12 July 1997; details kindly forwarded to the author by Jim Keck with kind permission from Jim McElroy. Jim McElroy even says: “Several months we were able to fly 6 to 9 missions on consecutive nights”, that is 3 aircraft each time flown on two to three consecutive nights. 132 Letter dated 17 January 1992, sent by Miles L. Johnson to Prof. William Leary, in: UTD/Leary/B69F11. 133 In July 2002, former Air America navigator Jim Keck donated a pair of these boots to the Dalai Lama’s Tibet Museum in Dharamsala, India (correspondence with the Office of the Dalai Lama, kindly forwarded to the author by Jim Keck). 134 For details of this first infiltration using a C-130, see Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.115-18. 135 Page from Doc Johnson’s log book kindly supplied by his son James on 18 February 2013. 136 Leary, Secret mission to Tibet, p.68. 137 Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach. The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Recon- naissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974, Washington, DC (History Staff, CIA), 1992, p.216 (online at: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000190094.pdf ). 19

should also be covered: selected areas on Hainan Island, Kunming airfield, from Kunming along railroad to Chan-I airfield, Hsi-Chang airfield, Chungking, Cheng-Tu area, and Wu- Kung airfield.138 As to “Doc” Johnson, after another hour of C-130 training at Kadena on 17 July 59,139 he flew his first real C-130 mission into Tibet in September 59: On 1 September 59, he and Bill Welk took Air America C-46 B-136 from Taipei to Kadena. The same day, both of them flew an unknown USAF DC-4 from Kadena AFB to Ashiya AFB in Japan, home of the USAF’s 483rd Troop Carrier Wing. Apparently after some ground training, both pilots made some training flights out of Ashiya in an unknown C-130 on 3 and 4 September 59 and at the end brought a C-130 to Naha, Okinawa, logging a total of 10.3 flight hours. From 4 to 20 September 59, “Doc” Johnson’s log book only shows 68.7 hours of flying as pilot in command, including 50.1 hours of night flying as pilot in command, all done at Naha in a USAF C-130. The meaning seems to be clear: As a flight from Takhli to Tibet and back to Takhli took about 13 to 14 hours and a flight from Kadena to Takhli or the other way round an estimated 8 hours, these could have been 3 or 4 flights to Tibet flown out of Takhli in more or less consecutive nights with a little rest in between – unless “Doc” Johnson’s training flights in the mountainous area of Colorado described by Conboy / Morrison140 are also hidden in these 10.3 + 68.7 hours of C-130 flying. This seems to be the case, as an U-2 first had to take photos of the Nam Tso area north of Lhasa, where rumors had located an isolated band of rebels. Indeed, “later in the year [i.e. 1959], the Far East Division needed photographs and maps of another area of Tibet. To conceal the target of this new operation, which was codenamed SOUTH GATE, the Development Projects Division planned and flew a total of six [U-2] missions covering much of Southeast Asia – Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, [blank] – as well as the desired area in Tibet. Only four of the missions involved the area of operational interest. Five of the flights took place between 29 August and 9 September, and one additional flight (Operation QUICK KICK) followed on 4 November. All of these missions were ‘Fast Move’ operations in which necessary supplies and personnel flew to a remote staging area in a C- 130, where they rendezvoused with a U-2 that had been ferried in. The staging base in this case was Ta Khli, Thailand.”141

CIA U-2 (https://military.wikia.org/wiki/Lockheed_U-2)

138 JCS Memo of 24 April 59 for Mr. James Q. Reber, TALENT Control Officer, CIA, online readable at: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP61S00750A000500060006-3.pdf . 139 Page from Doc Johnson’s log book kindly supplied by his son James on 18 February 2013. 140 See Conboy/Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.114/5. In “Doc” Johnson’s log book, there is no trace of this training, allegedly done just prior to his first mission to Tibet. 141 Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach. The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Recon- naissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974, Washington, DC (History Staff, CIA), 1992, pp.216/7 (online at: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000190094.pdf ). 20

The real mission seems to have been the flight of 18 September 59, when the first group of Tibetan agents was dropped into the Nam Tso area of Tibet for sabotage operations.142 As to “Doc” Johnson, he was back to regular airline work on 21 September 59, that is as pilot in command of CAT’s DC-6B B-1006 on the scheduled flight from Naha to Taipei.143

Extract from “Doc” Johnson’s log book showing the September 1959 flights to Tibet (with kind permission from James Johnson) There were still more flights that “Doc” Johnson made to Tibet as pilot in command: On 4 December 59, he flew CAT DC-6B B-1006 to Naha, Okinawa, and on 24 December 59, we see him back again in the same aircraft on a scheduled flight from Taipei to Hong Kong. But between these dates, i.e. from 10 to 21 December 59, his log book notes 51.9 hours of “charter” flying, including 20.8 hours of night flying, in a C-130. These seem to be another 2 flights to Tibet flown out of Takhli in more or less consecutive nights with a little rest in between – rifles were dropped to rebels at Penbar –, or perhaps one successful delivery after an aborted first attempt.144

Extract from “Doc” Johnson’s log book showing the December 1959 flights to Tibet (with kind permission from James Johnson)

Especially in November/December 59, two problems appeared: “Less than half of the nine to 12 flights scheduled for each full-moon period managed to complete their missions. The main problem came from the APN-59 radar sets on the C-130s.”145 At the end, it was found out that the problem was not the radar itself, but an electrical problem located behind the radar installation. As the Air Force couldn’t fix it, Aderholt called CIA communicators, and they managed to solve the problem.146 The second problem was the mission’s heavy fuel requirement, which meant that only 26,000 pounds of men and supplies could be carried so that additional flights were needed.147 Radar operator Leon C. Cartwright recalls two flights that were memorable: “On one, Johnson and Judkins flew out of Takhli, turning left at Mt. Everest to the IP, then right to the DZ. The altitude was about 20,000 feet. Pinkava was onboard. He went back to deal with problems with the clamshell doors and nearly passed out. Judkins’ windshield cracked, causing him considerable apprehension. On another flight, with Stiles, they almost ran out of gas en route to Takhli. They lost one engine due to fuel starvation, then another as they neared the field, which was obscured by clouds. The decision was to make one pass and crash land if they

142 For details of this first infiltration using a C-130, see Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.115-18. 143 Pages of Doc Johnson’s log book kindly sent to the author on 14 September 2012 by James Johnson. 144 Conboy/Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.123, speak of only 1 C-130 flight made in December 59. 145 Leary, Secret mission to Tibet, p.68. 146 Leary, Secret mission to Tibet, p.68. 147 Leary, Secret mission to Tibet, p.68. 21

missed, or to maintain altitude and bail out. At a critical point, someone on the ground fired a flare up through the clouds, giving Stiles his position and enabling him to land.”148 When, in early 1960, USAF Major Harry “Heinie” Aderholt, who, later, was to become responsible for the construction of STOL sites in Laos, had taken over the program, many things changed. It was Aderholt who solved the problem of the limited payload. “Aderholt immediately ordered the C-130s stripped of excess weight. He managed to get the payload increased from 12,000 pounds to 28,000 pounds. This was later cut back to 18,000. One plane (Pappy Hayes) was late coming back. He called in 80 miles out that he was low on fuel. There was fog sitting on the runway at Takhli, as it often did. Hayes made a pass but could not find the runway. Aderholt (on hand-held radio) and Ropka went down to the end of the runway and shot off flares. This enabled Hayes to land. Word of the incident soon got back to Dave Fleming and the result was a ‘grand inquisition’. In the end, General Kirshaw reduced the payload to 18,000 pounds, where it stayed.”149 Generally speaking, as there were no landing strips capable of a C-130A in Tibet, the CIA was unable to retrieve the agents, once they had been parachuted, and sometimes, the extremely long flight caused fuel problems for the return flight, so that the aircraft had to land in East Pakistan. For such cases, Aderholt had always troops on standby at the airfield in East Pakistan. Although such a landing was declared as an emergency landing, the Indians, fearing trouble with China, constantly fussed about these landings. “Aderholt leaned over backwards to appease the crews. They wanted larger parachutes, so he arranged for 34-foot canopies on personnel chutes. Someone at headquarters purchased Hillay’s first set of commercial gear at Abacrombie & Fitch for the crews. There were lots of toys and gimmicks: silenced .38s, emergency rations, gold bars. However, there was no real SAR program.”150 There were more changes that Major Aderholt brought about: Apparently upon Aderholt’s request, “the Agency set up Detachment 2 as an all-detailee operation (formerly the detailees had been a cell inside the 322nd). Things were sort of ‘bumping along’ in Det.2 when Aderholt arrived in January 1960 ‘and turned our world upside down’. Ropka had been in the US when Aderholt arrived, picking up a second C-118 in Baltimore. (It had been used in Europe and was the airplane that had gone into Russia with CIA men and been forced down).”151 For Aderholt arranged for the entire unit at Kadena to be detailed to the CIA, not only two commanding officers, and this improved the atmosphere among the staff. One to three USAF C-130As – which were always different aircraft152 – were flown by USAF pilots from Naha Field, Okinawa, to Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, located some 20 miles apart, loaded with cargo (mainly arms and ammunition packaged into individual 80- to 85-pound loads)153 by

148 Interview with Leon C. Cartwright conducted by Prof. William Leary on 5 October 87, written resume, at: UTD/Leary/B43F2. 149 Interview conducted by Prof. William Leary with Lawrence Ropka at Ft Walton Beach, FL, on 29-30 August 1990, transcript preserved at UTD/Leary/B43F4. 150 Interview conducted by Prof. William Leary with Lawrence Ropka at Ft Walton Beach, FL, on 29-30 August 1990, transcript preserved at UTD/Leary/B43F4. 151 Interview conducted by Prof. William Leary with Lawrence Ropka at Ft Walton Beach, FL, on 29-30 August 1990, transcript preserved at UTD/Leary/B43F4. 152 Fax dated 14 June 2000, sent by Brigadier General Aderholt to the author. 153 Jim McElroy, CIA loadmaster in the Tibetan program who was in charge of the Agency parachute loft and storekeeper for the FE airborne equipment stored at Okinawa, recalls that “each load (24,000-27,000 pounds) consisted of 34 to 40 bundles weighing 675 to 750 pounds. The bundles were loaded equally in two sticks on side by side center guide conveyor systems. The conveyor system had a center guide rail channel to keep the bundles on track. The pallets on the bottom of each bundle had two inline wheels which fit into the guide channel. Each bundle generally contained 8 individual containers weighing 75 to 85 pounds. Cross webbing straps held the containers together and served as a harness for the three nylon 28 foot parachutes used on each bundle. When the webbing straps were removed the container could be handled by one man or loaded on an animal for transport” (Jim McElroy, letter dated 12 July 97, details kindly forwarded to the author by Jim Keck with kind permission from Jim McElroy). “The packages came from the CIA supply facility at Chinan on 22

personnel of the CIA’s main logistics base in East Asia, and then flown to Takhli by Air America crews who were accompanied by pilots from the squadron for monthly currency checks. At Takhli, where Detachment 2 had taken residence in 1960,154 the C-130As were “sanitized”, i.e. stripped of military markings to make them non-attributable. They were simply identified by codes like “Able flight” or “Baker flight”. When weather conditions at the drop zone allowed the mission, the Tibetans, normally 10-12 for each aircraft, would arrive shortly before departure in the twilight. Then the “quarantined” Air America crews, i.e. crews that had been taken from the normal schedules and given special clearances for clandestine (“black”) missions would fly the C-130As to Tibet and drop the Tibetans and their cargo. “The airplanes would depart in the late afternoon for the 13+ hour flight. They followed a certain route, laid out by [Larry] Ropka, and would send Q signals as they passed over designated checkpoints.”155 Long range missions with internal Benson tanks156 could even last 14 hours.157 On 4 February 1960, President Eisenhower approved the continuation of the program.158 “Flights by Detachment C U-2s over Tibet and western China continued during the first half of 1960 under Operation TOPPER. The first mission on 30 March was very successful. The second mission on 5 April [1960] took good photographs but encountered mechanical problems. At the start of the mission, the landing-gear doors failed to close completely, resulting in increased drag and higher fuel consumption. With no fuel gauge to warn the pilot of the critical fuel situation, the aircraft ran out of fuel far short of Ta Khli, forcing the pilot to make a crash landing in a rice paddy. The area was inaccessible to large vehicles, and the plane, article 349, had to be cut into pieces in order to remove it. With the help of local villagers, the retrieval team disassembled the aircraft for transport to the base, where the pieces were loaded onto a C-124 under cover of darkness. The crash and subsequent recovery of the U-2 did not attract the attention of the press; there was only one report in a local Thai newspaper, which simply referred to the crash of a jet plane. In appreciation for the assistance provided by the villagers, [blank] gave the headman funds to build a new school.”159

Okinawa and contained different mixtures of guns, ammo, radios, and other supplies” (Written resume, p. 3, of an interview with B.G. Aderholt conducted by Prof. Bill Leary at Fort Walton Beach, FL, on 28-30 August 1990 (in: UTD/Leary/B68F9). Jim Keck recalls the first C-130A flight to Tibet: “I would always go back to help out with pushing out the load. As we were not pressurized with the doors open, I would always hook up to a walk around oxygen bottle and clip it on to my flight suit. As the load went out, on that first C-130 flight, I was frightened by the shuddering and ‘bumpy’ vibration of the aircraft. After the mission we tried to figure what had caused this bumping. It was the fact that the pallets had wooden bases and during the flight from Okinawa all the way up to Tibet, the tiny rollers of the track had worn tiny grooves into the wood. As they raced out towards the open door, each groove sort of rattled as the small groove moved over to the next roller. It did vibrate the entire airplane.” 154 Trest, Air Commando One, p.89. 155 Written resume, p. 3, of an interview with B.G. Aderholt conducted by Prof. Bill Leary at Fort Walton Beach, FL, on 28-30 August 1990 (in: UTD/Leary/B68F9). 156 According to Neese D. Hicks, the C-130s sometimes had pylon tanks that carried 300 gallons each and a rubberized Benson tank in the back that held 2,000 gallons (Interview with Neese D. Hicks, conducted by Prof. William Leary at Ashland, OR, on 3 August 1987, written resume, in: UTD/Leary/B43F2). 157 Letter dated 17 January 1992 sent by Miles Johnson to Prof. William Leary, at: UTD/Leary/B69F11. 158 Discussion with the President on Tibet, 4 February 1960: “Mr. Dulles briefed the group on CIA operations in support of the Tibetan resistance. […] The DCI requested approval for the continuation of the program […] to the resistance elements so far identified and to those which are expected to be contacted in the future. […] The President gave his approval for the continuation of the program as outlined.” (Memorandum for the Record by the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gordon Gray), FRUS 1958-60, vol.19, no.400, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v19/d400 ). 159 Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach. The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Recon- naissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974, Washington, DC (History Staff, CIA), 1992, p.219 (online at: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000190094.pdf ). 23

From the log book of “Doc” Johnson, we know about some of these flights: Between 4 and 17 February 1960, “Doc” Johnson logged 55.4 hours of C-130 flying at Kadena, which probably means 2 flights to Tibet during more or less consecutive nights. On 19 February 60, a Northwest DC-7 took him from Naha to Taipei, where he had to make some scheduled flights during the following days. On 4 March 60, his airline service ended at Naha, where he had flown CAT’s DC-6B B-1006. Somehow, maybe by car, he got to Kadena, and from 6 to 20 March 60, he logged 64.7 flight hours at Kadena AFB in a USAF C-130, including 47.9 hours of night flying – which probably means again 3 flights to Tibet during more or less consecutive nights, that is with some rest between the flights. On 23 March 60, he piloted CAT’s Round-the-Island flight in C-46 B-856. “Doc” Johnson’s next known tour to Tibet was in April 60: On 5 April 60, an Overseas National DC-7 brought him from Taipei to Kadena. From 9 to 15 April 60, he logged 39.5 hours in a USAF C-130, including 22.5 hours of night flying as pilot in command, and on 17 April 60, he flew an Air America DC-6 from Kadena to Taipei, again as pilot in command. This time, it was apparently only one or two flights to Tibet. The following day, “Doc” Johnson piloted CAT’s Round-the-Island flight in C-46 B- 856.160 However, it was this April 1960 mission that was particularly problematic: Air America Captain A. L. “Judkins recalls one two-plane mission. He flew with Welk in one aircraft, with Doc Johnson and Jack Stiles in the other. They got lost after the navigator corrected for a non- existent jet stream. Neither aircraft made the drop. Judkins headed south and landed at the emergency field north of Dhacca. It was raining, there were no runway lights, and there was a 30-knot crosswind. A bolt of lightning lit the strip just before landing. The crew had a tough time trying to reapply USAF markings in the rain. Meanwhile, Doc Johnson had gone on to Takhli. The weather was bad, and he had to make several passes before landing with low fuel warning lights on.”161 The following day, both aircraft had to return to Tibet and to drop their cargo.162

Extracts from “Doc” Johnson’s log book showing the February 1960 and March 1960 flights to Tibet (with kind permission from James Johnson)

Extract from “Doc” Johnson’s log book showing the April 1960 flights to Tibet (with kind permission from James Johnson)

“About an hour out of the DZ (drop zone) area we would hook up all the static lines to the static line cables and tape the snaps secure so the exit vibration wouldn’t inadvertently unsnap

160 Pages of Doc Johnson’s log book kindly sent to the author on 14 September 2012 by James Johnson. 161 Interview with A. L. Judkins conducted by Prof. William Leary on 9 September 85, written resume, at: UTD/Leary/B43F3. 162 A very dramatic description of the April 60 flights is given by Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.129-130. 24

them. We would check and make sure no loose straps or chains were on the tracks or unsecured. If personnel were involved we would double and triple check their parachutes and equipment. About 15 minutes out we would take off all the chains and stow them out of the way, leaving only the heavy duty nylon shear webs to hold the load in place. About 5 minutes out a red light would go on and the plane would depressurize. At this time we would be hooked up to walk around oxygen bottles, each bottle would be good for about 10 minutes, depending on how heavy it was used. When the pilot turned on the green light and bell, he would nose the plane up and the PDO’s would cut the shear web with a sharp knife and out it would all go. Like a roaring freight train – then all quiet. When personnel and cargo were dropped the cargo would go first and then the men. This all happened within a few seconds. The majority of drops went off very smoothly, but occasionally the door would get jammed or the static lines would get fouled up and couldn’t get them in without a struggle.”163 When on 1 May 1960, CIA pilot Francis Gary Powers was shot down in a U-2 near Sverd- lovsk in the Soviet Union, all CIA planes were ordered not to violate international borders, and at that time, some 14,000 Tibetans dependent on air support for food, arms and equipment, were left to fend for themselves. Since 18 September 59 (1 C-130A), there had been several C-130A drops – one in the second week of November 59 to Penbar, one in mid- December 59 to the same destination, 2 C-130As in January 60, one in February 60, 2 C- 130As in mid-March 60, and 2 C-130As in mid-April 60, both of which encountered bad weather, which nearly resulted in accidents. In order to deliver as much equipment as possible before the weather would prove prohibitive, where after deliveries would be possible only in autumn, “three C-130A flights were launched on two consecutive nights at the end of the April lunar circle.”164 An emergency delivery had been scheduled for 1 May 60, but was cancelled because of the U-2, which had been shot down.165 So many of the Tibetan guerrillas were rounded up and killed, while supplies destined for them were held up in Okinawa, Taiwan and Thailand. Furthermore, all the airborne teams operating inside Tibet during the first quarter of 1960 had been killed by May 1960 so that sending more teams was not considered to be a good idea.166 Between November 1959 and May 1960, some 35 to 40 missions had delivered almost 400 tons of cargo to resistance fighters of Tibet.167 In May and June 1960, some Air America crew members like Thomas Sailer were sent to the United States to do low level training and radar avoidance with C-130s, and this program was run by Gar Thorsrud, but that training did not lead to any operation.168 It was probably in this situation that Air America’s Managing Director George A. Doole, who felt unhappy with the C-130A, said that he wanted to use DC-7s, which were available from Southern Air Transport. So, Air America pilots William Welk and Doc Johnson ran a profile mission with the DC-7, but the problem was unreliable engines.169

