R. V. Stewart Hyson M. A. Degree ABSTRACT Department of Political

ABSTRACT

R. V. stewart Hyson M. A. Degree Department of Political Science McGill University August, 1971

GONDITIONS WHICH PREVENT THE ELECTORAL SUCCESS OF "THIRD PARTIES" IN THE MARITIME PROVINCES

This thesis examines the Maritime Provinces, demon-

strating,the conditions which have proved not to be conducive

v to the electoral success of third parties in this region of

Canada.

Four different theories on the rise of third parties

are analyzed and then applied to the Maritimes. It is thereby

possible to see which theory's criteria are the most applicable

and accurate in explaining the success of third parties in gen-

eral, and, more particularly, the failure of third parties in

,.-l. the Maritime Provinces.

The industrial area of Cape Breton county has proven

to be an exception to the general pattern since "left-wing"

third parties have consistently received substantial support

in this area.

Thus, by referring to the Cape Breton case, it is pos-

sible to reach a conclusion as to why third parties have not

been electorally successful in aIl other areas of the Maritime

region. CONDITIONS WHICH PREVENT THE ELECTORAL

SUCCESS OF 'THIRD PARTIES' IN THE

MARITIME PROVINCES

./ R. V. Stewart Hyson

1•• A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research;· McGill University, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts

Department of Political Science

McGill University

r10ntreal

~ugust, 1971.

@ R. V. stewart Hyson 1972 FAILURE OF THIRD PARTIES IN THE MARITIME PROVINCES ~: ... '

PREFACE

It is not until one actually sets about to write a

sizeable piece of work, such as a ·thesis, that one really

appreciates the amount of assistance, guidance, and direction,

from others that is necessary to make the work a fait accompli.

This has certainly been the case in the writing of

this thesis.

To start with, there were the three provincial Legis-

lative Libraries, and the three provincial Chief Electoral

Officers, who greatly assisted in the attainment of the offi-

cial electoral returns in time for the complet ion of this

thesis.

Then, there was the National Office of the NDP which

granted access to the CCF Files in the Dominion Archives of

Canada~ the material within these Files provided a background

understanding of the problems encountered by the CCF in its

efforts to win electoral support, as weIl as of the aspira-

tions of the people 'involved with the party's struggle.

Also, the permission of the Halifax Herald Ltd. to

use the microfilm file on past i~sues of its newspaper was

most welcomed.

ii A special thanks"goes out to Professor A. Adamson,

Acadia University, who was instrumental in getting my research underway: suggesting people to contact and writing letters of reference. There were also the very valuable information, assistance, and suggestions, offered by the peo- pIe whom l corresponded with and/or interviewed, as weIl as that offered by personal friends and class-mates.

Finally, and most importantly, there was my thesis director, Professor M. Stein, who contributed substantially to the completion of this thesis. From the very beginning,

Professor Stein worked diligently to ~~yelop this thesis by offering constructive criticisms and suggestions.

iii , • Il, '~,

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PREFACE. • • • . • . • • • ii

LIST OF DIAGRAM AND TABLES • vi

Chapter

l INTRODUCTION 1

II A REVIEW AND CRITIQUE OF THE LITERATURE ON 'THIRD PARTIES' ••.•. 10

III THE TRADITIONAL TWO-PARTY SYSTEM WHICH EXISTS IN THE MARITIME PROVINCES 35

IV MARITIME POLITlCAL ETHOS AND THE LACK OF THIRD PARTY ELECTORAL SUPPORT. 78

V ECONOMIC CONDITIONS WITHIN THE MARITIMES AND THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MARITIMES AND CENTRAL CANADA: WHY THERE HAS BEEN AN ABSENCE OF CLASS OR GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS •...•••• 119

VI THE ABSENCE OF A STRONG SOCIO-ECONOMIC MOVEMENT IN THE MARITIMES. • •••• 155

VII SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS •• 183

Appendices

A Percent of Vote for Each Party, in Each New Brunswick Provincial Constituency (1920-1970). • • • • . • • . • • . • • • • • • 201

B Percent of Vote for Each Party, in Each Nova Scotia Provincial Constituency (1920-1970) • • 205

iv - 1

Appendices (Continued) Page

C Percent of Vote for Each Party, in Each P.E.l. Provincial Constituency (1923-1970). • • • . . • • • • • • 211

D Percent of Vote for Each Party, in Each New Brunswick Federal Constituency (1921-1968) • ...... 215

E Percent of Vote for Each Party, in Each Nova Scotia Federal Constituency (1921-1968) • ...... 219

F Percent of Vote for Each Party, in Each P'.E.l. Federal Constituency (1921-1968) ••••••••• 224

G Total lndividual Membership Within The Nova Scotia NDP. 226

BlBLlOGRAPHY • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • .• 228

v LIST OF DIAGRAM AND TABLES

Page Diagram

1 Mode1s for the Rise of Third Parties . • • •. 34

Tables

1 Party Vote in Federal Elections for Prince Edward Island, 1921-1968, by Percentage . . • . • • • • • • • • • 39

2 Party Vote in Federal Elections for ~ova Scotia, 1921-1968, by Percentage .•••. 40

3 Party Vote in Federal Elections for New Brunswick, 1921-1968, by Percentage. 41

4 Party Vote in Provincial Elections for Prince Edward Island, 1923-1970, by Percentage • • • • . • . 46

5 Party Vote in provincial Elections for Nova Scotia, 1920-1970, by Percentage. 47

6 Party Vote in Provincial Elections for New Brunswick, 1920-1970, by Percentage. 48

7 Per Cent of Gainfu11y Occupied, 10 Years of Age and Over, in Each Occupation ~~oup, for the Maritimes Provinces, Alberta, and Saskatchewan, in 1921 and 1931 • • . • • . 123

vi CHAPTER l

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to define the conditions, and account for the factors, which hinder the development and electoral success of "third parties" in the Maritime Provinces of Canada.

The reasoning behind this objective is as follows.

Although a IIthird party" has never been electorally successful in the Ma,ri:times, there has never been an attempt to systemati cally explain this phenomenon. Many Maritimers who are polit ically aware of the politics of the region will offer valuable suggestions as to why "third parties" have remained so weak.

However, these suggestions have not been analyzed by any polit ical scientist or by anyone else.

For example, there have been three major books on

Maritime politics and they do not deal to any great extent with the activities of third parties. These three books only mention the number of votes and seats that minor parties have won; also, they offer sorne very valuable suggestions as to why third par ties have failed, but the authors go no further than that. 2

J.M. Beck's The Government 0 f Nova Scot1a,1 an d F . Mac K' 1nnon , s

The Government of Prince Edward Island2 are both historical accounts of the development of the political institutions and processes, and of the two major parties, in Nova Scotia and

Prince Edward Island respectively. H.G. Thorburn's Politics in 3 New Brunswick accounts for the development of the two major parties, pOlitical behaviour, and the pOlitical participation of the English-speaking and French-speaking groups in New

Brunswick. Other literature on Maritime politics also neglects such an analysis of third parties, only briefly mentioning (if at aIl) the fact that third parties have never been successful in this region of Canada.

It is probably just because of the low saliency of

"third parties" in the Maritime provinces that no analysis of these parties, and of the reasons behind their failure, has been made. Therefore, this thesis will be an attempt to fill this void in the literature on Maritime politics.

lJ.M. Beck, The Gov.ernment of Nova Scotia (Toronto,1957). Pages 168, 169 deal with third parties.

2F • MacKinnon, The Government of Prince Edward Island (Toronto, 1951). Pages 248, 249 deal with third parties.

3H •G • Thorburn, Politics in New Brunswick (Toronto, 1961). Pages 102-106, inclusive, deal with third parties. · ",. 3

Before continuing, it is first necessary to explain the

scope of this investigation. Within this thesis, as in most

other literature on the Canadian party system, the term "third

party" will be appliedto any political party other than the

Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties. Such parties as

the Social Credit party, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federa-

tion (C.C.F.), the New Democratie Party (N.D.P.) ,the progres-

sive party, and the various provincial United Farmers parties,

fall under the label of "third party" •

These third parties have been electorally successful in

one or more of the Canadian provinces, except for the Maritime

provinces and Newfoundland, since the first World War. The war

was instrumental in creating the factors which ended the two-

party system, and which led to the growth of third parties. The

formation of the Union Government and the resulting split within

the Liberal party, the deep cleavage-cutting issues caused by

the war, the economic recession of the immediate post-war years,

and the growing economic disparities among the various regions

of the country, tended to shatter traditional loyalties and pat-

terns of behaviour. From this turmoil, there immediately emerged

the United Farmers in several provinces and the Progressive party

at the federal level. And ever since, third parties have been - . 1 ,L.. successful in every province in Canada except for the Maritimes 4 and Newfoundland. Hence, the electoral statistics and material that will be analysed are those for the elections since the

First World War.

Similar to the three Maritime Provinces (Nova Scotia,

New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island), Newfoundland has never had a successful third party. However, since this province did not enter Confederation until 1949 and thus has not had a com mon history, or a cornmon development of its party system, with the rest of Canada, it will not be considered in this thesis.

The Maritime Provinces, on the other hand, have been in Canada for about a hundred years or more, during which time they have been subject to most of the same major economic, social, cul tural, and political forces, as the other provinces of Canada.

Also, their party systems were similar to those in the other provinces and to the national party system up to World War Ii but, since that time, the Maritimes have not deviated from sup porting the two major parties, while the other provinces have.

"Electoral success" will be defined as a provincial party being elected to office, forming the chief opposition party, having five or more candidates elected, or attaining 15 per cent (or more), of the vote in at least two consecutive elec tions. In federal elections, a party will be considered to be electorally. successful when it has at least one-fifth of a 5 province's Members of Parliament, or attains 15 per cent (or more) of the vote in at least two consecutives elections. To sorne extent, these conditions have been arbitrarily sélectedi however, upon examining Canadian electoral statistics, it seems that before a third party can establish itself anq/or displace one of the major parties these conditions must be met. 4 A brief glance at the federal General Election returns indicates that parties which attain less than 15 per cent of the vote, in a paE\,ticular province arid over several elections, generally do not have any of their candidates elected and are susceptible to easily losing what support they do have. On the other hand, parties which attain more than 15 per cent of the vote and at least one-fifth of a province's M.P.'s, over at least two consecutive elections, tend to be able to maintain or improve their positions in succeeding elections. It would therefore seem that a party is not able to attract and establish a solid base of loyal and dedicated supporters unless these conditions are attained. Instead, t~ party's supporters become disillusioned about the apparent "wastage" of their efforts, resources, and supporti then they tend to turn to sorne other

4For an easy comparison, see H.A. Scarrow, Canada Votes, (New Orleans, 1962), Tables 12, 16, 20, 24, 28, 32, 36, 40, 44, and 48. ~;:- 6

~.: party such as a more established party whi~h can "deliver"

returns for their support. Once a third party achieves sub-

stantial electoral support anàVor becomes either the governing

party or the chief opposition party, over at least two consec-

utive elections, it seems to be able to establish and maintain

a dedicated group of supporters. And it is usually able to

di"splace the weaker major party in the province's party system. 1. By treating success as electoral success, there is no

attempt to obscure the fact that third parties may be suc cess-

fuI in other ways. Third parties are quite often successful

in forcing the two major parties to adopt and to implement

socio-economic reforms. But it is difficult to assess just how

much influence third parties have, because there are other

factors which cause the major par~ies to adopt reforms (such

as agitation from their own rank and file, technological break- .. throughs, and change in party leadership). AIso, this thesis

is primarily dealing with the conditions which determine whether

or not a third party will develop and be electorally success-

fuI, ana:not with the conditions under which a third party may

be successful in bringing about socio-economic reforms.

Finally, within this introduction, it is necessary to

expand upon the methodology to be used. The first,step will be

a review and critique of the literature on the ri se of third 7 parties in other parts of Canada. From this there will evolve a general theory of the necessary conditions conducive to the

rise of electorally successful third parties. Then, in the

following chapters, the general hypothesis that these condi-

tions do not exist in the Maritimes (or are overshadowed by other conditions which are peculiar to the Maritimes) will be analyzed by investigating the Maritime situation. 5 The primary sources of information have been the exist-

ing material on Canadian third parties, Maritime party politics, and historical-sociological works on the Maritimes. The follow-

ing ,sources of information were also heavily relied upon in the writing of this thesis: electoral statistics, data on the Mari- times' economy, and figures on population composition and trends.6 Finally, valuable information' was obtained by correspondence and interviews with several individuals who areweLl acquainted with Maritime politics. Interviews were held with the following people: Mr. F. Young, presentlya NDP member in the Ontario Legislature, was the CCF's provincial organizer in

Nova Scotia (1944) and later the party's Maritime director of 7 organization, before moving to Ontario in 1951; Mr. G. Regan,

5See Bibliog·raphy.

6Loc • cit.

7Interview with Mr. F. Young. 8

who is present1y the Liberal Premier of Nova Scotia and who

was Leader of the Opposition at the time of the interview, 8 has been active in the Liberal Party since the 1950's;

Mr. J. Aitchison, who was instrumental in estab1ishing the

Nova Scotia NDP, holding such positions as President (1962-

1966), acting Leader (1964-1966), and Leader (1966-1968), and

who contested the 1962 and 1965 federa1 e1ections and 1967

provincial e1ection;9 and a high1y p1aced official within the

Nova Scotia Conservative Party who requested that he remain 10 anonymous. Correspondence was with the fo11owing people:

Mr. J. Akerman, who has been Leader of the Nova Scotia NDP

since 1968 and who was e1ected to the gasemb1y in 1970;11 Mr.

A. O'Brien, present1y the Mayor of Halifax, who first joined

the CCF in 1944 and who has been Secretary to the National

Leader of the CCF (1946-1951), President of the Halifax area

CCF in the mid-1950's, Provincial Secretary for the NDP in

8Interview with Ml:'. G. Regan.

9Interview with Mr. J. Aitchison.

l0Any reference to this man will be coded as "Mr. E.".

11The first part of this statement was supp1ied in the interview with Mr. J. Aitchison, whi1e the second part is revea1ed in Nova Scotia, Elections Returns. r 9

1962, and a federal Vice-President of the NDP (1965_1969);12

Mr. L.E. Shaw, who has been active in the CCF-NDP since he joined in 1938-1939, holding such positions as National Re- search Director of the CCF (1942-1943), Nova Scotia provincial organizer and secretary (1945-1947), and many other posi- . 13 t~ons; Mrs. P. Prowse, who was provincial secretary of the 14 Nova Scotia NDP at the time that l was doing my research; and a national figure within the CCF-NDP for many years who reguested that he remain anonymous.15

12correspondence with Mr. A. O'Brien.

13correspondence with Mr. L.E. Shaw.

14correspondence with Mrs. P. Prowse.

15Any reference to this man will be coded as "Mr. S.". CHAPTER II

A REVIEW AND CRITIQUE OF THE LITERATURE ON 'THIRD PARTIES'

There have been severa1 interpretations of the rise of

third parties in Canada. Each one stresses different factors

as being essentia1 to the rise and e1ectora1 success of third

parties. The interpretations of the fo11owing authors will be 16 17 examined in this chapter: Hartz-Horowitz,' Macpherson, . d 18 d . t 19 P~nar, an L~pse • It will not be the purpose of this

chapter to paraphrase, or to re-hash, these interpretations.

16 L. Hartz, The Founding of New Societies (New York, 1964): G. Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Po1itics (Tor~nto,1968): and G. Horowitz, IIConservatism, Libera1ism, and Socia1ism in Canada: An Interpretation,lI in Canadian Journal of Economies and Po1itica1 Science, vol. XXXII, nurnber 2 (May, 1966).

17c .B• Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System, second edition, (Toronto, 1962).

18M• Pinard, The Rise of à Third Party: The Social Credit Party in Quebec in the 1962 Federal Election, Ph.D. dis sertation, 1967, John Hopkins University, Baltimore: and M. pi nard, Il One-Party Dominance and Third Parties, Il in Canadian Journal of Economies and Po1itica1 Science, vol. XXXIII, number 3, (August, 1967).

19S •M• Lipset, Agrarian Socia1ism: The Co-operative Com monwealth Federation in Saskatchewan (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1950) •

10 11

Instead, only the essence or the pith and substance of each interpretation will be presented and commented upon.

Hartz-Horowitz

G. Horowitz emphasizes the particular composition of

Canada's political culture as being primarily responsible for the existence of socialist third parties in Canada. Byana- lyzing the Canadian political culture,he points out the relative strength of tory and socialist elements in this culture, and, thereby, the existence of socialist third parties.

The Hartzian analysis applied to Canadian conditions shows why socialism as an ideolo9Y could become a significant force in Canada. Institutional analysis can show why permanent, significant third parties arise, but it cannot explain why one of these parties should be socialist. The cultural analysis is necessary to explain the relative strength of a socialist ideology in Canada: the institutional analysis is necessary to explain why this ideology can easily find expression in a permanent separate party.20

The central concept of the Hartz-Horowitz theory is as follows: When a group of European settlers emigrated to the

New World, they brought with them the ideology of which they were a part. A new society's founders were not representative

20Horowitz, Canadian Labour in POlitics, op. cit., p. 49. 12 of the whole European ideological spectrum, but were only a fragment of this spectrum. The European ideological spectrum ranged from feudal to tory to liberal whiggery to liberal democrat to socialist. Each ideology arose from within Euro- pean society as an interaction (or reaction) to its predecessor. Then, when an ideological fragment was detached f~om its

European setting, it lost the ability to produce future ideol- ogies (which it would have done in Europe). Instead, it congealed to become the nationalism, or political ethos, of the . 21 new soc~ety.

The need for the new nationalism obviously increases as the fragment loses more and more of the European homeland, as the future enemies begin to wither because old enemies have been left behind. But as this happens, new genera tions emerge within the fragment to whom it is, in sober truth, a "nation". The conversion of ideology into nationalism is not accomplished by the first settlers • • • These men still identify with the European homeland. But their children are not in the same position. Their children do not remember the "old country". They have 1ived inside the fragment aIl their lives, their batt1es have been the battles of its unfolding, and to them it is a true land.22

2 lHorowitz , "Conservatism, Liberalism and Socialism," op. ci t ., p. 144.

22Hartz, op. cit., p. 12. 13

Once an ideo1ogica1 fragment has congea1ed to become the po1it-

ica1 ethos of a new society, 1ater immigrants are gradua11y

absorbed into it, and they adopt the values of this p01itica1

ethos.23

According to Horowitz's argument, 1ibera1ism is not

the sole e1ement of Eng1ish-Canada's po1itica1 cu1ture7

"[libera1ism] is accompanied by vital and 1egitimate streams

of toryism and socia1ism which have as close a relation to

Eng1ish Canada's 'essence' or 'foundations' as does 1iber

a1ism.,,24 Two reasons are offered as to why socia1ism is

present in Canada, since the point at which Eng1ish-Canadian 25 society congea1ed is not exact1y known7

Since toryism is a significant part of the po1itica1 culture, at 1east part of the 1eftist reaction against it will soone~ or 1ater be expressed in its own terms, that is, in terms of c1ass interests and the good of the community as a corporate entity (socia1- ism) rather than in terms of the individua1 and his vicissitudes in the competitive pursuit of happiness (libera1ism). If the point of con gea1ment is very ear1y, socia1ism appears at a 1ater point not primari1y because it is imported by British immigrants, but because it is contained

23Hartz, op. cit., p. 14.

24Horowitz, "Conservatism, Libera1ism and Socia1ism,1I op. cit., p. 156. :( 25Ibid ., pp. 153, 154. 14

as a potential in the original pOlitical culture. The immigrants then find that they do not have to give it up--that it is not un-Canadian--because it Iifits" to a certain extent with the tory ideas already present. If the "point of congealment is very late, the presence of socialism must be ex plained as a result of both the presence of tory ism and the introduction of socialism into the cultural mix before congealment. The immigrant retains his socialism not only because it "fits" but also because nothing really has to fit. He finds that his socialism ~s not un-Canadian ~artly because "Canadian"has not yet been defined.2

Hence, Horowitz maintains that socialist third parties have existed (and still do exist) in Canada because socialism is a part of its political culture.27

In the following chapters, it will be shown that Mari- time society congeaied at a relatively early time--before the arrivaI of socialist-minded immigrants. Also, the socialist- minded, British immigrants, who came at a later time, settled in the coal-mining and industrial area of Cape Breton Island.

This area is also the area where socialist third parties have been most successful in the Maritimes.

However, although the Hartz-Horowitz theory may seem to explain the fate of socialist third parties in the Maritimes

26Horowitz, "Conservatisrn, Liberalism, and Socialism," op. cit., p. 154.

27Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics, op. cit., p. 49. 15

and in other parts of Canada, the theory is not without its

share of weaknesses. Its most serious fault is that it tends

to neglect socio-economic factors which were indigenous to

Canada, and which were salient to the establishment of social-

ism in Canada. For example, the lack of private capital, the

reluctance of many Canadians to invest in Canadian develop-

ment which was contrary to the natural trade routes, and the

threat of American take-over of the unsettled Canadian west, were aIl factors which foraed the government to take an active

role in the economy and development of Canada. Also, with

particular reference to the Maritimes, the fact that the coal mines and steel industry were concentrated in the area around

Sydney cannot be ignored as being essential, and conducive, to

the early development of very active trade unions in the area, as weIl as to the growth of cooperative and socialist ideas.

A second fault of the Hartz-Horowitz theory is that it does not say if a socialist third party will arise or"if one of the major parties (or both major parties) will .adopt and implement socialist policies. The theory just explains why socialism is present in the Canadian political culture and why a socialist third party could existe Institutional factors 28 determine whether or not socialist third parties vill develop.

28Horowitz acknowledges this limitation of the theory, as can be seen in quotation no. 20 of this thesis, supra p. Il. 16

Finally, the theory seems to neglect the role that

indigenous interest groups played in enabling the development

of third parties. Observation of third parties reveals that

most, if not all, successful third parties have been precede~

by organized socio-economic movements (e.g. farmers ' groups and trade unions). These movements appear to perform three major

functions which will be elaborated upon in later chapters. The

three functions are: 1) organize those with a common interest

into a cohesive group, 2) formulate and articulate the common

grievances into coherent pOlicies, and 3) act as an inter-

mediary in breaking down loyalty to the two major parties while

developing loyalty to a third party.

The significance of the Hartz-Horowitz the ory is in its

explanation of the composition of Canadian political culture.

More particularly, the theory explains why socialism is a

legitimate force in Canada. However, the previously mentioned

faults in the theory must be kept in mind and not over-looked.

Macpherson

C.B. Macpherson's theory was formulated in reference

to Alberta's party system, which he has termed a "quasi-party

J system" .29 The main emphasis is on the anti-East ideology ) 29 Macpherson, op. cit., pp. 237-239. 17 possessed by the province's independen~ cornrnodity producers which was due to the economic dominance of the East, and to the failure of the two major parties to satisfy the needs of prairie society. Macpherson also suggests that similar conditions to those which existed in Alberta would give rise to 30 similar "quasi-party systems Il elsewhere in canada.

Alberta 1 S economy\'J'as- what Macpherson calls a "quasi- colonial economy", which was characterized by two aspects:

1) the provincial economy was subordinate to the priorities of the national economy, as the prairie lands were developed to meet the needs of the more populous East and central Cana- dian financiers, and were directly administered by the federal

• Il f' . Il 31 d government unt~l 1929 for the purpose 0 the Dom~n~on 7 an

2) a quasi-colonial economy existed and not a colonial econ- orny because "the typical prairie producer has been from the beginning an independent operator of an individual or family enterprise7 he has not been reduced to the status of a wage earner dependent on employment.1I32

30Macpherson, op. cit., p. 249.

31Ibid ., pp. 6-10.

32Ibid ., p. 10. , 18 ... , Professor Macpherson used census data ta show that

Alberta's population was relatively homogeneous, having their

livelihood either directly or indirectly dependent upon the . 33 gra1n crop. The predominance of small independent pro-

ducers--petite-bourgeoisie--developed similar beliefs, values,

and attitudes because of their position in the political and 34 economic systems. And primarily because they found that the

two major parties were not as responsive to their demands as

they would have liked, and because they perceived the two major

parties to be controlled by eastern interests, the petite-

bourgeoisie turned to the United Farmers in 1921 and to the 35 Social Credit in 1935. The frontier nature of prairie so-

ciety had resulted in a large percentage of Albertans demanding

a form of direct democracy in which the elect.ed representative

served the cornmunity's needs in a business-like fashion: they

objected to ·the political institutions inherited from the East

which were oligarchic in structure and which did not represent 36 the nature of prairie society. In such a situation, such

33Macpherson, op.cit., pp. 10-20.

34Loc • cit.

35Ibid., pp. 20, 21.

36Ibid., pp. 22-27. 19 capable and dynamic leaders as H.W. Wood, W. Aberhart, and

E. Manning, were able to channel the aspirations of the

A1bertan people into support for third parties, which advocated concepts simi1ar to those possessed by the people: .the desire for business-1ike government devoid of bickering parties, a form of de1egate democracy, an end to the cabinet- par1iamentary form of government, and a desire to combat the interests of central Canada. Macpherson ca11ed the resu1ting party system a "quasi-party system":

• • • a response to the prob1em of democratic government in a community main1y of independent producers which forms a subordinate part of a more mature capita1ist economy. It appears as a midd1e way between an a1ternate party system which has become unrea1 or harmfu1 and a one-party state which wou1d be unacceptab1e and for which there is not the requisite-c1ass basis.37

In app1ying Macpherson's theory to the Maritimes, it will be shown that there was no dominant economic c1ass in the

Maritimes 1ike the independent commodity producers of Alberta: instead, the Maritimes have been characterized by their economic diversity. A1so, whereas the a1ternate-party system and cabinet- par1iamentary form of government were imposed on the prairie society, these po1itica1 institutions were deve10ped from within

37 Macpherson, op. cit., p. 239. 20

Maritime society, and have always reflected the needs of this society. Finally, it will be shown that there was no particular ideology anq/or qualified leadership offering a suitable alternative to Maritimers.

Macpherson's theory is not without its limitations.

His conclusion that Albertans have a similar class composition is based upon census data; however, voting statistics show that the United Fœrmers of Alberta never received more than

40.5 per cent of the vote (1926) and the Social Credit's highest vote was 55.6 per cent (1948). The influence that the electoral boundary system played in providing rural areas (and their inhabitants) with a disproportionate number of seats, and thus enabling these two IIthird partiesll to sweep into power, must not be overlooked. Also, the U.F.A. and Social Credit received a large percentage of seats partly because "the opposition votes were divided fairly uniformly among the constituen- . 38 . . c~es", and the two major parties were lIunable to comb~ne ~n ~ ....

ll 39 opposition for reasons of federal party interest •

38nennis Smith, IIPrairie Revolt, Federalism, and the Party System, Il in H.G. Thorburn, editor, Party Politics in Canada (Toronto, 1963), p. 135.

39 Loc. cit. 21

Macpherson also implied that a third party arises

and replaces the two-party system with a one-party system.

On closer examination, M. Pinard illustrated that this is

not the case (see Diagram l, p. 34 ) •

One-party dominance precedes and is a factor in the rise of new movements, it does not follow from the rise. And one-party dominance is itself produced by structural cleavages or strong structural attachrnents, not by class homogeneity.40

In other words, a political system with. a strong two-party

system will not produce a third party or enable one to be sus-

cessful~ it is only when there is a one-party dominance sys-

tem that a third party will have an opportunity to develop

successfully.

In conclusion, Macpherson's theory contributes to the

understanding of the rise of third parties by his explanation

of the role of a relatively homogeneous class composition, as

well as of an ideology and leadership which reflects the nat'lre

of the particular political system •. Although the electoral

system provided Alberta's third parties with a disproportionate

share of the seats, there is no denying the fact that their

basis of support was the independent cornrnodity producer.

~OPinard, The Rise of a Third Party, op. cit., . p. 111. 22

Finally, if Alberta's third parties had not had such good leadership and attractive programs which reflected the aspirations of most Albertans, they would not have been as success- fuI.

Pinard

M. Pinard's theory places more emphasis on structural cleavages and institutional factors, and less emphasis on ideology, political culture, and on the "movement" aspect, in explaining the rise of third parties. Although his theory was formulated in reference to the rise of Quebec's Social Credit, his purpose is to develop a theory to be applicable every where in canada.4~

The essence of Pinard's thesis can be seen in Diagram l (p. 34) and stated as follows:

Structural cleavages of various sorts or cer- t.ain types of community structure--all this possibly reinforced by single-member plurality elections--lead to alienation from one major party and to one-party dominance~ this in turn, assuming the presence of strain, becomes a situation conducive to the rise of a third party.42

41pinard, The Rise of a Third Party, op. cit., p. 22.

42I bid., p. 104. 23

Pinard's theory has a broader application (than Macpherson's)

partly because it includes such social cleavages as religion,

ethnicity, and region, as weIl as economic cleavages. These

structural cleavages divide society and guite often enable

the establishment of one-party bastions in various parts of

Canada. In such a setting, the electorate will turn away from

the dominant party to a third party when "short-term grievances"

occur. The electorate will not turn to the second major party 43 because it is perceived to be an unsuitable alternative. For t! red. i b i 1i 1)- example, the Conservative party lost its e~eàisi~ily as an alternative to the Liberal party in Quebec because of religious and ethnic cleavages. Also, the single-member plurality electoral

sys,tem enabled the LiberaIs to receive' a disproportionate share of Quebec's federal representation: between 1921 and 1965, there were 5.6 Liberal M.P.'s for each Conservative M.P., although the

ratio of vot ers was 1.9 to 1.44 Consequently, a one-party dominance system existed in Quebec with the federal Liberal party receiving the majority of votes and seats, and with the Conser- vative party receiving less than a third of Quebec's

43pinard, The Rise of a Third Party, op. cit., p. 112.

44A• Cairns, "The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921-1965," in Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol. l, no. l, (March, 1968), p. 62. 24 representation, over several successive elections. In the

1962 federal election, such short-term grievances as unemployment, declining incomes, shrinking economic position of small businessmen and farmers, and increasing taxes, caused many

Quebecers to support the Social Credit party.45

By using Pinarrd's theory in reference to the Maritimes, it can be easily shown that each of the two major parties have always maintained a substantial basis of support in each province.

There has apparently been no structural cleavage which has seriously discredited either major party. Although one of the major parties may have faltered in a few constituencies over

~wo or three elections, it has always been able to regain its position. Pinard's theory can also be used to explain the voting pattern in the federal constituency which has been won by third parties. However, the theory will be shown to be inadequate in explaining the rise of third parties in Maritime provincial constituencies, where they have been relatively successful.

The most obvious defect of Pinard's theory is that it neglects the ideological and "movement" aspects which are

1 associated with successful third parties. For example, with the Social Credit in Quebec, Pinard tends to underestimate

45In the election, Social Credit won 26 per cent of the vote and 26 of the 75 federal setas, in Quebec. 25 the social movement and ideological factors shaping the party; that is, the efforts of the former Union des Electeurs and its newspaper, Vers Demain, in organizing the people and propagating the Social Credit ideology, during the post-war years, were an essential part in the partyls success in 1962.

Pinard maintains that class homogeneity did not exist in any of the provinces and cannot be used to explain the rise of third parties. However, he is referring to the objective concept of class and not to the subjective concept; by using the former, he is able to,point out that Quebec did not have a predominant economic or occupational group. The use of the latter term probably would have shown that the core of Social

Credit supporters in Quebec had a common set of attitudes, values, etc., which gave them a subjective feeling of a common lIidentityli. This is demonstrated in M. Stein's study of the

Social Creditelite in Quebec.46

On the whole, this theory is perhaps the most compre 47 hensive of the theories that have been advocated. It attempts to include as many variables as possible in explaining the rise

46M. Stein, The Dynamics of Political Protest: Social Credit in Quebec (University of Toronto Press, forthcoming).

47Pinard shows that his theory is applicable to every province. See Pinard, op. cit., Chapter 3. 26

of third parties, although it does stress certain variables

and underestimates others. For instance, Professor Pinard

should have placed greater emphasis on the roles of ideology,

leadership, and the "movement" aspect.

Lipset

S.M. Lipset's theory stresses the role played by indi- ~ genous socio-economic variables in the rise of third parties.

More specifically, his emphasis is on the need· for a third party to be associated with a rnovernent, such as a farmers' group or a trade union, which has turned to the third party because the existing structural cleavages did not respond to its needs.

Writing his e~xplanation of the rise of the Co-operative

Commonwealth Federation (C.C.F.) in Saskatchewan, Lipset notes the salience of the social structure in that province in facil 48 itating the rise of farmers' rnovements and the C.C.F. The

'rapid growth of Saskatchewan's population between 1896 and

1913,49 coupled with the fact that the population was dispersed

(not concentrated in urban areas)50, led to a dernand for

48Lipset, op. cit., p. 206.

49Ibid ., p. 22.

5 0 Ilbi d ., p. 36. 27 J .... - immediate social services. Since these services could not be . . . 51 h prov~ded by pr~vate enterpr~se, t e farmers were forced to

attain them (telephone service, roads, hospital facilities,

etc.) by co-operative action. By 1950, 125,000 farmers held

about 500,000 co-operative memberships since the need for 52 community institutions could only be supplied by co-operation.

Likewise, the economic structure resulted in the growth

of political pressure groups because only by such means could

the farmers defend themselves against eastern financial inter-

es'ts, and articulate their demands. Saskatchewan' s economy

was the least diversified provincial economy--based primarily 53 on wheat-growing--and the most vulnerable~

There is no doubt that many farmers in other parts of Canada and the world are in a worse financial position, but few experience the chronic alternation between wealth and poverty of the farmers of Saskatchewan • • • The pat tern of life of a mixed-crop farmer [like those in the Maritimes] may be upset by severe de pression, but food, clothing, and shelter are secure, and price fluctuations are not so great as in the wheat belt. But it is the "boom and Bust" character of wheat production that un hinges lifels plans.54

5lLipset, op. cit., p. 36.

52Loc • cit.

53IlDid.,· p. Il.

54Ibid., p. 29. 28

The irnmediate outcome of this economic situation was the forma-

tion of various farmers' groups such as the Saskatchewan Grain

Growers Association to provide the farmer with an organized voice and greater security in the national market.

