Problem of the Pacific and the New Policies of Bolivia

THE Problem of the Pacific And the New Policies of Bolivia

BY LUIS BARROS BORGOÑO Former Minister for Foreign Relations of Chile Together with TWO JURIDICAL REPORTS By JOHN W. DA VIS, LL. D. President American Bar Association Former Ambassador of the United States of America to Great Britain THE Problem of the Pacific And the New Policies of Bolivia

BY LUIS BARROS BORGOÑO Former Minister for Foreign Relations of Chile

Together with TWO JURIDICAL REPORTS By JOHN W. DA VIS, LL. D. President American Bar Association Former Ambassador of the United, States of America to Great Britain

The Sun Job Printing Office, Baltimore, Md. 1934 INDEX

CHAPTER I

Bolivía and the League of Natioiu Page 1—Bolivia Appeals to the League of Nations 3 2—Bolivia's Attitude Toward the Treaty of 1904 6 3—Influences and Contradictions 9 4—Solidarity of Intereats Between the Ex-Allies of 1879 11 5—Minister Gutiérrez a Diplomatic Enigma 15

CHAPTER II

The Respect for Principies of International Late

1—Treaties As the Law of Nations 17 2—The Interests of America 20 3—Chile Has Had Only One War Since Her Emancipation 21 4—The Secret Treaty of 1873 Made Arbitration Before the Conflict of 1879 Impossible 22

CHAPTER III

Genesis of the Secret Treaty of 1873

1—A Secret Agreement 26 2—Peruvian Naval Demonstration in 1872 27 3—Bolivia Snbmit8 Herself to Peravian Inflnence 27 4—The Acta of November 19, 1872 28 5—Confidential Note of Riva Agüero, November 20, 1872, Regarding Military Intervention of Pera 29 6—The Secret Treaty of Febrnary 6, 1873, Is Signed, and Bolivia Is Encouraged in Her Controversy With Chile 29 7—Bolivia Rejects the Lindsay-Corral Agreement 30 8—Bolivia Is Enconraged to Break Her Treaties With Chile 31 III. CHAPTER VIII

The Secret Treaty of 1873 Was an Offensive Alliance Against Chile

Page 1—Since 1873 Perú Offered Her Armed Mediation 32 2—Aggressive Nature of the Secret Conspiracy 32 3—Efforts Made to Isolate Chile 37 4r—Revulsión in the Argentine Senate.. 38 5—The Curse of the Peruvian Deputy Basadre 39

CHAPTER V

The Nitrate Monopoly Leads to the Secret Treaty and Wat

1—The Policy of Commercial Preponderance 40 2—Peruvian Laws Relating to the Nitrate Monopoly..,, 40 3—Chilean Nitrate Fields in Antofagasta 41 4—Bolivian Nitrate Fields of Toco 41 5—Transaction of 1883 43 6—The Nitrate Certificates; Their Payment by Chile in 1887 43 7—Chilean Policy of Commercial Freedom 43

CHAPTER VI

The Rights to the Coast

1—Quarrels Over Boundaries 45 2—Titles and Controversies 46 3—The Rights of Chile to the Atacama Desert 46 4—Chilean Jurisdiction on the Coast 49 5—Cobija, the Only Port of Bolivia 50 6—Possession De-facto Without Legal Title 53 7—"Epítome Chileno" by Field Marshal Santiago de Tesillo, 1648 53 8—The Treaties of August 10, 1866, and August 5, 1874 . 54

CHAPTER VII

The Conflagration of the Pacific

1—Breaking of the Treaty of 1874 56 2—Peruvian Diplomacy in La Paz 60 3—Perú Denies the Existence of the Alliance and Offers Her Mediation 61 4—The Lavalle Mission 63 5—The War With Perú and the Treaty of Ancón. 64 6—Bolivia and the Truce Pact of 1884 68 IV. CHAPTER VIII

The Negotiations of 1895

Page 1—Bolivia's Port 72 2—The Treaties of May 18, 1895 75 3—The Protocol Signed in Sacre, December 9, 1895 77 4—Explanatory Protocol of April 30, 1896 78 5—A New Reserration; the Legislativo Agreement. of November 7, 1896 79 6—Law of December 31, 1895, by whieh Chile approves the Treaties of May, 1895 83

CHAPTER IX

Commercial Policies.—Bolivia Abandona Her Aspiration to a Port

1—The Errázuriz Circular of September 30, 1900 89 2—The Aramayo Negotiations of 1902 90 3—The Edwards Negotiations of 1903 91 4—Public Opinión in Bolivia Favors the Negotiations 93 5—President Pando Accepts the Renunciation of Territorial Com- pensations 93 6—President Montes Makes an Agreement With Chile the Basis of His Presidential Program 94 7—Señor Gutiérrez Defends the Cession of Territory and the Aban- donment of a Port 95

CHAPTER X

The Treaty of Peace of 1904

1—The Edwards-Pinilla Agreement of December 24, 1903 97 2—The Peace Negotiations . 98 3—The Treaty of October 20, 1904 99 4—The Confidential Protocol of October 20, 1904 100 5—Minister Gutiérrez and the Declaration of the Parliamentary Minority 101 V. CHAPTER VIII

Relativity of International Agreements Page 1—Rights That Are Reborn 108 2—Aspirations That Do Not Die and Negotiations Postponed 109 3—The Immanent Right of Nations 112 4—The pogession of a Coast As an Attribute of Sovereignty 113 5—The Former Bolivian Coast As a Guarantee for the Commercial and Political Development of the Country 115

CHAPTER XII

The Demand of Bolivia 1—Erroneous Concept Regarding the International Role of the League 117 2—The Revisión of Treaties Can Be Effected Only by Agreement of the Signatory Parties 120 3—Definition by Victory 121 4—Perú and Bolivia in Agreement 123 5—The Bolivian Petition 127 6—Alleged Imposition of Treaty by Forcé As a Cause Justifying Its Revisión 128 7—Alleged Inapplication of Treaty As Another Cause 130 8—Threat of War 132 9—Bolivia's Condition As a Mediterranean State As a Fourth Cause Justifying Revisión of the Treaty 133 10—Inadmis8ibility of the Petition Because of Incompetence of the League 133 11—Juridical Reporte . 134 12—The Commission Appointed by the League Declares the Bolivian Demand Inadmissible 136 13—Lord Balfour's Epitaph 137

CHAPTER XIII The Responaibility of the Aggressor 1—International Law Before and After the War of 1914 138 2—The Responsibility for Conflicts 139 3—Bolivia Armed Herself in December, 1878 140 4—Chile Unprepared for War in February, 1879. Secret Minutes of the Senate, April 2, 1879 141 5—Improvised MilHary Prepara tions; Secret Minutes of the Senate of July 30 and August, 1879 144 6—The Civic Virtues of the Chilean People, and Their Strong Political Organization Secare Victory 147 7—The Chilean Policy of Harmony 147 VI. CHAPTER XIV

Solidarity Bettceen the Vanquished

Page 1—The Confidential Protocol of October 20, 1904 149 2—The Bello Mission of 1919 153 3—Military Revolution in Bolivia, July 12, 1920 154 4—The Executive Conncil and the Diplomatic Corpa; Declaration of the Chilean Chargé d'Affaires 155 5—Assembly of the League of Nations, Septemher 28, 1921 157 6—Bolivia Rejects the Offer of Direct Negotiations and Solicits an Invitation to the Washington Conference 159 7—The Oíd Allies 161 8—Future Policy of Chile 162

APPENDICES

1—Secret Session of April 2, 1879 165 2—Secret Seseion of July 30, 1879 166 3—Session of August 2, 1879.... 174

JURIDICAL REPORTS

BY JOHN W. DAVIS, LL. D.

1—The Reqnest of Bolivia to the Leagne of Nations 178 2—The Reqnest of Perú to the League of Nations 189

VII. Copyright by Luis BARROS BORGOKO SEÑOR LUIS BARROS BORGOÑO.

(Biographic data taken from "Chüeans of To>day" by William Belmont Parker.)

Luis Barros Borgoño, public man, born in Santiago May 26, 1858. Received secondary education in the National Institnte from which he was graduated in 1876 with the degree of Bachelor of Philosophy and Letters. Studied in the Law School of the University of Chile, devoting part of his time to the teaching of history in the National Institnte, and in 1880 was admitted to the Bar. In 1883 he was appointed to the Chair of Documentary History in the Teachers' College of the University of Chile, and in the same year placed at the head of the Diplomatic División in the Ministry for Foreign Relations. As a result of his competency in this department he was selected for a special mission to the General Headquarters of the Army of Occupation in Lima. In 1884 he obtained, in open competition, the post of Repórter to the Snpreme Court and held this position until 1889 when he was invited to assume the portfolio of War and the Navy in a Cabinet which resigned in January, 1890, because of disagreements with President Balmaceda. He was appointed provisional Secretary of War during the stormy days following the collapse of President Balma- ceda's government. In September, 1891, he entered the service of the Caja de Crédito Hipotecario (a mortgage bank of the Government) and held the position of Treasurer until 1901. In March, 1892, he was appointed Minister of War and the Navy; in 1894, Minister for Foreign Relations and in this capacity he materially advanced the final adjustment of Chile's relations with Bolivia. At the end of President Jorge Montt's administraron, when war with Argentina seemed imminent, he again held the portfolio of War and the Navy. At the present time Señor Barros Borgoño is Manager1 of the Caja de Crédito Hipotecario, and during the administration of President Sanfuentes he held the post of Minister for Foreign Relations, in which capacity he signed for Chile the Covenant of the League of Nations. In 1920 he was defeated as a candidate for the Presidency of the Republic of Chile by a cióse majority in favor of His Excellency Don Arturo Alessandri. He is the Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters of the Uni- versity of Chile and a member of the Chilean Academy. He was one of the Chilean delegates to the Fifth International Conference of American States held at Santiago during 1923. Besides being a frequent contributor to newspapers and magazines of his country, he has also published several books on history and education, the last of which is the one we now have the pleasure of introducing to the English-speaking public. CHAPTER I

BOLIVIA AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 1. Bolivia Appeals to the League of Nations. 2. Her Attitude Toward the Treaty of 1904. 3. Influences and Con- tradictíons. 4. Solidarity of Interests Between the ex-Aüies of 1879. 5. Minister Gutiérrez a Diplomatic Enigma. 1. Bolivia Appeals Early in its session of 1921 the attention % t^ation^Ue the General Assembly of the League of Nations was called to a petition placed before it by the Bolivian Delegation, demanding preference on the agenda. The representatíves of the great and email nations congre- gated there for the purpose of discussing the numerous political and economic problema afficting the world since the war of 1914 were obliged to put aside the problem of Silesia, the Greco- Tur kish war, the cry for help of Armenia, the difficulties of Albania, the question of reparations, the Russian conflagration, and the many other grave matters perturbing Europe, and the "Problem of the Pacific" was, for a few hours, the enforced topic for discussion at that Assembly. Although Bolivia does not appear among the nations to receive repara tion, she sanctioned the indemnities and gave her assent to the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles. Her disinterestedness disappears, however, as soon as the League of Nations, called upon to enforce the fulfillment of the Treaty of Versailles, begins its role of mediator between the belligerent nations and executor of the mandates conferred by the same Treaty. Bolivia then deems it necessary to focus the attention of the League on the tre'aties that defined her responsibilities in the War of the Pacific of 1879. In other words, forty years after the conclusión of a war brought about by motives and circumstances probably ignored by the representatíves of the Great Powers, Bolivia desires that the League of Peace should undertake to dig up anew the causes of oíd quarrels and complex commercial 3 problema, stirring once again passions long forgotten and entirely foreign to the problema of Europe. Thoae acquainted with South American problema are aware that the so-called War of the Pacific came to an end in 1881 and that the reaponaibilitiea of that conflict were defined, in ao far as the difficultiea between Chile and Bolivia were concerned, first by the Truce Pact of 1884 and then by the Treaty of Peace and Amity of 1904 which was definite and finaL The fact that in 1914 the great European war shook to ita foundations the atructure of peace, doea not in itaelf explain what special connection that conflict may have had with the foreign policiea of Bolivia. Neither haa it been poaaible to show in what way the intereat8 of Bolivia were affected by the war, notwithatanding the fact that ahe broke off diplomatic relations with Germany. If we are intereated in diacovering the motives that caused her to take that step we must satisfy oureelves that ahe was moved by 8entimenta of right and juatice, and eapecially those regarding the sanctity of and respect for treatiea that were then being proclaimed to the world. The Treaty of Yeraaillea impoaed on the vanquiahed nationa auch conditiona as the victors conaidered to be commenaurate to the damages and sacrificea caused, and showed at the same time in practical form the guarantees for the future peace of the world. No diplomat haa endeavoured to convert the peace of the belligerents into a war of the neutrala, or endeavoured to transform the concept of peace and harmony into a prologue to a new disturbance between nations that have absolutely no difficultiea pending between themaelvea. Bolivia's appeal to the League of Nationa has been an effort to renew a controveray that had been aettled by arms and regulated by varioua aolemn treaties. If her attitude was to her justifiable because ahe con- aidera heraelf one of the belligerent nationa, it is| well known that Chile ia not one of the vanquished. Chile has cooperated with the League of Nationa inspired by motivea above all selfish interesta, with no intentiona of securing with the aupport of other nationa benefita that a aovereign and independent atate does not have the right to claim for heraelf. She haa gone to Geneva inspired by her concept of free nations, shapers o'f their own deatiniea; ahe haa gone to affirm once again her policiea 4 of peace and harmony, and to give adherence to that work of respect for treaties, which has always been the keystone of her foreign policiea. The matter placed by Bolivia before the delegates of the nations does not refer to an existing litigation ñor to acts that might lead to an armed conflict, thus demanding the immediate attention of the Assembly. No circumstances have occurred "affecting international relations which threaten to disturb international peace" as contemplated in Article 11 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, neither are we aware of any acts that might affect the "peace of the world" as considered in Article 3 of the Covenant. None of these things has happened. Bolivia has sought the offices of the League of Nations solely in an endeavour to avoid the fulfillment of a treaty that she signed seventeen years ago, a treaty that defined, the political, economic, commercial and other relations between Chile and Bolivia, consecrating in definite form, the situation created by twenty years' application of the Truce Pact of 1884, and creating sacred obligations between the two nations. It is understood that the Covenant of the League haa contemplated that in an extreme case, when the peace of the world is threatened, the Assembly can advise the nations menacing peace to examine the stipulations or situations that provoke their action. But from this it cannot be established that the existing treaties can be broken, or that it be required of nations that they revise all their international obligations. The instrument designed to secure peace would then be converted ipso jacto into a power poisoned by hatreds and passions; the or- gañiz ation called to seek cooperation among the nations would be only a machine of war for the purpose of stirring up the causes of oíd quarrels. No prescription of thie Covenant can be interpreted as against the 'fundamental principie of the League, that is, the establishment of peace. That is why the distinguished President of the United States, on presenting the project to the Organizing Committee of the League, declared that the essential purpose of the pact was to "scrupulously respect all the obligations of treaties in the 5 mutual relations of the organized peoples." In accord with this spirit, the first base agreed upon in the first session of the Peace Conference had as its object the preservation of this fundamental principie. It states: "To create a Society of the Nations, an organ of international cooperation that can assure the fulfillment of the international obligations contracted and provide guarantees against war." These ideas are expressly stated in the preamble to the Covenant and form the foundation of the entire atructure.

2. Bolivia's Atti- In the first moments of existence of the tude Toward League of Nations, with Austria, Germany, the treaty of 1904. and Russia absent; with the observations formulated by the Argentine Republic pending; and with the approbation of the United States in suspense, or rather with a full knowledge of her refusal to adhiere to the Covenant, and a separate treaty in effect between that nation and Germany, the Bolivian representatives desired that the Assembly, on petition of only one of the parties concerned, declare itself competent to pronounce on the validity of the Treaty of 1904 between Chile and Bolivia. The Treaty has been in existence for seventeen years. Chile built the railroad that has united La Paz with the port of Arica, to do which she obligated herself in the Treaty; she has observed the stipulations regarding the construction of railroads in the interior of Bolivia; she has paid the credits she took charge of, and, in a word, given strict fulfillment to the obligations that the Treaty imposed on her. Bolivia, on the other hand, recognized the situation that the Truce Pact had sanctioned for twenty years, and confirmed definitely the incorporation to Chilean territory of thie former Bolivian coast to the north of Antofagasta, situated between parallel 23° and the Loa river, the southern boundary of the Province of Tarapacá. The state of affairs that the war of 1879 had liquidated remained definitely gettled by the Treaty signed twenty years later, and in the drafting of which various 6 administrations of Bolivia had taken. part and practically all of her public men. Many solutions had been proposed during this period. Chile had carried her acquiescence and desires to satisfy the aspiratíons of Bolivia in the most ampie form to the point of ceding to her the rights in the región of Tacna and Arica, and even assuring her, in any event, of an outlet to the sea on the northern boundary of the Province of Tarapacá. She considered that in this way she was giving unmistakable proof of her desires to contribute, as far as possible, to the securing of a port by Bolivia. In the antecedents to be given later it will be seen how Chile carne to give form to this thought in a Treaty that, although clothed in all the formalities of a diplomatic adjustment became ineffective by the solé action of Bolivia two years after the exchange of ratifications. From that moment Bolivia abandoned the idea of a coast and ports, and her leaders and principal publicista bent their energies to prove that the effective needs of the nation are best satisfied by an adequate system of interior railroads and mternational routes that would assure free commercial transit through the Chilean ports of Antofagasta and Arica. In speeches, books, and addresses of all kinds, the public men of Bolivia manifested with ardor these ideas, and even maintained that the possession of a coast with ports imposed sacrifices greater than the advantages obtained, and carried with it responsibilities and obligations of which the country was exempt in its actual condition. Furthermore, during the time that the coast had been in the possession of Bolivia, with Cobija as its only port, that región had remained absolutely foreign to the political and commercial life of the country. The distance from any populated center and the barrier of a great desert isolated it completely, making its commercial valué slight, and causing it to be completely neglected in its administrative services. The Central Government found it impossible to exert its authority and on one occasion the President of Bolivia, requested Chile to make her authority effective and execute justice on the coast. 7 The trade route to Bolivia waj by Arica and later was attracted to the international route of Moliendo, Perú. The growth of the port of Antofagasta and the development of that zone, thanks to the efforts and capital of the Chilean Nitrate Company, gave life to this región. After the war of 1879 when Chile reasserted her authority over this territory which not only belonged to her by ancient rights but had been developed by the energy of her citizens, the growth of the región permitted the construction of the railroad—with the same capital and the same energies—that opened Bolivia and the rich southern provinces to the sea, providing the safest and freest international way. The political and commercial relations between Chile and Bolivia could not but grow during the period covered by the Truce Pact, and since the Treaty of 1904, and in view o'f the way that Chile complied with her obligations, they have grown most cordial. Bolivia has had two outlets to the sea, one the Arica-La Paz railroad to the North and the other the Antofagasta railroad to the South, both Unes connecting with the interior railroads of the country. Chile, whose ports only influence 16% of Bolivian territory, has been responsible for the development of 75% of the Bolivian commerce, due entirely to the railroads built over the Andes. The rest of Bolivian territory, or 84%, over which the influence of Chilean ports is not felt, is practically in a state of abandonment, notwithstanding its immense wealth, waiting for the development of trade routes by means of the great rivers to the North and South of the territory. The construction of the railroad from Madre de Dios to Puno1 and the ones that will pass through the valleys of Mamoré and Beni, will, in the future, open up communication with the Amazon; and the Bermejo and Pilcomayo rivers of the Parana and La Plata zones will offer new sources of communication once the railroads reach these points. Communication between the Southi of Bolivia and the North of Argentine has been made possible by the construction of the railroad that unites Uyuni, of the Antofagasta-Potosi system, with Quiaca, on the Argentine frontier. Turning to the present and future commercial require- tnent8 of the zone under the influence of the Chilean ports 8 Arica and Antofagasta, we find that Arica has a capacity of 500,000 tone, while the Bolivian requirements have reached only 49,153 tons, the local traffic being very reduced. Thus the works constracted are ten times greater than the requirements of the Bolivian zone that they can serve. The increase in the railroad material for the Arica line and the new works that the Chilean Government has decided to build will place this line in a position to handle any demanda that the future commercial necessities of Bolivia and this zone may cali for. The movement by the Antofagasta railroad and port has been 86,766 tons. The ports of Antofagasta and Mejillones, with the new works under construction, have a capacity of 2,500,000 tons, that is, they present a margin of 1,000,000 tons over their present movement. This increase is fourteen times the present commerce of Bolivia and greatly exceeds the expectations of even the most optimistic.

if^p^si

3. Influences and This situation of commercial prosperity, of harmony and tranquility in her relations with Chile, Bolivia is endeavouring to alter, moved by sentiments and interests surely not her own. Judging by the speeches of her ambassadors to the Peru- vian Centennial Celebrations, Bolivia is at present heartily in sympathy with the work recently begun by the President of Perú to regain possession of the territory lost in the war, the materialization of his policy of open hostility toward Chile. Has the hatred that has continually inspired the rulers of Perú succeeded in suddenly dominating the reflexive spirits of the leaders in La Paz? Or are there more efifective ties that have been able to create a community of interests, or aspirations that it is hoped can be realized jointly? It is a fact that there has been little diplomatic mystery in the preponderant influence of Perú over the Foreign Office of La Paz since the rise to power of the Republican party in Bolivia. One of the planks in the program of the Republi- 9 can party has been the return of the coast provinces, not given much attention to when agitated by erratic and isolated impulses. The matter became more serious, however, when the party carne into power following a revolutionary coup, replacing the Liberal party, which for over seventeen years had govemed the country, working for public peace and progress in every line, and for the definí te settlement of peace with Chile, and the territorial questions with Perú and Brazil. But during tüe last period of the administration of the Liberal party, and in the presence of the Republican propaganda for the return of the provinces, the Minister of Foreign Relations, don Alberto Gutiérrez, who occupied that post in 1918, thought it opportune to send out the diplomatic circular of February 24, 1919, questioning the validity of the existing Treaty between Chile and Bolivia, a Treaty that had been signed fourteen years before by Sr. Gutiérrez himself, as Minister of Foreign Relations, and ardently defended by him as a publicist. At this time General Montes, who, as President, had ratified the Treaty, presented himself before the Minister of Foreign Affairs in France to demand that the Tribunal of the League of Nations revise or abrógate the pact with Chile. In his desire to obtain a port for Bolivia he neglected to deal directly with the nation that might be able to satisfy these aspirations, making an idealistic appeal that could interest no real statesman. We mention the incident because it shows how the Liberal party was also setting out, although along a different path, to claim a port for Bolivia. The difference in policy between the two political groups is in the method of securing it. General Montes and the most prominent men of the Liberal party set their eyes on the provinces of Tacna and Arica which are subject to the plebiscite established by thte Treaty of Ancón. On the other hand, the Republican party seeks the return of the coast of Antofagasta. Thus we find ex-Minister Gutiérrez, who as Minister of Foreign Affairs, signed the Treaty of 1904, questioning its validity, and, as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republican 10 President Sr. Saavedra, bringing the matter before the League of Nations for the revisión of the Treaty, the delegates of Bolivia to the League requesting the return of the "coast which we formerly owned."1 By the Treaty of 1904 Bolivia secured an international railroad, commercial concessions, and cooperation in the building of her interior railroads, and abandoned her claims to a port establishing a strong political friendship with Chile. Eighteen years later, when in full possession of these concessions, the same Minister discovers that nations have an inherent right that would make them forget their promises, disavow their obligations, and declare void or inapplicable the international stipulations, claiming once again a port that was given up for the international railroad and custom exemptions of Arica. As Foreign Minister of a Republican Government, Sr. Gutiérrez desires the revisión of the Treaty of 1904, acting in a manner unfriendly and openly hostile toward Chile.

4. Solidarity of This antagonistic diplomacy carried out in Interests Be- Geneva by two Bolivian extremista, Señores tween the üi* - Allies of 1879. Aramayo and Canelas, is in sharp contrast to the sudden silence and reserve shown by the Peruvian delegation. This difference in method of proceedure, however, is a result of an agreement existing between the, two delegstions to present their claims in different form yet united by the solé purpose of recovering their lost territory. The facts seem to show that these two ex-allies are once more firmly united. This is something that cannot pass unnoticed, seeing that on one occasion they united secretly against Chile, and are today agitated by hates and passions that cannot be hid even in official circles. The public manifestations of Bolivia, encouraged by the Republican leaders now in power, leaves no doubt as to their open hostility toward Chile. Dr. Escalier, from his general head-

1 Sr. Alberto Gutiérrez as "Confidential Agent" of his Government also endeavoured to hamper the Chile-Perú Conference held in Washington in 1922 making accusations against it in view of the fact thatl it would nat consider Bolivi&'ñ aspirations to a port. 11 quarters in Buenos Aires, in cióse cooperation with the Peru- vian residents in that city, has conducted an active campaign against Chile, advocating the necessity of coming to an agreement with Perú in the common support of their new policies. Among the numerous activities of this politician we remember particularly the reunión that he brought about in Oruro in 1919 to intensify and coordínate the labor of his co-partisans regarding their foreign policies. In a letter dated February 28, 1919, widely circulated by the Bolivian press, don Luis Paz, one of those invited to this sort of prívate assembly to amend the international policies of the nation—according to Sr. Paz's own words—states the direction of the policy of Dr. Escalier and his party:

"You (Dr. Escalier) have presented yourself from the first moment with your opinions firm, and the flag raised for the return of our coast usurped by Chile in a war of conquest. At the beginning there were some persons, who, if not against you, were undecided ayd vacilating; today the nation follows you unanimous like an irresistible torrent. The moral triumph that .you have achieved is now complete. At this moment I believe there is no other route for our Ministry to follow but that by which we shall come to an agreement with Perú, that the two nations may together carry to the Congress of Peace their demanda and their protests against the Chilean conquesta."

Don José Carrasco, who had ardently defended the Treaty of 1904, both in Congress and in the press, now expressed himself with no less violence, notwithstanding his post as Minister Plenipotentiary of Bolivia to Brazil. "If Perú," he says in one of his letters, "obtains the return of Tacna, and Arica by reason of right, we shall obtain an outlet to the sea because of the same principie. If Perú does not secure justice, neither shall we. Never before have the juridical interests of Perú and Bolivia been more closely united. Why not come to an agreement that will establish our claims and representation in the problem of the Pacific?" In the defence of the Treaty of 1904 that Dr. Carrasco, as Senator, h|ad published in 1905 he had sustained with his char- 12 acteristic ardor and the collection of numerous facts that a port for Bolivia was "unnecessary, and that only a concept of wounded patriotism and error due to the prejudices so common among us could demand," adding, "there are many flourishing nations developing admirably without a port." Regarding the port of Cobija, Senator Carrasco maintained that "Cobija was never the natural outlet to the sea for Bolivia, and that unfortunately this nation was born with a nominal port that never was of any commercial valué." Enlarging on this idea he then stated:

"It is well known that Bolivian commerce, since colonial days, was carried on through the port of Arica. Cobija was too far, the immensity of the desert separted us; sometimes a caravan of daring drivers crossed these plains, occupying months in doing so, but these adventures could not be considered commercial arteries. The support of a port imposes many obligations, and if, as a patrio tic aspiration, it does not admit discussion, as a question of convenience it requires very careful study. We do not think we are in error in stating that the opponents of the Treaty have not made any such study, at least comparing it with the benefits to be derived from the projected railroads and the actual condition of the country."

Nevertheless, Dr. Carrasco realized that the port that Bolivia might obtain would be Arica and recalls that that might have been done in 1895 had not Perú objected. With bitterness he recalls that Bolivia, as a result of the war of 1879, not only paid indemnity to Chile^ but also to Perú, her former ally, stating that more was paid to Perú than to Chile, and that "Perú always had maintained us in servitude because of the restrictions and taxes that she put on our commerce through Arica."1 Notwithstanding all this, and withi a ductility comparable only to his energy for supporting one or another thesis, Dr. Carrasco in 1919 emits the loudest note of those that insist upon the necessity of a port. "No nation," now states the new champion of Bolivia's changed policies, "can be imprisoned and smothered without an outlet to the sea."

' 1. "BOLIVIA Y CHILE." The Treaty of Peace of October 20, 1904, by José Carrasco, National Senator. Imprenta El Diario, 1905. 13 And carefully weighing his words he adds:

"Our desire to particípate in the solution o'f the problem of the Pacific must not be born frorn our approach to Chile, but from the community of rights and aspirations with Perú."

Uncovering Perú's plana and showing how she will aid her former ally, Dr. Carrasco reveáis the plot.

"Perú," he declares, "will not now discuss the plebiscite. She will attack the Treaty of Ancón as a fruit of victory and military occnpation. She iviU demand the return of her coast, including Tarapacá down to the Loa river. Here it is that she desires that we (Bolivia) concur with moral and material support claiming from the Loa river to latitude 24, mentioned in the Treaty of 1866. From that interest is born the support of our rights and it is obvious that instead of going separately we should go together, upholding identical ends."

And confiding that "national sentiment will concéntrate its aspirations on the return of what belongs to us," Dr. Carrasco urges his fellow-citizens to "collaborate with those who have similar rights, defending ourselves against a common enemy." In harmony with this moyement initiated by the Republican party a special committee was organized in París by wealthy and socially prominent Bolivians residing in that capital, among them señores F. A. Aramayo, Simón I. Patino, Manuel Cuéllar, J. C. Arteaga, Alejandro Dorado, Julio Anze Soria, etc. The purposes of the committee briefly were as follows: First, to work collectively in an effort to make evident Bolivia's claims, and for the recovery of the lost coast. Second, to work for closer cooperation with Perú in her efforts to secure the return of lost territories. Third, to organize the necessary propaganda. Such were the ideas of the public men of Bolivia, who, with the exception of Dr. Carrasco, were opposing the Government of Sr. Gutiérrez Guerra of the Liberal party. Parenthetically we might state that the attitude of Dr. Carrasco evoked a just protest from Chile's Minister in La 14 Paz, Sr. Bello Codesido, but the incident did not assume greater importance in view of the cordiality of the explanations proffered by the Foreign Minister, Sr. Darío Gutiérrez.

5. Minister The situation today merits cióse attention. Gutiérrez, a The Republican party, that started the move- Diplomatic Enigma. ment for the recovery of the lost provinces, is in power. Señores Escalier and Villazón, with greater authority and influence than ever, continué from Buenos Aires their active campaign against Chile; the Bolivian diplomatic representatives to Perú's Centennial Celebration exceeded themselves beyond measure in their manifestations of complete solidarity with Perú's attitude toward Chile; the delegates to the League of Nations, one of thlem Sr. Aramayo, a young man representing the new policies, and the other Sr. Canelas, formerly a newspaper man of Oruro and an ardent champion of the Peruvian thesis, have taken in the ñame of their Governmíent a stand against Chile that is difficult to explain between nations maintaining cordial relations. The true depths of the sentiments of these gentlemen can be estimated by the following words of Sr. Canelas, chosen to that high post precisely because he is a faithful representative of the new Bolivian policies: "For us the problem is not reduced to the mere remedying of the asphyxia to which the war of 1879 reduced us. Our case is more profound. It is a question of saving our autonomy, turning resolutely to a policy of solidarity with Perú or delivering ourselves without reservation to Chilean penetration. The conqueror has put a price on his victory, but we cannot occupy a site where the conqueror has placed his sword as a sign of dominance, and where our comp anión in misfortune awaits the day of justice. Before falling on that sword, we, too, prefer to wait and watch. This is our position in the committee. "This nation," he concludes with emphasis, "to live in peace with Chile would need to have neither past ñor future." Are these the true sentiments of the Bolivian. people? Do not the men who since the time of General Pando have been 15 cultivating the friendship of Chile represent the national sen- tinient? Or is it that the regime now in power after the revolution feels itself under certain obligations to Perú, and is being carried to situations not in harmony with the sentiments of thousands of Bolivians, many of them distinguished statesmen and all great patriots, who have believed that the maintenance of Chile's friendship was always to be Bolivia's goal? The presence in the Bolivian Foreign Office of the man that signed the Treaty of 1904 and ardently defended it might have given us hope of a return to a truer appreciation of the facts. Unfortunately, Sr. Gutiérrez has become an enigma since his actuation in 1918 in the Ministry of Sr. Gutiérrez Guerra, to his retirement shortly after his circular of February 24, 1919, just as the mission of don Emilio Bello Codesido, with whom he had adjusted the Treaty of 1904, arrived in La Paz. In his circular Sr. Gutiérrez announced his intention of presenting his claim to the League of Nations but always "within diplomatic bounds and with perfect friendship, and the desire to come to an agreement with neighbouring countries." And then with violent contradiction he states that should that effort fail, he will even demand of the League "the coast that we possessed before," that is, the territory that the Treaty which he signed gave definitely to Chile. Thus, while General Montes, ex-President of Bolivia, and at that time Minister Extraordinary to France, was presenting his demands to the League claiming Bolivia's rights to the province of Tacna and Arica, the Bolivian Chancellor was setting forth his idea of securing for Bolivia territory that she possessed forty years ago, and that had been definitely given up. The political events in Bolivia, the contradictory stand taken by her Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the attitude of her delegates to the League of Nations, make it imperative that we analyze the situation that these incidents are creating. It is necessary for us to recall diplomatic antecedents that appear to have been forgotten in order that in our own country and in other nations our rights and our strict adherence in every occasion to the principies of international law may be truly appreciated. 16 CHAPTER III

THE RESPECT FOR PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

1. Treaties as the Law of Nations. 2. The Interests of America. 3. Chile Has Had Only One War Since Her Emancipation. 4. The Secret Treaty of 1873 Made Arbitration Before the Conflict of 1879 Impossible.

1. Treaties as the The birth of the League of Nations has T 4 Nations given the Government of Bolivia a motive for the adoption of new international policies seeking the fulfillment of oíd aspirations. These policies, however, are not at all in accord with her obligationa under the Treaties she has signed, neither are they in accord with the fundamental principles of law and justice as conceived by the free nations organized into a League. Faith in treaties has been cultivated in all countries, and the greater the degree of civilization of a nation the more sacred have been her responsibilities and her respect for treaties. Whatever may be the interpretation given by the leaders of Bolivia to the League of Nations they must realize that in so far as the relations between Chile and Bolivia are concerned there are certain solemn obligations and treaties that cannot lightly be turned aside. The Government of Bolivia must remember that, notwithstanding the importance that they may attribute to historical points or questions of politics in general, the concrete stipulations of the Treaty of 1904 have established in definí te form the relations between the two nations. The statesmen who, united in Versailles, desired to put the peace of the world on a sound basis, found that the firm establishment of the understanding of international law as the actual rule of conduct among governments was guaranteed only by a permanent accord among the nations. Thus, on inviting 17 the nations they affirmed that to regúlate the conduct among the governments a "scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations" was absolutely necessary, as stated in the preamble to the Covenant of the League. The international policy of Chile has not had to adopt any new paths; it has been determined by important acts in her life as a nation, and by Treaties that define it clearly. Chile can present her organization as that of a country that in its regime of public order, its devotion to political rights, its guarantees of liberty, its social and material progress particularly in civic education, may be equalled but not surpassed by many nations better constituted. For Chile it is especially interesting to recall the opinion expressed by don Alberto Gutiérrez in his history of the war of 1879 in which he maintains the serene criterion of the historian. After recounting the impression produced by the "political demoralization of Perú due to the exaggerated fiscal splendour of the situation," and "of a country like Bolivia delivered into the hands of unrestrained tyrants," he adds:

"Meanwhile, Chile had prospered under the shadow of public peace, an ambient of industry, respect for authority, and the free development of all the energies of a youthful nation. Chile probably was at that time the only nation in Hispanic America that had public peace with guarantees of freedom and security for foreign capital. Perú, Bolivia, and Argentine paid the tribute of their adolescence to civil wars and military dictatorships."1

Chile would probably have reached yet greater attainments if on various occasions of her political history she had not shown herself so solicitous to help any nation in the defence of interests th)at were not Chile's, but which were just and lawful, or had not had to rise on another occasion in defence o'f her very own political existence. The victor^ of her armies broke down the secret coalition of 1873 and permitted her to affirm once again on the Pacific coast "the policies of respect for right and justice, and the commercial liberties which the Republic had been supporting since

1. Alberto Gutiérrez, The War of 1879, París, 19X2, Page 41. 18 the beginning of her organization. If since then she has always desired, and known how to keep down the sounds of war in this región of America it is because of her respect for treaties and the traditional ties of American policy. With regard to this she can show the most honorable record. From the first years of her existence she invariably consulted in her different treaties arbitration as a method of settling inter< national diíficulties, an example being the Treaty of March 28, 1902, which settled the oíd boundary dispute with Argen- tine. This Treaty has been cited with praise in juridical circles. These same sentiments of peace and American confraternity are found consecrated in the Treaty of May 25, 1915, made by Chile with the Republics of Brazil and Argentine. She can also invoke her complete accord with the declarations proclaimed by the four Pan American Congresses1. The Bryan type of treaties, developed after Chile adopted these principies as her fixed policies, eloquently show the purpose to create an era of harmony and peace among all the nations of the Continent. In his circular of February 24, 1919, don Alberto Gutiérrez affirmed that the foreign policy of his country was Consolidated with the doctrines that in all epochs of history had contributed to "constitute political organisms capable of being decisive factors for progresa and peace." To Chile it is particularly gratifying to hear that Bolivia in the future will settle her difficulties in accord with the principies of conciliation and arbitration. It ia hoped that statesmen and publicists like don Alberto Gutiérrez have abandoned the pessimistic spirit that in 1912 made him write the following words in his history of the war of 1879 already quoted:

"Despite the pacifist propaganda ánd regardleas of all the doctrinaire utopias, forcé will continué to be supreme in the settlement of political controversies. Very often agreements are entered into by nations to submit disputes to arbiters or international tribunals, but these apparent adhesiona to peace and justice do not resist the slightest impulsea of political interests."

