Douglas Albert Munro – Why Guadalcanal “Saving Lives”, War Plans Orange, Rainbow 5, and Higgins Boats
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Douglas Albert Munro – Why Guadalcanal “Saving Lives”, War Plans Orange, Rainbow 5, and Higgins Boats Seventy-five years ago, on September 27, 1942, Douglas Albert Munro, a 22-year old Coast Guard Petty Officer and Signalman First Class died in combat on the Pacific Island of Guadalcanal. How did it happened, why was he there and why were American forces there? Douglas Albert Munro was born on 11 October, 1919, in British Columbia, Canada to an American father, James Munro and an American citizen (originally British) mother, Edith Fairey Munro. The family subsequently moved to South Cle Elum, Washington, where Douglas and his sister, Patricia, grew up and went to school. (1) After the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, Doug Munro made the decision to enlist in the military service. Considering both the Navy and the Coast Guard, he settled on the Coast Guard because, as he said, “The Coast Guard is focused on saving lives, not taking them.” (2) On the day that he was inducted, 18 September, 1939, Doug Munro met the man who would become his best friend in the Coast Guard – Raymond J. Evans. Doug and Ray met by chance as they walked up the steps of the Seattle Federal Building on the way to the Coast Guard induction center. (3) Douglas A. Munro Raymond Joseph Evans Jr. After a very brief “training” stint at Port Angeles, Washington, and three tours on the Coast Guard Cutter Spenser on “Neutrality Patrols” in the North Atlantic as Signalmen third class, Doug and Ray transferred to the Coast Guard-manned, Navy, attack transport USS Hunter Liggett in New York harbor. (4) The Hunter Liggett and its sister attack transports, Dickman, Leonard Wood, Wakefield, Alcyone, and Betelguse, left New York in mid-1941 and steamed south towards Onslow Bay and New River North Carolina, arriving there in early July, 1941. (5) USS Transport Hunter Liggett (APA-14) Each of the transport ships was fitted with about 15 Higgins boats (landing craft) originally developed by Andrew J. Higgins for use in oil company and civilian humanitarian rescue operations in the shallow-water swamps of Southern Louisiana. Doug and Ray were interested in working on those Higgins boats. As part of the continuing evolution of the Navy and Marine Corps’ amphibious warfare strategy, the Higgins boat was brought to the attention of the Navy and Marines by the Coast Guard at a time when the Higgins boats were exactly what were needed in early 1941. Prior to that time, troops and supplies had to be delivered to an invasion beach by small, ship’s boats, a process which had proven to be unreliable and which was unable to maintain the delivery of troops and supplies on an timely basis. Ship’s boat delivering troops to shore at Gallipoli 1915 At the beginning of the 1940s the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps had very little experience with small boats, such as the Higgins Landing Craft, whereas the Coast Guard had been using small boats to rescue people since the formation of the U.S. Life Saving Service in 1871. Because of their long and extensive experience, the Coast Guard was called into service by the Navy and Marine Corps early in the WW-II pre-invasion practice exercises. (6) Higgins LCP(L) boats The Higgins boat landing craft fit well into the elements of the strategy and tactics developed by Admiral Thayer Mahan in the 1890s in his work on “The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783,” and his other writings. In his extensive work at the Naval War College, Mahan explored the long history of the projection of national policy by superior sea power across naval power nations. By the 1930s, Mahan’s teachings and theories were naval warfare gospel, and were followed by most major naval powers around the world until WW-II. The development of aircraft carriers, air power and new classes of submarines during WW-II modified much of Mahan’s theories of the importance and impact of sea power. (7) Building on Mahan’s theories, beginning in 1907, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps developed “War Plan Orang,” one of several strategies originating at the Naval War College at the time. “War Plan Orange” postulated the evolution of a hypothetical war between the United States and Japan. (8) In this scenario, the Imperial Japanese Navy (the IJN) and the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) would invade countries throughout the Far-East, which they did in Korea in 1910 and Manchuria in 1931. At the same time, the Japanese Navy was pursuing a parallel strategy in which the United States was designated as the most likely “hypothetical” enemy in a future war. (9) War Plan Orange also