Space as an Operational Domain

Space as an Operational Domain: What Next for NATO? Alexandra Stickings

NATO has declared space to be an operational domain. Questions must be addressed to understand what this means for future strategy and capabilities.

n December 2019, NATO such as the US Air Force-managed to the US, the NATO member formally declared space to be GPS system, which is used for a range state with the largest military space an operational domain. This of activities including navigation and programme, which has been clear announcement was evidence that precision-guided munitions. Although in its view of space as a warfighting Ithe role of space in military operations a programme beginning in the early domain, NATO as a body has gone and the importance of space for 1970s saw the deployment of NATO down a different route. By declaring national security had been recognised communications , this policy space to be an operational domain, by the Alliance and that more was was changed in the early 2000s to it appears that NATO is focusing on needed to assure the integration and one giving NATO access to satellites the integration and interoperability of interoperability of member states’ operated by member states. Since that assets belonging to different member assets. Coupled with ongoing concerns time, NATO has not operated its own states, and with a focus more on these about the orbital activities of states space assets, instead relying on members assets as enablers of military operations such as Russia and China and a potential to provide access and information. (such as for communications and ISR) arms race in space, it could be argued National programmes rather than those with the capability that this announcement is overdue. have played an increasingly important of denying space to adversaries. While it is encouraging that the role in NATO operations, both during Indeed, NATO Secretary-General Jens Alliance is moving forward in its conflict and in its ongoing operations, Stoltenberg stated that NATO would thinking on the space domain, questions training exercises and intelligence, not ‘weaponise’ space by developing remain. Will the Alliance continue to surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) offensive capabilities. rely on the assets of a relatively small activities. NATO’s 2019 declaration number of members, and how will is a recognition of these longstanding collective priorities be balanced against activities and intention to respond to the NATO and space security those of individual states? Similarly, increased security concerns regarding what does this mean for states with space rather than a completely new are collective activities, few or no sovereign space assets, and policy in itself. Space is now a priority, and neither can work will investment in space become a rather than an afterthought. It does, without the participation requirement for all members in the however, raise a question as to whether of all concerned future? Finally, and most importantly, the current model is effective, relying as how do activities in space fit into the it does on the goodwill of states to share context of an event that triggers Article their assets and the difficulties that can 5? These are all issues NATO will need be present in ensuring integration and An argument can be made that to grapple with to ensure it fully realises interoperability. While this recognition the development and deployment the benefits that space can bring and is a step forward, further issues must of offensive space capabilities is able to withstand any activities that be taken into consideration for the contribute to the inevitability of threaten its access. Recognising the development of a truly workable conflict in space, accelerating a importance of the domain is one thing, NATO and strategy. perceived ‘arms race in outer space’, deciding how to act is another. and that doing so will in effect Space as a Domain: Warfighting increase the threats faced by satellites. NATO and Space: A Brief History or Operational? Focusing instead on space systems as enablers of terrestrial operations NATO was formed before the While it may seem purely academic, (and also accepting that risks, while beginning of the first ‘space age’ and for there are important distinctions present, are more likely to be at a most of its history, the US has provided about space as an operational and sub-threshold level) can be seen as the majority of available space assets, a warfighting domain. In contrast a way of maintaining the status quo

October 2020, Vol. 40, No. 9 1 RUSI Newsbrief By declaring space to be an operational domain, it appears that NATO is focusing Space as an Operational Domain on the integration and interoperability of assets belonging to different member states.

of an admittedly fragile balance of are lost or damaged as a result of its jamming or interference. For example, power, decreasing the likelihood of destruction. There is also the question rendezvous and proximity operations outright orbital conflict. of whether kinetic ASATs are even (RPO), in which satellites manoeuvre However, as NATO members likely to be used given the implications in and approach others, or the increase their activities in space and of increased orbital debris on the possibility of using high-powered adversaries develop counterspace long-term sustainability of orbit. microwave frequencies to disable a capabilities that could destroy, degrade Despite recent ASAT tests by a number satellite without physically destroying it, or deny essential assets, the Alliance of states, an argument can be made that could be considered more threatening needs to make a decision on what is this capability is more about deterrence than less hostile acts. One only needs to perhaps the most difficult issue related and power projection than the look at the response to recent Russian to military action in space: what level development of a ‘weapon’ that would activity regarding a ‘projectile’ released of action against Allied space assets actually be used, particularly towards the from a satellite compared to the ways would trigger Article 5, and what might beginning of a conflict. in which the US and its allies react to a response look like? With counterspace the much more frequent use of GPS capabilities spanning kinetic jamming. When do these ‘middle anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles to cyber Simply being a user of ground’ capabilities cross a line and attacks and electronic interference, become an act of aggression? Not only this is not an easy decision. Non- space, rather than an does the range of capabilities create kinetic activity, such as GPS jamming, actor, does not negate complexity in deciding where a red line is not new, and can be seen within the need for participation may be; in assessing whether a capability the context of the sub-threshold or in space defence and may be used in reality, there is also the greyzone activity that is seen in all question of whether such a line exists domains. It is therefore unlikely that resilience at all. Finally, there is a question of such activity would be considered in an whether a satellite can be classified as a Article 5 context. At the other end of target requiring collective defence under the spectrum, an attack that physically The question becomes more Article 6. destroys a satellite is overtly aggressive, complicated when looking at those Should these questions be resolved, but the decision is still not clear. It capabilities that occupy a ‘middle and NATO commits to a policy of may be dependent on the functionality ground’ between destruction of a collective defence regarding space, of the satellite and what capabilities satellite and the reversible effects of what would a proportional, or indeed,

