MASTER'S THESIS M-493

DARMSTADTER, Mary Virginia Lagarde. THE KOREAN MINORITY IN POST-WAR JAPAN: REPATRIATION OF KOREAN RESIDENTS IN JAPAN.

The American University, M.A., 1963 History, modem

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. THE KOREAN MINORITY IN POST-WAR JA?AW î

REPATRIATION OP ZQREA3T HESIPENTS Df JAPAS~

by

Mary Virginia Darmstadter

Submitted to xx-e

Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of

Master of Arts

Signatures of Committee:

Cl

Da4 e : Date

1962

The American University Washington, D.C. UN:\^RC'vy

JUL 9 ?Or-c W %o.e. T /fs-/

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABIE OP CONTEîTS

C H A P T 3 S PAGfB

I. CHSATION OP TEB KTNORXH

Introduction ...... ]_

Annexation of Korea ...... 3

The Korean Minority in Japanese Society 5

The Sole of Korean Organizations . . . 10

II. SEPA.TRIATION UÎ-IDS?: TiiP OCCUPATION

Early Post-War Repatriation ..... 13

Difficulties in Repatriation ..... 15

New Problems for the Koreans Remaining

i n Ja p a n ...... 25

III. SOUTH KOREA'S REACTION TO REPATRIATION

Background to the South Korean Attitude 33

South Korea's Position Regarding

Repatriation ...... 42

IV. TESG-OTIATIONS WITH THE DEZCOCRATIC PEOPLE'S

REPUBLIC OP K O R E A

Pirst Steps towards Negotiations . . . 47

"Unofficial" Negotiations by the

R e d Cross ...... 50

Official Negotiations ...... 53

The Agreement ...... 58

South Korean Denunc iation ...... 60

The Motives for the Actions of the

Three Powers ...... 63

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. V. SHE 32SCÜTI0N GP TEE REPATRIATION

The Procedural Plan ...... 6'i

South Korean Efforts to Prevent

Repatriation ...... 7 3

Repatriation ...... 7 6

VI. E: the WAKE OF REPATRIATION

North Korean Reception ...... 78

ROK Protests Continue ...... SO

Extension of the Repatriation Program 82

Recent South Korean attitudes .... 8 6

VII. CONCLUSIONS ...... 90

VIII. SUPPLEI-ENT ...... 96

IK. BIBLIOGRAPHY

X. APPEIIDIXBS

I. a) Koreans in Japan by Prefecture

in November, 1945

b) Nationalities of Foreigners in

Japan in 1959

c) Foreign Population in Japan

i n 1961

II. a) Occupational Composition of the

Population in Korea in 1947

b) Educational Status of the

Population in Koea in 1944

III. Distribution of Korean Residents in

Japan by Occupation in 1948

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. IV. Volume of Korean Repatriation, 1945-1949

V. Calcutta Agreement

VI. American Occupation Policy towards the

Korean Minority

VII. a) letter from the Red Cross Society

o f J a p a n

b) letter from the Intemation.1. Red

Cross in Geneva

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER I

CREATIOH OP THE HIKORITT

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. raTRODUCTION

On December 14» 1959» 975 Korean men» women and

children boarded two Soviet ships at the port of Niigata,

Japan for the trip to Chungjin» a port in North Korea.^

By the middle of November» 1961, 93,360 Koreans bad 2 made this trip from Japan to North Korea. This monograph

will present an account of the Korean minority in Japan;

the circumstances of their entry into Japan; their position

in Japanese society; and the problems created in connection

with their departure.

The Korean minority in Japan was an outgrowth

of the Japanese subjugation of Korea. Prior to Japanese

domination, there was only a handful of Koreans living

in Japan. A 1904 registration of Korean nationals 3 disclosed only 227 in Japan. In 1910 Korea was

annexed by Japan and one result of this action was a

steady increase in the flow of Koreans to Japan. As

Japanese ambitions for further expansion began to mature

Japan encouraged Korean immigration to meet its increasing

need for laborers. By 1936, the year before the

commencement of largescale Japanese aggressions in

China, the figure given for the number of Korean people

^Japan Times. Tokyo, December 15» 1959; Asahi Shimbun. Tokyo, December 14» 1959.

This figure was obtained from Mr. Kuroiwa, an official of the Japanese Bmbassy, Washington, D.C., who quoted records of the Japanese Ministry of Justice.

