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Foreword Between The The The 912 The 1965–1969 by Dr. Wolfgang the Difficult Genesis Goes Mystery – 912: Porsche Worlds Birth of the Public The 912 Year by Year of the 901 902/912 in Motor- Compiled by Rick Becker sport contents

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The Targa Porsche Porsche The Number Road to A Few Acknowledge- Bought by 912 E – for of Prototypes Recognition Details on ments, Elke Sommer The Stopgap Beginners Remains by Rick Becker the 912 Art Credits, in February 1967 912 E a Riddle Bibliography by Hans Neubert

For many years, the type 912 was considered the stepchild of Por- Foreword sche history. The interior was too spartan, the four-cylinder boxer engine too starved of performance — or so runs the opinion of DR. WOLFGANG some Porsche connoisseurs. Here I would like to disagree, because PORSCHE I myself have many good and beautiful memories of the 912. In the spring of 1965, at the age of 22, I received from my father Ferry a signal-red , the second vehicle of this type to be built. I can still remember well the characteristic engine noise of the 90 hp four-cylinder. I drove my 912 countless times from to Vienna, where I began my studies at the Hochschule für Welthandel (now the Vienna University of Economics and Business) in 1965.

The 912 was a great success for the Porsche company. With a base price of 16 520 Deutschmarks, it was positioned to be significantly more affordable than, say, the more expensive 911 that cost at least 21 900 DM. Although it was only in the model lineup for four years, the 912 evolved into a real bestseller. With 28 333 coupes and 2 562 Targas, its sales figures far outperformed its big brother, the 911. For me, this success came as no surprise at that time, because the interplay of body and suspension with the lightweight 1.6-liter four-cylinder was incredibly harmonious. And with a top speed of 185 km/h, it was a pretty fast car for the second half of the Sixties.

I am very pleased that a writer as renowned as Jürgen Lewan- dowski has now taken up the history of the Porsche 912. As a long- time historian of the Porsche brand, he is more than predestined for this purpose. His extensive research and numerous visits to our historical archives in Zuffenhausen have brought many new findings to light that are likely to be just as interesting for laymen as experts. I hope you enjoy reading them.

Dr. Supervisory Board Chairman of Dr. Ing. h.c. F. Porsche AG The Genesis of the The car 902/912 that would save the In order to understand the history of Porsche, it is important to state clearly company again and again that, in the 1950s and was created 1960s, this was a very small firm run in a rather intuitive way without long-term as a b y- planning. While, ten years earlier, was still wondering if he would product be able to sell the 500 planned vehicles, one decade on, his company had grown into a sizable concern and had already achieved thousands of successes on the race track. Anyone who drove a Porsche just once was generally besotted with the brand for years and decades to come.

this is what 912 coupe and targa pro- duction looked like in porsche factory ii. pageo45 All of this unleashed an onslaught for which Ferry Porsche and his team were CEO from outside the family. He had expertly driven relatively ill-prepared. the cooperation with Porsche and maximized volumes, turnover and profits. However, when it came to the The search for a successor to the 356 had also turned out far more protracted production tooling for the 901, the enthusiasm evapo- and difficult than planned. It would ultimately be no less than seven years rated. Karl Ludvigsen wrote on the topic: “When until the 901 finally stood at the Frankfurt Motor Show – and then interested faced with the need to increase their investment in customers had another 15 months to wait before the first vehicles were actu- the company, the Reutter heirs balked. Wary of even ally delivered. In parallel to the development and refinement of the produc- deeper involvement they decided, on the advice of tion vehicles, the company also had to organize its motorsport activities – the their manager, to look for a buyer for the coachbuild- success of which perfectly underpinned the company’s sporty reputation – ing branch of the company in Zuffenhausen. They build race cars, attend races, coordinate race dates and deal with the large kept the original building on the Augustenstrasse in number of customers who, by using the products from Zuffenhausen, built Stuttgart, forming there Recaro GmbH and Company the brand’s reputation with their own money. to continue making and adjusters.”

But Porsche had another problem to solve. At coachbuilding company Reut- Porsche was the obvious candidate for acquiring Reut- ter – where chassis and bodyshells were built – it was becoming increasingly ter in Zuffenhausen. The decision to buy was a difficult difficult to finance the investment necessary for the production of the 901. one, and Ferry Porsche spent a long time deliberating These were costs that Reutter did not particularly want to take on, because it. “We spent millions, and everything stayed the same Reutter senior and junior had both died in the war and the eight remain- as it was. We had to make an investment in something ing Reutter heirs, seeing themselves less as entrepreneurs, had appointed a that brought us nothing new,” he said, and lashed out

built to the design of architect rolf gutbrod – factory ii, photographed here in 1965.