Both the cornmunity co-operatives and the farmers' associations were instrumental in organizing the farmers to act collectively and to participate actively in the political process. 55 These organizations were not only successful in organizing the farmers into a cohesive force, but were also instrumental in developing leadership abilities among the members, in articulating the member's grievances, and in educating the members as to what the sources of their problems were. Many of these associations had their own newspapers, such as the

Western Producer of the Wheat Pool, which contributed substan 56 tially to the achievement of the above-~entioned functions.

With this high degree of organization and participation, ideas were debated, accepted, rejected, inter-changed, and articulat- 57 ed. It was from this agrarian movement that the CCF arosei

Though it was a new radical party, the CCF did not have to build up an organization from scratch. It was organized from the start by the local "class"

55Lipset, op. cit., pp. 199-219.

56Ibid., p. 65.

57 Ibid., p. 206. 29

and community leaders of rural Saskatchewan. The fact that the province was so weIl organized on an occupational basis enabled the new party to obtain the support of the politically conscious community leaders. By the early 1940's, CCF com mittees, composed in the main of the same people who were the officiaIs of the other rural organiza tions, were operating in almost every district in the province. It was this "machinel! that brought the CCF to power.58

Hence, the CCF emerged from within the agrarian movement since

the grain growers wanted their own political party which would

be responsive to the needs of prairie society. The two major

parties could not be responsive to the gr~in growers' special

needs since their basis of support was in the more populous

and industrial East; also, the parliamentary form of govern-

ment has resulted in strong party discipline, by which specifie 59 sectional demands cannot always be implemented.

When this theory is used in reference to the Maritimes,

it will be shown that there was no "movement" behind any of the

Maritime third parties; the only exception would be the trade

union movement in Cape Breton and its connection with the CCF-

~ NDP. Maritime society is rather conservative in nature,

58Lipset, op. cit., p. 206.

59s .M• Lipset, "Democracy in Alberta," in John C. Courtney, editor, Voting in Canada (Scarborough, Ontario, 1967), pp. 182-185. 30 developing at a slow and graduaI pace rather than being sub ject to the IIboom and bustll rate of'development of prairie society.' within this situation, it will be sho~n that Mari timers were more likely to be attracted to the immediate benefits offered by the two major parties rather than the usually more radical and long-term policies advocated by move ments and third parties. Living -in a stable and economically low-standard of existence, the people are not lIawareli of, or tlfamiliarll with, an economically higher form of life~ there fore, their expectations have not been very high and Maritimers have not felt it necessary to form movements and/or third par ties like those of the prairies.

The main difficulty with Lipset's theory is that it is too rigid, since it iS,specifically derived from the study of the CCF in Saskatchewan. If a political system had to be like that of Saskatchewan before a third party could arise, then many of the existing third parties probably would never have developed. Lipset fails to say what degree of development a movement must be at before a third party will emerge~ for ex ample, although the trade union movement in the Sydney area was not as highly organized as the Saskatch~wan agrarian move ment, it was primarily responsible for the success of socialist third parties in that'area. 31

Another difficulty with Lipset's theory is that it

maintains that lia new mass political organization is • • • much

more difficult [to buildJ in a city than in a rural community 60 or small town" • Pinard also says practically the same thing . ... 61 . ~n reference to the Soc~al Cred~t ~n Quebec. However, ~n

other parts of the country, the CCF-NDP have received most of

their support in u~ban-industrial areas and have been weak, or

non-existent, in rural areas. Perhaps the rate of growth and

changes that a society undergoes is more important than the

rural-urban variable in determining whether or not a mass polit-

ical organization will develop: the rate of growth and societal changes in urban areas matched that of the prairies, and both

developed and supported third parties.

Lipset's theory is most helpful in illustrating the need for a third party to be a part of a larger movement in a political system. The movement develops because of the political system's inability to accommodate the demands of a particular social, economic, anq(or cultural group. Such a movement is indispensable to the third party in providing the party with leaders, organizational workers, finances, communication with .the group' s rank and file, and educational work.

60Lipset, op. cit., p. 215.

6lpinard, Il One-Party Dominance and Third Parties," ,2E. cit.,p.366. 32

The following set of conditions--derived from the four theories considered in this chapter--seem to be sufficient in explaining the rise of third parties:

1) There should be a vacuum into which a third party can enter. That is, using Pinard's theory, there should generally be a system of one-party dominance in which the second major party is a minor force (constantly receiving less than a third of the vote) and is perceived to be an unacceptable alternative to the major party in power.

2) Likewise, there has to be a potential for a third party to develop. That is, not only should the political culture con tain the elements necessary to enable a third party to develop

(e.g. socialist elements have enabled socialist parties to arise in Canada), but there should also be a major socio-economic grouping with which a third party could build a basis of support.

3) A third party has to have c~pable leadership at aIl levels of its organization, and the policy-makers should have channels of communication with their membership. (i.e. party newspaper, and frequent attendance at local organizational meetings) • 33

4) A third party should be a part of, or associated with, a movement. Such movements can direct the loyalty of their me~bership to electorally supporting a third party; these move ments also provide many other functions in aid of third parties.

5) Finally, there usually has to be sorne catalytic factor for causing the electorate to change its traditional pattern of political behaviour and to support a third party. Such factors which seem to be strong enough to change the electorate's behaviour would be changes in the socio-economic conditions resulting from depressions, rapid urbanization, etc.

These conditions must be considered as being inter related with no one being sufficient, by itself, to explain the rise and electoral success of a third party. Although a third party may suddenly develop and receive electoral support while only meeting a few of these conditions, its success will likely be only temporary unless it can achieve the other conditions. 34

DlAGRAM la

MODELS FOR THE RlSE OF THlRD PARTIES

Structural Level

1. Macpherson's Model (a) Quasi-colonial Non-party Rise of third parties economy ideology .J, .lnd and Establishment of a quasi-party (b) Homog~ous aspirations system (one-party dominance class composition system) 2. Pinard's Model (a) Structural cleavages (economic, ethnie, etc.) and/or Emergence of a (Search of (b) Residues of bitter (Alienation from one one-party alternative Rise of contests. of the major parties)~ dominance ~ to party ~ third and/or system ir power) parties (c) Structural attachments aided by single-member plurality electoral system

lndividual Level

1. Macpherson's Model Long-term dissatisfaction Conscious rejection ______~ Vote for a third with party system of the party system party

2. Pinard's Model Voters perce ive a strong Short~term grievances traditional alternative ______~) Switch to the other old party (often economic) toward party in power Vot ers perceive no strong traditional alternative ______~ Switch to a new party

aSource: Pinard, "One-Party Dominance and Third Parties," op. cit., p. 370. CHAPTER III

THE TRADITIONAL TWO-PARTY SYSTEM WHICH EXISTS IN THE MARITIME PROVINCES

Introduction

Politica1 activity began in each Maritime Assemb1y in

the late 18th century, and, as society matured and became more

differentiated, the two-party system gradual1y emerged as the

social institution through which political demands and supports

were channe11ed. Professors Beck, MacKinnon and Thorburn pro-

vide full accounts of the development of the two-party system

in Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and New Brunswick respec- . 1 62 t~ve y. Therefore, a detailed description of its emergence

should be unnecessary; moreover, any attempt to summarize in

a few pages the historica1 development of the two-party system

in each province would not do justice to the subject. It need

on1y be sa id that, by the 20th century, there was a strong two-

party system in each of these provinces, and that the Conservative

62Beck, op. cit., pp. 29-32, 74-85, 107-112, and 154-170; MacKinnon, op. cit., pp. 53-56, 93, 242-258; and Tho rburn, op. cit., pp. 5-13, and 83-114.

35 36 \- and Liberal parties have generally maintained their positions

ever since.

This chapter will illustrate the strong support con-

sistently given to the Conservative and Liberal parties, and

the weak support given to third parties, since 1920. To do

this, there will be two sections to this chapter: 1) a de-

scription of the vote given to each party in each election,

and 2) an explanation of the election results. Finally, the

particular theory that will be examined in this chapter will

be Pinard's theory. By examining the election results, it

will be possible to see if Pinard's theory is applicable in

explaining the failure of third parties in the Maritimes.

Party Electoral Support

The strength of the two major parties and the weakness

of third party support in each Maritime province is shown in

Tables l, 2, and 3 for federal elections, and in Tables 4, S,

and 6 for provincial elections. A more detailed illustration

of the strength of party support is contained in Appendices A,

B, and C for provincial elections (pp. 201-214 ), and in

Appendices D, E, and F for 'federal elections (pp. 215-225).

(' As mentioned in the IIIntroductionll to this chapter, this partic- 37 ular section will describe the vote given to each party in the

1920-1970 period. In considering the strength of the two-party system, Pinard's theory should be kept in mind, since the value of this theory in explaining the rise of third parties will be examined in the foll~wing section.

In not one P.E.I. provincial election, since 1923, has a major party failed to attract at least 42 per cent of the vote (Table 4, p. 46 ). Except for three widely separate federal elections, the Conservative and Liberal parties have both received 44 per','cent or more of the vote, since 1921 (Table l, p.39). These three occasions were: 1) in 1921, the Conservative party received 37 per cent of the vote~ 2) in 1935, the Con- servative party obtained 38 per cent of the electorate's support~ and 3) in 1958, the 'Liberal party fell victim to the wave of support for Diefenbaker and received 38 per cent of the vote.

As for having candidates elected, not one third party candidate has ever been elected to the provincial Legislature or 63 to the federal parliament.

63Scarrow, op. cit., Tables 62, 12, 16, 20, 24, 28, 32, 36, 40, 44, 48, and52~ and Canada, Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, 1962, 1963, 1965, and 1968. 38

It is q~ite clear that in Prince Edward Island, there has always been a very strong two-party·system, with each party

constantly receiving a substantial share of the vote. The

electorate has not been alienated from either major party, but has always perceived the major party out of office as a suit able alternative to the one in office. In this situation, a

third party has not had the opportunity to achieve electoral

support, at least according to Pinard's theory.

The Progressive party. was the most successful third party on the Island, when its three candidates won 12 per cent of the vote in the 1921 federal election, and when its four can didates won 3 per cent of the vote in the 1923 provincial elec tion. However, the Progressive party did not have any of its candidates elected and did not even contest the succeeding federal and provincial elections. The CCF-NDP has made the most consistent effort to gain support on the Island, contesting every federal election since 1945, as weIl as the 1943, 1947, and 1951 provincial elections. But as can be seen in Tables 1

(p. 39) and 4 (p. 46), the vote received by the CCF-NDP has been negligible. Finally, the only other third parties to enter

P.E.I. elections were the Reconstruction party which received

3 per cent of the 1935 federal vote, and the Social Credit party which received 0.2 per cent of the 1962 federal vote. 39

TABLE 1

PARTY VOTE IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS FOR PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND, 1921-1968, BY PERCENTAGEa

b b b b b b Con. Lib. prog. Recon. CCF-NDp Soc.Cred. Other

1921 37 46 12 5 1925 48 52 1926 47 53 1930 50 50 1935 38 58 3 1940 45 55 1945 47 48 4 1949 48 49 2 1953 48 51 1 1957 52 47 1 1958 62 38 (0.3) 1962 51 43 5 (0.2) 1963 52 46 2 1965 54 44 2 1968 52 45 3

Source: Percentages have been taken from the tables in J.M. Beek, Pendu1um of Power: Canada's Federal Elections (Scarborough, Ontario, 1968). The party percentages may be regarded as being accurate since they are supported byH.A. Scarrow, op. cit., Tables 12, 16, 20, 24, 28, 32, 36, 40, 44, 48, and 52~ and Canada, Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, 1962, 1963, 1965, and 1968. a Percentages do not a1ways add up to 100 per cent because of rounding. bAbbreviations: Con.--Conservative~ Lib.--Libera1~ Prog.--Progressive~ Recon.--Reconstruction~ CCF-NDP--Co-operative Commonwealth Federation New Democratie Party~ Soc.Cred.--Socia1 Credit. 40

TABLE 2

PARTY VarE IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS FOR NOVA SCOTIA, a 1921-1968, BY PERCENTAGE

b . b b b b b Con. L~b. prog. Recon. CCF-NDp Soc.Cred. Other

1921 32 52 12 3 1925 56 42 2 1926 54 44 3 1930 53 48 1935 32 52 14 2 1940 40 51 6 3 1945 37 46 17 1 1949 38 53 10 1953 40 53 7 (0.2) 1957 50 45 4 (0.1) 1958 57 38 5 1962 47 42 9 1 1963 47 47 6 (0.1) 1965 49 42 9 (0.3) 1968 55 38 7 (0.1)

Source: Percentages have been taken from the tables in J.M. Beek, Pendu1um of Power: Canada's Federal Elections Scarborough, Ontario, 1968). The party percentages may be regarded as being accurate since they are sup ported by R.A. Scarrow, op. cit., Tables 12, 16, 20, 24, 28, 32, 36, 40, 44, 48, and 52~ and Canada, Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, 1962, 1963, 1965 and 1968. a~ercentages do not a1ways add up to 100 per cent because of rounding. bAbbreviations: Con.--Conservative: Lib.--Libera1: prog.--progressive: Recon,--Reconstruction: CCF-NDP--Co-operative Commonwealth Federation New Democratie Party~ Soc.Cred.--Socia1 Credit. 41

TABLE 3

PARTY VOTE IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS FOR NEW BRUNSWICK, 1921-1968, BY PERCENTAGEa

b b b b b b Con. Lib. Prog. Recon. CCF-NDp Soc.Cred. Other

1921 39 49 10 1 1925 60, 40 (0.1) 1926 54 46 1930 59 41 1935 32 57 11 (0.4) 1940 43 55 (0.4) 2 1945 38 50 7 1 3 1949 39 54 4 3 1953 42 53 3 (0.4) 2 1957 49 48 1 1 1 1958 54 43 2 1 19'62 47 44 5 4 (0.2) 1963 40 47 4 9 1965 43 48 9 1c c 1968 50 44 5 1 (0.3)

Source: Percentages have been taken from the tables in J.M. Beck, Pendu1um of Power: Canada's Federal Elections (Scarborough, Ontario, 1968). The party percentages may be regarded as being accurate since they are supported by H•• A. Scarrow, op. cit., Tables 12, 16, 20, 24, 28, 32, 36, 40, 44, 48, and 52; and Canada, Report of the Chief E1ectora10fficer, 1962, 1963, 1965, and 1968. a Percentages do not a1ways add up to 100 per cent because of rounding. bAbbreviations: Con.--Conservative; Lib.--Libera1; prog.--progressive; Recon.--Reconstruction; CCF-ND@--Co-operative Commonwealth Federation New Democratic Party; Soc.Cred.--Socia1 Credit. c 1965 Social Credit vote actua11y consisted of a 0.1 per cent Social Credit vote and a 0.4 per cent Ralliement des Créditistes vote. The 1968 Social Credit vote was actua11y a tota11y Rallie ment des Créditistes vote. 42

The Nova Scotia Conservative and Liberal parties have not been quite as strong as their counterparts in P.E.I., but have still dominated the politics of Nova Scotia. In provin cial politics, the Conservative party's support dipped to 25 per cent in 1920, to 34 per cent in 1945, and to 39 per cent in 1949 (Table 5, p. 47). The Liberal party's support fell below 40 per cent on only one occasion which was in 1925 when it received 36 per cent of the v.ote. Other than these occasions, the two major parties have always obtained 40 per cent or more of the vote in provincial elections--well above Pinard's cut off point of 33 1/3 per cent.

In Nova Scotia federal elections (Table 2, p. 40), the

Conservative par.ty attained only 32 per cent of the vote in 1921,

32 per cent in 1935, 37 per cent in 1945, and 38 per cent in

1949, and the Liberal party's lowest ebbs were in 1958 and 1968 when it received 38 per cent of the vote in each election. Other wise, the Conservative and Liberal parties have always attained at least 40 per cent of the vote in federal elections.

Over the years, the Liberal party seems to have main tained the solid support of a larger portion of the electorate than has the Conservative party (Tables 2 and 5, pp. 40 and 47) •

However, the Conservative party has never permitted its support to be at a low point for several successive elections~ instead, 43

it has always recovered after a disappointing election and re- asserted itself as a suitable alternative to the Libera.l party.

As for the third parties, they have never been able to establish serious and consistent in-roads in Nova Scotia. The sole exception to this is the CCF-NDP in the industrial part 64 of Cape Breton Island~ this particular case will be considered in greater depth throughout this thesis. Generally, third parties have tended to contest one election and then never appear again, or to retain minor support after having reached their peak in a previous election (Tables 2 and 5, pp. 40 and 47) •

Third party representation in the provincial Legislature has consisted of four labour and seven United Farmers in 1921; three CCF'ers in 1941; two CCF'ers in 1945, 1949, and 1953; one 65 CCF.' er in 1956 and 1960; and two NDP 1 ers in 1970. In federal elections, Clarie Gillis was elected to Parliament as a CCF candidate in Cape Breton South in 1940, 1945, 1949, and 1953;

f 64 Th e concentrat~on. 0 CCF-NDP strength ~n . Cape Breton ·eounty is illustrated by the following. The percentages of the provincial CCF-NDP vote which have come from Cape Breton county are: 10~/o in 1933, 99% in 1941, 50% in 1945, 46% in 1949, 74% in 1953, 84% in 1956, 53% in 1960, 71% in 1963, 55% in 1967, and 57% in 1970.

65Nova Scotia, Election Returns, 1920-1970. 44

and in 1962, a NDP candidate was elected in Cape Breton 66 South.

Tables 3 and 6 (pp. 41 and 48) illustrate the strength

of the two major parties in New Brunswick. Except for two

elections, each major party has consistent!y attracted at least

40 per cent of the vote in provincial elections. And in both

of these cases, the Conservative party was able to bounce back 67 and be elected to office in the succeeding elections.

In federal elections, the strength of New Brunswick's

two major parties has been also quite ev~dent. The Liberal par-

ty1s support has never dropped below 40 per cent of the vote,

while the Conservative party's support has fallen below 40 per

cent on only four occasions (Table 3, p. 41): 39 per cent in

1921, 32 per cent in 1935, 38 per cent in 1945, and 39 per cent

in 1949. Except for these four instances, New Brunswick has

had a very strong two-party system in federa! politics, with

each party attaining 40 per cent or more of the vote.

There has been only one third party candidate e!ected

in a federal general election--the Progressive candidate in

66Scarrow, op. cit., Tables 12, 16, 20, 24, 28, 32, 36, 40, 44, 48, and 52~ .. and Canada, Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, 1962, 1963, 1965, and 1968 •

./ 67Saarrow, op. cit., Table 64. 45

Victoria-Carleton, who was opposed only by a Conservative can- 68 didate in 1921. Also, this M.P. was T.W. Caldwell who was president of the United Farmers of New Brunswick, and who had been first elected te Parliament in the federal by-election of

November 1919: the Liberal party had not put up a candidate . 69 in this by-election either. In provincial general elections, third party candidates were elected only in the 1920 election when seven United Farmers were elected.70

Finally, as can be seen in Tables 3 and 6 (pp. 41 and

48), third parties have not been very successful in New Bruns- wick. The figures indicate that although a third party may have attracted sorne support in one election, it was not able to maintain its support in subsequent elections. Like the other Mari- time provinces, New Brunswick has a deeply entrenched two-party system, with the electorate maintaining its loyalty to the two major parties.

68 Beck, Pendulum of Power, op. cit., p. 157.

69W•L • Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada (Toronto, 1950), pp. 82, 83.

70Although the Parliamentary Guide, 1921 and Scarrow's book provide different results fo.r the 1920 election, the New Brunswick Chief Electoral Officer's Office informed me that seven United Farmers were officially elected. 46

TABLE 4

PARTY VOTE IN PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS FOR PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND, 1923-1970, BY PERCENTAGEa

b b b b Con. Lib. Prog. CCF_NDp Other

1923 52 44 3 1 1927 47 53· 1931 52 48 1935 42 58 1939 47 53 1943 46 51 2 1 1947 46 50 4 (0.1) 1951 47 52 2 i955 45 55 1959 51 49 1962 49 51 1966 49 51 1970 42 58

Source: H.A. Scarrow, op. cit., Table 62~ Par1iamentary Guide, 1963 and 1967~ and the 1970 resu1ts were supp1ied by the Chief Electoral Officer for P.E .I.

apercentages do not a1ways add up to 100 per cent because of rounding.

~Abbreviations: Con.--Conservative~ Lib.--Libera1~ Prog.--Progressive~ CCF-NDP--Co-operative Commonwealth Federation New Democratie Party. 41

TABLE 5

-PARTY VarE IN PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS FOR NOVA SCarIA, 1920-1970, BY PERCENTAGEa

b b b b b Con. Lib. Labour UFNS CCF-NDp Other

1920 25 44 17 14 1925 61 36 3 1928 52 47 1 1933 46 53 1 1 1937 46 53 1 1941 40 53 7 1945 34 53 14 (0.2) 1949 39 51 10 (0.2) 1953 44 49 7 1 1956 49 48 3 (0.2) 1960 48 43 9 (0.2) 1963 56 40 4 1967 53 42 5 (0.2) 1970 47 46 7 (0.4)

Source: H.A. Scarrow, op. cit., Table 63: Parliamentary Guide, 1964, 1968: and Nova Scotia, Election Results, 1970.

a Percentages do not always add up to 100 per cent because of rounding. bAbbreviations: Con.--Conservative: Lib.--Liberal: Labour--Independent Labour Party: UFNS--United Fanmers of Nova Scotia: CCF-NDP--Co-operative Commonwealth Federation New Democratie Party. 48

TABLE 6 PARTY VOTE IN PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS FOR NEW BRUNSWICK, 1920-1970, BY PERCENTAGESa

b b b b Con. Lib. UFNB CCF-NDpb Soc .Cred. Other

1920 27 46 21 6 1925 53 45 2 (0.3) 1930 52 48 (0.1) 1935 40 60 (0.3) 1939 45 55 (0.1) (0.1) 1944 4.0 48 12 1948 31 58 6 1 4 1952 49 49 1 1 1956 52 46 2 (0.1) 1960 46 53 (0.4) 1963 48 52 (7 votes) 1967 47 52 (0.2) 1970 48 49 3 (0.2)

Source: H.A. Scarrow, op. cit., Table 64: Par1iamentary Guide, 1964 and 1968: and Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, Province of New Brunswick, 1970.

a Percentages do not a1ways add up to 100 per cent because of rounding. bAbbreviations: Con.--Conservative: Lib.--Libera1: UFNB--United Farmers of New Brunswick: CCF-NDP--Co-operative Commonwealth Federation New Democratie Party: Soc.Cred.--Socia1 Credit. 49 In conclusion,to this section, it can be said that each

Maritime province has a relatively strong two-party system. The

two major parties which were established during the 19th cen

tury have been able to maintain their positions of dominance on

into the 20th century. Therefore, according to Pinard's theory,

third parties have not been able to achieve success in this re

gion of Canada. Third parties have been either soundly rejected

or have had their support confined to a small area of the prov

ince. In either case, third party support in the Maritimes has

been minimal because the electorate has not been alienated from

either major party (according to Pinard's theory).

However, in the following section, a closer examination

of party support will be conducted at the constituency level.

It will be shown that Pinard's theory is not always adequate in explaining third party support at this level. Also, suggestions will be made as to other factors which are salient in explain ing the fate of Maritime third parties, and which are not in cluded in Pinard's theory. 50

Pinard's Theory Applied to the Maritimes

It will be the general contention of ihis section that

Pinard's theory is not sufficient in itself to explain the

failure of third parties in the Maritimes. Although there has

been a strong two-party system in this region, this is not

enough to explain why third parties have generally had litt le

success. The persistent success of IIleft-wingli parties in the

industrial part of Cape Breton county, for"example, cannot be

explained by Pinard's theory. Instead, other factors such as

the social, economic, and cultural characteristics of the Mari

times have to be considered, in order to fully understand the

general failure of third parties.

The strength of P.E.I.'s two-party system has already been described in the preceding section. And on further anal

ysis, the strength of the two major parties seems to be evenly

spread throughout the province and not just concentrated in one

or more areas (Appendices C and F, pp. 211; 224). In no federal constituency has a major party failed to attain at least one

third of the vote. At the provincial constituency level, there have been only four instances when a major party has failed to

receive at least one-third of the vote: 1) in 1947, the Conser

vative party obtained 6 per cent of the vote in 3rd District 51

Prince (Assemblyman): 2) in 1970, the Conservative party received 32 per cent of the vote in 5th District Prince ~oun- cillor): 3) in 1955, the Conservative vote in 4th District

Kings (Councillor) was reduced to 30 per cent: and 4) in

1955, the Conservative vote in 4th District Kings (Assembly- man) was at 29 'per cent of the total vote. Therefore, no

P.E.I. constituency--either federal or provincial--has ever provided a major party with less than one-third of the vote, over several successive elections. In other words, the Island has not had a system of one-party dominance. And according to

Pinard's theory, this situation prevents the emergence of third parties because the electorate perceives the second major party as a suitable alternative to the one in office, and will turn to it when the party in office falls into disfavour.

Pinard's theory would therefore appear to explain the fact that third parties have generally failed to achieve electoral success on the Island. However,Pinard's theory is not a sufficient explanation for this phenomenon.

In the general elections preceding the 1921 federal 71 election, both major parties had consistently received more than one-third of the vote--just as they did in 1921 and

7lparliamentary Guide, 1909, 1912, and 1918.

. J 52

succeeding general elections. Yet, despite the existence of

a strong two-party system, the Progressive party was able to

attract 12 per cent of P.E.I.'s vote in 1921. At the constit-

uency level, this party obtained 22 per cent of the vote in 72 King's., 20 per cent in Prince, and 6 per cent in Queen "s •

Admittedly, the Progressive vote in P.E.I. was not as great as

it was in the western provinces, and the party did not win any

seats; however, the fact that 20 per cent of the electorate in

Prince, and 22 per cent in King's, decided not to vote for the

two traditiona1 parties cannot be overlooked.

Other factors besides Pinard's criteria have to be taken

into consideration in order to fu11y understand and explain the vote for the Progressive party. Perhaps the most significant factor was the organizing of farmers into a cohesive force which was occurring at that time. Professor MacKinnon claims that

P.E.I.'s farmers organized in 1919 to encourage more farm can- 73 didates to contest e1ections and not to form a party. How- ever, one of the Progressive candidates was Horace Wright, who had been elected President of the United Farmers of Prince

72A Labour candidate in the two-member constituency of Queen's won 8% of the vote in Queen's.

73MacKinnon, op. cit., p. 248. , 53 ..... - Edward Island (OFPEI) at its first annual convention on Jan

uary 25, .L9• 2 1. 74 Hence, although the UFPEI may not have

" o fficially" supported the Progressives (I have no informa-

tion as to whether it did or not) , at least sorne of the or S)-'Mf'Cl.Th i .... eol ganization's officials Byffi~a~ftesiBeà with, and supported, the

Progressive party. The momentum created by the farmers

organizing their own association in P.E.I., and all across

Canada, was probably the basic reason why the Progressives did

so well in the 1921 federal election. By being associated with

a new and vigorous movement, the party was able to attract a

considerable share of the electoral support of the movement's

membership. But since the Maritime economy was more diversified

than the one-crop economies of the western provinces, and since

the average Maritimer is much more "conservative" than the

average westerner (both factors are to be considered later in

this thesis), the farmers' associations in the Maritime pro v-

inces were not as strong as their western counterparts. All

three United Farmers associations in the Maritime region were

fo~ced to unite for economy's sake and to establish a joint

74 L.A. Wood, A History of Farmers' Movements in Canada (Toronto, 1924), pp. 303, 304. It should also be noted that the UFPEI did not form an association until September 29, 1920, and { not 1919 as MacKinnon claims. Loc. cit. 54 secretariat in the year fo11owing the 1921 e1ection, as their 75 memberships dwind1ed. The obvious shoW of support for a po1itica1 party--instead of pursuing economic objectives--by the President of the UFPEl and others probab1yhad much in- f1uence in causing UFPEl members who were traditiona1 supporters of the two major parties to withdraw their support from the UFPEl.

To sum up the case of the Progressive party, its brief success and u1timate fai1ure cannot be fu11y exp1ained by

Pinard's theory. According to this theory, the Progressive party shou1d not on1y have fai1ed to attain continued success, but shou1d a1so have fai1ed to achieve the degree of support that it did in 1921 because: 1) there was not a system of one- party dominance, and 2) neither major party was perceived by the e1ectorate to be an unsuitab1e alternative. lnstead, the appearance of the Progressive party in 1921, and the 12 per cent of P.E.l.'s e1ectorate who supported the party, can on1y be fu11y understood by taking into account the association between the new1y organized farmers' movement and the po1itica1 party.

Likewise, the u1timate fai1ure of the Progressive party and the farmers' movement in P.E.l. (and in the other two Maritime

75wood, op. cit., p. 304. 55 provinces) is closely related to the "conservative" political culture and the diversified economy of the region.

Similar arguments can be made in reference to the

CCF-NDP's general failure te achieve electoral success in

Prince Edward Island. That is, although there was a strong two-party system in existence before the CCF entered elections on the Island, the party was able to attain moderate success in sorne of the constituencies. Most of the CCF-NDP support has been in the federal constituency of Prince and in the provincial constituencies of this county. And it is probably more than a coincidence that, in the 1940's, the CCF in t h e prov~nce· was perh aps b est organ~ze. d"~n Pr~nce county. 76

As for the generally small vote that has been attained by the

CCF-NDP on the Island, such factors as the lack of finances, leaders, and a strong trade union movement, have to be considered along with the strength of the two-party system.

The total vote for each party in New Brunswick's federal and provincial elections (Tables 3 and 6, pp. 41 and

46), which was described in the preceding section, tends to obscure the fact that the pattern of a strong two-party system at the provincial level is not found in each constituency

76Interview with Mr. F. Young. 56

(Appendices A and D, pp. 201-204 and 215-218). When Pinard's

theory is applied, it is found to be inadeguate in several

constituencies.

Perhaps the best method for analyzing New Brunswick's

seemingly complicated voting pattern is to classify the coun- 77 ties by language composition, as Professor ThDrburn does.

There are three main groups of counties: 1) those which have

at least 70 per cent English-speaking composition: Albert,

Carleton, Charlotte, Kings, Northumberland, Queens; Saint John,

Sunbury, and York: 2) those with a mixture of the two lan-

guage groups: Restigouche, Victoria, and Westmorland: and

3) those with at least 80 per cent French-speaking composition:

Gloucester, Kent, and Madawaska. The practicality in making

this division lies in the fact that the French-speaking popul-

ation has voted almost ~ ~ for the Liberal party since

World War I.78

The first two groups of counties--the English-epeaking

counties and the mixed ones--have generally had a strong two-

77Thorburn, op. cit., p. 41 and p. 190.

78Before 1917, the Acadians split their vote between the two major parties. As they grew in numbers and became more self conscious (especially during the conscription issue), and as a disciplined party system emerged in the province, they swung ( their support to the Liberal party. H.G. Thorburn, "Perspective on Change in New Brunswick," in The Dalhousie Review, Vol. XXXIV, no. 2 (Summer, 1954), p. 153. 57

party system (see Appendices A and D, pp. 201-204 and 215-218) •

Both major parties have consistently received at least one-

third of the vote over several successive elections in each of

these constituencies. However, despite this strong two-party

system, third parties have made moderate showings in sorne of

these constituencies.

In the 1920 provincial election, and the 1921 federal

election, the success of the United Farmers of New Brunswick

(UFNB) and the Progressive party respectively cannot be ex-

plained by Pinard's theory. Instead, it is necessary to con-

sider the difficulties within the Conservative party, and the

reforming zeal of the UFNB. The Conservative party of the

province was misorganized at election time because the former

Conservative Premier, Mr. J.K. Flemming, had been found guilty

of political corruption by a Royal Commission, and the party

experienced difficulties in trying to find a new leader.79 In

response, a substantial portion of the electorate did not turn

to the Liberal party because of the emergence of a reform-

minded movement. The UFNB was growing rapidly in size: from

the 200 farmers who formed the UFNB on April 23, 1918 to about

( 5"6 79Pinard, The Rise of a Third Party, op. ci t., p. ~. 58

10,000 members in 141 branches in 1921, with their own official 80 journal. Besides advocating policies to improve the lot of 81 farmers, the UFNB sought greater economy in public expendi-

tures and reduced taxation, and was a IIprotest against 'extrav-

agant ways of government by party machines, headed to a large

extent by political adventurers'II .82 This combination of dis- 83 harmony within the Conservative party and the rapid growth

of the farmers' movement, which was dedicated to political re-

form and to IIcleaning-outll corruption within government, enabled

the UFNB party to achieve the electoral support that it did.

The fact that the Liberal party was a suitable alternative to

the Conservative party was not a sufficient reason for theelec-

torate to vote Liberal. On the contrary, a substantial portion

of the electorate voted for the UFNB party and the Progressive

party because of the large movement behind these two parties.

Likewise, the ultimate failure of the UFNB cannot be

solely attributed to the over-all strength of the two major

80Wood, op. cit., pp. 301, 302.

8lIbid ., p. 302.

82Ibid ., p. 344.

83The degree of disunity within the party, and the lack of leadership, was reflected in the fact that the Conservatives ( only contested 27 of 48 seats. Scarrow, op. cit., Table 64. 59

parties, as Pinard's theory.would suggest. Other factors

must be taken into consideration, such as the UFNB's deci-

S10n, not to f orm a centra l'1ze d po l"1t1cal organ1zat10n,,,84 wh' 1C h

could have provided the party with greater direction. Also,

the general failure of the UFNB's co-operative stores due to

deflation following the war, insufficient capitalization, and

suspicions held by the local stores toward the central office,85 must have sowed the seeds of disenchantment amongst the move- mentis supporters, and also caused· the electorate to doubt the

UFNB I s ability to accomplish its aims. with the weakening of the UFNB movement, along with that of the United Farmers in the other two Maritime provinces, the supporters of the UFNB party in 1920 had shifted back to their traditional political allegiances by the time of the. 1925 election.

The other third parties, which have'contested these constituencies, have not fared as weIl as the UFNB. Generally, the CCF-NDP received most of its small support in the more urbanized anàVor industrialized areas, in the English-speaking 86 communities. While it would be quite valid to argue that

84wood, op. cit., p. 344.

85 Ibid. , p. 304.

86 Thorburn, Poliëics in New Brunswick, op. cit., p. 102. In the interview with Mr. F. Young, it was pointed out that the 60 the strength of the two major parties and their brokerage style of politics prevented the CCF-NDP from making any consistenti head-way in the province, this.would not be a complete argument.