dealt with the American response to Japanese attacks and occupation of islands extending across the Pacific. The aggressive Japanese military developments would be predicated on their efforts to gain access to natural resources not available in Japan and to provide a defensive ring around the home country in response to American Naval expansion. Based on misperception, arrogance and on Japanese military miscalculations of America’s willingness to sustain an extended period of war, the Japanese leadership fully expected to be able to use aggressive naval and army tactics to extend their sphere of influence across much of the Pacific-rim and to force the United States to sue for peace on terms dictated by Japan. In the scenarios created by planners at the American Naval War College, “War Plan Orange” and its successor, “War Plan Rainbow 5,” America’s response to Japanese aggression in the Pacific would be to “island-hop” across the Pacific destroying or bypassing Japanese naval and army forces along the way. Destroying Japanese forces would allow American to develop naval support bases, bomber and fighter based to attack Japanese forces, and to eventually isolate Japan – with or without occupying that country. (10) However, “War Plan Orange” required a Marine Corps amphibious capability to successfully attack the Pacific island beaches and destroy the Japanese defenders. Between 1923 and 1941 the Navy and Marine Corps conducted a number of Joint Navy and Marine Corps Fleet Exercises (FLEXs I-XXII) and on occasion included amphibious unit exercises on the East Coast, in the Caribbean, on the California coast and in Hawai’i. The U.S. Army also participated in some of these exercises. (11) Exploring the long history of worldwide naval experiences of the past, including the infamous British-led, failed invasion of Gallipoli, Turkey, during WW-I, the use of ship’s boats to transfer men and supplies to an invasion beach, the Navy and the Marine Corps concluded that using ship’s boats was not a workable strategy or tactic for the invasion conditions expected in WW II in the Pacific or in Europe. Landing with ship’s boats 1915 With the evolution of “War Plan Rainbow 5,” it became increasingly apparent that an alternative to ship’s boats was essential to military success, especially in the shallow, reef-surrounded waters of the islands in the South Pacific, but also in Europe. Building on Japanese naval experience with specialized, ramped landing craft and on the work and secret research of Marine Corps Lt Col. Earl Ellis on Japanese naval practices and intentions, the U.S. Navy reached the decision to test small boats developed by Andrew Higgins as a solution to putting troops and supplies on an invasion beach in a timely manner. (12) The landing craft designed by Higgins was the first, but not the only critical step in the solution to these problems. It was followed by the equally important development of the amphibian “Alligator” designed and developed by Donald Roebling, of the famous Brooklyn Bridge Roebling family. (13) Roebling Alligator Amphibian 1907 The Higgins boats that were fitted to the naval attack transports that Doug Munro and Ray Evans were assigned to in 1941 were a critical element in the war to come. This connection began the next phase of the journey towards an encounter with history at Guadalcanal for Douglas Munro and Raymond Evans. It also helps to explain why Doug and Ray were at Guadalcanal beginning in August 1942. On 1 November 1941, just weeks before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawai’i, an order was signed by President Roosevelt transferring the Coast Guard from the Department of the Treasury to the U.S. Navy, placing Doug Munro and Ray Evans in the Navy. (14) On reaching Onslow Bay, North Carolina, Doug and Ray began training to operate the Higgins boat landing craft that the Hunter Liggett and the other transports were carrying. During the summer and fall of 1941, Doug and Ray continued to hone their skills as small boat drivers on these small boats. On 7 December 1941, while aboard the Hunter Liggett and headed for the South Pacific and rounding the tip of South Africa, Doug and Ray listened to radio reports of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. After making a few more transits between the U.S. and the Pacific, and quite a bit of additional training on the landing craft with the Marines at New River, on 9 April 1941, Doug and Ray were headed for Wellington, New Zealand aboard the Hunter Liggett, arriving there on 28 May, 1942. New Zealand was to be the staging area for the upcoming American invasion of Guadalcanal. Known as “Operation Watchtower,” it was to be the first major American revision to the “Germany First Strategy” that had been agreed to by President Roosevelt and the leaders of Great Britain.