pageo46 that they had previously been able to buy the necessary volumes. That was one of the main reasons why Ferry Porsche – albeit with- bodyshells from Reutter and had always been satis- out any great enthusiasm – took over coachbuilder Reutter & Co. GmbH. If fied with them. In addition, German tax law made it he had not done so, it would have been highly likely that another major com- difficult for Porsche to raise the capital necessary for pany – Mercedes-Benz? – would have stepped in, leaving Porsche with even an acquisition of this size. “Two thirds of our profits less production capacity. The acquisition of Reutter may have secured the always went to the state,” said Ferry Porsche. supply of bodyshells, but it did not facilitate an increase in absolute volumes. Another solution had to be found. In the end, however, Porsche bought Reutter in July 1963. It changed little in Zuffenhausen. The Reutter Reutter had already started work on the design of the 901 and preparations factory remained as a standalone unit and continued to for its series production at the end of 1961 – but problems began to arise. So be managed by employees who saw themselves more as Ferry Porsche had to turn again to Wilhelm because of capacity Reutter than as Porsche people. Porsche was neverthe- bottlenecks at Reutter – where the groundwork for the 901 production was less able to make a slight saving. Previously, sales of already underway. Karmann was still building the 356 C/SC at this point, but bodyshells from Reutter to Porsche had been subject to there was plenty of capacity at Osnabrück to take on construction of complete taxation of four percent; this disappeared after the sale. 901 bodyshells as of 1963. This at least solved this particular problem and, It was a miniscule relief compared with the extremely from that point on, those in charge at Porsche, Karmann and Reutter met expensive acquisition of the Reutter coachworks and increasingly often in Zuffenhausen to its 1000 employees. At the end of 1963, Porsche itself reach agreement on progressing the employed only slightly more – 1372 to be exact. preliminary work being carried out on the new project. It was after one “We spent millions – In addition to the costs of the Reutter takeover, Porsche of these many meetings – on May and everything also spent a further six million Deutschmarks in 1963 10, 1962 – that the model designa- stayed the same on new buildings and production equipment – more tion 901 turned up for the first time as it was. But than twice as much as in the previous year. This in correspondence one week later, Reutter had to expenditure was in preparation for the production of albeit initially enhanced with the T 8 be bought” the 901, the start-up costs for which stood at around designation in brackets, just to make 15 million Deutschmarks. These impending costs clear to all which model was being were one of the main reasons why the Formula 1 pro- discussed. It was also around this time gram was not continued in 1963, despite its reasonable that the type 902 first appeared – a clear indication that consideration was results in 1962. And last but not least, the company being given to a second, simpler and less expensive variant. had also acquired a large piece of land in nearby Weis- sach, where it had started to build its new test center. Thus a number of problems were solved – Reutter could concentrate in Porsche was being squeezed from several sides – it was peace on preparations for series production of the 911, while Karmann in a good thing the team was so motivated and that the the meantime continued building the 356 C and SC, bringing Porsche the many development contracts were so lucrative. revenues that helped finance the company during the difficult transition to the 911. Karl Ludvigsen wrote on this period of transition: “Karmann prices However, the rapid development had also led to other for low-volume bodies were never the cheapest in Europe, but only Karmann problems. It was becoming increasingly difficult to could offer the quality insisted on by Porsche.” And this solution had a second find companies able to deliver bodies-in-white in the benefit – because Karmann had not only relieved Porsche of the production quantities required to meet the continuously rising of the final 356 models, but also started building 911 bodies in parallel, the

pageo47 the engine plant supplied the proven 356 four-cylinder not only for the 356 and the 912, but also as an industrial engine.

pageo48 projects had to wait in line behind it. However, in order to make it happen “We and to finance it – after the timing plan ran out of control – it was necessary to keep building the 356, despite this not having been the plan. The 902, made which would later become the 912, was therefore relatively unimportant at the time – to put it somewhat casually. Added to that was the fact that many in the company were not especially fired up about a 911 with a 356 engine – Fer- the 912 dinand Piëch in particular. He knew the problems, writing on the subject in his Auto.Biographie: “An unfortunate problem within the company at the time because was the fluctuating sales figures for the ‘true’ Porsche, i.e. the six-cylinder. To rescue the situation, a four-cylinder project was born in the shape of the 912, sales which was pushed out in a hurry after the 911.” And Peter Falk, who started with Porsche in 1959 as a test engineer and was head of race car development wanted from 1964 until 1969, before later becoming head of racing, recalls the model with very little enthusiasm: “We made the 912 because sales wanted it – not it – and because we were impressed by this mixture of old and new. We had a new car with a new engine and had to implant old technology into it. The 912 nevertheless had one advantage – thanks to the 911 chassis, its low weight and that’s better axle-load distribution, it drove better than the 911.”

the only Those involved naturally quickly realized that the “fluctuating sales figures” were not least due to the dramatic price increase – and they also knew exactly reason” that, with the market launch of new top model, now renamed the 911, pro- duction of the now outdated-looking 356 had to end as quickly as possible. In the absence of alternatives, it was therefore necessary to turn to the 356’s proven four-cylinder for the entry model. This was a solution that could be adopted with some confidence, as this engine had already proven itself very well in the various prototypes during the development phase. Unpleasant sur- prises were therefore unlikely.

However, converting the 901 into the 902 was not that straightforward. For one thing, the engineers around Ferry Porsche and Ferdinand Piëch had Osnabrück firm was then able to keep on producing. enough on their hands adapting the four-cylinder engine from the 356 SC to As a result, Karmann built not only a large number its new surroundings – never mind optimizing the ride and suspension tuning of bodies-in-white for the 911, but also, from 1967 in parallel. And for another, it was considerably more difficult than expected onward, complete 912 vehicles. Ultimately, a total of to slim down the not exactly inexpensive 911 technology and cut its cost suf- 21 778 units were built in Osnabrück. ficiently to achieve a sales price that truly differed from that of the 911.

Today, we should look back on those times thus: The It wasn’t until the end of 1962 that serious work began to develop the little new type 901 had top priority – it was the company’s brother to the 911 – until this point, all attention had been focused on produc- future. To realize it as quickly as possible, all other tion readying the 911, the first units of which were delivered to the domestic

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a rare sight – four porsche 912s, ranging from perfectly restored to absolutely original and completely unrestored, take a drive along the back roads.