This is because it would not take into account the fact that the

CCF's socialist doctrine was too "radical" for the normally " con- 87 servative" people of Loyalist and Acadian background. Nor does it consider the party's lack of finances, organization, and leaders, the small and "conservative" trade union movement in 88 the province, and the peculiar voting system in New Brunswick.

United Mineworkers of America contributed to the CCF in the 1940's, through a check-off system of union dues, at the coal mines in Albert county (at Minto). And as can be seen in Appendix A, (pp. 201-204), the CCF received 14% of the vote in both 1944 and 1948 in Albert, which was a very good showing for the CCF, considering its weak support in the province.

87 Thorburn, Politics in New Brunswick, op. cit., p. 103.

88During the 1940's at least, each candidate had to sup ply his own ballots. These ballots could be easily spoiled by the simple expedient of shoving a pin down through a pile of ballots while behind the voting booth's curtain, or simply run ning a pencil across the ballots. Also, people would put into their pockets ballots of the other parties and take them away from the booth--thus necessitating the printing of more ballots than what would be normally required. This system probably affected the CCF the most because: 1) its finances were the smallest: and 2) the CCF did not have a sufficient number of scrutineers to watch every polling station for such illegalities. Interview with Mr. F. Young. For further information about the electoral system of New.Brunswick, see Thorburn, Politics in New Brunswick, op. cit., pp. 49, 41. 61

Similar comments could be made for the Reconstruction party and the Social Credit party in the mixed and English- ' 'h ,89 l speak ~ng count~es. T e Reconstruct~on party not on y came up against the strong a ttachments to the·. old parties, but was also hindered by not having a healthy party organization and su ff~c~ent" f'~nances. 90 As for the Social Credit party, "there is really no Social Credit party in New Brunswick, although occasional candidates have run under a Social Credit designation 91 since 1945." Its candidates were rejected because the Social 92 Credit party "had no roots in the province": that is, the party lacked leaders, finances, organization, or association with a movement, and its policies were not accepted by the

"conservative" electorate.

So far in this chapter, a third party's lack of finances, leaders, organization, and association with a movement, have been treated as causes which explain its failure to attain electoral success. However, in a fashion, these factors are

89For an explicit account of the Reconstruction party, see J.R.H. Wilbur, "H.H. Stevens and the Reconstruction Party," in The Canadian Historical Review, Vol. XLV, no. l (March,1964), pp. 1-28.

90Beck, Pendulum of Power, op. cit., p. 215.

91Thorburn, Politics in New Brunswick, op. cit., p. 105.

92Ibid ., p. 106.

J 62 also symptoms of deeper and more fundamental aspects of Mari- time society. For example, third parties have not possessed sufficient leadership chiefly because of the emigration of so many thousands of people from the region since the late l800's--and as will be shown in a later chapter, those who left were generally the more radical and vigorous e1ements of the population who were not close1y tied to the established system. Furthermore, the economic conditions within the Mari- times--to be examined in Chapters V and VI--have been the main cause for the internaI weaknesses of third parties and their electoral failure. Political resources continue to go to the two major parties and not to the seemingly weak and unattrac- tive third parties. Hence, third parties perpetually remain in a weak position.

The three French-speaking counties have had voting patterns significantly different from the English-speaking and mixed counties. Gloucester county has supported the Liberal party in every provincial and federal election since 1920

(Appendices A and D, pp. 201-204 and 215-218). The degree of support given to the Liberal party in provincial elections al . 93 most established a one-party dominance system at one t1me.

93strictly speaking, Gloucester did not have a system of one-party dominance according to Pinard's criteria--a system 63

In Kent county, the Liberals have won every provincial election and 13 of the 15 federal elections. As for the Conservative party, it has generally received a slightly higher percentage of the vote in Kent county than in Gloucester county.

Third parties have not been able to attract much support in these two counties despite the obvious weakness of the

Conservative party. Pinard's explanation for this would probably be that the situation approximates that of rural Quebec in the 1960 ' s, and that, when short~term grievances develop, a third party will be successful. However, even if Pinard's 94 theory is accepted as being true for Quebec, it should not be taken to be true for New Brunswick because the position of the French-Canadian in Quebec is substantially different from that of the Acadian in New Brunswick (or in the Maritimes in general) •

The basic difference rests in the fact that the

Acadians have been (and still are) a minority in New Brunswick.

where one of the two parties receives less than a third of the vote over several successive elections. However, Gloucester came extremely close to having a one-party dominance system~ the Conservatives received 26% of the vote in 1935, 3~/o in 1939, 36% in 1944, and 35% in 1952, and did not-even contest the 1948 election. 94 . For the critique of Pinard's theory, see supra., pp. 24, 25. 64

For various reasons, they have had to struggle incessantly in order to preserve and promote their community and identity, - 95 within the Anglo-Saxon created New Brunswick. In such a 96 situation, Professor Leslie has argued that an ethnie minor- i,ty can best promote its interests by co-operating with the majority group rather than by confronting it. This has been the position of the Acadian community over the years, and will be elaborated on in the next chapter on political culture.

Instead of forming their own political party and thereby tempt- ing the Anglophone population to exercise its potential power to their detriment, the Acadians have found it 'more harmonizing and productive to co-operate with the Anglophones within the two major parties. Hence, the Acadians in Kent and Gloucester, as weIl as those in the mixed and English-speaking dominated counties, have consistently supported the two major parties, especially the Liberàl party, because they were not (and are not) secure enough to support a third party.

95Further information on the political culture of the Acadians in this thesis will appear in the chapter which fol lows.

96p •M• Lesli~, "The Role of Political Parties in Promoting the Interests of Ethnie Minorities," in eanadian Journal of Pol itical Science, Vol. II, no. 4 (December, 1969), pp. 419-433. 65

Another very important reason why a third party has

failed to attain a wide measure of support in Kent and Glouces-

ter is that there has been no significant movement in these

counties. As far as socialist parties are concerned, the

trade union movement in New Brunswick has been especially weak

in the French-speaking areas, mainly because the French-speaking 97 population lives predominantly in rural areas where there is

little heavy industry. In the case of the Social Credit party~

these two counties have not had a large-scale Social Credit

movement over the years like that in the rural constituencies

of Quebec which voted Social Credit in 1962. The main reason

for this is derived from the fact that the Francophone ~quiva-

lent of the Social Credit movement--the Union des Electeurs and

its successor, the Ralliement des Créditistes--has been basic-

ally a Quebec-based movement and has only concentrated its ef-

forts in the French-Canadian areas of northern New Brunswick

near the Quebec border. Conseguently, the party has had its

small vote restricted to the French-Canadian areas of the prov- $","cces.> ince where the movement has had sorne 8:~is'EeliCe, and not in the

Acadian areas (which are essentially in Kent, Gloucester, and the mixed counties):

97H•G• Tho rburn, "The Political Participation of the French-Speaking Population of New Brunswick," A study prepared for the Ro al Commission on Bilin ualism and Bic~lturalism, (November, 1965 1 Table xx. .j 66 '\. - The French Canadians have been more responsive than the Acadians, probably because the Union des Electeurs is a French-Canadian organization with its headquarters in Montreal. The can didates they have put up at elections aIl bear French-Canadian names, and they always run in the F.rench-Canadian areas of the province .98

To sum up the voting pattern in Gloucester and Kent,

the electorate has overwhelmingly supported the Liberal party

and has only provided the Conservative party with minor sup-

port. Despite this, third parties have not been able to

develop in these counties because there has been no strong

socio-economic movement amongst the Acadians, and because the

Acadians are an ethnie minority within the political system.

Finally, third parties in these two counties have experienced

the same problems that exist elsewhere in New Brunswick: lack

of leaders, personnel, finances, and organization.

Madawaska county is a throw-back to the days before

the appearance of disciplined parties. IIIn striking contrast

to Kent and Gloucester, where the party attracts support and

the candidates may be non-entities, Madawaskan politics concen

trates on personalities.1I99 As Professor Thorburn showed,lOO

98Thorburn, Politics in New Brunswick, op.cit., p. 105.

9 9 Ibi d ., p. 72.

lOOIbid., pp. 69-73. 67

Madawaskans have tended to vote for candidates who are dynamïc

and out-spoken, regardless of party affiliation. This is

despite the fact that the county has the highest percentage of

French-speaking citizens--chiefly French-Canadians rather than . 101 Acad1ans. The county has not supported the Liberal party to

the same degree as have Kent and Gloucester counties, and in

recent elections the Conservative party has done quite weIl.

Perhaps the most persistent third party to run in Madawaska has

been the Social Credit party (see Appendices A and D, pp. 201-204~

and 215-218). It gets its main impetus from the larger move-

ment just across the border in Quebec, and the Social Credit . 102 paper Vers Dema1n. However, the movement and party in

Madawaska does not have the same roots that it does in Quebec~

it suffers from internaI weaknesses and from the fact that

Madawaskans are more influenced bY'personalities than by ideol-

ogies.

At the constituency level in Nova Scotia, there appears

to be three distinct groups, each with its own voting pattern.

The first group consists of the provincial constituencies

within Cape Breton county, and the federal constituency of Cape

101 Thorburn, Politics in New Brunswick, op. cit., p. 69. ( 102Ibid., p. 105. "",;::' J 68 , " , Breton South. The second group is composed of the provincial

constituencies within Halifax county, Pictou county, and Cum-

berland county, and the federal constituencies of Pictou, Cape

Breton North-Victoria, and Halifax. The third and final group

consists of the remaining provincial and federal constituencies.

The basis for making this classification rests on the degree of

support that a constituency and/or county has given to the CCF-

NDP or other IIleft-wingli parties. The first group of constit-

uencies has given very substantial support to such parties and

has even elected third party candidates in many elections. The

second group has provided third parties with a fair degree of

support, but has not elected any third party candidates (except

in the 1920 election), and has not supported them to the same

degree as the first group hase Finally, the third group con-

tains the largest number of constituencies and these constit-

uencies have generally possessed a strong two-party system~ the

only third party candidates to be elected in these constit-

uencies were sorne United Farmers in 1920.

The failure of third parties in the constituencies with

a strong two-party system can be partially attributed to the

strength of the two major parties--that is, the electorate's

strong attachment to the major parties, and the major parties'

possession of most available financial resources, leaders, and 69 organization. However, the strength of the two major parties is not the sole cause for the failure of third parties in these constituencies. For example, a third party's lack of finances, leaders, and organization--which are necessary to spread the party's ideas to the populace and to get the electorate's support--are just as important as, if not more important than, the strength of the two major parties in preventing a third party from achieving electoral success. Third parties have failed to acquire these resources essentially because of the region's economic diversity and poverty, and the emigration ofmany young people from the Maritimes--these will be explained more fully in Chapters V and VI. In a region like the Maritimes w-ith such strong "conservative" attitudes and strong traditions, a third party needs such resources in great abundance in order to get its message across. As one very influential man within the national CCF-NDP has sa id in reference to the general failure of the party in the Maritimes:

there is also what one may calI another very important reason [as to why the CCF~NDP has failed] and that is the very limited re sources of the CCF and the limited resources of the NDP. l know the Maritimes very weIl and l am confident that if we had had the funds to appoint sorne permanent organizers of high calibre and to purchase time on radio and television we would undoubtedly have succeeded in putting our program and message across. The basic problem arises out of the fact that the people in the 70

Atlantic Provinces simply do not know much about the NDP and did not know about the CCF • • • l am certain this has been one of the major reasons for our failure to make progress there. Obviously if people do not know anything about a political party, do not even rëcognize the name, have only a vague impression of who its leaders are, they are not likely to support it. This has led to a related difficulty. As a· result of aIl the things l have indicated we have not been able to attract quality candidates except in a few situations. Again, it is obvious that if the candidate is either not known or if his standing in the community is not very high he is not likely to get much support, particularly, in circumstances where the party is not known either.l03

In these constituencies with a strong two-party system,

the CCF generally had a few individuals who supported the party

financially and who attended CCF study clubs. However, most of

these people were never willing to run as CCF candidates. One ··104 man who was an exception to this was R. Loomer,. in Hants

county, and, as Càn be seen, in Appendix B (pp. 205-210), the

103correspondence with "Mr. S ."_

104R• Loomer was very active in organizing the CCF study clubs in the area and in organizing the party at election time. He also contributed financially to the party, as weIl as provid ing the CCF with a high degree of respected leadership. This was mainly due to his ownership of one of the best florist businesses in the Maritimes. F. Young interview. Further, the leadership ability of Mr •. Loomer was reflected in the fact that he was president of the Nova Scotia CCF for a time during the 1940's--one of the very few people to attain such a high posi tion within the party and who did not, at the same time, come from the coal mining areas or from Halifax. Dominion Archives of Canada, CCFFiles. 71

CCF had its most success in the constituency of Hants in 1945 and in Hants West in 1949--that is, among the constituencies with a strong two-party system. Hence, it would not be far -ft3T~heJ.. fcbdh to suggest that if the CCF had more men like Mr. Loomer in every constituency in the province, the party would have done much better,l05 despite the existence of a strong two- party system. But it was extremely difficult to build up constituency organizations since so many people would emigrate 'd" 106 d ue to the econom~c con ~t~ons.

As for the second group of constituencies--those which have provided third parties with a fair degree of support--they generally have been constituencies in urban and/or industrial areas. For example, Cumberland county contains the former coal- mining town of Springhill (presently in the provincial ri ding of

105Although the CCF was able to contest most federal ridings, especially during the 1940's, it did not have enough personnel and finances to contest many provincial constituencies. This was also true for the other two provinces. F. Young Inter view. Further, as Mr. L.E. Shaw has stated in his corres pondence: "The CCF party organization in Nova Scotia was never fully developed on a constituency basis. During its 1944-1948 hey-day, it did have a fairly complete organization in most Federal constituenciesi however, it was never very strong in such large rural constituencies as Inverness-Richmond, the South Shore, and the Valley. As for provincial constituenciès, a mu ch smaller percentage had anything like a complete organiza tion ." L .E. Shaw correspondence. 106Correspondence with "Mr. S." 72

Cumberland Centre): Pictou county contains sorne coal mines

and steel-works, as weIl as two large towns: New Glasgow

(Pictou Centre) and Pictou (Pictou West): the federal constit-

uency of Cape Breton North-Victoria contains coal fields: and

Halifax county contains a large urbanized population centered

in the cities of Halifax and Dartmouth. However, these areas

have not provided third parties with nearly as much support

as has the industrial area of Cape Breton county. The latter

area differs from the former areas in that it is more heavily

industrialized, almost totally dependent upon the coal-steel

industry, and it also has a large, cohesive, and politically

active trade union movement--these will be discussed in later l chapters.

Although these areas which have provided third par-

ties with a fair degree of support have generally maintained

a two-party system over the long-term, third parties have made

very noticeable intrusions on occasions. One wonders just how

strong the loyalties to the two major parties are when in 1945,

for instance, the CCF was able to come practically from nowhere

and do so weIl in these constituencies. Mr. Shaw feels that,

• • • there was always a fairly large floating vote available to the CCF and NDP from people . " who were not involved in, or particularly keen on, ( \ the old parties, but who felt that there was no satisfactory alternative party which had a real 73

chance of "making it". Therefore, most of them decided that they shouldn't "waste" their votes, which is guite an understandable point of view for the average not particularly politically oriented citizen.107

Thus, if the CCF or any other party had done better nationally, it would be safe to suggest that the more "conservative" Mari- timers would have followed the lead, despite the strength of the two major parties. This would not only be "the bandwagon effect but also the fact that in such a situation the [CCF] party and its leaders would have become much better known and a more credible political vehicle because of it.1I108 Certainly with today's rapid means of communication, more people are aware of the NDP, its leaders, and its policies, and this should increase the party's electoral support. However, one should not underestimate the ability of the two major parties to alter their policies in order to accommodate changes in public demands. This is especially true for the Maritimes where the two major parties readily do what is politically expedient in order to retain electoral support, and where the conditions are such that the NDP does not have the necessary resources to fully utilize the modern means of communication.

107correspondence with Mr. L.E. Shaw. 108 Correspondence with "Mr. S.". 74

The county of Cape Breton stands out alone not only in

Nova Scotia, but in the whole Maritime region. The degree of support it has given to 1I1e ft-wingll parties is ummatched by any other Maritime county. In 1920, three of the four elected

Labour candidates and one of the elected United Farmers candidates came from the four-member constituency of Cape Breton county.109 IILeft-wingll candidates continued to receive significant support in Cape Breton in succeeding provincial elections, and all CCF-NDP elected candidates have come from Cape

Breton county.ll@. Although no third party Member of Parliament was elected until 1940,111 1I1e ft-wing ll candidates had consistently attained a substantial share of the vote in Cape Breton

South since 1921 (Appendix E, pp. 219-223) •

There was a relatively strong two-party system in Cape

Breton county before the 1920 provincial election and the 1921

109parliamentary Guide, 1921. Also, the fourth Labour M.L.A. was elected in Cumberland, while two United Farmers can didates were elected in both Colchester and Cumberland, and one in Antigonish and one in Hants. Loc. cit. Finally, one of the elected Labour candidates in Cape Breton was actually a candidate for the Great War Veterans Association~ this associa tion nominated one candidate to the joint ticket to which the United Farmers also nominated one candidate and Labour nominated two candidates. The Halifax Herald, June 14, 1920, p. 1 and June 21, 1920, p.s. 110 Supra., p~ 43~ 44. 111 . Loc. c~t. 75 112 federa1 e1ection. But since then, the county has given support to the two major parties as we11 as to third parties

(the Progressive party, the Independent Labour Party, the United

Farmers, the Reconstruction party, the Communist party, and the

CCF-NDP). And as can be seen in Appendices Band E (pp. 205-210~ and 219-223), the voting pattern in Cape Breton South and in the provincial constituencies within Cape Breton county cannot be exp1ained by Pinard's theory. In fact, the persistent support provided to "1eft-wing" third parties can on1y be fu11y understood when the strength of the trade union movement and its association with 11eft-wing" parties are considered. The large concentration of trade unionists--main1y in the coa1 mines and in the steel mi11s--in Cape Breton county, and the strength of socia1ist and co-operative ideas possessed by them, have enab1ed third parties to achieve considerable success.

Meanwhi1e, in the other counties where the trade union movement has not been as strong, third parties have not done near1y as we11. For instance, the united Farmers of Nova Scotia was

1ike its counterparts in the other provinces in that it was concerned with po1itica1 reform and improved farm po1icies.

112 . Par1iamentary Guide, 1907, 1910, 1912, and 1918. 76

It was also like its counterparts in that after its initial formation, which was very rap~d and pervaded with idealism, the UFNS soon lost its fervour and declined sharply in num- 113 bers. The UFNS failed partially because the movement was not deeply embedded among the populace as the socialist move- 114 ment was in Cape Breton county.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that Pinard's theory is not a sufficient explanation for the failure of third parties in the

Maritimes. Admittedly, there has been a strong two-party system in the Maritimes, but this has not been the sole cause of third party failure. It did not, for example, prevent third parties from being extremely successful in Cape Breton county.

Nor did the two-party system prevent third parties from having a fair degree of success on occasions in other parts of the region. Finally, third parties have been noticeably unsuccess- fuI in French-speaking ridings of New Brunswick, despite the weakness of the Conservative party in those areas.

113Beck, The Government of Nova Scotia, op. cit., p. 168.

114For further information concerning the UFNS's failure, see infra., pp. 156-163. 77

It is true that Maritimers are generally strongly attached to the two major parties, but this is not the only reason why they have not supported third parties. .Other reasons are:

1) ~hird parties have generally been internally weak--that is, they have not had adequate leadership, fi nances, and organization--and have not been able to get their message across to the electorate:

2) with the exception of the industrial area of Cape

Breton, there has been an absence of a strong socio-economic movement in the Maritimes which would have provided third parties with a basis of support: and

3) the Maritimes are economically weak and diversified-- both factors make it difficult for a third party to achieve electoral success, as will be demonstrated in Chapter V. , .! '\. -

CHAPTER IV

MARITIME POLITICAL ETHOS AND THE LACK OF THIRD PARTY ELECTORAL SUPPORT

Introduction

The. Horowitz theory would interpret the lack of third

party support in the Maritimes as being the result of the

region's political culture. It would be pointed out that

Maritime political ethos had congealed by 1850 and that the

pattern of behaviour has remained substantially the same ever

since. This is because of the relative homogeneity of the pop-

ulation in ethnie origin, the small number of immigrants since

the political culture congealed, the large number of Maritimers

who have emigrated from the region, and the large proportion of

people living in small, rural communities. Accordingly, once

the practice of a two-party system had become established in

each Maritime province, it became extremely difficult for third

parties to move in and attract supporters. There is one ex-

ception to this and that is the industrial area of Cape Breton

Island. This area was subject to an influx of working-class

British immigrants who were well-versed in Fabian socialism, (

78 79 trade unionism, and labour politics. Their socialist ideas were accepted because of the presence of tory values in the political culture at the time of congealment (according to the Horowitz interpretation). However, the main criticism of the Horowitz theory is that it neglects indigenous socio economic factors and the changes that these factors undergo- these will be more fully discussed in later chapters.

Finally, since there has been no attitudinal or behavioural study done in the Maritimes with the purpose of analyzing the region's political culture and its pattern of political socialization, the bulk of the evidence in this chapter will be derived from historical-sociological studies and from Dominion Bureau of Statistics findings.

Ethnie Origin and Composition of Maritime Society

The Maritime population is primarily composed of descendants of immigrants who either came directly from Eng land, Ireland, and Scot land, or from these countries via New

England. Also, there is a significant proportion of the pop ulation who are descendants of the French-speaking Acadians.

The first Dominion census was taken in 1871 and it indicated that New Brunswick's population was 285,594 and that 79.2 per 80

cent of this was of British ethnie origin and 15.7 per cent

was of French ethnie origin.115 Also in 1871, Nova Scotials

population of 387,800 consisted of 79.5 per cent British

ethnie origin and 8.5 per cent French ethnie origine By 1961,

New Brunswick's population was 597,936 of which 55.2 per cent

and 38.8 per cent were of British ethnie origin and French

ethnie origin respectively. Nova Scotials population was

737,007 in 1961 and the comparative percentages were 71.3 per

cent and Il.9 per cent. The 1881 census taken after P.E.I.

entered Confederation in 1873 indicate that P.E.I.ls popula-

tion was 108,891 and consisted of 88.1 per cent British ethnie

origin and 9.9 per cent French ethnie origine By 1961, P.E.I.ls

population was 104,629 and consisted of'79.8 per cent British

ethnie origin and 16.6 per cent French ethnie origine As can be seen from these figures, the three Maritime provinces have been relatively homogeneous in ethnie origin, being either

British or French ethnie background. Also, the population of each Maritime province has not increased in size very much since 1871, but has remained rather static.

l15Census of Canada, 1961, 'Volume VII (Part 1) - General Review: Origins of the Canadian Population, Series 7-1 (Bulletin 7.1 - 6) Tables 2 and 3 of Tabular Section, et. passim.

,\ 81

The major change over the years has been the growth in absolute numbers and percentage of those with French ethnie origin: this has been especially true for the province of New

Brunswick. Professor Thorburn has found that there are three main reasons for this: 1) a greater percentage of Acadians live in rural areas which have higher birth rates than urban areas: 2) practically aIl of the French-speaking population is Roman Catholic in religion and this religion has been strictly opposed to birth control: and 3) the English-speaking citizens have been more likely to emigrate since they were traditionally better educated and could assimilate better in the wealthy parts of North America.116 Renee, the chief source of the increase of the Francophone population has been natural increase rather than immigration.

The size of the other ethnie groups has been quite small. In each province, the main non-British and non-French ethnie groups have been German and Dutch. For New Brunswick, those of German ethnie background formed 1.6 per cent of the population in 1871 and 1.2 per cent in 1961, while those of

Dutch background formed 2.1 per cent in 1871 and 1.3 per cent in 1961. Although both groups declined in percentage of total

l16Thorburn, IIperspective on Change in New Brunswick,1I op. cit., p. 150. 82

population, they both increased slight1y in abso1ute numbers.

In Nova Scotia, the German ethnic group composed 8.2 per cent

of the population in 1871 and 6.2 per cent in 1961, whi1e the

Dutch ethnic group formed 0.7 per cent in 1871 and 3.4 per

cent in 1961. And a1though the German group dec1ined in

percentage terms, it actua11y increased in abso1ute numbers

(31,942 to 45,441). During the 1881-1961 period in Prince

Edward Island, the size of the German ethnic group decreased

from 1.0 per cent (1,076).to 0.6 per cent (664), whi1e the

Dutch ethnic group increased from 0.3 per cent (292) to 1.2

per cent (1,288). A11 three provinces have experienced growth

in the size of their Scandinavian ethnic popu1ation--both in

abso1ute numbers and in percentage--from a very minute pres~

ence in the 19th century up to 0.8 per cent (4,901) in New

Brunswick, 0.3 per cent (427) in P.E.I., and 0.8 per cent

(5,731) in Nova Scotia~ in 1961. Fina11y, Nova Scotia's

Ita1ian ethnic group has increased to 0.5 per cent (3,719) in

1961from a mere 0.04 per cent (152) in 1871. Therefore, the

non-British and non-French ethnic groups have been very sma11

in size and their effect of the region's po1itica1 culture has

been minimal, as will be demonstrated in the next section.

The immigration and emigration records on the colonies, ( before 1867, were not a1ways complete and accurate, especia11y 83

in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. However, although

it is not always possible to provide precise figures for the

number of immigrants who came from a particular count,ry in a

specifie year, it is possible to provide a general account of

population flows. 117 From this, one may see that the ethos

in each Maritime province congealed in the 1800-1850 period,

and that the political ethos (to use Horowitzls terminology)

developed at that time is still prevalent today.

Before 1782, there was little immigration to the Mari-

times and t~e settlements were small in size and dispersed over

the region. Halifax, the largest settlement, had grown from

about 2500 in 1749 to 5,000-6,000 in 1783.118 Other than this,

l17The best account of P.E.I.ls settlement is probably A.H. Clark, Three Centuries and the Island: A Historical Geography of Settlement and Agriculture in Prince Edward Island, Canada,' (Toronto, 1959) ~ possibly the most complete description of New Brunswickls settlement up to 1900 is W.F. Ganong, liA Monograph of the Origins of Settlement in the Province of New Brunswick,lI in Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, Section II, 1904~ and for the Maritimes in general andVor Nova .Scotia, see J.B. Bird, IISettlement Patterns in Maritime Canada: 1687-1786,11 in The Geographical Review, volume XLV, number 3, (July, 1955), P.M. Hobson, Il Population an'd Settlement in Nova Scotia,lI in The Scottish Geographical Magazine, volume LXX, number 2, (September, 1954), M. ElIs, IISettling The Loyalist in Nova Scotia,lI an historical paper in The Canadian Historical Association (1934), (Toronto, 1935), and J.W. Grant, IIPopulation Shifts in the Maritime Provinces,1I in The Dalhousie Review, volume XVII, number 3, (Autumn, 1937).

l18Bird, op. cit., pp. 396,397. 84 about 1500 Lutheran Germans had sett1ed in Lunenburg in 1753,119 approximate1y 3,000 New Eng1anders had taken over the vacant 120 Acadian farm-1and in the Bay of Fundy area by the 1ate 1760's, about 700 Irish immigrants had sett1ed in the Cobeguid Bay 121 area, and about 1000 Yorkshire farmers had sett1ed around the present-day New Brunswick-Nova Scotia border during the ear1y 1770's.122

As can be seen, these settlements were sma11 in size and dispersed over the region. Therefore, it cannot rea11y be said that a society or a community existed since there was litt le communication among the different settlements and prac- tica11y no social institutions. Even within a sett1ement, there was 1itt1e social deve1opment, since each fami1y usua11y 1ived on a farm, separated from its nearest neighbour by the great expanse of forest.

Between 1782 and 1784, more than 12,000 Loya1ists had

1anded in present-day New Brunswick which became a separate province in 1784--previous1y, it had been administered as part

119Bird, op. cit., pp. 396, 397.

120Ibid., pp. 398-400.

121Loc. cit.

122Hobson, op. cit., p. 49. 85 . 123 of Nova Scot~a. The Loyalists originally settled in the south-western quarter of the provincei 124 however, there was much re-settlement and rapid population growth so that by 1812 the Loyalists, and their descendants, had expanded into the south-eastern quarter and the central part of New Brunswick, as weIl as to points along the North Shore and the branches of 125 the st. John River. The pre-1782 settlers, and the British immigrants who arrived between 1783 and 1812, were absorbed as part of the larger Loyalist community.126 Only the Acadians remained distinct since they tended to live in the northern part of the province or in compact communities that had little contact with the English-speaking population.127

The Acadians, by the way, had numbered about 12,700 in

1748 and were mainly to be found in the Bay of Fundy area, except for 1000 in each of Cape Breton Island and Prince Edward

123Ganong, op. c~. t ., p. 57 .

l24Ibid ., p. 55.

l25Ibid., pp. 57-62.

l26Ibid., p. 62.

12 7 Ibid., pp. 63, 64. 87 ticated form of society than that which existed in the Mari- times in 1782, the Loyalists were instrumental in establishing roads, social institutions, newspapers, etc., in the region.

With these devices, the Loyalists were able to make a very important imprint on the Maritime region; and, as Horowitz's theory would probably maintain, their political values and norms congealed to form the basis of Maritime pOlitical culture.

This will be dealt with in the section which follows.

In the late l8th century, British immigrants were already starting to land in the Maritimes; however, the period of great immigration did not occur until during the first half of the 19th century.

For Prince Edward Island, most of its vacant land was occupied as its population increased from 7,000 in 1805 to

47,000 in 1841,133 mainly due to immigration and also to the high fertility rates of the settlers.134 Although the Scots ,-. formed about 50 per cent of the population,135 they did not control the Island's society. Instead, the English and Loyalist descendants, who were the more prosperous and skilled elements

l33clark, ~. cit., p. 66.

l34Loc. cit.

l35Ibid., p. 91. 86 128 Is land. After the Expulsion of 1755, the Acadians grad- ua11y re-sett1ed in northern New Brunswick, north-western

P.E.I., south-western Nova Scotia, and sorne other sma11 areas which were not near the Eng1ish-speaking sett1ements.129

In Prince Edward Island, a 1798 census revea1ed that there was a population of about 4,300, consisting of 669

Acadians, 1814 Highland Scots, 310 other Scots, 500-1000

Loya1ists or their descendants, and the remainder were Eng-

1ish .130

Approximate1y 20,000 Loya1ists sett1ed permanent1y in

Nova Scotia, a10ng the southern coast of the province, in the

Bay of Fundy area, and in Ha1ifax.131 These areas grew rapid1y in size between the time of the arrivaI of the Loya1ists and the ear1y 1800's.

Whereas the pre-1782 sett1ers were basica11y farmers, the Loya1ists were more diversified in occupation: they were engaged in fishing, 1umbering, trade, and commerce, as weIl as in~,farming .132 Because they were accustomed to a more sophis-

128Bird, op. cit., p. 394.

129Ganong, op. cit., pp. 48, 49.

130C1ark, op. cit., pp. 58-61.

131E11s, ~cit., p. 108.

132B ~. r d , op. c ~ . t ., p. 402 • 88 of the population, controlled the Island's economy and de termined its norms of behaviour and values.136

Between 1812 and 1850, immigration to New Brunswick was quite active, reaching 6,000-8,000 in sorne years. How- ever, many of these immigrants moved on to the United States 137 or elsewhere. Most of the immigrants in this .period were

Irish (71% in fact), while the remainder were basically from

England, Scotland, and other British colonies.138 They generally settled in the older settlements and usually in towns rather than on farms.139 Meanwhile, the native Acadian population steadily grew in the northern part of the province, as the native English-speaking population increased in the southern part.140

Nova Scotia also received several thousand British immigrants during the first half of the nineteenth century, especially to the largely unsettled eastern portion of the

136Clark, op. cit., p. 91.

137Ganong, op. c~'t ., p. 74 .

138I bid., pp. 74-76.

139~., p. 79.

140Ibid ., pp. 85-89. 89 province. By 1838, about 25,000 Highland Scots had settled in Cape Breton Island while others had settled in the eastern '1 d 141 part 0 f th e ma~n an • The Highland Scots and the Irish who arrived in the Maritimes, during this period, had had to immigrate because of the harsh economic conditions in their h orne 1 an d s an d usua 11y arr~ve'd penn~'1 eSSe 142

Thus, by 1850, most parts of the Maritimes had been settled due to native population expansion and to immigration.

Since the immigrants of this period were essentially of

British ethnie origin, they re-enforced the development of

British-type institutions rather than the development of Amer- ican ideals.143 For example, whereas the Americans were more radical and egalitarian in their concepts concerning the individual and his position within society, the Loyalists and

British immigrants were more ascriptive in theirs. Hence, the Family Compacts remained in existence"and in power for quite awhile in the Maritimes, while they easily gave way to the pressures for egalitarianism in the United States. Also, the Maritime colonies had forms of government in which most of

l41Hobson, op. cit., pp. 50, 51.

l42Loc. cit.

143 Ganong, op. cit., p. 80. 90 the power and initiative was centered in the executive and in the legislative council, with a relatively weak assembly.144

" This was substantially different from the strong powers in- vested in the American House of Assembly, and the "separation of powers" concept practiced in the United States. Shortly after 1~50, the period of large-scale emigration from, and of little immigration to, the Maritimes began to start. This became more noticeable with the economic decline in the l870 l s and in later years~ hence, the values and norms in existence became more firmly entrenched.

The year 1881 marked the end of the influx of immigrants to Prince Edward Island and also the peak in the Islandls pop- . 145 u 1 at~on. The steady decrease in population, which did not reverse itself until the Depression years, was chiefly due to the emigration of people of Scottish and Irish ethnie back ground from rural areas.146 Even though the Acadians were mainly located in rural areas, they did not tend to emigrate

l44As Professor Beek points out, the British author ities decided to establish colonial governments based on the Virginia model which was less susceptible to republicanism than the models found in the New England colonies. The Government of Nova Scotia, op. cit., pp. 3-12.

'145Clark, op. cit., pp. 125, 126.

l46I bid., pp. 125-128. 91 as much as the British groups; they were like their counter-

parts in the other Maritime provinces in that they were more

cohesive and less likely to move out of their community into

the larger English-speaking community.