^^Bdward ¥. Wagner, The Korean Minority in Japan. 1904-1950. (New Tork: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1951), p. 9» citing Japan Year Book, 1906, Tokyo, p. 21,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. in Japan was over 660,000, while at the end of World

War II, it was estimated that 2,500,000 Koreaias were

in the home islands of Japan. ^

Sueh a large number of foreigners in a country

undergoing the most radical changes in its history

presented a myriad of problems for both peoples. The

complexity of problems arising from the Korean nationals

now remaining in Japan continues to be of great concern.

Although immediately after the war, the majority of

Koreans decided to return to their homeland, well over

500,000 of their compatriots chose to remain in Japan 5 and are still there. Directly and indirectly, these

people have caused problems involving al 1 of the major

countries of the world.

Japan Report. (New Tork: Consulate General of Japan), Vol. V, No. 6, March 15, 1959, p.2, states that there were 800,000 Koreans in Japan in 1938 2,000,000 in 1945. Of the latter figure, only 96,000 had been brought to Japan under the National Personal Service Order. William J. Gane, Military Government in Korea. (Headquarters, U.S. Army, Porei^ Affairs Section, Seoul), p. 13, estimates the number of Koreans to be 2,400,000. Wagner, op. cit.. p. 96 agrees with the estimated number of 2,400,000.

^Japan Report. Vol. VII, No. 10, June 15, 1961, p. 10 states that, as of January, 1961, there were 580,421 Koreans registered in Japan.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ANNEXATION OF KOREA

Between the years 1894 and 1910, throu^i intrigue,

connivance, and because of their sxqserior military power,

Japan achieved the annexation of Korea as an integral

part of the Japanese Entire. ^ Many aspects of the

Japanese penetration of Korea and subsequent seizure

are not readily available and perhaps certain facts

remain undivulged. Records disclose, however, that

by July 6, 1909 the Japanese Cabinet had determined to

achieve the annexation of Korea, and from that date

forward hopefully planned a complete and largely peaceful 7 transference of power. The actual Treaty of Annexation 8 was signed on August 22, 1910.

Japan did develop Korea economically raise

the standard of living. Roads and railroads were built;

harbors were improved; electricity was introduced; the

agricultural system was in^roved; better sanitation was

Refer to the following for discussions of the Japanese annexation: Francis H. Conroy, The Japanese Seizcure of Korea. 1868—1910, (The University of Pennsylvania, 1960); Ch'ang-u Nam. Japanese Penetration of Korea. (Stanford University Press, The Hoover Institution, 1959); Harold M, Vinacke, A History of the Far Bast in Modem Times. (Appleton-Century—Crofts, Inc., New York, Fifth Edition, 1950), pp. 123-140, ISO, 183, pp. 352-354; Paul H. Clyde, The Far East. (Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, Second Edition, 1952), pp. 251-254, 329-337, 355-356; Hugh Sort on, Japan* s M o d e m Century. (The Ronald Press Conç>any, New York, 1955), pp. 204-206, 244-249. 7 Borton, op. cit., pp. 247-248.

^Ibid.. p. 249.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. introduced; s mcdem banking system instituted; industry

was promoted; and trade was expanded. However, all

development and improvements were planned to serve

the primary interests of Japan rather than in consideration

of the needs of the Korean people. Koreans were not

allowed to participate in the governing of their country.

They were forced to sell much of their best land, private

and public, to the Japanese. Japanese policy was

calculated to achieve the loss of l Korean cultural

identity by suppressing the Korean language, literature

and institutions. Although free education was available

for Koreans it was Japanese—oriented and the average

Korean was neither encouraged nor inclined to take

advantage of it. Therefore, throughout the period when

Korea was an integral part of the Japanese Empire, the

people were ezplcâked economically and politically 9 subjugated. Since conditions at home were so dismal,

many Koreans responded to Japanese promises of jobs,

better living conditions, end increased privileges and

emigrated to Japan. Ultimately, as Japan became over­

extended in her war efforts and her need for laborers

increased, this emigration became a forced one.^^

o Vinacke, A History of the Par East in Modem Times, pp. 355—354; Harold M. Vinacke, Par Eastern Politics in the Postwar Period. (Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New Tork, 1959), p. 180; Robert T. Oliver, "Korean- Japanese Discord", Korean Survey. (Korean Pacific Press, Washington, D.C.), Vol. 6, No. 5, May 1957, p. 4.