163 Letter dated 17 January 1992, sent by Miles L. Johnson to Prof. William Leary, in: UTD/Leary/B69F11. 164 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.132. 165 Details of these flights in: Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.117-34. 166 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.137. 167 Leary, Secret mission to Tibet, pp.66-71; Trest, Air Commando One, pp.87/8 + 91-98. Jim Keck questions the number of 35 to 40 missions given by Leary: “There never were that many unless they were of some other type of missions flown. I was on each monthly operation and it couldn’t have been that many using the C-130s” (Letter dated 12 August 2001 written to the author). Leary, Manuscript, p.304 (in: UTD/Leary/B19F3) speaks of 27 missions flown in 1960, of which 19 were considered successful, and of an average load of 19,000 pounds per flight. 168 Thomas C. Sailer, interview made with William M. Leary at San Francisco on 8 September 1985; professor Leary’s notes, preserved at UTD/Leary/B43F5. 169 Interview with CIA-man Thomas G. Fosmire conducted by Prof. William Leary at Florence, SC on 28 December 1992, written resume, in: UTD/Leary/B45F4. 25

On 26 and 27 December 1960, “Doc” Johnson flew Riddle Airlines’ DC-7C N301G on training missions out of Miami – possibly the test flight requested by George Doole170 (Page from “Doc” Johnson’s log book kindly supplied by his son James on 18 February 2013)

“Doc” Johnson’s training flights in the USA, between 9 and 17 January 1961 (Page from “Doc” Johnson’s log book kindly supplied by his son James on 18 February 2013)

Other Air America pilots did some training at Naha, Okinawa: On 30 November and on 1 December 60, “Doc” Johnson did a total 8.2 hours of C-130 training at Naha. As the CIA apparently wanted to use more advanced versions of the C-130, “Doc” Johnson did a total of 10.3 hours of conversion training in a C-130B at Atlanta on 9 and 10 January 61. As it seems, there was a great uncertainty about what type of aircraft was to resume the Tibetan operations in 1961, for “Doc” Johnson continued his flight training at Miami, this time using DC-7C N8215H on 13 January 61, and then travelled west, where he flew a Lockheed L-1649 Starliner / Constellation on 17 January 1961 – probably the prototype of that aircraft, N60968, which had been sold to the CIA in November 1960 to support the CIA’s A-12 program by flying shuttle services between Burbank and Area 51.171 But apparently, all of these training programs were dropped, as the next time “Doc” Johnson’s log book shows him doing some training (3 hours) was on 19 March 61, when he flew C-130 “70467” out of Naha, and this was a C-130A.172 On 14 February 1961, the “Special Group” of the new Kennedy administration “endorsed continuation of the covert program” of Tibetan operations.173 The airdrops were resumed on 31 March 1961, with known missions on 31 March 61 (1 C-130A), 2 April 61 to Mustang in Nepal (2 C-130As), and mid-December 61 to Mustang (2 C-130As),174 but the airdrop missions probably were to continue to about mid-1962.175 But due to the lack of success in Tibet, a new strategy was necessary. “By 1960, it was clear that attempts to nurture the resistance in eastern Tibet were a disaster, so instead it was decided to create an army of several thousand men who would make raids into western Tibet from Nepal. The place chosen

170 “Doc” Johnson flew N8215H (on 13 January 61 for 11.2 hours) on training flights out of Miami (Pages from “Doc” Johnson’s log book kindly supplied by his son James on 19 February 2013). 171 See my file Air America: Lockheed L-1049H Super Constellation within the Aircraft of Air America (at https://www.utdallas.edu/library/specialcollections/hac/cataam/Leeker/aircraft/const.pdf ). 172 Pages from Doc Johnson’s log book kindly supplied by his son James on 18 February 2013. 173 Memorandum for the 303 Committee, Washington, 26 January 1968, FRUS 1964-68. vol.30, doc.342, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d342 . Apparently, this was the old 5412 Commit- tee created in 1955 that was to issue approval for all major CIA covert operations. It consisted of representatives designated by the President, Department of State and Pentagon. Their decisions were forwarded to the President for final approval. Under President Kennedy, it was called the Special Group, and in June 1964, it was renamed the 303 Committee (Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.279, note 17). 174 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp. 140/1, 158-64. 175 Fax dated 29 May 2000, kindly sent to the author by Brigadier General Aderholt. 26

as a base for this army was the remote Mustang Valley, a small sub-kingdom populated by people who were ethnically Tibetan and separated from the rest of the world by the 27,000-ft mountains of Annapurna and Dhauligiri. Strategically it was ideal, since it reached to within a few hours’ march of Tibet’s Sinkiang-Lhasa highway.”176 At this time, the C-130s “were carrying two navigators, one for the outward portion and one for the return. Radar navigation was used, coming and going. The navigator compared the map and radar details. He also carefully monitored the fuel burn.”177 “Doc” Johnson’s log book shows him again doing C- 130 “training” out of “Naha” from 31 March to 2 April 60, but 11.3 hours of training on each of these days makes believe that in reality, he flew 2 missions to Tibet/Nepal out of Takhli in Thailand. For on 29 March 61, he took Air America C-46 B-154 on a 0.8 hour flight from Bangkok to “T” – apparently standing for Takhli. So the 11.3 hours of flying were just the round trip from Takhli to Tibet/Nepal and back to Takhli on both days. On 3 April 61, he did not need more than another 0.8 hours of flying from Takhli to Bangkok, this time in DC-6 “820”, that is in the USAF’s special mission DC-6/C-118A 51-3820. And on 4 April 61, he continued normal flying out of Bangkok for Air America. The mission of 31 March 61 was a last attempt to follow the old pattern, as the head of the jumpers was Yeshi Wangyal (“Tim”), whose hometown of Markham was known to be a center of anti-Chinese resistance. So the mission of 31 March 61 was to drop “Tim” plus 6 other Tibetans close to Markham, but overshot the landing zone by more than 100 kilometers. On their way to Markham, the jumpers met a group of former guerrillas who preferred to flee to India. At the end, most of the jumpers died, when attacked by Chinese soldiers; “Tim” was knocked down and sent to 17 years of Chinese prison.178

Flights to Tibet/Nepal in March and April 1961 (Page from “Doc” Johnson’s log book kindly supplied by his son James on 18 February 2013)

The idea to choose the quasi-autonomous kingdom of Mustang, located on the northern border of Nepal, as the new operating base for Tibetan resistance fighters came from NVDA chief Gompo Tashi and from Lhamo Tsering, the Darjeeling resident assistant of the Dalai Lama’s brother Gyalo Thondrup. In March 1960, Gompo Tashi received the US approval to begin choosing candidates to lead the paramilitary force, and the man elected was the 43 year- old Baba Yeshi, a former monk from the province of Kham. Then, 27 more men, mostly Khampas, were selected to serve as US-trained officers for the guerrilla force, and all 27 men were flown to Camp Hale in Colorado.179 In the meantime, Baba Yeshi and some followers travelled from Kalimpong to Kathmandu and on to Mustang, mostly walking, as Royal Nepal

176 Chris Mullin, “Tibetan conspiracy”, in: The Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 September 1975, pp.30-34, article preserved at: UTD/CIA/B57F1. 177 Interview with Leon C. Cartwright, conducted by Prof. William Leary on 5 October 1987, written resume, in: UTD/Leary/B43F2. 178 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.138-44. 179 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.145-51. 27

Airlines did not trust Tibetans who wanted to fly near Mustang, where a Chinese patrol had already penetrated in June 1960, looking for Khampa guerrillas. After Kathmandu’s CIA station had given up its resistance against the transfer of Khampas to Mustang, 3 radio stations were finally given to the Tibetans. On 1 August 1960, Indian newspapers reported that Tibetans were leaving the refugee camps in Sikkim, and many more followed during the following months. In November 60, Baba Yeshi dispatched them to Yara valley, while he himself settled with some others at Tangya – “with no weapons, a handful of tents, and little food.”180 The situation during that period of time was especially hard, but the CIA did not have permission to make a supply drop, and even inside the CIA, there was opposition against supporting the Tibetans. But then, Takhli signaled the arrival of 2 C-130As for 2 April 61, i.e. 29,000 pounds of arms and ammunition for 400 men – rifles, carbines plus 40 light machine guns. So, 800 of Baba Yeshi’s men shifted 15 kilometers northeast to the border and then another 10 kilometers deeper into Tibet – 600 were to be used as porters and 200 as guards. Together with the arms, 7 Camp Hale-trained agents were dropped, including the 40-year-old Khampa Lobsang Jamba (“Sally”) who was to act as field commander inside Tibet.181 Although the mission was a success and although India did not protest against overflying its territory, relations between the US and Pakistan went down, and Pakistan closed its border for the Tibet project. Upon special request by President Kennedy, Pakistan’s President Ayub Khan “agreed to let ten more Tibetans pass through his territory. Wasting little time, the CIA had the Tibetans through East Pakistan and into Mustang by August”182 – probably walking from Kurmitola airstrip to Mustang. At Mustang, Baba Yeshi did not accept his new field commander and so inspired 2 sorties: In September 61, 7 guerrillas ambushed and killed a Chinese patrol on the south bank of the Brahmaputra, and on 25 October 61, they ambushed a lone Chinese military jeep arriving on the trans-Tibet road running from Lhasa to Xinjiang. One of the Chinese killed apparently was a military leader whose large leather case contained some 1,600 documents – some of them classified – about the situation of the Chinese troops in Tibet and other topics. This was a tangible proof of the operation’s benefits that could not be talked down by the criticism expressed by John Galbraith,183 US ambassador to India, and other critics of the Tibet operation. And so, approval was given for another pair of C-130 drops to be made in December 1961.

180 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.153. 181 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.153-59. 182 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.160. 183 “[…] The issue, which is one on which my ideas are conclusively formed, involves the continuation of a series of adventures launched under the past Administration […]. It keeps going an activity started by the last Administration but about which that Administration had manifested sufficient uneasiness to halt. […] The history of the operation extends back over several years. At the time of the ChiCom takeover in Tibet, refugees came out which included quite a few able-bodied men. A group of these were taken to a special establishment […] where they were trained in guerrilla tactics. […] The stated purpose was to prevent the consolidation of the hold of the Chinese on Tibet, draw off Chinese resources into the insurrection there and keep in the public eye the image of Chinese aggression in the area. At the time of the U-2 attempt in the summer of 1960 President Eisenhower became aware or conscious of the operation […]. The number east of Lhasa was built up to the neighborhood of about 1000. Pressure to supply them developed. I became aware of plans […] last spring shortly before coming to India. By that time the political and economic return could only be defended in the most modest terms. […] Meanwhile, training continued. The […] groups have come under the leadership of the people trained […] and they are regarded as being much more competent than those eliminated west of Lhasa. Forays into Tibet have occurred. And pressure to supply them has built up. […] It was once thought that the operations would keep the Chinese from consolidating their hold on Tibet. Of this there is no chance. The operations cover a few square miles of an incredibly vast area. […] The truth is that the operation continues because it got started. […] This argument holds in effect that we must inherit and carry out faithfully the mistakes of the previous Administration. (Rather more faithfully than Eisenhower in fact because he canceled the support operations after the U-2.) […] John (US Ambassador to India, John Galbraith to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball), New Delhi, 30 November 1961, in: FRUS 1961-63. vol.22, doc.79, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v22/d79 – emphasis is mine). 28

From “Doc” Johnson’s log book we have details of a mission to Tibet or Mustang that seems to have involved 3 C-130As in mid-December 1961. On 7 December, Johnson ended his service with Air America at Bangkok, then was apparently deadheaded to Naha, Okinawa, and the next entry in his log book shows him training at Naha on 14 December flying in C- 130 “76” for 4.3 hours and on 15 December flying in C-130 “74” for 4.0 hours. On 16 December, he flew C-130 “74” from Kadena, Okinawa to “Romeo” (i.e. Takhli in Thailand) in 7.3 hours, on 19 December 61, Johnson flew C-130 “77” from “Romeo” to “Romeo” in an 11.3 hour flight – evidently the mission to Mustang and back. On 20 December 61, he flew C- 130 “76” back from “Romeo” (Takhli) to Kadena, Okinawa in 6.5 hours, and on 26 December, we find him flying CAT’s Round the Island service out of Taipei. This is the only

Flights to Tibet/Nepal in December 1961 (Page from “Doc” Johnson’s log book kindly supplied by his son James on 10 August 2013) time that his log book notes the serials of the C-130As involved, apparently standing for 57- 474, 57-476, and 57-477.184 So, all three C-130As flew from Kadena to Takhli, but it is not known if all 3 of them continued to Mustang. The cargo dropped, taken over by the 400-man reception party and their 60 mules and horses, contained 600 rifles, eight 60mm mortars, eight 75mm recoilless rifles, and some light machine guns, all needed by the fast expanding Mustang force that counted 16 light companies commanded by Hale graduates. At Camp Hale, the situation was more difficult: A group of Tibetans that was to be flown back to Asia was surprised at Peterson Field on 6 December 61, but press reports could be avoided. As transit thru Pakistan was still impossible, after some weeks of waiting on Okinawa the group was sent to Saipan at the end.185 By December 1961, 57 missions had been successfully flown, in which more than 50 agents and more than 500,000 pounds of cargo had been dropped.186 The C-130As used on that second Tibetan C-130 airlift still belonged to the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron,187 and the 20 or so C-130As of the 21st TCS based at Naha during that period were mostly the same that had operated the Tibetan airlift in 1959/60.188 For the air crews, two things changed: “First, they took away our 22 cal pistols that were equipped with silencers and we were given 45 cal pistols. These were very ‘ratty’ being put together with different part numbers (for security reasons). The other item was that we were told to forget any of the ‘cover stories’ we had been told and just go ahead and tell them everything: ‘They’ll get it anyway!’ Also from that night on, permission to make an overflight had to have the direct OK from the lips of the president.”189 At the end, the route to Tibet was changed: “Initially, they flew into Tibet through the back door: over Kunming and western China. Late in 1961, however, the Chinese shifted their air defense system 1000 miles to the west and flights were suspended for at least one moon phase. The route then shifted to fly over Burma,

184 See my C-130 file within The Aircraft of Air America. 185 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.164-66. 186 Leary, Manuscript, p.305, in: UTD/Leary/B19F3. 187 Trest, Air Commando One, pp. 87, 92/3. 188 See the C-130 file of this database. 189 Letter dated 12 August 2001, kindly written to the author by Jim Keck. 29

but the Burmese began to complain. About the time Khruschev pounded his shoe on the table at the UN, India gave permission to fly over their territory.”190 In late 1961,191 a small detachment called E-Flight was established within the 21st TCS at Naha, Okinawa, and this small flight of C-130As at Naha was dedicated to support the Tibetan airlift,192 later also becoming responsible for clandestine cargo flights into Laos. The four or five E-Flight ships were not camouflaged, because camouflage might have implied a combat role. The E-Flight ships were identical in internal configuration to the standard A- models except that skate-wheel rollers were installed on the cargo-compartment floor over which cheap wood pallets could be moved. The smaller pallets made handling easier at locations without forklifts and eliminated the need to recover pallets.193 Detachment 1, 315th Air Division had responsibility for the C-130A squadrons at Naha and control of all Combat Cargo Airlift transiting the Ryukyus. The Maintenance and Material support at Naha was the responsibility of the host 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing. On 1 January 1962, Detachment 2 of the 315th Air Division was organized at Kadena, Okinawa, and assigned a special mission.194 Changes inside the CIA shifted the Tibetan project from the Far East Division to the Near East Division, which favored support from India rather than from Pakistan. In June 1962, Mustang’s head Baba Yeshi told CIA representatives that he “demanded a long list of supplies before his men would shift action inside Tibet.” With no promises received from the US side, the guerrillas poured their energies into improving their tent camps.195 In the summer of 1962, Col. Alpheus W. Blizzard replaced Aderholt as commander of Detachment 2. “Blizzard recalls that several flights to Tibet were made after his arrival at Det.2, with the last one coming in 1965.”196 But most of these were probably flights to “Oak Tree” in India, as Robert E. Rousselot, Air America’s Director of Flight Operations at Taipei, notes that the Tibetan operation lasted “approximately three years.”197 On 10 November 1962, Director of Central Intelligence John McCone complained to Secretary of State Dean Rusk that “we were not operating on a policy line but were acting from day to day in a manner considered best by an individual of the State Department. […] I therefore stated that we will make no move whatsoever until there is a policy determination on this matter.”198 Nevertheless, after the

190 Written resume, p.4, of an interview with B.G. Aderholt conducted by Prof. Bill Leary at Fort Walton Beach, FL, on 28-30 August 1990 (Interview dated 28-30 August 1990, in: UTD/Leary/B68F9). 191 The official history of the 21st TCS, contained in microfilm no. K0716 preserved at the AFHRA at Maxwell AFB, notes a change in the maintenance system in the first six months of 1961: “The section was re-organized from a two flight system, and further divided into four flights. Also included in the reorganization was a night flight under TSGT Stamper.” And there was another change in October 1961: “In October 1961, the section reverted to a basic two-flight system. MSgt Ottmann assumed duties of “A” Flight Chief, and MSgt Napoliello assumed duties as “B” Flight Chief. The Special Projects function, formerly a “D” flight activity, was absorbed by “B” Flight during this change.” 192 Trest, Air Commando One, p.87; fax dated 29 May 2000, kindly sent to the author by Brigadier General Aderholt. Naha airfield is some 20 miles away from Kadena Air Force Base and is equally used for military and civilian flights. 193 Bowers, The USAF in South-East Asia, p.449. 194 Official history of the 374th TCW, contained in microfilm N0497 preserved at Maxwell AFB, p.5. 195 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.166-68. 196 Written resume of an interview with Alpheus W. Blizzard conducted by Prof. Bill Leary at Georgetown, SC, on 27 February 1993 (in: UTD/Leary/B68F10). 197 Interview with Robert E. Rousselot, conducted by Prof. William Leary on 10 August 1987, written resume, in: UTD/Leary/B43F4. 198 “I reviewed with the Secretary the plan CIA had developed […] in an effort to free Tibet of the ChiCom occupation. I said this objective was a stated policy of the United States adopted about 1958 and supported by CIA. I had gathered from discussions at the Special Group some doubt as to whether this policy remained valid […] I felt that here again we were not operating on a policy line but were acting from day to day in a manner considered best by an individual of the State Department. […] I therefore stated that we will make no move whatsoever until there is a policy determination on this matter.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A DCI Memos for the Record) […] CIA intends to initiate a program of active contingency 30

discussion of 19 November 62 with President Kennedy, it had become clear to US policy makers that a new partner had to be introduced to the Tibet operation: India.