1 The same might be said coacerning the Fifth Pan American Conference held In Santiago, Chile, during 1923. 19 And emphasizing yet more strongly these opinions he adds:

"Arbitration, the modern panacea, is worthy of praise and encouragement, but it is no more efficacious than the prescription8 of industrial pharmacopea."

2. The Interests It would seem that in the unconditional of America. adherence given to the League of Nations by Bolivia, some reservation should have been made regarding interests essentially American, too often neglected completely by the Powers of the Oíd World. Chile in her cablegraphic authorization sent on March 19, 1919, to the Chilean Legation in Paris stated:

"Your Excellency will declare that Chile is in accord with the general idea regarding the organization of the League of Nations in the sense of international cooperation to assure peace and maintain a scrupulous respect for existing Treaties, affirming at the same time the principies that constitute American rights proclaimed in all the Pan American Congresses."

Since her emancipation the American nations have found in their own resources the elements necessary for their growth and prosperity. The free people that constituted themselves in this continent acquired political freedom after strenuous effort8, and they have known how to preserve and defend it at all times. Their disturbances have seldom passed over the borders of their own territories. Their few wars have scarcely attracted the attention of the larger nations, and their desire for peace, if it has aroused interest on any occasion, has always excited less on the part of the stronger nations than the situation of any of their colonies would. In the meantime, many of the American nations have been able since three-quarters of a century ago, to constitute themselves on a firm basis; several of them practice the most advanced forms of democratic 20 life; and some can exhibit, as in the case of Chile, a political constitution in forcé since 1833 that has permitted the country to exercise the practices of a true republican society, in possession of allí her rights and political liberties, and zealous of her prerogatives as a nation.

3. Chile has had Since her emancipation, during one hun- sínce^her ^^ dred years of independent life, Chile has had Emancipation. only one war fought for a cause of her own, in defence of her nationality and injured interests. If in 1820 she went with her fleet and army to Perú, it was in the capacity of liberator and to proclaim in Lima the independence of that country, secured with the cooperation of the armies of Colom- bia. The Peruvian Government of those days publicly and solemínly recognized those services stating that "the exemplary and heroic conduct of Chile will strengthen more and more the friendship between both Republics" and that "the Peruvians had the pleasant satisfaction of confessing that their brothers of Chile have not ceased making thje most noble and generous efforts for the establishment and realization of the project of emancipation" as expressed in 1823 in the note of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Perú, Don Francisco Valdivieso. If the flag of Chile was again seen in Lima in 1838 it was to defend once more the political freedom of Perú seriously menaced by the invasión of the President of Bolivia, Don Andrés Santa Cruz and his vast designs of territorial conquest. Chile went in defence of Perú, of her territorial integrity, and of the peace of America. The Chilean troops, victorious in Yungay, returned to their homes as soon as the Military Con- federation that sought to enthrone itself in that section of the continent was broken. Chile then did not nourish, ñor has she ever nourished, any hidden designs of territorial expansión or predominance over other nations. After the brilliant realization of that "Restoration Expedition" to Perú, the Chilean nation returned 21 to the regular tasks of peace, and the Chilean Government could justly declare that

"Chile's most fervent desires are for harmony and peace, without the splendid triumph of Yungay having augmented in the least her pretensions. She will exact today what sh(e before proposed: the independence of every American state, their absolute líberty to regúlate as best they think fit the institutions that are to guide them."

Sr. Gutiérrez in his book, to which we have already referred, states:

"The battle of Yungay was always considered an episode of the civil wars, seeing that the nation (Bolivia) was also engaged in defeating Santa Cruz, just as the armies of Perú and Chile were doing. The flag was not conquered; it was the dictator who was defeated."

4. The Secret It may thus be correctly affirmed that only Treaty of 1873 Made Arbitra- in 1879 has Chile had to resort to arma to tion before the defend her own interests, doing it only when Conflict of 1879 Impossi- her very existence as a nation was threatened. ble. Thte great sacriíice of lives and money that Chile was obliged to make can only be compared to the splendid courage of her soldiers and sailors. Three memorable campaigns and two years of active war affirmed the triumph of the Chilean armies. Chile had patiently demanded the fulfillment of the Treaty of 1874 with Bolivia; she had called attention to the effective- ness of its stipulations in an efifort to detain the resolutions of the Bolivian Government seeking to annul them; she had pointed out the danger of violent measures; and she resorted to arms only the same day that forcé was used against her to 22 impose a solution that Chile had denounced in opposition to the Treaty and the legitímate rights of her citizens. Chile in her note of January 3, 1879, after many similar communications, stated:

"Chile harbors the fiim hope that Bolivia will heed the cali that is made to her for conciliation and the peaceful discussion of this question, and that she will hasten the suspensión of this law [the one of February 14, 1878, establishing a tax in opposition to the Treaty of 1874], which if put into effect by violent measures would create a grave situation between both Republics. "Chile," continúes the despatch, "is disposed to discuss this question and submit it in the last resort to the decisión of an arbitrator as provided in the Treaty of 1874; but to do this she insists that Bolivia will not solve this question by herself, dictating and excluding measures that we cannot accept as they are offending to our dignity, and detrimental to our interests."

The application of such measures, the absolute necessity on the part of Chile of preventing their execution, the fact that her repeated proposals of arbitration were not accepted—these things produced the rupture and the consequent declaration of war. Later, on a solemn occasion, the Government of Bolivia recognized the impetuousness of her methods of procedure, and in an effort to free the country of the responsibilities it had incurred because of those acts, blame was laid on General Daza who since 1876 exercised the political leadership of the nation. In the first session for the drafting of the Truce Pact held in December 7, 1883, the Bolivian representative, Sr. Belisario Salinas, stated:

"The work of the Secret Treaty uniting Bolivia to Perú, as well as the initiation and development of later incidents that were the immediate cause of the war, can only be contemplated as a result of the omnipotent military dictatorship, without counterbalance or censure, that for some time formed the absolute government of that country" (Bolivia). 23 The Chilean Legation in La Paz faithfully interpreted the ideas of the Government of Chile when it declared in the note of January 20, 1879:

"Chile on all occasions has manifested the sincere desire of living in peace and friendship with her neighbours, and the Treaty of 1874 in which she generously resigned some of her legitímate and recognized rights is a proof of the sympathy she has toward the Bolivian Government and people. Consistent with the glorious tradition of her past she today desires to make a new offer for the peace of the American continent, making known again the noble sentiments that move her in her relations with nations of the same origin."

The Secret Treaty that since 1873 had united the political and commercial interests of Bolivia and Perú—Chile being the direct and only objective of that pact—and the mediation offered by Perú, notwithstanding the existence of the Treaty that made it impo8SÍble for her to assume the role of an impartial mediator, make evident the only attitude that Chile could possibly take in the defence of her honor as a nation. With the result of the war favorable to her, and her rights confirmed after the sacrifice of thousands of her best citizens, the expendi- ture of large suma of money, and the damage done an orderly and industrious nation, it was necessary that Chile remove the possible causes of future wars. Chile, nevertheless, did not impose a peremptory treaty upon Perú, as many more powerful nations have done since. Chile discussed the bases of peace with her adversary from 1880 to 1883 even though the result of the war had been definitely settled in thte battle of January, 1881. The good offices of friendly nations, mediation on the part of neutral powers, direct and indirect negotiations of various kinds, were employed before the plenipotenciaries formulated the bases of a peace that would receive the approval of the Governments and Congresses of both nations. Bolivia, retired from active participation in the war in May, 1880, signed the Truce Pact of April 4, 1884, and twenty years later, after the commercial and friendly relations between the 24 two nations had been firmly established, the definite and final Treaty of Peace and Amity of April 20, 1904, was signed. This Treaty was inspired by a full understanding of the needs of Bolivia, and a spirit of true solidarity that moved Chile to cooperate in every way in the realization of the railroad project to be undertaken in the interior of Bolivia, the building of the Arica-La Paz railroad, and the establishment of various political and commercial measures to strengthen the ties between the two nations. With all justice Sr. Gutiérrez, negotiator of the Treaty, said that the pact "has been in fact a tie of friendship and esteem, of work, prosperity, and progress."1

1. Alberto Gutiérrez, The War of 1879, París, 1912, Page 18. 25 CHAPTER III

GENESIS OF THE SECRET TREATY OF 1873

1. A Secret Agreement. 2. Peruvian Naval Demonstration in 1872. 3. Bolivia Submits Herself to Peruvian Influence. 4. The Acta of November 19, 1872. 5. Confidential Note of Riva Agüero, November 20, 1872, Regarding Military In- tervention of Perú. 6. The Secret Treaty of February 6, 1873, is Signed, and Bolivia is Encouraged in Her Controversy With Chile. 7. Bolivia Rejects the Lindsay-Corral Agreement. 8. Bolivia is En- couraged to Break Her Treaties With Chile. Confidential Note of August 6, 1873. 1. A Secret In the circular of February 24, 1919, to Agreement. which we have referred, Sr. Gutiérrez declared that the Secret Treaty of 1873 between Perú and Bolivia was "a defensive alliance for the protection of their respective territories," and gives it the character of a truly pacifist negotiation. The Bolivian statesman considers it quite natural that the two allied nations should seek "elementa of cooperation and defence" and that the Treaty of 1873 filled so great a need that Argentine and even other nations were invited to adhere to it. Today we know that Argentine, the only nation that then had a boundary dispute with Chile, was invited to join the secret alliance. We also know that Argentine voted a sum of six million pesos for war expenses, so that the first result of that Treaty was to secure funda for a conflict. It would be interesting to know what other nations were invited to join, but the secret of fifty years has not revealed any invitation extended to another nation. In reality it was not necessary. No other nation bordered upon Chile or was interested in a war with her; furthermore, an alliance that permitted Chile to be attacked on the northern and eastern frontiers was sufficient. 26 It is necessary to understand the nature of the Secret Treaty in order to appreciate Chile's attitude in the war of 1879. For this purpose we shall briefly recall some of the important facts.

2. Peruvian Naval In June, 1872, a party of emigrated ^7872traíÍO" Bolivian politicians succeeded in equipping a email ship in Valparaíso, and attempted to attack the coast of Antofagasta. This was the expedition of the Bolivian General, don Quintín Quevedo, the ex-Minister of President Melgarejo, don Mariano Amado Muñoz, and about forty others. The adventure failed and Quevedo delivered his arms to the commanding officer of the Chilean warship "Esmeralda" at that time in Tocopilla. Chile was completely unarmed on the sea. She possessed only two wooden sloops of war, the "O'Higgins" and the "Chacabuco," and two small ships kept more as relies than elements of defence, the "Esmeralda" and the "Covadonga." In English shipyards the "Cochrane" and the "Blanco," two iron-clads, were being built. Perú, on the other hand, possessed two monitors, the "Manco" and the "Atahualpa," the iron- clads, "Huascar" and "Independencia," and several wooden ships that took part in the war. Perú tried to blame Chile for Quevedo's expedition to the coast, and, in defence of Bolivia, held a naval demionstration in Mejillones. This was followed by an official communication which took the form of a threat, Perú stating that she would not be "indifferent to the occupation of Bolivian territory by foreign forces."

3. Bolivia Sub- In October, 1872, the Bolivian Deputy, p!£uSZSelf 10 Don José Mier y Le011' petitioned the Minister Influence. of Foreign Affairs, to make a statement regarding Bolivia's relations with Chile. As a result of the debate that ensued in the Bolivian Assembly, and in keeping with the policy of Perú, the executive was au- 27 thorized to solicit an alliance with Perú and to ratify the treaty that he might celebrate without the necessity of presenting it for legislative approval.

lísy^l

4. The Acta of On November 19, 1872, a meeting of Novemher 19, 1872. Ministera wa8 held in Lima before President Manuel Pardo, in which Bolivia's petition for an alliance was discuaaed. After referring to the Quevedo expedition the Acta drawn up at that meeting relates:

"That it is to be feared that the Chilean Government, taking advantage of some dangerous Bolivian elementa, may abuse her maritime strength and endeavour to obtain possession of part of the Bolivian coast in order to exert pressure on her Government, protecting in an indirect manner the revolutionista; that these grave oc- currencea must affect the interests of Perú which are intimately connected with the independence and territorial integrity of Bolivia, besides influencing to a great degree the supremacy that Perú is called to preserve in the Pacific; that the Government of Bolivia, always allied to the frank and noble policy of Perú, is now, more than ever, decided to follow the sane advice of this Republic, and counts on her powerful aid in assisting her in the conflict to which the imperious tone of Chile seeks to conduce her. "After having carefully discussed the matter," con- tinúes thia important Acta, the precuraor of the Secret Treaty, "and Hia Excellency, the Preaident, and the mem- bera of the Council having debated the reasons of justice, policy, and convenience that assist Perú in not remaining an indifferent spectator in a matter of such vital importance for Bolivia, and of great consequence to Perú, it was agreed (among other reaolutiona) that the Peru- vian Government lend her aid to Bolivia to reject the demands of Chile which she considers unjust and threatening to the independence of Bolivia." 28 5. ConfideMial On the following day, November 20, 1872, Agüero!N*" the Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs sent vember 20, a confidential note to the Peruvian Minister 1872' in Chile, Sr. Ignacio Novoa, in which, after referring to the incidents of the previous day, he stated that Perú could not remain indifferent, and would be obliged to support Bolivia in the event that Chile attempted to take possession of the coast.

"It is convenient that once for all, as soon as possible, the relations between those two República be defined," he continúes, calling attention to the favorable condition» in which Perú finds herself, "to bring to bear the influence we now exert because of our maritime preponderante."

6. The Secret On February 6, 1873, the diplomatic ruary representative of Bolivia in Lima, Sr. Juan is Signed. de la Cruz Benavente, and the Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sr. José de la Riva Agüero, signed the Secret Treaty. Given the connection between this Treaty and the Acta of November, 1872—which resulted from Bolivia's petition for a unión against Chile—it is seen that the Treaty had as its solé object the insuring of Bolivia's possession of the coast that Chile ceded under the stipulations of the Treaty of 1874. This thought is completed by the casus foederis mentioned in the pact, an effort made to oblige one of the parties to "change laws enacted in the exercise of her sovereignty." Applying this cause for a rupture in relations, to the situation at that time, it will be seen that it would become effective should Chile insist that Bolivia could not alone alter the taxes on nitrate in the zone under joint administration. In a confidential note dated May 3, 1873, to the Peruvian Minister in Bolivia, Sr. Aníbal Victor de la Torre, Minister Riva Agüero announced the legislative approval of the Secret Treaty, and declared that the pact was inspired "not only by a desire of strengthening the ties with Bolivia, but also to give moral forcé to that Republic in order that she may with calmness and security sustain her rights." •29 7. Bolivia Rejects As at this very moment the Lindsay-Corral CoirtdAgree- agreement was being discussed between Chile ment. and Bolivia in an effort to solve the question of the boundary of Antofagasta, Minister Riva Agüero urged his representative in La Paz to prevent the sanction of that agreement by the Bolivian Assembly.

"It is difficult to believe," he said in a confídential note, "that that power would sanction a pact threatening the national sovereignty and dignity, since in it are confirmed and consecrated, so to speak, the concessions torn from Bolivia in the primitive Treaty."

In this way the Government of Bolivia, by virtue of the recent Alliance, was encouraged not to recognize the Treaty of 1866 between Chile and Bolivia, and an effort was made to obstruct the peaceful arrangement of the difficulties that the Lindsay-Corral agreement was attempting to solve. In this note Riva Agüero "with reference to the state of the relations between Chile and Bolivia," added the following suggestive words:

"It will not be hidden to Your Excellency that that state may very soon present alternatives of which we must take advantage."

As it will be recalled, the Treaty of 1866 had ended the controversy between Chile and Bolivia! regarding the territory ly- ing between latitudes 23° and 24°. In this zone a common administration had been established, Chile abandoning an exclusive sovereignty that she had exercised there since the days of independence. The Bolivian coast proper, with Cobija as its port, extended from latitude 23° to the mouth of the Loa river at latitude 22° 10' on the border of the then Peruvian Department of Tarapacá. The allusions to the coast mentioned in all the despatches and acts of Perú of that period refer to the disputed zone that the Treaty of 1866 had placed under a common administration, and that the Lindsay-Corral agreement of 1873 and the Treaty of 1874 deñned in a form, satisfactory to Chile and Bolivia. Chile had agreed to withdraw her frontier to latitude 24° on the condition that the Chilean industriáis and capitalists that were there established be safeguarded and their interests pro- 30 tected. Chile abandoned that sovereignty in order to maintain unaltered her friendship with Bolivia; she deprived these citizens of hers—who had explored the vast territory and developed and given valué to this región—of the effective protection of her laws and authority, conñding them to the administration of a friendly nation on the faith of a Treaty that guaranteed their safety and commercial freedom. During the first half of the nineteenth century Chile had always maintained her rights over this zone, although she had not taken advantage of the legitímate rights that authorized her sovereignty over the entire coast up to the Peruvian boundary. Thus she had respected the occupation by Bolivia of the small and distant bay of Cobija. The confidence that Chile's attitude had inspired in Bolivia is proved by the fact already mentioned, that on one occasion Bolivia asked Chile if she would be willing to use her military strength to maintain order and safety in that distant part of the coast.

8. Bolivia is The Peruvian Governmient now strongly en- Encouraged to Break Her couraged Bolivia to break her Treaties with Treaties with Chile. The Secret Treaty had been approved Chile. by Bolivia on June 16, 1873, and Minister Riva Agüero, on August 6, 1873, sent to his representative in La Paz, Sr. La Torre, a confidential note in which he said: "If Bolivia understands her interests, if she does not wish to lose part or all of her coast, she should give once for all her last word on the Treaty of 1866 and the Lindsay-Corral agreement; she should definitely break those pacts, either making the Extraordinary As- sembly disapprove of one and resolve on the substitution of the other because of the insuperable inconveniences that have developed in practice, or using some other means to attain the same end, but taking care that the breaking of relations is not done by Bolivia but thi/at Chile be the one obliged to do it" Truly, it is difficult to state with greater clearness the object of all this secret negotiation destíned to break all the Treaties between Chile and Bolivia, and make the entire responsibility fall on Chile. 31 CHAPTER IV

THE SECRET TREATY OF 1873 WAS AN OFFENSIVE ALLIANCE AGAINST CHILE.

1. Since 1873 Perú Offered Her Armed Mediation. 2. Aggres- sive Nature of the Secret Conspiracy; the Irigoyen Mission in Buenos Aires. 3. Efforts Made to Isolate Chile. 4. Revulsión in the Argentine Senate Caused by the Perfidy of the Proceedings. 5. The Curse of the Peruvian Deputy, Sr. Basadre. 1. Since 1873 Although today efforts are made to de- Her Armed scribe the Secret Treaty óf 1873 as an alliance

Mediation. Gf international cooperation, purely defensive, under its sha do w was planned the future break between Chile and Bolivia, and the attitude of armed mediator that Perú will assume. The expressive confidential note of Minister Riva Agüero is a flagrant confession, unanswerable and indefensibie, revealing the plan plotted against Chile. He states: "Broken the relations and a state of war declared, Chile will be unable to obtain her iron-clads; without sufficient forcea to attack with advantage she will be obliged to accept the mediation of Perú, which, if necessary, will become armed mediation if the forces of that Republic attempt to occupy Mejillones or Caracoles."

2. • Aggressive In, the antagonistic attitude toward Chile Secret Con-^6 *8 the spirit of the Secret Treaty, the spiracy. Argentine Republic, the only country then having a boundary dispute with Chile, was invited to particípate. This adherence was almost secured as the Argentine Government accepted the plan, and one of the National Chambers voted six million pesos for war purposes. 32 The instigation of this policy belongs exclusively to President Pardo of Perú, his Minister Riva Agüero, and his representatives, La Torre in La Paz and Irigoyen in Buenos Aires. In the next chapter we shall take up the motives that shaped Peruvian policy, their concept of their military superiority, and their commercial projects regarding the nitrate fields. In those days the principies of right and justice in the modern sense did not satisfy the aspirations of Perú when mercantile con- veniences and commercial monopolies were of paramount importance, treaties things to be easily broken, and their concept of naval supremacy a cause for arrogance. Don Manuel Irigoyen represented Perú in Buenos Aires, and, following instructions of his Government, the plenipotentiary of Perú in Bolivia requested that Sr. Irigoyen also take charge of the affairs of Bolivia. This was done, putting the affairs of the two nations in the hand of one person by which it was thought that the adherence of Argentine could be hastened. Sr. Irigoyen on May 20, 1873, had received from Minister Riva Agüero instructions similar to the ones sent to La Torre in La Paz, revealing again that the Alliance was aimed ágainst Chile. After alluding to the boundary questions pending between Chile and Argentine and Bolivia, the note reads:

"Bolivia, isolated, knowing that she would not have sufficient strength to resist the pressure that against her Chile attempts to exert, and aware of the convenience of strengthening the ties that unite us to her, solicited through her plenipotentiary, and in accordance with the legislative resolution, of which I endose a copy, the moral and material support that she required to discuss her rights calmly and safely. "The Government of Perú could not remain indifferent to the just petition of her neighbour, and signed the Treaty of Alliance, etc. "As in Article 9 of the Treaty," he concludes, "it is agreed to solicit the conference of other Governments, Your Excellency will endeavour to obtain the adherence of that Republic, which should not be difficult in view of the boundary discussions she has with Chile" 33 The aggressive nature of the Treaty is again demonstrated in the instructions sent Sr. Irigoyen on April 7, 1874, when it was stated that its object was

"to leave Chile isolated in all her questions, and cir- cumscribe the Alliance with Argentine and Bolivia to the question of boundary limita between these and Chile."

The instructions were carried out by Sr. Irigoyen in his note of May 5, 1874, to the Argentine Government, when he made clear

"what is in the mind and conscience of the Allies, that is, that the Alliance practically has as its solé object the settlement of the boundary questions between the Con- federation, Bolivia, and Chile."

Sr. Riva Agüero was anxious to hasten the action of the Argentine Government by showing the advantages that could be obtained by taking action before Chile received the new iron-clads being built in England. In his communication of August 24, 1873, he plainly calis attention to the danger of delay. Chile was then unarmed and without allies, while later "the Treaty would then not be of use to the Confederation" and the boundary question between Argentine and Chile "would have acquired in the interval unfavorable proportions" as Chile would then have

"maritime forces thiat would not permit the Allies to make her listen and avoid war, while today [August, 1873] what a different situation; with the united elementa of the three nations it would be sufficient for Argentine to carry her relations with Chile, to violent extremes, and in such an event Perú would asaume the attitude of armed mediator." "The plan that in my judgment should be followed in the boundary question," relates the official document of Sr. Riva Agüero, "is that we should ofíer our good offices if mattera come to a breaking point, and propose that the dispute be submitted to arbitration. If our good offices are not accepted [as it was natural to sup- 34 pose they would not be] then it must be necessary to make known that we will assume the character of mediators, and that as we are united by a Treaty we would have to lielp with our forces i'f arbitration were not accepted."

Thus was the plan conceived, and thus was it carried out in 1879, when Perú appeared as a third, disinterested party, denying that she was united to Bolivia by a secret pact. In the negotiations carried on in Buenos Aires—which, as it is known, afterwards failed due to the high spirit of Argentine's statesmen and her sane international policies— Minister Tejedor of Argentine suggested that the Alliance be made known to Chile. This idea was immediately rejected as it would "make the Alliance an illusion and help impossible" as Perú stated. "Chile would hurry up her armaments, would endeavour to weaken us (Perú), because Chile," says the negotiator of the war, "would not permit Perú to occupy her rightful position in the Pacific," adding that, "we must not accede to Sr. Tejedor's insinuation" and, on the contrary, "rec- ommend the greatest secrecy." Chile, says Riva Agüero, will have no allies. She confides in Brazil, but as to that Alliance:

"I not only do not fear it, but I have reasons to believe that if Chile solicits it ehe will not obtain it. Brazil," he adds, "has not any interest whatsoever in helping Chile and, on the contrary, has them for helping Perú, in strengthening relations with her, not only because of the Amazon trade, but also because of the boundary questions that might arise between Brazil, Ecuador, Colombia, and even Bolivia, questions in which it would not be to her advantage to have us as an enemy."

In these Buenos Aires negotiations there is another incident of great importance that shows the character of the ag- gression against Chile. As it is known, the boundary discussion between Chile and Bolivia referred to the zone between latitude 23° and 24°. Since the colonial days Chile had exerted her undisputed jurisdiction over the Atacama desert to latitude 23°. After 1842 Bolivia had claimed that territory, and 35 Chile had shown her titles proving her rights to it. In that absolutely desert región some deposite of guano had been discovered, and all the extraction rights were given exclusively by the Chilean Government. In 1866, when Chile went to the aid of Perú against Spain, Bolivia joined her in that generous and spontaneous manifestation of American cooperation. Chile, taking up the boundary discussion, agreed that the difficulty be settled by drawing the boundary at parallel 24 with an administration in common, both countries participating in the exploitation of guano. These were the provisions of the Treaty of August 10, 1866. One of the objects of the Secret Treaty was to annul this pact. After the Treaty of 1866 was signed, several Chilean explorers discovered nitrate in that región and had, in 1868 obtained special concessions from the Bolivian Government. They founded the port of Antofagasta and organized the prosperous Chilean Nitrate Company of that district. The need of overthrowing this organization was the purpose of the Peruvian law of Jan- uary 18, 1873, establishing a monopoly on nitrate, and a forced consequence was the effort made to annul the Treaty of 1866 to sustain the exclusive rights of Bolivia to that zone where the Chilean industry was growing. The Argentine Minister Tejedor, well aware of this state of affairs, and realizing that the annulment of the Treaty of 1866 would ipso jacto bring a break with Chile, desired to remove mth tact and care that casus foederis in the projected alliance. He, therefore, expressed to Sr. Irigoyen that in his opinion "the breaking by Bolivia of the Treaty of 1866 and the consequences to which that action might lead, would not be considered a casus foederis." Sr. Irigoyen immediately replied that

"he did not agree as the Alliance precisely had as its object on the Pacific side, to prevent the seizure by Chile of any Bolivian territory," and that "the Treaty of 1866 was not a complete pact and that the aspirations of Bolivia from the day that she became acquainted with that Treaty, made against her will and interests, had always been in favor of its annulment, a revolution having been started with this object against the Government that had signed it." 36 Against this splendid idea of incomplete pacts and the belief that a revolutionary movement can annul existing treaties, Sr. Tejedor, in a conference held October 12, 1873, offered a simple denial, affirming that he did not think this statement totally correct

"as the Treaty of 1866 had been approved by the Bolivian Assembly and ratified by the Government; furthermore, the present Minister, Sr. Baptista, in a communication to the Minister of Chile had declared that he recognized the pact, and was determined to see it fulfilled; and lastly, that in principie it is neither possible ñor convenient to establish the contrary."

These negotiations and secret conferences and agreements tended to remove all faith and confidence in treaties. The voices of Mitre and Rawson lifted themselves in opposition to those clandestine negotiations and pointed to war with Chile as their solé result. No Argentine statesman, either the ones who accepted the Treaty or those who opposed it, put in doubt its aggressive character against Chile. That is why the ones who approved it logically voted funds for war; those who opposed it denounced it as an act of faithlessness toward Chile, and fatal to the peace of America.

3. Efforts Made The idea of circumscribing the Alliance Chile. to boundary questions between Argentine, Bolivia, and Chile, and to isolate the latter country in order to deal with her with the security sought by Perú, is clearly brought out in negotiations in Buenos Aires carried on to appease the suspicion that the mysterious proceedings had aroused in Brazil. Argentine and Perú both saw the danger of an Alliance between Chile and Brazil. Riva Agüero, in his note of April 14, 1874, to his Minister in Buenos Aires, warns him that it is necessary to

"proceed with great care in this matter of the relations with Brazil. We have valuable interests in the Amazons and we can euffer too much not to try to avoid an alliance 37 between Chile and Brazil, which in case of war would be very injurious to us. The way of making this alliance impossible and thus to isolate Chile in all her questions, is, in my judgment, and that of the Government, to cir- cumscribe the alliance with Argentine and Bolivia to the boundary questions between these nations and Chile."

Thus Chile, with a boundary discussion with Argentine, and Treaties with Bolivia had, unknown to her, a secret confederation plotting against her.

4. Revulsión in So great was the feeling of revulsión that tSemae.SentÍne this policy aroused in the Argentine Senate that it was not long before the adherence of that nation was recalled. In his letter of September 27, 1873, Dr. Rawson testified unmistakably that the Alliance was directed against Chile.

"Chile," he declares, "is the object of this Alliance and a war with Chile will be its consequence. "Perú, who does not have, ñor can have boundary questions with Chile, initiates the negotiation of the Treaty moved only by a spirii of rivalry, and a desire of maritime preponderance in the Pacific. "Those two nations [Perú and Bolivia] remember that we have a boundary dispute with Chile, and hasten to offer us their Alliance, inviting us to particípate of their destiny in the pathi of adventures on which they set out; we accept their conditions, the pact formed by interests not our own, and conspire in secret against the most advanced Republic in South America, our neighbour, our sister in the fight for independence, our friend of today, seeing that we maintain cordial and strong política! and commercial relations with her."

Considering Argentine's situation if she subscribes to the pact, Rawson declares:

"While our representative in Santiago continúes the boundary discussion on friendly and courteous terms, while the Chilean Minister among us receives all kinds of friendly manifestations on the part of the Govern- 38 ment and the people, while all diplomatic and social acts show the characteristic signs of peace and friendship between civilized and Christian nations, we are secretly plotting a net in which to involve Chile. Chile," he adds with emphasis, "would feel herself wounded in her loyalty; she would break her diplomatic relations, she would denounce the perfidy of our proceedings before the world and our own country; she would temporarily accelerate the military occupation of whatever Patagonian territory she would deem convenient."

líNÍ^jg^l

5. The Curse of The day predicted by Dr Rawson arrived, the Peruvian Deputy but the events resulted contrary to all fore- Basadre. casts of the politicians who had brought it to pass, showing the wisdom of the few who in the allied countries had opposed the Secret Treaty, and had prophesied days of suífering and sacrifice for the fu ture. This was what Sr. Basadre, the Peruvian Deputy of Tacna to the National Congress, predicted with clear visión on ener- getically opposing the Secret Treaty as an instrument destined to bring on war between Chile and Perú. "I am so moved by the approval of the pact that I cannot speak!" he cried, "but I wish to make known the firm conviction that filis me that our children, and our children's children, will curse this fatal agreement for more than a hundred years to come." These prophetic words have no doubt found an echo in all the men who took part in the war unloosed by those treaties, and those who until today have had to suffer the consequences of that unfortunate conflagration.

39 CHAPTER III THE NITRATE MONOPOLY LEADS TO THE SECRET TREATY AND WAR 1. The Policy of Commercial Preponderante. 2. Peruvian Laws Relating to the Nitrate Monopoly and the Expropria- tion of Nitrate Fields (1873-1375). 3. Chilean Nitrate Fields in Antofagasta. 4. Bolivian Nitrate Fields of Toco and Their Secret Transfer to Perú; Watson and Meiggs. 5. Transaction of 1883. 6. The Nitrate Certificates; Their Payment by Chile in 1887. 7. Chilean Policy of Commercial Freedom.

1. The Policy of It i8 not difficult to prove that the Secret Preponderance Treaty of 1873 was a result, and the instrument, of the nitrate policy initiated about the same time as the Treaty by President Pardo. When Sr. Pardo assumed the Presidency of Perú, he found that the public revenue, swelled by the taxes on guano, was quickly diminish- ing, while a new and prosperous industry, the nitrate industry, was growing. The State was owner of the guano deposita, but the nitrate fields of Tarapacá were prívate property. Presi- dent Pardo proposed carrying to the nitrate fields the same fiscal regime that had governed the exploitation of guano. With this object in view he enacted the various laws that should carry him, first, to a nitrate monopoly by the State, and second, to the ownership by the State of all the nitrate properties in Tarapacá then in prívate hands. Lar ge amounts of foreign capital were invested in Tarapacá, and there existed valuable interests, exclusively Chilean, Valparaíso being the center of many of these Chilean and foreign firma dealing in nitrate.

2. Peruvian Laws Perú first decreed the law of January 18, Relating to 1873, a date that coincides with the drafting Monopoly. °f the Secret Treaty. By this law a nitrate monopoly was established and the production limited. On May 40 28, 1875, the expropriation of all the nitrate fields of Tarapacá was authorized, payment to be made with State certificates. The Chilean nitrate interests, however, antagonized in Tara- pacá, had carried their energies south to the Atacama border, where for many years there had been established a Chilean concern capable of making any monopoly ineffective.

3. Chilean Nitrate The Antofagasta Company had its seat in Antofagosta. that part of the coast that had been the subject for the Treaties of 1868 and 1874, that is, in the zone that Chile had always claimed as hers, had later agreed to administer in common with Bolivia, and had finally ceded to Bolivia on the condition that the nitrate taxes on the Chilean industries there established were not raised. This condition was not compatible with the objectives of Peruvian policy, and, therefore, the interest of Perú in the breaking of the Treatíes.

4. Bolivian _ Later, nitrate deposits were discovered in of Toco. ^e zone to the north of latitude 23°, that is, in the undisputed territory taken over by Bolivia. These were the Toco fields, near the Loa river, and the Peruvian Government did not delay in obtaining the transfer of that property, in accordance with its systematic policy leading to a concentration of the industry in Peruvian hands. The nitrate of Tarapacá had passed into the hands of the Peruvian Government by virtue of the laws of 1873 and 1875, already mentioned. The Bolivian nitrate of Toco, which might have been a rival, seeing that it was exploited by Chilean com- pames, was transferred with the secrecy required in order not to awaken the suspicion of Chilean industriáis. In Toco there were also large deposits belonging to the Bolivian State, but in which the Bolivian Government was not interested as they 41 were not being exploited due to the nnfavorable conditions for prívate enterprise. Mr. Watson, a Britisher, became interested in them, nevertheless, and obtained of the Bolivian Govern- ment concessions to work the State deposita for a period of twenty years. But Watson was not alone. With him carne Mr. Meiggs, an American, a relative of the builder of Perú's railroads, and the soul of large enterprises in that country. Watson acquired the rights for Meiggs, the annual rent being agreed to as 120,000 soles, and payment for one year was made in advance. Two important promises were secured from the Bolivian Government, first, that in the future no similar concession was to be granted; second, the assurance that for the time of the contract, or twenty-five years, the export duties would not be raised. The business was closed, and on March 20, 1876, the deed was signed in La Paz. But the concessionary apparent, Mr. Meiggs, did not delay in transferring his rights to the actual author of those negotiations, the Government' of Perú, as wit- nessed by the public deeds signed in Lima, July 18 and August 4, 1876. The negotiation, however, was not yet complete. The pri- vately owned industries of Toco were still to be acquired, and negotiations were initiated by the agente of Meiggs for this purpose. The first and most valuable property was one of 61% "estacas"1 which was sold in Antofagasta by the deed of Decem- ber, 1876. The second comprised the plants "Union" and "Duende" with machinery and accessories, and a piece of ground for cultivation, valued at 530,000 soles; the third was the "Virginia" plant valued at 52,000 soles, and bought by the deed of August 17, 1878. In all these documents the valué of the property is declared totally paid. A few days lat'er, August 23, 1878, the apparent purchaser, Mr. Meiggs, transferred these acquisitions to the Government of Perú by a deed drawn up in Lima. Thus, all the State and prívate properties in Toco passed into the hands of Perú, eliminating competition in that Bolivian zone. 1. "Estaca" is a special measure used only in the nitrate fields and the quantity thereof diffe:ra in Perú, Bolivia and Chile. A Peruvian "estaca" vas equivalent to 28.570 square matera; a Bolivian to 2.560.000 square meters, and a Chilean to 1.000.000 square meten-. 42 5. Transaction The Peruvian Government conducted some of 1883. exceedingly complicated liquidations with Watson and Meiggs, in order to make the obligations fall on Chile. Desirous of terminating a disagreeable matter, and un- ravelling as best it could the tangle of • contracta, Chile, notwithstanding that the facts supported her stand, was obliged in 1883 to effect a transaction with Watson who represented some of the interests.

6. The Nitrate The expropriation of the nitrate indus- Their Payment tries in Tarapacá, and the acquisition of those by Chile in Gf Toco, was effected by Perú by the emission 1887 of State Certificates known as Nitrate Cer- tificates, for a total valué of 21,308,203 soles. In this sum the valué of the Tarapacá fields is estimated at 15,000,000 soles, and the prívate ones of Toco at 583,000, the balance of over five and a half millions representing public works also included in that financial operation. The Peruvian law of April 14, 1875, arranged for the payment of those certificates by a loan to be negotiated within two years' time. As this loan was never secured, the certificates circulated as titles to the interna] debt with a depreciation that reached £80, £50 and £23 for each 1,000 soles; the situation of the holders of these was even more critical after the declaration of war in 1879. Afterwards Chile spontaneously undertook the obligations represented by these' certificates, in order to liquidate affairs in Tarapacá, paying in 1887 a total sum of £1,160,200, an equivalent of £105 for each 1,000 soles.