^^Wagner, op. cit., pp. 26-27.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. THE KOREAN MINORITY IN JAPANESE SOCIETY

Prior to annexation, the majority of Koreans

who went to Japan were students, intellectuals or

well-to-do merchants and businessmen. During the decade

of the 1920 ' s a change occurred in the pattern of

migration as some 400,000 Korean agricultural workers

went to Japan in the hopes of economic betterment,^

Then, as now, the Koreans lived largely in the industrial

centers of Japan: the prefectures of Tokyo, Osaka, 12 Hyogo, Ai chi and Pukuoka. Sere the unskilled Koreans

found their greatest opportunities for employment.

Because they were in conqpetition for jobs with the

more skilled Japanese, however, the majority of the 13 Koreans labored at menial tasks for low pay.

The overwhelming majority of immigrants represented

the lower element of Korean society and statistically

this group showed a high percentage of illiteracy,

cr h

is not surprising that these people would have some

difficulty in adjusting and becoming productive members

in a foreign community. And because Japan had conquered

^~4bid. , p. 9.

^ I b i d . , p. 11. Also refer to Appendix I.

^^Ibid., PP . 15-16.

^^Ibid.. p. 12.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the Koreans, the Koreans found themselves victims of

discriminatory practices and exploitation* These factors,

coupled with the fact that in certain instances the

Japanese and Koreans conpeted for jobs, caused a

deep-seated and continuing antagonism between the 15 two peoples.

Even thou^ Korea had been incorporated as an

integral part of the Japanese Enpire, Koreans were

not given Japanese citizenship but only Japanese

"nationality" This deprived the Koreans of the

full rights and privileges enjoyed by full citizens.

It gave the Japanese greater control over the Koreans

and opened up avenues for their further intimidation.

Despite the fact that the Koreans were deprived

of Japanese citizenship, in legal theory they were to

have almost complete equality. It was necessary for

Japan to pay lip service to this concept if she hoped

to lend any credulity to her plan of the "Greater 17 Bast Asia Co-Pro^erity Sphere". However, in

practice, application of the law was selective and

was used to subjugate the Koreans. The Korean in Japan

did enjoy slight legal advantages over his brother at

^^Ibid.. pp. 1 5 -1 7 . ^^Ibid.. p. 9.

17 For a discussion of Japan's economic plan for the "Greater East Asia Co-Frosperity Sphere", refer to Borton , op. cit.. pp. 361-364, 376-378.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. home, for, despite the fact that the codes in both

countries were basically similar, the Japanese

administrative ordinances in Korea were more restrictive.

legally, the one advantage for a Korean in Korea was

that he could be tried by a Korean judge.

Between 1939 and 1945, the demands of war caused

an increase in the need for laborers and to accomplish

this, the Japanese Government brou^t over large numbers

of Koreans under the People's Registration Ordinance.

This ordinance had been passed by the Japanese Cabinet

on July 8, 1939 and its net effect was to require

registration of all males between the ages of 15 and

50 within Japan and the older portions of the Empire 19 so that they could be classified for service. One

of the important points of the passage of this law

is that its enforcement marks the beginning of forced 20 migration of the Koreans to Japan.

With the onset of Japan's war in 1937, the Koreans

found themselves in a better bargaining position and

some wage increases were given along with somewhat 21 improved living conditions and fewer personal restrictions.

Wagner, on. cit., pp. 19-21.

Japan Report. Vol. V, No. 6, March 15, 1959, p. 2. The Japanese Government maintains that the order was not used to bring Korean laborers to Japan until August, 1944, that in all, only 96,000 Koreans were mobilized under this law. Also see Wagner, op. cit., P. 27 20 Wagner, o£. cit., p. 27. ^hRi±à.,, p. 25.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Tet, considering that the cost of living had soared

and living conditions for the Japanese had worsened,

these gains were of a largely illusory nature. Their

basic status of inferiority and inequality was little

affected.

Relations between the Korean and Japanese peoples

did not improve during the war. The Korean desire for

independence remained and the majority of Koreans aided 22 the Japanese war effort reluctantly. It would appear

that although there were no major incidents of resistance

there were individual cases of sabotage. Open rebellion

seems to have come mostly from the group of Korean students

then studying in Japan, However, even they were forced

to play a role in the war, some being drafted into the

Japanese military while others were forced to work as

ordinary laborers. It has been suggested that there

was some cooperation between the underground Japanese

communist faction and the Korean minority in joint 23 attempts to undermine the Japanese war effort.