C-130A 56-473 of the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron, dropping paratroopers, 1 January 1959 (US Government photo, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/21st_Airlift_Squadron )

planning […]. No active operations will be undertaken until such plans have been worked out.” (Ibid.) (DCI John McCone and Secretary of State Dean Rusk discuss about Tibet on 10 November 1962, Editorial note, FRUS 1961-63. vol.22, doc.155, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v22/d155 ). 31

US-Indian Cooperation: the program Since 1962, the Tibetan program was slowly reorganized as to include the cooperation of India. Already since the early sixties, US President Kennedy followed the idea that evolutionary economic development of Third World countries like India could ensure their noncommunist political stability, and so, India became the world’s largest recipient of US economic aid at that time, i.e. about 650 millions of Dollars per year between 1960 and 1965.199 When China attacked the North Eastern Frontier Administration area of India on 20 October 62, an air bridge was established between 2 and 11 November 62, bringing small arms from London, Frankfurt and Adana to Calcutta, to be used by the Indian Himalayan infantry. But then, on 21 November 62, maybe frightened by the idea of a major US intervention, China declared a unilateral cease-fire. Nevertheless, between 1963 and 1967, the tensions between India and China continued to be alive, as China constantly threatened the Indian Himalaya border, forcing the country to spend more and more money for weapons.200 US President Kennedy also offered India to construct a system of radar stations along the Indian northern border, which could survey any Chinese movements. It was this Chinese attack on India’s North Eastern Frontier Administration (NEFA) area that really brought India and the US together. On 29 October 62, President Nehru requested US military assistance, and on 19 November, President Kennedy and his “Special Group” decided to send a high-powered delegation to New Delhi. Lead by Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Averell Harriman, the delegation arrived on 22 November. As a covert aside to Harriman’s talks, CIA men Des FitzGerald (head of the Far East Division) and Ken Knaus (head of the Tibet Task force) discussed with Bhola Nath Mullik (head of the Indian Intelligence Bureau, which had already contacted Gyalo Thondup at Darjeeling) about schemes to be used against the Chinese, especially about the Tibetan guerrillas and their intelligence collection value. “By the end of the Harriman mission, the CIA and Intelligence Bureau had arrived at a rough division of labor. The Indians, with CIA support from the Near East Division, would work together in developing [Brigadier Sujan Singh] Uban’s 5,000- strong tactical guerrilla force. The CIA’s Far East Division, meantime, would unilaterally create a strategic long-range resistance movement inside Tibet. The Mustang contingent would also remain under the CIA’s unilateral control.”201 As a sign of good faith, in November 62 a Southern Air Transport DC-6 piloted by Neese Hicks made three shuttles between Takhli in Thailand and Charbatia airfield in eastern India, bringing in an assortment of military aid for building up a Tibetan resistance force.202 Back at Washington, there was some resistance against the joint US-Indian project, but at the end, on 13 December 62, President Kennedy’s “Special Group” – predecessor of the 303 Committee and responsible for covert action – “approved training of Tibetan guerrilla force”,203 which also meant training assistance to Uban’s force of Tibetan guerrillas to be built up in India. But things went slowly: It was not until April 1960 that the Dalai Lama settled at Dharamsala and began creating a government in exile. In October 1962, his brother Gyalo Thondup came looking for 5,000 Tibetan volunteers to fill Brigadier Uban’s guerrilla force, and in November 62, Uban and his team settled at Chakrata, former home of a training center for Gurkha regiments, to wait for the rest of his volunteers. In January 63, CIA man Jim McElroy started preliminary training of some Tibetans from Chakrata at the Paratroopers Training School at Agra, southeast of New Delhi, but was replaced by Thomas (“T.J.”) Thompson a couple of months later as one of 8 CIA advisors sent to India. But as the Tibetan

199 Paterson / Clifford, America Ascendant. U.S. foreign relations since 1939, pp.155/6; Wirsing, Indien, p.289. 200 Wirsing, Indien, pp.85-93. 201 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.170-74, quotation p.174). 202 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp. 174 and 284. 203 See Memorandum for the 303 Committee, Washington, 26 January 1968, FRUS 1964-68. vol.30, doc.342, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d342 . 32

guerrillas – dubbed “Establishment 22” – had to remain a secret also from most of the Indian military and as Agra was also open to the Indian army’s airborne brigade, the Tibetans were not only housed in a distant corner of the airfield, but were also disguised as members of a fictitious “12th Gorkha Rifles” regiment. On 11 May 1963, 47 year-old Brigadier Uban was the first out the door jumping from an Indian Air Force C-119, followed by CIA advisor Ken Seifarth and then by the members of the first Tibetan contingent. On 14 November 63, Chakrata was even visited by President Nehru who encouraged the Tibetans.204 While operations at Chakrata and Agra were supported by the CIA’s Near East Division as the one responsible for work in India, the Far East Division, which had originally set up the Agency’s Tibet program, started a new facet of its own program that was apparently also covered by the 13 December 1962 decision of President Kennedy’s “Special Group”.205 Whereas operations at Chakrata and Agra were essentially Indian projects supported by the CIA, the new program was essentially an American one supported by India. It called for some 125 Tibetans to be trained at Camp Hale. “Agent training would focus on producing self- sufficient three-man radio teams that could infiltrate Tibet, find support, and build a local underground that could feed and shelter them for extended periods without having to rely on lines of supply from India.”206 By February 1963, a total of 135 Tibetans had arrived at Camp Hale, this time flown in from New Delhi. When the Hale training concluded in June 1963, the CIA asked to have them dropped inside Tibet from ARC planes. But as India did not accept this, negotiations went on. So training at Camp Hale was extended, and the CIA established Air Ventures Inc. inside Nepal in the late summer of 1963; the idea was that this new outfit could do the airlift with 2 Bell 47Gs and a Helio Twin Courier.207 But then, in September 1963, the US and India found a way to cooperate, so that Air Ventures did not have to make covert supply drops.208 A joint operations center was opened at New Delhi “that would direct the dispatch of agents into Tibet and monitor their activities. The revised plan scrapped parachute insertions in favor of overland infiltrations and called for about twenty singleton resident agents in Tibet” plus some road-watch teams and some border watch communications teams, whose messages would be received at a new communications center to be built at Charbatia.209 As to transportation, US aircraft would fly the supplies to India, and Indian aircraft would fly them close to the Tibetan border. The US aircraft to do the job were the DC-6s210 and later the Boeing 727s211 of Southern Air Transport. Aircraft of the Aviation Research Centre would bring agents close to the Indo- Chinese border and supplies to Chakrata, Agra, and Joelikote.212 Back in the US, already on 19 September 63, CIA’s William Colby signaled to the President’s “Special Group” a change of strategy in the Tibetan program, which would no longer support “isolated Tibetan resistance groups within Tibet”, but would “restrict targets to

204 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.176-87. 205 See Memorandum for the 303 Committee, Washington, 26 January 1968, FRUS 1964-68. vol.30, doc.342, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d342 . 206 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.192/3. 207 See my file Cooperation with other airlines, p.31, within my History of Air America, online readable at https://www.utdallas.edu/library/specialcollections/hac/cataam/Leeker/history/Cooperation.pdf. 208 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.196/7. 209 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.192-95; emphasis is mine. 210 As it seems, initially, Air America C-130s were also used for some time (Leary, Manuscript, ch. VI, p. 522, in: UTD/Leary/B19F4). 211 Indeed, the decision to buy Boeing 727s was based on 2 factors, i.e. the need for faster planes to support overflights over Tibet (STBarnum) and the desire by MATS to convert from DC-6s to jets in Southern AT’s inter-island contract with MATS. The purchase agreement was signed on 2 August 65 (Leary, Manuscript, ch. VI, pp. 619+621, in: UTD/Leary/B19F5). 212 Joelikote is located in the Indian state of Uttarakhand, that is in the mountains some 300 kms northeast of New Delhi and west of the border to Nepal. 33

those of real significance, and would provide sufficient agent forces”.213 After President Kennedy’s death, the new “Special Group” approved the continuation of CIA controlled Tibetan Operations on 13 December 1963, and on 9 January 1964, a detailed Memorandum was presented to the “Special Group”. It explained the difference between the CIA’s old strategy of supporting isolated Tibetan resistance groups, whose remains had fled to Mustang at the end, and the new “broadly based political program with the exiled Tibetans”. This new program included training in political, propaganda and paramilitary techniques at Camp Hale, Colorado, support to the Dalai Lama and his entourage, support to the Mustang based Tibetan guerrillas, “the reassignment of a part of the unarmed guerrillas to India for further training”,214 “the establishment of approximately 20 singleton resident agents in Tibet” who were to inform about Chinese build-ups,215 a new communications center to be built at Charbatia Air Base,216 and a group of some 20 selected Tibetan junior officers who were to get linguistic and administrative abilities at Cornell University – a comprehensive program that was to total some $ 1,735,000 for Fiscal Year 1964. This Memorandum was approved on 20 February 1964.217

213 “At a meeting of the Special Group on September 19, 1963, William Colby of the Central Intelligence Agency referred to a detailed review of Agency operations in several areas including China and Tibet. According to a memorandum of the meeting by Thomas A. Parrott, Colby stated that the review had shown those activities were ‘not especially productive.’” The memorandum continues: “Therefore, the responsible operators have come to the conclusion that probably a change of approach is indicated. This would restrict targets to those of real significance, and would provide sufficient agent forces to accomplish the objective. Sizeable losses would have to be anticipated.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, Box 1, 303 Committee Meetings; that is: William Colby in Special Group meeting, 19 September 1963, Editorial note, FRUS 1961-63. vol.22, doc.189, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v22/d189 – emphasis is mine). 214 The 800 men living at Mustang who had yet been armed were to be sent to India. Due to Baba Yeshi’s resistance, this plan could not be carried out. 215 Instead of singletons, small teams of up to 10 agents were sent to Tibet from April 64 onwards. 216 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.195. 217 Memorandum for the Special Group, 9 Jan. 1964, appr. on 20 Feb. 64: Review of Tibetan Operations: “1. Summary—The CIA Tibetan Activity consists of political action, propaganda, and paramilitary activity. The purpose of the program at this stage is to keep the political concept of an autonomous Tibet alive within Tibet and among foreign nations, principally India, and to build a capability for resistance against possible political developments inside Communist China. […] 3. Background and Objectives—At a 13 December 1963 meeting “The Special Group approved the continuation of CIA controlled Tibetan Operations […].” Previous operations had gone to support isolated Tibetan resistance groups within Tibet and to the creation of a paramilitary force on the Nepal/Tibet border of approximately 2,000 men, 800 of whom were armed by […] airdrop in January 1961. In 1963, as a result of the [blank; read: cooperation with India?] and as a result of the cited Special Group meeting, the Agency began a more broadly based political program with the exiled Tibetans. This included bringing 133 Tibetans to the United States for training in political, propaganda and paramilitary techniques; continuing the support subsidy to the Dalai Lama’s entourage at Dharmsala, India; continuing support to the Nepal based Tibetan guerrillas; the reassignment of a part of the unarmed guerrillas to India for further training; […]. Operational plans call for the establishment of approximately 20 singleton resident agents in Tibet […] two road watch teams in Tibet to report possible Chinese Communist build-ups, and six border watch communications teams […]. The [blank; read: communications center to be built at Charbatia?] will stay in direct touch with Dharmsala and will conduct political correspondence with Tibetan refugee groups […] to create an increased Tibetan national political consciousness among these refugees. The [blank; read: cooperation with India?] was established in October 1963, and the communications center serving it, [blank; read: planned for Charbatia?] is presently being built with a completion date scheduled in February 1964. One of the most serious problems facing the Tibetans is a lack of trained officials equipped with linguistic and administrative abilities. The Agency is undertaking the education of some 20 selected Tibetan junior officers to meet this need. A United States advisory committee composed of prominent United States citizens has been established to sponsor the education of these Tibetans. Cornell University has tentatively agreed to provide facilities for their education. The Agency is supporting the establishment of Tibet Houses in […] Geneva, and New York City. The Tibet Houses are intended to serve as unofficial representation for the Dalai Lama to maintain the concept of a 34

At Mustang, things had improved for the Tibetans – with sufficient food bought at Pokhara, Nepal, with funds channeled by the CIA, new training programs were organized at Tangya and a private home was built for Baba Yeshi at Kaisang, 7 kilometers southeast of Jomson. But during all of 1963 and 1964, the Tibetan guerrillas remained inactive – with the exception of an attack carried out onto 4 Chinese trucks on 6 June 1964, but this attack had been instigated by a British television team that had found its way to the Tibetan camp seeking footage of a guerrilla attack.218 In January 65, B.N. Mullik, head of India’s Intelligence Bureau, proposed to drop arms to those Tibetans at Mustang that were still unarmed – but only on the condition that Baba Yeshi’s paramilitary force shift inside Tibet to 2 operating locations, one astride the route between Kathmandu and Lhasa and one along the Chinese border road running from Lhasa toward Xinjiang. On 9 April 1965, the U.S. President’s 303 Committee “approved relocation of Tibetan paramilitary force”.219 And so, on 15-17 May 65, a SAT DC-6 piloted by Eddie Sims delivered ammunition, weapons, and a small number of radios and inflatable rubber boats all the way from Okinawa to a drop zone a few kilometres from Tangya inside Nepal, making refuelling stops at Takhli and “Oak Tree”. India had allowed this flight in exchange for the shift of the Mustang guerrillas to positions astride the roads in Tibet. But Baba Yeshi had apparently promised his men “enough weapons for the next 15 years”. So after picking up what the DC-6 had dropped, the Mustang guerrillas felt disappointed about what they thought to be an insufficient delivery and returned to inactivity.220 In April 66, the CIA was still willing to continue funding of the Mustang guerrillas for another 3 years. Perhaps suspecting that his financiers had run out of patience, Baba Yeshi gathered some 60 horsemen and took them to the Chinese border. At the end, 35 of them entered Tibet, where they encountered an ambush that resulted in the death of 6 separate Tibetan political identity. The Tibet House in New York City will work closely with Tibetan supporters in the United Nations, particularly the Malayan, Irish, and Thai delegations. The cost of the Tibetan Program for FY 1964 can be summarized in approximate figures as follows: a. Support of 2100 Tibetan guerrillas based in Nepal—$ 500,000 b. Subsidy to the Dalai Lama—$ 180,000 c. […] (equipment, transportation, installation, and operator training costs)—$ 225,000 d. Expenses of covert training site in Colorado—$ 400,000 e. Tibet Houses in New York, Geneva, and […] (1/2 year )—$ 75,000 f. Black air transportation of Tibetan trainees from Colorado to India—$ 185,000 g. Miscellaneous (operating expenses of […] equipment and supplies to reconnaissance teams, caching program, air resupply – not overflights, preparation stages for agent network in Tibet, agent salaries, etc.) – $ 125,000 h. Educational program for 20 selected junior Tibetan officers – $ 45,000 Total – $ 1,735,000 4. Coordination – This Tibetan operational program has been coordinated with the Department of State for a number of years. Specific operational activity has been coordinated with the Department of Defense and the [blank; read: Indian Intelligence Bureau ?] as necessary. 5. Recommendations – Barring sudden developments inside Communist China and Tibet, expenses for this long-range, politically-oriented Tibet program are not expected to exceed this amount in the foreseeable future. In fact, there are a number of probable economics, […] for example. Nonetheless, this program will continue to require fairly large expenditures over a long period of time to keep the possibility of a non-Communist government alive to the Tibetan people. We recommend continuance of this program. – (Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Special Group Files, S.G. 112, February 20, 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. The source text bears no drafting information. Memoranda for the record by Peter Jessup of February 14 and 24 state that the paper was considered at a Special Group meeting on February 13 and approved by the Special Group on February 20. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Box 1, 303 Committee Meetings (1964)). = Memorandum for the Special Group, 9 January 1964, FRUS 1964-68. vol.30, doc.337, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d337 – emphasis is mine). 218 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.196-99. 219 See Memorandum for the 303 Committee, Washington, 26 January 1968, FRUS 1964-68, vol.30, doc.342, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d342 ). 220 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.216-18. 35

Tibetans and the loss of 8 horses and 7 rifles. After this failed foray, New Delhi’s Special Center limited Mustang’s task to passive intelligence collection.221 In November 63, the new joint operations center – dubbed the Special Center – was established at New Delhi. By the spring of 1964, the 135 agent trainees from Camp Hale222 in Colorado had returned to India. Two dozens of them were assigned to Chakrata, and another 8 manned the radio sets at Charbatia and at the Special Center. The remaining 100 or so trainees were sent to a holding camp outside of Joelikote, where they were divided into radio teams, whose main purpose was to radio back social, political, economic, and military information, and to check the existence of local resistance or the interest in creating resistance networks. In April 64, 10 radio teams were sent from Joelikote to Indian border communities like Gangtok (Sikkim), Shimla (north of New Delhi), Tuting (NEFA), Walung (NEFA), and even to Baba Yeshi’s camps in Mustang. From there they were to cross into Tibet, and some of the teams even succeeded in contacting a loose underground of resisters.223 But in 1964 and 1965, most of the agent teams that had entered Tibet were either dead or captured. At the beginning of 1966, only 2 teams sent to the town of Tingri located some 70 kilometers north of Mount Everest, were still active.224 Nevertheless, in early 1966, at least in the US, the prospects of a continued Tibet program looked favorable: In March 66, India’s new Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited Washington, where she received President Johnson’s support for a major food aid package. Seizing the opportunity, the CIA asked the 303 Committee on 22 April to approve a major $18 million Tibetan paramilitary package that included a three-year-support for the Mustang force as well as 2 C-130 ELINT platforms for the Indian Air Force. The problem was that the radio teams still working inside Tibet were experiencing major resistance from the local population who apparently was afraid of Chinese retaliation. Even the teams still remaining at Tingri were betrayed and captured by the end of the year. So, in late November 66, the Special Center at New Delhi put team infiltrations into Tibet on hold. Joelikote was closed, and the remaining agents became refugees again.225 At the same time, more alarming news were arriving from China, which, on 16 October 1964, had already detonated its first atomic bomb at the site of Lop Nor, located some 265 kilometers southwest of the provincial capital of Urumqi. In mid-1966, China’s Great Leap Forward campaign toward rapid industrialization and full-scale communism had not shown