7. Chilean Policy When Chile incorporated the territory of Freed™m.erCÍal Tarapacá into her political system, she also desired to establish the nitrate industry with a freedom that would correspond to Chile's commercial policy. She broke up the Peruvian monopoly system by returning to 43 their original holders, on presentation of the corresponding certificates, those properties that had been expropriated, paying the other holders the valué of their certificates. Prívate initiative and enterprise were thus again establiah'ed in this territory, permitting foreign and Chilean capital to flow in and build up the nitrate industry, now developing freely unrestricted by the oíd monopolies.

44 CHAPTER III

THE RIGHTS TO THE COAST

1. Quarrels Over Boundaries. 2. Titles and Controversias. 3. The Rights of Chile to the Ataeama Desert. 4. Chilean Jurisdiction on the Coast. 5. Cobija, the Only Port of Bolivia. 6. Possession De Facto Without Legal Title. 7. "Epítome Chileno" by Field Marshal Santiago De Tesillo, 1648. 8. The Treaties of August 10, 1866, and August 6, 1874.

1. Quarrels The circular of 1919 of the Government 9ver , . of Bolivia referred to the boundary quarrels Bounaanes. J 1 that began soon after the new nations had secured their independence in 1810, due to the fact that the previous administrative zones had never been clearly defined. Re- ferring to the dispute between Chile and Bolivia, the Bolivian circular states that "in that zone our rights were never in doubt or debatable," adding that everything between the two countries had been settled by the Treaties of 1866 and 1874, "which were called to create between them harmonious and normal relations." To this last statement we fully agree. In 1866 Chile renounced her unquestionable rights exercised from remote times over the Ataeama desert, which Bolivia did not claim until after 1842. With the same spirit of conciliation in 1874 she made new concessions to Bolivia, on the only condition that the rights of her citizens and industries there established should be respected. Unfortunately their subsequent relations, due to the perse- cution of Chilean citizens, the infringement on their rights, and the annulment of their concessions in contradiction to the Treaty terms, were far from being "harmonious and normal." 45 2. Tilles and The Bolivian Minister explains the bound- Controversies. ary disputes as due to the vagueness of the titles in the colonial administrations, but immediately adds that Bolivia's rights were never "doubtful or debatable." This contradiction is not possible. Either the titlea were doubtful requiring careful clarification and application, or they were without ambiguity and incontestable. What- ever may be the ground for discussion, however, Bolivia cannot deny that the titles she offered were formally impugned by Chile. It is necessary that the widely spread belief that Bolivia had absolute sovereignty over the Atacama coast, and that Chile occupied it without other title than that of forcé, be deíinitely denied and refuted.

3. The Rights of It is impossible to recall all the details ChíU to the Atacama of that debate, yet it will be of interest and Desert. valué to examine some of the bases on which reated Chile's stand regarding her rights to the Atacama desert. As it is known, that territory of America where the Liberator Bolívar in 1826 formed the nation that today bears his ñame (Bolivia), corresponded to the Charcas* Audiencia1 or Presi- dencia, so designated by the Spaniards. In order to properly understand the extent of these territories, and meaning of the administrative terms used in that period, it must be remem- bered that the mouth of the Loa river is on latitude 21° 28' S.; the port of Mejillones on latitude 23° S.; and Morro Moreno on latitude 23° 30' S. The coast was known as the Atacama desert or unpopulated Atacama, with Paposo, the only town in that región at the beginning of the nineteenth century aa the center of government. The valley of Copiapó, and the Atacama desert were the terms uaed to denote the beginning of the Reino de Chile (Kingdom of Chile), south of the Vice- royalty of Perú. The provinces to the interior of this Vice- royalty, generally called Upper Perú, or, as by Humboldt, In- terior Perú, corresponded to the Audiencia of Charcas, today

1 "Audiencia," a Spanish colonial, judicial, and administrative división of territory wherein the iurisdiction of a High Court of Justice was exercised. 46 Bolivia. The Bolivian authority on boundary questions, don José María Dalence, confirma this, stating that "neither in the Spanish laws, ñor by Spanish historians, is what today is Bolivia given any other ñame than Charcas." Law V, Title 15, Book 2, of the Laws of the Indies, dictated November 1, 1681, organized the Royal Audiencia of Lima, and designated its jurisdictional district as follows: "To have as a district the coast from said city [Lima] to the Kingdom of Chile, exclusively, and to the port of Paita, inclusive." Tlie extensión of the Audiencia of Lima in the colonial days is given by various contemporary documents. One of these entitled "General Idea of Perú," dated January 2, 1791, stated that Perú had lost several of the provinces that had contributed to its past greatness, in the north "the provinces that form the Reino de Quito, and successively those that constitute the Vieeroyalty of Buenos Aires." Regarding the northern and southern boundaries that document states: "The Guayaquil river divides it [Perú] from the New Kingdom of Granada to the north; the unpopulated Atacama desert separates it from the Kingdom of Chile to the south." It is necessary to recall that since August 1, 1776, the territory of the Audiencia of Charcas had been separated from Perú and added to the Vieeroyalty of Buenos Aires. That ia why the provinces to the east, those of Charcas, are referred to as the Vieeroyalty of Buenos Aires. Thus, we see Perú bounded on the south by Chile, separated by the Atacama desert, and on the east by the Vieeroyalty of Buenos Aires. Another document of that period published in the "Mer- curio Peruano," of January 5, 1792, defined the boundaries of Perú with more precisión, as follows: "Thus its greatest extensión * * * embraces twenty-three and a half degrees between Calpe Palmas on the border of Pasto, and Morro Mo- reno on the border of the Kingdom of Chile." The Pacific coast, according to the application that the authorized writers of the Vieeroyalty of Perú gave Law V, already mentioned, was divided solely between Chile and Perú, without the Audiencia of Charcas, or the Vieeroyalty of Buenos 47 Aires, having any part of the coast of the Pacific from Cape Palmas to Cape Horn, that is, inside the jurisdictional domains of Perú and Chile. In 1793 the Viceroy of Perú, don Francisco Gil de Taboada y Lémus, commissioned Dr. Hipólito Unánue to prepare a "Political, Ecclesiastical, and Military Guide of the Viceroyalty of Perú." This ofiicial report, written, as expressed by the Vice- roy, in accord with "the ideas I communicated to him with this object," was published in 1793 and reproduced in 1794, 1795, and 1797. In this ofiicial document the description of Perú is given as follows:

"By these divisions, Perú is today reduced to an ex- tensión of 365 leagues north to south—from latitude 3° 35' to latitude 21° 48'." Tumbes Cove separates it on the north "from the New Kingdom of Granada, and to the south the river Loa from the desert of Atacama and the Kingdom of Chile."

Viceroy Taboada y Lémus also made a special study of the geography of his territory, and in the report given in 1798 to Barón de Vallenar, who was to succeed him as Viceroy, after mentioning the previous lack of geographical knowledge regarding the Viceroyalty of Perú and the importance of such knowlege, stated :

"From north to south from Tumbes to the Vilcanita mountains it comprises 289 geographic leagues, but from that cove (Tumbes) to the Loa river, it has a diagonal coast line of 423 leagues. In the north it borders the New Kingdom of Granada, in the north east the Sacra- mento Pampa, in the east the fertile country of Pajonal, in the south east the Viceroyalty of Buenos Aires, and in the south, the Kingdom of Chile, from which it is separated by the vast desert of Atacama, and in the west the Pacific Ocean.

The map accompanying this document showed Perú bounded on the south by Chile, and only on the south east by the Vice- royalty of Buenos Aires, of which the Audiencia of Charcas had for several years been a part. 48 It is unnecessary to recall the numerous Royal Orders issued after the year 1776—when the Yiceroyalty of Buenos Aires was created—in which the Pacific coast is referred to as belonging only to Perú or Chile. If Charcas had had a port on the Pacific it would at some time have been mentioned in a document. In all these orders and regulations reference is only made to the "coasts of the Kingdom of Chile," or "of Perú," as in the State despatch of March 15, 1780, or to the "extensive coasts of Perú and Chile," as in the despatch of June 10, 1805. ifcVSÍSVvi

4. Chilean Juris- In the same way it is established by royal Coaitá °n ' commands toward the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, that the desert of Atacama was a dependence of Chile, with its center of jurisdiction in the town of Paposo, which became "the center of commerce for the inhabitants of the desert, in active communication with Copiapó." From Copiapó, in turn, the entire jurisdiction of the desert of Atacama depended. The Spanish laws declared that the desert of Ata- cama was part of Chile, and never mentioned any port, town, or part of the coast as belonging to the Audiencia of Charcas. Chile has also been able to show various acts of jurisdiction exercised over this territory. Bolivia has been unable to cite any such acts of jurisdiction on the part of the Charcas authoritie8. The Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sr. Jerónimo Urmeneta, in his note of July 9, 1859, referred to some valuable concessions of land and coast made by Chile in the middle of the seventeenth century. Also in some instructions given by the Captain General of Chile to the Sub- Delegate of Copiapó in December 16, 1789, in which we read about the steps to be taken in case ships should anchor in the coast under his jurdiction.

"I approve the instructions and measures that have been adopted with regard to the embarkation that has been sighted off the coasts of Paposo and Cobija," states this document, "where its boat neared the shore, and a guard has been placed in case some of these ships sighted prove to be English." 49 Miguel Luis Amunátegui, the eminent Chilean historian, in his work "the Boundary Question Between Chile and Bolivia," published in 1863, cites a series of twenty jurisdictional acts, all of importance and absolutely authentic, which prove the authority exercised by Chile over the desert of Atacama during the colonial period, and up to the first years of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, he refers to the adherence of the inhabitants of Paposo on December 1, 1817, to the Chilean Dec- laration of Independence, and adds:

"The inhabitants of Paposo constituted all the population of the desert; during all the colonial period the desert had formed part of Chile; its inhabitants had been considered subjects of that Kingdom; it was, therefore, very natural that, when independence was declared, they should desire to have as their country the same one of which until then they had considered themselves citizens." iNS^cy»"

5. Cobija, the During the early period of her republican Solivia?** life Chile continued, without opposition, her jurisdiction over that desert región. On January 30, 1843, Bolivia for the first time claimed that región as hers. Possessory acts had extended to Mejillones where the desert of Atacama ended, and Chile considered that territory as in- herently Chilean as Coquimbo or Valparaiso. With this conviction President Bulnes had sent an Exploration Commission which discovered guano in sixteen places on the coast and immediate islands, between latitude 23° and 29°. Preparations were made for the exploitation of these deposita by the State, for which purpose the law of July 13, 1842, was promulgated on October 31 of that year. In the message accompanying the law, President Bulnes declared that he had judged it necessary to send "an exploration commission to examine the coast between Coquimbo and the Mejillones headland, with the purpose of discovering whether in the territory of the Republic any guano deposits existed, the exploitation of which might provide new sources of revenue for the public treasury." 50 In doing this Chile was exercising a jurisdictional act in keeping with the ones exercised in previous years, coinciding with her unquestionable rights to that región. She had not opposed the occupation of the port of Santa María Magdalena de Cobija, realized by the Potosí authorities, as this port belonged to the district of Atacama, district from the desert of Atacama, and dependent on the administration of Potosí. Sr. Amunátegui in the work already cited, referring to this occupation, stated:

"Bolivia's title of possession to the port of Santa María Magdalena de Cobija is merely her occupation of it against express laws, and due to a tolerance on the part of the Governors of the Kingdom of Chile, who were responsible for its jurisdiction, a tolerance probably motivated by the distance and insignificance of the place, and perhaps because they had not heard of the strange possessory acts that the Potosí authorities had practiced in that isolated place." Even admitting "as sufficient a simple illegal possession, and for only a short time, Bolivia at most might have a right to retain the port of Cobija, but not to take possession, without legal titles, of the vast district called the Atacama desert."

During the early days of independent life the rulers of Bolivia did not consider the Atacama desert as a part of the national territory, and they focussed their attention on the only port of the country, Cobija. The Bolivian law of October 12, 1832, was dictated, as it states, in benefit of "our only port of Cobija." President Andrés Santa Cruz of Bolivia, complying with this mandate, issued in that port on January 1, 1883, a decree by virtue of which it was declared free for all ships, and exempt of duties. On reporting these acts to Congress on August 6, 1833, the President declared that he had personally visited the coast, and had dictated the necessary measures to develop Cobija, "the only port of the Republic." 51 In his exposition oí 1840 he speaks of the attention given to develop Cobija, Bolivia's "only port."

"Bolivia," he states in this document, "because of her geographical situation separated on all parts from the sea, will not be able to make marked progresa in her commerce and industries, or even in her civilization, while she remains out of contact with the industrious and more advanced nations of both continente. To remedy this defect I decided to protect with all the power of the Government, the bay of Cobija, the only port that Bolivia possesses because of a defective territorial demarcation."

He then points out the difficulties that existed in the communications between Cobija and the center of the State, having to cross "the distance of one hundred and seventy leagues of desert," and the efiforts made to give that port the elemente necessary to life, including water, which could not be found at a distance less than "twenty-five leagues." In the historie boundary dispute that ensued later, Chile was able to establish the fact that after her independence she had continued exerting her jurisdiction over a territory at least as far north as latitude 23°. Minister Jerónimo Urmeneta, in his note of July 9, 1859, already referred to, was able to state with all exactitude that Chile possessed full rights to exercise her authority in that zone up to latitude 23°. Regarding the extensión of the desert and coast between latitude 24° and 23°, where the desert of Atacama really ends," Minister Urmeneta declared:

"It could not be but agreed that Chile, possessing the inhabited and inhabitable parts of that territory, possessed it all, and consequently up to latitude 23°, because to possess an extensión of territory whatsoever, an island, a desert, it is not necessary, ñor possible, to materially possess every part of it. Chile, who of the eighty leagues comprising the Atacama desert possessed and exerted her jurisdiction over sixty of those leagues, naturally possessed it all." 52 6. Possession De Referring to the above-mentioned facts, Legal Tüte°Ut ant* authoritative documents that clearly established Chile's sovereignty over the Atacama desert, Sr. Amunátegui declared:

"The title of Chile to the sovereignty of the Atacama desert is not forcé, but the most legitímate and unques- tíonable right. It is not the guns of the frigates "Chile" and "Esmeralda," as the Bolivian diplomats declare, that have marked the present boundary of the Republic, it is the hands of the legislator since the days of the conquest until today, and, subsequently, in corroboration of what the laws of Spain disposed, the Constitution of Chile and the tools of our workmen. "On fixing this boundary at latítude 23° we have been sufficiently generous to leave Bolivia a portion of the coast that she possesses without legal title."

7. "Epítome Today we can add a new historical ante- FiMn

"Chile, the most beautiful, most fertile, and agreeable Province that America has, emulation of the best that Europe knows, is on the coast north to south, continuous from Perú to the Straits of Magellan. Its juris-

1 Epítome Chileno by Santiago de Tesillo, a facsímile reproduction of the first edition with a brief preface, by J. T. Medina, Santiago, Chile, 1911. Sr. Medina says that this is "one of the rarest national books known, if we may cali it so. It was published in Lima, without a date, probably in 1648. While references to it have been preserved in contemporary documents, it waa entirely unknown to us. The copy we have u»ed is today ln the John Cárter Brown Library in Providence, U. S. A., of which we were able to obtain photographlc reproductions thanks to the kindness of the Librarían, Mr. George Parker Winship." 53 diction extends from twenty degrees, to forty-seven on the other Pole of the equinoctial; proportioning a cli- mate similar to that of Spain, winter and summer, spring and autumn. "Its length is four hundred and fifty leagues, and its width is not more than twenty-five. In the east it is bounded by the great snow-capped Cordillera, and on the west the sea bathes its coastal towns. "Ascending by degrees, the inhabitable part begins at Copiapó, a pleasant valley, populated by some Spaniards, and more Indians, who are either farmera or sailors."

It is thus established, in agreement with the law of the Indies, with the geographical description entitled "General Idea of Perú," with the official description of Viceroy Taboada y Lémus, and with the other documenta that we have already quoted, that the coasts of Chile extended continuously from Perú to the Straits of Magellan, ending in the north at latitude 20°. The "Epítome Chileno" agreea with the other documenta, and differentiatea between the populated and unpopulated aections when it states "advancing by degrees, the inhabitable part begins at Copiapó, etc."

8. The Treaties The doubtful rights claimed by Bolivia 18661mvdtaÍ were defined in an hour of goodwill by the gust 5, 1874. ceaaion on the part of Chile of the territory down to latitude 24°, and the establishment of a zone under a common administration, that would permit both countries to divide between them the revenues derived from the export of guano and minerala. Such were the principal proviaiona of the Treaty of August 10, 1866. After the signing of this Treaty, enterpriaing Chilean explorers discovered deposits of nitrate salts situated to the south of latitude 23°, which shortly was to permit them to organize the first Chilean Nitrate Company of that diatrict, and establish in the seat of their operations the town of Antofagasta. 54 This discovery, and also that of the rich mineral deposits of Caracoles, rapidly attracted capital from Santiago and Val- paraíso. This unexpected prosperity was not long in causing friction and trouble with the Bolivian authorities, who, although representing the administrative regime created by the Treaty of 1866, had practically no connection with the industries there established, which were Chilean, and the population of the new city of Antofagasta, also Chilean. Chile desired to put an end to this unsatisfactory condition that was quickly sowing the seeds of greater problema and difficulties. She, therefore, abandoned the benefits to which she had a right and renounced her future prospects by ceding the territories to Bolivia, on the condition that the "Chilean people, industries, and capital will not be subject to more taxes, of any nature, than those existing at present," as stipulated in the Treaty of August 6, 1874. Although Chile, by putting the zone under one administration, hoped to settle the difficultiea, she aoon saw that despite her efforts and goodwill, peace and safety in the Antofagaata zone waa not to be aecured. There was something stronger than the faith in the recent Treaty, a apirit of unrest and uncertainty in the political regime that reatricted the energies of the people; a continuous uneaainess, and growing difficulties between the citizens and the authoritiea. The key to the situation, the myatery that nobody could solve, was later found in the Secret Treaty of February 6, 1873, which, following the breaking of the promises given, waa to bring on the war of 1879.

55 CHAPTER III

THE CONFLAGRATION OF THE PACIFIC

1. Breaking of the Treaty of 1874. 2. Peruvian Diplomacy in La Paz. 3. Perú Denies the Existence of the Alliance and Offers Her Mediation. 4. The Lavalle Mission. 5. The War With Perú and the Treaty of Ancón. 6. Bolivia and the Truce Pact of 1884. 1. Breaking of In order that the Alliance made in Lima %TreMy might assure a monopoly of the Peruvian nitrate it was necessary to end the free industry in Antofagasta. The war was not brought about for the possession of the coast, as the La Paz circular affirms, but because the compliance with the clauses of the Secret Treaty between Perú and Bolivia made it necessary to break the Treaty of 1874, drawn up to protect the Chilean industries in Antofagasta. It will not be necessary for us to discuss in detail all the steps taken by the Bolivian Government for the purpose of imposing on the Chilean Nitrate Company new taxes in violation of the Treaty of 1874. It will be sufficient to recall that, after numerous approaches, the Chilean representative in La Paz, in a note of November 8, 1878, asked of Bolivia the "definite suspensión of all taxes enforced since the Treaty," adding:

"A negative reply of the Bolivian Government to a petition so just would make it necessary for my Govern- ment to declare void the Boundary Treaty. The consequences of such an unfortunate, yet perfectly justified and necessary act, would be of the exclusive responsibility of the party that did not fulfill the stipulations of the pact."

Arricie 4 of that Treaty stated that the "Chilean people, industries, and capital will not be subjected to more taxes of any 56 nature, than those existing at present." This stipulation "will be effective for a period of twenty-five years." A second note of Chile, dated Decemiber 14, 1878, called attention to the fact that this exemption from taxation stipulated in the Treaty was not

"a generous concession on the part of the Bolivian Gov- ernment, but a compensation for the important and recognized rights that Chile ceded to Bolivia in order to put an end to the differences that separated the two nations before the Treaty of 1874"

The Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs replied in a note of December 18 that "he had ordered the coastal authorities to make the tax effective." To this the Chilean representative replied the same day stating that, having exhausted the methods of conciliation, he reiterated the declaration already made, that the "execution of the law imposing a tax on the Nitrate Com- pany, imports the rupture of the Boundary Treaty of August 6, 1874, and the Bolivian Government will be the only one responsible for the consequences."

In the presence of this situation Chile proposed as a last resort that the arbitration contemplated in the Treaty be effected. In the note of January 3, 1879, to the Chilean representative in La Paz, Chile stated:

"The Government of Bolivia lias thought that the contribution referred to is not in opposition to the Treaty of 1874; the Government of Chile maintains a contrary opinion. Therefore, the necessity for a peaceful and friendly discussion in order to arrive at a mutual agreement is seen, and if this is not possible, the time has arrived to deliver the disputed point to the decisión of a friendly power, thus complying with the provision of Article 2 of the Protocol annexed to the Treaty. "The Government of Chile," continúes the despatch, "accepts any of these two expedients; but what it cannot accept is that the Government of Bolivia, taking justice into her own hands, should solve the point under discussion by putting into execution a measure that Chile considera in open opposition to the Treaty in forcé." 57 The Government of Chile instructed it8 representative to propose arbitration, on the understanding that orders be immediately given to suspend the enforcement of the tax decree, pending a decisión, and asking that a definite reply be secured regarding this, authorizing him to return if Bolivia persisted in the enforcement of the law. The communication from the Chilean Government closes requesting the Chilean representative at La Paz to express to the Government of Bolivia in case he is obliged to retire, that

"the repeated refusal to suspend the execution of the law of February 14, 1878, would imply the annulment of the Treaty of 1874, and consequently broken that pact with Bolivia, Chile would again secure the rights she legitimately exercised before the Treaty of 1866 over the territory referred to by the Treaty. For the same reason Chile, if that disagreeable emergency, that she has not provoked or been able to avoid, should arrive, will take all the steps she considers necessary in the defence of her rights."

The Chilean representative complied with the instructions received, January 20, 1879. But meanwhile serious occurrences had taken place on the coast. On January 11 the Prefect of the Department of Antofagasta had ordered the imprisonment of the Manager of the Chilean Nitrate Company, and had set an embargo on the properties of that company. Furthermore, all shipments of nitrate were prohibited, despite the written protests of the Chilean Cónsul and of the Manager of the Company. The lack of direct communications between La Paz and Antofagasta was responsible for the fact that the Chilean representative in La Paz did not hear of these occurrences until nearly the end of the month. In his note of January 20 to the Government of Bolivia he had stipulated a time limit of three days for a reply. On February 5 he called attention to the fact that sixteen days had elapsed without a reply having been received, and that he had meanwhile received the news of the embargo and other violent measures effected in Antofagasta. On the following day the Bolivian Minister of Foreign 58 Affairs replied that, in view of the protest made by the Anto- fagasta Company against the enforcement of the tax law, the Government of Bolivia

"had been obliged to rescind the contract that had been signed with that Company. With this action the execution of the law of February 14, 1378, was suspended, and the motive for the protest of your Excellency therefore disappears."

The Bolivian Government on February 1, 1879, had re- scinded the contract with the Company and had taken possession of its properties. The Chilean plenipotentiary resolved to resort to every possible expedient in an appeal for a reasonable agreement.

"My Government," he stated in his note of February 8, "which maintains that by virtue of the existing Treaty, Bolivia cannot impose on the company any import or export tax, or hinder the exploitation of the nitrate deposits belonging to the Company, must now affirm that much less can the Company be deprived of the properties of which it is in peaceful possession."

And as the previous communication of the Bolivian Gov- ernment had declared that "in case of a new incident arising Bolivia would be ready to accept the arbitration stipulated by the Treaty," the Chilean representative, still in a conciliatory spirit, requested that the Bolivian Government

"declare in a frank and definite form whether she will accept the arbitration provided for in the pact, meanwhile suspending all action taken on the coast with regard to this matter."

In the meantime the Government of Chile had been informed of the steps taken by Bolivia in Antofagasta, and on February 13 ordered her representative to return, stating that in view of the decree annulling the Company's contract, Chile had decided to occupy Antofagasta. On February 14, 1879, the date set by Bolivia for the sale at auction of the Company's properties, a Chilean división landed at Antofagasta to stop the sale and restore order on the coast. 59 Minister Gutiérrez, in the circular to which we have referred, declares that "Bolivia accepted war because no other honorable solution existed after the occupation of the Ataeama desert." Sr. Gutiérrez forgets that Chile occupied Antofagasta only to avoid the unlawful appropriation of the Chilean Ni- trate Company, after Chile's repeated proposals of arbitration had been rejected. Chile was more justified in sending military protection to her people, than was Bolivia in sending military forces to expropriate the property of Chilean citizens. The occupation of Antofagasta was not a declaration of war. It was only the first rupture following Bolivia's unreasonable and antagonistic attitude, Chile having done her best to settle the matter amicably. With the breaking of the Treaty, Chile again secured possession of the territory up to latitude 23°, as the Treaty of 1874 clearly stated that if Bolivia failed to com- ply with her obligations, or broke the Treaty, "Chile's rights legitimately exercised over that territory before the Treaty of 1866 would again be hers."

2. Peruvian The cause of Bolivia's violent attitude be- LaPp^IC5f carne known when the existence of the Secret Treaty, and the activities of the Peruvian Plenipotenciary in La Paz, don José Luis Quiñones, were revealed. President Daza of Bolivia, on decreeing the expropriation of the Chilean nitrate fields, on February 1, 1879, wrote to Prefect Zapata: "They will not be able to take them from me, let the whole world try. I hope that Chile will not inter- fere; if she does declare war we can count on the support of Perú, as we shall insist on the fulfillment of the Secret Treaty."

The Peruvian Minister, Sr. Quiñones, communicated to his Government the steps that Bolivia proposed to take, and stated that "the desire of the Bolivian Government is to give preference in the exploitation of the nitrate fields to her sister and ally, 60 the Republic of Perú, with the object of avoiding the competí- ñon from which she suffers in the exploitation of her own fields." In another of his letters he informs his Government that President Daza would maintain that attitude because he counted on "the loyalty of the Peruvian Government in fulfilling the Secret Treaty of February 6, 1873."

if^ysi

3. Perú Denles The second stage of the diplomatic de- of the Alliance vel°Pments now begins with the offer on the and. Offers Her part of Perú to act as mediator. It is inter- Mediation. esting to see to what extent Chile was ignorant of the Secret Treaty. President Aníbal Pinto of Chile, a peace-loving man of sterling character, had kept the Peruvian representative in Santiago constantly informed of the difficulties with Bolivia. When the breaking point was reached he requested the Peru- vian representative to secure the good offices of his country in order that a peaceful settlement, satisfactory to both nations, might be reached. He moreover wrote, with the uttermost sincerity, to the Chilean representative in Lima, asking him to invite Perú to assume the role of mediator.

"We will alWays be ready to accept a solution that will re-establish the good relations between Chile and Bolivia," he declared in his letter of February 21. "To work toward this end is the glorious task corresponding to Perú, in view of her friendly relations with both Chile and Bolivia."

This letter gives evidence of Chile's complete faith and confidence in Perú. At the same time momentous events were being enacted in Lima behind the scenes of that international drama. The Bolivian Plenipotentiary, don Serapio Reyes Ortíz, sent especially to Perú to demand the fulfillment of the Secret Treaty, was investigating the military and naval strength of that country. Perú was doubtful regarding her naval superiority, and 61 decided to gain time wliile she could secure additional equipment. The Secret Treaty was still held in strict reserve, yet in the meantime, on his way to Chile to act as mediator was Sr. José Antonio Lavalle, well aware of the existence of the Treaty, and fresh from the conference held in Lime to determine the miíitary and naval assistance that Perú might be able to give Bolivia. Through his representative, Sr. Lavalle, President Prado sent messages of goodwill to Chile. Yet to his representatives in Europe he sent communications of a very different nature. To the Vice-President of Perú, then in Europe, he cabled on February 28:

"Buy immediately, regardless of cost, one or two iron- clads better than or equal to those of Chile. Obtain funds in any way."

On March 4 he repeated his order as follows:

"If you cannot obtain in England iron-clads ready for service as good as or better than those of Chile, see Italian ones. Once the purchase is made, hoist the Perú- vian colors immediately, with the ñame Amazonas.

He realized that there would be an outburst in Chile as soon as she became aware of Perú's double role of ally and mediator. It was necessary to secure the ships while Perú was yet neutral, and place them out o'f the reach of foreign powers. The Lavalle mission was on its way to Chile, but the Peru- vian Government did not wish to hide from its representatives the fact that war would shortly be declared. In a confidential communication of March 5 he predicted that the Lavalle Mis- sion would be futile, and in that case, uthe Government will have declared war on Chile by the time this communication reaches your hands." President Prado also endeavoured to reach an agreement with Argentine that would permit him to secure subsidies, or some of her warships, even though under the guise of a supposed purchase. In a confidential note of March 7, he told his representative in Buenos Aires, Sr. La Torre, to convince the Argentine Government that a "Treaty of Subsidies does not 62 viólate her neutrality," especially as Perú was not then in a state of war with Chile. In case this was not possible he suggested the idea "of purchasing one or two of her warships, through a third party, with the necessary secrecy, and with the complete reciprocity on the part of Perú, so that should Argentine later require the use of her ships, Perú would be obliged to sell them back, and, in addition, place at Argentine's disposal one or tivo of her ovan ships." Just as Argentine had refused to give her approval to the Secret Treaty because it was aimed at Chile, she again turned down this proposal of Perú. Argentine, despite her boundary dispute with Chile, put aside all these questions until after the war, when Chile could again give her attention to the matter. The efforts of Perú to secure warships in Europe, also failed.

4. The Lavalle On Marcli 4,1879, the Lavalle Mission reach- Mission. ed Valparaíso with manifestations of friendship toward Chile, the Secret Treaty in Lima apparently forgotten. That same day the first hint of Perú's real intentions carne to Santiago in a message from the Chilean Minister in Lima, Sr. Godoy, stating: "Navy, army, Callao batteries being prepared." Messages from other quarters began to arrive hinting at the existence of an alliance between Bolivia and Perú. How- ever, nothing definite regarding these rumors could be secured, and Sr. Godoy was unable to confirm the reports. On March 14 the Chilean Government ordered her repre- sentativo in Lima to insist on "an immediate declaration of neutrality" on the part of Perú, which instructions Sr. Godoy carried out on March 17. After referring to the preparations for war that Perú was conducting, Sr. Godoy, in his note of March 17, recalls the friendly ties that have bound the two nations together, and demands a declaration of neutrality. The Peruvian Government did not reply to this note, but President Prado invited the Chilean representative to a conference at Chorillos on March 20. In this memorable conference Presi- dent Prado íinally confessed that he could not declare his neu- 63 trality because of the existence of the Treaty of Alliance with Bolivia. This was the first official confirmation of the existence of that pact, and produced in Chile the explosion that was to be expected. Plenipotenciary Lavalle, who had previously denied the existence of the Treaty, now also confessed. Before that serene magistrate, President Pinto, who had sincerely and faithfully worked to avoid war, Sr. Lavalle, ostensibly on a friendly and peaceful mission, admitted the machinations of his country against Chile, exclaiming when the President read out the telegram from Godoy: "It must be so if His Excellency, General Prado, says it." From that moment the Chilean nation was united for war. Sr. Lavalle, following instructions from Lima to postpone the breaking point, remained in Santiago eight days more. On April 3, when Congress authorized the declaration of war, the Chilean Government requested him to leave the country.

i^jcr^i

5. The War with Arbitration and conciliatory methods hav- Perú and the ing failed, Chile, on April 5, 1879, declared Treaty of Ancón. war. The Chilean soldiers stationed at Anto- fagasta, and those recruited from the south, were obliged to wait seven long months for the supplies and munitions ordered from Europe. The Chilean navy meanwhile set out to clear the seas of enemy ships, in order to permit the safe transportation of the army up the coast. The battles of Chorillos and Mira- flores, near Lima, won by the Chileans in January, 1881, followed by the occupation of the capital, marked the definite downfall of the military power of Perú. The political administration of Perú which Chile was obliged to undertake from that moment to the time when the Peace Treaty was signed in 1883, was due to the fact that together with the military forces, the elements of national authority capable of governing the country had also disappeared. It was necessary that the public find men able and willing to undertake the responsibilities. 64 The downfall of the military power of the Allies had really begun in June, 1880, and Chile in October of that year, in the Arica Conference, had stated her terms for peace, which not only provided for a just indemnification, but also sought guarantees that would prevent future disputes and outbreaks. The defínite cession of Tarapacá was a fundamental condition to any treaty, seeing that the commercial and economic interests of this Province had been the cause of the Alliance of 1873. The cession of Tacna and Arica was a guarantee for the safety of Chile's future frontiers, and Perú's refusal to consider this point at the Arica Conference led to the continuation of the war. In 1882 the sale of these two Provinces to Chile was suggested, and in 1883 the form finally adopted was proposed, that is, that Chile should take them over for a period of ten years, after which their definite status was to be decided by a plebisicite. The history of these negotiations clearly establishes the fact that these territories were required solely as guarantees for future peace. In a letter dated January 24, 1883, from the President of Chile, don Domingo Santa María, to his Pleni- potentiary in Washington, Sr. Marcial Martínez, an account of the state of the peace negotiations is given, calling attention to the fact that the only question to be solved is that regarding Tacna and Arica.

"In Perú the cession of Tarapacá is no longer a matter for discussion," the letter states. "With the cession of this territory we could tomorrow arrange peace with García Calderón, but we cannot limit ourselves to this point alone, not only because our commercial interests and the safety of our future make it necessary for us to go to the extreme of purchasing, for safety's sake, the provinces of Tacna and Arica, nothwithstanding that in our position we could remain in possession of these territories without compensation of any kind."

The conditional cession of these territories, that is, dependent on the result of a plebiscite, was the formula finaDy 65 adopted. With regard to this, the Chilean representative, Sr. Novoa, telegraphed to President Santa María on March 28, 1883: "They [the Peruvian representatives] are convinced that Tacna and Arica sooner or later must be lost to Perú, but they do not daré state that they are ceding these territories, much less can they sell them, as the nation would not tolerate any Government that would do this. On the other hand, Lavalle told me that the masses would be fascinated by the idea that those territories were not ceded, and might be called Peruvian, notwithstanding that the plebiscite after ten years would show the result that the Chilean Government desires."

From many long coriferences held in Viña del Mar and Santiago and among the representatives of the different political groups in Perú, there gradually evolved the Preliminary Protocol signed by General Iglesias on March 12, 1883, the stipulations being those that later were incorporated into the Treaty of Ancón, signed October 20 of that year. For the approval of the Treaty a Constitutional Assembly was convoked in Perú, which approved the Treaty on March 8, 1884, the ratifications being exchanged the 12th of the same month. In this way was peace with Perú established, after Chile had sought and received the advice of friendly nations, never imposing peremptory and final terms to an adversary whose territory she occupied. On the contrary, the Government of Chile for three years patiently discussed the peace proposals, limiting herself to insisting solely on those conditions absolutely necessary for the peace and safety of the State, in order to put an end to circumstances that for years had been a conátant source of trouble, and which at length led to war. While some maintain that the loss of Tarapacá signified for Perú the loss of the nitrate by means of which Chile has enriched her treasury, it is to be borne in mind that it was the Chilean policy of commercial freedom that permitted these territories to develop as they have. The acquisition of Tara- 66 pacá put into the hands of Chile the total production of nitrate. The Bolivian statesman, Sr. Gutiérrez, in his book previously quoted, states:

"What Perú has lost, however, is not as great as what Chile has gained by the acquisition of the Tarapacá nitrate zone which permita her to control the entire production of nitrate. "In the hands of Perú those riches, although great, would not have acquired the same importance, seeing that she would not have had the same monoply, nitrate being exploited by Chile and Bolivia. In order that the nitrate industry in Peru's hands might have been as profitable as it has been in Chile's, it would have been necessary for Perú to secure the nitrate fields of Anto- fagasta and Taltal, a task greater even than her aspirations. It is, therefore, inexact to say that Perú lost the income that Tarapacá produces, seeing that she could not have developed it sufficiently without securing a monopoly. On the other hand, it is exact to say that Chile has secured that imánense subsidy with the territorial annexation.1

The statement of Sr. Gutiérrez regarding the ampie indemnity that Perú was later able to secure at the cost of her former ally is also interesting.

"Perú," says Sr. Gutiérrez, "has been conducting a policy that will slowly but surely replace, by means of progressive territorial occupations in the Amazon región, all the territory that she lost on the Pacific coast. * * * During the last thirty years since the Treaty of Ancón, Perú has secured territory more vast, more rich, and of greater future possibilities than that of Tarapacá."