They evidently accomplished little in actual sabotage

but their association served to solidify the relationship

between the Korean minority and the Communist element.

This association of the two groups continues today

and is one reason why the Japanese people regard the

^^Ibid.. pp. 31-34. ^^Ibid., pp. 32-34.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Koreans as agitators and troublemakers.

Despite the relative inefficiency of Korean

contract laborers, they nevertheless were important to

Japanese wartime production. Estimates vary, but one

source, in a survey taken shortly after the war's end,

showed that during the war approximately 500,000 had

worked in Japanese mines; 200,000 had been utilized in

manufacturing plants; 100,000 had been enqployed as

farm laborers; and another 360,000 had been utilized

as general laborers. There were also about 240,000

Koreans in the categories of businessman, merchant, 25 student and white collar worker. Women and children

comprised another million, in many instances the women

working alongside the men in the factories and even the

mines, and also being utilized in the textile mills.

S. Embassy, Daily Translations of Newspapers in Seoul, translation of the article, "On the Trend of the Japanese Communists", Tong A . February 2, 1950.

25 Gane, op. cit., p. 13, citing Japanese Government report, Korean Residents in Japan. 21 November, 1945.

^^Gane, op. cit.. p. 13; Vagner, op. cit.. p. 30; Republic of Korea, Korea and Japan. (Office of Public Information, Seoul, 1954), p. 14.

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THE HOLE OF KOREAN ORGANIZATIONS

Several aboarfcive attempts were made to organize

the Korean laborers in Japan in collaboration with the

left—wing of the Japanese labor movement, but these 27 were quickly suppressed by the Japanese Government*

In 1 9 2 1 Korean collaborators, under Japanese auspices,

did organize the Soaikai or Mutual Friendship Society,

for the purpose of fostering mutual feelings "of 28 brotherhood and mutual esteem among Koreans and Japanese*•

Membership for Koreans was virtually compulsive, however,

and the organization functioned primarily as a control 29 organ for the Japanese Government.

Iiater, in 1936, the Japanese Government went

even further by establishing the Kyowakai. which was

an official agency of the Japanese Government. The

goals of the Kyowakai were: l) to promote Korean-

Japanese harmony on a nationwide basis; 2 ) to integrate

closely all activities concerning Koreans; 3 ) to effect

speedy Japanization of Koreans.During the war, the

Kyowakai was particularly useful as a control organ,

touching every phase of the Korean's life in Japan.

Membership for Koreans was conroulsory.

27 28 Vagner, op. cit.. pp. 20-21. Ibid., p. 22.

^^Ibid.. p. 22. ^°Ibid.. pp. 22-23.

^^ i d . . pp. 37-38.

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Inïïnedxately after Japan's surrender, an independent

Korean organization came into existence with the stated

purpose of protecting the rights of Koreans residing

in Japan. The Iteague of Korean Residents in Japan

commanded the allegiance of practically i of the

Koreans. This organization participated in a variety

of activities affecting the lives of its members in

every sphere of interest and often interposed itself

between the Koreans and the Japanese Government, 32

Apparently, it drew its power from strongarm tactics 33 and its monies from illegal or extralegal sources.

The early political activities of the league revealed

a close association with the Communist wing of Japanese 34 political groups.

Dissension emanating ftom the league's political

rapport with the Communists led to a break within the

ranks and the formation of the Youth Organization for

the Reconstruction of Korea (YORK).^^ This grovcp

never attained the power or the wealth of the league

but it did represent the more right-wing elements of

the Koreans in Japan. There were other smaller and

far less important groups but the league and YORK

attained and held their early prominence, the league

^^Ibid.. p. 52, ^^Ibid.. pp. 52-53.

^Ibid.. p. 54. ^^Ibid.. pp. 55-56.

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actually taking part in the early post-war repatriation 36 program.

^^Gane, op. cit.. p, 5 5 ,

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REPATRIATION UNDER THE OCCUPATION

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BARIT POST-WAR REPATRIATION

With, the end of World War II end the deliverance

of their coxmtry, the majority of the Koreans began to

stream back to their homeland,^ At first, it was

expected that almost all of.them would repatriate,

but it was soon determined that many thousands preferred

to remain in Japan.