221 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.221-22. This situation continued for several years, as the the Memorandum for the 303 Committee, Washington, 26 January 1968 (in: FRUS 1964-68, vol.30, doc.342, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d342 ) shows: “The Tibetan paramilitary unit, a remnant of the 1959 resistance force, is dispersed in 15 camps […]. The Tibetan leadership views the force as the paramilitary arm of its “government-in-exile" […]. Because of the diplomatic sensitivity occasioned by the presence of the Tibetan force […] it has been enjoined from offensive action which might invite Chinese […] retaliation. Joint efforts to disperse the force to other uninhabited areas […] have not been successful because of Chinese […] reaction or of difficulties in resupply.” [emphasis is mine] 222 “The covert training program conducted in the U.S. under which some 250 Tibetans were trained, ended in November 1964” (See Memorandum for the 303 Committee, Washington, 26 January 1968, FRUS 1964-68, vol.30, doc.342, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d342 ). So, Camp Hale was closed, and in 1966, it was transferred to the US Forrest Service (Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.287, note 15). 223 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.199-204. 224 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.210-14. 225 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.219-21; Minutes of Meeting of the 303 Committee, 22 April 1966, DDRS, #2460-1999. This situation continued for several years, as the Memorandum for the 303 Committee dated 26 January 1968 shows: “At present there are no radio teams remaining inside Tibet. Radio teams continue to function […] although much of their information comes from the debriefing of traders and refugees. Singleton resident agent operations in Tibet, regarded as being the long-range replacement of the black radio teams, have not progressed as planned due to continued tightening of Chinese security in the border areas. Intelligence reporting from all sources deals primarily with military, political and construction activities along the Tibetan border” (Memorandum for the 303 Committee, Washington, 26 January 1968, in: FRUS 1964-68, vol.30, doc.342, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d342 ). 36

the results expected, and after several foreign policy setbacks, there were even questions about who would succeed Chairman Mao. As a reaction to all this, Mao proclaimed the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in August 66. “The Cultural Revolution was launched in China in 1966 by Communist leader Mao Zedong in order to reassert his authority over the Chinese government. Believing that current Communist leaders were taking the party, and China itself, in the wrong direction, Mao called on the nation’s youth to purge the ‘impure’ elements of Chinese society and revive the revolutionary spirit that had led to victory in the civil war 20 years earlier and the formation of the People’s Republic of China.”226 Already in May 1966, “Red Guards” – as those teenagers became known – “started arriving in Lhasa from Beijing. As the revolution’s goal was to wipe out divergent habits and cultures in order to make all of Chinese society conform to a communist ideal, minorities were a prime target. Tibetans, predictably, suffered tremendously. Thousands were jailed by marauding Red Guard gangs. Monasteries were emptied, monks publicly humiliated, scriptures burned, and priceless art treasures destroyed. Belatedly realizing that he had lost control, Mao in January 1967 attempted to soften his rhetoric and asked the military to intervene. This had little effect in Tibet, where the empowered Red Guard took on the army in street battles across Lhasa through the spring and summer.”227 In earlier years, such conditions might have made India’s covert Tibetan assets appear all the more important both as a border force and as a tool to exploit China’s turmoil. Apparently, the CIA thought like this, because having been unable to have the 2 ELINT C-130s desired by India approved by the 303 Committee in April 1966,228 they sent 5 additional Helio Twin Couriers from Agency stocks plus 8 additional C-46s from Davis Monthan storage to India in the spring of 1966, with 2 more C-46s following in October 66. All of these 15 aircraft were officially registered to the Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, and appeared on the Indian civil aircraft register in early 1967 or later.229 At the end, the U.S. President’s 303 Committee, on “8 July and 25 November 1966 – endorsed the covert paramilitary program” for Tibet for another 3 years – again without the 2 ELINT C-130s desired by India.230 But with the Mustang force and the radio teams limited to passive intelligence collection from outside Chinese borders by late 1966, only a small part of the original budget of annually $1,735,000 projected for 3 years in February 1964 for the Tibetan project were approved by the 303 Committee on 25 November 1966: $650,000 per annum for Fiscal Year 1967.231 The program that remained was India’s favorite, however, that is General Uban’s “Establishment 22” at Chakrata, which was renamed the “Special Frontier Force” (SFF) in mid-1966. The Indians were eager to double the number of Tibetans at Chakrata, and the SFF was well organized: 122 guerrillas made up a company, and 5 or 6 made up a battalion commanded by a Tibetan political leader. The Tibetans were rotated along the borders of Ladakh and NEFA in company-size elements. ARC C-46s staging from newly built air bases at Doomdoomah in Assam and Sarsawa south of Chakrata supported these SFF camps by dropping food

226 See https://www.history.com/topics/china/cultural-revolution . 227 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.228. 228 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.219. 229 See my files at https://www.utdallas.edu/library/specialcollections/hac/cataam/Leeker/aircraft/c462.pdf and https://www.utdallas.edu/library/specialcollections/hac/cataam/Leeker/aircraft/thelio.pdf . 230 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.230. 231 “At the time of the February 1964 review by the Committee, the projected annual cost for all Tibetan operations was $1,735,000. With the discontinuation of the training programs in the U.S., […] a reduction of $570,000 in this estimate for FY68 has been achieved. The remainder of $1,165,000 has been programmed in the CIA budget for FY68 for the activities described in this paper. Of this amount $650,000 was approved by the 303 Committee on 25 November 1966 in its review” (Memorandum for the 303 Committee, Washington, 26 January 1968, FRUS 1964-68. vol.30, doc.342, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964- 68v30/d342 ). 37

packages.232 An ARC C-46 dispatched to an airfield near Siliguri south of Sikkim supported SFF teams who had put taps onto telephone poles that paralleled the roads built across Tibet and who, from time to time, changed the cassettes in the recorders that were connected to these taps. 233 In 1967, relations between the CIA and India cooled down. An article in the March 1967 number of Ramparts revealed that the CIA covertly supported private organizations like the Asia Foundation, and as numerous US educational groups were active in India, this ignited an anti-CIA furor in the Indian parliament. In the wake of the Ramparts article, a newly created special committee headed by Undersecretary of State N. Katzenbach recommended against any covert assistance to US educational organizations. So the CIA stopped funding for the third cycle of several Tibetans undergoing training at Cornell University, and the students were sent home to India in July 67.234 More important, after the CIA had removed the ELINT C-130s from their proposal approved by the 303 Committee in November 66, the Indians made the Soviet An-12 the new centerpiece for the ARC fleet. In the spring of 1967, the CIA had also stopped the annual $ 180,000 for the Dalai Lama and his entourage. So his brother Gyalo assumed that all money would soon be drying up.235 Yet, the CIA did not yet cut off its links to the Tibetan program, as the Memorandum for the 303 Committee dated 26 January 1968 clearly shows.236 There were several critical voices

232 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.225-27. 233 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.227. 234 “Twenty selected Tibetan junior officers studied at Cornell University, over a three year period. Due to the Katzenbach strictures, this program was concluded in July 1967; CIA is considering a continuation of the program, on a limited scale” (Memorandum for the 303 Committee, Washington, 26 January 1968, FRUS 1964-68. vol.30, doc.342, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d342). 235 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.228-30. 236 “Memorandum for the 303 Committee, Washington, 26 January 1968 - Status Report on Tibetan Operations 1. Summary – The CIA Tibetan program, parts of which were initiated in 1956 with the cognizance of the Committee, is based on U.S. Government commitments made to the Dalai Lama in 1951 and 1956. The program consists of political action, propaganda, paramilitary and intelligence operations, appropriately coordinated with and supported by [blank; read: the Indian Intelligence Bureau ?]. This program was last reviewed and endorsed by the Committee on 20 February 1964. Current activities have been coordinated with and have the approval of [blank; read: the Indian Intelligence Bureau ?], Mr. William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Mr. Lucius Battle, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs. 2. Program Objectives – In the political action and propaganda field, Tibetan program objectives are aimed toward lessening the influence and capabilities of the Chinese regime through support, among Tibetans and among foreign nations, of the concept of an autonomous Tibet under the leadership of the Dalai Lama; toward the creation of a capability for resistance against possible political developments inside Tibet; and the containment of Chinese Communist expansion – in pursuance of U.S. policy objectives stated initially in NSC 5913/1. […] 3. Appraisal of Current Programs – The cultural revolution in China expanded into Tibet bringing with it tremendous disturbances including the disruption of internal transportation, communication, travel and, to a significant extent, peace and order. Unfortunately there are no apparent signs that the Tibetan people are capitalizing upon this internal chaos to seek further autonomy. Chinese security has shown no signs of deterioration and their control over Tibet, both political and military, remains as pervasive as ever. Tibetan leadership has been purged, leaving the Chinese in direct control of the local administration, and a large number of underground assets have been uncovered and neutralized. The Tibetan program has a potential for operational success based on a reservoir of trained agent material, the location in a safe-haven of the Dalai Lama together with the nucleus of new young leaders, widespread sympathy for the Tibetan cause, indications of a more positive Indian attitude toward the political aspirations of the Tibetan government, and evidence of considerable disarray among the Chinese stationed in Tibet. a. At present there are no radio teams remaining inside Tibet. Radio teams continue to function […] although much of their information comes from the debriefing of traders and refugees. Singleton resident agent operations in Tibet, regarded as being the long-range replacement of the black radio teams, have not progressed as planned due to continued tightening of Chinese security in the border areas. Intelligence 38

reporting from all sources deals primarily with military, political and construction activities along the Tibetan border. b. The Tibetan paramilitary unit, a remnant of the 1959 resistance force, is dispersed in 15 camps […]. The Tibetan leadership views the force as the paramilitary arm of its ‘government-in-exile’ […]. Because of the diplomatic sensitivity occasioned by the presence of the Tibetan force […] it has been enjoined from offensive action which might invite Chinese […] retaliation. Joint efforts to disperse the force to other uninhabited areas […] have not been successful because of Chinese […] reaction or of difficulties in resupply. c. [blank; read: Charbatia communications Center?] responsible for radio contact with and operational direction of the radio teams, the paramilitary resistance force, and the support mechanism [blank; read: SAT- ARC ? ] continue to serve their intended purpose with a minimum of problems. d. Bi-lateral CIA-Tibetan intelligence collection operations into Tibet, […] have increased significantly, both in number and in value during the past few years. e. Activities designed to develop a dynamic political program […] to weld the refugee communities into a cohesive whole under the leadership of the Dalai Lama and his brother, Gyalo Thondup, continue. These include: (1) The Geneva, New York and […] ‘Tibet houses’ continue in operation. The Geneva office serves as the coordinating point for the resettlement of some 500 Tibetan refugees in Switzerland and other European countries and maintains contact with the international agencies concerned with Tibetan relief. Although time has dimmed some of the effectiveness of its pleas, the New York office continues to lobby among the U.N. delegations for legal and moral support for the Tibetan cause, guided in their efforts by a sitting former U.S. delegate to the U.N. who is also a well-known international lawyer. […] (2) The covert training program conducted in the U.S. under which some 250 Tibetans were trained, ended in November 1964. (3) Twenty selected Tibetan junior officers studied at Cornell University, over a three year period. Due to the Katzenbach strictures, this program was concluded in July 1967; CIA is considering a continuation of the program, on a limited scale, […]. (4) The Tibetan organizational party, the Cho Kha Sum, (i.e. the Defense of Religion by the Three Regions: Kham, Amdo and U-Tsang), which was established in India in April 1964 by Gyalo Thondup, now has an active press and publications arm. While the future potential of the party is still in question, the Tibetans are making an effort to mold it into an effective organization, aimed at halting a drift towards disunity among the refugees, developing a political consciousness and a political program with which to challenge the Communist efforts inside Tibet. 4. Significant Previous 303 Committee Approvals – a. September 1958 – initial endorsement of CIA covert support to Tibetan resistance; b. 20 May 1959 – initial approval of covert support to the Dalai Lama; c. 14 February 1961 – endorsed continuation of the covert program; d. 13 December 1962 – approved training of Tibetan guerrilla force; e. 20 February 1964 – reviewed and endorsed continuation of covert program; f. 9 April 1965 – approved relocation of Tibetan paramilitary force; g. 8 July and 25 November 1966 – endorsed the covert paramilitary program […]. These landmark reviews were interspersed with status reports and briefings of the Committee, in one period at monthly intervals. The basic decisions listed above in several instances were reviewed with Higher Authority. 5. Coordination a. Department of State – Since the project’s inception, appropriate officials of the Department have approved various elements of the program. Department officers who have been briefed on aspects of this project include Elmer Falk and Clement J. Sobotka, Director and Deputy Director, respectively, of the Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs; Harald Jacobson, Director, Office of Asian Communist Affairs; William Gleysteen, Deputy Director, Office of U.N. Political Affairs; William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; and Lucius Battle, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs. b. Ambassadors – The past and present Ambassadors to Nepal and India have approved the Tibetan program, […]. 6. Projected and Planned Programs – a. On the political front during 1967, the Dalai Lama began what is hoped will be a long-range program of projecting himself and Tibetan affairs on an international basis. He is contemplating visits to Ceylon, Burma and Cambodia, having visited Japan and Thailand in late 1967. Invitations have also been extended from several European countries having active Tibetan refugee programs or interests. 39

– when the memo was discussed at the 19 March 68 meeting of the 303 Committee, CIA representative James Critchfield stated that “achievements inside Tibet were minimal – outside more substantial.” He observed that “the Tibetans by nature did not appear to be congenitally inclined toward conspiratorial proficiency.” No action by the 303 Committee is recorded at the 26 January meeting. The memo itself observes: “The cultural revolution in China expanded into Tibet bringing with it tremendous disturbances including the disruption of internal transportation, communication, travel and, to a significant extent, peace and order. Unfortunately there are no apparent signs that the Tibetan people are capitalizing upon this internal chaos to seek further autonomy. Chinese security has shown no signs of deterioration and their control over Tibet, both political and military, remains as pervasive as ever. Tibetan leadership has been purged, leaving the Chinese in direct control of the local administration, and a large number of underground assets have been uncovered and neutralized.”237 But the memo also contains some more optimistic notes: “Bi-lateral CIA-Tibetan intelligence collection operations into Tibet, […] have increased significantly, both in number and in value during the past few years.” And there are still some things to do: “Some elements of the basic covert program remain to be implemented. They include: the deployment of landline wiretap teams to selected priority targets within Tibet; the activation of special refugee debriefing teams; a census of some 70,000 Tibetan refugees spread throughout India and its neighboring countries which may locate additional operational assets; and the resupply of arms and ammunition to the Mustang force.” 238 The resupply of arms and ammunition to the Mustang force was not only something many Mustang guerrillas hoped for, but apparently also based of the idea that these guerrillas might one day be a factor, if the situation in Tibet further deteriorated. As to Mustang, as early as 1967 some guerrillas had demanded for an audit of Baba Yeshi’s finances, and so Baba Yeshi was given the Tibetan Wangdu as an assistant. Things seemed to work, but when Baba Yeshi attended a ceremony held at Dharamsala, India, in

b. Gyalo Thondup, acting for the Tibetan partnership in our liaison with the Indians, has proposed the establishment of a Tibetan Operations Center to represent Tibetan interests […]. This Tibetan center would conceivably provide greater efficiency in the Tibetan handling of existing operations and in the relegation of operational tasks to Tibetan assets. […] c. Some elements of the basic covert program remain to be implemented. They include: the deployment of landline wiretap teams to selected priority targets within Tibet; the activation of special refugee debriefing teams; a census of some 70,000 Tibetan refugees spread throughout India and its neighboring countries which may locate additional operational assets; and the resupply of arms and ammunition to the Mustang force. 7. Costs At the time of the February 1964 review by the Committee, the projected annual cost for all Tibetan operations was $1,735,000. With the discontinuation of the training programs in the U.S., […] a reduction of $570,000 in this estimate for FY68 has been achieved. The remainder of $1,165,000 has been programmed in the CIA budget for FY68 for the activities described in this paper. Of this amount $650,000 was approved by the 303 Committee on 25 November 1966 in its review of the […].” (Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Tibet, 1967–1968. Secret; Eyes Only. The source text bears no drafting information. A March 4 memorandum from Battle to Bohlen describes it as a CIA memorandum. (Ibid.) It was discussed at a March 19 meeting of the 303 Committee. According to Peter Jessup’s memorandum for the record of the meeting, CIA representative James Critchfield stated that “achievements inside Tibet were minimal—outside more substantial.” He observed that “the Tibetans by nature did not appear to be congenitally inclined toward conspiratorial proficiency.” Jessup records no action by the 303 Committee at the meeting. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, 303 Committee) - (Memorandum for the 303 Committee, Washington, 26 January 1968, FRUS 1964-68. vol.30, doc.342, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d342 – emphasis is mine). 237 Memorandum for the 303 Committee, Washington, 26 January 1968, FRUS 1964-68. vol.30, doc.342, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d342 238 Memorandum for the 303 Committee, Washington, 26 January 1968, FRUS 1964-68. vol.30, doc.342, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d342 40

March 69 to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the Lhasa insurrection, he was rewarded a permanent transfer to Dharamsala as Deputy Security Minister in the Dalai Lama’s cabinet. Unwilling to take over the new job, Baba Yeshi returned to Pokhara in Nepal and “implored his men to rally on his side. A civil war was about to begin.”239 In New Delhi, the CIA received a new Indian counterpart on 2 September 1969: That day, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) was officially unveiled, and from then on, all foreign intelligence work and paramilitary projects were under RAW’s control, whose first director was R.N. Kao, former head of the ARC. On the international side, the new U.S. President Richard Nixon felt more sympathy for Pakistan than for India, and so Prime Minister Indira Gandhi began courting the Soviet Union. The little that the CIA representative still sitting in the Special Center at New Delhi could do was to send out a new type of singleton who was not to go in black, but to merge directly into society. But when the only spy of this new type, code-named “Red Stone”, was arrested in Tibet a couple of days later, the program was stopped. More successful were some special refugee debriefing teams sent to Nepal’s capital Kathmandu in 1968/9, because there, they could debrief cross-border travelers, that is Tibetans who had received Nepalese citizenship in 1959 and who were allowed to visit their families in Tibet.240 Earlier in 1969, the Indians had made clear that their contingency plans did no longer involve any Tibetan guerrillas sitting in Nepal, and the CIA felt the same. In a Memo of 1 August 1969 on Tibetan operations prepared by the CIA for the 303 Committee, the CIA declared that already in 1968, for Tibetan and other paramilitary programs all together, “the Fiscal Year 1969 expenditure was, however, only $2,500,000 and it is proposed to continue the program at this level in Fiscal Year 1970.”241 The memo then deals with the Tibetan