October 2020, Vol. 40, No. 9 2 RUSI Newsbrief Space as an Operational Domain

non-proportional, response constitute, Not only is this not practical or It is clear that more work is required and in what domain would this take financially feasible for many but it also to ensure NATO space policy is effective, place? A NATO response might wish does not take into account the other both now and as new developments in to avoid attacking a satellite, and indeed ways that states can contribute to a space emerge. This is an activity not this may not be possible if it lacks the secure and resilient collective space just for NATO as a whole but for each capabilities to do so by staying away architecture. Space situational awareness member state individually. For those from acquiring offensive space assets. (SSA), also often referred to as space with larger sovereign programmes, Understanding the repercussions of domain awareness (SDA), involves they must assess the balance between the loss of a satellite, even for a limited monitoring the orbital environment, their own and NATO’s future priorities time, is needed, and this will vary tracking satellites and pieces of debris, and what effect this may have on their depending on the satellite’s function assessing the threat of space weather space assets, as well as their willingness and the situation on the ground at and the actions and intent of space to allow others access to what may the time. It is not simply a case of ‘an actors – in short, acquiring as full be sensitive programmes. For smaller eye for an eye’, and a response could a picture as possible about what is states, including those without any be anything from jamming satellite happening in orbit. It is an essential space programme, thought must be signals, to kinetic attacks on land assets, activity for protecting space assets, but given to how comfortable they are with to economic or diplomatic actions, is still an activity carried out by relatively reliance on others as well as the ways depending on the severity of the event. few NATO members. States without in which they can contribute to the If NATO does decide that collective space capabilities can be involved in Alliance’s space policy, whether through defence is appropriate for space, it must this through developing their own SSA deploying space assets or involvement also decide on a collective response and programmes or hosting ground stations in space surveillance and intelligence. to what extent it is willing to act. as part of existing programmes, as Simply being a user of space, rather well as participating in intelligence than an actor, does not negate the need What Next? activities. These options would be for participation in space defence and particularly important should there be resilience. Every member state has a role All the available evidence suggests that a future requirement for all member to play. Both NATO and space security space will continue to play an increasing states to contribute to the NATO space are collective activities, and neither can role in future conflicts. The reliance of enterprise. work without the participation of all military operations on space assets is The Alliance must also take into concerned. The next step for NATO also likely to increase and space will be account potential future conflicting is to develop a space strategy that does seen as an even more essential domain. priorities. One such possible scenario just this. NATO members such as the US, the relates to the increased attention of the UK and France have all responded US on its interests in the Pacific, while Alexandra Stickings is a Research to this through the reorganisation of significant NATO focus remains on the Fellow for Space Policy and Security in how space is managed within their threat posed by Russia, particularly in the Military Sciences team at RUSI. armed forces, for example, through the Northern and Eastern Europe. Ensuring establishment of the US that assets are available to monitor This work is presented within the Security and , the appointment Russian activity in the High North or on and Defence in Northern Europe research of a Director Space in the UK’s its borders is essential. Reliance on one programme, funded by the Norwegian Ministry Ministry of Defence, and the creation or a few states for these assets may not of Defence and is a collaborative effort of the of a French space command. Others, be sustainable, particularly if there is a Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, the too, have increased their military hesitation to make them available, and Center for Strategic and International Studies, space activities, all of which may have it may be the case that NATO will need the German Council on Foreign Relations and been part of what led to the NATO to acquire dedicated capabilities to carry RUSI. announcement. out priority operations, either through a This is not to say that all NATO national programme that is managed by The views expressed in this article are the members will, or should, develop NATO, or one similar to that of NATO author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI extensive military space programmes. communications satellites. or any other institution.

October 2020, Vol. 40, No. 9 3 RUSI Newsbrief