In the beginning, the Korean repatriation was

a more or less spontaneous movement with the individual

making his own arrangements for transportation to Korea.

The trek homeward had actually begun before the surrender

of Japan and one source estimates that from 300,000 2 to 500,000 Koreans had returned by August 15, 194-5.

After the occupation authorities had gained

control of the situation, they attempted to organize

an orderly repatriation of all foreign laborers remaining

in Japan. The early repatriation was handled by the

American forces of the tactical troops of the Sixth,

Seventh, and Fortieth Division, and the Displaced

Persons Divisions working in unison. Sy their joint

efforts 700,000 Japanese in Korea were returned home

and nearly 1,000,000 Koreans had been transported to

their homeland between September 25, 1945 and

^efer to Appendix T.

Vagner, op. cit., p. 43.

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December 31» 1945.^

The early repatriation was somewhat chaotic

because the occupa-tion authorities had many difficulties

in becoming effectively organized. The first tentative

plan was proposed by the Bureau of Planning of the

U.S. Military Goveznment in Korea. The ma-i-n office

was to be at Seoul and the operational name was to be

"The Relief Organization for Refugees and laborers".

Housing, food and arrangements for transportation were

to be the responsibility of the control point offices.

This plan was stillborn, however, and on September 23,

1945, the problem was given over to the Foreign Affairs

Section of the Military Government in Korea which set-up

the following plan to execute the Korean repatriation : ^

. S. Army Military Government in Korea, South Korean Interim Government Activities. April, 1948, p. 5«

^Gane, op. cit.. p. 17.

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AGENCY BSSPONSIBILITY

Local Military Government Execute local refugee movements U n i t s in their assigned area.

Transportation Bureau of Military Government Routing and supplying trains.

Local Korean Governmental Expedite the movement and A g e n c i e s supply protection.

Local Korean and Japanese Aid Military Government team Organizations to prepare movement.

Health, and Welfare Section Supply necessary medical of Military Government supplies.

Navy Port Control Notifying displaced persons of the time of arrival of vessels.

Navy Patrol Ships Prohibit illegal shipping.

Ports, Military and Civil Prepetre and process refugees A u t h o r i t y for movement.

DIPPICULTIES IN REPATRIATION

Dei^ite all efforts, the foregoing plan was not

executed as expected and there was considerable confusion.

It became necessary to change plans and responsibility

was shifted. Because the Eeeilth and Welfare Sections

of the Military Government were not opeiating by the

time the actual repatriation had started, the Foreign

Affairs Section of the Displaced Persons Office had to

assume the responsibility for the housing, food and

medical care of the Korean refugees. It had been ex­

pected that Army personnel would help with the manual

labor involved in caring for these groups but as there

was a shortgage of Army personnel, the Displaced

Persons Office was forced to request assistance from

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the League of Korean Residents in Japan. ^ Unfortunately,

it appears that the League took this opportunity to

strengthen its position at the expense of individual

Koreans whose rights and interests it purportedly

represented. The League found that, through its role

in the repatriation program, opportunities were presented

to gain monies, by extra-legal or illegal methods,

which ultimately went to finance their political

activities. ^ Mention has already been made of the

apparent connection of the League «nd the Japanese

Communists.

Ostensibly the Military Government was to set

the League's policies, direct the distribution of its

supplies, and”investigate the sources and the usage of

its solicited funds. The various chapters of the League

were to be licensed by each city and to be operated

under municipal supervision within the overall supervision 7 of the Military Government. Despite these checks on

its operation, the League was able to acquire large sums

that had been intended for the individual Korean. For

example; before Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP)

assumed control of the repatriation program, the Korean

had been required to pay his own rail fare from his

home to the Port of Smbarkation. Subsequently, SCAP

^Gane, o p . cit., p. 55.

^Wagner, op. cit., pp. 52-53. 7 Gane, op. cit.. p. 55.