239 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.231-34. 240 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.234-39. 241 Memo of 1 August 1969 on Tibetan operations prepared by the CIA for the 303 Committee “On August 1, 1969, the CIA prepared for the 303 Committee a 14-page update on regional intelligence activi- ties that included information and recommendations concerning the Tibetan operations. The report stated in part: ‘Since 1958, CIA has been supporting guerrillas of the Dalai Lama’s Tibetan resistance movement, the bulk of whom are now located in a safehaven in Nepal just across the Tibet/Nepal border. They are conducting intelligence collections and minor paramilitary operations against Tibet and constitute a force which could be employed in strength in the event of hostilities […], or in the event of a partial collapse of Chinese control of Tibet resulting from other causes. The above combined [Tibetan and other regional paramilitary] programs were approved by the 303 Committee for a three-year period in 1966 at a cost of […]. The Fiscal Year 1969 expenditure was, however, only $2,500,000 and it is proposed to continue the program at this level in Fiscal Year 1970.’ – ‘The report noted that the CIA had provided military equipment, training, communications, and money to Tibetan resistance guerrillas in the Mustang area of Nepal. Approximately 1.5 million […] was spent on the Tibetan force during the 1966–1969 period, often passed to leaders in local currencies to purchase food or animals. The current force had 1,800 men, “well above the optimum size considering the current targets and the increased Chinese control of Tibetan territory opposite Mustang.” The CIA noted that it had been discussing with the Dalai Lama’s representatives, guerrilla leaders, and others a plan to reduce the force to “300 well- equipped and combat ready men, the remainder being resettled as civilian ‘reserves.’ “The CIA requested $500,000 per year for the Tibetan program, with the expectation that the force reduction “might involve a termination and resettlement payment of $2,500,000, spread over a number of years, but the eventual effect would be to cut our annual cost to under $100,000.” In considering alternatives, the report stated: “In light of current conditions in South Asia it is not deemed necessary to discuss the alternative of more extensive support than that outlined in the ‘Proposal’. Should current indications of Soviet plans for subversion in Sinkiang and Tibet sharply increase, a plan to augment the present proposals could be quickly developed.” The CIA stated that there were few risks involved with these programs. The U.S. Ambassadors to India and Nepal, as well as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, had been kept apprised of this program. The report concluded by requesting $2.5 million for the Tibetan and a related paramilitary program for Fiscal Year 1970, while the CIA explored “ways to reduce the force level of the Tibetan guerillas, and to resettle them as appropriate.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303/40 Committee, 1969 Minutes) In a September 12 memorandum to Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Joseph Sisco noted “reservations” about the CIA claims that the force could be used in the event of a conflict with China or the weakening of Chinese control over 41

guerrillas resident at Mustang stating: “The current force had 1,800 men, ‘well above the optimum size considering the current targets and the increased Chinese control of Tibetan territory opposite Mustang.’ The CIA noted that it had been discussing with the Dalai Lama’s representatives, guerrilla leaders, and others a plan to reduce the force to ‘300 well-equipped and combat ready men, the remainder being resettled as civilian ‘reserves.’ The CIA requested $500,000 per year for the Tibetan program.”242 A final remark contained in the memo – “Should current indications of Soviet plans for subversion in Sinkiang and Tibet sharply increase, a plan to augment the present proposals could be quickly developed ” – was criticized by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Joseph Sisco who suggested “that the CIA emphasize to other governments in the region that the Tibetan border force was ‘defensive’ in nature and that caution should be exercised before its use.” On 30 September 1969, “the recommendations for reducing the Tibetan and related regional paramilitary programs in the August 1 CIA paper were approved,”243 so this was also the way things would continue during Fiscal Year 1970. A Status report on support to the Dalai Lama and Tibetan operations dated 11 January 1971, which had been prepared for the 40 Committee, noted: “Intelligence collection costs are being reduced […] by eliminating unproductive agent personnel. […] Elimination of the intelligence collection operations would not seriously diminish coverage of Western China for U.S. needs, […]. The total cost of the proposed Tibetan operations for Fiscal Year 1971 will be $363,000 […] These funds have been programmed by CIA for Fiscal Year 1971.” 244 A memorandum dated 6 September 1972,

Tibet stemming from “other causes.” (Ibid.) In a subsequent September 15 memorandum to Johnson, Sisco raised other concerns related to the possible use of these forces “given the state of Sino-Soviet relations.” He predicted that the Soviets would encourage an internal uprising in Tibet in the event of hostilities with China and urged that “The Committee make clear that it would reserve its judgment on any use of the Kampa Force [Tibetan guerrillas in the Mustang Valley in Nepal] in Tibet pending an extremely careful analysis of the circumstances existing at the time the issue comes up.” Sisco also suggested that the CIA emphasize to other governments in the region that the Tibetan border force was “defensive” in nature and that caution should be exercised before its use. (Ibid.) These memoranda were forwarded to the 303 Committee for a September 23 meeting. Tibet was not discussed until the September 30 meeting of the 303 Committee, when Henry Kissinger, Richard Helms, John Mitchell, David Packard, and George C. Denney, Jr., Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research, concluded that “the operation is well worthwhile, […].” The recommendations for reducing the Tibetan and related regional paramilitary programs in the August 1 CIA paper were approved. (Memorandum for the Record by Frank Chapin, 303 Committee Meeting of September 30; National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, 303/40 Committee Files, 1969 Minutes - Memo of 1 August 1969 on Tibetan operations prepared by the CIA for the 303 Committee, Editorial note, FRUS 1969-1976, vol. 17: doc. 273, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d273 – all emphasis is mine). 242 Memo of 1 August 1969 on Tibetan operations prepared by the CIA for the 303 Committee, Editorial note, FRUS 1969-1976 , vol. 17: doc. 273, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d273 . 243 Memo of 1 August 1969 on Tibetan operations prepared by the CIA for the 303 Committee, Editorial note, FRUS 1969-1976 , vol. 17: doc. 273, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d273 . 244 Status Report on Support to the Dalai Lama and Tibetan Operations 1. Summary – CIA Tibetan activities, utilizing followers of the Dalai Lama, have included in addition to guerrilla support a program of political, propaganda, and intelligence operations. These activities are designed to impair the international influence of Communist China by support to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan exiles in maintaining the concept of an autonomous Tibet. 2. Status Report – Developments During Fiscal Year 1970 For intelligence collection on the Chinese presence in Tibet we have worked […] independently with Tibetan leaders […]. Our independent operations with Tibetans […] have concentrated on attempts to place resident agents in Tibet. Chinese security in the border area and travel controls within Tibet have made such agent operations extremely hazardous. CIA-trained radio teams of Tibetans along the Nepal border of Tibet have continued to report [blank; read: the Charbatia communication Center?] continues in radio contact with these teams as well as the paramilitary resistance force in the Mustang valley of Nepal. (d) Planned Continuation of Program – Intelligence collection costs are being reduced […] by eliminating unproductive agent personnel. […] Elimination of the intelligence collection operations would not seriously diminish coverage of Western China for U.S. needs, […]. 42

sent to Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) by some of his colleagues comments the CIA’s Tibetan Forces in Nepal, observing: “During FY 1972 expenditures for the Tibetan contingency force were further reduced in accordance with a plan for the gradual phasing out of the force approved by the Committee in 1969. Maintenance of the force will come to an end in FY 74; current funds provide for the training and resettlement of approximately 500 men per year of the original 1800 man force.”245 And so, since 1969, the end of the Tibetan program was clearly visible. In early October 1969, the CIA representative at New Delhi was anxious to finalize the demobilization plan for Mustang. With $500.000 as rehabilitation funds per year, he wanted to resettle the Mustang force to Pokhara in Nepal during the next 3 calendar years, providing jobs in carpet factories as well as cheap hotel rooms for the first third of them. Some of the Mustang Tibetans accepted, while others flirted with a Soviet Colonel who tried to employ them as spies against Chinese installations like airfields and PLA border posts.246 When General Uban’s Tibetans successfully fought against Pakistan in the war of 1971, this was definitely the end of the CIA’s assistance to India, although Indians and Bangladeshis praised the Tibetans for their heroic participation in the fighting. The CIA stations at New Delhi and then at Kathmandu handled the rehabilitation and resettlement project in the Pokhara area that the CIA offered to the Mustang guerrillas. In November 1973, the ex-guerrillas formally opened their Pokhara hotel, the Annapurna Guest House.247 But not all of the Mustang guerrillas accepted to be resettled at Pokhara. Wangdu and some 600 Tibetans refused to hand over their weapons. Some of them gave up only upon a personal plea by the Dalai Lama sent to Mustang on tape in 1974. Then the Nepalese Army intervened, and a last group of Tibetans was attacked close to the border when fleeing to India. Some of them escaped across the border, others were shot, including Wangdu. “With a whimper, the secret war in Tibet had come to an end.”248 By then, US interests had already shifted from Tibet to Communist China for a couple of years. As early as September 1970, President Nixon had directed Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to make contact with Peking, and this resulted in Kissinger’s visits to Zhou Enlai in July 71 and in October 71 and in President Nixon himself meeting Chairman Mao Zedong in February 1972.249

5. Coordination – This proposal was coordinated in September 1970 with State Department officials. They agreed to its submission to the Committee. 6. Costs – The total cost of the proposed Tibetan operations for Fiscal Year 1971 will be $363,000 […] These funds have been programmed by CIA for Fiscal Year 1971. (Memorandum prepared for the 40 Committee, 11 January 1971, FRUS 1969-1976, vol. 17: doc. 278, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d278 - all emphasis is mine). 245 Memorandum dated 6 September 1972 (From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) In the attached memorandum, CIA reports on its Tibetan activities and asks 40 Committee approval to continue the program, in a reduced form, for FY 73. The program, begun in 1959, was last considered by the Committee in March 1971. Expenditures amounted to $557,000 in FY 72; $437,000 is budgeted for FY 73. During the past year CIA has: provided the usual subsidy for the Dalai Lama and his entourage; continued to maintain, at a reduced level, a Tibetan contingency force in Nepal; and supported press activities; […], administrative training, […] and unilateral intelligence activities, and Tibetan offices […] New York. Support for a Tibetan office in Geneva ceased in 1970. During FY 1972 expenditures for the Tibetan contingency force were further reduced in accordance with a plan for the gradual phasing out of the force approved by the Committee in 1969. Maintenance of the force will come to an end in FY 74; current funds provide for the training and resettlement of approximately 500 men per year of the original 1800 man force. (Memorandum dated 6 September 1972, State Dept., FRUS 1969-1976, vol. 17: doc. 280, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d280 – all emphasis is mine) 246 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.234-39. 247 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.244-46. 248 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.247-53, quotation p.253. 249 See the National Security Archive at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/ for documents. 43

US-Indian Cooperation: transportation to India

The “CAT and Air America in Japan” file of this database describes in detail how former Air America DC-6s then operated by Southern Air Transport, working under contract no. AF49(604)-4379 with the USAF’s Logistical Support Group, flew support missions out of Kadena Air Base on Okinawa, which was the main CIA supply station for the Far East during the sixties.250 In late 1963, India offered to use Charbatia Air Base as a staging base for U-2s. However, “the Charbatia base was in poor condition and needed considerable renovation before it could be used for U-2 operations. Work on the base by the Indians took much longer than expected, so Detachment G continued to use Ta Khli when it staged four sorties over Tibet from 29 September to 10 November 1963.”251 In his diary now preserved at the Air America Archives,252 Clifford A. Costa describes in detail how those flights to India worked. The DC-6 went to Kadena in December 63 with 2 crews for a covert operation. Team I consisted of Messrs. Sims (Pilot in Command), Marsh, Barrett, La Pointe, Oliver, Keck or Cartwright, and Hudson, and Team II of Messrs. N. Hicks (Pilot in Command), Bussart, Parker, Costa, Scott, Keck or Cartwright, and Hudson. Hudson flew on all flights because he was proficient in CW. On Okinawa, Air America operated out of Det.2; Company representatives were Bill Reid (“Mr. Okinawa”) and Bob Aubrey, but Aubrey handled most of the briefings.253 “This project [was] to fly Tibet tribesmen (insurgents + equipment) to India from Kadena. (A) White portion route: aircraft [N]90781 from Kadena to Bangkok. 100 [miles] out [of] Bangkok, cancel flight plan + proceed to alternate. Alternate was Takhli, Thailand, code name “The Ranch”, “Tic Toc”, “Romeo”, etc. At Takhli, aircraft number change to [N]81907 and aircraft completely sterilized. (B) Black portion route: aircraft [N] 81907 from Takhli to Tavoy, Burma direct across to Charbatia, India (code name “Oak Tree”), also called Cuttack on charts. Our call-sign was “Hightail 1, 2, 3, + 4”, depending on trip flown. Alternates were (1) Bhubaneswar, (2) Kalaikundah. 100 to 200 miles out, down to 500 feet altitude to duck Calcutta radar, also blacked out aircraft. [The] story was: displaced hill tribesmen being sent for vocational training under charter or space available – the company was Marathon Aviation Co, Miami, Florida – to Bhubaneswar. Four trips flown, starting Dec. 26, 1963 –> Jan. 2, 1964, total about 100 hours flying time on aircraft [N]90781 [of ] SAT.”254 The Sims crew flew on 26-27 (“Hightail 1”) and on 30-31 December 63 (“Hightail 3”), and the Sims crew with Costa on 28-29 December 63 (“Hightail 2”) and on 1-2 January 64 (“Hightail 4”). The passengers were Chinese-looking, but nothing is known about the cargo. The missions were timed so that the flight arrived just at dawn. After landing, the passengers were promptly transferred to a waiting C-46, flown by Air America crews, which took off within minutes. Costa recalls a “mad scramble” to unload and transfer people and cargo. Although the crews had been given several contacts in case it was necessary – Dudley Foster at Tainan, “Mr. Long” at Takhli, “Mr. Baker” at Clark AFB, “Clancy” at Danang, “Mr. Leister” at Bangkok, and an Indian Air Force captain called Creywall255 at “Oak Tree” –, the

250 At Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, was the CIA’s main logistics base in East Asia, code-named ZRBLUSH and containing, among other supplies, arms and ammunition (see Leary, Secret mission to Tibet, p.69). 251 Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach. The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Recon- naissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974, Washington, DC (History Staff, CIA), 1992, p.232 (online at: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000190094.pdf ). 252 As part of the Leary collection; the notes are preserved at UTD/Leary/B44F5. 253 Written summary (preserved at UTD/Leary/B44F5) of a tape recorded interview that William Leary made with Clifford Costa on 5/6 November and 4/5 December 1984; diary of Clifford Costa, p.6, also preserved at UTD/Leary/B44F5. 254 Costa, Diary, pp.5/6, in: UTD/Leary/B44F5. 255 Colonel Laloo Grewal (see Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.188-95). 44

flights maintained voice radio silence, but reported progress to the Customer on CW.256 The flights between Kadena and Takhli took about 8 ½ hours westbound and about 6 ½ hours eastbound, and the flights between Takhli and “Oak Tree” a bit less than 5 hours westbound and a little bit more than 4 hours eastbound. Costa’s next flight to “Oak Tree” was on 15/6 May 1964: “This flight [was] both ‘black’ and white. Questionable cargo from Kad[ena], Okinawa, to India. (A) White portion: [The] aircraft [flown under the] military contract [was N]90782. Flight from Kadena to Bangkok. 100 [miles] out [of] Bangkok cancel flight plan and proceed to alternate, which was Takhli, Thailand. At Takhli, Peterson and Conway completely sterilized [the] aircraft removing all markings, tags etc. [The] new number painted on was [N]2782 on tail only (no flag at all). A false FAA certificate of registration was installed in [the] cockpit. It gave: serial # 44917, registration # [N]2782.257 Address of cover: Marathon Aviation Co., Box 884, Inter Airport Branch, Miami, Florida. (B) Black portion: sterilized are personal gear, and then flew to Tavoy, Burma, then direct to Charbatia, India (Cuttack on charts, code name ‘Oak Tree’). Load was ammo, exp[losives], radio gear + 4 passengers. Probably agents? 100 [miles] out, down to 500 feet to get under Calcutta radar. Plane blacked out and radio silence, except for Hudson on CW (coded replies).258 Mech[anic]s Peterson and Ed Conway went as far as Takhli. [The] white trip [flight] numbers: Kadena-Takhli: 531/14; Takhli-Kadena: 524/15. […] Crew: Bussart, D.E.; Hicks, N.D.; Hudson, H.J.; Costa, C.A.; Oliver, D.V.; Keck, J.W.; Rockwell, K.R.; Marlow, T.H.; Greiner, T.H. – Time: KAD-TAK: 8+00; TAK-OAK: 4+45; OAK-TAK: 4+27; TAK-KAD: 7+25, [making a total of] 24+37. On return to Takhli, aircraft again changed back to SAT, military contract, [reg. no. N]90782.”259 The following month, on 18-20 June 1964, Costa went to “Oak Tree” again: “Aircraft [N]90781. Marsh, H.L.: captain; Walton, J.B.: co-captain; Barrett, R.L.: pilot; Costa, C.A.: flight engineer; Lopshire, L.B.: flight engineer; Sanders, W.L.: navigator; Aubray, R.J.: C.W. operator; Haynes, D.: C.W. operator; Umback, W.: security; Herald, R.J.: load specialist […] This flight [was] white to Takhli as before. Then sterilize [the] aircraft and change # to [N]2781 with phony registration certificate from our old friends Marathon Aviation of Miami, Florida. Black portion from Takhli to Charbatia, India via Tavoy, Burma. Again down to 450- 500 feet 150 miles out, to duck Calcutta radar. Cargo to ‘Oak Tree’ (Charbatia) was 1 jeep and hot cargo, ammo etc., radio gear. Contact at ‘Oak Tree’ is Ed Rector. We had [a] very important passenger out of there, looked Chinese.260 […] At any rate, he was V.I.P., had an American escort (CIA). We took them back to Takhli and then direct to Hsin-Chu airfield, Taiwan. Saw the ‘black’ B-26s and P2Vs there; they make the flights over the ‘mainland’. Flight terminate at Kadena. – Time: KAD-TKL: 8+00; TKL-OAK: 4+35; OAK-TKL: 4+47; TKL-Hsin-Chu: 5+56; Hsin-Chu-KAD: 1+45, [making a total of] 25+03.”261 By then, cargo

256 Written summary (preserved at UTD/Leary/B44F5) of a tape recorded interview that William Leary made with Clifford Costa on 5/6 November and 4/5 December 1984; diary of Clifford Costa, p.6, also preserved at UTD/Leary/B44F5. 257 Costa, Diary, p.10, in: UTD/Leary/B44F5. While the registration N2782 was false, serial # 44917 was the correct msn of that particular aircraft, that is of DC-6 N90782. 258 The aircraft arrived on the coast at dawn and followed a river to the isolated airfield. The pilots were Bussart and N. Hicks (Summary of the interview with Clifford Costa recorded by William Leary, in: UTD/Leary/B44F5). 259 Costa, Diary, pp.10-12, in: UTD/Leary/B44F5. 260 Costa speculated that the passenger might have been “a Chinese communist engineer from Tibet who defected” (Diary, p.17, in: UTD/Leary/B44F5). According to Conboy / Morrison (The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.290, note 27), a senior Chinese official had secretly defected to Kathmandu, Nepal, and had been flown to Charbatia by Air Ventures helicopter pilot Jerome McEntee. On the pretext of servicing two ARC C-46 transports, a CIA-operated DC-6 arrived at Oak Tree, took aboard the ex-communist while the plane was taxiing at the end of the runway and flew him from India to Taiwan. 261 Costa, Diary, pp.16-18, in: UTD/Leary/B44F5. 45

flights from Kadena to “Oak Tree” followed the same pattern. On 19/20 September 64, Clifford Costa was on another mission to India, this time aboard N90782 piloted by D.E. Bussart and A.R. Gibson: “This flight same as previous black flights. Flight was white to Takhli, Thailand. Then complete sterilization of crew and aircraft and a ‘black’ flight to India (Oak Tree) and back. Aircraft # change to [N]2782, and our old cover company – Marathon Aviation of Miami, Florida – was used with fake FAA credentials. Again used low altitude 4- 500 feet ‘in’, in order to get below Calcutta radar. Cargo was guns, radio gear, ammo, explosives and other supplies to the ‘boys’ up on the border. Contact man at Oak Tree is Ed Rector.”262