The five southern counties of New Brunswick, which were mainly English-speaking, showed a loss of population immediately after 1881, while the other counties with large

Aca d ~an' popu 1 a t'~ons con t'~nue dt'0 ~ncrease ~n,,147 s~ze. The basic reasons for this were the same as those for the other

Maritime provinces: the opening of the Canadian west, the greater economic attractiveness of the United States cities,148 and the general economic decline in New Brunswick.149 This general pattern of litt le immigration and much emigration per- sisted on into the twentieth century.150 Meanwhile, the

Acadians in the northern and eastern counties continued to grow in numbers because they tended to live apart from the larger English-speaking community, and were not affected very much by the changes in the provincial economy.15l

l47Ganong, op. cit., p. 95.

l48Ibid., pp. 96-98.

l49Thorburn, Politics in New Brunswick, op.~it., pp.13-20.

l50Ibid:." -:p. 17.

l5lI bid., p. 21. 92

Nova Scotia also suffered from large-scale emigration

and little immigration; its population increase s!nce the

1870's has been mainly due to natural increase. Furthermore,

the counties west of the Shubenacadie River (which divides

the province approximately in half) increased in population

by 7.5 per cent between 1871-1931, while the eastern counties

grew by 46.7 per cent. This increase was entirely in the

mining counties of Cape Breton, Pictou, and cumberland.152

Cape Breton county has the largest industrial concentration

in the Maritimes, as weIl as the highest proportion of foreign

workers. 153 Although Halifax county has been the growth centre

of the Maritimes since the Depression years, its economy has

been more diversified and less concentrated than that of Cape

Breton county. The relevance of this difference to the

electoral success of IIleft-wingli third parties in the latter

county and not in the former county will be dealt with later.

The lack of immigration to the Maritimes since around

1850 means that the native population has not had its tradi-

tional ideas and norms of behaviour challenged by, or subjected

to, lIoutsideli ideas and norms. Instead, the political ethos

l52Grant, op. cit., p. 292.

\, '--- 153Hobson, op. cit., p. 52. 93

that existed in the ear1y 1800's has been pro10nged into the

twentieth century, except for the Cape Breton industria1 area.

A1so, the 1arge-sca1e emigration that was so prevalent in the 154 1861-1931 years resu1ted in the traditiona1 patterns be-

coming more deep1y entrenchedi

Those who emigrated from the Maritimes have been, in most cases, the most radical e1ements in the population. They were the most venturesome men who might have had the IIdriveli to estab1ish the position of the Maritimes more firm1y. They have a1so been 1arge1y the poorer e1ement, with 1itt1e chance of a 1ive1ihood in the Maritimes. The conservative and we11-estab1ished e1ements are thus 1eft in the provinces. The resu1t has been natura11y to intensify the conservatism of the people of the Maritimes ••.. The strong and ambitious have not been content to exist on the submargina1 standard of living attainab1e in the Maritimes, and have departed for the West and for the United States, where many of them have succeeded.155

154Between 1861 and 1871, 30,000 young people emigrated from the three Maritime provincesi between 1871 and 1881, 40,000 young people emigratedi and in the 1881- 1931 period, 100,000 people emigrated from the Maritimes in each decade. Clark, op. cit., p. 122.

155Grant, op. cit., p. 289. 94

Political Culture and Socialization in the Maritimes

Maritime political culture is often characterized as being "conservative", or "traditionalistic","because of the strong attachment for institutions, values, and norms which had their origins in the early nineteenth century. The Horowitz theory would maintain that this is to be expected since the pop ulation figures show that Maritime culture had congealed by

1850. The theory would also interpret the presence of socialism in industrial Cape Breton as being the result of the presence of a tory streak at the time that the culture congealed, and of the spread of socialist ideas by the British immigrants in the late

19th and early 20th centuries. However, the general contention of this thesis is that the main cause of the "conservative"

Maritime political culture, and the failure of third parties outside of industrial Cape Breton, is indigenous socio-economic forces. This argument will be developed in the following chap terse But for now, the remainder of this chapter will look at the Horowitz theory as an interpretation of the Maritime polit ical culture.

Non-French and Non-British Ethnic Groups

As indicated in the previous section, the "other" ethnic groups in the Maritimes have been very small in size and, 95

undoubtedly because of this, they have been assimilated into

the dominant political culture. The lack of self-

consciousness among the members of the German group (the larg-

est "other" ethnie group) has been explained as thus:

Germans were among the earliest settlers in many parts of Canada. The fluid social organization of frontier communities and the similarities be tween the German and British cultures led to a rapid loss of German ethnie identity, except where groups were geographically isolated. Many people of German ethnie origin have participated and are now participating in Canadian political life with no feeling that they are representing a particular group.156

The suspicions and hostilities directed towards the Germans

during two World Wars have also played a part in causing them

not to exert their ethnie characteristics.157 Therefore, the

largest of the "other" ethnie groups in the Maritimes has not

been pof:[tically active as a cultural group, but has been

substantially assimilated into the dominant Anglo-Maritime

political culture as have the smaller "other" ethnie groups.

l56Canada, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Bi culturalism, Volume IV, Ottawa, 1970, p. 83.

1 / l57LOC • cit. 96

The French Ethnie Group

POlitically, the French ethnie group, composed chiefly

of Acadians, has been an ethnie minority which has had to

function within the political institutions created and domin

ated by the British ethnie majority. This is unlike the situa

tion in Quebec where the French-speaking Quebecers are a major

ity and dominate the provincial government. Therefore, it is

probably unfair to test Horowitz's theory in reference to the

Acadians since their values did not become the political ethos

of a political system. If it was plausible to use Horowitz's

argument, the argument would emphasize that the degree of lib

eralism, tempered with corporate-organic-collectivist concepts,

possessed by the Acadians was due to the values of the original

immigrants who arrived from south-western France in the early

l600's--a feudal but parochial France without the degree of

absolutism and centralism which existed during most of the

l700's. But to make such an argument would be to ignore much

more sa'lient factors: the economic conditions of the Maritime

region, the traumatic effect of the Expulsion, and the rela

tions with the Anglo-Maritimers. Thus, the fact that the

Acadians have had to co-operate with a dominant ethnie group has meant that the fragmentation concept inherent in Horowitz's 97 theory has not been able to unfold as it would have done if

the Acadians had been the dominant group within a political

system.

A brief look at the Acadian cornrnunity illustrates how

strong indigenous forces have been. After the Expulsion of

1755, many Acadians gradually returned to the Maritime region

and settled mainly in the less productive parts of the region

(especially in northern New Brunswick). They settled in these

areas since the English-speaking settlers had occupied the most

productive areas, and since the Acadians did not want to chance

another Expulsion by living too close to the Anglophones. The

harsh geographic and economic conditions within which the Aca-

dians have lived since their return have fostered the develop-

ment of such liberal values as individualism and egalitarianism.

Likewise, these conditions along with the lasting remembrance of

the Expulsion have caused the Acadians not to promote their col-

lective interests in an aggressive fashion. Instead, they have

sought to promote their identity in a rationalistic way by seek-

ing compromise rather than confrontation in or der not to cause

the ethnic majority to react along ethnic lines.

A simple and honest rural people who lack the +eaders who normally corne from such urban pro fessions as law, medicine, and business, they want above aIl to be left alone to live their ( . lives as they wish. They are conscious of the 98

superior power of their English-speaking neighbours and they wish to take no action that might provoke them in retaliation. They are happy to see their representation rising in the legislature, the civil service, and elsewhere, but they are patient and cautious. Time, they feel, is on their side, as their population is growing--so why provoke con flict when they are coming into their own anyway, albeit sl'owly? In any case, the Acadian farmer woodsman is more interested in his farm, his family, and the conditions of the local road than in any question of the rights of his race. He may subscribe to L'Evangeline and generally approve of the attempt it makes to advance the Acadian cause, but he is little interested in doing anything about it. Acadian history is that of a helpless people, buffeted about by superior -forces and somehow sur viving by a non-violent acquiescence that meant a life of isolation, simplicity, and rugged labour. There is no spirit of aggression here, rather an element of humility.158

This is not to say that Acadians have ignored their heritage and identity becausle it is quite obvious that they 159 have note However, they have not sought to promote their collective interests in an aggressive and emotional manner:

l58H•G • Thorburn, "The Political Participation of the French-speaking Population of New Brunswick," A study prepared for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, November, 1965, p. 31.

l59For examples of the institutions and associations formed by the Acadians to promote their interests, see M.-A. Savoie, "Varieties of Nationalism: (1) The Acadians, A Dynamic Minority, Il in C.F. MacRae, ed., French Canada Today, (Sackville, N.B., 1961), pp. 81, 82: and Thorburn, "The Political Participa tion of the French-speaking Population of New Brunswick, Il .2E. ci t ., pp. 3-6. l 99 instead, they have placed greater emphasis on rationalism and

compromise because of their pos.ition within Maritime society.

Generally, the promotion of Acadian interests has been

performed by a small elite composed basically of the clergy

and a few businessm~l and lawyers.

This myth [about the Acadians] has centered on the expulsion as a dramatic symbol of their martyrdom and their survival and has been associated with devotion to the Church which has been their source of comfort in distress. Through the years of pioneer adversity, the Church served as a constant agent of unit y for them. It, ironically, was also within the Church that the battle was fought to determine whether the Aca dians were to retain their French language and customs, or to assume the English-speaking but Irish culture of the hierarchy of the Maritimes. They won their battle within the Church, but to do so they had to organize strong pressure groups and develop an awareness of themselves as a distinct people. Their victory in the realm·of the Church, where they were bound to win by sheer weight of numbers, gave them the confidence and the organization to de fend what they considered to be their rights in other spheres of life.160

As a result, the Acadians established social institutions and

associations based on a strong allegiance to the Catholic reli-

gion, a determination to preserve the French language, and a

160Thorburn, "The Political Participation of the French speaking Population of New Brunswick," op. cit., pp. 2, 3. ( 100 type of emotional or romantic patriotism.16l Thus, there are sorne corporate-organic-collectivist values to be found within the Acadian community. Such groups as La Société l'Assomption and La Société Nationale des Acadiens are designed to promote the collective interests of the Acadian people and have been created and directed largelyby the small elite. However, as previously indicated, the Acadians have not felt secure enough to exert their identity in an aggressive manner. The Acadians have been reluctant to stress race as an issue, especially in politics~ instead, they havebehaved in a rather cautious and parochial manner by supporting" the major party which promises to do the most for the particular locality. Thus, despite the potential for the development of socialism because of the presence of corporate-organic-collectivist values (according to

Horowitz's theory), no socialist third party has developed in, or received substantial support from, the Acadian community.

The reason why no socialist third party (or any other type of third party) has received very much support in the Acadian areas is the position of the Acadians as an ethnic minority within a political system.162 To come out and openly support a third

l6lThe Rev. Clement Cormier, "The Acadian Outlook (II)," in MacRae, op. cit., p. 28.

l62Another reason is the fact, mentioned in the previous chapter and by Professor Thorburn, that the Acadians have lived 101 party, which was not also supported by the Anglophones, would invite the ethnie majority to retaliate.

Admittedly, most Acadians have voted for the Liberal party since the conscription issue of the first World War. But a substantial number of the Acadians have supported the Con- servative party, and the Liberal party has received considerable support from the English-speaking population. In other words, both parties have sought the support of both. ethnie groups and have received it. The Acadians, because of their past experiences and accomplishments, perceive that they can best promote· their collective interests by working within the established party structure.

It is not pretended that a politician belonging to an ethnie minority need mask the attractive ness of his party to his own group, but it is asserted that he must scrupulollsly avoid any ~ndication that its interests conflict with those of the rest of the population ~ bloc. Other- wise he simply courts the mobilization of the majority against the minority. For this reason it is assumed . . • that an ethnie minority, so long as it adheres to a strategy of parliamentary action (as opposed to IIdirect actionll or a strategy of confrontation), must avoid provoking political controversy on matters relating to the 163 promotion of its interests as an ethnie minority. essentially in rural areas which have fostered the development of individualism and parochialism. These areas have not experi enced a sudden, rapid change in their socio-economic structure7 such changes guite often result in the development and acceptance of socialist and other concepts. This will be discussed in greater detail in the chapter which follows.

l63Leslie, op. cit., p. 421. 102

By co-operating with the Anglophones within the political

structures (including the major parties), the Acadians have been able to advance their particular interests in other spheres of society.164

To sum up then, the Horowitz theory cannot really be used to explain the political culture of the Acadians nor the

lack of third party support in Acadian areas. According to this theory, the values and norms possessed by the main founding group of settlers determines the political ethos of the new society, and subsequent settlers or members of minority ethnie groups are absorbed into the dominant political ethos. How- ever, in the Maritimes, the Acadians have not been totally assimilated but have remained a very distinct group in many spheres. Furthermore, the fact that the Acadians did not find a new society but have had to be part of a larger society and political system makes the Horowitz theory unsuited as an explanation of the Acadians. Instead, the political values and norms of the Acadians have been primarily determined by indigenous socio-economic conditions and by their relations with the

Anglophones. These factors also explain why the Acadians have supported the two major parties and have shunned third parties.

l64 l' L es ~e, op. cit., pp. 423-431. 103

The British Ethnie Group

The Horowitz theory would maintain that the Anglo-

Maritime political ethos consisted primarily of bourgeois lib-

eral principles, along with sorne tory principles, which were present at the time of congealment. The time of congealment would be the 1780-1850 period during which time the Maritime

region experienced its main influx of settlers. This argument would then be supported by illustrating the values and norms possessed by the settlers.

First of aIl, there were the New Englanders who arrived prior to the coming of the Loyalists:

It was they who demanded and obtained the first representative assembly in what is now British North America, who published the first news paper, and who thus provided for future Nova Scotians the two chief vehicles of self expression, the forum of the House of Assembly and the 'pages of the public press.165

The reason why the pre-Loyalists sought these liberal institutions was that they had come from a society--New England--where such institutions were common. For the most part, they were

farmers who had owned their own land (as opposed to a feudal

165n.c. Harvey, "The Intellectual Awakening of Nova Scotia," in G.A. Rawlyk, editor, ·Historical Essays on the ,Atlantic Provinces, (Toronto, 1967), p. 104. 104

land system) and who had developed such liberal values as

individualism and egalitarianism. Furthermore, approximately 166 8,000 of these New Englanders were puritans whose religious

outlook coincided and re-enforced these liberal values.

The Horowitz theory·would then probably point out that

liberal values were more deeply entrenched with the great influx

of Loyalists. These Loyalists were instrumental in the estab

lishing of cornmunities, social institutions, and communications

so that their influence was quite substantial. They were able

to do this essentially because many of them were well-educated and talented men (professionals, merchants, military men, etc.);

they were therefore able to develop Maritime society on the basis of their value structure since previously there had been an absence of such skilled men.167 However, since these men had been loyal to the British crown and were more conservative than

those who had rebelled in the American Revolution, their values were more "whig" liberal than "democratic" liberal.

The essence of the difference between Il whig Il liberal and

"democratic" liberal is that in economic terms the former refers to organized economic expansion, with the economy being in the

l66Harvey, op. cit., p. 104.

l67Hartz, op. cit., p. 243. 105 control of a mercantile, bourgeois oligarchy, while "democratic" liberal refers to economic expansion by less centralized control and direction and by more open competition. Politically, the

"democratic" liberal values egalitarianism and individualism, and is more radical and less moderate in his demands. On the other hand, the "whig" liberal does not go quite as far in his demandsi he prefers to restrict equality to the mercantile oligarchy and advocates moderation, compromise, and a certain reverance for the existing order. Also, whereas the Il whig Il liberal emphasizes good government and a well-ordered society, the

"democratic" liberal tends to emphasize the individual's pursuit of happiness under a government which sees that the individual has an equal opportunity to attain this end.

There are many examples of liberalism which were present at the time of congealment. For one thing, political representatives came from the particular community that they represented.

Maritimers did not accept or develop the old tory practice of having representatives representing any constituency in the 168 realm. Another example would be the numerous newspapers which

l68G . Dickie, "Cultural Origins in Colonial Life: Part II," in The Dalhousie Review, Volume XXXVII, number 2, (Summer, 1957), p. 171. 106 were established at this time. They strove for social reform, debated social issues, and challenged the authoritYi the prime example of this would probably be Joseph Howe and his reform- minded journalism. It was not uncommon for competing newspapers in a community to carry on their rivalry by supporting 169 different political candidates, or major parties. One other example of liberalism would be the practice of holding open nomination meetings, in each community, where political candi 170 dates would speak, debate, and be heckled before the PUblic.

Thus, early in the 19th cen tury, the practice "of political rivalry was instilled in every community. An~ as the two disciplined parties gradually emerged in the latter half of the

19th century, this liberal practice of open competition became institutionalized in the party system.

The Maritimes were not to be as "democratic" in political style as the United states because of the influence of

169perhaps the most significant rivalry was that be tween the Herald and the Chronicle, in Halifax, which lasted until just after World War II. See S. MacGlashen, Two-Party Theory and Its Application to Nova Scotia Provincial Politics, Dalhousie University, unpublished M.A. thesis, 1964, pp. 42, 43.

170J .M• Beek, "The Nomination of Candidates in Nova Scotia," in The Dalhousie Review, Volume XXXVI, number 4, (Winter, 1957), pp. 363-364. 107

whiggism. Due to their unpleasant experiences with repub-

licanism, the Loyalists were adamant in their efforts to

prevent republicanism, or democratic liberalism, from becoming

established in the Maritimes. They consciously looked to the

British government as a model upon which to base Maritime 171 colonial governments. The Loyalists and British immigrants were guite successful in imposing their whig· values on Maritime

society. By attaining influential positions, they were able to

articulate their values and "they soon found a profitable role

for themselves in saving the colonial masses from the spectre 172 173 of republicanism and democracy." The Family Compacts were influenced significantly by the dominant ideas prevalent

in Britain at the time since they read magazines from that coun- 174 try, and generally looked towards the British system for guidance. The significance of this cornes to light when it is

remembered that it was members of the middle and upper classes

l7lM• ElIs, "Loyalist Attitudes," in G.A. Rawlyk, 0p. ci t ., p. 54.

l72Hartz, op. cit., p. 243.

l73For a graphie outline of the hereditary relation ships of a Nova Scotian Fami ly Compact, .see Appendix C of Beck, The Government of Nova Scotia, op. cit., p. 349~ see also Thorburn, Politics in New Brunswick, op. cit., p. 5~ and MacKinnon, op. cit., pp. 37, 38.

l74Harvey, op. cit., p. 105. 108

who had the ability to run for office and to influence the

electorate.

To make the argument complete, the Horowitz theory

would single out the method by which responsible government

was attained in the Maritimes. In the late l840's, Maritime

society had developed to such an extent that many politicians

felt that they could (and should) govern themselves in local

matters and that the'executive should be held responsible to

the elected representatives. Those who sought such a liberal

reform in the Maritimes did not resort to violence, nor did

they seek to sever the connection with the mother country.

Instead, these reformers (such as J. Howe who was a son of a

Loyalist) sought to bring about liberal ideals by compromise, moderation, and constitutional means~ ,"the Reformers wanted nothing less than the full application of the spirit of the

British system which, to them, was a system of responsibility

to the people extending through aIl departments of govern ment.,,175 Reformers such as Howe desired to be a part of the

British empire, traditions, and thought, and they felt that this could best be accomplished by removing the colonial

l75Beck, The Government of Nova Scotia, op. cit., pp. 75, 76. 109 system and having responsible government like that in the mother country.176

The political style which developed in the l800's was based on individualism and strong rivalry. A person would be elected on the basis of his background and persona lity, and on his ability to convince the electorate within his constituency that he could deliver a greater share of the public purse to them. Ideological differences were relatively insignificant in this age of liberalism, when a politician was expected to appeal to the whole electorate rather than to a particular socio- economic c'lass. Politics became competitive as politicians and various groups debated the issues on the hustings, in the newspapers, and in the Assemblies. with the emergence of two disciplined parties, these parties continued to reflect this political style. That is, the Conservative and Liberal parties have been highly competitive in their attempts to appeal to most segments of society. Neither party has found itself bound solely to any particular class or socio-economic group; instead, over the years, both major parties have shifted their policy orienta- tions and ideological perspectives in order to remain in tune

l76J .M• Beek, "Joseph Howe: Opportunist or Empire Builder?", in G.A. Rawlyk, op. cit., p. 143. 110 with public opinion. By incorporating new policies which are reflective of public opinion, these two parties have been able to retain their competitive positions and pre-eminence. The

"democratic" nature of these major parties is tinged with values of moderation and ascription; hence the Conservative and Liberal parties generalJy wait for public opinion to shift before they will advocate a change, and changes are usually moderate in scale, retaining sorne traditional elements, rather than radical and completely anew. Also, change in policies is usually decided by the leaders of the parties who generally have the final sayon when to adopt a change, and how far the change will go.177 The Horowitz theory would therefore maintain that the political style of the nineteenth century has continued on into the twentieth century.

Finally, the Horowitz theory would undoubtedly explain the presence of socialism in industrial Cape Breton in the following way. Since Maritime political ethos had congealed by

1850, the presence of socialism is explained by the presence of sorne tory values at the time of congealment, and by the spread of socialist ideas by the British (and other European)

l77For a more elaborate description of the development of the party system"and the political style, in the Maritimes, see references in foO"tnote no. 62, supra., p. 35. "', III 178 immigrants at the turn of the century. This general con-

cept can be seen functioning at the more particular level in

the severe (and often violent) conflict between labour and

management in the coal and steel areas in Nova Scotia, which

came to a head in the 1920's.179 The corporate-organic-

collectivist ideas of toryism were to be found in the method

by which the coal industry was organized (especially that of

the large British Empire Steel corporation) :the managements

and owners provided company stores, housing, etc., for their

employees, and operated these company "properties" without

consultation with the employees who used them. The industry

itself was managed in an oligarchie fashion for the benefit

of the corporations--and especially that of the investors, and

the employees were treated as instruments to be manipulated in

order to maximize the industry's productivity. The leftist

reaction (mainly voiced by the U.M.W. and recent British im-

migrants) against the policies of management was expressed in

similar corporate-organic-collectivist terms«: the establishment

of co-operatives and credit unions for the collective welfare

of the miners; a concern for better living conditions for the

l78See quotation no. 26, supra., p. 14.

l79E . Forsey, Economie and Social Aspects of The Nova Scotia Coal Industry, (Toronto, 1926), et. passim. 112

working-class as a whole; and the general concept of the miners

forming a class within an organic body and who were pitted

against.an oligarchie class at the top.

It will now be shown that the Horowitz theory fails to

be a sufficient explanation for the general weakness of social

ism in the Maritimes, and for its relative strength in Cape

·Breton county. As previously mentioned, the contention of this

thesis is that indigenous socio-economic factors have moulded

Maritime political culture and determined the region's polit

ical behaviour.

The region's economy will be considered in greater

detail in a later chapter. For now, it will be sufficient to

say that the economy is quite diversified and of small-scale.

The exception to this would be the heavy industry in Cape

Breton county and the large concentration of workers in the

coal fields and steel mills. Whereas the people outside of

industrial Cape Breton developed the liberal philosophy of

laissez-faire, and the "self-made man" myth, because they

could move from one economic endeavour to another quite easily,

the people in industrial Cape Breton developed socialist or co

operative ideas. They did this because of the almost complete

dependence on the coal and steel industry, and because of the ( need of security when the industry suffered a lag. Also, the 113

rapid rate at which the area increased in size, 1891-1911,

meant that living conditions were not adequate, resulting in

bitter criticism of those in charge.Consequently, co-

operative stores, trade unions, and socialist ideas have been

stronger in industrial Cape Breton than in other parts of the

Maritimes.

This is not to say that Horowitz's explanation has

nothing to contribute to understanding why socialism is strong

in industrial Cape Breton. From Mr. F. Young's experience with

the Maritime CCF in the 1940's:

There is no question that a lot of the leadership came from people who had come from Britain, and who had the answers. And who made i t very c lear that they felt the working-man should vote CCF, just as they had voted Labour in Britain. Those people gave a large measure of leadership in the local unions, among the miners.180

Professor Forsey's study also revealed that British immigrants

in the very early 1900' s were primarily responsible for pu·shing . t d .. 181 f or more v~gorous ra e un~on~sm. However, socialism was

able to develop in industrial Cape Breton primarily because of

indigenous economic forces, with the aid of immigrant socialists.

If there had not been a concentration of workers dependent on

(" l80Interview with Mr. F. Young. 181Forsey, op. cit., p. 21. 114

the coal and steel industry, nor the miserable living condi-

tions, the British workers (who came because of the opportunity

to work in the developing industry) would have found their

efforts to spread socialism and to speak in class terminclogy

ignored.

Another criticism of the Horowitz theory is that it does

not say if a socialist party will develop or if one of the major

parties will adopt socialist policies.182 Thus, for example,

the major parties have quite often advocated socialist policies

albeit in the form of state welfareism as opposed to full social

ownership and control of industries, etc. Between 1926 and

1939, the amount of governmental expenditure for each of the

Maritime Provinces increased more than 100 per cent~ in Quebec,

the comparable increase was 70 per cent, and in the other prov-

inces it was less than 50 per cent.183 This action by the

Maritime governments probably was very significant in preventing

discontent and alienation towards the two major parties from

developing to such a degree as to cause the electorate to turn

to a third party. Furthermore, the rapid decline of CCF

182 . Supra~, p. Il and p. 15.

183s .A • Saunders, "The Economic History of the Maritime ( Provinces," A study prepared for the Royal Commission on Dominion Provincial Relations, (Ottawa, 1939), p. 58. 11~.

support in the mid-1940's, after its peak years in the early

1940's, is partially explained by the policies adopted by

Prime Minister King, as weIl as by the societal and psycho-

logical changes resulting from the war:

During the war years one coûld feel an inarticulated but important tendency in Canadians reaching for sorne fundamental changes that could justify the costs and sacrifices of the wa=. When the war was reach ing its end this popular desire for change was transformed into a show for consolidation. l had the feeling that the war and aIl it entailed sapped . the energy of the Canadian community to the point where it wished to have sorne undisturbed peace and could not be excited to a new major victory. This was aided by a. . • • related factor which was the brilliant adaptation of the King policies to the widespread desire for sorne changes and sorne commit ment to full employment and to better social welfare. The relatively progressive program which King and his party presented in, before and during the 1945 election gave the Canadian people a feeling that they could have necessary changes without the deeper commitment which the CCF policy required.184

And one must not under-estimate the effects of the national

campa~gn, 185 to smear an d d'~scre d'~t the CCF party an d ~'t s 1 ea- d

ers. The charges that the CCF was communist and intent on

taking away individual opportunities and rights appeared almost

l84correspondence with "Mr. S."

l85For a fuller account of this campaign, see G.L. CapIan, "The Failure of Canadian Socialism: The Ontario Experience, 1932-1945," in The Canadian Historical Review! Volume X:ç,IV, .number 2, (June, 1963). 116 daily in booklets and leaflets, on radio broadcasts, and in newspapers. 186 And because of the lack of finances, the CCF 187 was not able to counter this attack. IIThis campaign was undoubtedly the major reason for the widespread rejection of the CCF.1I188 Since the CCF was less firmly established in the Maritimes and Quebec than elsewhere, it was probably more affected in these regions by this national campaign. But where the party was more firmly established such as in Sas- katchewan, and industrial Cape Breton, the CCF did not suffer nearly as much. Likewise, it would be safe to'suggest that if the economic conditions in most areas of the Maritimes had been like those in industrial Cape Breton, the CCF would have been a. fq,;-T more firmly apa~t of the political system and less affected by the smear campaign.

In conclusion then, the Horowitz theory provides sorne insight as to why socialism and socialist parties have been weak in the Maritimes. Certainly, the values and norms brought by immigrants to a new land (especially those possessed by the dominant group of settlers) have an effect on the society's

l86correspondence w:th IIMr. S.II

187 J:,oc ~_ ,cit • 188 Loc. cit. 117 political ethos. However, the indigenous conditions as weIl as the relations with other political systems have the prime determining effect on t~e society's political ethos. This is what the Horowitz theory neglects to emphasize since it fails to account for the saliency of changing socio-economic condi tions within a society.

When explaining the failure of third parties in the

Maritimes, it is aIl very weIl to point to the region's con servative political culture and the clos~.attachment to the two major parties. However, it would not be completely accurate to attribute this to the dominant bourgeois liberal values possessed by the sèttlers in the late l700's and early l800's. This is because such an explanation would neglect the role played by socio-economic forces at that time and ever since. In the case of the Acadians, their political behaviour have been primarily determined by their relations with the larger Anglophone population as weIl as by indigenous socio economic conditions.

In explaining the success of socialist third parties in industrial Cape Breton, one could stress that the presence of a tory streak at the "time of congealment meant that the political culture had a potential for socialism to develop, and 118 l. that this occurred when the British socialis~s arrived at the

turn of this century. This type of argument, however, neglects

the very rapid industrial.ization and urbanization which occurred

a·t that time and which were primarily responsible for creating a

situation for socialism to develop. This latter argument will

be more fully developed in the chapter which follows.

( CBAPTER V

ECONOMIC CONDIT,IONS WITHIN THE MARITIMES AND THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MARITIMES AND CENTRAL CANADA: WHY BAS THERE BEEN AN ABSENCE OF CLASS OR GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS?

Introduction

The Maritime economy never fostered a high level of

class-consciousness nor an indigenous socio-economic movement

which functioned outside of the two-party system. The first

phenomenon will he examined in this chapter, while the second

will he looked at in the chapter which follows. In explaining

these two phenomena, there are severa1 economic determinants

held in common (e.g. economic diversity) and they will he fully

examined in this chapter.

This chapter will il1ustrate the characteristics of the

Maritime economy, showing why no economic grou~-consciousness

has developed outside of the two-party system except in the

coal/steel areas. The conditions conducive to the rise of third

parties (according to Macpherson's theory) therefore have not

existed in the Maritimes; this was especially true for the ( period under study (1920-1970) and more particularly during the

119 120

1920's, 1930', and 1940's when third parties arose in western

Canada. Instead, the economic conditions within the Maritimes

have not caused the populace (or a sizable proportion of it) to

think and act as a political group outside of the two-party sys

tem, but have fost'ered a high degree of parochialism.

The Maritime Economy

Statements continually appear bemoaning the poverty or backwardness of the Maritime economy, and how Maritimers have been neglected by central Canadian financiers and politicians.

Yet, despite these statements and the statistics to prove most of them, Maritimers have not vented their anger by supporting a third party. Instead, when severe economic grievances have developed, they have been articulated chiefly through the two major parties, and have not been permitted to develop into class-consciousness and eventually into support for a third party. An examination of the nature of the Mari time,;'economy goes a long way to understanding political behaviour in the region. And since ,third parties arose in western Canada· during the 1920's, 1930's, and 1940's, most of the economic comparisons will be made in reference to these years in order to show why comparable parties did not develop in the Maritimes. 121

The essence of the development of third parties in

Alberta, according to Professor Macpherson's theory, was the large economic class of people dependent on agriculture. The

Maritimes were not like the prairie Provinces since they had a.more diversified economy at that tirne. Table 7 provides an indication of how much more diversified the Maritime provinces' economies were than those of the two main Prairie Provinces at the time that third parties arose in the West. Although the agricultural sector for the Maritime region as a unit was sub stantially smaller than that of the Prairie region, it was still the largest sector within the Maritimes prior to 1951. There fore, it probably had the most potential to develop a conscious ness and a successful third party. It is thus necessary to examine this sector of the economy rather closely to demonstrate why Maritime farmers did not behave in the same fashion that

Prairie farmers did in the 1920's, 1930' and 1940's.

In this period, more Maritimers were occupied in agri culture than in any other sector of the economy: however, with the exception of the smallest province (P.E.I.), the proportion in each province occupied in agriculture was substantially less than that in each of the Prairie Provinces. There were even more significant differences than just that of size. For one thing, the average Maritime farmer was more likely (and still is) 122

to fu11y own the land that he operated than the average Prairie

farmer. In each Maritime province, at 1east 91.4 per cent of

the farmers have "fu11y owned" their farms in each census year 189 from 1901 to 1951. But since the vast immigration to the

Prairie Provinces during the ear1y part of this century, and

the droughts and rapid shifts in the demand for wheat in the

1920's and 1930's, western farmers have been 1ess 1ike1y to

fu11y own the land that they have operated. At 1east 90.0.:oo per

cent of Prairie farmers had fu11y owned their land in 1911, but

by 1931 the percentage was down to 72.6 per cent in Alberta and

66.1 per cent in Saskatchewan, and by 1961 the respective per-

centages were 59.1 per cent and 51.5 per cent. Furthermore,

whi1e the percentage of tenant farmers in the Maritimes has

f1uctuated around 2.0 per cent, the Prairie Provinces have had

a much higher percentage since the ear1y 1920's; reaching ap-

proximate1y Il per cent in 1921, 15 per cent in 1931, and 25 per

cent in 1941 in Saskatchewan, and 10 per cent in 1921, 12 per

cent in 1931, and 17 per cent in 1941 in Alberta. And a1though

there has been a substantia1 decrease in the number of tenant

189Census of Canada, 1941, Volume VIII, Table l, (1901- 1941 figures):and·Census of Canada, 1961, Volume VII, Part 2, (' p.5-17 (1951 and 1961 figures), et. passim. 123

TABLE 7

PER CENT OF GAINFULLY OCCUPIED, 10 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER, IN EACH OCCUPATION GROUP, FOR THE MARITIME PROVINCES, ALBERTA, AND SASKATCHEWAN, IN 1921 AND 1931

Occupationa1 group P.E .I . N.S. N.B. ALBT. SASK.