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ordered the Japanese Government to provide free rail O transportation for the Koreans. Thereupon, the League

demanded reimbursement for the fares paid prior to SCAP ' s

order. The Japanese Government reimbursed the League

which kept the funds, making, for all pinrposes, no effort

to reimburse the individual Korean. Other examples of

the tactics of the League are; the manner in which it

confiscated back wages due the individual Korean; bank

accounts left in Japan; securities that the Korean could

not take to Korea; and other compensations and benefits

to which he was entitled but left in Japan because of

cei"tain restrictions that had limited what the Korean 9 could initially bring back to Korea. The League

filed claim in the name of the individual Korean for

these monies but apparently kept the monies to fill its

own coffers.

Because of the problems encountered in executing

the; plan, the repatriation remained largely an individual

effort for a while longer. Koreans accomplished their

return by using private transport of all types from

small, fishing vessels to the larger ships that regularly

operated on the Japan-Korea run. The continuance of

this unorganized repatriation created problems of a

Q Supreme Commander for Allied Powers Orders to the Japanese Government, ( SC AFIN ) . No. 410, "Supplies, Transportation and Facilities for Repatriates", December 9, 1945; SCAPIN No. 685, "Railway Fares Charged to Koreans", January 31, 1946. 9 Wagner, op. cit., pp. 52-53.

^®Gane, op. cit., p. 55; Wagner, op. cit., p. 53.

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serious nature. First, the unsupervised but large-

scale movements caused a health menace. Secondly,

it encouraged a black market in Japanese currency

because the Korean banks were not allowed by the Military

Government to accept or exchange Japanese currency. And

finally, the vessels used by the Koreans were urgently

needed to carry other repatriates from other areas and 11 cargo.

These factors led the American Occupation forces

to take measures to stop Hie independent repatriation.

On November 1, 1945, SCAP issued a directive concerning

the "Repatriation of Non-Japanese from Japan*. This

order gave the re^onsibility to the Japanese Ministry

of Welfare to offer all Koreans, Formosans, «--nd Eyukyuans

the opportunity to return to their homes at the es^ense

of the Japanese Government. Specific instructions were

given for the execution of the repatriation, including

a restrictive provision allowing each Korean to take

with him only 1,000 yen and the property he could carry 12 on his back.

Many Koreans had been discouraged from returning

home because of the dismal reports emanating from Korea:

jobs were not readily available and living conditions

were difficult being complicated by floods, epidemics.

^SCAPIN No, 254, November 8, 1945; Wagner, op. cit.. p. 44.

^SCAPIN No. 142, October 15, 1945; SCAPIN No. 224, November 1, 1945; SCAPIN No. 293, Section F, November 17, 1945.

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1 3 azid rice z-iots* 33bie restrictions placed ty SCAP’s

order further dampened the enthusiasm of nany Koreans

for returning home. Therefore, many thousands of Koreans

decided to remain in Japan, fearing conditions would be

worse for them at home.

In an effort to persuade additional Koreans to

leave Japan, on July 13, 1946, SCAP authorized an

increase in the amount of property that could be brought

back to Korea. The returnee was a].lowed to ship an

additional 250 pounds of personal property and further,

4,000 pounds of li^t machinery and handici-aft tools

owned free and clear as of September 2, 1945*^^

Despite this relaxation of restrictions, it was

evident that many Koreans remained uninterested in

repatriation. Therefore, to clarify the situation

and in hopes of ending their responsibility for repatriation,

SOAP offered the privilege of repatriation "with finality"

to all of those entitled to it. The Japanese Government

was ordered to register all Koreans, Chinese, Syukyuans

and Formosans for the purpose of determining if they

wanted repatriation. Those who failed to register were

considered to have forfeited their right as did those

who registered but advised they did not want to be 15 repatriated. ^ Approximately 137,000 registered that

Korea^ Quarterly. (The International Research Center, Seoul,) "Korean-Japanese Relations", Jin Won Dee, Autumn, 1959, Vol. I, Ho. 1, p. 6 5 .

^^SCAPIH Ho. 822/1, March 27, 1946; SCAPIH Ho. 927/5, July 1 3 , 1 9 4 6 .

^^SCAPIH Ho. 746, February 17, 1946; SCAPIH Ho. 872, April 9, 1946.

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they did not desire to leave Japan, hut 505,806 requested

repatriation to South Korea and 9,701 requested

repatriation to North Korea.^^

SOAP then directed that all of those who had

registered for repatriation be cleared from Japan by

August 30, 194-6• Those who refused to leave on the

scheduled date would be considered to have forfeited 17 their ri^ts to repatriation.