Official Chinese Air Force photo of Hsin-Chu Airbase, Taiwan, taken in 1965/6 (kindly submitted by Kent O. Williamson)

The security was especially tight when the DC-6s brought back Tibetan guerrillas who had been trained outside India. Cliff Costa was on two of such flights. On 24/25 September 64, the aircraft was N90782 piloted by H.L. Marsh and H.J. Hudson. “Same type trip as previous. Black portion from Takhli with crew and aircraft black, with the old Marathon Aviation cover story. This time [we] carried cargo and 30-35 of the rebels (guerrillas). Security is tight with these passengers on board. [We] brought up Dudley Foster (CAT security) from Tainan plus customer liaison man – unknown. These boys look to me like Tibetans or from Nepal. Anyway, they are tough little guys. Believe they go up to the Tibet / India / Burma-China border to stir up trouble. On these passenger flights we are always met at Charbatia at [the] far end of the runway by a ‘black’ C-46, and they are ‘off’ on [the] last leg of their long journey in a matter of minutes. Aircraft # and paper changed to [N]2782 (Marathon Aviation Co, Florida).”263 On the last flight to “Oak Tree” mentioned in his diary, that of 27/28 October 64, Cliff Costa was aboard DC-6 N90782, piloted by N.D. Hicks and A.R. Gibson: “This was a ‘white’ SAT flight as far as Takhli. Then crew and aircraft [were] sterilized and left Takhli as

262 Costa, Diary, pp.20/1, in: UTD/Leary/B44F5. 263 Costa, Diary, pp.22/3, in: UTD/Leary/B44F5. 46

Marathon Aviation aircraft [N]2782 with phony FAA documents and no flag. [The] flight to India (Charbatia) was ok – [the] route is now changed. We used to cross directly over Burma (Tavoy), but as of late, have been going south out of Takhli over [the] Gulf of Siam, till we hit past Burma, then cross over and take up a direct route to Charbatia, India. Still going down to low level 150 miles out, to duck radar. This trip we had 50 more ‘insurgents’ on board. They all look same – still believe they are Tibetans or Nepalese. Also supplies. Ed Rector still at ‘Oak Tree’ as ‘contact’, Dick Long at Kadena and Takhli is still a mystery: Company or Customer? They have tightened up security a lot. Don’t want us back aft around our passengers any more than necessary. They (the passengers) are really kept in the dark. They never know where they have come from. Keep their trucks covered and aircraft curtains pulled; so they never know where we land, who we are, etc. etc. Same old C-46 pick-up as soon as we landed at ‘Oak Tree’.”264 But there were more Air America crews working for Southern Air Transport who, from time to time, flew DC-6 missions from Kadena, Okinawa, to “Oak Tree” on the East coast of India. Captain Jesse Walton made 3 flights to “Oak Tree”: no.1 on 18/9 June 64, as described above, no.2 on 25/6 August 64, and no.3 on 3/4 February 1965; each time, the flight was at night, and each time, the aircraft descended to 500 feet above the water to avoid radar detection.265 On 15-17 May 65, a SAT DC-6 piloted by Eddie Sims even delivered ammunition, weapons, and a small number of radios and inflatable rubber boats all the way from Okinawa to a drop zone a few kilometres from Tangya inside Nepal, making refuelling stops at Takhli and “Oak Tree”. India had allowed this flight in exchange for a shift of the Mustang guerrillas to positions astride the roads in Tibet. But disappointed about what they thought to be an insufficient delivery, the Mustang guerrillas returned to inactivity.266 In 1966/67, John E. Lee also made three or four trips to India, “arriving at ‘Oak Tree’ on the coast of India just before daylight. Zeke Zelitis, whom he knew at NACC, would meet [the] airplane and arrange for offloading (mainly arms; a Helio on one occasion). The crew would have a good meal, shower, and go to bed, then return that night.”267 Air America Captain Joe Hazen, also working for Southern Air Transport at that time, recalls similar flying conditions, when he flew his DC-6 to “Oak Tree” on 20 March 67 and on 27 April 67.268 Other flights were probably to follow, as in May 68, Air America DC-6 N90782 was still assigned to contract no. AF49(604)-4379 with the USAF’s Logistical Support Group for use by SAT out of Kadena.269

264 Costa, Diary, pp.25-27, in: UTD/Leary/B44F5. 265 E-mails dated 30 June 2002 and 20 July 2002, kindly sent to the author by Jesse Walton. 266 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.216-18. 267 John E. Lee, interview conducted by William M. Leary at Watkinsville, GA on 27 May 1987; Prof. Leary’s notes are preserved at UTD/Leary/B46F10. 268 E-mail dated 9 August 2004, kindly sent to the author by Joe Hazen. 269 “Status of aircraft” of 1 May 68, in: UTD/Herd/B2. 47

Southern Air Transport DC-6A N90781 at Taipei in February 61 (with kind permission from Mel Lawrence / Airliners.net)

In 1966, the CIA even scheduled four Boeing 727 flights between Okinawa and “Oak Tree”, to be made at low level to avoid radar and anti-American opposition at New Delhi – evidently using the aircraft of Air America / SAT.270 One such flight is known to have been flown for LSG in the night from 5 to 6 April 71, with “Doc” Johnson at the controls of 727

The 727 mission to “Oak Tree” on 5-6 April 71 (Page from “Doc” Johnson’s log book kindly submitted by his son James on 10 Aug. 2013)

N5055. On the way back to Yokota, another SAT crew member was apparently at the controls. Eddie Sims made several supply runs into “Oak Tree” in the Boeing 727, but no drops.271 The 727 flights into “Oak Tree”, as the DC-6 flights made earlier, had to be made at low level to avoid radar.272 The decision to buy Boeing 727s had not only been based on the desire by MATS to convert from DC-6s to jets in Southern AT’s inter-island contract with MATS, but also on the need for faster planes to support overflights of Tibet (STBarnum).273 In late 1966, the 727s

270 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.210; for the aircraft see the file “The jets” of my The Aircraft of Air America. 271 Interview with Eddie F. Sims conducted by Prof. William Leary at Watkinsville, GA on 27 May 1988, written summary at: UTD/Leary/B43F5. 272 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.210. 273 As early as 1961, the CIA’s Development Projects Division had declared that the aircraft needed for any overflights of Tibet was to have sufficient speed to complete the entire mission during the hours of darkness and to carry fuel for 3,000 miles. The plane had to possess a high degree of engine reliability to return over the Himalayas with one engine inoperative, a drop door that could be opened in flight, and a pressurized cabin (for the high altitude cruise segment of the flight) that could be depressurized upon arrival at the drop zone. The 727 with its ventral exit seemed to be the solution. In 1962, Air America’s CEO George Doole persuaded the Boeing 48

were delivered,274 but it took quite a while, until such a jump training is known to have been done. Of course, this was a top secret operation, and in such a case, information was given only according to the “need to know”-principle. What this principle means, is very well explained by former Air America and Southern Air Transport Air Freight Specialist John Kirkley who, in 1968, participated in training jumps from a SAT 727: “As you may know, all of our operations were on a need to know basis. During my indoctrination to the company in Taipei in 1965, I signed a document stating that I would not discuss any operations I was involved in or I would be subject of being fired. I was not given a copy of this document and assumed it was put in some personal file. When being sent on a specific operation we were encouraged not to talk about anything we did, even with other employees, however information trickled down. The accuracy of hearsay depended on whether you thought the source was credible. […] When the company knew that reporters or politicians would be in Vientiane on some sort of fact finding mission, we were informed at our meetings to be aware of this when out in the town and especially in bars at night. Information of our operations was secret.”275 In a memo dated 29 November 1971 (released in 2009), the CIA admitted that “the Boeing 727 aircraft also have drop capabilities out the ventral exit which can be opened in flight and Southern has crews trained in this procedure.”276 This is what can also be seen in the Air America documentary Flying Men, Flying Machines. A Portrait of Air America, which was made around 1970277, where the segment about training jumps and drops made from a Southern Air Transport’s 727 appears from 1 hour, 08 minutes, 40 seconds onwards. Flying Men, Flying Machines. A Portrait of Air America can now be watched at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tmMtzQwcWRA. The comment to that scene is purely technical, saying that the cabin could be depressurized before the drop and pressurized again after the drop, that is for the return flight. Since 1985, it was also known that the Boeing 727s were tested at Takhli for air drops with conveyer belt and rollers and that the system was never used in operation, although it worked well in the tests.278

Company to develop a cargo floor and a cargo door and to make test flights in the use of the normal ventral exit. After 2 successful test flights made in 1963, Boeing developed a 727 cargo version. After some financial discussions inside the CIA – Doole wanted to have the 727s for Tibet, the CIA only accepted to order them after MATS had told SAT that they were necessary for the Inter-Island contract –, Doole ordered 3 Boeing 727Cs for Air Asia, to be used by Southern Air Transport and Air America (Leary, Manuscript, ch. VI, pp. 619-621, in: UTD/Leary/B19F5). According to FBI material put together after the D.B.Cooper hijacking, “in 1963-1964, The Boeing Company had a team of 20 to 30 engineers and test pilots experimenting with the air stairs of the Boeing 727 to determine the plane’s adaptability for dropping cargo or personnel. In the tests conducted the air stairs were removed and packages were dropped from the plane using an especially designed chute” (FBI paper labelled “SE 164-81”, p.2, and “DB Cooper-8376”, kindly sent to the author by Dr. Robert Edwards on 1 March 2020). 274 See the file called “The Jets” in my The Aircraft of Air America. 275 John Kirkley, e-mail dated 23 February 2020, sent to the author and to Dr. R. Edwards. 276 CIA Memo no. 197110 for the CIA’s Deputy Director for Support, p.2, dated 29 November 1971, Subject: Southern Air Transport Inc., approved for release on 24 September 2009, kindly sent to the author on 18 February 2020 by Dr. Robert Edwards. The document can also be seen online in the CIA’s reading room at https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/197110.pdf . 277 The contract with John Willheim Productions for the production of Flying Men, Flying Machines was concluded in 1969 (see UTD/Leary/B59F13; see also UTD/CIA/B21F6). E. J. Theisen (who appeared in the documentary at 16 minutes, 48 seconds, misspelled ‘Thiesen’) was Base Manager Saigon in 1970, followed in late 1971 by Jack R. Barnhisel (for references, see my file “Company Management, Administration, and Ground Support II – at the times of Air America, Part 1: 1959-1973”). 278 Thomas C. Sailer, interview made with William M. Leary at San Francisco on 8 September 1985; professor Leary’s notes, preserved at UTD/Leary/B43F5. 49

Southern Air Transport Boeing 727 N5092 at Nha Trang in 1968 (UTD/Misc.Mat./B4F4)

Who knew about the SAT flights to “Oak Tree”, may have guessed that the training jumps and drops from the SAT 727 shown in the documentary had something to do with the Tibetan program. In the January 2014 number of Smokejumper Magazine, an article portrayed former smokejumper and Air America Air Freight Specialist (“kicker”) John Kirkley, who had been on a DC-6 mission in Okinawa October/November 1967 learning to be a morse code radio operator for night flying radio silence operations.279 This sounds like a preparation for some sort of top secret mission, and indeed, in the Smokejumper Magazine article we read: “Kirkley was later selected as one of seven air-freight specialists sent to Takhli, Thailand, on a secret mission to train to jump and drop freight from a commercial Boeing 727 jet. ‘There was unrest in Tibet on the Chinese border and the CIA wanted to do some tests to see if it was feasible to make high-altitude drops of paratroopers and cargo from a 727,’ he said. After making a few jumps and dropping several loads of cargo, Kirkley said the mission was eventually scrubbed.”280 I am very grateful to John Kirkley for having found the time to answer a couple of more questions about those jumps. Here are his answers:

“1. The exact date escapes me after 50 years, however I believe the date was in May 1968.281 I recall the plane was unpainted had no markings282 & I have no record of the tail number of the plane we jumped. 2. Yes, the test were only conducted with AFS from Vientiane and a couple of CIA case officers (customers). No Tibetans were involved in this test operation. 3. The rear stair case in the 727 was removed and the exit was then covered with riveted sheet metal. This made a sliding board that we sat on and slide out the rear with a static line hooked to the plane.

279 E-mail dated 3 March 2020, kindly sent by John Kirkley to Dr. Edwards and to the author. 280 Dr. Robert Edwards quoted these lines from the article in Smokejumper Magazine, January 2014, in his e-mail to the author dated 20 February 2020. 281 This date was later corrected from being the “spring of 1968” (E-mail dated 5 June 2020, kindly sent by John Kirkley to Dr. Edwards and to the author). 282 A photo taken at Saigon in October 1967 showing an unmarked Southern Air Transport 727 can be seen at http://www.flickr.com/photos/aodcurator/4059675378/ . 50

4. The test were done in the morning at approx. 1,200 ft.283 and the outside air temperature at Takhli was warm (70-80°). When we jumped or slide out the rear exit, the pilot put the flaps & landing gear down in a landing configuration in order to reduce the speed to (approx.) 135-150 knots. I noticed when we exited the 727 there was no noise or prop blast that I had experienced when jumping from reciprocating aircraft as a smokejumper. Inside the 727 cabin roller conveyers were installed to handle the cargo. Large cardboard boxes tied to a pallet were used for the cargo with parachutes attached. We were told that these were test to see if it was feasible to make drops of men and supplies in Tibet. […] As far as I know drops were never made from the 727 in Tibet.”284

John Kirkley, who left Air America in 1969, is not aware of more tests. He recognized some of the kickers that appeared in the documentary, but couldn’t say if the jumps and drops from the SAT 727 shown in the documentary were the tests he was involved in or if these were tests made on another occasion.285 Former Air America Air Freight Specialist Dan Gamelin reports that all people he had asked did confirm that the scene shown in Flying Men Flying Machines was the last occasion when such drops and jumps were made from a SAT 727.286 There were, of course, more SAT 727 flights to Takhli – for example, “Doc” Johnson flew SAT 727 N5055 to Takhli between 22 and 24 April 70 and SAT 727 N5092 between 4 and 7 March 1971287 –, but these shuttles for the LSG probably only carried some sort of supplies. The “need to know”-principle described above may explain, why so little is known about the exercise jumps and drops made from a 727. It was Thomas (“T.J.”) Thompson, who cleared up a couple of things about the 727 drop, when John Kirkley spoke with him on 28 March 2020: “First, Lou Rucker, (deceased) former OSS and airborne officer was running the program. T.J. was his deputy on the project and he did the set-up in the 727 with roller conveyors and the slide out the back. […] Also, he wanted to make the jump with us but Rucker told him no, he wanted him to be in the trail plane making the video. Jim Rhyne was the pilot of the Volpar chase plane […] and a professional photographer was hired to take the video of the drop, but he got sick and puked all over the plane about 10 minutes into the flight so T.J. picked up the video camera and did the shoot. This was the only jump/drop/video made by the CIA. He also said that the Tibet funds dried up and that was the reason the 727 project was cancelled and was not used to drop in Tibet. It was not as I heard the plane was unstable at altitude. He said all the logistics of making the drop had been done before we went to test at Takhli and they had intended to use it until the funds were cut.”288 The pilot of the 727 during the training drops and jumps was Bill Welk.289 So what was the situation in 1968? As an aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, through the spring and summer of 1967 and probably also later on, the empowered Red Guard took on the Chinese army in street battles across Lhasa and elsewhere in Tibet.290 As there were still some hopes to use the Mustang guerrillas, not all of whom had already been armed, in regional conflicts, “the resupply of arms and ammunition to the Mustang force” are still on

283 Later corrected from the original 2000 feet (e-mail dated 13 April 2020, kindly sent to the author by John Kirkley). 284 John Kirkley, e-mail dated 22 February 2020. 285 “No, I’m not aware of more test. This was what I heard at the time.” (John Kirkley, e-mail dated 23 February 2020). “I recognized the kicker releasing the load […]. The guy sliding out the back may possibly be […], but it is too fast to be sure. […] As to whether this was a different occasion I can’t be sure. Details have become rather foggy after half a century.” (John Kirkley, e-mail dated 25 February 2020). 286 E-mail dated 7 March 2020 kindly sent to the author by Dan Gamelin. 287 Pages from “Doc” Johnson’s log book kindly submitted to the author by his son James on 10 Aug. 2013. 288 E-mail dated 28 March 2020, kindly sent to the author and to Dr. Edwards by John Kirkley. 289 E-mail dated 13 April 2020, kindly sent to the author and to Dr. Edwards by John Kirkley. 290 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.228. 51

the agenda of the Memorandum for the 303 Committee of 26 January 1968.291 So, this was probably the background for the drop and jump training done at Takhli in May 1968, that is when the old 1966-68 Tibetan program was still valid, which provided for annual funds of $ 650,000.292 At that time, the new Fiscal Year began already on 1 July.293 This means that discussions for FY 1969 began in the spring of 1968. And the FY 69 funding for the Tibetan project went down from $ 650,000 to $ 500,000 per year requested by the CIA,294 but this sum apparently also included a gradual reduction of the Mustang force and their resettlement in the Pokhara area of Nepal.295 Of course, it does not make sense to drop additional arms and ammunition to a force whose resettlement to the Pokhara area had already been decided, and so there was no money for the drops and jumps that had been trained a little earlier. There was still another problem: the route to be flown for such a drop, if it had really been carried out. The first flights to Tibet originated at Kurmitola in East Pakistan. Because of political sensitivities between Pakistan and India, the staging area was moved from Kurmitola to Takhli in July 59.296 “Initially, they flew into Tibet through the back door: over Kunming and western China. Late in 1961, however, the Chinese shifted their air defense system 1000 miles to the west and flights were suspended for at least one moon phase. The route then shifted to fly over Burma, but the Burmese began to complain. Then India gave permission to fly over their territory.”297 At about the same time, relations between the US and Pakistan went down, and Pakistan closed its border for the Tibet project in 1961.298 So cooperation with India came into being in 1962/3, but fearing retaliation from China, the Indians did not allow border- crossing into Tibet. Supply flights to Mustang out of Charbatia needed the OK of the Indian Government, which happened only once, on 15-17 May 65,299 and India was more and more turning to the Soviet Union since 1967. But why, then, such a scene is shown in the documentary? Well, the documentary Flying Men Flying Machines was commissioned by Air America, and that possibly by order of the CIA.300 You have Air America’s CEO George Doole saying the introductory words, and it is