1921

Agriculture 59.5% 26.5% 35.4% 52.SOIo 65.4% Fishing, Logging 4.0 8.0 5 .4 0.4 0.3 Mining, Quarrying 7.8 0.6 4.0 0.1 Manufacturing 5.8 9.5 9.0 4.9 3.3 Construction 3.1 5.7 4.2 2.9 2 .3 Transportation 3 .3 6.9 6.2 5 .3 4.1 Trade 5 .6 7.1 7 .2 6.7 6.2 Service 10.3 13.8 12.0 12.1 10.5 Clerical 3.0 4.6 5.1 5.2 3.9 Labourers 4.9 9.5 14.5 4.6 3 .2

1931

Agriculture 57.1 24.3 33.1 50.9 60.3 Fishing, Logging 4.5 7.6 5.3 0.9 0.7 Mining, Quarrying 8.3 0.7 3.2 0.2 Manufacturing 4.9 8.5 7.8 5 .2 3 .5 Construction 3.1 4.9 4.0 3.0 2.3 Transportation 4.4 8.4 6.9 5 .9 5 .0 Trade 5.4 6.8 6.5 6.6 6.1 Service Il.2 15 .1 14.4 13.7 12.7 Clerical -." 2.6 3.8 4.3 4.1 3.2 Labourers 6.6 Il.9 16.5 5.7 5 .4

( Source: Census of Canada, 1931, Volume VII, pp. 12, 13 (Table 8) . 124

farmers ever since the second World War--as the number of part-

owners has increased, the fact remains that western farmers were less likely to fully own their land, and more likely to be

tenant farmers, than their counterparts in the Maritimes during

the period that third parties developed in the West.

A second major difference has been the larger size of western farms compared to Maritime farms. Resulting for the most part from the topography of the region, the average acreage of a Maritime farm has been rather small (especially that of improved land). In his study for the Rowell-Siro~s Commission,

Dr. S.A. Saunders pointed out the small size of Maritime farms and the still smaller amount of land under cultivation in 1931: in Nova Scotia the average acreage of farms was 109.1 of which only 21.4 acres were improved land, while the respective figures for New Brunswick were 122.0 and 39.1 and for P.E.I. were 92.6 and 59.5. 190 The average size of a farm and its lIimproved farm landll have been considerably greater in the other Canadian provinces, especially in the Prairie Provinces. In Alberta, for example, the average acreage of a farm has increased from 352 acres in 1921 to 461 acres in 1946, and the average acreage of improved land has increased from 142 acres in 1921 to 224 acres

1905aunders, op. cit., p. 61. 125 191 in 1946. The significance of this difference, which still 192 exists today, rests in the fact that Maritime farmers have been restricted in the amount of farm machinery that they could 193 own or use. Consequently, since Maritime farmers did not have to invest nearly as much money in machinery as did the prairie farmers, they found themselves less obliged to pay debts to central Canadian machine manufacturers during bad years such as during the Depression.

Also due to their small amount of arable land, many Mari- time farmers have·had to supplement their incomes by finding work elsewhere:

The information on this point is .very meagre, but according to the 1931 census, 10.2% of the farm operators in Prince Edward Island, 31.0% in Nova Scotia, 20.2% in New Brunswick, and 23.6% in the Maritimes as a unit, consider their principal occupation as something other than farming.194

19lMacpherson, op. cit., p. Il.

192In actual fact, the average acreage of farms in the four western-most provinces has always been substantially larger than that of the eastern provinces, 1901-1961. Census of Canadà, 1951, Volume X, p. 459 (for 1901-l95l)~ and Census of Canada, 1961, Volume VII, Part 2, p. 5-8 (for 1961) •

193saunders, op. cit., p. 68.

1945aunders, op. cit., p. 62. Furthermore, Dr.Saunders points out that British Columbia su~passes P.E.I. with l5.~~, while the next nearest province, Quebec, shows 8.2% of its farmers in this group. 126 '.

In other words, a large number of::-:Maritime farmers have not been solely dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods but have had to find employment in other endeavours (e.g. fishing, lumbering, etc.). This has mitigated against the development of consciousness among Maritime farmers. Their views and perspectives on society and their place in society have not been developed solely through experience in agriculture, but have evolved from many varying experiences and un der varying circumstances. Thus, this has helped to prevent one cleavage from becoming dominant; instead, the multiple interests of many Maritime farmers have prevented them from acting or feeling as a cohesive unit. Multiple interests and cross-cutting cleavages have tended to promote pluralism which has resulted in Maritime farmers--and for that matter, the vast majority of the region's population--possessing a variety of concerns and loyalties and not just one pre~ailing cleavage.195

In a similar vein, Maritime farmers have generally been mixed-farmers--growing a variety of crops and raising livestock at the same time; they have not been as totally dependent on one activity as the prairie farmers. Therefore, when there was

195For an elaboration of this the ory , see W. Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society, (New York, 1959). 127 a fai1ure of one crop or when the demand for one crop dropped, the average Maritime farmer and the Maritime farming community

in genera1 were not affected to thè same degree as were their

prairie counterparts. To put it another way, the Maritime

farmer has not experienced the "boom and bust" type economy

like that fou~d on the prairies~

There is no doubt that many farmers in other parts of Canada and the world are in a worse financia1 position, but few experience the chronic a1teration between wea1th and poverty of the farmers of Saskatchewan. It is possible to adjust to a continuous1y 10w income and standard of living, as do many farmers in the Maritime Provinces; for one can plan onels life ahead, make provision for future expenditures, and adjust community institutions to the economic possibilities of an area. The pattern of life of a mixed-crop farmer may be upset by severe de pression, but food, c10thing, and she1ter are secure, and price fluctuations are not so great as in the wheat be1t. But it is the "boom and bust" character of wheat production that unhinges 1ife l s plans.196

Again, this has mitigated against the deve10pment of consciousness among the Maritime farmers since their farm incorne has been

traditiona11y derived from a variety of sources. Their interests have been devoted to a variety of activities and have not been concentrated on one activity 1ike that of the western grain growers or ranchers.

196Lipset, Agrarian Socia1ism, op. cit., p. 29. 128

In reference to the preceding two paragraphs, the 1941

Census showed that 12.7 per cent of P.E.I.ls farms were IIsubsis 197 tence farms, 11 34.4 per cent were Il combinations of· su.bsistence

farms,1I 24.1 per cent were IImixed farms,1I and 6.1 per cent were

ll II part-time fa.rmp : in Novp. Scotia, 30.4 per cent were IIsubsis-

tence farms,1I 22.7 per cent were II combinations of subsistence

farms,1I Il.7 per cent were IImixed farms,1I and 12.2 per cent were

II part-time farms ll : and in New Brunswick, 2S.3 per cent were

IIsubsistence farms,1I 28.4 per cent were II combinations of subsis-

tence farms,1I 12.7 per cent were IImixed farms,1I and 13.7 per

cent were II part-time farms. 1I As can be seen, a very high propor-

tion of Maritime farmers were not engaged in commercial activitief

instead, many only produced to meet basic family needs and not to

sell on the market. Therefore, when the economy has sudden1y

changed as during the Depression, the average Maritime farmer has

197Census of Canada, 1941, Volume VIII, Table 46. Explanation of terms: IIsubsistence farmsll--value of products consumed or used by the farm household amounted to sœ/o or more of the gross farm revenue: II combinations of subsistence farms ll ...,, value of products used or consumed and the revenue from another main type (e.g. poultry, livestock) were reguired fo form sœ/o or more of the gross farm revenue: Il part-time farmsll--sœ/o or more of gross revenue was obtained from work performed off the land- lumbering, fishing, road work, etc.: IImixed farmsll--revenue from two or more of the.~ain types of products reguired to produce S~/o or more of the gross revenUe . .( 129 ,~ " not b.een affected to the same degree as the average Prairie

farmer who produeed one commodity which was to be sold com-

mercially. The Prairie Provinces were substantially differ-

ent from the Maritime Provinces: in Saskatchewan, 4.8 per cent

were "subsistence farms," Il.0.,per cent were "combinations of

subsistence farms," 8.7 per cent were "mixed farms, Il 2.0 per

cent were "part-time farms,lI and 65.5 per cent were IIgrain

farmslli in Alberta, 5.2 per cent were IIsubsistence farms,"

9.4 per cent were "combinations of subsistence farms," 16.6 per

cent were "mixed farms, Il 3.5 per cent were Il part-time farms ,II

and 46.7 per cent were IIgrain farms. 1I By 1961, things were

approximately the same since only 61.8 per cent of P.E.I.ls

farms, 39.5 per cent of Nova Scotials farms, and 43.4 per cent

of New Brunswick 1 s farms, were classed a's IIcommercial farms"--

value of agricultural products sold was $1200 or more. Mean-

while, the national percentage was 73.5 per cent, Saskatchewan's 198 was 87.6 per cent, and Alberta's was 80.2 per cent. The

result of this difference has been the fact that, for the aver-

age prairie farmer and Prairie society in general, issues

concerning the grain crop (i.e., priee fluctuations, world

market for grain, droughts, etc.) have emerged as the dominant

198 Census of Canada, 1961, Volume, VII, Part 2, p. 5-30. 130 cleavage and have been re-enforced by voluntary associations and affiliations based on similar lines (i.e. farm co-operatives).

The average Maritime farmer, on the other hand, has tended to be mo're concerned with producing goods to meet the needs of his

fami ly and/or to s ell wi thin the loca 1 communi ty; in other words, he has not been influenced by one dominant cleavage but has been governed more by local, or parochial, influences.

One final factor which has hindered the development of a common identity has been the fact that Maritime farms have tended to be dispersed over the region. This has been chiefly due to the topography of the region and the generally poor soil conditions. Hence, this "[made] it extremely difficult to estab

lish and maintain the social and commercial institutions necessary to a successful agriculture.1I199 Instead of fostering a sense of cohesiveness, the topographie conditions have led to the development of a very strong feeling of parochialism, which has tended to supersede what one might objectively judge to be com mon inberests of the region's agriculturalists.

In conclusion then, although the agricultural sector of the Maritime economy includea the largest percentage of the labour force prior to 1951, the farmers did not behave

199saunders, op. cit., pp. 60, 61. 131 politically like their western counterparts. This was mainly due to the diversity within the Maritime agricultural sector, an absence of a "boom and bust" economy, and the greater likeli hood of the average Maritime farmer to own his own land and to be less in debt to central Canadian financiers and manufacturers.

Furthermore, there has been the common practice of many Mari time farmers to earn part of their income from non-agricultural activities, which has in turn hindered the development of a sense of common identity. These factors, along with the tendency for

Maritime farms to be small in size and to be dispersed over the region, have fostered the development of parochialism rather than cohesiveness.

The small number of immigrants to the Maritimes, and the large number of emigrants from the region, mentioned in the p'revious chapter has perpetuated this parochialism especially within the farming sector, as weIl as most other sectors of the economy. For without the influx of new ideas and concepts to challenge the established ones, and with the outflow of those people less attached to the system, it is extremely difficult to break away from traditional forms of political behaviour.

Those occupied in the other sectors (except for coal mining and steel producing) have not developed class consciousness to a degree which would lead them to act \.' 132 independently in the political arena. Even if one of these

economic groups had acted outside of the two-party system, it

would not have had much potential of providing a third party

with electoral success in the region. Because of the small

size of each non-agricultural group within the region, a third

party voicing the demands of one group would never have received

enough votes to achieve electoral success. This can be seen in

the case of third parties which have articulated the views of

the coal-miners and steel-workers. These parties were rather

fortunate that these two groups were co~centrated in a rela

tively small area--unlike the members of the other economic

sectors. Thus, even though these IIleft-wingli third parties

benefited from the concentration of class-conscious miners and

steel-workers, they were still restricted in the degree of sup

port that they received because of the small proportion of the

electorate who were either miners or sbeel-workers.

As indicated in the previous paragraph, class

consciousness has not been fostered within most economic

sectors partially because their memberships have not been con

centrated in one or a few areas. Instead, their memberships

have been dispersed over the region, and this has restricted

the amount of communication within each group. This has en ( çouraged the development of parochialism rather than 133

cohesiveness since a group's members have been permitted to

become more closely attached to their local communities than

to their economic group. The fishing'industry illustrates

this point:

,The fishing industry of the Maritime Provinces is not, as, for example, in British Columbia, a highly centralized industry. Operators are to be found at practically aIl the many bays and harbours along the extensive coast line of the three provinces, and the individual fisher man is still, in many branches of the industry, working on his own account and is largely responsible for the methods employed in catch ing, and very often in processing, the fish.200

Another factor which contributed to the lack of class-

consciousness in the Maritimes has been the relatively small-

scale unit of operation. That is, the very fact that factories, processing plants, fishing vessels, lumbering operations and mills, etc., have been small in size has discouraged the development of alienation which is quite often found in larger units of operation. One indication of the small unit of operation found in the Maritimes is the following:

62.6% of aIl those employed in the manufacturing industries [in 1930J in Nova Scotia were employed by firms which had on their pay rolls one hundred

200saunders, op. cit., p. 78. Although the conditions within the fishing industry have changed substantially since the second World War, the conditions mentioned in this quotation were in existence up to that time. 134

people or less; 54.5 per cent in New Brunswick were so employed; and 100 per cent in Prince Edward Island; and this despite the iron and steel industry in Nova Scotia and the forest industries in New Brunswick. For Ontario and Quebec, th~ percentages are respectively 37.8 and 33.0, and for aIl Canada, 39.3.201

Thus, du ring the midst of the Depression, the smallness and intimacy of Maritime manufacturing industries probably did much to prevent the wage-earners from developing a sense of alienation.

The coal-steêl industry has been an exception and an examination of this'industry illuminates the factors that lead to class-consciousness and which were not present in the other industries. In many ways, the Nova Scotia coal-steel industry paralleled the Prairie agricultural industry since they both developed at the same time and had many common characteristics: rapid population growth and changing socio-economic conditions, dependence on outside markets, and oligarchie actions by financiers and businessmen.

Before examining the labour-management conflict and the development of class-consciousness in the coal-steel areas, three background points have to be mentioned:

201 d .. h f h .. S.A. Saun ers, Stud~es ~n t e Economy 0 t e Mar~t~me ~rovinces, (Toronto, 1939), pp. 187, 188. 135

1) The Nova Scotia coal-steel industry was one of the very few Maritime industries that began to flourish in the last quarter of the 19th century. Most other Maritime industries had already passed their peak years and were either declining or stagnating. One indication of the growth of the Nova

Scotia coal industry can be found in occupation figures: there were 2,123 miners in 1871, 5,660 in 1891, and 12,184 in 1931.202

Another indication is the growth in coal output: from an average yearly output of 634,344 short tons in 1867-71, to 954,089 in 1871-75, 1,495,085 in 1881-85, 2,325,072 in 1891-95,

5,243,109 in 1901-05, 6,262,082 in 1906-10, and 7,520,535 in

1911_15.203 There was also a very rapid growth in population and urbanization in the counties which contained the coal mines and steel m:i.lls, mainly Pictou, Cumberland, and Cape Breton.

This is best illustrated in Cape Breton county where the population increased 43.6 per cent during the 1891-1901 decade, 49.2 per cent during the 1901-1911 decade, and 15.9 per cent during

202Dominion Bureau of Statistics, "The Maritime Prov inces in Their Relation To The National Economy of Canada: A Statistical Study of Their Social and Economie Condition Since Confederation, Il (Ottawa, May 1934), p. 14. Furthermore, those occupied in all mining occupations increased from 2,186 in 1871 to 14,948 in 1931.

203saunders, "The Economie History of the Maritime ?rovinces, Il op. cit., p. 134. 136

the 1911-1921 decade--the first two percentages not on1y stood

above (and except for Restigouche, far above) the other Mari-

time counties, but were a1so higher than the respective national

figures of Il.1 per cent and 34.2 per cent.204 What is perhaps

more important was the fact that Cape Breton county is one of

the sma11er Nova Scotia counties in land area: therefore, on

an area of 972 square miles, the population of 31,258 in 1881

had increased to 34,244 in 1891, 49,166 in 1901, 73,330 in 1911,

86,296 in 1921, and 92,419 in 1931.205 Need1ess to say, the

population increase far out-distanced the avai1ab1e housing,

public uti1ities, etc., and the resu1ting socio-economic condi-

tions direct1y 1ed to much discontent especia11y in the 1893-

1925 periode One final point in reference to the population

growth that needs to be stressed was the large number of foreign

immigrants (especia11y those from Britain and Europe), who

introduced to the native population new ideas and concepts, and

who cha11enged traditiona1 norms of behaviour possessed by 'native-born Maritimers.206

204Dominion Bureau of Statistics, op. cit., Table 15 on pp. 10, Il. 205 't Loc. c~ •

206As mentioned previous1y, Cape Breton county has had one of the highest proportions of foreign workers in the Mari times. Supra, P.92. 137

2) The rapid growth of the coal industry during the 1890-

1913 period was closely tied to the industrialization of cen"tral

Canada and the opening of the prairies for settlement. Central

Canada was one of the main markets for Nova Scotia coal, with

Quebec alone buying 34 per cent of it in 1913.207 The demand

for coal had increased as central Canada became more industrial-

ized and urbanized, and with the aid of the National Policy

which encouraged the buying of Nova Scotia coal.208 The second

major impetus came from the railroad building expansion: the

steel mills which were developed and expanded in Nova Scotia

at that time to meet the need for steel rails and eguipment

proved to be important buyers of the locally mined coal.209

However, by the end of the war, the coal-steel industry of

Nova Scotia found that conditions were not the same as they had

been: the National Transcontinental Railway development ceased

a b ruptl y, 210 sales to t h' e Un~te d states d roppe d d rast~ca . Ily, 211

"central Canada was getting cheaper fuel from hydro-electric

207 Forsey, op. cit., p. 14.

208Ibid ., p. 7 and p. 14.

209Saunders, The Economie History of the Maritime Prov inces, op. cit., p. 73.

2l0forsey, op. cit., p. 30.

2llIbid ., p. 31. 138

power and oil,2l2 new techniques resulted in the fuller

utilization of coal,2l3 and American coal was entering the

Canadian market.2l4

3) In 1893, most of the independent Cape Breton coal

operators had merged to eliminate useless competition;2l5 but, by 1921, through a series of financial manoeuvring, a

large conglomerate (the British Empire Steel Corporation,

Ltd.) had appeared which included most of the coal mines and steel mills in Nova Scotia, as weIl as other concerns.2l6 The

federal Royal Commission on Coal reported that by the end of

1921, this corporation employed 90 per cent of Nova Scotia's 2l7 mine workers. Much of the capitalization for the development and expansion of the mines and mills, as weIl as the

2l2Forsey, op. cit., p. 43. 213 Saunders, The Economie History of the Maritime Prov- inces, op. cit., p. 74.

2l4F orsey, op. c~'t ., pp. 43 -45 . 215 Ibid., p. 5.

2l6A discussion of the various transactions and financial arrangements which led to the merger is outside of the scope of this thesis; therefore, for a detailed account, see Forsey, op. cit., Chapters 1 and 3. 2l7Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Coal, 1946, (ottawa, 1947), p. 286. 139

financial control, came from outside sources--American, Toronto, 2l8 and Montreal at first and 1ater British.

Thus, with the material in the preceding three para-

graphs in mind, it is now necessary to examine the labour-

management problems and how these prob1ems developed'c1ass-

consciousness, in the 1893-1925 periode

Much of the trouble can be traced to the living condi-

tions within the mining towns. A very high percentage of the

houses were company houses rented out to the miners: the

British Empire Steel Corp., Ltd. (Besco) owned 3,442 houses in

1925, of which its 1argest constituent company (Dominion Coal

Company Ltd.) owned 2,374, housing 80 per cent of its employ

ees.2l9 Although the 1925 provincial Royal Commission described

the rentals as moderate and showed that the corporation was

actua 11y 1 oS1.ng' money on t h e h ouses, 220 1.' t a 1 so r~mar k e d tha: t

In the course of the evidence we heard and of our perambulation of the districts, we came to the conslusion that the mere fact that the operators were the owners of the houses, and were presumed to possess great resources, was a very definite

2l8Saunders, The Economie History of the Maritime Prov inces, op. cit., p. 22~ and Forsey, op. cit., p. 13, p. 32, and pp. 33-41.

2l9Forsey, op. cit., p. 91. ( 220Ibid., pp. 94, 95. 140

factor in causing many occupiers not to bestow upon their homes the care and work 'which--partic ularly in the light of the admittedly low rentals--persons would bestow upon the house they occupied, in the interests of their own comfort and enjoyment.22l

As Professor Forsey points out, the owners had not built any new houses since 1913 and had been warned about the housing conditions by a 1920 Royal Commission.222 Also, public util- ities and services in these company towns were generally in wretched condition or non-existent.223 Furthermore, it was not uncommon for the more radical miners and their families to be evicted or spied upon or harassed by the coal companies in 9rder to make the men subservient.224 During the wage negotiations in March, 1925, Besco abruptly terminated credit at the company stores because it felt that it was giving out t 00 muc h cre d ~'t' ~n. th at per~o' d 0 f recess~on.,225 The action was interpreted by the miners as an attempt to force them to

22lTh'~s was quote d ~n ' Forsey, op. c~'95 t ., p. •

222Ibid., pp. 95·r 96.

223Ibid., pp. 90-96.

224Ibid., pp. 24, 25: pp. 27, 28: and p. 88.

225 Ibid., p. 67. Ml accept a wage reduction, and, since Besco refused to extend the credit system, the miners went out on a strike which did not end until the Duncan Royal Commission was established in 226 August. This brief account of the living conditions of the miners sheds sorne light on the rigid class structure which existed in the 1893-1925 period. There was a top elite which became centered in Besco, which not only decided on matters concerning the coal-steel industry but also on matters dealing with the personal, daily lives of the workers. The workers were living in squalid conditions and were treated as instruments to be manipulated for the bene fit of the corpora- 227 tion-- actually expecting the men to accept a 33 1/3 per· cent to 37 1/2 per cent wage cut in December 1921 in order tha t Besco cou ld b e more compet 1't' 1ve. 228

Now with the large concentration of miners and steelworkers, which included many recent arrivals from Europe, it was not long before the industrial union--the United Mine-

Workers of America--had replaced the old craft union--the

226F orsey, op. C1't ., pp. 67-80.

227Ibid ., pp. 73, 74.

228I bid., p. 55. 142

Provincial Workmen's Association--as the spokesman for the

min ers (1918) .229 with this more active union which did not

cooperate with the managers as the PWA had done (especially

during the struggle between the two unions to be the sole

union representative of the miners), the lines of cleavage

between management/owners and workers became more sharply

defined. Added to this was the fact that the owners were for

the most part from outside of the Maritimes:

One witness [before the 1925 Royal Commission] even declared that up to about 1910 or 1911 no one could have worked for a better Company than Dominion Coal. In his opinion, it was the introduction of new and less reasonable management fr~m ~rea~3Hritain which brought much of the frJ.ctJ.on •

Finally, there was the "boom and bust" nature of the mining

industry, as evidenced by the rapid rise prior to 1913 and

the decline which followed. Even during the good years, there

had traditionally been a constant shifting back and forth in

seasonal income since the men would receive a higher wage

scale in the summer months, and since there was usually less work available during the winter months. The unsettling effect

of this type of livelihood made the miners aware of the class

229Forsey, op. cit., p. 21, and pp. 49-52. 230Ibid., p. 28. 143

structure of the mining industry and their position within it.

The class-consciousness of the miners and'steel-workers was

strong enough to cause them to act independently in politics~

this can be seen in their graduaI support for labour candi-

dates and "left-wing" parties.

Thus, the coal mining-steel producing industries were

substantially different from other Maritime industries: they had a "boom and bust" type of existence, with the workers

(including European immigrants) highly concentrated together

in squalid conditions and having to deal with an "outside"

group of financiers. The other industries, on the other hand, were characterized by being dispersed over the region and by having a generally low and stable standard of existence, with

the work-force not experiencing a class structure or feeling

alienated. While the miners and steel-workers developed class-

consciousness and started to support third parties in the 1893- '.. 1925 period, the behaviour of other members of the working

force continued to reflect parochial feelings and trad~~ional

loyalties rather than class feelings. In succeeding years, the pattern has remained substantially the same with third parties being most successful in the coal-steel areas where the economic conditions have been remarkedly similar to those on the prairie Provinces. 144

Pre-dominance of parochialism in Maritime "Politics

This section will show how the nature of the Maritime

economy has foatered parochialism and brokerage style politics,

as opposed to class-based politics, except in the coal-steel

areas. When economic discontent has developed, the general

practice has been for one of the major parties to become the

spokesman for the discontented. Maritimers apparently have

had no qualms ubout supporting the two major parties which

have had their bases of strength in the larger provinces of

Quebec and Ontario, while at the same time suffering econ-

omically. Provincial politicians have not hesitated to

criticize their federal counterparts or to use the provincial

parties as means to articulate regional discontent. W.S.

Fielding, for example, was the Nova Scotia Liberal Premier in

the l880 l s who advocated secession, and was later to be the

federal Minister of Finance in Laurierls government. Pro-

fessor Rawlyk has termed this style of politics as Il the

Paranoid Style" of regional protest:

the IIParanoid Stylell was effectively used by the Nova Scotia economic, social, and polit ical establishment to channel the deep-rooted and sometimes violent frustrations of the ordinary farmers, fishermen, and workers against Ottawa rather than against Halifax. In periods of economic crises, as in 1868-69, 1885-86, 1922-25, ( " '- / 145

movements emphasizing provincial rights have been organized and IIUpper Canadian interestsll sing1ed out for b1ame and abuse.231

:. Po1iticians and the genera1 pUblic have sought to attain financia1 rewards through the two major parties, even though they have not hesitated to criticize their counterparts in central Canada.

~n the 19th century, the diversity within the Maritimes had deve10ped the brokerage form of po1itics and this has remained substantia11y intact ever since. As Professors Beck,

MacKinnon, and Thorburn have stressed, neither major party has been bound to one position because of ideo10gica1 consider- ations; instead, both the Conservative and Liberal parties have tr~e, d to appea 1 to as many peop1 e an d groups as poss~'b le. 232

These parties have stressed local 10ya1ties and have used po1itica1 rewards--bui1ding new schoo1.s, hospita1s, etc., or doing road work--in ,order to receive support in each community.

By doing so, parochia1ism has been strengthened:

As true products of their communities, these men [po1iticians] disp1ay the individua1ism and intense 10ca1ism that are ha11marks of the New

231G• Raw1yk, IIThe Maritimes and the Canadian Community,1I in M. Wade, editor, Regiona1ism in the Canadian Community: 1867- 1967, (Toronto, 1969), p. 103.

232Beck, The Government of Nova Scotia, op. cit., p.156; MacKinnon, op. cit., pp. 243-247; and Thorburn, Po1itics in New Brunswick, op. cit., p. 114. 146

Brunswick character. The picture of the organized'and ordered western members co operating persistent1y to secure the goals of their region as a who1e has no counterpart in the Maritimes. In fact, the persistence of varying regiona1 interests within one sma11- province, when combined with excessive loca1ism and a division on 1ines of language and religion, tends to create jea10usies that work to prevent co-operation.233

IIBut why,1I one may ask, IIhave Maritimers continued to behave in this fashion since they have never been as prosperous as citizens in other provinces?1I IISure1y, Maritimers wou1d have hadtheir demands more fervent1y articu1ated by a third party, as in the case of westerners.1I

To answer this, it is necessary to reca11 that by the time of Confederation the Maritimes were just passing from their II go1den agell of prosperity. As Maritimers rea1ized that their economy was dec1ining and that there were IIgreener pastures" e1sewhere--in the United States, central Canada, and the West, thousands of Maritimers emigrated from the old Mari- time society to new frontiers where they cou1d start anew.

Those who remained behind expressed their discontent by supporting the anti-Confederation party--the Liberal party. This has been the pattern ever since when economic conditions worsen:

233 Thorburn, Po1itics in New Brunswick, op. cit., p. 172. 147

the more vigorous and radical segments of the population have

emigrated while those who remained behind found solace in

supporting the major party out of office. Secondly, most

people realized that the region lacked natural resources, and

therefore a substantial tax-base, and that central Canada was

directing its energies to exploit western resources. Being

ignored, Maritimers felt that they must operate within the power circles in Ottawa in order to attain "better terms";

they did not feel that they were being exploited by the central

Canadian authorities because the region had no natural re sources to exploit (and which were also in high demand) • Hence, as Professor MacKinnon stated in reference to P.E.I.,

Il 1 Provincial Rights 1 in the province. have usually meant

Dominion obligations rather than local autonomy.1I 234 Mari timers have therefore been unlike the people in the prairie

Provinces who saw how central Canada was exploiting them and reacted by supporting third parties to defend their interests.

Thirdly, resulting from the diversity of the economy, not aIl sectors have been affected to the same degree by changing economic conditions; also, the region has not experienced wide fluctuations in living standards since there has not been

234MacKinnon, op. cit.,p. 313. 148 the dependence on one commodity. The result has been a perpetuation of parochialism and a hinderance to the development of class-consciousness. Finally, the low standard of the economy and the isolation from more prosperous regions, over the years, has resulted in many Maritimers" being cautious and hesitant about accepting new ideas or adopting new norms of beha viour . Al though when compared to other parts of Canada, Maritime society is II poorll and not as lIadvancedll economically, the Maritimers, themselves, have not

IIfeltll the poverty as much because amongst themselves (at their level of existence) there is a lesser degree of in- eguality. As a recent studyon Maritime rural society stated:

• there is a social eguality in poverty, when the poverty is experienced in a bio-physical setting which is generally loved and has been inhabited for several generations. A level of income which would bring about unacceptable living conditions in a large agglomeration is made bearable here by several factors: social cohesion and the absence of social classes, mutual aid at the level of the local community, the modesty of aspirations and needs, and the role of welfare allowances. Several families also own a house and a patch of ground. A good nurnber of the local people identify poverty with exceptional cases: the physically and mentally infirm, alcoholics, widows, and lI unfor tunates. 1I Poverty is even interpreted as acci denta~ and exceptional phenomenon • • • .I!nferior living conditions (though real on a comparative level) are not felt too much because the external points of comparison are generally 149

distant, and also because certain factors connected . with material progress, which are already integrated into the life of other areas, have only just be.en acquired in the rural sectors of most counties: paved roads, telephone, electricity~ Moreover, comparisons are made perhaps not so much with the large prosperous regions of Canada as with the Maritimes as a whole, where the living standard is naturally lower. We believe that these various factors, in addition to the often welcomed winter rest due to seasonal unemployment, largely reduce the feeling of poverty for the local inhabitants. Looking. 1at it from the exterior, however, we judge poverty as such.235

Furthermore, those who have become aware of their relative poverty--via T.V. or from relatives who have emigrated and who return for vacations sporting new cars and weekly wage cheques--have joined the flock of young people moving to cen- . 236 tral Canada or to t h e Un~ted states.

In such a situation, it is extremely difficult for class-consciousness to develop and for a third party to be elected to power. As two men closely connected with the CCF-

NDP wrote:

Another reason for the lack of progress in the CCF and NDP in these provinces is the lack of economic and, therefore, political security of

235p._y. Pépin, Life and poverty in the Maritimes, ARDA Research Report No. RE-3, (ottawa, March 1968), pp. 214, 215.

236Ibid ., p. 215. l5Q

so many of the people. It would appear that a certain strong economic base . . • is essential to taking independent political activity in a democratic socialist party. It was, perhaps, largely due to this fact that the CCF was able to reach its greatest strength organizationally, and at the polIs, during the latter part of the Second World War, and in the immediate post-war years, during periods of relative full employ ment for this region.237

and,

Finally, my studies and experience have given me the feeling that groups and communities which are badly disadvantaged develop a kin~ of fear of change. They are inclined pitifully to hang on to the little that they have or hope to get and are frightened about major changes in case they should lose the little they have. Related to this, and a very important factor, is that such communities live off patronage and favours much more than is the case elsewhere.238

Instead of being conducive to the development of class-

consciousness and the rise of third parties, the generally

low-level of the economy has caused the electorate to support

the major parties, as weIl as to express discontent through

them. Even members of the middle class who have had a higher

standard of living, and who probably would have been more

aware of new ideas and concepts, have been reluctant to

237correspondence with Mr. L. Shaw. ) 238correspondence with "Mr. S." 151 support or give leadership to third parties. Of course, there have been exceptions to this, since such people in the NDP as Mayor A. 0 ' Brien, L. Shaw, and J. Ai tchi son are members of the economic middle class (if not the upper class) •

But generally speaking, members of the middle class have not associated with third parties, probably because theY.perceive such an association as being detrimental to their position within society; instead, most middle class members have been active within the two old parties.

Economic discontent that has been articulated has been in provincial anàVor regional terms rather than in class terms, and has been expressed by the local elite (or at least part of it) rather than by the members of a lower economic class.

As Professor Rawlyk pointed out in his study of Nova Scotia during the three economic crises of 1868-69, 1885-86, and

1922-25, one of the major parties successfully took-over 239 regional discontent and directed it against "Upper Canada. 1I

By not hesitating to stress provincial rights, or "Maritime

Rights," whenever it was politically expedient, the Con- servative and Liberal parties have been able to retain the electorate's support. The financial rewards that have been

239In reference to the 1922-25 case, see infra. pp. 156-163. 152

attained by such action, such as the Maritime Freight Rates

Act of 1926 and periodic federal subsidies for various in-

dustries or projects, have always been just enough to cause

Maritimers to come back for more--thus perpetuating this

form of political behaviour.

The inherent weakness of class cleavages in the

Maritimes--due t~ the nature of the economy, and to the

absence of sufficient, radical leaders to articulate economic

discontent in class terms--has created a situation where

parochialism and traditional allegiances have been far more

salient than any possible ideological or class cleavage in

determining political behaviour. This was especially evident

during the 1920's, 1930's, and 1940's when third parties

received considerable electoral support in the Prairie Prov-

inces but attained minor support in the Maritime Provinces

(except in the coal-steel areas) •

Conclusions

parochialism has .been a more salient force in Maritime politics than has class cleavage because of the nature of the

economy. The general diversity of the Maritime economy has ( prevented the development of a common identity, as have the 153 dispersion of the population and industries and the small- scale unit of production. Even the agricultural sector of the Maritime economy which was for many years the largest sector failed te develop class-consciousness because of internal diversity and the other factors previously mentioned.

Also to be considered is the lack of a "boom and bust" type economy which has meant that the populace has been allowed to become settled in its waysi because of the prevalence of a subsistence economy and the absence of a dependence on one commodity, the region has escaped the wide fluctuations in living standards experienced in the Prairie region. There- fore, there has been an absence of a rigid class structure and a feeling of alienation, except in the coal-steel areaSi instead, the economic divisions have not been as salient a force as other forces such as locality. Parochialism has been re-enforced by the immigration-emigration pattern: the absence of an inflow of new citizens possessing different values and norms, and the presence of an outflow of those who are less attached to the system and more radical and enter- prising.