And, adds Sr. Gutiérrez bitterly, Perú has enriched herself with this territory at the cost of her ally in the war of 1879.2

1 Alberto Gutiérrez, The War of 1879, París, 1912, pages 12, 13. 2 Alberto Gutiérrez, Ibid. page 14. 67 6. Bolivia and the When Chile, on Ferbruary 14, 1879, oc- 2884B P<1Ct Antofagasta, all that territory remained under Chilean control. In reality the only Boliviana found in that zone were in the administrativa services. The nitrate industries with their workmen, railroads, commerce, and the entire population, were all Chilean. The change brought about was thus only a change in administration, a few Bolivian officers being supplanted by Chileans.1 During the first days the occupation of the coast was limited to latitude 23°, and only extended itself to the north through Cobija, Tocopilla, and all the región up to the Loa river at the south of Tarapacá (latitude 21° 28') when Bolivia on March 1, 1879, declared war on Chile. The occupation of these small ports soon gave the Chilean army the possession of all the Atacama desert and región up to the Peruvian frontier. The war with Bolivia would naturally have stopped there had not the intervention of Perú carried military activities to other territories. Bolivian troops participated-with Perú for a short while in the fighting in Tara- pacá, and in the defence of Tacna under the Bolivian General Narciso Campero. After its capture by the Chileans following a strenuous campaign across the great deserts the Bolivians withdrew from active participation. Peace between Chile and Bolivia thus really began May 26, 1880, when the Bolivian army was defeated in Tacna, and the port of Arica became the naval and military base of the Chileans. As a spectator, Bolivia saw the downfall of her ally following the great battles of Mira- flores and Chorillos, January, 1881, and the subsequent occupation of Lima and Callao.

1 Regardins the conditions existing in this zone at this period it is of interest to note the following account of the región published in Le XIX Sié-cle oí Jone, 1879, by a French traveler: "The exploitation of the guano and nitrate deposita is made very difficult as the coast that forms the end of the desert ia devoid of water. The Chileans, better eittt- ated than the Bolivians for ¡the development of this territory in view of the fact that their country is the natural continuation of the coast, have employed much energy and aetivity in these sections, have invested large amounts of capital, and have built up .the mining towns found there and the large apparatus used for the distillation of sea water. "Of every twenty inhabitants seventeen are Chileans, one is a Peruvian, one European and one Bolivian. The Bolivian, usually a colonel, is the authority. "The Chileans work, the European trades. and he (the Bolivian colonel), orders. The isolation of the district that he administers converts him into a sort of dictator, and a regime of capriciousness and ill-will, exceedingly vexatious, makes the position of the Chileans as disagreeable as it is difficult to endure." 68 The military leaders then fought among themselves to secure the leadership in Perú, aggravating the situation, and making it necessary for the Chileans to send military expeditions to the north and interior of Perú. The Treaty of Peace of October 20, 1883, put an end to the Chilean military occupation, and also to the political administration of Perú by Chilean headquarters in Lima, which administration had lasted two years and ten months. In December, 1883, the Bolivian representatives, Sr. Beli- sario Salinas and Sr. Belisario Boeto, arrived in Santiago to discuss a treaty of peace between Chile and Bolivia. Don Luis Aldunate, who, as Minister of Foreign Affairs for President Santa María, had participated in the drafting of the Treaty of Ancón with Perú, initiated the negotiations with the Bolivian representatives. In 1900 Sr. Aldunate published an account of these negotiations, in which he stated that although the pact with Bolivia took the form of a temporary Truce Pact, "because of its spirit, and the considerations that led Chile and Bolivia to give it that ñame, it was a treaty drawn up with the reciprocal and complete understanding that the bases for deñnite peace had been established." The Bolivian representatives first of all desired to deny that their country had been responsible for the war.

• "Both the Secret Treaty that united Bolivia to Perú and the initiation and development of all the posterior acts that were the immediate cause of the war," they declared in the conference of December 7, "can only be contemplated as the exclusive result of the military dictatorship, omnipotent, unbalanced, and uncensored which the absolute Government of the former country has in fact been for some time."

The Bolivian Plenipotentiaries were anxious to contradict the opinion then prevalent that in Bolivia there existed, or had existed, two parties, one in favor of the continuation of the war with Chile, and the other in favor of peace.

"On the contrary," they affirmed, "the opinion of the nation is, and has been for some time, unanimiously and decidedly in favor of peace with Chile." 69 Bolivia's loyalty to Perú had until now made it an obligation of honor to stand by her, it was explained.

"But the latter developments of the war," declared the Bolivian representatives, "the formation of the Iglesias Government, the Treaty that this Government made separately with Chile, and, finally, the surrender of Arequipa, completely severed the ties that duty had imposed on Bolivia in opposition to her national interests."

The desire of Bolivia to secure an outlet to the sea was th'en insinuated, but later abandoned. The Preliminary Protocol was signed February 13, 1884, but the defínite Truce Pact was not signed until April 4, the final result of tñe negotiations begun in December of the previous year. The difficulties that aróse during the latter part of the negotiations were due to the clauses regarding the reciprocity of the exemption of custom duties. That idea, as also the principal ones of the Treaty, dated back to the Lillo-B aptista project drawn up in Tacna in January, 1882. The Truce Pact contained stipulations that might be called transitory, to be replaced by the permanent clauses of the Peace Treaty, yet the authority of Chile over the zone which she had reoccupied was established in definite and absolute form. Chilean sovereignty was sanctioned over all this territory between latitude 23° and 24°, which had been ceded conditionally to Bolivia by the Treaty of 1874, and which automatically returned to Chile when that Treaty was broken; the territory from latitude 23° to latitude 21° 28' was temporarily occupied by Chile until the drafting of the Peace Treaty. The Bolivian statesman, Señor Gutiérrez, declares with regard to this:

"The main condition imposed by Chile in the negotiations of 1883 that lead to the Truce Pact was that Bolivia recognize Chile's sovereignty over the zone between latitude 23° and 24°, the long dispute over which had terminated with the Treaty of 1874. This recognition is seen not only in the text of Article 2 of the Truce 70 Pact, but in the form in which, since 1891, the negotia- tio'/is for a definite Treaty were developed. "Thus actually, and in accord with the text of the T ruce Pact * * * the only territory to be transferred find therefore subject to pecuniary or territorial compensation, was that comprised between the Loa river and latitude 23o."1

Thus the reincorporation to Chilean jurisdiction of the ter- ritoj ry of Antofagasta, which had been the inevitable conse- que ®ce of the rupture of the Treaty of 1874, was solemnly refjognized by the international agreement, ratified by both ct rantries, that terminated the state of war between Chile and Píolivia. Twenty years later the Treaty of 1904 definitely estab- Üshed the peace so long sought by the two nations.

i Alberto Gutiérrez, The Treaty of Peace with Chile, La Paz, 1905. 71 CHAPTER VIII

THE NEGOTIATIONS OF 1895

1. Bolivia's Port. 2. The Treaties of May 18, 1895. S\ The Protocol Signed in Sucre, December 9, 1895. 4. Explane tory Protocol of April 30, 1896. 5. A New Reservation by Bolivia: The Legislative Agreement of November ¿ 1896. 6. Law of December, 31, 1895, by Which Chile Approves the Treaties of May, 1895.'

1. Bolivia's Port. It is not strange to find in the discussioi is that have taken place between Perú an«»\ Bolivia, claims of the latter to Tacna and Arica. Against the rights maintained by Perú, Bolivia has invoked the argument that colonial history shows that Arica,

"conquered in the thirteenth century by the Aymarás, was organized in the sixteenth century as the Upper Peruvian District, destined to serve the needs of communication and the economic interests of the Audiencia of Charcas. For that reason the authorities of that district were under the jurisdiction of Charcas, and its military defence was entrusted to the troops of Potosí until the creation of the Viceroyalty of Buenos Aires."

As these argumenta did not convince Perú, Bolivia went back many years to the time when Bolívar was creating the Republic of Bolivia, recalling that in those days the inhabitants of Tacna and Arica had manifeated their deaire to be incorporated into the nascent Republic, and to end their dependence to Lima. In an act drawn up March 14, 1826, the citizens of Tacna demanded "the separation of this Province from Lima and its unión to Sucre," asking that the votes of a "patriotic people, that decidedly wish to belong to the Re- public of Bolivia," be heeded. The few inhabitants in. Arica followed suit, requesting that the "city of Arica be joined to 72 the Bolivian nation arnd form a part of that family," as stated in their manifestó of March 22, 1826. Bolivia's desire to possess a port had been clearly manifested in her first Congr^ss, which met in 1825. Following the declarations of the inhabitants of Tacna and Arica, a Treaty was signed with Perú in Chuquisaca on November 25, 1826, by which General Sucre endeavoured to remedy the territorial defect with which Bolivia had entered the concert of Amer- ican nations. Under this Traaty Perú ceded to Bolivia the territory between latitudes 18° and 21°, that is, the portion of the coast that today forms the Provinces of Tacna and Tara- pacá, from Cabo Sama to the Loa river. Bolivia, in turn, ceded to Perú the rich territory of Beni, and in addition was to pay the sum of five million pesos. This Treaty was not ratified by Perú, and the work inspired by General Sucre's clear visión, with the purpose of making Bolivia economically independent, was lost, as well as the excellent opportunity that presented itself at that most proper time in Bolivia's history. When the Bolivian Government desired to recall all these facts, the Peruvian Minister dismissed the matter with the statement that it was "news to excite the curiosiíy o'f the ignorant." Perú gave Bolivia no opportunity to discuss the question, notwithstanding that Arica was the natural and unavoidable outlet for Bolivian commerce. A distinguished Bolivian writer correctly maintains that all efforts to colonize Atacama were sterile, and that the custom privileges of Cobija "did not succeed in deviating the international commerce from its oíd and natural route, the port of Arica, notwithstanding that in Arica Peruvian hostility imposed on our imports duties up to 90%, while at Cobija they were 2%"1 In these insistent efforts to attract trade, Cobija was even declared a free port, and premiums were paid on exports, but to no avail.

"It is sufficient to glance at the map to convince ourselves that if we are to chose between the desert of Atacama and the slopes of Tacora, our trade route must inevitably be by the latter región," states Sr. Muñoz Cornejo. i Humberto Muñoz Cornejo, directo? of El Tiempo. March 30, 1919. 73 Perú remained obstínate, and the opp ortunity that presented itself when Bolívar and Sucre were creafjng nations and defining frontiers was lost. Chile, on the otAier hand, not only considered the independence of Bolivia an indispensable condition for the peace of that section of America, but had inclined to Bolivia's aspirations regarding an outlet to the sea. In another chapter we have recalled some of Chile's efforts in this direction. For the present it w/Jl suffice to mention that the Egaña Mission, appointed in 1?,36 for the beneñt of peace in America, had as a special purpose the better orgañization of the Republic of Bolivia, to secure which Chile proposed the transfer of Tacna and Arica to Bolivia.1 Bolivia's efforts to colonize Cobija failed, notwithstanding the protective decrees, the privileges enjoyed by the inhabitants, the free distribution of land, tools, and cattle to Bolivians who wished to establish themselves there, the construction of roads begun several times, and other efforts to this end made by the Government.

"This situation," declares Sr. Muñoz Cornejo, "had reached such a state on the eve of the war of 1879, that in the municipal elections of December of the previous year the Bolivian candidates nominated with the support of foreigners, did not even succeed in being elected as alternates. "Scarcely had Chile disembarked her troops in Cobija the following February, than the entire town was flying the Chilean colors, as if the troops were in their aum country. "Frankly speaking, and although it will deeply wound our patriotism, we had a greater population in Tacna and Arica than in Cobija, and the Bolivians that sailed with the Prefect from that latter port following the Chilean occupation were not more than twelve. "All of this, in our opinion, together with the un- impeachable testimony of history, shows that our claims to the Atacama coast were well grounded, but that there was nothing whatsoever that would secure the effective incorporation of the people of that territory as an integral part of the Bolivian nation. "We need not discuss whether or not it would be possible today to secure the territory we lost in 1878 1 Luis Barros Borgoño, The Chilean-BoHvian Negotiations of 1895, pages 83-88. 74 through non-representation politically, even before the fortunes of war were adverse to us. "It is criminal to deceive the people with beautiful words of justice, of international rectitude, or to speak of the return of our lost territories. Rights are not founded on empty air."

Sr. Muñoz Cornejo invokes these arguments to combat the thesis advocating the recovery of the Provinces lost in the war of 1879, and to support the movement seeking the port of Arica. "This movement," he states, "may injure Peruvian sentiment. However, it is more injurious for us to live entombed." No further proóf is needed at present to show that the distant coast of Antofagasta did not provide easy access to the sea. Antofagasta, or Chimba Bay, as it was called in those days, was first inhabited in 1870 by Chilean nitrate concessionaires, but even that port did not help Bolivia in any way. Anto- fagasta's growth is entirely due to the efforts of the Chilean Nitrate Company, which afterwards constructed the railroad to the interior of Bolivia. The growth of Arica in recent years has been due to the railroad built by Chile connecting it with La Paz, in fulfillment of one of the clauses of the Treaty of 1904. Before the drafting of this Treaty Chile had faithfully sought a way of satisfying Bolivia's aspirations to a port, and her generous efforts of 1895 form the preliminaries of the definite peace negotiations.

2. The^Treaties The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, 1895. ' don Alberto Gutiérrez, in his circular of February 24, 1919, has seen in the Treaty of May 18, 1895, Chile's recognition of Bolivia's need of a port, a "primordial necessity for Bolivian sovereignty." He states that Chile by that Treaty ceded to Bolivia "the expectant rights 75 to be derived from Article III of the Treaty of Ancón." Ex- plaining the cause for the failure of these negotiations, Sr. Gutiérrez declares:

"When the time carne to perfect and promúlgate those pacts, an obstacle of political character was encountered, in that Perú could not agree on the procedure of the plebicite that was to determine the definite status of those territories."

The Treaty of Peace and Amity of May 18, 1895, the one of Transfer of Territory, and the one relative to Commerce, all of the same date, as well as two Complementary Protocols of the 28th of that month, form the total result of these negotiations, when Chile, in a concrete manner, showed her desire to do all possible to satisfy Bolivia's aspirations to a port on the Pacific. The most important point in those negotiations is that relative to the concession to Bolivia of a port on the Pacific that would allow her free access to the sea. The special Treaty on Transfer of Territory states its object in the following preamble:

"The Republics of Chile and Bolivia, with the object of strengthening more and more the ties of friendship that unite both countries, and conscious that a superior necessity—the future development and commercial prosperity of Bolivia—requires that she have free and natural access to the sea, have agreed to sign a special Treaty regarding the Transfer of Territory * * *"

Article I of this Treaty states:

"If as a result of the plebicite to be held in accord with the Treaty of Ancón, or as a result of direct settlement, the Republic of Chile should acquire permanent sovereignty over the territories of Tacna and Arica, Chile agrees to transfer them to the Republic of Bolivia, in the same form in which she acquires them * * *"

Article IV states:

"If the Republic of Chile does not obtain by means of the plebiscite or by direct settlement the definite sovereignty over the zone in which are found the cities 76 of Tacna and Arica, Chile agrees to cede to Bolivia the bay of Vítor to the Camarones ravine, or a similar one, and, in addition, the sum of five million silver pesos * *

In the first case Bolivia was to receive Tacna and Arica, and she was to pay Chile five million pesos; in the second case she was to receive Vítor bay and five million pesos; in the third case, a bay similar to Vítor chosen on Chilean coasts, and five million pesos for its development. On December 31, 1895, the Congress of Chile passed the law approving these three Treaties of May 18, 1895, and the two Protocols of May 28. From that moment the Chilean Govern- ment was ready to exchange ratifications, and give the Treaties drafted in a spirit of international conciliation and friendship their final form.

3. The Protocol The Bolivian Congress, however, did not Signed in give the Treaties the approval that was ex- ber 9, 1895. pected, but added a protocol that modified the agreement, and introduced into the negotiations an element of distrust. This Additional Protocol of December 9, 1895, was declared necessary in order to prevent the rejection of the Treaties on the part of Bolivia, and the Minister of Chile in Bolivia in this emergency considered that he ehould sign it. The Protocol was not known to the Chilean Congress when they approved the Treaties, and because of this fact the Government of Chile was obliged to suspend their ratification. The Protocol of December 9, apart from other defects, contained in Clause IV the stipulation that in the case of the transfer by Chile of Vítor bay, or a similar one, "sucli an obligation on the part of Chile would not be considered fulfilled until she has delivered a port and zone that will amply satisfy the present and future needs of the commerce and industries of Bolivia."

This was the clause that was objected to by tlie Chilean Government. The actual difference was only present in con- 8Ídering the extreme case contemplated in the Treaty—that is, 77 should Chile have to give Bolivia a port other than Tacna and Arica or Vítor. It was Bolivia's desire to subordínate the transfer of the coast to the appreciation that Bolivia reserved herself the right to make regarding the qualifications of the future port, that Chile could not accept, because of its extreme vagueness. The stipulation that the port "amply satisfy the present and future needs of Bolivia" frustrated the entire negotiations conducted by Chile with true disinterestedness. It was something that might lead to serious differences in the future. This, and not the fact that the conditions of the plebiscite could not be agreed upon, as stated by Sr. Gutiérrez, was the cause of the failure of these negotiations.

iK^lcy^i

4. Explanatory The disagreement between Chile and Protocol of Bolivia carne as soon as the Chilean Govern- April 30, 1896. ment was acquainted with Clause IV of the Additional Protocol of December 9, 1895. On December 11, the author, as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Negotiator of the May Treaties, telegraphed the following observations regarding that clause:

"The phrase that the obligation on the part of Chile will not be considered fulfilled until Chile delivers a port and zone that will amply satisfy the present and future needs of Bolivia, etc., has two grave objections: first, the fulfillment of the obligation is left to the entire criterion of Bolivia; second, it is of too ampie and absolute a range. Its replacement by a phrase that clearly expresses the form in which the obligation will be fulfilled, would satisfy the purpose followed by that Gov- ernment, and will avoid a difficulty."

The necessary explanation not being secured imm,ediately, the exchange of ratifications was suspended by Chile. Another determinative factor was the fact that one of the Protocols of May 28 referring to the liquidation of Credits had not been ratified by the Congress of Bolivia. On April 30, 1896, an agreement was reached, and an Ex- planatory Protocol was signed in Santiago. In its first article 78 it stated that the obligation undertaken by Chile would be fulfilled by the delivery of Vítor bay, or a similar one, which would unite "the conditions necessary to satisfy the needs of commerce, that is, with an anchoring place for merchant ships, ground for the construction of a pier and fiscal buildings, and with capacity sufficient to permit the development of a town, which, by means of a railroad to Bolivia, will respond to the fiscal and economic needs of the country." With this explanation the exchange of ratifications of the three Treaties of May 18, 1895, and one of the Protocols of May 28 proceeded, with the understanding that Bolivia was to secure the approval of Congress to the second Protocol of May 28 relative to the Liquidation of Credits. It was also distinctly agreed that

"the failure of any one of the Congresses to approve the Additional Protocol of December 9, 1895, or the Explanatory Protocol of April 30, 1896, would be a disagreement on one of the fundamentáis of the Treaties of May, and would make them totally ineffective." According to Clause II of the Explanatory Protocol of April 30 this formality was first to be performed by Bolivia, and once the Legislature of that country had approved the explanation given to the Protocol of December 9, the Govern- ment of Chile was to secure from its Congress the corresponding approval. The year 1896 passed without the Chilean Government receiving notice of the fulfíllment of this formality.

5. A New Reser- Instead of being notified of the approval TegUÚtive of the Explanatory Protocol, the Chilean Agreement of Government was surprised to learn of a new

November 7, 0b8tacle placed in the path of these negotiations. On February 25, 1897, the Minister of Bolivia in Santiago advised the Chilean Government that the Congress of Bolivia, 79 on giving its approval to the pending Protocols, had made a reservation which, given its importance, was transmitted in detail.

The text of this Congressional Agreement follows:1

THE NATIONAL CONGRESS In accordance with the initiative contained in the Message of the Executive of the fourth of this month regarding the international negotiations with the Re- public of Chile

DECLARES : That in the extreme case contemplated in Clause IV of the Protocol of December 9, 1895, it corresponda to the Executive in the exercise of his constitutional duties, to declare as to whether the port and zone that Chile may offer in substitution of the port and territory of Arica and Tacna, fulfill or not the conditions established in the stipulationa agreed to between the two República. The present legislative declaration ahall be communicated to the Government of Chile at the time of the exchange of ratifications of the Treaties and Com- plementary Protocola. Be it communicated to the Executive Power for constitutional purposes.

NATIONAL CONGRESS, SUCRE, November 7, 1896.

RAFAEL PEÑA—JOSÉ SANTOS MAIHUADO—MANUEL JOFBÉ LIJO TRIFÓN MELEANO—ABEL ITURRALDE

Be it executed in accordance with the Constitution. Government Ilouae of Sucre, on the tenth day of Novem- ber of 1896. SEVERO FERNÁNDEZ ALONSO

MANUEL MARÍA GÓMEZ, Minister of Foreign Affairs. DARÍO GUTIÉRREZ, Chief Clerk, Miniatry of Foreign Affairs.

i We have given the complete text in view of its importance, and the fact that we believe it haB not been hitherto published. 80 Although the Bolivian Minister transcribed it as an "agreement," it will readily be seen that it has all the characteristics of a law, and left the Chilean Government, no matter how much patience and goodwill it might have, no other recourse than to send it to the files together with all the other documents of those negotiations. From there we have taken it, in order to show the true reason why the negotiations were abandoned. While Chile gave her immediate attention to the complete and unconditional approval of the Treaties and Protocols, Bolivia first granted in December, 1895, an incomplete and conditional approval. Chile afterwards succeeded in coming to an agreement regarding the scope of the Protocol of December 9, and as a result the Explanatory Protocol of April 30, 1896, was signed. The Government of Bolivia promised to secure the approval of that Protocol together with the Protocol of May 28, 1895, regarding the Liquidation of Credits. Instead of this approval being given, the negotiations depart from the customary procedure among nations, and reciprocal intelligence is substituted by rigid Congressional mandates. Chile's attitude during the entire proceedings is in sharp contrast to that of Bolivia's. The Government of 1895 saw that a political rapprochement toward Bolivia must also include the realization of an international program that would harmonize in permanent form the interests on the Pacific Ocean, then threatening to follow opposing courses. The political and commercial situation of Chile would be consolidated at the same time that the peace of the nation would be assured. The policy o'f Bolivia since 1889 had been that of a frank leaning toward the Atlantic. Bolivia sought the satisfaction of her needs in an approximation to Argentine, and in the development of a complete plan of railroad and waterway systems that would facilítate commercial intercourse between the two nations. The Argentine-Bolivian Treaty of 1893 was a result of that policy. It was the work of the most notable of Bolivian statesmen, don Mariano Baptista.

"I have always thought," he said later, "that our international life would be ephemeral if we did not seek the support of some of our neighbours. When Campero 81 signed my credentials for Buenos Aires I asked for only one instruction: offer the Government of La Plata the reorganization under federal 'form, ,of the oíd Vice- royalty."

It was in this situation, and when Chile's boundary difficulties with Argentine were still pending, that the Treaties of May, 1895, were drafted. The Chilean Government could then feel a natural relief on settling the grave and delicate questions that darkened the international horizon of the Republic. The Buenos Aires press, particularly that section that had given much attention to the boundary questions between Argentine and Chile, made interesting comments on the Treaties of May. In its issue of May 24, 1895, "La Prensa" declared in a long editorial:

"Chilean diplomacy is clearing the international horizon in the Pacific by a policy that transforms her enemies into permanent friends, for such is the tie of commerce, moving on paths of common interests. "There is a thought of foresight in this diplomatic program, independent of the positive success it may obtain; and we make this reservation because the resent- ments of nations are not obliterated by the stroke of a

"El Diario," in an article published June 19, said:

"The objective of Chilean diplomacy is quite obvious; its purpose is to do away with the latent problems that Chile has to the north. » » » We shall not censure her foresight and diplomatic zeal; she is within her rights, and it is to her convenience to carry on these negotiations working for an approximation that she requires either to temper her crude policy toward the vanquished or, as a precaution against conflicts she fears may take place in the future."

"El Tiempo" of Buenos Aires calis attention to the political and commercial influence that Chile is acquiring, and adds:

"Given these horizons, Chile is destined to become the first nation, not only of the Pacific, but of all South America." 82 Taking away from these statements what is exaggerated by the newspaper writer in order to rebuke the Argentine Govern- ment for its inactivity, there remains that which refers to the nature of the negotiations. In Chile the desire to solve the difficulties and avoid future conflicts had dominated. Moved by the same spirit that brought about a settlement with Argen- tine, Chile wished to bring about an agreement with Bolivia.

6. Law of Decem- Peruvian propaganda, however, has main- ber 31, 1895, By Which tained that the purpose of those Treaties Chile Ap- was only to put off Bolivia, and that Chile proves the Treaties of never intended to fulfill them. A distin- May, 1895. guished Peruvian writer and statesman in a book that I have before me, referring to the Treaties of May, asserts: "Chile approved only the two principal Treaties, and left the others that complete them, in an uncertain condition." The Treaties were three in number, not two, all dated May 18, and the Complementary Protocols were two, signed May 28. These five international covenants drawn up in Santiago between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile of that year, and the Minister Plenipotenciary of Bolivia, don Heriberto Gutiérrez, constitute the result of the Chilean-Bolivian negotiations of 1895. These Treaties were approved alm,ost by unanimity in the Chilean Congress in both Houses. In virtue of this, on Decem- ber 31, 1895, the law giving total and unconditional approval to these Treaties was promulgated as follows:

Santiago, December 31, 1895. WHEREAS, the National Congress has given its approval to the following project of law: Solé Article: Approval is given the Treaties of Peace and Amity, of Transfer of Territory, and of Commerce, signed in Santiago May 18, of this year, between the Plenipotentiaries of Chile and Bolivia, and the Complementary Protocols of the 28th of the same month. 83 AND WHEREAS, the Council of State has been heard, I have sanctioned said Law, and, therefore, let it be proclaimed as Law of the Republic.

JORGE MONTT.

LUIS BARBOS BORGOÑO.1

This document clearly shows that from that moment Chile was ready to proceed with the exchange of ratiñcations, a diplomatic formality waiting only for similar action on the part of Bolivia. The Peruvian writer is, therefore, in error, when he states that Chile gave these pacts an incomplete approval. The truth is that this was what was done by Bolivia. The Bolivian Congress omitted to give its approval to the Protocol on Liquidation of Credits, thus leaving its approbation incomplete, and subject to a new agreement between the Governments. That, however, was not the only objection. The approval of the Congress of Bolivia to the fundamental Treaties was conditional, subordiated to the interpretation that the Addi- tional Protocol of December 9, 1895, signed in Sucre, gave the special Treaty on Transfer of Territory. We have already seen how the introduction a posteriori oí this Protocol postponed the immediate exchange of ratiñcations until a new agreement (the Explanatory Protocol of April 30, 1896) was signed to make the situation clear. It is not necessary to recall all the details. We only wish to speak of the mortifying resolution passed by the Bolivian Assembly, Novem- ber 7, 1896, communicated to the Chilean Government in Jan- uary of the following year. The President of Chile, Sr. Errázuriz Echaurren, who had recently assumed power, desired to exhaust every effort in an endeavour to come to an agreement with the Government of Bolivia, and with this purpose sent a special representative to Bolivia.

11 had the honor of forming part of this Government and of giving my assist- ancé in this sincere effort on the part of Chile of approximation toward Bolivia. In my treatise, The Chüean-Bolivian Negotíatüms of 1895, published in 1897, I have given the test of these various agreements and the nature of the negotiations. In harmony with the spirit of these negotiations, while in the Foreign Office during 1918-1919 I sent to Bolivia the distinguished diplomat, Don Emilio Bello Codecido, negotiator of the Treaty of 1904, in order to complete the good work of friendship, and the unión of political and commercial interests of the two countries. 84 In the instructions given to this representative, Sr. Manuel Salinas, he was requested to ascertain the exact scope of that Congressional resolution, seeing that it was not natural to sup- pose that Bolivia was attempting to impose on Chile, on her ora initiative, a special interpretation of the Treaty. He was also instructed to point out that that resolution, in the form in which it had been communicated to Chile, would be a serious obstacle to the approval of the Additional and Explanatory Protocols of December 9, 1895, and April 30,1896, respectively. These, as agreed upon with Bolivia, were pending in the Chilean Congress until news carne of the approval of those documents by Bolivia. Unfortunately all the energies expended by Sr. Salinas proved fruitless, for the Government of Bolivia, as he communicated in his note of September 4, 1897, gave the resolution of November 7, 1896, the strength of a law, and considered it indispensable for the approval of the Treaties. Meanwhile the Chilean Congress, waiting for Bolivia's approval, adjourned in January, 1898, without having been able to take action on the Protocols. Chile still had faith that an agreement would be reached. Don Carlos Moría Vicuña, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the new administration, in his report for 1897, states regarding the negotiations of 1895:

"The Government of Chile considere that it is to its interest to do everything in its power, and everything legally possible in accordance with those Treaties, to bring about a realization of that national aspiration of the Bolivian nation, to secure a port on the Pacific, not only because of the advantage that will resnlt to Chile by the integration of her sovereignty over a territory that she today occupies with provisional title, but also because of the political interest present in satisfying an imperative need 'felt by that neighbouring country. Bolivia considers a port essential to her autonomous existence, seeing that it is not only a road for the im- portation and exportation of merchandise that Bolivia seeks, but also that she may cease to be a mediterranean state, and be able to establish contact as a sovereign nation with others, and to celebrate with them Treaties of navigation and commerce. A neighbouring country 85 such as Chile caünot be indifferent to the fact that Bolivia is constantly agxtated by an uneasiness that will persist as long as she does not secure that desiderátum of all parties: an outlet to the Pacific Ocean on conditions of independence and international economic efficacy. "In this agreement the Government after a careful study, resolved to adopt the policy of doing everything possible within the limits of international honor as already indicated to satisfy Bolivia's natural aspiration, and the fiist step in that direction will be to complete the Treaties already exchanged by sanctioning the Addi- tional and Explanatory Protocols submitted to the Na- tional Congress."

In this way the work accomplished by the Government of President Montt received the full approval of the administration of Sr. Errázuriz Echaurren, inaugurated toward the end of 1896. The year 1898 passed with Chile still waiting for Bolivia's approval, as will be seen by the following extracts of the Report of the Foreign Office:

"There are still pending for the consideration of Congress the Additional Protocol of December 9, 1895, and the Explanatory Protocol of April 30, 1896. To their approval is subjected the validity and effective- ness of the Treaties of Peace and Amity, of Transfer of Territory, of Commerce, and of Liquidation of Credits, all signed in May, 1895, by the Plentipotentiaries of Chile and Bolivia. "It is not possible to overlook the importance of these pacte, or of the necessity of creating a permanent situation in the relations between Chile and Bolivia. The negotiations that may be carried on to settle the difficulties that have prevented sanctioning the peace and friendship existing between the two countries, will be a work of sane and long-sighted international policy. "This Department has not neglected this important matter. With prudence and a definite purpose in view, it has sought the opportunity to make effective this de- 86 gire of public opinion seeking an honorable solution convenient to the interests of both countries. "Unfortunately, the latest political developments in Bolivia, which have changed the Government by replacing President Fernández Alonso by a Provisional Coun- cil in charge of the supreme power, has not permitted us to advance one step in the negotiations. They, therefore, remain in the same condition as described in the Report of this Department of June 1, 1898. "Notwithstanding all this, the Government still hopes that the negotiations may be continued just as soon as the new political order permits the Government of Bolivia to dedícate its attention to international questions."

This moment did not arrive. The same spirit that inspired the agreements of the Bolivian Assembly of November 7, 1896, still persisted, and in 1900 the Bolivian Legation in Chile frankly manifested the desire of its Government to abandon those Treaties, to which the Government of Chile reluctantly had to consent. Sr. Alberto Gutiérrez, explaining the reasons why the Bolivian Government had to consider the Treaties of May, 1895, as void despite the f act that they had been officially promulgated, declares that this was due to the fact that an agreement could not be reached on the Additional Protocol of December 9, 1895, regarding the specifícations of the future port of Bolivia.

"The negotiations of 1900," he adds, "confirmed those declarations [of the Government of Bolivia] and in that way the two Governments agreed to cancel the Treaties."1

Sr. Gutiérrez in 1904 declared that it was to Bolivia's advantage to renounce her aspirations to a port in favor of commercial privileges and franchises, and railroads to the sea, convincing the country that it was necessary to renounce a policy of "illusions and sentimentalisms, and to study solutions

1 Alberto Gutiérrez, The Treaty of Peace with Chile, 1905, pages 4-5. 87 that are possible and practical, and that consuít the economic and commercial needs of Bolivia." Yet as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1919 Sr. Gutiérrez in his circular of February 24 declares that:

"the cause of the inefficacy of the Treaties of 1895 was not the one that I stated in 1904, the only one shown by the facts, but was due to the inability to reach an agreement with Perú regarding the conditions of the plebiscite that was to determine the definite possession of Tacna and Arica."

Thus the sentimental thesis in favor of a coast and the necessity of restoring the maritime personality of Bolivia was revived.

88 CHAPTER IX

COMMEBCIAL POLICIES. BOLIVIA ABANDONS HER ASPIRATIONS TO A PORT

1. The Errázuriz Circular of September 30, 1900. 2. The Aramayo Negotiations of 1902. 3. The Edwards Negotia- tions of 1903. 4. Public Opinión in Bolivia Favors the Negotiations. 5. President Pando Accepts the Re- nunciation of Territorial Compensations. 6. Presi- dent Montes Makes an Agreement With Chile the Basis of His Presidentiál Program. 7. Señor Gutiérrez Defends the Cession of Territory and the Abandonment of a Port.

1. The Errázuriz The definite abandonment of the Treaties Circular of . , „„» , . . September 30, 1895 was tollowed by new negotiations opened in La Paz, in which Bolivia again endeavoured to renew the discussion regarding territorial compensations in Tacna. The Chilean Plenipotentiary refused any discussion on this basis, and invited Bolivia to seek a solution in pecuniary, or commercial compensation. On September 30, 1900, the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sr. Rafael Errázuriz, issued a communication in which he stated that although the territory secured from Bolivia had little valué,

"* * * Chile has always offered, and still offers Bolivia pecuniary compensations and material advantages of much greater valué than that territory. "Chile," adds this communication, "did not occupy the Bolivian coast attracted by riches that do not exist, ñor does she keep it because of its material valué."

Sr. Errázuriz explains how the best and most valuable part of that territory carne back into the possession of Chile after 89 the rupture by Bolivia of the Treaty of 1874. Regarding the rest of it he says:

"Chile retains possession of the other part because it is necessary to her existence, because it is an indispensable condition to her political, administrative, and geographic unity, which otherwise would be interrupted, disclosed and made impossible."

The distinguished Minister recalls the causes of the war of 1879 to which Chile was provoked, and which caused the country so many sacrifices. He explains that Perú transferred the department of Tarapacá to Chile as a war indemnity, thus leaving between the southern boundary of this department and the former northern boundary of Chile—that is, from the mouth of the Loa river at latitude 21° 28' to latitude 23°—a narrow strip of Bolivian territory of little valué, causing a break in the continuity of the territory of Chile. The indemnity that Bolivia was to pay for a war into which she dragged three nations ako remained to be settled. Any of these two reasons was sufficient to justify Chile's acquisition of that territory, the only valué of which was that given to it by the courageous efforts of Chilean workmen. The negotiations of 1900, defined by this note of Sr. Er- rázuriz, placed the discussion of the matter on the ground of pecuniary and commercial compensations for the section of Bolivian coast to be taken over by Chile. The Government of La Paz announced to the Chilean representative that the proposals were worthy of examination. From that moment the relations between the two countries took on a new form. The idea of territorial compensation for that strip of territory was abandoned, and the discussion of pecuniary and commercial compensation for it were begun.

if^ysi

2. The Aramayo The negotiations took definite form in ofgM02!°m 1902 and in that year and those immediately following, continued in Santiago. The basis for the new negotiations was brought to Chile by the Minister of Bolivia in Great Britain, don Félix Avelino 90 Aramayo, who, while in Santiago, submitted them to the consideration and study of the Chilean Government, with the understanding that if they were accepted they would be given form through the regular diplomatic channels. Once this fact was assured and recorded, recites the official record of the negotiations, the discussion of the basis of a treaty was begun, with the assistance of the Commercial Attaché of Bolivia, don Julio César Valdés.

"In the conferences held regarding the matter," relates the record, "the following points were particularly discussed: 1. Abandonment on the part of Bolivia of all pretensions to a port on the Paciñc. 2. Commercial independence of that country, Chile remaining the favored nation. 3. Payment in annual installments by Chile of a sum to be used in the construction of railroads that will provide easy access to the Pacific for Bolivia's producto. "Regarding these details almost complete accord was reached, the negotiations proceeding far enough to end them once the Plenipotentiaries ad hoc had been named."

Sr. Gutiérrez, commenting on these conferences, states with perfect exact /tude: "The basis of the negotiations was the renouncement by Bolivia of all territorial compensation in place of an indeninity of two million pounds sterling payable in annttal installments, and to be applied to the construction of railroads leading to the Chilean coast on the Pacific."1 if^SJJ^i

3. The Edwards In August, 1902, don Alberto Gutiérrez 5'fiS*"" was named Minister Plenipotentiary to Chile with the special mission of giving definite form to the general proposals already agreed upon between the two Governments.