291 Memorandum for the 303 Committee, Washington, 26 January 1968, FRUS 1964-68. vol.30, doc.342, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d342 . 292 “At the time of the February 1964 review by the Committee, the projected annual cost for all Tibetan operations was $1,735,000. With the discontinuation of the training programs in the U.S., […] a reduction of $570,000 in this estimate for FY68 has been achieved. The remainder of $1,165,000 has been programmed in the CIA budget for FY68 for the activities described in this paper. Of this amount $650,000 was approved by the 303 Committee on 25 November 1966 in its review” (Memorandum for the 303 Committee, Washington, 26 January 1968, FRUS 1964-68. vol.30, doc.342, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964- 68v30/d342 ). 293 According to the US Treasury, at the time of the Vietnam War, the Fiscal Year still ran from 1 July to 30 June: “The first fiscal year for the U.S. Government started Jan. 1, 1789. Congress changed the beginning of the fiscal year from Jan. 1 to Jul. 1 in 1842, and finally from Jul. 1 to Oct. 1 in 1977 where it remains today” (quoted from https://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/histdebt/histdebt_histo5.htm ). 294 Memo of 1 August 1969 on Tibetan operations prepared by the CIA for the 303 Committee, Editorial note, FRUS 1969-1976 , vol. 17: doc. 273, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d273 . 295 “During FY 1972 expenditures for the Tibetan contingency force were further reduced in accordance with a plan for the gradual phasing out of the force approved by the Committee in 1969. Maintenance of the force will come to an end in FY 74; current funds provide for the training and resettlement of approximately 500 men per year of the original 1800 man force.” (Memorandum dated 6 September 1972, State Dept., FRUS 1969-1976, vol. 17: doc. 280, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d280 – emphasis is mine). 296 Interview with M. D. Johnson conducted by Prof. William Leary on 4 Aril 81, written summary in: UTD/Leary/B43F1. 297 Written resume, p.4, of an interview with B.G. Aderholt conducted by Prof. Bill Leary at Fort Walton Beach, FL, on 28-30 August 1990 (Interview dated 28-30 August 1990, in: UTD/Leary/B68F9). 298 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.160. 299 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.216-18. 300 Although there is no evidence of this in the documentary, Air America’s CEO George Doole wouldn’t have commissioned that documentary without an “ok” from his superiors at the office of the CIA’s Deputy Director for Support. A letter dated 29 April 1975 that William Colby, who was the Director of the CIA at that time, sent 52

his voice that explains the structure of the Company, its offices and that even comments some scenes, including the one that introduces the section about the 727 operation. The reason why the segment about the air drops and jumps from a 727 was included in the documentary seems to be that, as the 727 was never used for drops and jumps into Tibet, the drop and jump training was no longer considered to be secret. On the contrary, the scenes filmed in 1968 probably for internal documentation only,301 could demonstrate the drop capability of the 727 – something that potential buyers might be interested in. In 1976, former CIA General Counsel Lawrence R. Houston reported to the US Senate that “already in the late 1960s an internal decision was made about the 727s that: … ‘we probably couldn’t justify this major airlift with the big jets, and so we started getting rid of them. See, they had no utilization to speak of in Southeast Asia. A couple of supply flights went into [another area] and I think we used prop planes for that, to my recollection.’”302 Furthermore, as early as 10 February 1970, the Executive Committees of Air America and Air Asia noted “that the USAF does not intend to renew Air America’s [Yokota-centered] Booklift Contract beyond June 30, 1970. The Booklift Contract has grossed approximately $3,000,000 in transport revenues during the past year. The two DC-6A/B and two DC-4 aircraft now utilized on the Booklift Contract would be released for other use or disposition.”303 Although the Yokota-based 727s were not involved in the Booklift Contract, this notice may have been considered as some sort of signal that the end of operations out of Yokota may not be that far away. This is confirmed by a letter dated 28 March 1970, in which the head of the FAA’s Pacific Division wrote George Doole: “Our people at Yokota Air Base, Japan, tell me that there are a number of rumors indicating the possibility that Air America may terminate its maintenance facilities at Yokota sometime this summer.”304 Even clearer is a letter that George Doole, as Consultant to SAT, wrote to the Contracting Officer of the USAF’s Military Airlift Command on 13 March 1970: “Southern, as you know, has two Boeing 727s based in Japan and is also using a DC-6 hired two days a week from Air America to perform the Iwo Jima and Marcus flights. Usage of the 727s has, since the beginning of February 1970, declined to a point where it appears operation will result in a substantial loss and if Southern is to stay in the inter-island business, which it very much wants to do, additional flying will need to be found. In some way or another we will have to be able to realize a bit over 400 727 flying hours per month or 180,000 miles, if we are to make ends meet and continue our performance for MAC. […] We are now at something of a crossroad. If we can stay in Yokota with our 727s, we are prepared to include in the package one DC-4 to meet the requirements which are listed in your 9 March request for a proposal. The operation of a DC-4 as our only activity in Japan does not appear practicable.”305 In that case, the appearance of the 727 jump and drop sequence in the documentary seems to have been intended as some sort of advertising. On 18 November 1971, George Doole even offered the Chairman of SAT at Miami to buy the entire airline.306

to John Willheim, the producer of Flying Men, Flying Machines, makes clear that the CIA knew the documentary and even suggests, by the way it was written, that the Agency had a favorable view on it (see https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88-01365R000300080012-6.pdf ). So it is no wonder that the first shipments of documents that the CIA sent to UTD in the 1990ies also contained 3 undated VHS video copies of Flying Men, Flying Machines. They are preserved at UTD/CIA/B14. 301 The drop and jump training is described by a different voice than the rest of the documentary. 302 Former CIA General Counsel Lawrence R. Houston quoted in: Senate Report no.94-755, Foreign and Military Intelligence, I: Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Washington, 26 April 1976, Chapter “Proprietaries”, p.226, online readable at https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP92M00732R000700070024-8.pdf . 303 Minutes of Meetings of Executive Committees of Air America, Inc. and Air Asia Company Limited of 10 February 1970, p.3, in: UTD/CIA/B8F4. 304 See https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/197008.pdf . 305 See https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/197006.pdf . 306 See https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/197128.pdf . 53

Against this background, the comment made in the SAT document of 29 November 1971 mentioned above – “the Boeing 727 aircraft also have drop capabilities out the ventral exit which can be opened in flight and Southern has crews trained in this procedure”307 sounds like a search for new work to be assigned to Southern Air Transport’s 2 Air America-owned Boeing 727s.308 So it seems to be logical to assume that the documentary Flying Men Flying Machines, which already by omitting all of Air America’s paramilitary operations in Laos looked somehow like a publicity film, was to be shown to a larger public. This may have been contracting officers, buyers,309 press people or even selected TV stations.

George Doole, letter dated 13 March 1970 sent to the USAF, MAC regarding Southern’s Boeing 727s and the possible end of operations out of Yokota Air Base, Japan (https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/197128.pdf)

Then, something happened that changed everything: In February 1970, the Royal Laotian Government made the first appeal for B-52 strikes onto parts of central Laos. After some discussion at Washington, they were approved by President Nixon and carried out on 17-18 February, with more to follow. This led to an outcry in the US Senate, and within hours, the war in Laos wasn’t any longer secret. But more important for Air America was what happened at Long Tieng on 25 February 1970: With US Embassy invitation, journalists had been invited to visit the USAID center at Sam Thong, which had a 200-bed hospital, a junior high, and a high school. But three of the journalists were more interested in Long Tieng, left behind the larger party of the official tour, and walked down the trail to Long Tieng, where

307 CIA Memo no. 197110 for the CIA’s Deputy Director for Support, p.2, dated 29 November 1971, Subject: Southern Air Transport Inc., see https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/197110.pdf . 308 At as early as 8 minutes, 21 seconds, the documentary announces that Air America leases 2 727 “to another operator.” 309 Some parts of Flying Men, Flying Machines could really serve for a sales promotion tour with the seller intro- ducing himself at the beginning and the 727s, the Porters, the Caribous or Air Asia offered for sale. 54

they could walk around for nearly 2 hours, before they were stopped.310 The following day, an article entitled “Long Cheng yields its secrets” appeared in the Bangkok Post, written by T. D. Allman, one of the 3 journalists who, the day before, had become “the first reporters to observe and report US military activities at the clandestine CIA base at Long Cheng”.311 In this article, T. D. Allman wrote: “On the parking area, we saw no less than half a dozen American transport planes, mostly DC3’s and Caribous, though the field can take larger planes, and bearing the insignia of Air America. Also in the parking area, were a similar number of Short Take Off and Landing (STOL) planes. The STOL’s are the life-line for dozens of isolated government positions in northeast Laos, their American pilots ferrying in soldiers, arms and supplies to remote areas.” 312 The article also speaks of helicopters, T-28s, O-1s, and Jolly Green Giants seen at Long Tieng and continues: “There are also more radio antennae in Long Cheng, it seems, than trees. Some of them belong to Gen. Vang Pao’s radio station or to Laotian military offices. Most, however, sprout from CIA houses which are easily recognized by the air conditioners protruding from windowless buildings.” 313 The report from Long Tieng broke the dam and led to a flood of further revelations: In most cases, Air America’s paramilitary side is mentioned if not even in the center of an article like in Richard Halloran’s “Air America’s civilian façade gives it latitude in East Asia”.314 Sometimes, even Air America’s active role in the fighting is underlined. For example, on 7 July 1971, the Washington Star reported that “Air America helicopters have carried commando teams to the center of the PDJ”, and the following day, the New York Times reported that a “secret operation involving commando raiders, some led by CIA employees, is underway against Communists on the PDJ. Air America C-123s are landing on the PDJ.”315 On 19 January 71, reporters were allowed to visit Long Tieng, followed on 27 January 72 by “journalist Robert Rogers and three film and sound crewmen of NBC” who arrived at Bouam Long (LS-32), symbol of the resistance to the NVA,316 and apparently also visited Long Tieng.317 A good picture of how, step by step, Long Tieng had become known to a larger public since 1970 is given by Bangkok Post correspondent Don Ronk, who had visited the “forbidden valley” in mid-November 73, in Bangkok Post Sunday Magazine of 9 December 1973.318 So, since 1970, Air America’s involvement in paramilitary activities in Laos, which had been suspected since 1966,319 had become very well known by press articles and even by TV

310 Prados, President’s Secret Wars, pp.290/1. 311 T.D. Allman, “Long Cheng yields its secrets”, Bangkok Post of 26 February 1970, formerly preserved at UTD/Hickler/B3F16, now probably at UTD/Hickler/B21 or B22. 312 T.D. Allman, “Long Cheng yields its secrets”, Bangkok Post of 26 February 1970, formerly preserved at UTD/Hickler/B3F16, now probably at UTD/Hickler/B21 or B22. 313 T.D. Allman, “Long Cheng yields its secrets”, Bangkok Post of 26 February 1970, formerly preserved at UTD/Hickler/B3F16, now probably at UTD/Hickler/B21 or B22. 314 Richard Halloran, “Air America’s Civilian Façade Gives It Latitude in East Asia”, New York Times, 5 April 1970, formerly preserved at UTD/Hickler/B3F14, now probably at UTD/Hickler/B21 or B22. 315 Both articles are quoted from the notes taken in the late Professor William Leary’s notebooks, online readable at: https://www.utdallas.edu/library/specialcollections/hac/cataam/notebooks/aam71.pdf . 316 Both details are quoted from the notes taken in the late Professor William Leary’s notebooks, online readable at: https://www.utdallas.edu/library/specialcollections/hac/cataam/notebooks/aam72.pdf . 317 Don Ronk, “The long hard road to Long Cheng (and worth every mile)”, in: Bangkok Post Sunday Magazine of 9 December 1973, p.12, formerly preserved at UTD/LaShomb/B7F1, now probably at UTD/LaShomb/B18F2. 318 Don Ronk, “The long hard road to Long Cheng (and worth every mile)”, in: Bangkok Post Sunday Magazine of 9 December 1973, p.12, formerly preserved at UTD/LaShomb/B7F1, now probably at UTD/LaShomb/B18F2. 319 Reports about Air America being involved in the Secret War in Laos had appeared since 1966. For example, on 14 February 1966, the New York Times (formerly preserved at UTD/Hickler/B6F1, now probably at UTD/Hickler/B21 or B22) published an article about Air America Helios and Porters that not only supplied the civilian population, but also Laotian troops. The March 1966 edition of Blue Book (formerly at UTD/LaShomb/B2F28, now probably at UTD/LaShomb/B18F2) had a fanciful article entitled “Air America – the CIA’s secret air force”. It starts with Allan Pope being shot down in Indonesia and then draws a line from 55

reports, but little is known about who had seen Flying Men Flying Machines in the early days. Aviation Letter reported that Air America’s C-46 registered XW-PEJ appeared on the Swedish television in July 1971320 – and this aircraft is featuring several times in Flying Men, Flying Machines. But as Aviation Letter did not mention any other Air America aircraft in the same context, the appearance of XW-PEJ on the TV seems to go back to some news report from Laos and not to the documentary. On 18 October 1971, The Miami Herald published James McCartney’s story entitled “How the CIA runs secret airline in Asia.”321 There we read: “Marchetti322 recalls that at one time the CIA made a movie about its activities in Laos – hoping to get public credit for its long-secret activities. ‘The big star of the movie was Air America’, he says. ‘It carried the supplies and weapons into battle, supported the guerilla army of Meo tribesman, and evacuated the wounded.’ The movie was never shown publicly.” If it is correct that the movie, i.e. Flying Men Flying Machines, was never shown publicly, there could be a good reason for this: Flying Men Flying Machines had been filmed under the rules of the Secret War and so the filmmakers were not allowed to show Air America in combat scenes.323 But after the paramilitary side of Air America’s activities could no longer be denied, people who could have seen the documentary might have thought of it as some kind of propaganda trying to deny or hide the obvious. It is unknown if parts of Flying Men Flying Machines were ever used for finding buyers for the company or its aircraft. So, the next known mention of Flying Men Flying Machines – although only in an indirect way324 – seems to be in an answer that on 29 April 1975, CIA Director William Colby, a friend of Air America,325 had his assistant Angus MacLean Thuermer send to John M. Willheim, producer of the documentary, who had apparently wanted to speak with William Colby.326 In this letter, Mr. Thuermer first asks Mr. Willheim “to sketch out what it is you have in mind”, and then adds: “I might say that it has been our position that we do not think it is appropriate for us to be associated with any project which might be judged to be a public relations endeavor.”327 In the memo dated 16 January 2003 that the CIA sent to the National Archives

“mysterious” flights operated during the Korean War to a Chinese Nationalist B-24 bomber shot down over Burma in 1961 to South Vietnamese agents dropped into North Vietnam in 1966, attributing all this to Air America. On 1 September 1969, Aviation Week & Space Technology (formerly preserved at UTD/Hickler/ B3F14, now probably at UTD/Hickler/B21 or B22) reported that “Swiss Government last week embargoed delivery of three Pilatus Turbo-Porter aircraft believed to have been purchased by Washington-based Air America on the grounds they were to be used in support of the war in Southeast Asia”. On 18 September 1969, the New York Times reported that Air America was flying arms, supplies, and reinforcements in a larger war campaign in the Laotian panhandle. On 29 October 1969, the New York Times reported that Meo (that is Hmong) units had engaged in conventional battles in which they had been transported by Air America’s planes and helicopters. These details are taken from P.D. Scott, “Air America: Flying the US into Laos”, in: Ramparts, February 1970, p.39 (formerly preserved at UTD/Hickler/B3F16, now probably at UTD/Hickler/B21 or B22). This article gives a fanciful and somehow sinister history of Air America since the days of General Chennault’s Flying Tigers, culminating in the sentence: “Consciously or not, Air America’s operations were leading our country into war in Southeast Asia. And it is hard to believe that Air America’s directors were unconscious of this” (quotation p.53). 320 Aviation Letter, no.57, August 1971, p.20. 321 James McCartney’s article can be read online at https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1971-10- 18%20NEWSPAPER%20ARTICLE%20HOW%20THE%20CIA%20RUNS%20SECRET%20AIRLINE%20IN %20ASIA.pdf . 322 In the McCartney article, Victor Marchetti is presented as a “former special assistant to the CIA’s Chief of Plans, who quit in ‘disenchantment’ and is now cooperating with congressional committees.” 323 According to the main idea that the war in Laos was secret and had to remain secret, the documentary Flying Men Flying Machines underlines that Air America’s flying was just humanitarian work and that the Company also trained the technical and other skills of the local population. 324 A hand-written note on the letter adds that John M. Willheim had to do with Flying Men Flying Machines. 325 It will not be forgotten that William Colby was one of the persons who spoke to the audience at the unveiling of the Air America Memorial Plaque at UT Dallas in 1987. 326 Online readable at https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88-01365R000300080012-6.pdf . 327 See https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88-01365R000300080012-6.pdf . 56

at College Park, MD, position no. 28 lists Flying Men, Flying Machines as an “Air America publicity film.”328 So that letter written to John Willheim apparently meant that the CIA did not have the intention to release the documentary in 1975. Anyway, the documentary was eventually published, although it is unknown when. The next known mention referring to it is the date “1984 October 30” given for a Betamax version of Flying Men, Flying Machines belonging to the material of the late Professor William Leary that has been donated to the University of Texas at Dallas.329 And the first shipments of documents that the CIA sent to UTD’s Department of Special Collections in the 1990ies also contained 3 undated VHS video copies of Flying Men, Flying Machines.330 In May 2003, the CIA sent a VHS copy of Flying Men, Flying Machines to the National Archives & Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road, College Park, MD 20740-6001. At the beginning of the 21st century, a technically improved online version of the documentary was provided by Texas Tech University, and nowadays, the documentary can be watched at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tmMtzQwcWRA .