The result of this has been for Maritimers to express regional discontent"by seeking more federal financial aid, rather than by trying to defend the region from overt 154 . ( ...... exploitation (which did not exist in the Maritimes) . Maritime

politicians have been more concerned with gaining financial

rewards for their local constituen'ts and that has been the

way the electorate has expected them to perform. While com

plaining about "Upper Canadians" and the problems that have

occurred since Confederation, politicians of the major parties

have been able to control the main forces in Maritime politics

and at the same time prevent third parties from developing.

Therefore, when third parties arose in the West and received

considerable support during the 1920's, 1930's, and 1940's,

they failed in the Maritime Provinces primarily because of

the economic differences between the two regions. CHAPTER VI

THE ABSENCE OF A STRONG SOCIO-ECONOMIC MOVEMENT IN THE MARITIMES

Introduction

To sorne extent, this chapter is a continuation of the preceding chapter. Many of the economic factors examined in

Chapter V are salient to the lack of a strong socio-economic movement in the Maritimes. The diverse economy, the emigration of many young people, and the low level of the economy, have prevented the development of such a movement. Because of the absence of such a movement, third parties have had difficulty in finding leaders, personnel, and finances, as weIl as in putting their programmes across to the people.

However, in industrial C~pe Breton, there has been an exceptionally strong trade union movement which has been politically active for most of the 20th century. This movement has been the chief reason for the continued success of

"left-wing" third parties in Cape Breton county.

Most of the first-hand information concerning the

CCF-NDP is in reference to Nova Scotia (especially Cape

155 1!)6

Breton) because the party has had its greatest success in that province, and because one can most readily see the significance of the trade union movement to the party's suc cess in Cape B~eton county. AIso, the people who replied to my letters or who were interviewed were mainly connected with that party's efforts in Nova Scotia, and were not as acquainted with the other two provinces. The other contemporary third party--the Social Credit--apparently does not have any perma nent organization in the Maritimes, and l was not able to attain any original information of the party's activities in the region. However, since the Nova Scbtia CCF-NDP has been the strongest third party in the Maritimes, an analysis of this party proves to be a very good example with which to demonstrate the significance of a socio-economic movement to a third.'·party' s success.

Socio-Economic Movements in the Maritimes

The first movement to appear during the period under study was the farmers' movement in the late teens and early twenties. In many areas, the farmers were in alliance with labour groups. The farmer-Iabour movement rose in protest to the economic recession in post-war years, and in hopes of 157

establishing social, economic, and political reforms. But after an initial pha's'e of vigorous growth, the movement proved

to be internally weak and soon fell apart, allowing the Con-

servative party to voice the protest in each province.

Shortly after the formation of the Nova Scotia Labour

Party on April 8, 1920, and the United Farmers of Nova Scotia on April 14, 1920, a provincial general election was called.

These two "third parties" were thrown together against a common enemy--that is, "they represented ordinary people pitte,d aga~ns, t t h e L~'b era 1 - 1awyer-Ha l'f~ ax-e l'"~te • 240 HO'\lever, t1)e ideological differences between the two groups--farmers and workers--soon rose to the surface after the election. And although they were the official op~osition in Nova Scotia,'24l their M.L.A.'s proved to be ineffective:

For sorne of the more optimistic supporters of the farmer-labour movement, the 1920 election represented the dawning of a new golden age for Nova Scotia. The farmer M.L.A.'s, former Liberals and Conservatives to a man, looked to the past for their model of the golden age when rural values predominated. On the other 24'0 G.A. Rawlyk, "The Farmer-Labour Movement and the Failure of Socialism in Nova Scotia," in L. La~ierre et al., edit ors , Essays on The Left: Essays in Honour of T.C. Douglas, (Toronto/Montreal, 1971), p. 34.

241Seven U.F.N.S. candidates, four Labour candidates, three Conservatives, and twenty-nine Liberal candidates, were elected. Scarrow, op. cit., Table 63. 158

hand, the labour M.L.A.ls who were hard-line socialists, wished to build a New Jerusalem on the Atlantic coast--a workerls utopia where co operation would replace competition and where a new humanitarian value structure would be imposed upon society. In the legislature, having to respond to various complex issues and under heavy pressure from both the LiberaIs and the Conservatives, the farmer and labour M.L.A.ls were unable to put for ward a united front. Lacking an effective leader, the alliance shattered into a small nu~i~r of warring cabals, especially after 1923.

The division and disillusionment within the political arm of the farmer-labour movement was also to be found among the rank and file, as membership of the U.F.N.S. declined from 2,500 in 243 1920 to 254 in 1922. Sorne of the leaders within the labour 244 movements were extremely radical, causing many moderate trade

242 Rawlyk, "The Farmer-Labour Movement and the Failure of Socialism in Nova Scotia," op. cit., p. 35. In order to acquire a better understanding of the ideological differences, see the. platforms of the U.F.N.S. and N.S.L.P. ~., pp. 32- 34. For further .information on the farmers l movement, see supra., pp. 52-54 and pp. 57-59.

243Bec k , The Government of Nova Scotia, op. cit., p. 168.

244In 1922, the executive of District 26 of the United Mine Workers of America resolved to affiliate with the Red Inter national of Labour Unions in' Moscow. Also, one U.M.W. leader tried to negotiate a $15 million distress loan for the starving millions in the Soviet Union. Rawlyk, "The Farmer-Labour Move ment and the Failure of Socialism in Nova Scotia," op. cit., p. 37. 159 ( ...• - 245 unionists to go over to the rejuvenated Conservative party.

The farmer and labour movements had been newly organized, and,

out of the fervour surrounding their formations, had entered

the political arena. But, outside of industria~ Cape Breton,

there was little grass-roots organization and dedication, or

orientation, to a common goal. Those who supported the third

parties, outside of industrial Cape Breton and the coal mining

areas on the mainland, did so in hopes that the panacea offered

by these parties would alleviate éhèie problems. Once the

initial fervour and idealism had subsided, the economic diversity

and parochialism of Nova Scotian society arose to the fore front

to destroy the political movement outside of the coal and steel

There were at least two other factors which contributed

to the fall of the farmer-labour movement. The clergy in Nova

Scotia was particularly upset with sorne of the more radical,

socialistic policies of the farmer-labour movement, and did its

best to preserve traditional values:

The important role played by the church, during the early decades of the twentieth century, in preserving the pristine purity of nineteenth century politics and ideology should not be under estimated. Conservative, if not reactionary, in

( 24SRaWlyk, "The Farmer-Labour Movement and the Failure of Socialism in' Nova Scotia ," op. ci t., p. 37. 160

terms of basic social and economic issues, most Roman Catholic and Protestant clerics and active laymen (although there were of course, noteworthy exceptions), probably felt threatened by what they perceived to be forces of profound chang~ unleashed in 1920 by the new political movement.24b

It is interesting to note that during the early part of this century when third parties arose in the ~rairie provinces, religious sects and cults were more numerous and influential in those provinces than in the Maritime provinces. The prairie provinces were experiencing great influxes of immigrants, shifting populations, and changing socio-economic conditions, which created lia highly unsettled state".247 As a consequence of this, established religious denominations were not as strong as in the more settled eastern provinces. Instead, numerous sects and cults developed to meet many of the social needs of a large portion of the populace which were not being fulfilled by the established denominations. W.E. Mann further shows how the

Social Credit party with its fundamentalist fervour and its attacks on the establishment developed from these forces within

246RaWlyk, "The Farmer-Labour Movement and the Failure of Socialism in Nova Scotia," op. cit., pp. 36,37.

247w•E • Mann, Sect, Cult, and Church in Alberta, (Toronto, 1955), p. 153. 161 246 Alberta, and won office under Mr. W. Aberhart. This was

significantly different from the Maritimes where, during the

20th century, sects and cuIts have been relatively weak and

the established denominations have been quite strong. Du ring . the latter part of the 19th century, the established denomina-

tions had strengthened in the Maritimes as Bowns and cities developed, and as society became more stable and institutional-

J.ze. d • 249 Thus, in the twentieth century, Maritimers were more closely tied to their established denominations, as they were to other social institutions and norms of behaviour. The existence of established denominations which supported the status quo, and the absence of fundamentalist sects which attack- ed the existing socio-religious structure, undoubtedly contributed in sorne degree to Maritimers' reluctance to support third parties.

The other factor leading to the fall of the farmer-

labour movement was the strategy of the Conservative party in usurping the protest and discontent present in society, and voicing it as "Maritime Rights". Here was perhaps the most

'248Mann , Sect, Cult, and Church in Alberta, pp. 156-157.

249S •D • Clark, Church and Sect in Canada, (Toronto, 1948), p. 329. 162

overt example of brokerage politics in the Maritimes, where

the major party out of office guickly moved in, advocating

many of the demands of the discontented, and was elected to

office. In July, 1922, the Tory newspaper in Halifax--The

Herald--started the Maritime Rights movement, whi~h "worked

hand-in-glove with the Maritime Board.of Trade--an organiza-

tion intimately involved with the sudden spectacular growth

of the new protest movement in aIl three of the Maritime prov- 250 inces." And in April, 1923, the Nova Scotia Conservatives 251 publicly endorsed the Maritime Rights movement. Thus, this

major party, with leaders, finances, organization, and strong

party loyalties, was able to replace the comparatively weak

farmer-labour movement as the party of proteste The effect

in party voting was tremendous:

1) in 1920 and 1925, both Nova Scotia and New Brunswick held provincial elections and in both provinces the Conserva-

tives were elected to office in the latter year after suffering humiliating defeats in the former year (Tables V and VI, .pp.

47, 48)~

250Raw l yk, "The Farmer-Labour Movement and the Failure of Socialism in Nova Scotia," op. cit., p. 38. 261 . 'Loc. cit. ( 163 2) the Progressive party received substantial support in

all three provinces in the 1921 federal election, but did not

even contest the 1925 federal election (Tables l, II, and

III, pp. 39, 40, 41): and

3) the 1923 P.E.I. provincial election was held after the

Conservatives had taken ov'er the protest movement, and resulted

in the Conservatives defeating the Liberal government, and in

the farmers receiving only 3 per cent of the vote (Table IV,

p. 46) .

It was only in the industrial area of Cape Breton',

as well as in the coal mining areas on the mainland, where

there was a very strong, grass-roots trade union movement, that

socialist third parties have continued to be relatively success-

f u 1 , S1nce. 1920 .262 And, in reference to the CCF-NDP, its ~uc-

cess dates from August, 1938, when the United Mine Workers of

America, District 26 (covering Nova Scotia and New Brunswick)

became the first union to affiliate with the national CCF par- 25.& ty~ Along with the Steelworkers, the U.M.W. has continually

been the backbone of CCF-NDP success in Cape Breton and in the

269Supra, pp. 43, 44.

( 253D •E • McHenry, The Third Force in Canada: The Co \ operative Commonwealth Federation, 1932-1948, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1950), pp. 47,48. 164 ( .. ; other coal-steel areas. These two unions have provided

leaders, finances, and personnel to the CCF-NDP, and have

lIëducatedli thé populace to socialist ideas and co-operative

values.

The first co-operative store to be established in the

Maritimes was the British Canadian Co-operative Society Ltd.,

in Sydney, which was founded in 1906 by immigrant Lancashire 254 miners. At that time, the coal and steel industry was

rapidly growing, and was attracting many workers from Britain

and other European countries, where co-operative values and

labour politics were common. With the large concentration of

miners and steel-workers dependent on one particular industry,

it was comparatively easy to organize the workers and to prop-

agate socialist ideas. It was not long before labour candida-

tes started to contest elections in Cape Breton county, having

their first success in the 1920 provincial election. The

defeat in the 1925 election did not dampen the hopes of most

Cape Breton trade unionists in their efforts to establish a

society based on socialist principles. Trade union activity

continued to make co-operative values and policies well-known

25.4C~R. Fay, IIproblems of the Maritime Provinces," in The Dalhousie Review, Vol. IV, No. 4, (Winter, 1925), p. 449. 165

to the public, as weIl as developing capable leaders within

the movernent. Therefore, it should not be surprising to see

the CCF candidate, C. Gillis, being elected in the 1940

federal election and three CCF candidates being elected in

the 1941 provincial election--both elections were the first

to be held after the U.M.W. had affiliated with the CCF.

Before actually looking at the CCF-NDP's relationship

to the trade union movement, the effect of the Extension

Department of St. Francis Xavier University in propagating co-operative principles will be examined. Founded in 1930 by Dr. M.M. coady,255 the Extension Department was located

in Antigonish (on the mainland of Nova Scotia and just across from Cape Breton Island) and the university also has a Junior

College in Sydney. Father Coady and his associates, of course, did not advocate support for any particular party and especially 256 not for any "left-wing" party 0 Instead, they were more concerned with alleviating the people of their economic problems,

2SSFor a brief account of the formation of the Extension -Departrnent's programme, as weIl as of its aims and accomplish ments (up to 1943), see Dr. M.M. Coady, "The Antigonish Move ment," in International Labour Office, edition, The Co-operative Movement in the Americas, (Montreal, 1943); also, M.M. Co~dy, Masters of Their Own Destiny, (New York, 1939). -

2~6There were, however, sorne people at St. Francis who were sympathetic towards the CCF and supported it financially. Interview with Mr. F. Young. 166

and with showing them that extreme socialist or even communist

solutions were not the only answers. The Extension Department

IIsuccessfully attempted te redirect the frustration and ani-

mosity of disenchanted Nova Scotians into safer and more re-

• • • 11 25.7: . ... 1 spectable ~nst~tut~ons. However, ~n advocat~ng pr~nc~p es

of co-operation, community self-help, and in helping to es-

tablish consumer co-operatives and credit unions, the Roman

Catholic field workers indirectly aided the CCF-NDP:

The Extension programmes carried on by st. Francis Xavier University in industrial Cape Bre·ton, and in conjunction with the co-operative movement which was also quite strong in that area, both contrib uted a great deal to the CCF and NDP electoral success.25B

The philosophy of the teachings of the Extension Department

was· imbued with the idea of co-operation and of building a new . t 2$9 soc~e y. And Mr. F. Young found that this was quite differ-

ent from the philosophy of many co-operatives outside of the

Extension Department's orbit, in that they were more business-

oriented and more concerned with making an extra dollar for

2 $·7 Rawlyk, IIThe Farmer-Labour Movement and the Failure of Socialism in Nova Scotia,1I op. cit., p. 36.

258Correspondence with Mr. L. Shaw.

\ j 2$9Interview with Mr. F. Young. 167

themselves.260 Hence, co-operative ideals have been stronger

in Cape Breton, and in northern mainland Nova Scotia, than in

other areas of the Maritimes partially because of the work of

Father Coady and his associates, operating at the grass-roots

level to alleviate poverty.

However, as far as the CCF-NDP is concerned, the co

operative values taught and institutions developed by the

Extension Department did not directly lead to support for the

party by the rural population. As can be seen in Appendices

Band E (pp. 205-210 and 219-223), the CCF-NDP did not receive

mu ch , if any, support in the rural count~es of Richmond,

Victoria, Inverness, Antigonish, and Guysborough--all within

the influence of the Extension Department. Instead, the CCF

NDP has received substantial support mainly in the coal mining

and steel producing areas--Cape Breton county, and parts of

Cumberland and Pictou counties--where the U.M.W. and Steel workers were strongly organized. The work of the Extension

Department, therefore, seems only to have directly aided the

CCF-NDP in areas where there was a strong trade union movement:

in other words, the work of the Department only augmented the

strength of the trade union movement and its alliance with the

CCF-NDP.

2~~Interview with Mr. F. Young. 168 The.electoral suc cess of the CCF-NDP in Cape Breton

county has been mainly due to the partyls association with

the trade union movement in that area. There are four basic

ways in which this movement has aided the CCF-NDP: 1) the

~rovision of leaders~ 2) the contribution of money~ 3) the

supply of personnel and organizational workers~ and 4) the

"educational" work.

The U.M.W. and Steelworkers were a steady source of

leaders for the CCF. As Mr. L. Shaw pointed out in his cor-

respondence:

Practically aIl of the CCF and NDP elected M.L.A.ls and M.P.ls had been, and continued to be (in most cases), active in their trade unions. This was true of such people as Donald MacDonald, who was a CLC organizer for Nova Scotia, and who later became the national president of the CLC~ Mickey MacDonald, formerly of the U.M.W.~ Russell Cunningham, of the Rail way Union~ Foreman Waye, from Coal [actually, Mr. Waye was not a CCF M.L.A.~ he was elected for the Labour party in 1920. Parliamentary Guide, 1921J~ in fact, l think perhaps aIl of the elected members except Mr. Fred Brodie, who was a most unusual printer and business-man from Glace Bay.2f5ffi

Perhaps the most noteworthy CCF politician from the Mari-

times was C. Gillis, a M.P. for seventeen years (1940-1957),

/ 261 Correspondence with Mr. L. Shaw. 169 who had been a coal miner associated with the trade union 262 movement. He wasone of the original organizers of the

Coady Credit Union in New Aberdeen--the second credit union

to be formed in Nova Scotia. At the U.M.W. Convention which

decided to affiliate with the CCF, Mr. Gillis was chairman of

the resolutions committee. Finally, he had held several

executive positions within the U.M.W., and Trade and Labour

Congress of Canada, before being nominated as a CCF candidate.

Many of those who either were defeated as CCF-NDP

candidates, or were officials within the party, in the coal and

steel areas were also connected in sorne capacity with the trade

union movement. Therefore, the U.M.W. and Steelworkers proved

to be a valuable source of leadership material for the CCF, and,

to a lesser degree, the NDP.~SB Within the tradeunion movement,

2~9l1Report of The Nominating Convention of the CCF in Nova Scotia for the Federal Constituency of Cape Breton South" held at Sydney, Nova Scotia, August 5, 1939. CCF Files, et. passim.

263possibly because of the decline of the coal industry since the late 1950'8, anq/or because the NDP has become a more attractive party to a wider spectrum of the populace, the NDP's elected candidates have not come from the ranks of the trade union movement. Mr. M. Maclnnis who was elected in the federal constituency of Cape Breton South in 1962 was a university educated sociologist. Parliamentary Guide, 1963. Mr. P.MacEwan was elected in the 1970 provincial election, in the riding of ( Cape Breton Nova, and is a school teacher by profession. The 4th Estate, October 15, 1970. Finally, the provincial 170

these men were able to develop leadership ability which they were able to utilize when they became political candidates.

Also, these candidates were guite often able to retain their trade union supporters as supporters on election day.

Secondly, like most third parties that have tried to compete against the two major parties, the CCF-NDP found that its efforts were hindered by a lack of adeguate finances.

Without such finances, a third party finds it difficult to pub-

lish sufficient literature, and to fully utilize the media, which is necessary in order to make the public aware of the party's policies and candidates. A lack of finances also acts as a draw-back in a third party's efforts to attract campaign workers, and organizational personnel, as weIl as candidates.

Of course, insufficient finances hurts major parties as weIl as third parties: however, the two major parties usually have a sounder basis of financial support, and find themselves less restricted because of financial reasons, than third parties.

The contributions of'the U.M.W. and Steelworkers was a main source of money for the CCF-NDP. The importance of the party leader, Mr. J. Akerman, was also elected in 1970, in the constituency of Cape Breton East. And though l do not have any official source of information providing his occupation, l believe he is an archeologist. Although these men did not come from the ranks of trade unions, they have attained close ties with such unions. 171

U.M.W.1s affiliation was not only reflected at the local and provincial levels, but also at the national level:

It brought to the party a considerable measure of financial strength at a very critical periode In the biennium 1940.:.1942, for example"ï the contribution of Nova Scotia, mostly from the U.M.W.,exceeded $1800, the largest contribution made by any province to the national CCF in that period.2S4

At the Nova Scotia provincial level in the 1944-1948 period,

"most of the funds for elections and carrying on betweel1 elections was supplied by rel~tively few local unions and by not more than twelve or fifteen individuals who contributed regu zas larly and generously." These union locals were with the

U.M.W. and the Steelworkers, and contributed by means of the check-off system of union dues. In the 1940 1s, there were about 10,000 dues-paying members of the U.M.W., and 4,000 dues- paying members with the Sydney Steelworkers, affil~ated with 266 the CCF. Although the Maritime CCF during its hey-day in the 1940's tried to obtain the affiliation and union check- offs of other trade unions, it was never successful (although the party almost succeeded in obtaining the support of the

2G~ . '!'McHenry, op. c~t., p. 48.

2SScorrespondence with Mr. L. Shaw.

2S6Loc • cit. 172 2€li, Marine Workers' Union in the Halifax dock-yards):. The

U.M.W.'s, and Steelworkers', financial contributions were un-

doubtedly one of the main reasons why the CCF was able to do

so weIl in the coal and steel areas. with such finances, the

party was able to campaign on almost egual terms with the two

major parties in these areas. Elsewhere in the Maritimes, the

CCF had to rely almost entirely on membership dues, which did

not amount to very much since, in the 1940's, there were about . 2€l8 1500-2000 dues-paying members in aIl of Nova Scot~a. The

party's Maritime organizer at that time (Mr. young) received

regular contributions of $5, $10, etc., from several individuals

as he travelled around the region.2~e Other than this, the CCF

received sorne revenue from the federal party which paid the

.. . 22~ sa 1ary 0 f t h e Mar~t~me organ~zer. Hence, the CCF was much

better-off financially in the coal and steel areas because of

its affiliation with the two unions; elsewhere, the party had

a hard time trying to make ends meet.

261Interview with Mr. F. Young.

2€l8correspondence with Mr. L. Shaw. c.) 2S9Interview with Mr. F. Young. 22(i)LOC. cit. 173

The NDP has also been plagued with financial problems, especially outside of the coal and steel areas. Pres- ently, there are 20 union locals affiliated with the Nova 221 Scotia NDP, and they have about 6,500 members. As of mid- 22g July, 1970, the party had 823 individual members, each pay-

~ng, th e $3 mem b ersh' ~p f ee. 213 other than this, the NDP obtains revenue by having " sustaining memberships", canvassing for funds at election time, and receiving a small federa-l sub-

2j~ sidy ta help payfor a provincial secretary. As in the case of its predecessor, the NDP has been better-off in the industrial area of Cape Breton where the trade union movement is strongest and most politically active. About 61 per cent of the membership of the NDP, as of mid-July, 1970, was in the six provincial constituencies composing Cape Breton 225 county. Consequently, the financial contributions made by

27Gcorrespondence with Mrs. P. Prowse who was Provin cial Secretary at the time (August, 1970). l failed to get a reply from the other two provinces, but it would be safe to assume that they have a much smaller number of affiliated union locals, if any at all.

222correspondence with Mrs. P. Prowse.

2JBlnterview with Mr. J. Aitchison.

214LoC . cit.

215This was calculated from material supplied by Mrs. P. Prowse: 505 of the 823 individual members came from Cape 174

the U.M.W. and Steelworkers, and by individual members of

other unions in the coal and steel areas, have been one means

by which the movement has helped the CCF-NDP. And these

financial contributions serve as one explanation for the CCF-

NDP's greater success in these areas than in other industrial

and urban areas such as Halifax and Saint John city •.

The third way by which a movement assists a third par-

ty is by supplying the party with organizational workers. The

close relationship between the movement and party results in

many members of the movement'committing themselves to the ad-

vancement of the party. Because of their involvement within

the movement, these people are usually weIl acquainted with

r, organizational techniques, as weIl as with the functioning of

meetings and committees, and the "nitty-gritty" work that goes

on behind the scenes (printing and distributing literature,

raising money, operating telephones, renting meeting-halls,

etc.). with such expertise, the movement's members who volun-

teer their services to the party prove to be a very valuable

asset.

Breton county. Furthermore, 131 members were resident in the ten Halifax county constituencies: 71 members were in Pictou county (of whom 48 were in Pictou West): and the remaining 116 members came from the other fifteen Nova Scotia counties--mainly ( '. those on Cape Breton Island or the northern part of the main land. See Appendix G, pp. 226, 227. 175

In the Maritimes, third parties have always found it difficult to obtain sufficient personnel. The CCF-NDP has been more fortunate than other third parties because of its connection with the labour movement. Tbis has been especially true in the coal and steel areas where the CCF-NDP has been able to obtain personnel from the labour unions to establish effective constituency organizations. In the 194

Within the U.M.W. and Steelworkers, the CCF received more assistance over-all from the rank and file members than 23?l from the union leaders. There were, of course, exceptions to this, since several union leaders obviously worked hard for the CCF (such as Foreman Waye of the Steelworkers) .218 A few

2l6Interview with Mr. F. Young.

271Loc • cit.

2J8Loc • c~'t • 176 union leaders within these two unions did not support the CCF because they were actually long-time Conservative and Liberal supporters. Therefore, they usually contented themselves with working purely within the union and not for the CCF party.279 other union leaders found that they had to restrain themselves from openly supporting the CCF because many of their rank and file members were supporters of the two major parties, and they did not want to lose their positions within the union by a l ~ena, t'~ng these rank an d f'l~ e mem b ers. 280 And then there were a few Communists within the trade unions who strove to prevent the CCF f rom rece~v~ng"t ra d e un~on~s"t s 1 supporL..... 281 Consequen t - ly, although the CCF received considerable organizational and manpower aid from the U.M.W. and Steelworkers, it probably could have received greater assistance if the trade union 'movement had been more united.

Both the former leader of the Nova Scotia NDP, Mr. J. . 282 283 Aitchison, and the presen~ leader, Mr. J. Akerman, have

279Interview with Mr. F. Young.

280Loc • cit.

28lLoc • cit.

282Interview with Mr. J. Aitchison.

283correspondence with Mr. J. Akerman 177 found that the rank and file union members have been generally more active in the NDP than have the unions' leaders. Trade union leaders have usually been hesitant to openly support the

NDP for fear that they might eventually lose their positions within the unions, and because (as Mr. Aitchison speculates) they believe that this might jeopardize their relations with 284 the government. And then several trade unionists are sup porters of the Conservative and Liberal partie~.2S!a

The membership figures for the CCF-NDP, the two major parties, and the other third parties, over the years were not available so as to decide the minimum core membership that a party must have for effective electoral action. However, from the interviews and correspondence, and from casual conversation, it was generally accepted that the two major parties hav.e been quite able in getting sufficient personnel for electoral cam paigns in most, if not aIl, Maritime constituencies. The CCF

NDP, on the other hand, has usually been able to form compar able organizations only in industrial/urban areas. This is reflected in the 1970 Nova Scotia election when the NDP received its main support in the second most populous county--Cape

2Q~Interview with Mr. J. Aitchison.

29SLoc . cit. 178 Breton--and in the most populous county--Halifax. Furthermore,

Cape Breton county has a population density of 133.30 while

Halifax has 118.73 people per square mile--well above the other 2S6 counties which are mostly in the 15-30 range. What is even

more interesting is the fact that the Halifax "metropolitan

areall has a density of 1,687.04 and the Sydney-Glace Bay lIurban 287 areall has a density of 2,347.59. It was precisely in these

densely populated areas that the NDP was able to attract suf-

ficient membership (see Appendix G, pp. 226,227) with which to

establish effective political organizations. And in such areas,

these well-staffed organizations were able to obtain consider-

able support for the party--winning Cape Breton East and Cape

Breton Nova.

Like o the CCF, the NDP has been better organized in

industrial Cape Breton and other large industrial/urban areas

such as Pictou and Halifax. In these particular areas, the

party has had its largest membership, and thus has been able

to draw on this membership to work within the ~artyls organiza-

tion at election time. Furthermore, in those areas where there

were also affiliated union loeals, the CCF-NDP bas been greatly

286census of Canada, Volume I: Population: General Cbaracteristics. Table 2. ( ;'

° 287Ibid., Ta'Elle 4. ,i 179 assisted by members of the trade union movement who have vol-

untered their services to the party.

The final method by which a movement helps a third par-

ty to be electorally successful is the "educational" work that

it does. Movements usually develop in order to advance the

position of a particular segment of the population. This is

done by making the movementls members and the general populace

aware of the existing problems and of policies that would

alleviate these problems. In order to make people aware, move-

ments Use such techniques as holding meetings and discussion

groups, employing research and staff workers, and circulating

. ~. ideas, po licies, etc., .v ia newspapers, pamphlets, radio, and

T.V. By being closely associated with a political party, the

movementls educational work often serves to the advantage of

the party.

The CCF was most fortunate in the industrial area of

Cape Breton county when the U.M.W. bought the Glace Bay

Gazette, in the early 1940's. Thus, about 17,000 members of

this union and the Steelworkers union had lia daily newspaper

which, by their declared policy and natural interests is for

the development or organized labour, political action, credit 288 un~ons. andt' co-opera ~ves. 11 This newspaper undoubtedly was

28811Memorandum re. The Gazette.by iiFim Wright, Il CCF Files. 180 of great service to the CCF at that time, since the values and orientation of the newspaper went hand-in-hand with those of the party. However, the full potential effect of this paper was probably diminished by the apparent squabbling that went on among the paper's staff, and between the editors and the owners.289

During the early part of this century, the unions in the coal and steel areas were actively involved with discussing socialism. Not only did the union members actively discuss socialism, they actually exercised what they believed--that is, the members established numerous credit unions and co-operatives, and voted for "left-wing" candidates. Hence, when the CCF arrived on the scene, most of the hard work involved in making people aware of socialism had already been completed (and was s'till going oh). The policies coming out of the various union local meetings, in the coal and steel areas, were the same as those which the CCF advocated. The situation was quite different in the other areas of the Maritimes where an active and socialistic movement was absent.

The areas where such a movement was absent had not been

'~prepared" for the CCF and its socialistic policies. In these

299This is easily detected in the correspondence of that time. CCF Files. 181 areas, the party had to do its own educationa1 work via CCF

Clubs, its newspapers and 1iterature, and its radio programmes.

Whi1e these instruments 1arge1y augmented the work done by the

U.M.W. and Stee1workers in the coa1 and steel areas, they were essentia11y introducing the populace in the other areas to socia1ism for the first time. Therefore, the party had great difficu1ty in most areas of the Maritimes because the people simp1y did not know what the CCF and its po1icies were a11 about. Socia1ism to them was something akin to Sta1inism and atheism and, therefore, something not to be accepted,. It was on1y in the coa1 and steel areas where socia1ism had deve10ped over several decades that the CCF-NDP was an acceptable altern ative to the two major parties.

Conclusions

The presence of a movement, su ch as that in the coa1 and steel areas, seems to be very conducive to the success of a third party. The movement provides the party with finances, leaders, and personnel, as we11 as performing considerable educationa1 work. A1so, the values advocated by the movement substantia11y determine the values of the third party. That is, since the trade union movement advocated socia1istic and co- 182 operative values, a "le ft-.wing" par~y would more likely develop than a " r ight-wing" party. Therefore, this theory goes a long way towards explaining why third parties have failed to be electorally successful in most parts of the Maritimes, and as to why socialistic third parties have attained considerable support in the coal and steel areas.

However, the indigenous socio-economic conditions in the coal and steel areas led to the formation of class consciousness, which gradually gave rise to the trade union movement. Also, the aggregation of the class-consciousness was largely accomplished by socialist immigrants at the turn of this century. The tràde union movement in the coal and steel areas directly provided IIle ft-wing" candidates with electoral sup port, but the movement itself was the result of socio-economic factors. The absence of these factors in other Maritime areas has' discouraged the development of a movement or a third party. 1 ~,

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary

As stated in the IIIntroduction,1I the purpose of this

thesis was IIto define the conditions, and account for the

factors, which hinder the development and electoral success

of 'third parties' in the Maritime Provinces of Canada. 1I

An examination of the electoral statistics shows that

the Conservative and Liberal parties have dominated the pol-

itics of the region and that third parties have generally been

very weak. In explaining this phen omen on , the first thing

that is usually emphasized is the inherent strength of the two

major parties and the inherent weakness of third parties. That

is, the two major parties are shown to have been well organized

and financed, and to have had sufficient numbers of capable

personnel and leaders, in order to effectively contest most, if

not all~ electoral constituencies. Consequently, the Conserv-

ative and Liberal parties have been able .to build up strong

party allegiances over the years, and to maintain their

183 184

positions of dominance. Third parties, on the other hand, have not had the organization, finances, personnel, and

leaders, that the major parties have possessed. And without

such assets, third parties have not been able to get their message across to the populace: hence, these parties have not been able to develop strong party allegiances nor to attain a

substantial share of the vote at election time. The strength

of the two major parties and the weakness of third parties is thus emphasized in explaining the electoral success of the

former and the electoral failure of the latter.

But surely this type of explanation is only a descrip tive explanation. It is not a causal explanation; that is, it does not show why the major parties have had most of the assets and the minor parties have had so few of them, thereby producing the electoral results we have described. In order to develop a causal explanation, it is necessary to look at the region's political culture and socio-economic conditions.

When considering the Maritime Provinces, it must always be remembered that they entered Confederation just as their

"golden age" was passing. Professors Beck, MacKinnon, and

Thorburn have shown how the two major parties, and the two-party system, developed in the Maritimes around such issues as re sponsible government, education, land reform, religion, and 185

Confederation, during the l800's. Thus, the two-party sys tem had become institutionalized prior to the 20th century.

Allegiances to the two major parties have remained remark- ~ ably stable during this century as has the practice of turn ing to the major party out of office when the one in office falls into disfavour.

The reason for this stability exists partially in the immigration-emigratiop pattern. Since the vast influx of immigrants had slowed down drastically by the l850's, there has not been the incorporation inward of different con cepts, ideas, and norms of behaviour. The old pattern has not been seriously challenged but has been permitted to re main relatively stable, evolving at a slow pace. There has also been the large-scale emigration from the region, with the more radical and vigorous elements of the population leading the exodus. Those who have been more attached to, and comfortable with, the established system have remained behind. Hence, the traditional pattern has become more deeply entrenched over the years, and the populace, being unlikely to be exposed to different concepts and norms, has not been en couraged to support a minor party advocating "foreign" ideas.

This was substantially different from that which existed in western Canada where there was a great influx of immigrants at 186 the turn of the centurYi thus, when conditions became un bearable in the 1920's and 1930's, westerners were willing to experiment with new ideas and methods since they were not as firmly attached to the established system as Mari timers, and since they were aware of such different ideas and methods.

The coal and steel areas in the Maritimes were simi lar to the Prairie Provinces in that they experienced a rapid population growth at the turn of the century. Not only did the people come from other, Maritime areas, but a significant number of them came from Britain and other European countries where labour politics and socialism were common. The influence of these immigrants in challenging the established order, and in being active in unions, cooperatives, and politics, was an important factor for IIleft-wingll parties receiving considerable support in these areas. They challenged the traditional con cepts and norms with ones that they had acquired in Europe, and they were also more likely to support third parties since they had no long-standing attachment to the two major parties.