Alberto Gutiérrez, The Treaty of Peace with Chile, 1905, page 7. 91 Sr. Gutiérrez explains that he initiated the negotiations under those favorable circumistances, and that he proposed that the material delivery of the money be substituted by having it deposited in Europe as a guarantee for the construction of the railroads. To don Agustín Edwards, as Mimster of Foreign Affairs of Chile in September, 1903, fell the task of drawing up a plan that would serve for a definite treaty. Sr. Edwards proposed that the payment of two million pounds sterling in yearly installments be substituted by a system of railroads already built, and with guarantees for the projected railroads. As it is known, the Treaty of 1904 contvímplated the construction by Chile of a railroad from Arica Vo La Paz, and guarantees on the part of Chile for the interior railroad system of Bolivia. The plan of Minister Edwards was readi'ly accepted by the Bolivian Plenipotentiary, and by the Gover.nment of La Paz. But it was then delayed by a Cabinet crisis in Chile that resulted in the resignation of Sr. Edwards. Sr. Gutiérrez meanwhile showed himself anxious to conclude the negotiations as soon as possible, and was obliged to take steps to calm the uneasiness felt in Bolivia . where it was feared that Chile would not accept the results o£ the Edwards' negotiations. It is of interest to recall these details as they permit ua to give a true valué to those statements made by anthorities in Bolivia to the effect that Chile imposed a Treaty on Bolivia against the latter's will. This alleged imposition on the part of Chile has been considered sufficient cause to hold tíie Treaty of 1904 as non-binding. Sr. Gutiérrez himself repudiares these accusations in the following phrases:

"With the knowledge that I could obtain regiArding the opinion of the leaders, and of the political situ ation of the country before which I had the honor of rt*presenting Bolivia, I was convinced that the time when the negotiations for the treaty began, in September, 14N94, 92 was exceptionally propitious for the attainment of a solution that would consult, as far as possible, the requirements and needs of Bolivia. It had been possible to harmonize the opinions of the most prominent per- sonalities in Chile regarding this international solution, and the leaders of all the political parties had offered their support to a diplomatic agreement based on the conditions proposed the previous year by Sr. Edwards. "I advanced resolutely in the negotiations because I knew that the project would not be a sterile one, but a solution that was practicably obtainable."

4. Public Opmion If m the concept of this successful nego- in Bolivia . , _ 1 Favors the tiator of the Treaty the atmosphere in Chile

Negotiations. was favorable to an agreement, it was no less so in Bolivia.

"There existed," affirms Sr. Gutiérrez, "a series of facts that prove that within the intemal policies of Bolivia the occasion was just as favorable. "Public conscience was able to form itself with perfect clarity, and able to discern between that which constituted the national aspirations, and that which was actually attaináble."

5. President "The work of the Government begun in the^enmKi& 1899," continued Sr. Gutiérrez, "was directed

"The present President of Bolivia [General Ismael Montes] not only followed all the negotiations step by step, but also formed part of the Government of Gen- eral Pando. When in 1903 the candidacy for the Presi- dency was offered to him he accepted the responsibilities of the new situation, formulating a program of political ideas among which he placed in the first place a settlement with Chile, accepting all that of the previous negotiations mjght be considered consummated acts. "The public, well aware of this fundamental plank in his program, strongly supported him. "Everybody in Bolivia was in a position to become acquainted with General Montes' program, and to study its scope and proposals. With this governmental plan frankly exhibited the nation gave its decisión at the electoral urns by a majority of votes in favor without precedent in our political history. The government program drawn up by the candidate, in which a settlement with Chile based on compensation that would not be illusive, such as those of 1895, but that would respond to the needs of our nation and the effective possibilities of Chile, obtained the support of 38,000 voters of Bolivia, that is, a figure that may be considered synonymous with unanimity given the proportions of our electoral statistics. "In a yet more solemn and official occasion, the in- auguration of Sr. Montes, he repeated that fundamental formula of his program, and declared that his other plans would revolve around that settlement demanded by public opinion." 94 Nevertheless, later we find General Montes before the League of Nations seeking the annulment of that Treaty that constituted the most important act of his presidency, and the negotiator of the Treaty, Sr. Gutiérrez, demanding its revisión because "it did not establish a definite situation in the international life of the Continent."

7. Señor Gutiér- Fifteen years áfter the Treaty that he rez Defendí the Cession of negotiated was signed, Sr. Gutiérrez has de- Territory and manded that Bolivia's territorial situation be the Abandon- ment of a readjusted, notwithstanding that he sane- Port. tioned Bolivia's present condition and definitely condemned the proposals of 1895, confident that a permanent peace with Chile could be established by the Treaty of 1904. In 1904, replying to a small minority that opposed the Treaty he declared:

"I will not discuss the degree of seduction that that proposal [of a port] effected in Bolivian patriotism; but I ask the national conscience, supposing such a plan had been realized [the one of 1895] what would have been the future of our maritime coast, secured under such conditions, and^whether it would not have been more grievous to national dignity or convenience to accept a depressive protectorate, after the style of the Balkan States, or to maintain military forcé entirely out of proportion to our íinancial resources? "It is well known," he continúes, "that all international treaties that have put an end to a belligerent situation have required territorial or pecuniary compensations. On certain occasions the victor has imposed both territorial and pecuniary indemnities. This is the case with France in the Treaty of Frankfort. Other time, cession and purchase of territory have been demanded; as in the case of the United States that acquired of Spain Porto Rico by cession, and the Philippines by purchase."

The distinguished citizen concludes by asserting his conviction that in signing the Treaty of 1904 he has not only done his duty as a citizen and representative of the nation, but has 95 also consulted the vital interests of Bolivia on dissipating "the cloud of distrust and jealousy that has separated us politically from Chile since 1879 or since we have had with that country boundary disputes," adding emphatically:

"It is clear as the light of day that the Treaty with Chile has strengthened our international prestige and has brought us closer to a country with whom we shall undertake an obligation of practicable and lasting solidarity."

96 CHAPTER XII THE TREATY OF PEACE OF 1904. 1. The Edwards-Pinílla Agreement of December 24, 1903. 2. The Peace Negotiators. 3. The Treaty of October 20, 1904. 4. The Confidential Protocol of October 20, 1904. 5. Minister Gutiérrez and the Declaration of the Parliamentary Minority. 1. The Edwards- As we have seen, since the Truce Pact of ment of^De^' 1884, Chile had conducted with Bolivia fre- cember 24. quent friendly negotiations in an effort to reach a definite peace settlement. These negotiations presented two different phases, the first being characterized by Bolivia's aspirations to a port, which took form in the Treaties of May, 1895. The inability to reach a settlement regarding the nature of the port, as already recounted, made these agreements void. From 1900 the second phase begins. The accounts that we have made of the Aramayo negotiations gives us the state of affairs in the year 1902. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, in an official report of these negotiations, stated:

"Sr. Aramayo, although he did not come on a special mission, brought the basis of an agreement accepted by the Government of Bolivia, and he desired that they be studied in order that an agreement might be reached, which could later be given form through diplomatic channels."

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Sr. Eleodoro Villazón, also reported on these approaches, stating that the diplomatic relations with Chile had been resumed in order that a treaty of peace might be signed on the basis of territorial cession on the part of Bolivia, and pecuniary and commercial compensations on the part of Chile.

"With no preconceived ideas," he added, "I have firmly resolved to conclude and sign a treaty of peace on those conditions, assuming all the responsibility of so 97 important an act. Our action has been positive and determined, and, complying with our duties, we have decided to reach the desired end without withdrawing on the face of responsibilities of any kind."

These negotiations were actively conducted, and by Decem- ber, 1903, the various clauses of the Treaty of Peace had been agreed to, as also the stipulations regarding railroads and reciprocatory commercial concessions. These were embodied in the Preliminary Act signed in Santiago on December 24,1903, by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, don Agustín Edwards; the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, don Claudio Pinilla, then in Chile, and by don Alberto Gutiérrez as Plenipotentiary of Bolivia in Chile. The most important aspect of this agreement was the substitution on the part of Bolivia of the demand for a port on the Pacific by the construction of a railroad from Arica to La Paz, and the permanent recognition by Chile o'f Bolivia's ampie and free rights of transport through her territory and ports.

2. The Peace In 1904 the Chilean representative in- Negotiations. B0ljv¿a was gr. Beltrán Mathieu, a distinguished and sagacious diplomat1. In Santiago don Alberto Gutiérrez, the young and brilliant diplomat, represented Bolivia. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile was don Emilio Bello Codesido, who had occupied the same post during 1900-1901, when the discussion of the Tacna-Arica problem was most acute. His genius had played an important part in placing the discussion on a firm and definite basis, and he was eminently able to conduct the later negotiations. The representatives in La TPaz, where the negotiations were being conducted, were soon able to draft a Treaty based on the Edwards-Pinilla agreement. 1. The Hon. Beltrán Mathieu has been Ambassador of Chile to the United States since the year 1918. 98 3. The Treaty of On October 20, 1904, the Treaty of Peace 1904. ' and Amity, together with a Confidential Pro- tocol, was signed in Santiago by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Sr. Bello Codesido, and the Bolivian Plenipotentiary, don Alberto Gutiérrez. The original project was drawn up to strengthen the commercial relations between both Republics, but the final Treaty emphasized as well the political character of the document. Clause III states:

"With the purpose of strengthening the political and commercial relations between both Republics, the High Contracting Parties agree to unite the port of Arica with La Paz by a railroad, the construction of which the Gov- ernment of Chile will contract at its own expense within one year from the time of ratification of this Treaty.

The Complementary Protocol particularly defined the political significance and scope of the agreement. The stipulations of the Treaty relate the obligations that Chile undertook in favor of Bolivia in compensation for the definite cession of the narrow strip of Bolivian coast that she occupied under the Truce Pact, as well as the recognition of the right of Chile to reincorpórate the zone of Antofagasta—which she had occupied following the rupture of the Treaty of 1874— into her territory. Chile's obligations may be summarized as follows:

1. Chile agreed to construct the railroad of Arica to La Paz and to transíer it (the Bolvian Section) to Bolivia after fifteen years. 2. Chile agreed to pay guarantees up to five per cent, on the capital that Bolivia might invest in the construction of the following railroads: Uyuni to Potosí; Oruro to La Paz; Oruro, by Cochabamba, to Santa Cruz; from La Paz to the Beni región; and from Potosí to Santa Cruz, by Sucre and Lagunillas. This obligation could not exceed five hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling. 3. Chile agreed to give Bolivia, in cash, three hundred thousand pounds sterling. 4. Chile undertook the payment of claims recognized by Bolivia corresponding to prívate indemnities or obligations that directly or indirectly affected the coast. 99 The fulfíllment of these obligations has imposed on Chile the following expenses according to the statement of the Ac* counting Department of December 31, 1918:

1. Construction of the Arica-La Paz railroad £4,063,561 2. Guarantees on interior railroads of Bolivia stipulated at £550,000, paid up to December 31, 1918 315,000 3. Cash payment in accordance with Clause 4 300,000 4. Payment on indemnities in accordance with Clause 5 487,000

Total Paid £5,165,561

This sum, in view of payments made since 1918, may be estimated at f^OOO.OOO.1 Chile has therefore complied with all the stipulations of the Treaty, and since May 13, 1913, Bolivia has enjoyed the benefits of the Arica-La Paz railroad by which her interior railroads have direct communication with the great commercial arteries of Antofagasta and Arica.

4. The Confiden- Together with the Peace Treaty there was of October 20, ^g11^ a Complementary Protocol regarding 1904. the Provinces of Tacna and Arica.

"This Complementary Protocol," says Sr. Emilio Bello Codesido, "refera to the plebiscite that is to decide the future nationality of these provinces. "Perú exhausted every effort in preventing Bolivia from signing this agreement, the existence of which she was aware of, or suspected. There was some vacillation at the last moment on the part of Bolivia, as the representative in Santiago declared he had received instructions not to sign the Confidential Protocol. But after the declaration8 of our Government expressing surprise at that change in policy that had modified thes spirit inspiring the negotiations so profoundly, probably en-

1. Tbia -was written during the first months in 1922. 100 dangering the success of these, Sr. Gutiérrez íinally agreed to sign the Protocol, after certain modifications, but which retained Bolivia's obligation to cooperate in every way possible to secure the success of Chile in the plebiscite."1

Sr. Gutiérrez declared in that Protocol that Bolivia, in accord with the spirit of harmony and cordiality that had guided the Government8 of Bolivia and Chile in these negotiations, would make every effort, separately or in cooperation with Chile, to secure the definite incorporation of the territories of Tacna and Arica into Chilean territory. The Chilean Pleni- potentiary, on the other hand, declared that, together with his Government, he considered that the common interests of Bolivia and Chile could best be served by uniting their efforts for the definite sovereignty of Chile over Tacna and Arica. Thus the Chilean and Bolivian Plenipotentiaries gave testimony of the spirit of political and commercial solidarity that inspired them. The great work of the construction of the railroad from Arica to La Paz over the heights of the Andes, for a distance of 438 kilometres, opened to Bolivia an excellent commercial route, capable of fully satisfying her needs of greater commercial expansión.

5. Minister The Treaty and the Confidential Protocol the Declara- were approved by the Congresses of both tion of the countries without delay. Minority. In the Bolivian Congress, however, there was a small minority, politically hostile toward the Government, which endeavoured to obstruct the approval of the Treaty. After their defeat the members of this minority published a manifestó against the Treaty and the Protocol. To this manifestó Sr. Gutiérrez replied in vigorous manner in his book The Treaty of Peace with Chile, published in 1905, 1 Emilio Bello Codesido—Notes on the Historv of the Diplomarte Relatüm» with Perú and Bolivia (1900-1904), Santiago, 1919, pages, 201-202. 101 from which we have quoted several times, and to which we must again refer for the replies to the various accusations made against the treaties. (a) The territorial cession did not injure national honor. The opposition was, in the first place, directed against the cession o'f national territory. Sr. Gutiérrez replied that "nobody could prevent that conflicta should result in territorial losses to the vanquished," recalling that contemporaneous history is full of war followed by territorial cessions, and that "all international treaties in history that have ended a belligerent situation have required territorial or pecuniary compensations."

"To Bolivia," he adds, "corresponds the satisfaction of having contemplated every necessity, every guarantee, and every practical possibility, in the realms of facts, without invading that nebulous región of dreams, of declamations, and vain and sterile utopias."

(b) Pecuniary compensations are not humiliating to a nation. The minority considered that the pecuniary compensations established in the Treaty signified for the nation a distinct humiliation. "Miserly pecuniary compensations," they declared, "have been accepted for the nation's soil."

"Political history of all times," replies Sr. Gutiérrez, "shows us that an appreciation of what constitutes the honor and dignity of the nation is entirely contrary to that concept. On some occasions the victor has imposed territorial cession and pecuniary indemnities; this is the case of France and the Treaty of Frankfort. Other times cession and purchase of territory have been demanded, as in the case of the United States that acquired of Spain Porto Rico by cession and the Philippines by purchase. No nation in this world has considered the gold of indemnities a stain, more so since in the majority of the cases it has been the victors who have imposed pecuniary compensations for the blood of their sons, and the sacrifíces of their heroes." 102 (c) The renunciation of all maritime coast was something unavoidáble.

"The renunciation of a maritime coast," continúes Sr. Gutiérrez, "is the greatest sacrifice that the Treaty has imposed on us, but it is a fact that this is not due to the Treaty itself, but to the natural development of circumstances. "To lose all communication with the ocean, and cede a territory that national energy had not been able to recuperate for the period of a generation, were important sacriñces, but sacrifices that could not be attenuated or avoided by stubbornness or protests."

(d) The Treaty has not alienated custom-Ivouse independence. The opposition maintained that the Treaty had subjected Bolivia's customs to the jurisdiction of Chile.

"The only custom's privilege that Chile has obtained by the Treaty," declared Sr. Gutiérrez, "has been to consider herself the nation commercially favored. South American diplomatic history is full of commercial treaties in which this clause is consigned, and neither of the countries that agree to it have thought that it alienated or annulled national sovereignty or dignity. It is proved in so much as in all treaties this clause is reciprocal, and although on occasions that reciprocity has been purely apparent, it never has been considered that such stipulations import a barrier to commercial liberty, or to customs independence."

(e) The Treaty ¿toes not injure the interests of other nations and amply satis fies the needs of Bolivia. The opponents of the Treaty also criticized it on the ground that it injured the interests of neighbouring countries which might provide Bolivia with means of communication with the exterior.

"All the treaties signed," asserts Sr. Gutiérrez, "follow that purpose, and the absolute fairness of the Chilean Government in drafting this Treaty should be recognized." 103 He refera to the proposed railroads to the La Plata river, a subject for agreementa with Argentine, and to the atipulation8 of similar nature of the Treaty of Petrópolia with BraziL

"All of them," he adds, "tend to procure for Bolivia, deprived of a coast, means of communication with the exterior by the four cardinal points. "Furthermore, the railroad from Arica to La Paz provides the most rapid and direct communication between Bolivia and the sea, and fully satisfies the financial, economic, and political requirements of the country."

(f) The transfer of the Bolivian section of the railroad. The minority opposed the delivery to Bolivia of the Bolivian section of the Arica-La Paz railroad as an act denoting Bolivia's cooperation to Chile's deaire to retain Tacna and Arica. Sr. Gutiérrez'a reply to thia is clear and conclusive:

"Bolivia accepts the transfer of a certain amount of capital in the form of a railroad. That railroad provides the most direct communication between her central section and the ocean. That clause therefore haa a double purpoae, financial and political. The first, becauae Bolivia receivea the mercantile valué of a railroad in exploitation. The aecond, becauae it providea rapid and direct communication to the aea, which commercially means lower freights and mercantile facilities of every kind. If those territories from which the railroad starts return to Perú, the only difference will be that Perú, instead of Chile, will benefit by the commercial traffic to Bolivia."

(g) The transformation of the economic and commercial life of Bolivia by the construction of the railroads. Aa we have 8tated, the railroad from Arica to La Paz has a longitude of 438 kilometers, of which 232 are in Bolivian territory, and are to be transferred to Bolivia fifteen years after the opening of the lines. Against the tranafer of this section without cost whatsoever to Bolivia the strange opposition just referred to was directed. 104 On treating this point Sr. Gutiérrez points out to his coun- trymen the immense benefits that will accrue to Bolivia from the construction of these railroads and the guarantees offered by Chile.

"The construction of railroads is so important for the development of Bolivia, and to facilitate her communications with the ocean," he states, "that no retrogressive tendency can detain the impulses of work and progress. These railroads will be responsible for a true gigantic evolution, something akin to a prodigious renaissance in the territories through which they pass, and in those which they connect with the sea. "If the Arica-La Paz railroad is to create a great current of progress and development, the railroads in the interior will effect a great transformation; they will exert an influence similar to that of a magic wand, creating riches and welfare."

(h) The Treaty has consulted the permanent ínterests of Bolivia. After refuting other statements of the manifestó which are more or less puerile, Sr. Gutiérrez affirms again his conviction that he has

"guarded and served completely the interests of his country on accepting the territorial cession in a form that has assured a revival as vigorous as any that might have been secured by military victories. "The Government," he adds, "has found it necessary to submit to the hard condition of renouncing Bolivia's status as a maritime power, and the possession of a coast on the ocean; but its duty was to retain a clear cognizance of facts before listening to the dictates of an irresponsible sentimentalism."

(i) The Treaty has been the work of various Governments and the resúlt of vast and abundant labor. Sr. Gutiérrez concludes his exposition by declaring that the Treaty of 1904 was not the result of precipitated or inexperi- 105 enced work, but was the fruit of slow and persistent labor, to which the most prominent and best prepared statesmen of Bolivia contributed. All opinions, which with good faith have collaborated in the work of the Government, have been consulted, he declares.

"Whosoever has contemplated from a distance the political situation of Bolivia must have seen the territorial sacrifice already consummated, requiring only the formality of a transfer. This was the only solution possible, and the only way of securing compensations able to assure the nation a prosperous future, and the coming generations a legacy of welfare and riches."

Thus Sr. Gutiérrez reasserted that the Treaty was the work of not only the Government of General Pando, but also that of General Montes with the express approval of the votes of the people. He also proved that the pecuniary compensations were of greater valué and of more signiñcance to the country, than expectations based on the acquisition of a coastline. For this reason he could truly state that the Treaty consulted the "present and future needs of Bolivia." Sr. Gutiérrez shows that Bolivia signed the Treaty with Chile, fully conscious of what she was doing, and that the Treaty has been "a tie of friendship and esteem, of work, riches, and progress."1 Yet his book published in 1912, which we also have quoted profusely, already showed the beginning of the new international policies of Bolivia. In this book treaties have lost their permanent and enduring characteristics, their absolute nature, and have become representative of passing desires, of the con- veniences of one of the parties. One or more treaties might be signed, but, he states, "they could not alter the intrinsic order of things, or suppress the necessity of ports that assure in practice political, economic, and commercial sovereignty of the Republic." In his concept these needs are not "political provisions or diplomatic plans more or less remote, but expositions of physical 106 laws that cannot be avoided or evaded by the simple concensus of men. The physical and social laws impose themselves despite the artífices of human events.'n Thus Sr. Gutiérrez expounds his doctrine of international policy by which the requirements that each nation may deem necessary to assure her influence, or her political prosperity, authorize her to break her treaties.

1 Alberto Gutiérrez, The War of 1879, pages 16-17. 107 CHAPTER XI RELATIVITT OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS. 1. Rights That Are'Reborn. 2. Aspirations That Do Not Die and Negotiations Postponed. 3. The Immanent Right of Nations. 4. The Possession of the Coast As an Attribute of Sovereignty. 5. The Former Bolivian Coast As a Guarantee for the Commercial and Political Develop- ment of the Country. I. Rights that are The new currents in the international Reborn. policiee of Bolivia have brought up again all the questions that the Treaty of 1904 had definitely settled. An atmosphere of uneasiness seems to lie over the heads of the Bolivian leaders. Political and commercial ties that seemed lasting are now threatened with rupture. Solutions that yes- terday were approved unanimously by the Bolivian electorate, today are antagonized by the leading elements of the country. Obligations imposed by treaties are considered easily avoidable, and the work of many men, many governments, and of more than one generation is shaken to its foundations. Just as the Treaty of Versailles defined the future relations of the belligerent countries, so did the Treaty of 1904 establish in permanent form the relations between Chile and Bolivia, sanctioning a condition that had existed for twenty years after the Truce Pact of 1884. Chile has strictly observed the stipu- iations of the Treaty, and the application of the Treaty for seventeen years without criticism proves that, as Sr. Gutiérrez himself declared, the Treaty fully considered the "present and future needs of Bolivia." Nevertheless, an effort has been made to secure its revisión by the League of Nations, which body, however, declared that only the signatory states of a treaty are competent to revise such a document. Distinguished international lawyers of France, England, and the United States1 have unmistakably qualified Bolivia's claims to the revisión of the Treaty as being absolutely unfounded and imjustifiable. 1 Former Ambassador to Great Britain and present President of the American Bar Association, Mr. John W. Davis, whoae reporta are printed at the end of this book. 108 2. Aspirations Bolivia's aspirations to a port have cor- Díe amí"?Vego- responded to the natural sentiments of the tiations Post- people, and Chile has given positive proof of poned. desiring to satisfy such aspirations as far as possible. Yet it is a fact that a more exact appreciation of the requirements, and of the economic and commercial need's of the country inspired the Bolivian Government to abandon its pretensions to the coast, receiving in return the international railroad of Arica, the guarantee for the construction of her interior railroads, and the commercial privileges extended to Bolivia by Chile. Sr. Gutiérrez himself considered the aspirations to a port as a manifestation of a sentimental policy, and a vain utopia. He was of the opinion that the possession of a coast would place Bolivia in a position similar to that of the Balkan States, or would oblige her to undertake military and naval defences out of proportion to, and beyond her financial capacity. In his circular of 1919, however, Sr. Gutiérrez states that Bo- livia did not abandon her aspirations to a port when she signed the Treaty of 1904, but that she "was obliged to postpone the negotiations to secure an outlet to the ocean, and the rights of Bolivia to free communication with the sea have not lapsed, but, on the contrary, have shown themselves with the evidence of an unavoidable necessity." With reference to the genuine and sincere aspirations of a people we can understand, theoretically, the statement made that their desires for progress and development are never satisfied; but regarding the concrete point as to whether in the negotiations of 1904 Bolivia did, or did not, renounce her aspirations to seek of Chile a portion of the coast and a port, and whether the renunciation of that aspiration was responsible for the obligations in favor of Bolivia undertaken and fulfilled by Chile, is something that can be definitely settled by recalling the simple facts of the case, the obligations contracted by Bolivia, and the definite and final declaration made by her Government and by the negotiators of the Treaties. When President Montes consulted the Bolivian electorate the results of the voting showed conclusively that the nation was almost unanimously in favor of the negotiations of 1904, 109 which negotiations contemplated the territorial cession to Chile, and the abandonment of the aspirations to a port on the part of Bolivia, in exchange for which Chile contracted certain obligations which she has faithfully fulfilled. The unequivocal and final abandonment of Bolivia's aspirations to a port, in so far as that port was to be secured of Chile, is proved by the following facts: (a) The very first declaration of the Aramayo Negotiations was as follows: "Abandonment on the part of Bolivia of all pretensions to a port on the Pacific." (Chapter IX, Sec. 2.) (b) The confirmation given to this fundamental basis of the negotiations by Sr. Gutiérrez, as follows: "The basis of this officious negotiation initiated by Sr. Aramayo is the renouncement by Bolivia of all territorial compensation in exchange for an indemnity of two million pounds sterling," etc. (Ibid.) (c) Declarations of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Sr. Eleodoro Villazón, in which he explained to Con- gress that diplomatic relations had been renewed with Chile with the purpose of signing a Treaty of Peace on the basis of territorial cession on the part of Bolivia, and pecuniary and commercial compensations on the part of Chile. (Aramayo Negotiation.) "I am firmly resolved to conclude and sign a Treaty of Peace on those conditions, assuming all the responsibility of so important an act," he declared. (Chapter X, Sec. 1.) (d) The Edwards-Pinilla Preliminary Act of December 24, 1903, drafted with the intervention of the Plenipotentiary of Bolivia, Sr. Gutiérrez. Its principal clause stated that the oíd demand by Bolivia for a port was substituted by the construction of the Arica-La Paz railroad, and the permanent recognition by Chile of Bolivia's ampie and free rights of transport through Chile's territory and ports. (Ibid.) (e) The final Treaty of Peace of October 20, 1904, sanctions the territorial cession on the part of Bolivia, and the pecuniary, railroad, and commercial compensations on the part of Chile. (Chapter X, Sec. 3.) (f) The Complementary Protocol of the same date establishes the political unión of Chile and Bolivia, and the obliga- 110 tion of the latter country to cooperate, as far as possible, to secure that Tacna and Arica be definitely incorporated into Chilean territory. (Chapter X, Sec. 4.) (g) President Pando of Bolivia, under whose administration the negotiations were initiated, accepted a diplomatic solution of the problem, consisting of "the renunciation of territorial compensations sought in 1895 in exchange for ñnancial agreements, and commercial and custom-house facilities, which constituted the primordial demand made by public opinion, and the expression of the needs of our social state." (Chapter IX, Sec. 5.) (h) The Presidential program of General Montes (who ratified the Treaty of Peace of 1904) had as its fundamental plank an agreement with Chile based on "compensations that would not be illusive like the ones of 1895," but that would respond to the needs of the nation. This program obtained the approval of the nation in a vote synonymous to unanimity. (Chapter IX, No. 6.) (i) Sr. Gutiérrez considered that the Treaty of 1904 "dis- persed the clouds of jealousy and suspicion that since 1876 separated us [Bolivia and Chile] politically, that is, since we had with that country boundary disputes, and has brought us closer to a country with which we contract obligations of a practical and lasting nature. Is it necessary to accumulate further evidence to show that in the negotiations of 1904 Bolivia renounced all her aspirations of obtaining from Chile a port on the Pacific? Are not these declarations suificient to prove conclusively that Bolivia abandoned all pretensions to the coast, fully conscious of what she was doing, and that any claims that she may make today for the recovery of this coast are unfounded? It must also be borne in mind that this abandonment by Bolivia of her aspirations to a port was not gratuitous. It had as an immediate and direct cause the obligation contracted by Chile to build the Arica-La Paz railroad; the guarantees offered by Chile on the construction of the interior railroads of Bolivia; and the payment to Bolivia of a large sum of money. Has not Chile complied with each and all of these obligations? It would not be right to believe that the obligations con- 111 tracted by Bolivia in 1904 were undertaken solely with the purpose of securing from Chile certain concessions, Bolivia reserving herself the right to renew, at some later time, her petition for a port. Although today, in view of recent events, this theory might easily be accepted, we do not consider it to be ao. On the contrary, we believe that throughout these negotiations Bolivia worked in good faith and in perfect sincerity. The leaders of Bolivia who conducted the negotiations with a true concept of the needs of the country; the public men who gave the best of their talents to the successful realization of the Treaty; the people of Bolivia who sanctioned it joyfully, and have since reaped the benefits of the Treaty with Chile in the economic development of Bolivia;—all of them give manifest evidence of the fact that this Treaty was a piece of work of permanent character. The perturbations of today may be in part the result of vain hopes born from the Congress of Versailles—the belief that this body would adjust all the claims and satisfy all the aspirations of the smaller nations; it may be that they are the product of oíd passions in a few irreconcilables now in power, hitherto latent but now dominant; or it may be that these new currents have been stimulated by the interested suggestions of Bolivia's ex-ally of 1873. Yet whatever the cause they cannot be sufficiently strong to nullify an agreement solemnly signed by the peoples of Chile and Bolivia, guarded by the honor and dignity of both nations.

3. The lmmanent In the new international policies of Bolivia Nations. the immanent right of nations has been in^ voked to support the thesis in favor of the return of the coast. This is not the only surprise with which the Bolivian Gov- ernment has sought to stimulate the curiosity of authorities in international affairs. We cannot help thinking that the Swiss jurista and the Government of the Helvetic Confederation must have observed 112 with some irony the attitude of the Bolivian diplomats, advocating in Ceneva that the possession of a coast is an indispensable attribute for the independence of a country. The frank and honest spirit of those noble mountain people of Europe, must have taken it for granted that their congénere from Amer- ica had given thought to the consequences of their action before signing a Treaty that substituted for the possession of a maritime coast, various positive and valuable compensations. Those happy inhabitants of one of the most prosperous nations of the Oíd World might have been able to add that they, because of the inspiration they find in work, their fervent love of liberty, and the free exercise of their political rights, have always been, in the midst of the nations of Europe, the masters of their own destiny, and meriting the respect of the most powerful of nations. The possession of a coast has not been for them necessary for the maintenance of their freedom, ñor has the absence of a coast deterred the growth of their commerce and industries.

iNJjp'ii

4. The Possession An argument such as Bolivia's, that a na- an Attributehas a right to demand a coast, is not of Sovereignty. based on the principies of international law, ñor can it be supported by facts.

"There is no known principie of international law," declares an authority, M. Dupuis, "that concedes a state the right to pretend to a boundary with the sea, and no state, whether before or after the Treaty of Versailles, will have found itself authorized to claim territorial concessions in order to extend its sovereignty to the sea."1

Facts demónstrate the contrary. Switzerland has never had an outlet to the sea. The new state of Czechoslovakia, created by the Treaty of Versailles, was not given a coast. In fact, we find that the Treaty of Versailles deprived two new states— Austria and Hungray—of coastlines, recognizing them as independent, and with all the attributes proper to sovereignty.

1 Charles Dupuis, member of the Institute oí France; professor of International Law in ¿the Free Schooi of Political Science, and member of the Institute of Inter- national Law. Report given on July 7, 1921, in reply to a consultation on the part of the Government of Chile. 113 Another distinguished jurist, M. Paul Faucíiille, agrees with M. Dupuis as to the lack of validity of Bolivia's claims:

"Bolivia invokes a special motive for the revisión of the Treaty that she signed in Santiago in 1904," he declares. "Bolivia maintains that she can ask for its annulment because, as in it she ceded all her coast to Chile, the Treaty left her without access to the sea. "Without doubt access to the sea is of great importance to a country, but in international law it has never been considered an essential condition to the existence of a state. In our own days there have been created states, which, like Bolivia, have no access to the sea. "Furthermore, it is not exact to say that Bolivia is deprived of all communication with the sea. By virtue of the Treaty signed in Santiago, Chile was obliged to build a railroad from La Paz to Arica, and bound herself to recognize perpetually, the right of Bolivia to the most free and complete commercial transit through her territory and coast of the Pacific."2

M. Dupuis is also equally precise regarding this last point:

"If lately there have been certain preoccupations regarding communication with the sea in those states that do not border upon it, it is a fact that in the Treaty of October 20, 1904, some steps were taken to anticípate a condition where absolutely no access to the sea might exist. Chile, by Article 6, recognized in favor of Bolivia the perpetual right of free and complete commercial transit through her territory and coast of the Pacific. At her own expense Chile has constructed the railroad from Arica to La Paz which permáts Bolivia to commu- nicate by railroad with the port of Arica. Consequently, if Bolivia resents the fact that she does not have a coastline, she is not justified in considering herself a country absolutely enclosed, and deprived of all access to the sea."

The eminent American jurist, Mr. John Davis, and the well- known authority, M. André Weiss, Professor of Public and Prívate International Law in the University of París, expressed

2 Paul Fauchille, founder and director of the General Review of Public Interna- tional Law and of the Institute of Advanced International S-tudies. Member of the Institute of International Law; member of the Royal Academy of Belgium. Report given on June 27, 1921, in repiy to a consultation on the part of .the Government of Chile. 114 themselves in similar terms. The latter, referring to the statement of Bolivia to the effect that her condition might provoke conflicts, declared that if this happened, "the responsibility would fall exclusively on Bolivia because of her contempt for international obligations." The conclusions reached by these eminent authorities have confirmed the statements made by Sr. Gutiérrez, the negotiator of the Treaty, when he was called on to defend it. Sr. Car- rasco, the Bolivian Senator, as we have already seen, also made use of the same argument, "that a port is unnecessary, and that only an exaggerated concept of wounded patriotism and error due to the prejudices so common among us can demand one." Sr. Carrasco qualified as "prejudices" the same pretensions that M. Fauchille denominates "preoccupations." Sr. Carrasco, agreeing with these authorities, also stated: "There are many flourishing nations developing admirably without a port."

"We do not know," he added, "from where aróse the idea that the possession of a port is the condition sine qua non oí independence. If it were so, many independent states that today have reached a high degree of development without a port, would not exist."

5. The Former The argument that the oíd coast of Bolivian Coast •„,... . . , , . as a Guarantee Bolivia is necessary tor the development ot for the Com- the country does not withstand an array of mercial ana Political De- facts. V£PC^^f. 11 ia known that before the war of 1879 that coast was separated from the interior of the nation by a vast desert and the Andes Mountains. "Sometimes a caravan of daring drivers crossed these plains," states Sr. Carrasco, "occupying months in doing so; but these adventures could not be considered as establishing commercial arteries." Statistics show the influence that the railroads of Anto- fagasta and Arica, built by Chile, have had on Bolivian commerce. In the ten years following the Treaty of Peace of 1904 115 the foreign commerce of Bolivia was £79,599,209. In the ten years preceding tlie Treaty the total was £33,055,441. The increase is 140.80%. Compared to the period of 1884-1893 the increase is 165.83%, while compared to the commerce of 1874- 1883 the increase is 363.38%.1 The exports of Antofagasta, which possessed only a short railroad to the nitrate field Salar del Carmen, consisted almost entirely of the products of the nitrate industries in the neighbouring districts, while the materials necessary for the exploitation of the nitrate deposits, and the supplies required for the Chilean population, constituted the imports. Commerce with the interior of Bolivia was nil, or practically nil. The insigniñcant port of Cobija, or La Mar, had at that time a very small population, the greater part of which was Chilean. The lack of communications between the interior of Bolivia and Cobija prevented commercial traffic of any importance.