328 See http://www.docexdocs.com/n1263001.pdf – source indicated to the author by Dr. Robert Edwards. 329 See UTD/Leary/B78F7. 330 They are preserved at UTD/CIA/B14. 57

US-Indian cooperation: air transportation in India – the Aviation Research Centre

“Oak Tree” was the code-name of Charbatia Air Base, located north of the city of Bhubaneswar in the east of India, home of the Aviation Research Centre (ARC), an intelligence joint venture between the CIA and the Indian Intelligence Bureau, created on 7 September 63.331 Already in March 1963, a group of 8 Indians – 6 from the air force (incl. Colonel Laloo Grewal) and 2 from the Intelligence Bureau – had visited Washington, as had been arranged in February by CIA man Robert (“Moose”) Marrero and by Premier Nehru’s friend Biju Patnaik, Chief Minister of the Indian state of Orissa, where Charbatia was located. Then, the visitors from India attended a month of lectures on intelligence and paramilitary topics at Camp Peary. Then, accompanied by Patnaik, the US side, represented by CIA men Marrero and Gar Thursrud, visited the Himalayan frontier and the locations of Chakrata, Agra, and Charbatia, which was to be the principal site for clandestine air support operation. Colonel Grewal became the first ARC operations manager, intelligence officer Rameshwar Nath Kao became the first ARC director, and Colonel Edward Rector became the CIA operations advisor at Chabatia Air Base.332 Also earlier that year, crews of Intermountain Aviation of Marana, AZ had come into contact with the Indians. Former CAT, Air America, and Intermountain pilot Connie Seigrist recalls: “22 March 1963: Gar [= Garfield Thorsrud of Intermountain] and I flew a C-46 N9700Z on a local flight at Washington National airport in Washington, DC. Before take-off we were introduced to some Indian Nationals from India. They were there for the purpose to have an introductory flight in a C-46 type aircraft. There were six or eight of them dressed in civilian clothes introduced to me as representing the Air Force, CAA, and Commercial Interests from India. During the flight I let those that wanted to fly around a bit to get the feel of the controls to do so. One did most of the flying and I let him make the landing. I assisted him as necessary but he still did a respectable job for anyone the first time at the controls of a C-46. I would find much later his position was a Commander from a special unit in the Indian Air Force. His name: Commander Grewal. A few days before this flight, Gar had briefed me of the possibility of such a flight. The Agency was interested in forming an associated airborne type project in India with the Indians. The Agency proposed to quickly get the operation off the ground and into the air would be to acquire the C-46 model D readily available from USAF storage depots. When that opportunity began to materialize, the Agency gave Southern Air Transport of Miami, Florida a contract to perform a major overhaul on some C-46D’s to be flown to India for the project. Later Intermountain received part of the contract to do maintenance and flight test on some of the C-46D’s. Southern Air Transport also received the contract to deliver all of the C-46D’s to India. Air America Inc. from Tachikawa, Japan became the first proprietary involved in having received the first part of the overall contract, flying three333 of its C-46’s to Agra, India. Air America made available its American national pilots on the C-46’s. Air America also assigned one of their Helio Courier aircraft from Vientiane, Laos with its American pilot instructor for the project.334 Air Asia Co Ltd, an Agency maintenance proprietary from Tainan, Taiwan and Intermountain Aviation shared the maintenance responsibilities in India for the project. The Indians would receive

331 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.190/1. In May 1964, a CIA U-2 took off from Charbatia Air Base, performed a spy mission over Xinjiang Province of Red China, and rolled off the end of the runway after it had touched down again at Charbatia; hastily manhandled into a hanger, it was later repaired, and then discreetly flown out without attempting further overflights from Indian territory (Conboy / Kohli, Spies in the Himalayas, pp. 23/4). 332 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, 333 Only 2 Air America C-46s remained with the project: B-846 became VT-DRH, and B-854 became VT-DRI (see the C-46 file of this database). 334 Helio B-847 became VT-DRJ; the second Helio, VT-DRK, had formerly been a VIAT aircraft: XV-NAI. 58

ground school and line maintenance training until they were capable of managing their own maintenance. The Indian air operation was code named ‘Oak Tree’”.335 Since September 63, that unit trained agents for infiltration into Tibet,336 parachuted them to launch sites close to the border of Tibet, re-supplied those agents as well as paramilitary outposts, dropped supplies to the Tibetan guerrillas of Mustang, made reconnaissance flights close to the Chinese border,337 installed sensors on high mountain tops close to the border,338 later installed wiretaps, and did other covert operations, using among other aircraft up to 4 Helio Couriers, up to 7 Helio 500 Twin Couriers, and probably up to 22 C-46s. Former Air

Two Helio Twin Couriers on their way to India: N8745R (msn 2, to become VT-DVC) and N10037 (msn 7, to become VT-DVD), passing thru Sharjah on 16 March 66 and 6 April 66 respectively (with kind permission from the photographer, John Phillips)

America and Intermountain pilot Connie Seigrist gives some details about testing the C-46s destined for the project: “22 November 1963: I test flew N10703. It was a C-46D and our first aircraft of the Indian contract. Four other aircraft I personally flight tested were numbered N10708, N10710, N10705, and N10706.”339 All of those aircraft are described in detail in the C-46, Helio, and Twin Helio files of this database. Officially, even as late as 1969, at least the C-46s – which were later based at Delhi and did not bear any markings apart from the registration – were understood to have been used in relief work, especially in the Kashmir region,340 and so the flow of aircraft that joined the ARC was never affected by the total arms embargo and the termination of US military aid that President Johnson inflicted on India and Pakistan after both nations started a war in August 65. As starvation due to a constant shortage of food was a big problem in India during the early sixties, during this time, i.e. until 1967, many millions of tons of wheat per year were shipped from the United States to India.341 As to the aircraft of ARC, one of their C-46s was converted by CIA technicians into an electronic intelligence (ELINT) platform in 1964. Kent O. Williamson recalls: “The ELINT system was designed at Hsin Chu by me and I supervised the installation and modification of the bird down at the Air Asia facility in Tai Nan. There was an APR9, tape recorders, and a set of UHF receivers installed, after which we ran test and evaluation there in Taiwan. The bird was then ferried over to Charbatia, which at that time was pretty primitive and we immediately followed to set up the electronics shop, electronic spares and train the crews and

335 Connie Seigrist, Memoirs, p.67, in: UTD/Leary/B21F11. 336 Head of that Tibetan force was General Sujan Singh Uban, who, in the hill village of Chakrata, turned Tibetan refugees into warriors. ARC had been conceived as a covert air wing to infiltrate General Uban’s commandos into Tibet in the event of renewed hostilities with China (Conboy / Kohli, Spies in the Himalayas, pp.16+54). 337 Several missions are described in Conboy / Kohli, Spies in the Himalayas, pp.54-56 and 92/3. 338 These missions are described in detail in Conboy / Kohli, Spies in the Himalayas. 339 Connie Seigrist, Memoirs, p.67, in: UTD/Leary/B21F11. 340 Letter dated 29 April 2001, kindly sent to the author by Peter G. Hillman, Air-Britain’s specialist for India. 341 Wirsing, Indien, pp.287-93. 59

electronic techs. About a year later I was sent over there by HQS to do a fire investigation because the Indians had a ground fire and the aircraft was damaged too badly to fly. After wading through all the tall tales, some quite fantastic, I found the steel bottom of a can with the sides mostly burned off where a hole had been melted in the aircraft floor by the GNU [ground power unit] which puzzled me until I started watching members of the ground crews charged with cleaning the aircraft drawing avgas from the overflow valves at the trailing edge of the wing and using rags and the gas to clean the other aircraft. This rather dangerous practice seemed to be standard. In any event the ground crew member had been cleaning the inside of the aircraft and punched the start button on the GNU. He then dropped the gas can which set one foot on fire and the gas rag stuffed into his back pocket burned his behind, which explained why he was in the hospital with burns on his behind and foot. The aircraft was a total loss because the ELINT crew oxygen which was routed to each operator position has ruptured and the entire top of the fuselage had burned through. At the conclusion of the investigation I was having drinks one evening with the Indian Air Marshal who was a white bearded, Sikh with a turban and he insisted it was no one’s fault, ‘ – just fate.’”342 This aircraft flew regularly along the Himalayas recording Chinese telecommunication signals from inside Tibet. Sometimes, the ARC C-46s had problems with the altitude of some airports. Connie Seigrist recalls: “February 1964: The Indians had an airfield in the Himalayas located at about 12,000 foot elevation they wanted to service with the C-46D. They requested performance charts from sea level up to 12,000 feet. To the best of our research we were unable to locate performance charts for the D model C-46. […] As a result of the Indian request the Agency awarded Intermountain a contract to conduct high altitude take-off performance tests and construct charts for the aircraft. […] February 1964: N10705 was made available by the Agency for Intermountain to fly the altitude tests which would enable us to construct the performance charts. Intermountain maintenance installed a 1000 gallon fuel tank aboard N10705. The tank had a visual sight gage so that we could monitor filling the tank accurately with water to any desired level to be able to control our aircraft gross weight for take-off at different altitudes. […] The three airfield chosen as stepping stones in elevation were Albuquerque, NM 5,350 ft., Bogota, Columbia 8,000 ft, and La Paz, Bolivia 13,300 ft.”343 The tests took place between 28 February and 30 March 64. Perhaps as a result of these tests, some of the remaining 9 ARC C-46s received rocket boosters in 1964 that were installed on the bottom of the fuselages to allow the aircraft to take off from some of India’s highest airfields with heavy loads.344 As many Third World countries feared CIA infiltration even thru humanitarian organizations like the Peace Corps,345 Air America kept a very low profile in India, and many aircraft delivered to the ARC by the CIA passed thru the hands of the lesser-known Miami-based Marathon Aviation, which had close relations with Southern Air Transport,346 another CIA-proprietary since 5 August 1960.347 Marathon Aviation was not only the cover used by SAT DC-6s for their flights to “Oak Tree”, it is also known to have furnished at least 3 Helio Couriers plus Helio 500 Twin Courier VT-DVL, while Twin Courier VT-DVM, acquired in December 67, was the former N10034 of Air Ventures Inc.,348 the CIA-proprietary previously operating in Nepal.

342 E-mail dated 9 February 2011, kindly sent to the author by Kent O. Williamson. 343 Connie Seigrist, Memoirs, pp.67/8, in: UTD/Leary/B21F11. 344 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.171-207, especially pp. 190-95, 200/1, and 206-8. 345 Paterson / Clifford, America Ascendant. U.S. foreign relations since 1939, p.156. 346 See the “Valid Contract List” dated 7 July 1964, in: UTD/Kirkpatrick/B1F1. 347 See https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/196302.pdf . 348 FAA, US Civil Aircraft Register of 1 July 1966, p.135. 60

As to Air America, the Company not only supported the ARC by supplying the first 2 C- 46s (VT-DRH and VT-DRI)349 and the first 2 Helio Couriers (VT-DRJ and VT-DRK, of which VT-DRJ had belonged to Air America) in September 1963, but they also sent some of their best pilots to act as instructors for the ARC crews. Head of the C-46 conversion team was Bill Welk, and the Helio Courier and later the Helio Twin Courier conversion team was headed by Jim Rhyne, who also flew some reconnaissance missions in the Himalayas in 1965, using one of ARC’s Twin Couriers.350 The ARC Helios were used for supply missions to isolated paramilitary outposts along India’s northern border, and they flew supply missions to Kalsi airfield in 1965 to support the Nanda Devi operation.351 In 1965, the wrecks of 3 Helios (VT-DRK, VT-DRL, and VT-DRW) were transferred to Air America, while the 4th Helio (VT-DRJ) went to Continental Air Services in March 1966. In late 1964, the first 2 Helio Twin Couriers were delivered to the ARC and registered as VT-DTY and VT-DTZ in October 1965.352

ARC C-46 VT-DRX (msn 22311), taken by Former ARC Helio VT-DRK (msn 568), Denis Goodwin somewhere in India in 1966 rebuilt as “881” with Air America, (with kind permission from The Air-Britain Trust) Bangkok, late sixties (UTD/Hickler/B28)

Other instructors included M.D. Johnson, Al Judkins, and Maurice Clough, with Connie Seigrist and Tom Sailer providing additional C-46 training at Charbatia in early 1964.353 In the 1964 period, Connie Seigrist even flew Indian Air Force aircraft, when requested by the CIA to do so. In his memoirs, Connie Seigrist recalls his time in India as follows: “The last week of May [1964] I proceeded to New Delhi per Gar’s instructions and reported to Ed [= Col. Ed Rector]. Ed introduced me to Commander Grewal, the Indian Commander for the project. Ed and Commander Grewal informed me my first assignment would be at an airfield outside the city of Agra. I would be required to participate in an airdrop exercise that was scheduled. Also I might be required to fly an aircraft in the exercise. I reported to the airfield as required. I was introduced to some Americans I already knew and met some Indian Air Force Officers who informed me they would like me to fly a C-46 in a two ship night drop pattern late that evening over the Yamuna river bed nearby. The other C-46 would be flown by one of the Indian pilots in the program. Our drop would consist of Tibetan refugees who were in paramilitary parachute training. I noticed the parked C-46s we would fly were Air America aircraft. The Air Force weather forecast for the first night was a strong wind and the exercise was canceled until the following night. […] The next day the weather […] was forecasted to be fine that night for our airdrop exercise. […] I taxied out behind the other

349 In August 63, Chief Pilot Bob Rousselot sent Messrs. Rhyne, Welk, Sutphin, and Clough to “Oak Tree” to start the program there. They were the pilots of the 2 C-46s. Jim Rhyne remained in India until February 64, working most of his time “up in the hills” (Jim Rhyne, Interview conducted at Clayton, NC on 13 October 90 by Prof. Bill Leary, p. 2, in: UTD/Leary/B47F9). 350 Conboy / Kohli, Spies in the Himalayas, pp.54-56 351 Conboy / Kohli, Spies in the Himalayas, pp.54+67. 352 See my file https://www.utdallas.edu/library/specialcollections/hac/cataam/Leeker/aircraft/thelio.pdf and Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.207. 353 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.191/2, 255, 286. 61

aircraft to the runway. He took off and I waited the prescribed time for my take-off. After take-off I turned left, climbed to 1,200 feet, and was already established in the pattern as I could see the lighted drop zone on the sand and the river in the moonlight, although for some unknown reason the other aircraft’s navigation lights were not in sight. The lights had been on for take-off. I called on the radio to ask where he was so that I could space myself properly in case he had in some way gotten close in behind me. There was no answer to my radio call and I became concerned he might be in trouble. By this time I am approaching the lighted DZ when suddenly his navigation lights came on and he was directly in front of me slightly higher coming directly at me. If I had tried to turn out of his way following air navigation rules he would surely have flown into my wing. I had no choice but push on the stick and go under him with hopes he did not fly into the top of my tail. We missed by a hair. I turned quickly to the left hoping to miss any jumpers in case he had made his first drop. Luckily he had not made the drop. I continued my turn to get behind him and keep him in sight at all times determined, if he wanted to kill himself, he was not going to take me with him. After some time he finally made a left hand 180 turn over the river and went straight back to the DZ with me following behind him. I gave the jump master the light signal to prepare for the first jump. He came forward and said he was ready. Over the DZ I rang the jump bell. There was a pause for some reason, then immediately there was noise and yelling in the cabin. The jump master ran to the cockpit and said two of his jumpers were entangled and one was hanging by his leg out in the slip stream. I already realized by then we were in an emergency predicament as I was now having my hands full just trying to control my aircraft. The jump master went back to the jump door, but soon came to the cockpit again and said one jumper had parachuted free, but the other one was still hanging by his leg to a static line out in the slip stream. Also the jumper was too heavy for them to pull in. Suddenly the aircraft was controlling normal again. By now the excitement was on the level that English was forgotten and Hindu reigned supreme with me totally cut-off from any communication of what was going on in the aircraft. Finally when the jump master realized I was not getting the word, he informed me in English the rest of the jump was cancelled, some of his jumpers were injured, and we would go back to land. We landed, taxied back, and parked without further mishap. After one hell-of-a-sigh of relief on my part I departed the aircraft ready to celebrate for having come out alive of such a conglomeration of events. […] My opening initiation into the Indian operation was an eye opener to say the least, which left me elated the next morning when I was informed I was scheduled to return to New Delhi and catch a flight to Charbatia for continuing duties. […] I flew the same C-46 back to New Delhi. It was decided to use it as the air transport commuter for the project until cable mountings were available to restore it for parachute jumping. The Indians liked the Air America C-46’s much more than the C-46D’s we were making available for them. I assumed the reason they liked the AAM C-46’s better was from their polished aluminum commercial appearance compared to the militant blue-white paint look of the D models. Arriving in Charbatia I observed construction of major proportions in progress such as new hangars, runway improvement with extension of length, billets, admin buildings, transit quarters, etc., and close by permanent type construction of family housing. […] From this point on my stay and activity in India was mundane in the nature of aviation. I participated in flying, training, classroom instruction, and joined in casual social functions with the Indians. I commuted to New Delhi when called in by Ed. Ed would also come to Charbatia to stay abreast of the activities and see how I was fitting into the scene. […] I left the first week of July [1964] and returned to Marana.”354

354 Connie Seigrist, Memoirs, pp.69-72, in: UTD/Leary/B21F11. 62

In 1966, other ARC air bases like Doomdoomah or Sarsawa were added for special operations. As to the “Special Frontier Force” (SFF) created in 1966, “the Tibetan majority […] was being rotated along the Ladakh and NEFA border in company-size elements. Several ARC air bases were established specifically to support these SFF operations. In the northeast, the ARC staged from a primitive airstrip at Doomdoomah in Assam. For northwestern operations and airborne training, it used a larger air base built at Sarsawa, 132 kilometers south of Chakrata.”355 The SFF border camps were fed by food packages airdropped from ARC aircraft.356 Also in 1966, another ARC C-46 was dispatched to an airfield near Siliguri in the Indian state of West Bengal south of Sikkim. Its task was to resupply Tibetan guerrillas who had penetrated into Tibet to place taps onto telephone poles that paralleled the roads built across Tibet and who, from time to time, had to change the cassettes of the hidden recorder that was connected to the taps by a wire. “Taking off during predawn hours, the plane would overfly the Sikkimese corridor and be at the team’s position by daybreak. Flying with the rear door open, the kickers briefly took leave of their oxygen bottles and shawls to push the cargo into the slipstream.”357 But this program code-named GEMINI was put on hold near year’s end, as a Calcutta newspaper had reported about the mysterious flights over Sikkim. Having been unable to have the 2 ELINT C-130s desired by India approved by the 303 Committee in April 1966,358 the CIA sent 5 additional Helio Twin Couriers from Agency stocks plus 8 additional C-46s from Davis Monthan storage to India in the spring of 1966, with 2 more C-46s following in October 66. All of these 15 aircraft were officially registered to the Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, and appeared on the Indian civil aircraft register in early 1967 or later.359 But in the summer of 1967 the CIA reduced its links to the ARC, and the Indians decided to introduce Antonov An-12s to the ARC fleet and to increase the number of Mil Mi-4 helicopters already introduced earlier. In 1968/9 cooperation between the CIA and the ARC still existed: “In 1968, for example, agency technicians installed oxygen consoles in the unpressurized An-12 cabins for use during SFF parachute training. Because this aircraft had an extremely fast cruising speed – more than double that of the C-46 – a CIA airborne adviser was dispatched to India that spring to train an ARC cadre in high-speed exit techniques. Two years later, CIA technicians were back in India to modify an ARC An-12 with ELINT gear. CIA support for the SFF, meanwhile, was declining fast. One of the last CIA-sanctioned operations took place in 1969, when four SFF commandos were trained in the use of sophisticated ‘impulse probe’ wiretaps. Buried underneath a telephone line, the tap trans- mitted conversations to a solar-powered relay station on a border mountaintop in NEFA, which in turn relayed data to a rear base further south.”360 During the 1971 war between India and Pakistan, the Tibetans successfully defended the independence of Bangladesh, but at that time, cooperation between the CIA and India had already come down to nothing.361

© University of Texas at Dallas, 2006-2020

355 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.226/7. 356 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.227. 357 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.227. 358 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.219. 359 See my files at https://www.utdallas.edu/library/specialcollections/hac/cataam/Leeker/aircraft/c462.pdf and https://www.utdallas.edu/library/specialcollections/hac/cataam/Leeker/aircraft/thelio.pdf . 360 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.242. 361 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp.242-45. 63