The nature of the Maritime economy has also been detrimental to the efforts of third parties. The diversity of the economic groupings has "meant that the populace of the region has not been solely dependent on one economic activity. 187

Thus, the region has experienced neither a IIboom and bustll

type economy nor the unsettling social effects which usually

accompany such an economYi rather, it has been reààtively

stable. This situation has been conducive to the maintenance

of the two major parties since the electorate bas not lost

its confidence in these parties as a result of severe economic

fluctuations (like those which occurred in the Prairie Prov-

inces) • .~

Another factor which can be traced to the region's

economic diversity is the lack of cohesion and class

consciousness which would lead the electorate to independent

action outside of the two-party system. Other characteristics

of the economy which have contributed to this have been the dis

persion of the population, and of the members of most economic

groupings, over the region, and the generally small unit of

production.

Without the concentration of large numbers of people

dependent on one economic activity, there is less chance for

alienation and class-consciousness to develop. Instead, other

factors (such as locaiity or religion) have generally been

more salient than any possible degree of alienation and class

consciousness that may have existed. Furthermore, the not un ( common practice of many workers earning their incomes from 188 more than one activity, especially among the primary prod ucers (fishermen, farmers, and lumbermen), has discouraged the development of a rigid class structure.

Hence, the nature of the economy has mitigated against the ri se of third parties. The situation is such that the two major parties have been able to make direct appeals to the memberships of most sectors of the economy (and bo other societal groupings) and to have these appeals accepted by the electorate. The average citizen has acted parochially over the years and has not acted as· part of a class~ as most litera ture on Maritime politics demonstrate (such as Professor Thor burn's works), the average Maritimer formulates his demands and thinking in reference to his immediate surroundings-~usually a small town or raral area in which everyone knows everyone else, and in which he has gone to school and participates in community activities with his fellow neighbour (who just might be the man he works for). Despite the absence of a rigid class structure, there are divisions within Maritime society (e.g. religion) but these divisions have come to be accepted since they have existed for possibly a hundred years or more and have left much of their bitterness behind. As these divisions unfolded, the two major parties emerged with their brokerage

~tyle politics and on many issues each party has found itself 189 ( on different sides at different times--depending on which

party was in office and on what was politically expedient at

a particula,r time. The strong' party loyalties to these two

.major parties, along with the fact that there was not a "boom

and )justl~ type of existence to disrupt these loyalties or to

seriously divide Maritime society, has meant that third par

ties have been unable to capture a substantial portion of the

Maritime vote.

The generally low level of the standard of living,

which in many cases has been near the subsistance level, also

has made most people a bit reluctant and cautious about sup

porting a new party. They prefer to support the two major par

ties which have a chance of winning power because by doing so

they will receive political and financial rewards--as they have

done in the pasto Most Maritimers over the years wanted such

rewards immediately and did not want to wait for a third par

ty's utopia to be established. In this regard, Maritimers have

been unlike the citizens of other provinces (especially the

western provinces) during the 20th century. A high proportion

of westerners had just arrived from different parts of the

world and possessed new ideasr therefore, since they were not.

closely attached to the major parties, these westerners turned ( to third parties when the old ones failed to alleviate their 190 problems. However, in the Maritimes, traditiona1 ideas and

10yalties were stronger since there was not the influx of immigrants nor the economic problems as severe as in the West.

Maritimers have been content to support the major parties, and especia11y when they see the direct benefits of doing so. The construction of a new highway, the building of a post-office or 1ighthouse, the arrivai of fami1y a110wance or old age pension cheques, a10ng with the use of patronage, have a1ways been visible and direct reminders of the benefits to be derived from supportinCY.. the two major parties. The Maritimes have prob ably been more affected in this way than the other provinces since ~he percentage of the Màritime population contributing to the region's economy is sma11eri that is, Census data show that the region has a higher percentage of its population in non-productive age-groups--under twenty years of age and over sixty-five. Thus, the region has been more dependent on, and aware of, government programmes and po1icies designed to aid those who are not economica11y secured. In order to break

Maritimers out of this pattern of behaviour, many of those interviewed voiced the opinion that it wou1d be necessary for a third party to win power nationa11y and to become better known via T.V. and other media. The electorate wou1d thereby become more aware of the third party's po1icies and wou1d have 191

their traditional concepts and norms challenged; furthermore,

the electorate would feel that since the party was in power

they would not be "wasting" their vote and would be able to

attain financial rewards for supporting the party.

It has only been in the coal-steel areas that class

consciousness developed to such an extent as to cause a sub

stantial portion of the electorate to vote for "left-wing"

candidates and parties. The highly disruptive changes in the

economy and society that occurred at the turn of the century,

as the coal-steel industry and the areals population rap*dly

expanded, fostered the development of class~consciousness.

The fact that there existed a rigid class structure at that

time with Besco owning the company stores and houses, and with

the industry being controlled by outsiders, overshadowed

traditional party loyalties in many ~ases. with the sudden

deçline in the post-World War l years, and the "boom and bust"

nature of the industry, class-consciousness became more deeply

entrenched among many members within the coal-steel industry.

One other consequence of the general nature of the Maritime

economy has been the fact that the amount of finances avail

able to support political parties is limited. In most areas,

the few people with money to spare have traditionally given ) it to the two major parties, leaving third parties out in the 192 cold. Other regions of Canada have been more prosperous than the Maritimes and thus there have been more sources for their parties to tape Also, other regions of Canada have had strong socio-economic movements which have provided third parties with finances, leaders, organizational workers, and "educational work. 1I In the Maritimes, it has only been in the coal-steel areas that there has been a politically active trade union movement which has assisted third parties. Elsewhere, third parties have been at a severe disadvantage because of the ab sence of'a politically active socio-economic movement.

Political protest then usually has been articulated by the two major parties which have not hesitated to criticize

"Upper Canada" and the policies made by the central government whenever it has been politically expedient to do sO. When they have advocated "Maritime Rights,lI they have actually sought more favourable consideration by the central govern ment and not more autonomy like western Canada or Quebec.

Realizing that they are living in an economically poor region,

Maritimers have found it best to be within the power circ les in ottawa in order to receive greater consideration. consequent ly, Maritimers have continued to support the major parties which have the best chance of win'ning office, and thereby perpetuating the traditional pattern. 193

Conclusions

As can be seen, the conditions explaining the rise and electoral success of third parties as set out at the end of Chapter II have not existed in the Maritimes. The coal- steel areas have generally been an exception and it has been in these areas (basically Cape Breton county) that socialist third parties have achieved a high degree of success.

1) There has not been a vacuum into which a third party could have entered. Instead, there has been a very strong two-party system in each Maritime province, with each major party considered a suitable alternative to turn to when the one in office falls into disfavour. Although the Conservative party has generally been weak in the French-speaking areas of

New Brunswick; it has still received about a third of the vote in these areas, and other factors (as outlined previously in

Chapter IV and in Professor Leslie's article) have prevented third parties from moving in and displacing the Conservative party.

However, it is conceivable that if a third party was to win power nationally and to have its policies better understood by the electorate via T.V., Maritimers would provide

1 ~ 194

this party with electoral support. As further proof of this

hypothesis, one need only look at the case of Cape Breton

county: in this case, a strong two-party system did not pre-

vent the emergence of third parties when confronted by strônger

forces.

2) There has not really been much potential for a third

party to develop. The political culture of the region has been

based on liberalism with its emphasis placed on competitio~,

individualism; and decentralization: the result has be~n a

high degree of parochial feeling rather than class-consciousness.

There is also to be found in the political culture a tory streak,

as Maritimers tend to respect the established societal struc~

tures and the leaders of society (usually financiers, lawyers,

and clergymen). Therefore, sorne of the left-wing criticism in

the Maritimes would be expected to be expressed in corporate-

organic-collectivist terms (e.g. equality of condition rather

than eguality of opportunity, and cooperation rather than com-

petition). However, in the Maritimes, the two major parties

have been able to maintain their positions since they have

been brokerage-style parties which have not hesitated to imple-

ment"soèiàlist policies (albeit state welfareis~). Further-

( more, socialist third parties have generally been unable to 195 find sufficient personnel and leaders, except in the ceal steel areas, in order to become the chief spokesman for social ism and to confront the established parties. Even if they did have sufficient assets, such socialistthird parties would have to temper their policies in order to be electorally suc cessful since the basis of the region's political culture is liberalism.

The strength of liberalism, as weIl as the economic diversity, has also meant that there has not been a large and cohesive socio-economic group which could have provided a third party with a ba~is of support. There are two main ex ceptions to this: the Acadian community and the workers in the coal-steel areas. Because of their past experiences and their position within the Anglo-Maritime society, the Acadians have neither developed a third party nor provided one with much support. As for the coal-miners and steel-workers, they have acted as a cohesive group outside of the two-party system; however, in this case, the main drawback has been the small number of miners and steel-workers relative to the total Mari time labour force, resulting in socialist parties being re stricted to a small part of the region.

Possibly, if the central government1s policies con cerning regional development were to become over-centralized ,. 196 and formulated without regard for Maritime interests, Mari

timers would be forced to work together in order to prevent

such subjugation. However, this has not been the caze so

far since most Maritimers have felt that the central govern

ment has not delle enough.

3) Most third parties that have entered the Maritimes

have been poorly organized. Basically because of the scarcity

of political assets in general, and because the major parties

have most of the available assets (finances, leaders, personnel,

etc.), third parties have not been able to contest most rid

ings. And in those ridings that they did contest, they were

severely restricted in their efforts to get their message

across to the public. It has only been in the coal-steel

areas, and in the more urbanized areas, that third parties

(especially the CCF-NDP) have been able to build up an organ

ization to enable them to campaign seriously.

It was the opinion of most CCF-NDP members who were

interviewed that the NDP would not have sufficient assets

until the party did better nationally. If this was to occur,

the party's leaders and policies would become better known

and it would be able to attract more, and better qualified,

people to the party in the Maritimes. Maritimers would be (. 197 more likely to support the party since they would not feel

that they were "wasting" their·vote. But until a third party

such as the NDP does better nationally, the party will have a

very difficult time establishing a viable organization in the

Maritimes. And without such an organization, its chances of

being electorally successful will remain dim.

4) As a continuation of the preceding point, the rnost

successful third party in the Maritimes (the CCF-NDP) has been

closely connected with the trade union movement. The associa-

tion between the CCF-NDP and the trade union movement has been

most fruitful, especially in the coal-steel areas and in in-

dustrial/urban areas. It seerns that such an association between

a third party and a socio-economic rnovement is indispensable for

the electoral success of the party: this seems to be the case

of third parties in the other provinces as well as in the Mari-

times.

Therefore, the prospect of a third party being suc-

cessful in the Maritimes is bleak because of the absence of a

strong socio-economic movement in the region. The trade union

movement is only strong and politically active in a few

industrial/urban areas: elsewhere, it is either non-existent

or weak. Socio-economic conditions have not been conducive to 198 the development of a strong movement, and the efforts of third parties to develop a mass-based party have also been hindered by the indigenous socio-economic conditions. It would probably take a major socio-economic upheaval to cause

Maritimers to develop a movement which would provide a third party with support.

5) Finally, Maritime society bas generally escaped major socio-economic upheavals during the 20th century which would have upset traditional norms of behaviour and concept. With- out experiencing such upheavals and without the introduction of new ideas, Maritime society has been permitted to evolve at a slow pace, languishing in tradition. The coal-steel areas have been a major exception, especially du ring the first thirty years or so of this century. Here, the rapid industrialization and urbanization which occurred caused the populace to develop a strong trade union movement, as weIl as co-operative and credit union movements. The influx of immigrants from

Europe who were well-acquainted with socialism was also a significant factor which resulted in the electoral success of third parties in these areas. But, the other areas of the

Maritimes did not experience such forces and have continued to support the two major parties. 199

Thus, unless there is a major socio-economic upheaval

in the future, Maritimers will continue to support the two

old parties. They will do this because their loyalties to

the Conservative and Liberal parties will not have been

shattered. Instead, the absence of a major socio-economic

change will only perpetua te and strengthen the loyalties to

these two parties.

Therefore, the conditions derived from the four major

theories concerning the rise of third parties have not existed

in the Maritimef?, and, if they have, not to the same degree

that they have existed elsewhere in Canada. And without these

conditions, third parties have not been able to achieve electoral

success.

As for the future, conditions would have to change

substantially before a third party could achieve electoral suc

cess. Until Maritimers feel that they are being subjugated or exploited by outside interests, they will continue to support

the two major parties in order to attain financial and polit

ical rewards. If a third party was to win power nationally and to become better known, then Maritimers might tend to sup port this party in order to continue receiving such rewards.

The continuance of the immigration-emigration trend will also l 200

hinder the activities of third parties~ that is, they will

continue to find it difficult to attract qualified people to

the party in sufficient numbers. Therefore, third parties

will not be able to effectively contest most ridings and will

not'receive very much electoral support. The absence of a

socio-economic movement will continue to be a drawback to a

third party's efforts in the region. With the economic condi

tions of the region and the immigration-emigration trend, the

prospects of a socio-economic movement developing are bleak.

The task of organizing the people (or a substantial portion

of them) into a cohesive movement is made difficult by the

scarcity of available leaders, the economic diversity, and the

dispersion of the population over the region. Finally, there

would be need for a major (unforeseen) socio-economic chan<;Je

which would have the same effect as a "boom and bust" economy

in causing the people to seek solace in a third party. There

fore, the possibility of a third party being electorally suc

cessful in the Maritimes in the near future is very slim and

unpromising. 201

APPENDIX A

PERCENT OF VOTE FOR EACH PARTY, IN EACH NEW BRUNSWICK PROVINCIAL CONSTITUENCY (1920-1970)1

1920 1925 1930 1935 1939 1944 1948 1952 1956 1960 1963 1967 1970

Albert C 56 53 47 47 49 41 30 56 58 55 61 59 70 L 44 47 53 53 51 45 56 44 36 45 38 41 30 0 14 14 7 Carleton C 17 66 58 51 55 55 51 61 64 58 65 58 69 L 13 42 49 45 39 49 40 30 42 35 42 29 0 71 34 6 6 2 Charlotte C 53 L 47 Charlotte C 26 o -- Charlotte C 53 43 44 39 42 54 56 49 48 52 57 L 49 st.Stephen C 74 L 48 57 57 57 58 47 45 51 52 48 43 - 0 25 and L 27 o -- 4 1 l:lUtQl:lD Il -- Gloucester C 35 30 L 65 70 G10ucesterc 33 44 41 28 30 36 35 40 34 36 o -- 1 L 67 56 59 72 70 62 100 .59 60 66 64 Bathurst C 34 40 0 2 3 City L 66 60 o -- Kent C 48 46 30 36 31 35 43 44 38 34 37 28 L 100 52 54 70 64 59 65 57 56 62 66 63 72 0 9 King's C 43 57 57 49 54 54 53 60 57 56 59 62 64 L 42 40 43 51 46 39 47 40 39 45 42 38 34 0 16 3 8 4 2 Madawaska C 46 40 L 54 60 Ma dawaska C 34 32 20 33 20 56 59 43 44 o -- L 100 66 68 71 64 48 61 44 42 57 57 Edmunston C 44 55 0 9 3 32 40 Cit:r' L 56 45 o -- Moncton C 31 53 58 58 43 36 35 52 56 48 49 48 52 City L 46 47 39 42 58 39 54 45 44 52 51 52 44 0 23 2 25 11 3 4

',- 202 APPENDIX A - Continued

1920 1925 1930 1935 1939 1944 1948 1952 1956 1960 1963 1967 1970 Northum- C 52 46 36 39 39 40 50 39 44 38 38 ber1and L 100 49 54 64 62 61 72 59 51 61 '56 60 55 0 29 1 7 Queen's C 37 54 58 49 51 45 35 53 55 53 55 39 52 L 48 46 42 51 49 49 56 47 45 48 45 61 46 0 14 7 9 1 Restigouche C 47 46 L 54 53 Resti- C 39, ,54 52 41 50 37 43 51 56 41 49 o -- 1 gouche L 34 42 48 59 50 45 66 49 42 59 51 Campbell ton C 57 54 0 27 3 18 1 2 L 43 46 o -- 1 St .John C 53 52 Centre L 47 43 Saint C 47 57 64 45 55 41 36 59 58 56 50 o -- 5 John L 53 43 36 56 44 34 48 41 36 44 50 St .John C 59 60 City 0 1 25 17 6 East L 41 34 o -- 7 St.John C 49 58 72 53 63 49 44 58 59 52 56 st .John C 68 68 County L 51 42 29 47 38 29 50 42 36 35 44 West L 32 28 0 22 6 5 13 o -- " Sunbury C 54 54 48 49 44 30 52 51 41 46 43 55 L 68 46 46 52 51 45 57 46 49 59 55 57 42 0 32 12 13 3 3 Victoria C 45 49 37 39 38 42 55 57 50 52 54 52 L 4,5 55 51 63 61 52 54 38 43 50 48 46 48 0 55 11 4 8 l'iestmor- C 12 52 51 39 42 35 25 41 45 44 44 41 45 land L 51 48 49 61 58 50 66 54 55 56 56 59 5;' 0 37 15 8 6 4 York C 65 York C 55 57 York C 45 L 35 York C 57 45 52 44 31 49 59 55 59 L 45 40 t 36 0 L 43 55 48 46 58 46 42 45 41 o -- 3 0 20 Frederic- C 58 0 10 11 4 Frederic- C 58 62 ton, t 42 ton L 42 34 Marysville 0 -- o -- 4 and Devon 203

Source: Parliamentary Guide, 1920-l968~ and Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, Province of New Brunswick, 1970.

1) Percentage"totals do not always add up to 100 per cent because of roul1.ding. The Let ter Il Cil stands for the Conserva ti VI Party, the letter IIL II for the Liberal Party, and the letter 11011 for the non-Conservative and non-Liberal vote.

Explanàtion of the Other vote in each election:

1920 -- It is difficult to make an accurate interpretation of the results because not all constituencies made com plete and official returns. The Parliamentary Guide has incomplete results and these results do not always agree with the results in Professor Scarrow's Canada Votes~ also, the results in the New Brunswick Journal of Assembly, March 17, 1921 are not accompanied with party affiliations. Thus, with the available informa tion and the aid of the Chief Electoral Officèr's office, the following results were derived: 1) in Albert, Gloucester, st. John City, and St. John County, it was a straight two-party contest between the two major parties ~ 2) in Ma dawas!.:a, two Liberals were chosen by acclamation~ 3) in Kent, the returning officer only notifièd thè authorities that three Liberals had been elected~ 4) in Carleton, the 11011 vote consisted of a 67.2 per cent vote for the three United Farmers candidates and a 3.4 per cent vote for an Independent~ 5) in Charlotte, Victoria, and York, the 11011 vote was for the United Farmers~ 6) in Northumberland, the Parliamentary Guide listed all eight candidates for the four seats as Liberals~ the four who were elected attained 61.9 per cent of the vote and the four who lost (all Liberal encumbants) received 38.1 per cent of the vote~ 7) l do not know the official affiliation of the two 11011 candidates in each of Restigouche, Queen's, Kir:tg's, or of the 11011 candidate in Moncton city--probably most were United ( ~"armers ~ 8) the Il 011 vote in Westmorland consisted of a 13 per cent vote for a United Farmer and a 24 per 204

cent vote for two other candidates who could have been United Farmers or Conservatives; 9) in Sunbury, two candidates received a total vote of 32 per cent; they may have been either Conservatives or united Farmers. 1925 -- the ,vote under "0" in Carleton was for the United Farmers; while in King's and Restigouche, it was for Independents. 1930 the vote under "0" in Moncton was for an Independent. 1935 the vote under "0" in Madawaska was for two Inde pendents. 1939 the vote under "0" in Madawaska was for an Inde pendent-Liberal; while in St. John City, the other vote was for a CCF candidate. 1944 the vote under "0" was for CCF candidates. 1948 the vote under "0" in Albert, Queenls, St. John City, Sunbury, Westmorland, Moncton, and York, was for the CCF; in Victoria and Restigouche, the Other vote was for the Social Credit; in St. John County, the vote under "0" was for an Independent; in Madawaska, the 40 per cent Other vote consisted of a 7 per cent Social Credit vote and a 33 per cent vote for Inde pendents; and in Northumberland, the 29 per cent Other vote consisted of a 2 per cent CCF vote and a 27 per cent vote for Independents. 1952 -- the vote under "0" in Moncton, Sunbu.rY, Westmorland, and York, was for the CCF; and in Gloucester, St. John City, and Victoria, the "0" vote was for Independent candidates. 1956 the vote under "0" was for the Social Credit party. 1960 the vote under "0" in St. John County was for two Independentcandidates. 1963 an Independent won 7 votes in Albert which was 0.06 per cent of the vote in that constituency--this was too small a figure to be placed in the table. 1967 the vote under "0" in Northumberland was for three NDP ,candidates. 1970 in Moncton, the vote under "0" consisted of a 0.6 per 'vote for an Independent and a 3.3 per cent vote for three NDP candidates; in Campbellton and Gloucester, the Other vote was for Independent candidates; in Northumberland, the vote under "0" was for one Independent who received 0.6 per cent of the vote and for five NDP candidates who received a total vote of 6.4 per cent; in St. John Centre, an Independent attained 0.2 per cent of the vote while the constituency's four NDP candidates received a total vote of 4.3 per cent; and in aIl other constituencies the vote under "0" was for the NDP. 205

APPENDIX B

PERCENT OF VC1l'E FOR EACH PARTY, IN EACH NOVA SCOTIA PROVINCIAL CONSTITUENCY (1920-1970) 1

1920 1925 1921l 1933 1937 1941 1945 1949 1953 1956 1960 1963 1967 1970 Annapolis C 44- 49 .~ 56 56 54 Annapolis C 58 52 45 43 39 41 46 49 East L 55 49 42 44 46 County L 58 42 49 55 57 61 59 52 52 0 2 3 1 0 42 2 Annapolis C 46 43 46 46 46 West L 54 53 53 54 5"; o -- 4 2 Antigonish C -- 46 43 46 39 39 38 42 13 52 55 55 50 46 County L 52 54 57 54 61 62 62 58 49 48 43 45 50 51 o 48 39 2 3 Colchester C 48 72 58 53 54 52 41 52 50 54 56 63 60 53 county L 28 42 47 46 48 54 46 47 44 39 35 37 47 o 52 5 2 2 2 5 2 3 Cumber- C 42 51 51 57 63 5"-' 52 Cumber- C 20 63 54 49 55 51 40 land L 50 49 49 39 34 38 37 land Ln 37 46 52 45 49 45 East 0 8 4 3 7 li County Cumber- C 52 45 45 46 54 58 '37 o 47 15 land L 48 55 55 50 46 39 43 West o -- 4 3 Clare C 51 42 47 48 53 44 40 Digby C 36 60 46 41 42 38 34 L 50 59 53 52 47 56 60 County L 64 40 54 59 58 62 59 o -- a -- 7 Digby C 51 48 51 48 52 51 'w.') L 49 52 49 49 47 49 58 a 3 J. Guysbor- C 19 52 48 43 42 36 38 36 56 49 50 53 53 48 ough L 64 48 53 57 58 64 62 64 44 51 47 47 ,),7 44 County o 17 3 6 Hants C 47 50 50 50 53 5~ 1.7 49 45 46 48 53 Hants C 21 61 52 46 45 42 34 East L 47 50 0 1 6 2 County L 31 39 48 54 55 58 53 6 Hants C 40 54 49 49 58 52 48 o 48 13 West L 40 46 48 46 39 48 52 o 21 3 4 2 Cumber- C 31 46 60 53 67 67 55 land L 42 41 40 40 33 28 40 Centre a 27 14 7 lj 5 206

APPENDlX B - Continucd

1920 1925 1928 1933 1937 1941 1945 1949 1953 1956 1960 1~i63 1907 1970 .Kings C 50 51 60 55 51 North L 50 47 39 4~ 49 0 ;1 :-:. Kings C 42 54 53 48 44 37 40 49 51 Kings C 60 57 ,;jl) ,.')3 ::;a County L 58 46 47 52 56 63 60 51 49 South L 40 ,3e: 35 3i 43 o -- C 5 Kings C 50 45 56 49 49 West L 50 52 44 48 49 0 3 3 2

1920 1925 1928 1933 1937 1941 1945 1949 1953 1956 1960 1963 1967 ! ~,70 lnver- C 36 51 47 46 41 37 29 28 43 4~ 47 51 51 -·;6--- ncss L 51 49 53 54 59 64 71 72 57 5~ 51 '19 50 .,:; Count:l 0 13 2 10 Lunenburg C 54 58 63 56 ~l East L 46 38 37 44 ~S '0 3 Lunenburg C 40 62 47 45 45 42 46 45 54 Lunenburg C 51 53 53 50 47 County L 60 38 53 55 56 59 55 49 44 West L -19 47 42 47 53 o -- 6 1 0 3 Lunenburg C 51 52 57 52 ~5 Centre L 49 4·6 ':;'3 46 5:: 0 2 3 Pictou C 42 47 50 45 50 5~ 47 East L 47 49 50 47 50 49 48 011 4 8 5 Pi ct ou C 12 60 53 45 47 50 38 pictou C 45 50 51 52 60 65 51 ,- County L 50 36 47 55 53 50 52 West L 55 50 49 45 ., ... 35 38

o 39 4 10 0 ~ J.2 Picto'.l C 40 40 52 44 60 54 '>4 Centre L 48 45 49 33 40 38- 48 o 12 15 23 8 -/ Queens C 46 52 55 51 52 50 42 45 52 51 59 66 56 52 County L 55 48 45 49 48 50 48 50 46 49 41 34 4~ 48 o -- 9 5 2 She1- C 45 55 46 44 42 49 38 47 49 52 53 54 47 44 burne L 55 45 54 57 58 ·51 56 53 51 48 47 46 44 49 Count:l 0 6 9 7 Victoria C 36 49 48 52 43 37 35 38 44 44 47 49 55 53 County. L 64 51 52 48 57 63 65 62 57 56 53 51 45 43 0-- 4 ( . 207 .-~ , A??ENDIX B - continued

1920 1925 1928 1933 1937 1941 1945 1949 1953 1956 1960 1963 1967 1970 Yarmouth C 35 54 46 39 40 37 45 50 54 44 48 51 55 51 County L 65 46 54 62 60 63 55 50 46 57 48 4ï 43 50 0 3 2 2 Richmond C 52 57 48 Rich- 47 47 49 23 34 42 46 49 51 59 S6 and Cape L 48 43 52 mond 54 53 51 77 67 58 54 51 49 4i 39 Breton o -- 5 l'lest 1920 1925 1928 1933 1937 1941 1945 1949 1953 1956 1960 1963 1967 1970 Cape C 48 46 49 47 44 Breton L 42 33 33 38 43 Cape C 44 48 28 17 27 22 South 0 11 20 18 15 13 Breton L 43 52 43 47 46 36 Cape C 39 37 53 47 42 37 26 33 Cape C 68 58 South o 13 40 Breton L 26 31 19 30 14 Breton L 29 42 Nova 0 35 32 27 23 ~3 Centre 0 3 Cape C 44 40 16 7 19 21 19 27 54 56 51 Cape C 14 Breton L 48 60 31 38 40 31 38 26 14 21 26 Breton L 32 Centre 0 9 53 54 41 49 43 47 32 24 ~3 County Cape C 48 48 29 28 30 32 58 47 59 54 50 o 54 Breton L 46 52 40 39 46 47 42 28 28 32 25 North 0 6 32 34 24 21 26 13 15 25 Cape C 59 44 Cape C 39 27 11 20 13 42 46 58 53 34 Breton L 8 37 Breton L 39 40 39 30 37 38 30 15 13 :'.5 18 East 0 34 19 East 0 22 33 61 59 43 49 28 40 29 32 48 Cape C 54 49 32 18 32 34 52 45 56 ·44 49 Breton L 47 51 41 50 51 49 48 40 44 43 51 West 0 27 33 17 18 15 13 ~ 208

APPENDIX B - continued

1920 1925 1928 1933 1937 1941 1945 1949 1953 1956 1960 1963 -~{9ô7 1970 Halifax C 55 46 Citadc1 L 41 54 Halifax C 44 45 41 27 34 42 Halifax C 47 48 59 0 4 Centre L 54 55 60 55 55 58 Centre L 53 45 41 Halifax C 47 37 0 2 18 11 o -- 7 Necdham i., ':'8 58 0 5 5 Dartmouth C 44 40 North L 50 54 47' 4-3 . Halifax C 47 48 40 26 29 43 HalifalrC 53 0 7 ô 47 44 East L 53 52 60 54 52 51 county L 50 Dartmouth C 50 50 0 o -- 20 19 6 Dart- 4 II 4 South L 41 50 mou th 0 9 C 28 66 50 Halifùx C 56 :i9 Halifax Cornwallis L .4<; 54 Halifax C 47 44 41 24 31 40 Halifax C 54 55 63 L 47 33 50 0 ï South L 53 56 59 61 60 60 L 46 ;;0 34 County ~o.uth,. Hz..lifax C 54 55 o -- 15 9 C -- 5 3 o 25 1 A-:lanl:ic L ~2 :)~ 0 4 6 Halifax C 42 44 53 Halifax C 43 ' 42 Halifax C 39 42 31 17 31 34 East L 58 51 47 Eastern L 50 5C North L 62 58 65 59 55 61 o -- 6 Shore 0 7 0 4 24 14 5 Halifax C 47 44 52 Halifax C 52 :-sa North L 53 47 45 Chebucto L 43 50 o -- 9 3 0 5 2.J. Halifax C 48 47 56 Halifax C =? 43 Halifax C 45 46 42 27 28 44 North- L 50 46 41 Cobequid L 49 5~ I~est 'L 55 54 58 49 50 51 Nest 0 2 7' 3 o -- o -- 24 22 5 Halifax C 49 45 57 H<'.:i.ifax C 54 ~C West L 51 47 40 St .Margaret" J.. 42 52 0-- 8 3 0 5 9

( 209

Source: Parliamentary Guide, 1921: and Nova Scotia, Election Returns, 1920-1970.

1) Percentage totals do not always add up to 100 per cent because of rounding. The letter "c" stands for the Con servative Party, the letter "L" for the Liberal Party, and the letter "0" for the non-Conservative and the non-Liberal vote.

Explanation of the Other vote in each election:

1920 the vote under "0" in Annapolis, Antigonish, Colchester, and Guysborough was for the United Farmers: in Inverness, the "0" vote was for a Labour candidate: in Cape Breton, the "0" vote consisted of a 41 per cent Labour vote and a 13 per cent United Farmers vote: in Cumberland, the 47 per cent Other vote consisted of a 15 per cent Labour vote and a 32 per cent U.F. vote: in Halifax, the U.F. received 5 per cent of the vote while Labour received 20 per cent: in Hants, Labour was supported by 10 per cent of the voters and the U.F. was ,supported by 38 per cent of these voters: and in Pictou, Labour received 23 per cent of the vote while the U.F. received 16 per . cent. 1925 the vote under "0" was for Labour candidates. 1928 the vote under "0" was for Labour candidates. 1933 the vote under "0" in Cape Breton South Çind cape Breton Centre was for the CCF: in Cape Breton North, the Other votewas for the United Front, as it was in Halifax Centre: and in Cape Breton East, the 22 per cent Other vote consisted of a 3 per cent CCF vote and a 19 per cent United Front vote. 1937 the vote under "0" was for a Labour candidate in Cape Breton East. 1941' the vote under "0" was for CCF candidates. 1945 the vote under "0" in Halifax North consisted of a 21 per cent CCF vote and a 3 per cent Labour-Progressive vote: in Halifax South, the 15 per cent Other vote consisted of a 13 per cent CCF vote and a 2 per cent vote for an Independent: in Pictou, the CCF received 9 per cent of the vote and an Independent received 1 per cent: and in a1l other constituencies, the "0" vote was for the CCF. 210

1949 -- the Other vote in, Hants West consisted of a 9 per cent CCF vote and a 12 per cent vote for an Independent: 11 and, in aIl other constituencies, the 110 vote was for ,the CCF . 11 . 1953 -- the 110 ' vote in Antigonish was for an Independent, 11 while in aIl other constituencies the 110 vote was for the CCF. 11 1956 -- the 110 vote in Cape Breton Nova consisted of a 23 per cent CCF vote and a 12 per cent vote for an Independent, 11 while in aIl other constituencies the 110 vote was for the CCF. 11 1960 the Il 0 vote in Yarmouth was for an Independent: aX.~d, ~'h 't~e other consti tuencies, the Other vote was for the CCF. 1963 the "0" vote was for the NDP. 1967 the "011 vote in Cape Breton South consisted of a 2 per cent vote for an Independent and a 13 per cent NDP vote: in Yarmouth, the Other vote was for an Independent: 11 and, in aIl other constituencies, the vote under 110 was for the NDP. 1970 -- the "0" vote in Inverness consisted of a 7 per cent vote for an Independent and a 3 per cent vote for a NDP can 11 didate: in King's West, the 110 vote was for an Inde 11 pendent: and, elsewhere, the 110 vote was for the NDP.