1 Exposé de la Delegation du Chile a propos de la demande de la Bolivíe contre le Chile, en revisión du Traité de Paix de 1904. Généve, Imprimerie Kunding, 1921, page 54. In this interesting exposition the reply of Chile to the demanda of Bolivia in the League of Nations is given. The exposition is accompanied by the reponts of the French jurists and professors of international law, Messrs. • Charles Dupuis, Paul Fachille, and André Weiss, the distinguished jurist, Mr. John Davis, and the no less famous English authority, Sir "William Finlay. To these reporta we have already referred. 116 CHAPTER XII

THE DEMAND OF BOLIVIA 1. Erroneous Concept Regarding the International Role of the League. 2. The Revisión of Treaties Can Be Effected Only by A greement of the Signatory Parties. 3. Definition by Victory. 4. Perú and Bolivia in Agreement. 5. The Bolivian Peti- tion. 6. Alleged Imposition of Treaty by Forcé As a Cause Justifying Its Revisión. 7. Alleged Inapplication of Treaty As Another Cause. 8. Threat of War. 9. Bolivia's Condition As a Mediterranean State As a Fourth Cause Justifying Revisión. 10. Inadmissibility of the Petition Because of the Incompetence of the League. 11. Juridical Reports. 12. The Commission Appointed by the League Declares the Bolivian Demand In~ admissible. 13. Lord Balfour's Epitaph. 1. Erroneous Bolivian statesmen have seen in the League fegarding the Nations an organization destined to exert Interna' a tutelary jurisdiction over free and inde- ÍFCTLESE °F PENDENT 8tates- "A tribunal constituted by the will of the associates themselves with the purpose of judging their own quarrels and giving to each what is theirs," says Sr. Gutiérrez, "is the most noble institution that could have arisen from the ruins of a terrible war." The distinguished statesman has therefore desired to appeal to this institution in order that Bolivia may secure, by the revisión of the Treaty of 1904, the coast that she herself abandoned. Sr. Gutiérrez forgets completely that the League was formed primarily for the purpose o'f assuring respect for treaties, particularly such treaties as the Treaty of 1904 between Bolivia and Chile, which carne into existence solely because permanent peaceful and harmonious relations were sought by the countries concerned. The supporters of the new Bolivian policies have differed, however, as to their objectives. Ex-President Montes, during whose administration the Treaty of 1904 was ratified, goes to 117 the League of Nations alleging that Bolivia "has rights over Arica superior to those of Chile or Perú." He considers that territory res nullius because in the concept of this ex-manda- tary, "juridically and politically that port belongs to no one," and he therefore expects the League to decide "as to which interests are greater, and whose rights are to prevail, those of Bolivia, those of Chile, or those of Perú." In these claims the Bolivian diplomat is not supported by the Committee of Bolivian Citizens organized in Paria. Don Simón Patiño, representing this Committee, was of the opinion that the form in which the problem was stated by Sr. Montea was improper, maintaining that, if Bolivia is to secure the return of the province8 loat in the war, it ia neceaaary to act in harmony with Perú. Finally, the Bolivian delegatea to the League aaked for the revisión of the Treaty of 1904, basing themselves on Article 19 of the Covenant of the League. This is the firat instance of a country endeavouring to re- cover by peaceful measures territories lost in war. If France had not been victorious in the World War, her former provinces would have continued in the hands of Germany. Her victory, however, cancelled the Treaty of Frankfort, and the Provinces of Alsace and Lorraine returned to her possesaion. The diatinguiahed Chilean authority in matters of international law, don Alejandro Alvarez, has stated:

"Bolivia desires to break the Treaty of 1904 on a new principie, one lesa costly than the right of the victor as employed by France, but absolutely unknown in international law, that ia, the right of the vanquiahed."

Whatever may be the objectivea aought by Bolivia, there ia no doubt that the League ia not a auper-state, and has not been set up aa an inatitution to deprive aovereign nationa of their inherent righta.

"The League of Nations," declares M. Dupuis, "is not competent to revise treaties. It could only do it had it been constituted as what is called a super-state, with authority and jurisdiction over states reduced to a sub- ordination that would be the equivalent to semi-sovereignty. The authors of the Covenants of the League of Nations have formally denied that they ever had in mind the thought of constituting a super-state capable of imposing resolutions on the associated nations. To revise treaties—which constitute laws voluntarily accepted by the signatory parties, just as contracts form the law that prívate parties impose on themselves— would serve only to destroy the prívate law of contracting states by the imposition, in the way of authority, of a superior law."

Such an idea would be directly in opposition to the spirit of the Covenant of the League, seeing that, as M. Dupuis points out, the Preamble to the Covenant states that to "secure cooperation among nations, and to guarantee peace and safety, it is necessary that all the obligations of treaties be scrupulously respected in the mutual relations of the organized nations." Elsewhere we have explained the differences that existed between the opinions of France, and those of Great Britain and the United States regarding the purposes of the League.1 On no occasion did the founders of this organization desire to give it powers that would infringe on the rights of independent and sovereign states. Their purpose was not to form a League that would impose peace; what was planned and what was organized was an association of nations for the purpose of securing cooperation among the various states in all international questions of the future. The members of the organizing committee were unanimous in their acceptance of the general principies of the proposed League. The French delegates, however, sought stronger guarantees to prevent future perturbations of the peace of the world. There was also doubt concerning the safety of their own nation. That is why, in the concept of M. Barthou, "the new Inter- national Court has resulted narrow, insufficient, timid. Never- theless, it must be borne in mind that the Covenant opens a new era, and will regúlate the future. If it is not more daring, and if it establishes too many principies without sanctions that will assure their fulfillment; if it makes generous recommenda-

1 Luis Barros Borgoño, "The Covenant of the League of Nabfcms, Santiago, Chile, 1920, pages 56-61. 119 tions, and if it frequently gives advice or makes observations instead of dictating orders or formulating prohibitions, this must not be attributed as due to the action of the French representatives." But with a true understanding of the general and permanent interests of the nations, the British and American representatives drafted a special pact for the political guarantees that France sought, refusing, however, to create an organization that would be a super-state. That is why Lord Cecil stated that the new organization is characterized by a spirit of cooperation and association, and that it does not infringe on the sovereignty of any nation, seeing that the League was founded precisely to assure to all nations respect for their fundamental rights.

2. The Revisión International law, as well as the Covenant te^ffected*1" League of Nations, is based on the only by Agree- fundamental principie that treaties are to be ^gnLoryífcC respected. It exeludes all modification and Parties. revisión of treaties that is not effected by the will of the signatory parties. That is to say, treaties can be modified only by the same powers that created them. To revise a treaty means to substitute a new one for the oíd one, cancelling the obligations contracted, and putting in their places others different, and probably contrary, to the former ones. To make such changes against the will of the signatory parties would be to break up all law and order in international affairs. The eminent American jurist, Mr. Davis, regarding this point in the Covenant of the League, expressed himself as follows:

"The Covenant of the League was not intended to set aside the rules of international conduct which have been gradually built up among the nations, or to substitute in their stead an entirely new system. It was not designed to supersede the obligations of existing treaties and con- traets, ñor did the nations in agreeing to it abandon that right to negotiate agreements on their own behalf to 120 which is an inseparable attribute of sovereignty. On the contrary, the whole design was to confirm and strengthen the rules of international law, and promote the observance of treaty obligations. It may be truly said that the sanctity of treaties is the very life-blood of the League."

After recalling the Preamble to the Covenant, which we have quoted several times, the distinguished jurist adds that an opinion contrary to the above would make the League of Nations "more an enemy of treaties than their guarantor, and would transform it, furthermore, into an element of discord rather than an element for the promotion of peace." "It is known," he adds, "that treaties that sanction cession of territory create a state of affairs that is permanent and irrevocable." This principie of the immutability of treaties unless changed by the agreement of the signatory parties was solemnly formulated in the international agreement of London, January 17, 1871, to which all the powers concurred. The Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Germany, France, Russia, Italy, Austria, etc., declared on that occasion that it was an essential principie of international law that no nation can free itself of the obligations that emanate from a treaty, ñor modify its stipulations, unless by the agreement of the contracting parties, or through friendly understanding.1

3. Definition by Conflicts between nations have had, until r ICtOTY today, no other solution than that brought about by war. In the history of the world, war has always played a leading part, and international law, recognizing the situations created by war, has given it juridical forcé. Great liberating movements have been effected only by means of war, as in the case of the struggle of independence of the United States, and the emancipation of Latin America. 1 Protocol of London quoted in the Exposé de la Delegatlon du Chili, Gfenéve, 1921, page 22. 121 The result of these struggles has been the creation of new political entities, soon recognized by other nations with all the attributes of sovereignty. Such situations, created by war, thus received the consagration of international law; they have been recognized as permanent and unchangeable. It is, therefore, not exact to state that all wars are to be condemned, and much less exact to declare that war does not define in permanent form the rights of the contending parties, or does not create definite and unmistakable political relations with other nations. Such is the scope and power of treaties of peace. Has the Treaty of Guadalupe, which in 1848 transferred to the United States over 850,000 square miles of Mexican territory, ever been questioned? Is the Treaty of Paris, by which Spain lost her valuable possessions in the Antilles and the West- ern Pacific, subject to revisión? And the Treaty of Versailles itself, has it not created new frontiers, unmade empires, and called new nations to independent life? Does the map of Europe today have a boundary that has not been modified by war? Has not victory given the nations the right to define the boundaries of the vanquished? If before going to war, declared M. Clemenceau, the opponents agree that the victor is not to gain anything, why fight? "When it is affirmed that victory does not give rights," he states, "a beautiful and noble idea is expressed that may mark a new epoch in the march of humanity toward a future confraternity, but at present it is an exaggerated platonicism." M. Pichón, Minister of Foreign Affairs, also expressed himself in similar terms in the French parliament. "It is necessary that our victory have certain just consequences that will prevent the vanquished nation from again putting the peace of the world in danger. Victory gives rights over the vanquished." The Treaty of 1904 between Chile and Bolivia, which consecrated in definite form the situation created by the Truce Pact twenty years before, was the result of long and friendly negotiations carried on with the sincere desire on the part of both nations of creating permanent peace. That is why Chile, in compensation for the cession of territory on the part of Bolivia, 122 made railroad, financial, and commercial concessions that would "amply satisfy the present and future needs of Bolivia," as expressed by the Bolivian negotiator of the Treaty. The condition of Bolivia, a vanquished country, was in- fmitely better, commercially, and politically, after the war than before it. The Treaty confirmed Chile's ownership of one degree and a half of Bolivian territory, but Bolivia in turn was relieved of the obligation of paying war indemnities totalling several millions due prívate individuáis in this región, Chile undertaking the payment of these indemnities. Bolivia received in cash a payment of three hundred thousand pounds sterling. Furthermore, Chile built the railroad from Arica to La Paz, and has guaranteed the construction of the interior railroads of Bolivia up to a sum of £550,000. Putting to one side her position of victor, Chile not only desired to heal oíd wounds regardless of the compensation or payments required of her. Her purpose was to cooperate in the establishment of true political and commercial solidarity between Chile and Bolivia.

4. Perú and In 1883 Perú and Chile signed the Treaty Agreement. of Ancón which put an end to the state of war between the two nations. Perú acted independently of her ally of 1879, and did not consider it necessary to consult Bolivia regarding the cession of Tarapacá. The incorporation of this zone into the territory of Chile had a two-fold effect. On one hand it extended Chile's coastline in the north up to Camarones; on the other, it gave her possession of the nitrate fíelds of that región, thus eliminating the bitter competition that had been responsible for the Secret Alliance of 1873. Peace with Bolivia was established later in two stages, each separated from the other by a period of twenty years. It was necessary, of course, that this peace with Bolivia be based on the Treaty of Peace signed with Perú, that is, taking into con- 123 sideration the new state of affairs established by that Treaty. For Chile, it was absolutely essential that her territory be united, forming one continuous coastline; Chile also sought complete control of the nitrate región. She could not accept that the nitrate fields of Toco, situated in the oíd Bolivian coast, and which had been the subject of negotiations between Bolivia and Perú, become once again a center of strife.1 Apart from this aspect concerning the economic causes of the war, it should be noted that the cession of that strip of coast was the only indemnity falling upon Bolivia. Thus, in the drafting of the Truce Pact, and in the negotiation of the Treaty of Peace of 1904, these two fundamental points had to be considered, with a view at the same time to the future political and commercial requirements of the two nations. Each time that Chile has sought to provide Bolivia with an outlet to the sea through Arica, the natural route, Perú's opposition has been encountered. In the very days preceding the Treaty of 1904 Perú endeavoured to establish diplomatic relations destined apparently to reach an agreement and termínate the lengthy Chilean-Peruvian negotiations regarding the future nationality of the Tacna and Arica Provinces; but these advancea were really for the purpose of frustrating the settlement agreed upon with Bolivia, which lacked only the final diplomatic formalities for its consummation. This step of Perú took form in the Prado Ugarteche Mission, the activities of which the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile at that time, Sr. Emilio Bello Codesido, related as follows: Sr. Prado Ugarteche having expressed the desire of his Government to exchange ideas that should permit both Gov- ernments to study concrete bases for an agreement on the Tacna and Arica question, Sr. Bello Codesido was obliged to reply that the moment picked for such negotiations was most un- propitious, seeing that Chile was then negotiating a definite Treaty of Peace with Bolivia. As the interposition of new dis-

1 See Ghapter V, Section 4. 124 cus8Íons with Perú would most probably interrupt the treaty negotiations with Bolivia, Sr. Ugarteche was invited to postpone his proposals until after the treaty with Bolivia had been signed. "In view of this," declared Sr. Bello Codesido, "Sr. Prado Ugarteche proceeded to explain why he recom- mended that negotiations be first conducted with Perú at the sacrifice of a temporary interruption in the Chilean-Bolivian negotiations. "It was clearly seen from the arguments of Sr. Prado that his desire was to paralyze the negotiations with Bolivia, and to avoid that they be completed without the intervention of Perú. "Obliged to state definitely the purpose of his Gov- ernment in making these arguments, and realizing that our Government was determined not to retard any further the Treaty with Bolivia, or to be attracted by offers that at that time might appear particularly alluring, Sr. Prado definitely proposed the idea of modifying one of the fundamental points of the Treaty with Bolivia, which was, without a doubt, the dominant preoccupation of the Peruvian Government. He referred to Chile's obligation to construct a railroad communicating Arica with the capital of the Bolivian Republic, and indicated the convenience of not stating in the Treaty that the railroad would start precisely from Arica but from some undetermined point on the coast, in order to arrive at some agreement with Perú. "I realized that to secure that important objective Sr. Prado was directing all his efforts, and that this was the true purpose of his mission. "I explained to Sr. Prado Ugarteche that it was not now possible to modify the basis of the agreement with Bolivia, and that even though we might desire to take into account Perú's wishes, it was not in the power of Chile to concede what constituted a prime demand of Bolivia, since the construction of the Arica-La Paz railroad would take the place of her demand for a port on the Pacific." 125 Notwithstanding the evident obstacles that prevented Chile from listening to the insinuations brought by so distinguished a representative of Perú, Sr. Prado did not wish to abandon his intention of initiating negotiations with Chile at a moment when the Tacna and Arica problem was to be modified in opposition to the interests and expectations of Perú.1 It is not our purpose to show the way in which Peruvian diplomacy has made its influence felt in the international policies of Bolivia, or how Perú has been able to maintain herself in harmony with those extreme elements in Bolivia that have raised the banner of hatred against Chile. The fall of the Liberal Party, which for some time had been governing Bolivia, and the rise to power of the new regime following a short revolution, give official evidence of the community of interests and purposes of the new leaders of Bolivia and the Government of Perú. The special Bolivian representatives sent to the Cen- tennial celebrations in Perú publicly declared the adherence of their Government to the antagonistic policy of Perú toward Chile. Furthermore, the representatives of both nations to the League together presented their petition against Chile.

"We wish to declare," said the Bolivian petition of November 1, 1920, that this petition is made with the approval of Perú, a country to which Bolivia feels herself united in this purpose because of historie and political reasons, and because of the common interests emanating from the war and their alliance in 1879."

For the sake of exactitude the Bolivian representatives that signed this grave declaration should have referred to the selfish motives that brought about the Secret Alliance of 1873 as being responsible for the unión of the two nations, and not the war itself that was brought on by this Secret Alliance.

1 Don Javier Prado Ugarteche was one of the most distinguished and able of Peruvian. statesmen. Sr. Prado Ugarteche, toward the middle of the year 1904, was named Minis.ter of Perú to the Argentine Bepublic and) carne to Chile on the confidential mission recounted by Sr. Bello Codecida. Shortly after this he was called to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and sought a satis factary solution to the difficulties existing with Chile over the settlement of the Tacna and Arioa question. He stated that he considered himself "obliged to confront the problem without hesitation or weakness, resolved to adhere to the strict compliance of the Treaty of Ancón. If in thk path I attainí success," he declared, "it will be to the benefit ofl the country: if I fail in no way shall I harm or make worae the presenil situation." Sr. Prado died suddenly in 1921 while rector of the University of San Marcos. 126 5. The Bolivian On November 1, 1920, Bolivia and Perú presented themselves separately, but in accord as to their course of action, to the first Assembly of the League of Nations, asking for the revisión of the Treaties of Peace of 1883 and 1904 that put an end to the state of war between Chile and Perú, and Chile and Bolivia, respectively. Perú withdrew her petition on December 2, 1920, reserving herself the right of presenting it anew, however. Bolivia, reiterating hers, on December 15 solicited that it be included in the agenda for the Assembly of 1921. The withdrawal of the petition by one of the allies of 1873, and the insistence of the other, followed tactics agreed upon by the two nations. The failure of the petition of Perú—the success of which was exceedingly doubtful from the very beginning—left an open road for the one of Bolivia, and the role of pioneer again 'fell to Bolivia as it had fallen to her in 1879. The Bolivian delegates to the League, Sres. F. A. Aramayo, Florián Zambrano, and Franz Tamayo, presented their petition to the General Secretariat as follows:

"Bolivia invokes Article 19 of the Covenant to obtain the revisión by the League of Nations of the Treaty of Peace signed between Bolivia and Chile, October 20, 1904. "To justify this petition, Bolivia presents the facts enumerated below, reserving herself the right to bring forth in due time the necessary proofs and arguments: "1. The Treaty was imposed upon Bolivia. "2. The non-fulfillment, on the part of Chile, of some of the fundamental clauses of the Treaty, which has as its purpose the maintenance of peace. "3. The constant menace to peace that this situation creates. Proof of this is the actual mobilization of large bodies of troops by Chile on the Bolivian frontier, despite the existence of a state of peace between both nations. "4. Because of the Treaty of 1904 Bolivia has become a country completely enclosed and deprived of access to the sea." 127 The distinguished professor of international law in the Uni- versity of París, M. André Weiss, on studying this petition, declared:

"The Government of Bohvia has thought that the Covenant of the League of Nations gives her an opportunity to free herself of the obligations and sacrifies that were the price of her defeat."

He might have added that this attitude was taken by Bolivia while enjoying the privileges secured from the railroads, the monetary guarantees, and the payments made by Chile under the Treaty, in compensating for the concessions made by Bolivia, and which she now wishes to cancel.

6. Attegeá Impo- The first argument that Bohvia invokes, sition of seen in the light of facts, becomes absurd, and Treaty by Forcé as a is contradicted not only by the facts of the Cause Justify- case, but also by the authorized statements ing Its Revisión. of the Bolivian negotiators of the Treaty. It is against all reason to maintain that a Treaty signed twenty-four years after the cessation of hostilities was imposed by forcé, even though this were a cause for declaring it void. The application of the Trace Pact for twenty years, the much discussed negotiations of 1895 which fell through because of the lack of accord on the part of Bolivia, the negotiations maintained from 1900 to 1904 with various Bolivian administrations, and with the intervention of numerous public men and diplomats of Bolivia, these are facts that conclusively refute the argument that the Treaty was imposed by forcé. The words of Sr. Gutiérrez himself, the exposition of Sr. Villazón, the popular consultation of the presidential candidate, General Montes, the approval of the Treaty not only by the administration of Sr. Pando, but also by that of his successor, Sr. Montes, are incontrovertible facts that establish conclusively that the Treaty was arrived at following ampie, free, and prolonged discussion, both before and after the fundamental conditions had 128 been decided upon. It will suffice to refer to Chapter X of thie book where we have recalled in detail the important facta of the case. The argument that the Treaty was imposed is also refuted by a fact of yet greater significance. In the Treaty of 1904 all the stipulations that were matter for discussion were those referring to the obligations that the victor was to undertake in favor of the vanquished. Regarding the legal aspect of this argument of Bolivia's, all the jurist8 who have given their opinion on the subject agree with Chile in declaring that if the Treaty were to be revised for this alleged reason (imposition by forcé) it would be necessary to ask for the revisión of all the treaties of peace in history, beginning with those of Versailles and St. Germain.

"If this argument of Bolivia's were cause for the revisión of the Treaty," declared Sr. Agustín Edwards, Chilean Delegate to the League, in the Assembly, Sep- tember 7, 1921, "all the vanquished in all the wars of history would come here to reclaim the territories that the fortunes of war took from them. The League of Nations would have to undertake the task of remaking the map of Europe; and this society, created to consolí- date peace, and having as its foundation the respect for treaties, would let loose a universal war."

The former American Ambassador, Mr. John W. Davis, whom we have quoted before, made the following statement regarding this cause of violence alleged by Bolivia:

"The assertion loses forcé when confronted by the fact that the Treaty was negotiated, twenty years after the cessation of actual hostilities."

Even had this been the case, he states, quoting the opinions of Wheaton and Yattels, "it is a general and indisputable principie that the argument of violence or forcé cannot be invoked to evade the obligations of a treaty of peace. Might and forcé form part of the very essence and idea of war, and if the 129 nations make war, it is understood that each one of them appeals to the eventuality of a successful compulsión." (Wheaton's International Law, 8th Edition, page 722.)

"If such an interpretation were admitted it would undermine fundamentally the security of treaties of peace, as there would be very few treaties that could not thus be impugned. To authorize such an excuse for not complying with the provisions of a treaty would threaten the common safety and welfare of nations." (Vattel, Book 4, Chap. 4, Sec. 37.)

7. Alleged Inap- The second argument of Bolivia's is even plication of Treaty as more important than the first. Another Chile has complied with all the provisions Cause. of the Treaty of 1904 which she undertook to fulfill, there being not one clause with which she has not complied.

By the date stipulated, the fundamental provision of the Treaty—which was the construction of the railroad uniting La Paz with Arica, and which has put all of Bolivia in easy and rapid communication with the sea—had been complied with. That important international railroad was opened to traffic in 1913, and since that time Bolivia has been able to enjoy all the privileges that this important clause of the Treaty brought to her. Chile has paid, and is still paying, the annual sums of money indicated in the Treaty for guaranteeing the construction of interior railroads in Bolivia. As Sr. Gutiérrez himself declared, these payments have been effecting a true transformation in the economic life of the nation. We have already listed the payments made by Chile in accordance with the Treaty, and which total almost six million pounds sterling ($27,000,000 U. S. Currency). We have also seen that Chile has paid the stipulated sum of three hundred thousand pounds sterling, and has cancelled all the prívate claims of Bolivian citizens for which Chile assumed responsibility as stipulated in the Treaty. 130 There are no other provisions of the agreement that involve additional payments or concessions on the part of Chile; there are no clauses of the Treaty that Chile has left un'fulfilled; Chile has complied with every one of her obligations, and Bolivia has never had occasion to make any observations calling into question the sincerity of Chile in her desire to cooperate with the provisions of the Treaty, ñor has Bolivia had to com- plain of any default on the part of Chile in the fulfilling of her obligations. Only in very recent times—to be exact, since the change of policy in the Government of Bolivia—has an effort been made to raise to the category of international problem an incident concerning individual rights, a question belonging to those which the Treaty itself submitted to the jurisdiction of the regular Tribunals of Justice. The discussion raised by Bolivia concerns some claims filed by Bolivian citizens who have alleged certain rights in the nitrate fields in the coast ceded to Chile. These claims were thoroughly examined and discussed through the regular judicial channels, and their re- peal does not give cause whatsoever for the payment of indemnities. The Treaty of 1904 and the Complementary Protocol of October 24, that forms an integral part of the Treaty, settled this point. Article 2 of the Treaty declares that "the prívate rights of citizens or foreigners that have been legally acquired in the territories that by virtue of this Treaty remain under the sovereignty of one or the other nation, will be recognized by the High Contracting Parties." The Complementary Pro- tocol, explains the Minister of Chile, has as its object the clarification of this point, "with the purpose of leaving perfectly established that the recognition of prívate rights to which that clause refers could in no case oblige the High Contracting Parties to pay indemnities of any kind." The Minister of Bolivia, Sr. Gutiérrez, agreeing with this, stated that "the recognition of prívate rights, which would be defined by the Tribunals of Justice, will not impose on the High Contracting Parties indemnities of any kind." 131 The nature of this matter, however, makes further discussion unnecessary. Even though it did refer to some unfulfilled obligation it might give cause for a protest demanding the fulfillment of such an obligation, but it would by no means make the Treaty void.

8. Threat of The Bolivian petition, however, deduces War that as a conquence of this alleged non-fulfillment of the Treaty there has been created "a situation that constitutes a permanent threat of war," citing in corroboration of these fears the "mobilization of large bodies of troops," which, it is presumed, were moved by the Government of Chile with the most belligerent intentions. The connection between the discussion of prívate rights and the establishment of a permanent threat of war is inexplicable. Every nation has the right to dispose of its troops in the way that it may deem convenient. The Covenant of the League of Nations has not pretended to restrict rights so essential to the safety of every nation. Only such acts as are obviously belligerent in intent and purpose fall within the province of the League of Nations. But it is impossible to see in a true or supposed threat of war the right to revise or annul existing treaties. The argument of the Chilean delegation to the effect that "if in a denounced case there was sufficient mobilization of troops without a justifíable motive to imply a threat of war, such a state of affairs would justify a petition for the removal of those troops, but would not justify a petition seeking the revisión or annulment of a treaty," was found to be logical and in agreement with the accepted principies of international law. Furthermore, it is a fact requiring no proof that the diplomatic relations between Chile and Bolivia have suffered no change, either before or following this strange petition to the League of Nations. 132 9. Bolivia's Con- The Chilean delegation peremptorily Mediten-a- denied the affirmation of the Bolivian peti- nean State as tion to the efFect that the Treaty of 1904 Cause^Justify- Bolivia without access to the sea. "The ing Revisión pecuniary sacrifices that Chile impoaed on of the Treaty. herge]f by the Treaty of 1904?" the dele. gates of Chile declared, "have permitted Bolivia to possess a system of railroads that gives her access to the ocean through the ports of Arica and Antofagasta. She also enjoys the perpetual right of ampie and free commercial transit through the Chilean ports on the Pacific Ocean." We have already seen how Chile, in the negotiations of 1895, and also during the preparation of the Treaty of 1904, endeavoured to satisfy Bolivia's aspirations to a port, and how she was on one occasion frustrated by the action of the Govern- ment and Congress of Bolivia. We have seen how after that the policy of Bolivia changed in favor of the substitution of a port by the construction of railroads, and the perpetual right of free transit through the ports of Chile. In Chapter X, Sec- tion 5, we have recalled the defense of the Treaty made by Sr. Gutiérrez, the Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in order to prove that by the Treaty the present and future requirements of Bolivia are amply satisfied. To endeavour to secure from Chile the port that Bolivia willingly relinquished in exchange for certain material compensations, is equivalent to re- vising the fundamental clauses of the Treaty of 1904, which revisión can only be done by the signatory parties, and not by the League of Nations or a third state.

10. Inadmissibüity Chile asserted that the League was not fcecrawc'o/'tfce competent to revise the Treaty on the peti- Incompetence tion of only one of the parties, basing her

of the League. att£tu|je on t}je gj.0unds that such a procedure was against the fundamental principie of "sanctity of treaties," on which principie the entire structure of the League rests. The Chilean delegates also pointed out that Article 19 of the Covenant, on which the petition of Bolivia based itself, re- 133 ferred to treaties that have become inapplicable, but not to those that are in effect and the provisions of which have been complied with. Chile also maintained that the League could only suggest, or invite, a revisión, leaving it to the interested parties to decide whether or not they agreed to modify their existing relations. Finally, a third reason for the incompetency of the League to revise the Treaty of 1904 was found in Article 21 of the Covenant, by virtue of which the League cannot take action on problems that concern only the American continent. Because of these considerations the Chilean delegation declared that "Chile does not consent to being invited to revise the Treaty of 1904, and if, notwithstanding this declaration, such an invitation is extended she must decline it now." The Chilean delegates added that they took this stand because any invitation to revise the Treaty would set a dangerous precedent, with disastrous results for the international relations of the world.

11. Jwidical Chile's attitude regarding the revisión of

Repartí. ^ Treaty q( 1904 by the Assembly of the League of Nations—maintaining that the League was incompetent to revise this document—has been supported by the scholarly reports of many distinguished authorities in international affairs, whose opinion regarding this question had been solicited. The former Ambassador of the United States in Great Britain, Mr. John W. Davis, arrived at the conclusión tñat the League of Nations is not competent to revise the Treaty of Oc- toher 20, 1904, signed between Bolivia and Chile, and that therefore "the motion of Chile for the previous question should be sustained." M. Charles Dupuis, member of the Institute of France, concludes his report on the question by stating that "the petition for the revisión of the Treaty of October 20, 1904, made by Bolivia to the League of Nations, is inadmissible, and should be rejected, as it not only is not founded on international law, but is against the very principies of international law." 134 Equally peremtory is the decisión of the eminent authority, M. Paul Fauchille, who tabulates his decisions as follows:

"1. That Article 19 of the Covenant does not authorize the Bolivian Government to present before the Assembly the petition for the revisión of the Treaty of Santiago, in view of the fact that this petition does not refer to a treaty that has become inapplicable, or to an international situation that may affect the peace of the world. "2. That in any case, by virtue of Article 21 of the Covenant, the demand of Bolivia, no matter what may be its basis, should be declared inadmissible by the League of Nations as this body is incompetent to try the case."

The well-known British authority, Sir. William Finlay, expressed himself as of the opinion that "the petition for the revisión of the Treaty made by Bolivia, based on Article 19, is not admissible; that the reasons brought forth by Bolivia as a whole or taken separately do not bring the matter into the ground covered by Article 19; and that the petition of Bolivia should be rejected." M. Weiss, Professor of International Law in the University of París, after a careful study of the question, concludes his report with the following words:

"Chile has faithfully fulfilled all the obligations that the Treaty o'f 1904 imposed on her. On her part there is no danger of rupture, no threat of war; she has always endeavoured to cultívate with the neighbouring Republic peaceful, and even cordial, relations; and the minor movement of troops on the frontier, brought about by the attitude of Perú and the revolutionary agitations in both countries [Perú and Bolivia] have never taken the form of a mobilization with belligerent intentions directed against Bolivia. If the peace of the world is disturbed the responsibility will fall on Bolivia because of her direct disrespect for international pacts. "The League of Nations has as its special purpose the assuring of the inviolability of treaties. It cannot 135 eanction with its authority so grave an infraction of the principies on which it rests. "Consequently, the undersigned reaches the conclu- sión that the petition of the Bolivian Government to obtain under Article 19 the examination and revisión by the League of Nations of the Treaty of Peace of Oc- tober 20, 1904, is not admissible, and should be rejected."

12. The Commis- The Assembly of the League of Nations sion Appoint- ed by the decided to appoint a commission of three League De- clares the Bo- jurista to examine the scope of Article 19 of livian Demand the Covenant with regard to the attríbutes lnadmissible. of the Assembly under this article. The report, drawn up in Geneva, September 21, 1921, is signed by Messrs. Manuel de Peralta, A. Struycken, and Vittorio Scialoia, and reads as follows:

"The Commission of Jurists, formed at the suggestion of the Bureau of the Assembly following the demand presented by Bolivia on November 1, 1920, with the purpose of investigating the scope of Article 19 of the Covenant, particularly with regard to the attributes of the Assembly under this Article, is of the opinion: "That, as presented, the demand of Bolivia is inadmissible, as the Assembly of the League of Nations cannot modify by itself any treaty, seeing that the modification of treaties can only be effected by the signatory states. "That the Covenant, while professing the scrupulous respect for all the provisions of treaties in the mutual relations of organized peoples, attributes to the Assem- bly, by virtue of Article 19, the faculty of advising the members of the League to proceed to a new examination of certain treaties or certain international situations. "That such an invitation can only be extended in the case of treaties that have become inapplicable; that is, when the state of affairs existing at the time of the drafting of such treaties has later experienced, materially or morally, such radical changes that the treaties are placed 136 beyond reasonable possibility of applying thern; or before certain situations the continuance of which might endanger the peace of the world. "That in such a case the Assembly would have to assure itself that one of these conditions was presented for its examination."

13. Lord ^ With this report all discussion of the ques- Epitaph. t^011 hY t^e League terminated. The delegate of Bolivia, Sr. Aramayo, endeavoured, however, to make certain reservations regarding the rights of his nation, announcing that the petition would be brought 'forward anew at some later period. In view of this, Chile was obliged to declare on September 28, 1922, that she did not believe that such an event could be realized, and that if it were, she would oppose it with all her strength, basing herself on the facts of the case, and on the various judicial opinions that had been given out, including the one by the special commission appointed by the League. Mr. Balfour (now Lord Balfour), admitting that it was the right of every member to present to the League any problem, added: "We trust that this eventuality [the repetition of Bolivia's demand] will not come to pass, and that this incident will not be renewed." With this inscription was engraved the stone that buried Bolivia's petition.

137 CHAPTER XIII

THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AGGRESSOR 1. International Law Before and After the Great War. 2. The Responsibility fot Conflicts. 3. Bolivia Armed Herself in December, 1878. Secret Communication of November 22, 1878. 4. Chile Vnprepared for War in February, 1879. Secret Minutes of the Señóte, April 2,1879. 5. Improvised Military Preparations; Secret Minutes of the Senate of July 30 and August 2,1879. 6. The Civic Virtues of the Chilean People, and Their Strong Political Organization Secure Victory. 7. The Chilean Policy of Harmony. 1. International The principies governing the relations of LaZ Afierre ^ticns before the war of 1914 have not War of 1914. undergone a marked improvement that might show progress in the development of this important branch of juridical learning. International law of today is the same as that which has always regulated the relations that should exist among civilized nations. The Covenant of the League of Nations, established by the Treaty of Yersailles, has confirmed all of the principies already established. The great and cultured nations of Europe that had to support for four years the effects of the worst war that the annals of history register, felt the need of associating with the other civilized countries o'f the world to discuss the methods by which armed conflicts between nations may be avoided in the future, or made almost impossible. They felt a natural relief in being able to consécrate anew those principies that would disarm the machinations of intrigue and rivalry, and cement international ties in good faith, and in the strict fulfillment of the obligations contracted in treaties. The transgressions against international law have been most severely condemned by all students of international relations. The distinguished members of the Institute of International Law in Paris, in a special meeting held in May, 1919, considered in their duty, before resuming their regular labors, interrupted 138 by the war, to register their protest against the violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg, and for the violation of established treaties, and the laws of civilized warfare.

"We are convinced," they added, "that the restoration and scientific development of international law must be sought in a spirit of loyal collaboration of jurists that are fully conscious of the necessity of respecting treaties, and sincerely resolved not to accept any excuses to justify the violation of a promise."

In reality, the Hague Conventions, and particularly the second Convention, formulated a body of doctrines that cannot be surpassed, and to which it is sufficient to refer to be able te declare with exaetness the transgressions that may be committed against international law.

2. The ResponsU The greater solidarity that today exists Conflicts,* among nations has served to give more importance to public opinion regarding the causes of conflicts, and the íixing of blame and responsibility for wars. The world today always wishes to know who it is that has broken the rules of international law. A fair and just appreciation of the attitude taken by the victor depends on whether the victor was the offensive or offended pa'rty. The forcé of public opinion has been felt against those mili- taristic nations that perturb the peace of the world by seeking to expand their boundaries, or who seek economic advantages or industrial monopolies. But at the same time sympathy cannot be denied a nation that, knowing how to defend herself against an unjust attack, disarms her adversary politically and commercially, and places her in a position where she cannot again perturb the peace of the world. This is what happened in the War of the Pacific, into which Chile was dragged when she was completely disarmed, and in the middle of a financial crisis. In Chapters IV and V we have given the faets that led up to the war. Here we only wish to present some documents that prove conclusively that Bolivia, 139 during the days immediately preceding the rupture of relations, was actively engaged in military preparations, and which show the unarmed and defenceless condition in which Chile found herself at the outbreak of the war.

3. Bolivia Armed As we have shown in Chapter VII, Section December on November 8, 1878, when all diplomatic 1878. efforts to secure a peaceful settlement had failed, the Government of Chile demanded o'f Bolivia that she suspend the measures taken in violation of the Treaty of 1874, declaring that otherwise the Chilean Government would find it necessary to declare void the Boundary Treaty, and that the party that did not fulfill the stipulations of the Treaty "would be responsible for the consequences of such an unfortunate, yet perfectly justified and necessary act." On December 18 the Bolivian Government replied that she had ordered the fulfíllment of the measures she had dictated. Bolivia then frustrated the proposals of Chile of January 3,1879, suggesting that the question be submitted to arbitration as provided for in the Treaty. While Chile was doing everything possible to avert a serious conflict, the Bolivian Government was receiving military equipment that placed the nation in a position to assume an offensive attitude. These preparatory measures were being taken in conjunction with her ally, Perú, an arrangement having been made for the unloading of a shipment of arms at the Peruvian port of Moliendo, and their subsequent transportation to Bolivia under the protection of Peruvian forces. An unpublished document from the Peruvian archives, given below, shows how Bolivia was arming herself while refusing the conciliatory proposals of Chile, and the arbitration of the dispute. The document reads as follows:

No. 41—Legation of Bolivia in Perú. Lima, November 22, 1878. Sir: In a few days there should arrive in Moliendo the shipment of 1500 rifles, with the corresponding ammunition, belonging to my Government, the transit of 140 which through said port to Bolivia, Your Excellency has permitted on petition of this Legation. Notwithstanding the security that the public tran- quillity in both countries offers, I do not think it superfluous to take certain precautions against mishap in the transit of this shipment over land, and over Lake Titicaca. In virtue of this, and convinced by unequivocal acts, of the interest that the Government of Your Excellency takes in all that concerns public order and the well-understood interests of Bolivia, I beg to request that Your Excellency order a guard for said armaments, consisting of fifteen or twenty men and one officer, to accompany the shipment to the port of Chililaya; which measure will be appreciated by my Government as a new act of deference on the part of Your Excellency. I reiterate, Sr. Irigoyen, my sentiments of distinguished consideration and personal appreciation, Z. Flores. To His Excellency, Sr. M. Irigoyen, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Perú.