( 211

APPENDIX C

PERCENT OF VOTE FOR EACH PARTY IN EACH P.E.I. PROVINCIAL CONSTITUENCY (1923-1970)1

2 1923 1927 1931 1935 1939 1943 1947 1951 1955 1959 1962 1966 1970

lst District C 43 44 35 39 39 39 55 48 53 44 44 36 Counci11or L 58 57 65 61 57 52 45 52 47 57 56 64 0-- 4 9 lst District C 44 47 37 42 37 38 48 47 52 45 48 38 Assemb1yman L 57 53 64 58 57 51 44 53 48 55 52 6~ o -- 6 11 8 2nd District C 42 50 41 42 45 38 49 49 53 51 54 50 Councillor L 58 50 59 58 55 49 52 51 47 49 46 50 o -- 13 2nd District C 42 50 46 44 43 37 47 56' 55 52 57 54 Assemblyman L 58 50 55 56 57 52 53 45 45 48 43 .. H~ o -- Il

C 49 3rd District C 50 54 44 47 40 41 38 42 51 56 57 .{Jo~ Prince Councillor L 50 46 56 53 45 46 49 58 49 44 43 59 L 44 0-- 15 14 13 County 3rd District C 51 55 43 47 43 6 48 47 56 58 59 43 0 7 Assemb1yman L 49 45 57 53 43 70 52 53 44 42 41 57 o -- 14 24 4th District C 44 50 39 48 47 41 45 44 44 45 ., .. 40 Counci11or L 56 50 61 52 48 46 55 56 56 55 !;6 60 o -- 5 13 4th District C 44 52 42 50 49 44 38 40 40 44 49 40 Assemblyman L 56 48 58 50 46 49 50 60 60 56 51 éD o -- - .... - -- 6 8 13 5th District C 46 46 41 45 55 42 47 44 55 54 47 22 Counci11or L 54 54 60 55 45 56 53 56 45 47 54 68 o -- 2 , 5th District C 48 51 42 45 55 43 49 38 55 52 48 Jo.., Assemb1yman L 52 50 58 55 45 55 51 62 45 48 53 66 o -- 3 212

APPENDIX C - Continued

2 1923 1927 1931 1935 1939 1943 1947 1951 1955 1959 1962 1966 1970

lst District C 52 57 50 47 36 48 48 46 53 49 45 46 Counci11or L 48 43 51 53 59 52 52 54 47 51 55 54 0 5 lst District C 54 58 44 48 49 51 49 46 52 51 47 44 Assemb1yman L 47 43 56 52 52 49 51 54 48 50 54 56 o -- 2nd District C 47 48 41 40 49 52 41 60 57 62 58 52 Councillor L 53 52 59 60 51 49 59 40 43 38 42 48 C) -- 2nd District C 41 46 35 42 44 47 38 47 55 58 55 52 Assemb1yman L 59 54 65 59 56 53 63 53 45 42 45 .'j8 o -- C 56 King's 3rd District C 50 58 46 53 53 46 50 43 52 57 56 47 L 43 Councillor L 50 42 54 47 47 54 51 57 49 43 42 53 County o -- 0 1 3rd District C 47 54 43 46 51 49 53 49 54 53 56 4ô Assemb1yman L 54 46 57 54 45 51 47 51 46 47 44 52 o -- 4 4th District C 44 49 42 47 50 48 40 30 43 41 43 4~ Councillor L 56 51 58 53 50 52 60 70 57 59 57 58 o --

4th District C 41 48 39 42 41 45 44 29 38 3~ 37 34 Assemb1yman L 59 53 61 58 59 55 56 71 62 64 63 66 o -- 5th District C 51 58 40 43 48 44 39 39 50 46 50 41 Council1or L 49 42 60 57 52 56 61 61 50 54 s.o 59 o -- 5th District C 48 57 40 44 49 44 41 37 47 46 50 43 Assemb1yman L 52 43 60 56 51 56 59 64 53 54 50 57 o -- ',- '~ , ".~ 213

APPENDIX C - Continued

19232 1927 1931 1935 1939 1943 1947 1951 1955 1959 1962 1966 1970 lst District C 49 54 42 46 49 45 50 46 51 53 52 47 Councillor L 51 46 59 54 51 51 50 54 50, 47 48 53 o -- 4 lst District C 48 52 42 48 50 45 50 48 52 52 52 ~5 Assemblyman L 52 48 58 52 50 49 .~O 53 48 48 48 55 o -- 6 2nd District C 44 50 43 50 50 52 50 51 52 53 50 51 Council1or L 56 50 57 50 48 45 50 49 46 47 50 50 o -- 3 3 2nd District C 44 50 45 48 50 49 49 48 50 51 47 49 Assemblyman L 56 50 55 52 48 48 51 52 50 49 54 51 o -- 3 3 3rd District C 47. 52 43 42 39 46 46 44 50 51 53 ~:3 Councillor L 53 49 57 58 61 54 54 57 50 49 48 --- o -- 3rd District C 44 56 44 44 40 43 45 46 51 50 ~9 4:; . Assemblyman L 56 44 56 56 60 58 56 54 49 50 5 ~, 5,· C 53 0 Queen's 4th District C! 47 46 43 49 47 49 45 42 50 47 ';9 --;-r- L 45 Councillor L 53. 55 57 51 53 51 55 58 50 53 51 -l8 County o -- 0 2 4th District C 44 45 42 44 45 46 41 38 47 46 ~9 50 Assemblyman L 56 55 58 56 55 54 60 62 53 55 51 5J o -- 5th District C 54 57 45 57 51 55 53 49 56 55 1,7 31, Councillor L46 43 55 43 46 41 45 51 44 45 53 6é o -- 3 4 2 5th District C 55 58 45 56 46 53 48 46 51 55 44 3:; Assemblyman L 45 42 55 44 50 44 49 54 49 45 5S 65 o -- 4 3 3 6th District C 55 39 Councillor L 46 61 o -- 6th District C 54 40 Assemblyman L 46 61 o --

( t_: 214

Source: Parliamentary Guide, for the elections 1923-1966, inclusive; for the 1970 election result, the information was supplied by the Chief Electoral Officer for P.E.I. (because the 1971 Parliamentary Guide had not been pub lished at time of writing) •

1) Percentage totals do not always add up to 100 per cent because of rounding. The letter "C" stands for the ... Conservative Party, the letter "L" for the Liberal Party, and the letter "0" for the non-Conservative and non-Liberal vote. 2) Although there were constituencies in each county in the 1923 election--as in the succeeding elections--the method by which the results are presented in the Parliamentary Guide makes it impossible to provide the results for each constituency. Therefore, only the total result for each county is provided in the table, for the 1923 election.

Explanation of the Other vote in each election:

1923 -- the vote under "0" in King's County was for an Inde pendent; in Queen's County, the Other vote was also for an Independent; and in Prince County, the Other vote was for four Progressive candidates. (Although Professor Scarrow mentions in Table 62 of his book that there were five ,Progressives in the 1923 election, .the Parliamentary Guide only provides the names and votes for four Pro gressive candidates) . 1943 -- in lst District King's (Councillor) and lst District Prince (Councillor and Assemblyman),. the vote under "0" was for Independent LiberaIs. In aIl other constit uencies, the vote under "0" was for the CCF. 1947 -- in 4th District Prince (Councillor), the 13 per cent Other vote consisted of a 10 per cent CCF vote and a 3 per cent Independent vote. The Other vote in aIl other constituencies was for the CCF. 1951 -- the vote under "0" was for the CCF. l 215 APPENDIX D

PEF<.CENT OF VOTE FOR EACH PARTY, IN EACH NEW BRUNSWICK FEDERAL CONSTITUENCY (1921-1968)1

1921 1925 1926 1930 1935 1940 1945 1949 1953 1957 1958 1962 1963 1965 Gloucester C 27 46 44 ' 49 19 34 30 41 42 47 43 19 27 L 73 54 56 51 75 66 62 70 58 58 53 57 58 61 0 6 38 1 23 12 NOl'thumberland C 44 59 48 59 24 40 47 40 31 Northumberland C 36 48 37 35 35 L 56 42 52 41 56 39 53 56 64 L 47 52 53 57 52 0 20 21 5 5 Miramichi 0 17 10 8 13 York - Sunbury. C 53 73 66 69 46 51 44 45 43 50 54 49 49 49 t 47 27 35 31 47 49 48 49 53 48 44 43 45 46 .0 8 8 7 6 2 .2 9 7 6 Kent C -- 56 47 52 17 35 29 21 34 42 45 41 31 24 Wes tmor liond C L 60 44 54 48 6E1 65 65 49 66 58 55 51 60 60 L 040 15 6 30 8 9 16 Kent 0 Westmorland C 24 60 51 55 24 38 36 32 40 42 48 42 39 36 Moncton C L 61 40 49 45 63 62 53 57 54 51 45 43 48 50 L 0 15 13 11 10 6 7 7 16 13 14 0 Charlotte C 51 62 58 58 32 42 50 50 44 47 53 46 45 45 Carleton C L 49 38 43 42 52 58 50 50 52 53 47 51 53 51 L o -- 16 4 3 2 4 Charlotte 0 Victoria C 46 58 54 60 41 52 • 55 55 49 58 60 57 59 57 Madawaska C L -- 42 46 40 48 48 42 45 45 36 36 34 37 39 L Carleton o 55 1 11 4 5 6 4 9 5 4 Victoria 0 Restigouche C 19 57 43 51 23 30 24 26 29 55 56 44 19 37 Rest::'gouche C L 82 44 57 49 77 70 55 65 50 45 42 46 49 55 L Madawaska 0-- 21 9 21 2 10 32 8 0 Royal C 41 57 55 60 48 53 53 52 55 59 60 53 54 55 Fundy C L 40 43 45 40 47 47 40 43 45 41 40 40 41 37 L o 20 5 7 5 7 5 7 R0l:,.1 0 St .John C 50 62 62 66 37 50 47 45 50 54 64 52 52 51 Saint John C! L 45 38 38 34 48 47 41 49 48 46 33 39 40 37 L Albert 0 5 15 3 12 6 2 3 10 9 12 Lancaster 0

( :.." "' 216

Source: Scarrow, op. cit., Tables 15, 19, 23, 27, 31, 35, 39, 43, 47, 51, and 557 and the Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, 1962, 1963, 1965, and 1968.

1) Percentage totals do not always add u'p to 100 per cent because of rounding. The letter IIC II stands for the Conservative Party, the letter IIL II for the Liberal Party, and the lètter 11011 for the non-Conservative a~Q non-Liberal vote.

Explanation of the Other vote in each election:

1921 in St. John-Albert, the Other vote consisted ~f a 2 per cent Progressive party vote and a 3 per cent vote for a Labour candidate7 and in the other constituencies, the vote under 11011 was for the Progressive party. 1925 in Victoria-Carleton, an Independent received 0.7 per cent of the vote. 1935 in St. John-Albert, an Independent Liberal received 2 per cent of the vote and the Reconstruction party received 13 per cent7 and in the other constituencies, the Other vote was for the Reconstruction party. 1940 -- in Northumberland, an Independent Liberal won 21 per cent of the vote 7 and in st. John-Albert, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation won 3 per cent of the vote. 1945 -- in Gloucester, the vote under "ail consisted of a 3 per cent CCF vote and a 34 per cent vote for an Independent7 in Restigouche-Madawaska, the CCF received Il per cent of the vote and the Social Credit received 10 per cent7 elsewhere, the vote under Il 011 was for the CCF. 1949 -- in Kent, the CCF received 4 per cent of the vote and an Independent Liberal gained 26 per cent7 in Northumber land, the CCF won 2 per cent of the vote while an Inde pendent won 3 per cent7 in Restigouche-Madawaska, the vote under 11011 was for the Union des Electeurs7 and in the other"constituencies, the Other vote was for the CCF • 1953 -- in Res tigouche-Madawaska, the CCF received 4 per cent of the vote and an Independent Liberal received 16 per cent7 in Victoria-Carleton, the vote under 11011 was for the Social Credit7 and in the other constituencies, the vote under Il 011 was for the CCF. 217

1957 -- in Northumberland-Miramichi, an Independent won 17 per cent of the vote~in Victoria-Carleton, the vote under "0" was for the Social Credit: in York-Sunbury, the vote under "0" was for the CCF: and in Westmorland, the CCF gained 4 per cent of the vote while the Social Credit also won 4 per cent. 1958 -- in Restigouche-Madawaska and Victoria-Carleton, the vote under "0" was for the Social Credit; in St.John :Albert and York-Sunbury, the vote under "0" was for the CCF: and in Westmorland, the CCF received 6 per cent of the vote and Social Credit received 1 per cent. 1962 -- in Charlotte, the vote under "0" was for the NDP: in Victoria-Carleton, the vote under "0" was for the Social Credit: in Kent, the Other vote consisted of a 4 per c.ent Social Credit vote and a 4 per cent vote for an Independent~ in Northumberland-Miramichi, the NDP received ,6 per cent of the vote while the Social Credit received 4 per cent: in Restigouche-Madawaska, the Other vote was 4 per cent NDP and 6 per cent Social Credit: in Royal, the Other vote was 4 per cent NDP and 3 per cent Social Credit: in st.Jo~ Albert, the Other vote was 6 per cent NDP and 4 per cent Social Credit: in Westmorland, the Other vote was 14 per cent NDP and 2 per cent Social Credit: and in York-Sunbury, the Other vote was 4 per cent NDP and 5 per cent Social Credit. 1963 -- the vote under "0" in Gloucester, Restigouche-Madawaska, and Victoria-Carleton was for the Social Credit: in Charlotte, the NDP and Social Credit each received 1 per cent of the vote'!; in Kent, the Other vote was 2 per cent NDP and 7 per cent Social Credit: in Northumberland-Miramichi, the Other vote was 5 per cent NDP and 4 per cent Social Credit: in Royal, the Other vote was 2 per cent NDP and 3 per cent Social Credit: in St.John-Albert, the Other vote was 5 per cent NDP and 4 per cent Social ,Credit: in Westmorland, the Other vote was Il per cent NDP and 2 per cent Social Credit: and in York-Sunbury, the Other vote was 3 per cent NDP and 4 per cent Social Credit. 2W

1965 -- in Restigouche-Madawaska, the Other vote was 4 per cent NDP and 4 per cent Ralliement des Créditistes; in Victoria-Carleton, the Other vote was 2 per cent NDP and 2 per cent Social Credit; and in the other constituencies, the Other vote was for the NDP. 1968 -- in Moncton, the Other vote was 7 per cent NDP and 2 per cent for an Independent; in Restigouche, the Other vote was 4 per cent NDP and 9 per cent Ralliement des Créditistes; in Saint John-Lancaster, the Other vote was 5 per cent NDP and alper cent vote for an Inde pendent Conservative; and in the other constituencies, the Other vote was for the NDP. l_ 219

APPENDIX E

PERCENT OF VOTE FOR EACH PARTY. IN EACH NOVA SCOTIA FEDERAL CONSTITUENCY (1921-1968)1

1921 1925 1926 1930 1935 1940 1945 1949 1953 1957 1958 1962 1963 1965 1968

Antigonish C 29 48 51 48 67 39 33 37 33 51 54 48 46 49 L 58 53 49 52 33 61 60 63 67 49 46 49 54 49 Cape Guysborough o 13 7 3 2 Breton C 48 Highlands L 50 0 2 Inverness C -- 57 54 51 Inverness C 28 44 34 32 37 47 50 51 46 44 Canso L 53 43 47 49 L 56 56 55 68 63 53 40 45 54 53 o 47 Richmond o 16 12 5 3

Richmond C 55 54 55 Capa Cape C 27 L 45 47 46 C 52 Breton - Breton l''est cape ...:_ L 35 O The South L 41 Breton o l.2 Cape C 54 58 63 26 30 21 17 15 40 46 35 39 37 Sydn

Pictou C 38 56 54 51 34 44 43 43 42 55 60 49 51 53 Central C 59 L 56 44 46 49 44 53 44 51 51 41 40 42 43 40 Nova L 33 C 6 22 3 14 7 8 4 9 6 7 0 8

""" ...... :220 APPENDIX E - continued

1921 1925 1926 1930 1935 1940. 1945 1949 1953 1957 1958 1962 1963 1965 1968

Cumber- C 26 57 55 55 42 4~ 47 50 48 55 60 51 50 53 land L 57 43 45 46 44 46 34 44 52 46 40 .42 45 39 Cumber- C 61 o 18 14 8 20 6 8 5 7 land L 34 Colches- Colches-C 49 65 60 48 ter 0 6 ter L 51 35 40 52 Col.ches- C 45 45 46 49 47 54 55 48 49' 52 North 0 ter L 46 55 46 48 49 43 41 47 48 44 Hants 0 9 9 3 4 3 4 5 3 5 Hants C 43 L 46 C 53 50 47 011 rIants L 47 50 53 C 57 King's Anna- King's C 47 o -- Digby C 32 39 38 polis L 40 L 53 Anna- C 50 Digby 52 58 58 53 50 53 Valley o -- polis 0 3 61 61 56 L 50 Anna- An~apolisL 48 42 42 44 49 44 6 King's o -- polis Digby C 41 51 51 50 0 8 2 L 59 49 49 50 King's 3 3 Anna- o -- King's polis 221 APPENDIX E - Continucd

1921 1925 1926 1930 1935 1940 1945 1949 1953 1957 1958 1962 1963 1965 1968

Halifax C 60 C 34 63 56 53 31 41 35 33 41 51 60 47 46 Halifax 50 L 36 L 53 37 45 47 55 47 48 57 55 47 38 45 50 40 0 4 o 13 13 12 18 10 4 2 3 8 4 10 Dartmouth C 55

Halifax L 40 Luncn- C 37 Luncn-C 45 East burg L 64 burg L 52 0 4 0-- 0 3 Halifax C 60 Shel- C 46 Queen's Shel- C 48 Queen's L 36 bume L 54 C 49 52 53 48 38 44 burne L 49 C 44 51 57 54 53 58 East Lunen-L 51 48 47 52 !j9 50 3 Lunen- Hants 0 5 o -- 0 L 57 49 43 44 47 39 Queen's burg 0 -- 3 7 Queen's burg o -- -_ .... 3 3 South C 59 Yar- C 44 Shel-C 49 45 45 Shel- C 29 38 45 Digby C 46 Shel- C 39 48 54 50 46 49 Shore L 39 mouth bume burne burne L 56 L 52 55 55 L 62 62 49 L 54 L 61 52 46 47 52 45 0 3 Clare Yar- Yarmouth Yar- 0-- 6 mouthO -- o 9 Yar- 0-- mouth o -- 3 2 7 Clare mouth South C 52 Clare Western L 44 Nova 0 3 222 Source: Scarrow, op. cit., Tables 15, 19, 23, 27, 31, 35, 39, 43, 47, 51, and 55; and the Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, 1962, 1963, 1965, and 1968.

1) Percen.tage totals do not always add up to 100 per cent because of rounding. The letter "c" stands for the Conservative Party, the letter "L" for the Liberal Party, and the letter "0" for the non-Conservative and the non-Liberal vote.

Explanation of the Other vote in each election:

.. 1921 -- the vote under "0" in Halifax was for two Labour can didates, while in the other constituencies it was for the Progressive party. 1925 the vote under "0" in Cape Breton South was for a Labour candidate. 1926 the vote under "0" in Cape Breton South was for a Labour candidate. 1935 the vote under "0" in Cape Breton South consisted of a 18 per cent Reconstruction party vote and a 19 per cent vote for a Communist candidate; the Other vote in the other constituencies was for the Reconstruction party. . 1940 -- the vote under "0" in Halifax consisted of a 2 per cent Co-operative Commonwealth Federation vote and a 10 per cent vote for an Independent Liberal; the Other vote elsewhere was for the Co-operative Commonwealth Federa tion • 1945 -- in Cape Breton South, the CCF received 47 per cent of the vote and a Labour-Progressive candidate won 3 per cent of the vote; in Digby-Annapolis-King's, the CCF received 5 per cent of the vote and a Farmer Labour candidate received 1 per cent; in Halifax, the CCF received 17 per cent of the vote, an Independent received 0.4 per cent, and a Labour-Progressive can didate won 0.6 per cent; in Pictou, the "0" vote consisted of a l2.per cent CCF vote and a 2 per cent Labour-Progressive vote; and in aIl other constit uencies the vote under "0" was .for the CCF. 1949 the vote under "0" was for the CCF. 1953 the vote under "0" in Cape Breton South consisted of a 49 per cent CCF vote and a 3 per cent Labour Pro- 223

gressive vote: and in the other constituencies the Other vote was for the CCF. 1957 -- in Pictou, the Social Credit received 2 per cent of the vote and the CCF received 2 per cent also: else where, the vote under Il 0" was for the CCF. 1958 the vote under Il 0" was for the CCF. 1~62 in Antigonish-Guysborough, the NDP received 2 per cent of the vote while Social Credit received 1 per cent: in Colchester-Hants, the NDP vote was 4 per cent and the Social Credit vote was 1 per cent: in Cumber land, the NDP received 7 per cent of the vote and the Social Credit received 1 per cent; in Digby-Annapolis King's, the NDP vote was 2 per cent and the Social Credit vote was 1 per cent; in Halifax, the NDP received 7 per cent'of the vote and the Social Credit candidate received 1 per cent: in Pictou, the "0" vote consisted of. a 7 per cent NDP vote and a 2 per cent Social Credit vote: in Shelburne-Yarmouth-Clare, the NDP received 2 per cent of the. vote and the Social Credit received 2 per cent: and,in the other constit uencies, the "0" vote was for the NDP. 1963 -- in Pictou, the vote under "0" consisted of a 5 par cent NDP vote and alper cent Social Credit vote: in Shelburne-Yarmouth-Clare, the NDP and the Social Credit each received 1 per cent of the vote: and the vote under "0" in the other constituencies was for the NDP. 1965 -- in Colchester-Hants, the NDP received 4 per cent of the vote while an Independent received 1 per cent; in Halifax, the NDP vote was 9 per cent and an Independent received 0.5 per cent of the vote: and in the other constituencies, the vote under "0" was for the NDP. 1968 -- in South Western Nova, the NDP received 2 per cent of the vote and an Independent Conservative received 1 per cent of the vote: the vote under "0" was for the NDP in the other constituencies. :t_ 224 APPENDIX F

PERCENT OF VOTE FOR EACH PARTY, IN EACH P. E. I. FEDERAL CONSTITUENCY (1921-1968)1

1921 1925 1926 1930 1935 1940 .1945 1949 1953 1957 1958 1962 1963 '1965 1968

C 35 52 ,51 52 36 45 46 47 48 52 56 48 47 50 C SC

King's L 44 48 49 48 61 55 50 53 52 47 44 47 52 4S Cardigan L 49

o 22 3 3 1 5 1 1 0 2

C 54 C 35 44 43 45 35 40 47 46 44 50 60 49 48 51 Egmont L .~<; Prince L 45 SEi' 57 55 65 60 47 Q,7 5.2 48 38 46 51 47 0 2 o 20 6 7 ~ 2 1 5 1 2

C 50

Ha1peque L ~o

C 39 49 48 52 40 47 48 50 50 54 64 53 55 56 0 " 46 36 42 43 42 Queen's L 47 51 52 48 55 54 48 49 50 C 53 2 o 14 5 4 1 1 6 2 Hillsborough L t;l

0 6

( i 225

Source: Scarrow, op. cit., Tables 15, 19, 23, 27, 31, 35, 39, 43, 47, 51, and 55~ and the Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, 1962, 1963, 1965, and 1968.

1) Percentage totals do not always add up to 100 per cent because of rounding. The letter "C" stands for the Conservative Party, the let ter "L" for the Liberal Party, and the letter "0" for the non-Conservative and the non-Liberal vote.

Explanation of the Other vote in each election:

1921 -- the vote under "0" in Kingls and Prince was for the Progressive party~ and in Queenls the 14 per cent Other vote consisted of a 6 per cent Progressive party vote and a 8 per cent Labour vote. 1935 the vote under "0" was for the Reconstruction party. 1945 the vote under "0" was for the Co-operative Common- wealth Federation. 1949 the vote under "0" was for the Co-operative Common wealth Federation. 1953 the vote under "0" was for the Co-operative Common wealth Federation. 1957 the vote under "0" was for the Co-operative Common wealth Federation. 1958 the vote under "0" was for the Co-operative Common wealth Federation. 1962 the vote un der "0" in Kingls and Queenls was for the New Democratie Party~and in Prince the 5 per cent Other vote consisted of alper çent Social Credit vote and a 4 per cent NPP vote. 1963 the vote under "0" was for the New Democratie Party. 1965 the vote under "0" was for the New Democratie Party. 1968 the vote under "0" was for the New Democratie Party. ~ _-.. __0,.

APPENDIX G

TOTAL INDIVIDUAL MEMBERSHIP WITHIN THE NOVA SCOTIA NDpl

Provincial Constituency Membership Number

Cape Breton Nova 177 Cape Breton East 142 Cape Breton North 96 Cape Breton South 38 Cape Breton West 26 Cape Breton Centre 26 Pictou West 48 Pictou Centre 15 Pictou East 8 Halifax Chebucto 23 Halifax st. Margarets 24 Halifax citadel 20 Halifax Cornwallis 16 Halifax Atlantic 9 Halifax Cobequid 11 Halifax Needham 5 Halifax Eastern Shore 3 Dartmouth South 16 Dartmouth North 4 Richmond 13 Cumbel.land East 16 Cumberland Centre 3 Cumberland West Colchester 25 , Inverness 15 Hants West 9 Hants East 4 Shelburne 4 King's West 5 King's North 3 King'p South Guysborough 3 227 provincial Constituency Membership Number

Lunenburg East 3 Lunenburg Centre Lunenburg West Antigonish 4 Digby 2 Annapolia East 3 Annapolis West 1 Victoria 1 Queenls 2 Yarmouth

Source: Mrs. P. Prowse, Provincial Secretary of the Nova Scotia New Democra tic Pa,rty.

l} The total membership of 823 was up to mid-July, 1970. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Beek, J.M. Pendulum of Power: Canada's Federal Elections. Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada,Ltd., 1968.

The Government of Nova Scotia. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957.

Clark, A.H. Three Centuries and the Island: A Historical Geography of Settlement and Agriculture in Prince Edward Island, Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959.

Clark, S.D. Church and Sect in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1948.

Coady, M.M. Masters of Their Own Destiny. New York: HaI.'per and Brothers, 1939.

Forsey, E. Economie and Social Aspects of The Nova Scotia Coal Industry. McGill University Economie Studies in the National- Problems of Canada, No. 5. Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada, Ltd., 1926.

Hartz, L. The Founding of New Societies. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1964.

Horowitz, G. Canadian Labour in Politics. Toronto: Universfty of Toronto Press, 1968.

Kornhauser, W. The Poli tics ~"\f Mass Society. New York: The Free Press, 1959.

Lipset, S.M. Agrarian Socialism: The Co-operative Common wealth Federation in Saskatchewan. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1950.

228 229

McHenry, D.E. The Third Force in Canada: The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, 1932 to 1948. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1950.

MacKinnon, F. The Government of Prince Edward Island. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951.

Macpherson, C.B. Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and The Party System. Second edition. Toronto; University of Toronto Press, 1962.

Mann, W.E. Sect, Cult, and Church in Alberta. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1955.

Morton, W.L. The Progressive Party in Canada. Revised edition. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967 .

Quinn, H.F. The Union Nationale: A Study in Quebec Nationalism. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963.

Regenstreif, P. The Diefenbaker Interlude: Parties and Voting in Canada. Toronto: Longmans .Canada Ltd., 1965.

Saunders, S.A. The Economie Welfare in the Maritime Prov inces. Economie Publications (No. 1). Wolfville, N .S ., 1932.

Studies in the Economy of the Maritime Provinces. Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada, Ltd., 1939.

Scarrow, H.A. Canada Votes: A Handbook of Federal and Provincial Election Data. New Orleans: The Hauser Press, 1962.

Schwartz, M.A. Public Opinion and Canadian Identity. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967. 230

Smiley, D.V., ed. The Rowell-Sirois Report: An Abridgement of Book l of the Royal Commission Report on Dominion Provincial Relations. The Carleton Library No. 5. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1963.

Stein, M. The Dynamics of Political Protest: Social Credit in Quebec. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, forthcoming .

Thorburn, H.G. Politics in New Brunswick. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961.

Wood, L.A. A History of Farmers' Movements in Canada. Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1924.

Young, W.D. The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF, 1932-1961. Toronto: University of Toronto ~~ess, 1969.

Articles

Beek, J.M. "Joseph Howe: Opportunist or Empire Builder," in Historical Essays on the Atlantic Provinces. Edited by G.A. Rawlyk. The Carleton Library No. 35. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1967.

"The Nomination of Candidates in Nova Scotia." The Dalhousie Review, Volume XXXVI, number 4. (Winter, 1957).

Bird, J.R. "Settlement Patterns in Maritime Canada: 1687-1786." The Geographical Review, Volume XLV, number 3, (July, 1955).

Cairns, A. "The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921-1965." Canadian Journal of Political Science, Volume l, number l, (March, 1968).

CapIan, G.L. "The Failure of Canadian Socialism: The ontario Experience, 1932-1945." The Canadian Historical Review, Volume XLIV, number 2, (June, 1963) . 231

Coady, M.M. "The Antigonish Movement," in International Labour Office, The' Co-operative Movement in the Americas, Montreal, 1913.

Cormier, The Rev. Clement. "The Acadian OUtlook (II)," in French Canada Today: Report of the Mount Allison Summer Institute. Edited by C.F. MacRae. Sackville, N.B.: -Mount Allison University Publication No. 6, 1961.

Dickie, G. "Cultural Origins in Colonial Life: Part I." The Dalhousie Review, Volume XXXVII,.number l, (Spring, 1957).

"Cultural Origins in Colonial Lite: Part II." The Dalhousie Review, Volume XXXVII, number 2, (Summer, 1957).

ElIs, M. "Loyalist Attitudes," in Historical Essays on the Atlantic Provinces. Edited by G.A. Rawlyk. The Carleton Library No. 5. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1967.

"Settling The Loyalists in Nova Scotiâ.," in The Canadian Historical Association Report, 1934 of The Canadian Historical Association. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1935.

Fay, C.R. "Problems of the Maritime Provinces." The Dalhousie Review, Volume IV, number 4, (Winter, 1925) •

Ganong, W.F. liA Monograph of the Origins of Settlement in the Province of New Brunswiqk." Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, Section II, (1904) •

Grant, J.W. "Population Shifts in the Maritime Provinces." The Dalhousie Review, Volume XVII, number 3, (Autumn, 1937).~

Harvey, D.C. "The Intellectual Awakening of Nova Scotia," in Historical Essays of the Atlantic Provinces. Edited by G.A. Rawlyk. The Carleton Library No. 5. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1967. 232

Hobson, P.M. IIPopulation and Settlement in Nova Scotia. 1I The Scottish Geographical Magazine, Volume LXX, number 2, September, 1954.

Horowitz, G. "Conservatism, Liberalism, and Socialism in Canada: An Interpretation. 1I Canadian Journal of Economies and Political Science, Volume XXXII, number 2, (May, 1966).

Leslie, P.M. IIThe Role of Political Parties in Promoting the Interests of Ethnie Minorities. 1I Canadian Journal of Political Science, Volume II, number 4, (December, 1969).

Lipset, S.M., IIDemocracy in Alberta, Il in Voting in Canada. Edited by John C. Courtney. Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada Ltd., 1967.

MacNutt, 'W.S. IIThe Maritime Ba~kground: A Contest of Parochialism. 1I Public Affairs, Volume X, number 2, (March, 1947).

1I Pinard, M. Il One-Party Dominance and Third Parties. Canadian Journal of Economies and Political Science, : Volume XXXIII, number 3, (August, 1967).,

Rawlyk, G.A. IIThe Farmer-Labour Movement and the Failure of Socialism in Nova Scotia, Il in Essays on" the Le ft : Essays in Honour of T.C. Douglas. Edited by L. LaPierre, J. McLeod, C. Taylor, and W. Young. Toronto/Montreal: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1971.

IIThe Maritimes and the Canadian Community,1I in Regionalism in the Canadian Community: 1867-1967. Edited by M. Wade. Canadian Historical Association Centennial Seminars. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969.

Saunders, S.A. IIThe Maritime Provinces and the National policy.1I The Dalhousie Review, Volume XVI, number l, (Spring, 1936). 233 Savoie, M.-A. IIVarieties of Nationalism: (1) The Acadians, A Dynamic Minority,lI in French Canada Today: Report of the Mount Allison Summer Institute. Edited by C.F. MacRae. Sackville, N.B.: Mount Allison University Publication No. 6, 1961.

Scammell, H.L. IIThe Rise and Fall of a College. 1I The Dalhousie Review, .. Volume XXXII, number l, (Spring, 1952) •

Smith, D. IIPrairie Revolt, Federalism, and the Party System,lI in Party Politics in Canada. Edited by H.G. Thorburn. Toronto: Prentice-Hall of Canada Ltd., 1963.

Thorburn, H.G. IIPerspective on Change in New Brunswick.1I . The Dalhousie Review, Volume XXXIV, number 2, (Summer, 1954).

Wade, M. IITwo French Canadas: Quebec and Acadia,lI in French Canad~ Tod~~: Report of the Mount Allison Summer Institute. Edited by C.F. MacRae. Sackville, N.B.: Mount Allison University Publication No. 6, 1961.

Wilbur, J.R.H. IIH.H. Stevens and the Reconstruction party.1I The Canadian Historical Review, Volume XLV, number l, (March, 1964).

Government Documents

Canada. Report of the Chief Electoral Officer. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1962, 1963, 1965, and 1968.

Report of the Royal Commission on Coal, 1946. ottawa: King's Printer, 1947.

Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Volume IV. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970. ( 234

Canada. Census of Canada. Ottawa: King's Printer, 1931, 1941, and 1951.

Census of Canada. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1961 and 1966.

Dominion Bureau of Statistics. "The Maritime Provinces in Their Relation To The Nat~onal Economy of Canada: A Statistical Study of Their Social and Economic Conditions Since Confederation." Published by the authority of the Hon. H.H Stevens, M.P., Minister of Trade and Commerce, May, 1934.

New Brunswick. Report of the Chief Electoral Offi.cer. 1970.

Nova Scotia. Election Returns. 1920-1970 inclusive.

P~pin, P.-Y. Life and Poverty in the Maritimes. ARDA Research Report No. RE-3. Published under the authority of the Minister of Forestry and Rural Development. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, March, 1968.

Saunders, S.A. "The Economic History of The Maritime Prov inces." A study prepared for the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations. Ottawa: King's Printer, 1939.

Thorburn, H.G. "The Political Participation of the French speaking Population of New Brunswick." A study prepared for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. November, 1965.

Miscellaneous

Correspondence and Interviews.

Dominion Archives of Canada. CCF Files.

---. 235 MacGlashen, S. "Two-Party Theory and Its Application to Nova Scotia Provincial Politics." Unpublished M.A. thesis, Dalhousie University, 1964.

Parliamentary Guide.

Pinard, M. "The Rise of a Third Party: The Social Credit Party in Quebec in the 1962 Federal Election." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, John Hopkins University, 1967.

Sheppard, T.W.L. "The Resurgence of the Progressive Conservative Party in Nova Scotia, 1946-1956." Unpublished B.A. Honours thesis, Acadia University, 1966.

The 4th Estate. October 15, 1970.

The Halifax Herald. June 14, 1920, p. 1: and June 21, ;1.920, p. 5.