Indorsement (Providencia) Lima, November 22,1878. Let the necessary orders be issued to the Prefects of Arequipa and Puno to the effect that suitable protection be provided through the territory under their jurisdiction up to the port of Chililaya for the 1500 rifles to which this communication refers, and reply made to the request. Larr abure.

This shipment, that today might be considered insignifícant, was not so in those days, either for Bolivia whose power it was to strengthen, or for Chile whose army then consisted of only 2000 men.

4. Chile Vnpre- In order to show how Chile, at the out- ^l^eb°uary,ar break of the war, found herself in an unarmed 1879. Secret and defenceless condition, we are to make use tenate* April a document of the highest authority, a 2, 1879. copy of the Secret Minutes of the Chilean Senate, in which the Government, seeking the assistance of 141 Congress during the first months of the war, gives an account of the state of the country at the time.1 This document shows how Chile found herself without money, guns, or munitions, and with a handful of soldiers that was scarcely sufficient to maintain public order and guard the frontier in the southern región of Araucania. As it is known, Chile declared war on April 5, 1879. Dur- ing the days immediately preceding this declaration of war, a secret debate had been conducted in the Chilean Senate regarding the military operations in Antofagasta, and the general military situation in the country. The minutes for the extraordinary secret session of April 2, 1879 (maintained until today in the greatest secrecy, as if even now they might endanger the security of the Republic by revealing the appalling financial and military situation in which the country found itself at the outbreak of the war), also show the spirit in which the Government ordered the occupation of Antofagasta, seeking only the protection of the Chilean interests in that región.

"When the Government of Chile occupied the northern coast," declared the Ministry that had ordered the occupation, "it did so almost surprised, as it was not expected that Bolivia would openly viólate a solemn Treaty that prescribed arbitration as a last resort for the settlement of any difficulties that might arise."

The Government of Chile, in view of the act of violence that the Government of Bolivia performed February 17, 1879, in Antofagasta in violation óf the Treaty, took measures for the safeguarding of Chilean interests. The determination of Bolivia to continué her antagonistic policy made the Govern- ment of Chile realize all the dangers of the conflagration into which it was being dragged.

"Surprised by a resolution of the Government of Bolivia as unjust as it was unexpected, the Government of Chile saw in the boldness of that nation indications that she was encouraged by the knowledge of definite or 1 By permission of the Senate X was authorized in, 1919, while Minister of For- eign AfiEairs to publish copies of these minutes. Not being able to do this while in office, I take this opportunity of xnaking them known, with the permission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as I consider them of the greatest importance for the interests of Chile. Extracte of the minutes of different sessions are given above; the complete minutes will be found in the Appendices. 142 probable help from another power, and Chile realized, also, that this idea had predominated, since the beginning, in all the councils of the Bolivian Government, and had determined all her actions, such as the rapid and resolute organization of her army, and the immediate arming of her navy."

The existence of a Secret Treaty had, until then, been mentioned only in vague rumors, but now the Chilean Government was hastily investigating these reports. Under the light of these rumors the Antofagasta incident immediately changed and took on a new aspect; the whole affair was no longer a question concerning an isolated and unpremeditated act of violence on the part of the Bolivian Government; indications of some strange suggestion or promise of help from some third power were now present; the existence of the Secret Treaty of Al- liance between Bolivia and Perú appeared with most discon- certing and menacing certainty, and threatened to convert the coast dispute into a most grave problem. The rumors regarding the existence of a secret treaty had also helped to bring about the decisión to begin arming the nation. These rumors demanded the attention of the Govern- ment, as the. notes exchanged with the Chilean Legation in Perú beginning January 20 indícate; this, as the date shows, was before the occupation of the coast and the conference that the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs had with the Peruvian Plenipotentiary, of which conference the Senate was aware; in this conference, as it will be recalled, the Peruvian delegate had declared that he did not know of the existence of any such secret treaty. Notwithstanding this declaration, the Gov- ernment had persisted in obtaining a definite declaration from Perú. In the secret session of the Senate, the thoughts and opinions of the Government were expressed frankly and fearlessly, nothing being withheld or attenuated. The statements made by the Government to the representatives of the nation, whose assistance in confronting the grave responsibilities was being sought, show that the war had taken the defenceless nation by surprise, finding it in complete ignorance of the secret machinations that had been conducted against it. 143 5. Improvised The second of these important documenta 22Z/ST is to be found in Appendix 2, and ia the creí Minutes minutea of the secret session of the Chilean % hUy^o'and tenate o'f July 30, 1879, recording the report August 2, 1879. of don Antonio Yaras, head of the Cabinet organized April 18 to succeed the Prats Cabinet which had ordered the occupation of Antofagasta, and had begun the military preparations in the country. Due to the lack of funds, and also because of the belief that any conílict would be limited to Bolivia alone, an army of only 6000 men had been prepared. When Prats retired, on April 18, there existed in Antofagasta, due to the rapid military preparations being undertaken, a división of 6596 men in training; in addition five thousand Comblain rifles, eight Krupp field guns, and six million rounds of ammunition had been ordered. As we have already said, the Chilean army in February numbered 2200 men, but, due to an efFort that was considered extraordinary, this number had been raised by the middle of April to over 5500 men, the greater part recruits that had to undergo military training in the camp at Antofagasta while waiting for the arma and munitions to arrive. The stock of ammunition that they possessed then was not sufficient for one day's battle. The new cabinet organized by Señor Varaa represented an intense patriotic movement on the part o'f the political leaders that were to accompany President Pinto during the remainder of his administration. Sr. Varas assumed the leadership at a time when the war had taken on all the aspeets of a struggle for national existence and independence. No longer were the violations of Bolivia of the Treaty of 1874 the only cause for war; the secret plan of Perú and Bolivia to take from Chile her nitrate possessions in Antofagasta and Atacama, and to assure the industrial monoply that had inspired the Peruvian laws of 1873 and 1875 was sufficient reason for Chile to rise up to defend her rights. It was soon realized that the dispatch of a small división of troops to the north would not suffice; what was required was a regular army to save the Republic. To the organization of this army were devoted the efforta of the Government. Three montha after the declaration of war, Antofagasta was yet only 144 a training camp, with recruits anxious to follow the flag north, but detained until the vast work of organization might reach such a stage as to permit the troops to enter into hostilities with some chance of success. In the secret session referred to by the minutes of July 30, Sr. Varas painted a true and exact picture of the condition of the country, showing everything yet in a state of preparation, a lack of unity of command, troops unable to move into action, and the fleet unable to do any effective work. The machinery of war showed in every wheel and cog the marks of hasty improvisation. It is noteworthy, however, how even then the Government of Chile hoped that actual conflict might be averted. In this exposition of Sr. Varas's we find him observing that the preliminary measures "had not exerted sufficient influence to induce the enemy to make peace, or to produce a change of government that would facilítate a peaceful settlement." At the beginning it was believed that the war would be re- stricted to Bolivia, and that the military división that occupied Antofagasta, with the help of a few warships, would be sufficient.

"But when it was seen," stated Sr. Varas, "that Perú was going to take part in the conflict, the greater part of the fleet had sailed north, and additional forces had been sent to Antofagasta, making the total number of troops stationed there, at the middle of April, 5696 men. Fur- thermore, it had been realized that an army, and not merely a división would be required; for this reason during the first fortnight of April a General-in-Chief had been appointed, and other measures thought necessary had been taken."

Chile was not, therefore, the military power that she has been subsequently described to have been, ñor was she in a position to undertake wars of conquest. She was, on the contrary, a nation that found herself with her border absolutely unprotected; without arma, without ammunition, and without military organization of any kind. Only after two long months of hard work and patient efforts had Chile been able to equip 145 a email división of slightly over five thousand men, which were held in training in Anto'fagasta waiting for the arms and munitions coming from foreign countries. The condition of the fleet also showed the same lack of preparation. Assembled hastily, it had sailed north just as it was, without having an opportunity of preparing itself for war, most of the ships being in a poor condition after years of coastal service. This readily explains how it was that the Peru- vian fleet, during a period of six months, was able to evade the Chilean ships, which at that time were incapable of presenting effective resistance to the movements of their enemies. The fundamental fact brought forth by the report of Sr. Varas is that on that date, July 30, 1879, the Chilean army was not in a condition to take up an extended campaign, and that it had not even been able to engage in minor, preliminary expeditions. As has been stated, the army was in,no condition to enter hostilities until the end of October, 1879, that is, over six months after the declaration of war. Another report made by Sr. Varas on August 2, 1879 (see Appendix 3), confirms, through the presentation of yet greater details, the fact that the country in April, 1879, was entirely unprepared for war.

"When the chief of the división at Antofagasta was asked toward the end of April, what forcé he could muster," relates Sr. Varas, "he replied that the total of his forcé ascended to only 200 men for the artillery, 200 cavalry, and 3000 foot soldiers; but he also stated that there was no equipment for the mules that would he required for an expedition, and that for this reason the army that might be mobilized would be only of ábout 2000 men."

Such was the army that some have wanted to picture as ready to undertake a campaign of conquest in the two countries that in secret agreement had chosen their own time in which to strike! The reverses on land and sea that the allies of 1873 suffered have been explained by attributing them to that powerful, yet mythical, military organization of Chile's; the reason for that fable—one of the many invented in the war— 146 is easy to find; but the secret of Chile's success must be sought elsewhere. The facts of the case bring it out clearly. It is the same cause that brought success to the Entente in the war of 1914.

6. The Civic The people of Chile, sober, energetic, and Virtues of the Chilean Peo- industrious, rose as one when they realized ple, and Their that two neighbouring countries, which on Strong Politi- cal Organiza- several occasions the people of Chile had tion Secure aided in their struggles for ¿ndependence Victory. and liberty, had conspired against them, disregarding all principies of international faith, and violating existing treaties. The entire nation was eager to take up arms in defence of its rights; the industries of peace were converted into industries of war; the regular activities of the nation were suspended, while its soldiers armed themselves to defend the principies of right and justice, to see that treaties were documents to be respected; and to uphold international good faith. And it was the desire to see permanent peace established in the continent, and to maintain the safety obtained by great sacrifices, that made necessary the conditions for peace that the victor sought.

7. The Chilean Chile has been able, therefore, to trust Harmony. absolutely to the impartial opinion of all civilized nations, and if, at times, Chile has neglected replying to the numerous accusations ,that the vanquished countries have launched against her, it has been for two reasons. First, because the facts regarding the causes and results of the war of 1879, widely published by the Government, are so obvious and conclusive in themselves that they do not require constant proving. This is why silence has usually been the answer to the nervous activities, and tenacious propaganda, of the two ex-allies of 1879. Second, because Chile, victorious in the conflict into which she was dragged, has continued her invariable policy of pacifi- 147 éjtgta* and conciiiation, and has endeavoured to re-establish Atttong all the republics of the Pacific the oíd political and commercial ties which should lead to better days of American solidarity. She has deplored the fact that her efforts in this direction have not obtained the necessary response and cooperation, and also that in recent times the currents of sympathy and goodwill that the Treaty of 1904 had restored have been interrupted by the policy of hate and revenge that the present Government of Perú has adopted. It is not within our province to inquire whether it is through these policies that the permanent interests of Bolivia are best served; we can, however, point out that these policies of Perú's were not those of Bolivia until the military revolt of 1920 in the latter country. We might also point out that, personally, we have been much disillusioned and discouraged by the sterile resulte of the efforts of so many administrations and public men of Chile, who have tried to bring about closer and more friendly relations between Chile and Bolivia. It did seem, for a time, that these relations had been established following the Treaty of 1904; now, however, they have been threatened anew by the vacillations of uncertain national policies in Bolivia. Yet we feel a certain confidence that is born of the fact that those efforts of Chile have been brought about by a true concept of American solidarity, and because we know that, despite the uncertainty of the moment, the dictates of a sane and intelligent national consciousness must, in the end, prevail. Chile can continué treading the straight and frank path that she has chosen for herself, without fear of attacks or con- spiracies; she relies on the great moral strength that is given to her by her strict adhesión to the principies of international law, and experience has shown her that in time of need any material forcé that she may require to make justice triumph will not be lacking.

148 CHAPTER XIV

SOLIDARITY BETWEEN THE VANQUISHED 1. The Confidential Protocol of October 20, 1904. 2. The Bello Mission of 1919. 3. Military Revolution in Bolivia, Jidy 12,1920. 4. The Executive Council and the Diplomatic Corps; Declaration of the Minister of Chile. 5. Assembly of the League of Nations, September 28, 1921. 6. Bolivia Rejects the Offer of Direct Negotiations and Solicits an Invitation to the Washington Conference. 7. The Oíd Allies. 8. Future Policy of Chile.

1 ^tial p0nfdej~ Up to 1919 the foreign policies of Bolivia of October 20 f°H°wed faithfully the spirit of the negotia- 1904. ' tions of 1904. The Governments of Chile and Bolivia, and the peoples of both nations, had shown since the signing of the Treaty, the most unmistakable evidence of cordial friendship. The mission of don Emilio Bello Codecido to Bolivia in 1919 was a sincere manifestation on the part of Chile of her desire not only to maintain herself faithful to that policy of solidarity, but also to consolídate it in the most satisfactory way. Sr. Bello had been the negotiator of the Treaty of 1904, and his own opinions regarding the relations of Chile and Bolivia, as well as those of the Government in Santiago, were well known. The fact that Sr. Alberto Gutiérrez, who had represented Bolivia in the peace negotiations, was then Minister of Foreign Affairs in Bolivia, seemed a most auspicious circumstance, and a favorable indication of the probable success of Sr. Bello's mission. Nevertheless, before Sr. Bello reached La Paz, Sr. Gutiérrez had dispatched his now famous circular of February 24, 1919, to which we have referred so often, and which representa a sudden and unexpected change in the international policies of Bolivia. We now find Bolivia addressing herself to the north, instead of to the south as she had done previously. This change in policy was soon followed by the withdrawal of Sr. Gutiérrez as Minister of Foreign Affairs, to be succeeded 149 by Sr. Darío Gutiérrez, with whom Sr. Bello was to negotiate. Before Sr. Bello's arrival in La Paz a discussion had started in the Bolivian press regarding the existence and the scope of the Confidential Protocol of October 20, 1904, complementary to the Treaty of Peace. Sr. Bello had referred to this document in his book "Notes on the History of the Diplomatic Relations with Perú and Bolivia," as we have mentioned in Chapter X of this book. The Protocol, which, it had been claimed, was lost, is in the Archives of the Department of Foreign Affairs of Chile, with the original seáis and signatures of the two Plenipotentiaries, Sr. Bello and Sr. Gutiérrez. Dr. Camacho, son of the General of the same ñame who played so conspicuous a part in the War of the Pacific, and Senator of Bolivia during the period when the Treaty was approved, maintained that the Protocol was invalid as it had been declared void by a decree of General Montes. Dr. Carrasco, in his article of February 24, 1919, also maintained that this document had been rejected by General Montes, and that for this reason it had never been submitted for the approval of the Bolivian Congress.1 If what Dr. Carrasco maintains is exact, it must be stated that the Chilean Government was never informed of this de- cisión. However this may be, it is to be borne in mind that a diplomatic document, complementary to, and in explanation of a formal treaty, and drafted at the same time as the treaty, cannot be altered unless it be by accord of the signatory parties. Dr. Carrasco gives the purpose of the Protocol, although stating that he was not aware of its publication by a newspaper in Lima. He therefore must have had access to the copy in the Department of Foreign Affairs in La Paz. We give here an extract of Dr. Carrasco's article:

"And now, does the country wish to know of what this Protocol consisted? Well, this 'formula of attenuated terms' [as Sr. Bello had expressed it] stated nothing more or less than the following monstrosity: 1 La Verdad, February 25, 1919, La Paz. The Confidential Protocol. 150 "Bolivia obligates herself to assist, with all the ele• ments and resources at her disposal, to secure Chile's definite jurisdiction over Tacna and Arica. "And Chile obligates herself to exercise her di pío- matic influence in favor of Bolivia in her boundary disputes with Perú."

And, adds Dr. Carrasco, "this facturn was reduced to a mere scrap of paper." Dr. Carrasco has sought to give us the true text of the Protocol, and, on giving us his versión, he evidently considered it a fact that the copy supposedly in the possession of Chile had been lost. As this is not so, we are able to give a corred versión, not of what the Protocol said, but of what it says, and of the interpretation that the persons who signed the document wanted it to convey. The Special Representative and Minister Plenipotentiary of Bolivia to Chile, Sr. Alberto Gutiérrez, after stating that he has met the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Sr. Emilio Bello Codesido, with the purpose of signing the Treaty of Peace and Amity concluded on that date by the Governments of both nations, declared in the ñame of the Government of Bolivia:

"That in accord with the spirit that has guided the Governments of Bolivia and Chile in celebrating the Treaty, and interpreting the cordial and harmonious purposes manifested by his Government during the negotiations that have just finished, Bolivia will rnake every effort, separately or in cooperation with Chile, to secure that the territories of Tacna and Arica be definitely incorporated into Chilean territory. "On the other hand, the Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that, in accord with his Government he considered that the common interests of Chile and Bolivia established between both República the necessity of uniting their efforts to make permanent the jurisdiction of Chile over Tacna and Arica."

The Chilean representative also added that Chile "recipro- cating, would lend Bolivia her diplomatic aid on behalf of the 151 rights of Bolivia over territory that she at present occupies if it should be disputed by a neighbouring country, offering her mediation, her good offices, or other friendly measures." As will be seen, the Protocol does not imply less than what Sr. Carrasco stated; it implies more than he attributed to it. That Pact defined the scope and importance of the Treaty of Peace in a double sense: íirst, with regard to the political unión of the two countries with the purpose of securing for Chile permanent jurisdiction over Tacna and Arica; second, with regard to the definite abandonment by Bolivia of a port in exchange for the compensations provided by the Treaty. That is why Sr. Bello, in his book, calis attention to the importance of these facts. "As a result of that negotiation," he states, "Bolivia became an ally of Chile in the settlement of the problem with Perú, and the important interests of both countries, established in Tacna and Arica, indisputably point to the necessity of that territory coming under the permanent rule of Chile." And this, in effect, is what has happened. Bolivia, by means of the Arica-La Paz railway, has obtained all the benefits of a nation with free and easy access to the sea, and enjoys the benefits of the concessions made by Chile for Bolivia's free commercial transit through her territory and ports on the Pacific. Chile, on the other hand, through the investment of large suma of money in that territory, and the construction and building up of the port of Arica—which work still continúes—has created interests that most certainly cali for the definite incorporation of that territory to Chile. This situation created by th® Treaty has united the interests of Chile and Bolivia, making a change of sovereignty over this territory impossible, as it would alter the essential bases of the Treaty of 1904, a document the provisions of which have Been fulfilled, and which is therefore unalterable. It should not be forgotten that Chile permitted Bolivia to enjoy the benefits derived from that Treaty with the understanding that Tacna and Arica were to be incorporated definitely into Chilean territory. This objective was the essence of the negotiations, and to cooperate toward this end Bolivia obligated herself. 152 2 The purpose of the Mission conñded to 1919Sr. Bello in 1919 was to harmonize the aspirations of Bolivia following the European war, with what Chile could concede, quite independently of the Treaty of 1904, and as an entirely different negotiation, subject to corresponding compensations. However, a división in the political party of Bolivia then in power brought on a Cabinet crisis, with the result that don Carlos Gutiérrez assumed the leadership as head of the new Cabinet. Sr. Gutiérrez did not delay in following the policies outlined by his brother, don Alberto Gutiérrez, in the latter's circular of February 24, 1919. Although the pending negotiation was taken up directly with the President of Bolivia, Sr. Gutiérrez Guerra, the Chilean diplomat, was not long in noticing that the uncertainty in Bolivian national politics caused the Government to hesitate as to the course it should follow, and forced it to consider the wishes of the party leaders on the matter to be taken up with Chile. A surprising thing then happened, the first indication of the understanding existing between Perú and the Bolivian party that was raising the banner of hatred against Chile. Thé Minister of Foreign Affairs of Perú, don Melitón Porras—well known for his irreconcilable attitude toward Chile—telegraphed the Government of Bolivia inquiring as to the matter which it was endeavouring to negotiate with Chile. This strange intervention of the Peruvian Government could not but surprise the Chilean representative. The reply of the Bolivian Government, however, as reported by the press, caused even greater surprise. The Bolivian newspapers stated that Bolivia had replied to Perú to the effect that she would not negotiate with Chile without the previous consent of Perú. The Bolivian Government was asked to give an explanation regarding the incident, whereupon the text of the reply was announced to the Chilean representative. In the reply to Perú, stated Minister Gutiérrez, it had been declared that the "Bo- livian Government has not celebrated ñor is about to celebrate any treaty with Chile regarding the future of the Provinces of Tacna and Arica." 153 While the form of this communication was not so grave as it had been pictured by the press, it showed only too well the vacillations of the Bolivian Government. President Gutiérrez sought to attenúate the scope of the reply, and explained to Sr. Bello that all that had been desired was to establish the fact that up to that moment there existed no concrete agreement regarding the pending negotiations. The denial by Sr. Gutiérrez of the newspaper reports, however, revealed the secret. The Government, in its official reply, had not made the statement attributed to it by the press; but the Minister admitted that in a recent secret session of the Bolivian Congress contradictory opinions had been emitted, and that the idea predominated that a solution arrived at by the intervention of the three interested countries should be sought. It was not necessary for the Chilean diplomat to read between the lines, ñor did he endeavour to secure from the Gov- ernment new promises for consultations with prominent party leaders. The Minister of Foreign Affairs himself soon admitted that the political situation of thé country prevented any action on the part of the Government, and made difficult, even unwise, any decisión on the international problem. Chile had exhausted every effort to secure an understanding, but in December, 1919, she had to admit that the antagonistic influences that were manifesting themselves in Bolivian politics counselled suspensión o'f further advances, leaving the door open for the study of the problem at some later date. Sr. Bello, due to personal reasons, was obliged to retire from the special mission in January, 1920, receiving official testimony from the Bo- livian Government and from the Bolivian people of the sincere cordiality in which the negotiations had been conducted.

3. Military Revo- On July 12, 1920, a military revolt took lution in Bolivia July place in Bolivia that could be clearly seen to 12, 1920. be a result of the Peruvian intervention of November, 1919. The revolution was provoked by the Repub- lican party in Bolivia, headed by don Juan Bautista Saavedra. Sr. Saavedra later was elected President, replacing Sr. Gutiérrez 154 Guerra, who had maintained such cordial relations with Chile. The new adminstration, with the purpose of appealing to popular opinion, and securing the unconditional support of the army, condemned the negotiations with Chile, and demanded the restitution of the coast lost in 1879, making this demand the fundamental plank of the party program. One of the most influential members of the Executive Coun- cil of the successful revolution (the Executive Council temporarily took charge of affairs in Bolivia until the presidential elections could be held) was Sr. Escalier, who declared that the international policies of the defeated Government had failed completely, and announced the intention of the new Govern- ment of seeking the restoration of the lost coast. Despite the rectifications to these statements that Sr. Esca- lier made later in order to ameliorate their eflfects in Chile, and despite the official declarations of Sr. Saavedra to the effect that Bolivia desired to follow a policy of friendship with all her neighbours, and to respect treaties, Bolivia's representatives to the League of Nations, acting in compliance with instructions of their Government, presented the petition seeking the revisión of the Treaty of 1904, which we have discussed in Chapter XII.

4. The Executive Council and The Government set up by the revolution nwticclorps• ^ not receive the immediate recognition Declaration of the countries with accredited diplomatic Ch£¡éChÍlean representatives in Bolivia. The 17th of July d?Affaires. Sr. Saavedra, as President of the Executive Council, addressed himself to the deán of the Diplomatic Corpa seeking the recognition of the new Government. The Diplomatic Corps, following a meeting in the residence of the American Minister to Bolivia, drafted the Memorándum given below, and which was delivered to Sr. Saavedra on July 18, 1920:

"The Diplomatic Corps, desirous of advising the Gov- ernments they represent as to the present situation in Bolivia in accordance with the request made by Sr. Saavedra, respectfully solicit information as to whether 155 the Executive Council offers ampie guarantees to foreigners resident in Bolivia, and is willing to assume the obligations entered into by preoeding Governments. The Diplomatic Corps also requests details concerning events in various sections of the country, information regarding the attitude of the departmental authorities toward the new Government, and the approximate date for the election of the delegates to the Convention that is to elect a President and consider the reformation of the Con- stitution."

The presentation of this Memorándum was accompanied by the following declaration that the Chilean representative in La Paz, Sr. Rodríguez Mendoza, read in the presence of the Diplomatic Corps:

"Although in view of the declarations made to me by Sr. Saavedra on the 12th instant this statement may seem superfluous, I wish to declare explicitly that the Chargé d'Affaires of Chile in Bolivia understands by the phrase "ampie guarantees" employed in the Memorándum just read by His Excellency the Plenipotentiary of the United States that the first and most fundamental of those gnarantees is the absolute respect for existing treaties. I beg, therefore, that in the reply to the Memo- rándum of the Diplomatic Corps this point be clearly established."

The revolutionary Government hastened to supply the information and declarations sought. With regard to the point brought up by the Chilean representative, the reply of Sr. Saavedra states the following:

"The new Government will respect faithfully all the treaties and contracts signed by previous Governments as long as they have pledged the honor of the Republic, as governments, whatever the form in which they have been constituted, are only interpreters of national honor and faith."

On recognizing the Government constituted by Sr. Saavedra following his election as President of the Republic by the Na- tional Convention, the Chilean representative, on February, 1921, reiterated the declarations contained in the note of July 156 19, 1920, stating that under those conditions the Government of Chile recognized the new Government of Bolivia, and renewed the official relations between both countries, interrupted by the political movement of July 12, 1920.

5. Assembly of Despite these declarations that served to the League of Nations, Sep- cover the brusque realities of the first days, tember 28, there has been no change in the antagonistic 1921. policies of the new Government of Bolivia. Proof of this are the events that occurred in the Assembly of the League of Nations from September 7 to September 16, 1921, as related elsewhere. In these meetings of the Assembly, however, there occurred another incident which, although we regret to recall it, shows how Chile is prevented from following any other policy in her relations with the present leaders of the international policies of Bolivia other than one exacting the strict compliance of international obligations. At the meeting of the Assembly held September 28, 1921, when the Commission of Jurists presented its report on the inadmissibility of Bolivia's petition, the Chilean delegate, Sr. Agustín Edwards, desired to end that memorable incident by extending to Bolivia a generous invitation to reach an understanding by frank and direct negotiations: "Bolivia," declared Sr. Edwards, "can obtain satisfaction through direct negotiations freely conducted. Chile has never closed this door to Bolivia, and I am in a position to state that nothing would be more agreeable to us than to consider directly with her the best means by which to help in her development, What we seek is her friendship; our ardent desire is that she be happy and prosperous. This is also our interest, seeing that she is our neighbour, and her prosperity will affect ours."

We admit that this statement created a difficult situation for the Bolivian delegates. Expert diplomats, they had known how 157 to domínate their passions, and to retain the dignity demanded by such an assembly; now, however, a torrent of hatred was let loose. "Bolivia," exclaimed the Bolivian delegate, Sr. Ara- mayo, "has not been able to congratúlate herself on the results of the direct negotiations that up to the present she has held with Chile; these have always resembled the relations between the wolf and the lamb. Further- more, Bolivia will not accept the renewal of negotiations that have not borne results unless they be under the protection and sanction of a high court of justice, such as the League of Nations."

In this way Bolivia has been placed in a situation for which she alone is responsible. She went to the League of Nations with an unfriendly petition against Chile, not heeding the suggestions made to her to the effect that she should not provoke a verdict against her; she learned that treaties may be modified only by the consent of the signatory parties, and that respect for treaties is the basis of all international law, any other interpretation being against the principies of the League of Nations. On being invited by Chile to follow the regular methods employed by nations for the study and solution of the problems that affect them, Bolivia insists on her petition seeking aid from an organization that does not wish to hear her, and is not able to listen to her even if it did wish to. Bolivia is not unaware that the Government of the Argen- tine had already come to the decisión that the League is unable to consider these problems of the Pacific. In its telegraphic instructions to the delegates to the League, the Argentine Gov- ernment stated:

"If the question of the Pacific is discussed in the League, you shall argüe that this matter should be rele- gated to the interested nations. If the Assembly does not sanction our proposition, the delegation will retire."

But Bolivia preferred to provoke and secure the definite rejection of her petition. 158 6. Bolivia Rejects Although direct negotiations appear to be the Offer of Direct Negó- repugnant to Bolivia, she was quite willing tiations and to participate in the negotiations between Solicits an Invitation to Chile and Perú held at Washington following the Washing- ton Confer- the invitation of President Harding to these ence. two nations. Bolivia sought to participate in this discussion, and requested Chile to invite her. The Government of Chile was obliged to oppose such strange intervention, remind- ing Bolivia that the "negotiations pending between the Gov- ernments of Chile and Perú concern a Treaty signed by the two countries, in which Bolivia neither had, ñor has, any participation either direct or indirect." The Chilean Government also called the attention of Bolivia to the fact that the Treaty with Bolivia of 1904 had been put into effect, and fulfilled without any controversy having arisen over it, either regarding its execution or interpretation.

"Notwithstanding this," continúes the note, "the Gov- ernment of Youí Excellency has been publicly 'and solemnly invited in Geneva, and later in La Paz and Santiago, to place directly before Chile the Bolivian point of view regarding the aspiration to possess a port on the Pacific. "But in the note of November 16 Your Excellency made known to me the fact that instructions had been received to declare that the mission of Your Excellency (the mission of Sr. Macario Pinilla, in Santiago) did not embrace, for the moment, any proposition or initiative regarding the aspirations of Bolivia to secure a port on the Pacific."

Following Chile's refusal to include Bolivia in the discussion of a question concerning only Chile and Perú, Bolivia addressed herself directly to the Government of the United States, re- newing her petition to be allowed to send a representative to the "conference" with the purpose of making known her rights in the international dispute. 159 This petition of Bolivia was also refused, President Harding replying as follows on January 29, 1922:

"I have read with great interest your Excellency's telegram of January 21st, eloquently expressing your country's aspiration to secure an outlet to the sea which was lost as a consequence of the War of the Pacific, and of its desire to secure a modification of the terms of the treaty entered into with the Republic of Chile in 1904. "Your Excellency asks that in the hearing given to the dispute that Perú and Chile wish to submit to me, I will listen to the claims of Bolivia and cali your country so that it may be considered as a constituent part in solving the case of the Pacific. In reply, I beg to explain to your Excellency that the invitation which I had the honor to address to the Governments of Perú and Chile does not contémplate a hearing before me or before the Government of the United States of the matters in controversy between these Governments. "Having noted in the telegrams recently exchanged directly between the Governments of Chile and Perú that the idea of a meeting of representatives of the two countries for the purpose of reaching a settlement of the difficulties growing out of the unfulfilled provisions of the Treaty of Ancón, either directly or by arbitration, seemed acceptable in principie to both, I invited them to send representatives to Washington for this purpose. "This invitation, I am happy to state, has been accepted, and I am informed that representatives of the two countries will soon be appointed to meet in Wash- ington for the purpose of arriving at a settlement, by direct negotiations between themselves. "Your Excellency will readily understand from the foregoing that the inclusión of Bolivia in the discussion of the questions at issue between the Governments of Perú and Chile is a matter for the exclusive consideration of the two Governments concerned, and that in the circumstances I am precluded from taking the initiative you suggest. "I deeply appreciate the friendly sentiments of your Excellency's telegram and beg to assure your Excellency of the great interest of the Government and the people of the United States in the welfare and prosperity of the country over whose destines you so worthily preside." 160 Bolivia had previously also sought the assistance of Perú in an attempt to participate in a meeting to which she had not been invited. Bolivia was no more fortúnate in this attempt than she had been in others, despite the fact that she demanded such an invitation as being her right. In a note of December 24, 1921, the Government of Perú stated that the "situation in which Perú found herself could only permit her, due to reasons of international courtesy and method of procedure, to regret that the moment was not propitious to fulfill, with the sincere cooperation of Perú, the legitímate desire of our sister nation, the Republic of Bolivia." This statement does not refer to acquisition of the port of Arica by Bolivia. It refers, as the note states in a previous paragraph, to the "restitutional aspirations of Bolivia," that is, to the efforts of Bolivia to secure the restoration of the coast she ceded to Chile.

7. The Oíd It Í6 to this task that Perú, since 1920, Allies. has been inviting her former ally, Bolivia, and toward this end both nations have been directing their activities, fundamentally in agreement although apparently somewhat at variance as to the method of procedure that is to be adopted. The existence of such an agreement is confirmed by the note of March 5, 1920, sent by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Perú, don Melitón Porras, to his colleague don Carlos Gutiérrez of Bolivia, which note clearly defined the relations of Bolivia toward her ally in the Secret Treaty of 1873.

"We cordially repeat our invitation to Bolivia," writes Sr. Porras, "to aecompany us in the great fight for restitution of lost territory that we are to begin in the League of Nations against the common usurper, and to abandon definitely her intention of soliciting, before the League, the adjudgment of Arica to Bolivia."

With the insensate desire for restitution of lost territories the Government of Perú has succeeded in dragging the Bolivian statesmen of today with her. The objective of this 161 policy, which has been tried each time that there has been a possibility of an understanding between Chile and Bolivia, is too well known for it to perturb the judgment of the Bolivian nation for any length of time. The present leaders of the country will be responsible for the interruption of the work of conciliation and friendship with Chile undertaken by all the Governments and public men of Bolivia during the last forty years. These conciliatory efforts have led to the opening up of Bolivia to the world through the international railroads of Antofagasta and Arica, and the development of the interior railroads of the country.

8. Future Policy In so far as international law is concerned, o} Chile. Chile has no pending problems with Bolivia. The Treaty of 1904 having definitely settled the outcome of the War of the Pacific, Chile's solé duty is to maintain herself in the position that is hers by virtue o'f her acquired rights, the sacrifices she has made, and the concessions granted to Bolivia. Bolivia may justly aspire to sovereignty on the coast of the Pacific, so long as in order to satisfy her aspirations she re- sorts to legitímate means that will not conflict with the interests of third parties, or be in violation of existing treaties. Chile, however, cannot consent, in our opinion, to any attempt to revise the Treaty of 1904. On the contrary, the international policy of Chile should follow the strict adherence to the Treaty, and, in the spirit in which the Treaty was drafted, give to Bolivia every facility for free and ampie traffic through her ports and railroads on the Pacific coast. The sanctity of treaties, which is the fundamental principie of the League of Nations, and which constitutes a superior mandate imposed on all nations by universal concensus of opinion, is the base on which rest the rights of Chile. We may well make ours the declaration of the eminent French statesman, M. Barthou, who on April 10, 1922, said: "We cannot tolerate the revisión of any signed treaty. We consider all pacts agreed to as sacred." 162 The League of Nations was conceived as an organization destined to establish greater solidarity among nations, to cement by international law the relations among nations, and to assure respe ct for all treaties and treaty obligations. In view of the historie hour in which the League was born, it must be considered the first step in the raising of a structure that, in time, is to satisfy a real need, and fill a void that threatened human progress. The present organization, however, has given cause for serious criticism, and has not permitted the incorporation of the United States of America. The definite attitude of the Argentine Republic toward the League is also uncertain, being dependent on the approval of the amendments that Argentine proposed. Seven other nations have ofifered eleven suggestions for the reform o'f the Covenant of the League. There is also pending the question of equality of races, brought forth by the Oriental peoples, and with the possibility existing of Japan and China forcing a decisión that might seriously threaten the fundamentáis of the League. Differences more or less profound in the League itself would not be a favorable indication of lasting intelligence amongst the peoples of the earth, but fortunately these have been successfully met by the wisdom, discretion, and diplomatic tact that so far has been shown by the Council. The League's intímate connection with the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles, and its character of executor of dififer- ent mandates of the Peace Treaty, have made the existence of the League necessary for the application and fulfíllment of those provisions of the Treaty. This circumstance has made it necessary that the League, since its beginning, particípate actively in the many complica- tíons that have arisen in Europe out of the war. Despite the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles, and against all the proclaimed principies of the League, the termination of the war has been followed by an economic and commercial struggle that caused Mr. Lloyd George to describe the civilized nations of Europe as a group of mad dogs whose solé interest is the destruc- tion of each other. 163 Lord Grey, the illustrious British statesman, as Ambassador to the United States, has been able to appreciate rather fully the reasons for the failure of the United States to adhere to the League. On deploring this condition he could not hide the fact that the absence of the United States deprived the League of its universal character, and of the great moral forcé that the country of Wilson has to offer.

"Without the United States," has declared Lord Grey, "the League of Nations may be only a league of the allies to serve as a defence against the rebirth of Prus- sian militarism, or against a military school of bolshe- vism. "The great purpose of the League of Nations is to prevent the recurrence of war in the future, and to oppose, from the beginning, all increase in aggressive armament that may produce war. To secure this it should begin functioning immediately, and begin now, in the first days of peace, to establish for itself a reputation of justice, moderation, and strength. "Without the United States the League will not have an overpowering strength, neither physical ñor moral, as it will be an organization predominatingly European, and not universal, and it will be colored by the international envíes and hatreds of Europe."

Now we are witnessing the settlement of many questions by means of special conferences conducted outside of the jurisdiction of the League, in which conferences the nations have been represented by the leaders responsible for their political interests. Washington, Cannes, and Genova have taken upon themselves to lay the bases for the political and economic rehabili- tation of the world, and from that effective cooperation of powers freedom and right will result triumphant, and a new era of better life for humanity will dawn.

164 APPENDICES

SECRET SESSIONS OF THE SENATE, APRIL 2, JULY 30, AND AUGUST 2, 1879 1. Secret Session The Secretary of the Treasury declared: 1879. ' "That he did not think the charges made against the Government regarding the direction of the diplomatic relations and of the defensive preparations were justified, seeíng that it was not right to judge the attitude of the Cabinet in the past in the light of later occurrences that were not known at that time; that when the Gov- ernment of Chile occupied the northern coast it did so almost surprised, as it was not expected that Bolivia would openly vió- late a solemn Treaty that prescribed arbitration as a last resort for the settiement of any difficulties that might arise. That because of this fact, and because Chile had been occupied almost exclusively with her economic situation, Chile found herself with an army of less than two thousand men, with a fleet practically unarmed, and with the national guard discharged. That the Government of Chile, surprised by a resolution of the Gov- ernment of Bolivia, as unjust as it was unexpected, saw in the boldness of that nation indications that she was encouragéd by the knowledge of definite or probable help from another power. That this idea had predominated since the beginning in all the councils of the Government, and had determined all its actions, such as the rapid and resolute or gañiz at ion of the army, and the immediate mobilization of the navy. That the rumor regarding the existence of a treaty had also helped to bring about these resolutions, and had preoccupied the attention of the Government, as shown by the notes exchanged with our Legation in Perú since January 20, that is, before the occupation of the coast and the first conference that the Minister of Foreign Affairs had with the Peruvian Plenipotentiary, of which the Senate was aware, and in which conference the Peru- vian diplomat had declared that he knew nothing of the exist- 165 ence of the Treaty; and, finally, that in spite of all this the Government had insisted that Perú make a definite declaration concerning the existence of such a Treaty."

2. Secret Session Señor Varas, Minister of the Interior, de- 1879. ' clared: "That before taking up the various questions asked of his Department in past sessions, he thought it opportune to review briefly the progress of the war, recalling facts which, although not known to the public, he could recount if not in detail at least in substance in order to show how it had been sought to satisfy the desire for a short and victorious war. That so many important interests were affected by the war, and its progress and results might have such a strong influence on the fate of the country, that nobody could be suprised if impatience was shown to know what was being done to conduct it successfully. That the Government, as far as possible, would be glad to express openly its opinions, reporting to Congress on the operations being planned, the resources available, the difficulties that had hin- dered and were hindering progress, the measures taken to over- eóme these, etc.; but that the Senate would readily understand that frank and complete explanations regarding these matters might seriously endanger the success of the war, as it was known that the secrecy of the sessions was purely relative, and that repeated occurrences had shown that the Government could not confide in securing ahsolute reserve. That to understand the march of the war it was well to recall some of the opinions predominating during its ñrst pilases. That everybody had confidence in the superiority of the Chilean fleet over Perú's because of its personnel and equipment, and did not doubt that in an encounter it would come out victorious. That such a result would have given Chile the control of the seas, and made it impossible for Perú to protect her extended coast against our ships; also, it would have made it difficult for her to mobilize her army and concén- trate it on the points attacked by Chilean forces. That this is 166 why it was said then that the war with Perú was primarily a maritime war, and that its success lay in the hands of the navy. "That another predominant idea in those days had been that the most effective way to wage war on Perú was to deprive her of her pecuniary resources, shutting off her sources of revenue, which, so it was said, produced her ten to twelve million pesos yearly. That it was realized that this money was essential to Perú to conduct war, and that, deprived of these importan! sums Perú would be in so difficult a position that she would have to seek or accept peace. That by this means Perú would be prevented from securing the war material that she needed; and, it was added, that a nation largely dependent upon the budget could not resign itself to that situation; also, that there were many who, judging by Perú's internal troubles, expected a revolutionary movement in that country with a change of Government, which event would bring as a consequence a peaceful settlement of the international difficulties. That the exploitation of guano and nitrates constituted a most important source of revenue for Perú, and the prevention of the exportation of those materials was indicated as one of the objectives of the operations to be undertaken. "Sr. Varas further declared that the Chilean Government could not ignore these predominating opinions, in which, it must be acknowledged, there was much truth, and the influence of which had been shown by some of the Government's actions after Perú entered the war. That this was why on March 25, when doubt no longer existed regarding Perú's participation, the Minister of War in Antofagasta was notified to inform the Admiral-in-Chief, of the state of affairs, in order that he might be ready to operate against the enemy's forces immediately upon the declaration of war. That in this note it was also stated that it would be wise to give the Admiral of the fleet the freedom of action that his responsibilities demanded, especially in view of the fact that the outcome of the war depended on the success of the naval operations; and that this was also why at the beginning of April, Iquique had been blockaded, and the Rear-Admiral who had ordered the blockade had stated that 167 one of the reasons for it was to induce the Peruvian fleet to come out and engage in battle, and if these measures were not sufficient, others would be taken. "That either because Perú knew that her fleet could not successfully engage the Chileans, or because she did not wish to have the control of the seas settled by a naval battle, her fleet, since the declaration of war until the middle of May, had remained under the protection of the fortresses of Callao, the blockade of Iquique not having been aufficiently efficient to oblige the Peruvian fleet to come out. "That those two opinions of the Government had not brought about the results sought, inasmuch as the control of the seas had not been secured, ñor had the seizure of important resources through the blockade of Iquique exerted sufficient pressure on Perú to make her negotiate peace, or secured a change of Government that would facilítate a peaceful settlement. "That, aside from the illusory aspect of these policies, it was certain that if a naval engagement had been brought about the results would have been favorable to Chile; also, that it could not be denied that the blockade of Iquique had secured some results, seeing that the exportation of nitrate had been stopped, although had the control of the seas been obtained, the blockade would have been even more efficacious. "The Government, notwithstanding these opinions, prepared not only the naval forces but also the army, continued Sr. Varas. He also declared that when Chile was concerned with Bolivia only, one división to occupy Antofagasta, with part of the fleet to support it, had been considered sufficient; but when it was seen that Perú was also to take part in the conflict the greater part of the fleet had been sent north, and reinforcements dispatched to the división in Antofagasta, which, in the middle of April, numbered 5696 men. Furthermore, it was seen that an army, and not a división, was needed, and, therefore, in the first fortnight of the month a General-in-Chief had been appointed, and other measures thought necessary had been taken. "That although the country had sufficient equipment for an army larger than the one maintained annually under arms, it had not enough to provide for one growing so rapidly as to 168 meet the demands of war. That it had therefore been necessary to order by telegraph, first in February and then in March, considerable quantities of equipment, arma, and other war material, but that the conflict which now faced the country was one much greater and more serious than the one it faced in the early part of April. "Sr. Yaras further declared that he had taken office in the middle of that month, and had undertaken the direction of the war, beginning by defining its objectives and the results it should bring to the country. That his first task had been to become acquainted with what had already been done, with the resources of the nation, and with the situation of the enemy. That he was convinced that as yet naval engagements which would give the country control of the seas could not be expected, since the enemy's fleet would not leave the waters of Callao, and that the blockade of Iquique, while having certain advantages, would not, as had been supposed, forcé the enemy to terms. That it was impossible to continué in this expectant, and to a certain extent passive, situation, and that to satisfy the aspirations of the country—which sought an active and successful war—it was necessary to examine and study new operations that might be undertaken by the fleet or by the army on land, and for which the resources already mobilized or those in course of preparation would be sufficient. That with the end of the war and the final results in mind the Government had considered particularly two plans of operations, one by the navy alone and one by the army in cooperation with the navy. That to this end the note of April 25, containing the ideas of the Government, was sent to the Admiral of the fleet and to the General-in-Chief of the army, in order that they might express their opinions concerning the plan, and stipulate the localities and elements that might be employed, in view of the fact that the execution of the plan would fall to them. "The Admiral of the navy, explained Sr. Yaras, had been told that with regard to the operations to be undertaken by him, it was planned to prevent the movement of enemy ships carrying aid to the army at Iquique and other neighbouring ports, and also to prevent these expeditions from threatening our defenceless ports. He declared that in a note of May 10 169 the Admiral of the navy had made several objections to such a plan, and considered his resources insufficient to carry it out successfully; on the other hand, he had expressed himself in favor of the combined operation of the army and the navy that should be directed toward a point insufficiently guarded at that time, and which did not offer grave difficulties for the disembarkation of troops. "The General-in-Chief of the army, in a note of May 4, also had declared himself in favor of a disembarkation of troops in the enemy's territory as indicated by the Government; but he had stated, at the same time, that he considered it necessary to raise the number of men at Antofagasta from 5695—the total on April 30—to 8000, and that further supplies of ammunition be sent to him. Sr. Varas stated that orders had been immediately issued for the dispatch of additional forces, which a few days later were on their way north, together with the ammunition, although the quantity of cartridges sent was con- siderably leas than that demanded by the General-in-Chief. "Continuing his exposition, Sr. Varas declared: That as the Government foresaw possible delays in disembarking the troops as suggested, it proposed to the General-in-Chief, in a telegram dated May 10, that some isolated operations and partial disembarkations in different parts of the enemy's coast be effected, considering these operations easier to put into practice than the original plan, also asking that he get in touch with the Admiral- in-Chief. That this plan, for the carrying out of which there were sufficient resources, had been thought of in April, a telegram having been sent on the 26th of that month to the head of the división in Antofagasta, asking him for an exact statement of his resources, of those that he required, and the part of the army that might be devoted to belligerent operations. That in those days the General-in-Chief had arrived in Anto- fagasta, and that it had been thought prudent to give him time to know and organize his army, and, above all, to wait for his reply to the note sent him on April 25. That the General-in- Chief had replied that he did not consider opportune partial disembarkations which would divide the army and the attention of the leaders, while the disembarkation comprised in the principal operation indicated in the note of April 25 could 170 be effected in the time required for one of the partial disembarkations, adding that everything was ready for the expedí- tion, only further reinforcements and transports being necessary. That the same day he had been informed by telegraph that it was possible to send only a part of the ammunitions ordered, and had been asked whether with those and the stock in Anto- fagasta he could start on the expedition immediately. That in a telegram dated May 15 the General-in-Chief had replied: 'I am ready for the expedition. Without troops and other reinforcements ordered I cannot move.' "That in order to carry out the proposed plan of operations it had been necessary, first, to satisfy by whatever means possible the requirements of the General-in-Chief. That the urgency of the case made the Government decide to examine anew a considerable quantity o'f shells for cartridges that had been thought rendered useless by dampness. That, fortunately, means of using these had been discovered, and that with the cartridges manufactured of these, and part of an order that arrived at that time, it was possible to satisfy the requirements of the General- in-Chief. "That the delay in receiving this type of cartridge ordered in February and March, and the requisitions of the General in subsequent communications, had made the Government decide to order considerable quantities by telegraph to Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro, but without results, and had also caused telegrams to be sent to the Minister of Chile in London im- pressing upon him the necessity of prompt shipment of the munitions ordered. That on May 15 a telegram had again been sent to the Minister in London, and, seeing that he inquired whether the ship that was to bring the cartridges required should be delayed in order that it might also bring arms that were to be delivered the fifteenth of the following month, a reply was sent on the 21st of May as follows: Cartridge-shells urgente do not detain ship. "That aside 'from these measures taken to hasten the shipments from Europe it had been thought necessary to find out whether or not the shells required for this type of bullet could be made in this country, in order not to be dependent on the 171 contingencies of shipment. That this had been partly achieved as these shells had been manufactured successfully, although not with the speed desirable; but that, nevertheless, efforts were being made to accelerate their production, as they might serve for other needs less urgent. "That more or less during the time when the reinforcements and cartridges required were being received by the General-in- Chief, it was learned that the fleet had left Iquique for an operation of which the Government was not aware, and the absence of the fleet, until the beginning of June, had prevented carrying out the proposed plan of operations, notwithstanding that the army was supplied with the reinforcements it required. "That this plan of operations, accepted by both the Admiral and the General-in-Chief, had remained, therefore, inoperative; first, because the army could not be supplied immediately with the quantity of cartridges considered necessary for the expedition; and second, because after these had been supplied, the navy went north leaving the Government without knowledge of its whereabouts from the middle of May to the first days in June. "Sr. Varas also added that in addition to the equipment and arms ordered up to the middle of April, the Government, since April 22, had been increasing its orders for war material, tele- graphing for twice the quantity of bullets ordered in February, following a report of the General-in-Chief in which he recom- mended the purchase of fifty million rounds of ammunition, in addition to the quantity in stock in Chile and the amounts ordered, which were three times the quantity in the country. That the size of the General's requisition had called the attention o'f the Government to it, which, following consultations with experts in the matter, decided to order on May 21 only 14 million rounds. "That the Government had done everything it possibly could to place the army in a position to carry out the plan agreed upon, dictating all the measures that it considered necessary. "That on receiving news of the return of the fleet in the early part of June the Government had again given its attention 172 to hostile operations in the enemy's country. That the plan proposed toward the end of April, and which was to have been carried out about the middle of May, was inoperative because of the reasons given, and demanded certain modifications because of changes that had taken place in the enemy's territory to be attacked; the last fortnight in May, it was stated, had been used by the enemy to transport forces and arms to the points that it wished to guard, to supply them with provisions, and even to fortify some of these points, which made it necessary to consider anew this plan of operations, and to study two others that had been suggested. That as all the necessary data were not on hand, and as the operations would he carried out under the direction of the General-in-Chief and the Admiral of the fleet, the Government considered a conference with the two chiefs indispensable before coming to any definite conclusión; but as these conferences were not possible in Santiago without taking the two chiefs from their posts, it had been decided to send one of the members of the Cabinet to Antofagasta, who, with a complete knowledge of the wishes of the Government, could confer with them. That they had not been able to agree regarding the plan of operations to be undertaken, -the General preferring one of them, and the Admiral the other. That once the Minister had returned to Santiago, the Government, in view of the opinions given by the General and the Admiral and other data secured in that port, decided on the 7th instant in a general way on the operations to be undertaken, leaving to the General-in-Chief and Admiral of the fleet, who would be in charge of the operations, the selection of the best methods by which to secure the objectives of the plan. "Sr. Yaras concluded his exposition by stating that this plan of operations was the one which at present the nation was endeavouring to carry out, and Congress would understand that it was possible only to indícate in a general way the course decided on, without entering into details or specifications. But the Government could assure Congress that there were sufficient forces and supplies to carry out the operations under way, and 173 although the practical difficulties that the Admiral or General would have to overcome might delay or hinder somewhat the march of events, it was to be hoped that the plan could be carried out quickly, permitting operations in other points if the results of the first operations did not correspond to the hopes placed in it. "That this was, in short, the way in which the Cabinet had directed the war. The members of the Cabinet were convinced, declared Sr. Yaras, that time had not been lost in agreeing upon and preparing operations, either of the navy or of the army, and that the inevitable delays had been due to circumstances over which they had no control."

3. Session of "With regard to the charge made by Señor Prats to the effect that the expedition against Iquique agreed upon by the previous Cabinet had not been carried out, Señor Yaras, Minister of the Interior, declared that he had not found any data whatever regarding such an expedition, and that concerning it he had only been able to secure the prívate information given by one of the persons that had knowledge of the matter. That the only official data that had been found in the archives consisted of an order regarding the mobilization of troops dated April 11, but that the nature of this document did not justi'fy its being reported to the Senate. "With regard to this the Minister also recalled that toward the end of April he had inquired of the head of the división in the north, Sr. Sotomayor, as to the strength of the army, and that Sr. Sotomayor had replied that it consisted of only 200 men in the artillery, 200 cavalry, and 3000 in the infantry; but that there was no equipment for the mules that would be required for an expedition, and that, finally, the army that might be mobilized would be of only some two thousand men. That a few days later Sr. Arteaga, then General-in-Chief of the army, had made inquiries to the same end, and on May 14 received the 174 reply that the army consisted of 5696 men, of which number two-thirds were retw recruits, without uniforms and other equipment, which, therefore, made an expedition impossible. "That at that time the General-in-Chie'f was also warned regarding the possibility of new complications with the Argentine Republic, and that it was therefore necessary to push the hostilities, to which the General-in-Chief replied that he was not ready to march on Iquique as he required from eight to ten thousand men to do this. That in view of these facts and those recalled by his colleague, the Minister of Justice, concerning the scarcity of munitions, and the impracticability of hostile operations at that time, it would be perfectly understood that in omitting to mention the plan proposed by his antecessors he had not intended to diminish the merit of the persons that had conceived it."

The End.

175 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC AND THE NEW POLICIES OF BOLIVIA

JURIDICAL REPORTS ON THE

REQUESTS SUBMITTED BY

PERU AND BOLIVIA

TO THE

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

By JOHN W. DAVIS, LL. D.,

President American Bar Association. Former Ambassador of the United States of America to Great Britain

177 OPINION OF JOHN W. DAYIS, LLD.:

In the Matter of

The request of Bolivia for the inclusión in the Agenda of the 1921 session of the Assembly of the Bolivian demand for the application of Article 19 of the Covenant to the Treaty of Peace signed between Bolivia and Chile on October 20, 1904.

By a letter addressed to the Assembly of the League of Nations on November 1, 1920, the Bolivian delegates invoked Article 19 of the Treaty of Yersailles with a view to obtaining from the League of Nations a revisión of the treaty of peace signed by Bolivia and Chile on October 20, 1904. In support of this request, Bolivia, through her delegates, while reserving the right to offer proofs and declarations at a suitable moment, made the following assertions: 1. That the treaty was imposed upon her by forcé. 2. Failure to carry out certain fundamental articles of the treaty which aimed at securing peace, for which failure Chile was to blame. 3. That this state of affairs involved a permanent menace of war. This may be proved by the mobilization of large army corps carried out by Chile on the Bolivian frontier in spite of the fact that these countries are at peace. 4. As a result of the treaty of 1904, Bolivia is now entirely shut in and deprived of all access to the sea. The Bolivian delegates asked that their request should be placed upon the agenda of the Assembly, and having been notified that it was received too late for the approaching session, they then requested by letter of December 15, 1920, that it should be entered upon the agenda for the next session of the Assembly in 1921. The Chilean delegates so soon as the matter carne to their attention were prompt in challenging both the request itself 178 and the grounds upon which it was based. By a letter addressed to the Secretary General of the League on the 25th of November, 1920, and by subsequent letters to the President of the Assembly dated the 17th, 19th and 28th o'f December, 1920, they urged the rejection of the Bolivian request. They pointed out that the treaty in question had been concluded twenty-one years after the war to which it put a formal end; that all the obligations entered into by Chile had been without an exception carried out and completed; that Chile had no thought of war with Bolivia; that Bolivia by the very terms of the treaty had free access to the sea at the ports of Arica and Antofagasta; and, protesting that the question was not one within the competence of the Assembly, they opposed its inclusión in the agenda of the next or of any future session. They asked to have it noted that they moved the previous question with regard to the inclusión in the agenda of the Bolivian demand. The matter now standa upon the agenda of the second session of the Assembly in the following form:

"Items proposed by Members of the League.

22. Request of Bolivia, dated November lst and December 15th, 1920, for the inclusión in the Agenda of the 1921 Session of the Assembly of the Bolivian demand for the application of Art. 19 of the Covenant to the Treaty of Peace signed between Bolivia and Chile on October 20th, 1904. Chile, in letters dated 17th, 19th and 28th December, 1920, has requested that notification should be made of her opposition, by moving the 'previous question,' to the proposal of Bolivia to include this item in the Agenda of the assembly."

In this situation, the following questions of right and procedure arise:

1. Has the Assembly of the League of Nations jurisdiction under Article 19 of the Covenant to the Treaty of Versailles to 179 entertain the petition of the Bolivian Government for the re- visión of the Treaty of Peace between Bolivia and Chile of the 20th of October, 1904? 2. What is the parliamentary situation of the Bolivian request and the Chilean motion of the "previous question," under the rules of procedure adopted by the Assembly, or the general principies of parliamentary law?

Article 19 of the Convenant of the League which Bolivia eeeks to invoke is in the following language:

"The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable, and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world."

It is apparent that two distinct subjects are contemplated: (1) a reconsideration of treaties which have become inapplicable, and (2) the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world. In order to determine the right of Bolivia to invoke this article, one must first consider its meaning and interpretation. While the language used is general in character, and somewhat novel in form, it is clear that the article must be read in the light o'f established principies of international law. The Covenant of the League was not intended to set aside the rules of international conduct which have been gradually built up among the nations, or to substitute in their stead an entirely new system. It was not designed to supercede the obligations of existing treaties and contracts, ñor did the nations in agreeing to it abandon that right to negotiate agreements on their own, behalf which is an inseparable attribute of sovereignty. On the contrary, the whole design was to confirm and strengthen the rules of international law, and promote the observance of treaty obligations. It may be truly said that the sanctity of treaties is the very life-blood of the League. Indeed, as if to avoid all misapprehension, the preamble of the Covenant 180 declares in unmistakable terms that among the objects of the League are,

"The firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Govermnents, and The maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another."

It may be taken for granted, therefore, that the members of the League in agreeing to the Covenant, did not waive in any respect their right to insist upon existing treaties or to demand that any changes which might be necessary should be brought about not by exterior pressure but by direct negotiation between the contracting parties themselves. An interpretation of the Covenant which would open the door for the revisión at the request of either party of all treaties by which the rights of nations are established and upon which the peace and order o'f the world depends, would make the League of Nations an enemy of treaties rather than their guarantor, and a disturber rather than a promoter of peace. When search is made, however, within the recognized rules of international law and the language of the Covenant itself, for conditions to which Article 19 may properly be held to apply, they at once appear. In the first place, there is the familiar doctrine that all treaties are concluded under the tacit condition rebus sic stantibus and that vital changes of circumstances may justify a withdrawal from a treaty otherwise valid and binding; although the mere fact that a treaty may have become disagreeable, burdensome or onerous, will not justify an effort to escape from its obligations, for as Vattel remarks:

"If a treaty could be revoked because it is found to work injuriously, there would be no stability in the contracts of nations" (Lib. II., Ch. XII., Sec. 158).

It is the general opinion also that the clause rebus sic stantibus does not give to a state the right to liberate itself 181 from a treaty, but only to claim its release at the hand of the other party. Treaties which fall within the accepted limits of this principie may properly be said to have become inapplicable and are therefore appropriate subjects for the consideration of the Assembly under Article 19. The Covenant itself describes another class of treaties which are within the Article. In contemplation of possible obligations or understandings inconsistent with the terms of the Covenant, Article 20 specifically provides that it shall be the duty of a member of the League to take immediate steps to procure its release from any such obligations. Of such an obligation, understanding or treaty, it might properly be said that after the ratiñcation of the Covenant it had become inapplicable, and should be reconsidered or annuled. The second clause of the Article which permits the "consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world" has been truly said to be so general as to be incapable of definition. Manifestly it would be impossible to catalogue for the future all conditions by which the peace of the world might be endangered; and yet, however broad may be the interpretation of the clause, it would be a contradiction in terms to include within it treaties o'f peace solemnly negotiated and formally ratified by the contracting pardes. Especially is this true of those treaties which are fulfilled by a single act, such as the cession of territory, or whose terms have been carried out and performed; for such treaties, if\valid, naturally bring about a permanent and irrevocable state of things. Indeed, since the first clause o'f the Article deals with the revisión of treaties, it may be argued with some forcé that the second clause is not mere repetition but contemplates subjects of a different sort. Turning now to the facts involved, it appears that the Treaty of Peace between Chile and Bolivia was entered into on the 20th day of October, 1904, in pursuance of a pact of truce signed twenty years earlier on the 4th of April, 1884. During this interval the relations between Chile and Bolivia had been pacific and perhaps cordial. The treaty stipulated the cession o'f certain territory to Chile, the payment by Chile to Bolivia or to its creditors of large sums of money, and the 182 execution of certain public works. It is asserted by Chile that the treaty has been integrally executed at a cost to her of some six millions livres sterling. She professes herself ready, so soon as the time specified by the Treaty has arrived, to deliver to Bolivia the Bolivian section of the railroad from Arica to La Paz, which she was required by Article 3 of the treaty to construct. Nothing can be further than this from the situation contemplated by the clause rebus sic stantibus. Ñor is there any conflict between the treaty and the Covenant of the League which would bring it within the scopei of Article 20. The conclusión that such a situation is not within the scope of Article 19 becomes all the more clear upon consideration of the grounds put forward by the Bolivian delegates in support of their request. It is said, first, that the treaty was imposed upon Bolivia by forcé. The assertion loses forcé when confronted by the fact that the treaty was negotiated twenty years after the cessation of actual hostilities; but even were it otherwise,

"It is a general and necessary principie that duress cannot be set up against the obligation of a treaty of peace. Coercion and duress are of the essence and idea of war; and it is the understanding upon which nations go to war, that each appeals to the chances of successful coercion." (Wheaton's International Law, 8th Ed., page 722.) "A sovereign cannot dispense himself from observing a treaty of peace by alleging that it was extorted from him by fear or constraint. In the first place, if this plea were admitted, it would make it impossible for any reliance to be put upon treaties of peace; for there are few such treaties against which that plea would not be brought as a cover for bad faith. To authorize such an evasión would amount to an attack upon the common safety and welfare of nations. * * * If men could unmake at a later date contracts which they were glad to make at an earlier date, there would be no stability in their dealings with one another." (Vattel, Book 4, Chap. 4, Sec. 37).

Again, it is said by the delegates of Bolivia that there has been a failure to carry out certain fundamental articles of the 183 treaty for which failure Chile is to blame. Chile on the other hand, insists that the treaty upon her part has been fully performed and that the only points remaining to be disposed of have to do with the manner in which it is to be administered for the future. She insists that the treaty, so far as it has been carried out and consummated, has created rights that cannot now be disturbed. Without assuming to pass upon the accuracy in point of fact of the one claim or the other the remedy, if any, which is open to Bolivia is not a revisión of the treaty, but an enforcement of its terms as written. The Bolivian delegates assert that the state of affairs involves a permanent menace of war. Chile upon her part avers that she has no hostile intention whatever against Bolivia and desires nothing more than the maintenance of the treaty in strict accordance with its terms. Obviously, the mere fact that one party to a treaty becomes dissatisfied with its terms, cannot be treated as a "condition whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world," since this would mean nothing less than a possible reopening of any and every international covenant. Finally it is said that by virtue of the treaty Bolivia is now entirely shut in and deprived of all access to the sea. It might well be answered by Chile that this situation is one which Bolivia must have contemplated when she signed the treaty ceding her entire littoral, and that there is no principie in international law which gives her the right to nullify the treaty for this reason. Moreover, in order to protect herself against such a deprivation the treaty expressly gives to Bolivia free access to the seaports of Arica and Antofagasta, and requires Chile to construct a railroad at her own expense for the use of Bolivian commerce. The conclusión seems inevitable that the request entered by Bolivia does not fall within the scope of Arricie 19 of the Covenant of the League, and that the Assembly is without competence to consider the matter. It should be expressly noted that the request of Bolivia is based solely upon Arricie 19 of the Covenant and can draw no support whatever from Arricie 12, 13 and 15 of the Covenant, which provide a method of procedure entirely differ- 184 ent from that which Bolivia has seen fit to adopt. To cali those arricies into action, it would be necessary for Bolivia to define the exact matters in dispute between Chile and herself, and to afford the latter an opportunity to determine whether the subject could be recognized as one suitable for submission to arbitration. Ñor do those arricies in any event confer any power upon the Assembly of the League except in cases referred to it by action of the Council.

II.

In discussing the parliamentary questions which arise, it is not necessary to consider the situation which would be presented if the demand of Bolivia for the revisión of the treaty had already been entered upon the agenda. That step has not been taken. The specific request is that the Assembly may include in its agenda the Bolivian demand for the application of Article 19 of the Covenant to the treaty between Bolivia and Chile. This question must be disposed of before there can be any decisión as to the course to be taken in regard to the Bolivian demand after the Assembly has determined to entertain it. Chile, acting under Rule 18, Clause 1, o'f the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, has moved the previous question. It becomes important to determine the precise scope and effect of this motion. The rules of procedure of the Assembly were declared by the Committee which framed them to be based, among others, upon the rules of procedure in forcé in several parliaments which were considered, and were inspired

"by the principies which are in forcé in different countries of the world and which have in their favor the experience of centuries. Such are the provisions * * * for the suspensory previous question * • * " (Re- port by M. Ferraris, Nov. 30, 1920.)

The rules and practice of the various parliamentary bodies in reference to this motion are not entirely uniform, but the history of the motion itself, the terms in which it is referred 185 to by the Committee, and the practice in the majority of countries, make its effect and purpose clear. It is said to have been, introduced originally in England in 1604 for the purpose of suppressing subjects of a delicate character which might cali forth observations of a dangerous tendency. Its object is to withold from the decisión of the House a motion that has been proposed from the Chair, by a motion which compels the House to decide in the first instance whether the original motion shall or shall not be submitted to the vote of the House. In the House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor puts the question "whether the original question be now put." In the Gommons the question proposed on this motion is "that that question be not now put." A negative vote in the one case or an affirmative in the other, according to the form of the question, will prevent the House from considering the original question. (Law and Usage of Parliament, by Sir Thomas May, page 252 and notes; Procedure of the House of Gommons, by Josef Redlich, page 227; Parliamentary Procedure in the Dominion of Cañada, by Sir John George Bourinot, page 326.) When first introduced into the United States of America, the motion for the previous question was understood in its original sense. In time, however, it has become diverted from the original purpose of suppressing the main question, and under rules adopted in Congress and in other assemblies is chiefly used for suppressing debate. The object of the mover is to obtain a decisión that the main question be now put, whereupon debate immediately ceases, and the main question comes to a vote. A negative decisión of the previous question, on the other hand, is considered to leave the main question under debate until otherwise disposed of. (Rules of Proceed- ing and Debate in Deliberative Assemblies, Cushing, page 46; V. Hinds Precedents 5445; Jefferson's Manual, Sec. XXXIV.) In France the motion appears to have preserved its original purpose; its object being to declare that there shall be no further discussion. According to the rules of the Senate, the previous question is pronounced without debate and the principal question is thereby disposed of, although in the Chamber of Deputies it is said to be a moot point whether debate may take place on the previous question itself. (Summary 186 of Rules and Procedure of Parliaments; Reginald Dickinson, p. 231; Traité Pratique de Droit Parlementaire, G. Pondrá and E. Pierre, p. 663.) In Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Spain a similar use of the previous question is believed to prevail. Clearly it is such a use which was contemplated by the Committee on Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in describing it as "the suspensory previous question," and in providing by Rule 18, Clause 3, for a separate and independent motion for the closure of debate. By universal practice the motion for the previous question is put to vote before the principal question, and must in every case be disposed of by the parliamentary body itself before any decisive action on the main question can be taken. The Assembly, therefore, will be first confronted with the motion by Chile of the previous question, to wit, that the motion arising on the request of Bolivia for the inclusión in the agenda of the Bolivian demand be not now put. A decisión in the affirmative will evidence the intention of the Assembly to proceed no further in the matter; and in view of what has already been said on the subject of the incompetency of the Assembly, to entertain the Bolivian demand, the previous question should be carried. Article 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure reads as follows:

"The Assembly shall not decide ítems on the agenda in full meeting until a report of a committee upon them has been presented and circulated, unless the Assembly itself by a two-thirds majority determines otherwise."

In the opinion of the undersigned, this paragraph neither demands ñor authorizes the reference to a committee of the motion for the previous question. It refers to decisions which the Assembly must také on the merits of propositions pending before it, and is intended to prevent hasty action upon matters of substance. It cannot be taken to tie the hands of the Assembly in matters of parliamentary procedure. The motion for the previous question is one which must necessarily be decided by the body itself. So fari as I am aware, there is no precedent in the practice of any State for the reference 187 of such a motion to a committee. The motion on the part of Bolivia is simply that her demand may be included in the agenda, and until, by vote of the Assembly, the original demand has been formally placed on the agenda of the meeting, any reference of the subject to a committee would be premature. If, therefore, a motion should be made to refer either the Bolivian request for inclusión or the Chilean motion for the previous question to a committee, a point of order would lie under Rule 15, paragraph 4, and should be sustained. By Article 5 of the Covenant of the League, all matters of procedure may be decided by a majority of the members of the League represented at the meeting. All other questions, except where otherwise expressly provided, require unanimous agreement. Classifying the questions which the instant situation presents, it would seem that the request of Bolivia to place its demand upon the agenda and the motion of Chile for the previous question, are both matters of procedure which a / majority can decide. On the other hand, the demand of Bolivia that the Assembly advise a reconsideration of the Treaty of 1904, is a matter of substantive right and no such advice could be given by the Assembly except by unanimous vote. The fact that the negative vote of Chile would be sufficient to defeat the demand, is additional proof that the case is not one of the character contemplated by Article 19.

III.

To sum up, it is the opinion of the undersigned:

1. That the Bolivian demand for the application of Article 19 of the Covenant to the Treaty of Peace signed between Bolivia and Chile October 20, 1904, is not within the competency of the Assembly.

2. The motion of Chile for the previous question should be sustained.

New York, U. S. A. July 28, 1921. 188 OPINION OF JOHN W. DAYIS, LLD.:

In the Matter of

The demand heretofore presented by Perú that the Assembly of the League of Nations re- consider and revise the treaty of October 20, 1883, between Chile and Peni.

On the first day of November, 1920, the Peruvian Delega- tion to the Assembly of the League of Nations, by letter addressed to the Secretary General, requested the Assembly which was to meet at Geneva on the 15th of that month to "recon- sider and revise the treaty of October 20, 1883, betwéen Chile and Perú." In making this request, Perú specifically invoked Articles 15 and 19 of the Treaty of Yersailles. In support of her contention Perú asserted that the treaty of 1883, which took from her the Department of Tarapacá, was imposed and maintained by forcé and had not been carried out by Chile in its essential provisions; that the occupation of the provinces of Tacna and Arica was to be temporary, and was to be terminated subject to a plebiscite in 1894; that since that time Chile had remained in occupation of that territory by forcé of arms, from time to time expelling Peru- vians not only from the provinces above mentioned, but also from the Department of Tarapaca. It was averred that the "agreement which Perú is desirous of having reconsidered and amended involves a serious danger of war; the most recent event being the forceable expulsión of Peruvians from the conquered and occupied provinces, and the mobilization of the Chilean army, which has been concentrated on the frontier of Perú and Bolivia." It was stated that the request was submitted in agreement with Bolivia, the two countries being bound together by the history and circumstances of this question. To this letter the Secretary General was forced to reply that the request had been received too late to place the ques- 189 tion upon the provisional agenda of the Assembly. Where- upon the Peruvian Delegation, by letter of December 2, withdrew the request it had made reserving at the same time the right to submit its dispute with Chile to the League at a later date. The Chilean Delegation, so soon as the matter carne to its attention, was prompt to challenge both the request submitted by Perú and the grounds alleged in its support. By a letter to the Secretary General of November 25, 1920, the Chilean Delegation denied that the request presented by Perú was within the contemplation of Arricies 15 and 19 of the Covenant, which were invoked by the Peruvian Government. They asserted the incontestable validity of the Treaty of 1883, and denied that the failure to hold the plebiscite therein provided for was in any way the fault of Chile. They also denied any hostile intention or act toward the Peruvian Government. This letter provoked a reply to the Secretary General by the Peruvian Delegation ori the 14th of December, 1920, which the Chilean Delegation answered in its turn by a letter simi- larly addressed on the 17th of December of that year. While the matter is not at present on the agenda of the coming session of the Assembly, the Peruvian Delegation in withdrawing their request, expressly reserved the right to renew it. Under these circumstances, the question arises whether the Assembly of the League would be competent to consider such a request if again presented by the Peruvian Delegation.

By an opinion of even date herewith, the undersigned has expressed his views concerning a request of similiar character presented to the Assembly of the League by the Bolivian Government. What was said in that opinion in reference to the incompetency of the Assembly to entertain such a reqnest, and more especially to advise under Article 19 of the Covenant the revisión of the Treaty of Peace between Bolivia and Chile may be taken mutatis mutandis and without repetition to apply 190 to the request of Perú. The Peruvian demand, however, differs from the demand presented by Bolivia in that it invokes not only Article 19 of the Treaty of Versailles, but Article 15 as well. It is necessary, therefore, to consider in this opinion whether the reliancei placed by Perú upon Article 15 is well founded in the present case. Under Article 15, "if there should arise between members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture" which is not submitted to arbitration in accordance with Article 13, the members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. There is no warrant under this Article for a direct approach to the Assembly in any of the contingencies to which the Article refers. The agreement on the part of the members of the League is that they will submit their disputes to the Council and the manner in which this shall be done and the steps which the Council shall take thereafter are set forth in detail. It is true that after submission the Council may at its own motion or at the request of either party refer any such dispute to the Assembly. The reference, however, must be made by the Council and it is not the act of either of the parties to the dispute. Until such a reference has been made no jurisdiction whatever attaches under Article 15 to the Assembly. For this reason, as well as for those given in the opinion heretofore referred to, it is the view of the undersigned that the demand presented to the Assembly by Perú is inadmissible.

New York, U. S. A. July 28, 1921.

191