Apparently the Occupation authorities were

concerned that such a large number of Koreans had

chosen to remain in Japan since some of the Occupation

forces considered the Koreans a disturbing factor.

At one point, they recommended that all of those Koreans

who had registered in March, 1946 requesting repatriation

be forced to carry through with it and return to Korea.

However, the United States Government rejected this

recommendation because it had been pledged to carry out

only voluntary repatriation. 19

In May, 1946, SCAP then presented the policy that

"Koreans who refuse to return to their homeland under

the SCAP repatriation program will be considered as 20 retaining their Japanese nationality ..." This

^^SCAP, Summation of Activities, No. 11, August, 1946, p. 255.

SCAPIH No. 872, April 9, 1946. 18 19 Vagner, op. cit., p. 58. Ibid. 20 Par Eastern Survey, "The Korean Minority in Japan", David Conde, Vol. XVI, No. 4, February 26, 1947, p. 45.

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policy received the approval of the Far Bastem Commission, 2 1

Therefore, officially, those Koreans remaining in Japan

were to he handled at the discretion of the Japanese

Government within the overall supervision of the Occupation

forces. Eventually, when Japan had regained her

sovereignty, she would then be responsible for finding

a solution for the problem arising from the presence

of the Korean minority in her country.

The Korean reaction to SCAP's announcement

pertaining to Japanese nationality for the remaining

Koreans was very adverse. The Korean protests were so

vigorous that SCAP was forced to issue a statement

to the effect that:

Recent misconceptions in some sections of the press . . . to the effect that this Headquarters recently issued an order that Korean nationals remaining in Jepan sifter December 15, 1946 must obtain Japanese citizenship sure entirely incorrect. . . . The Japanese authorities have been issued strict instructions to insure that Koresns sire not discriminated against in any way and the Occupation authorities are at constant pains^^o see that these instructions are carried out.

The Korean was caught on the horns of a dilemma.

On the one hand, it was true that many problems existed

for the Korean upon his return home. And on the other

hand, the Korean in Japan was subject to discrimination.

Xt must be remembered that slthou^ Japan hsui

developed Korea, it had done so as a part of Japan's

^ ^ s g n e r , op. cit., p. 58.

^ ^ a r Eastern Survey. Conde, o p . c i t . . p . 45.

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economy, not ae a self-sustaining unit. Separation

from Japan had resulted in complete collapse of the

Korean economy — a situation which was improved by

economic assistance from the United States but recovery

required time. Matters had been further complicated

by the division of Korea which cut off the egricultural

south from the industrial north. During the early

post-war years, starvation had been prevented only by

drastic steps taken by the Military Government to bring 23 in food. 2nq)loyment opportunities for the returnees

were few. In fact, it was easier for the Korean to find

a job in Japan, despite the discrimination against him.^^

In addition to employment discrimination, the

Japanese appear to have conducted a propaganda program

emphasizing the black—market activities and criminality 25 of the Koreans remaining in Japan. Yet, when the

Korean decided to repatriate, he faced more abuse

because the Japanese often violated the spirit if not

the letter of the repatriation program, confiscating

Korean property that ri^tfully could be taken to Korea

and many times overlooking certain rights to which the

^^insicke, A History of the Far Bast in Modem Times. Fifth Edition, pp. 754-755.

^^ a r Bastem Survey. Conde, op. cit.. pp. 41-43.

^^Ibid.; Vagner, op. cit., p. 60.

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2 6 Korean was entitled. To illustrate their d.ilemma, it

should be noted that, hoping to escape their harsh

living conditions in Japan, many Koreans rushed home

only to quickly and illegally return to Japan because 27 they had found conditions even worse at home.

In December, 1946, the official repatriation 28 program was considered to be completed. After this

date, however, an additional 15,000 Koreans were

repatriated at Japanese expense under practically the

same conditions as those sent home before the December

deadline. Both SCAP and the Japanese Government were

willing to cooperate in their belated return. This 29 "unofficial" repatriation was ended August 15, 1948.

The exact number of Koreans who repatriated by

the official and the "unofficial" programs is difficult

to ascertain. A Japanese Government source estimates

that approximately 1,400,000 Koreans left Japan between

August, 1945 and March, 1946 under the official program

and by privately arranged means. A report by the

South Korean Interim Government (SKIG) showed 1,111,971

Koreans as having arrived in Korea between October, 1945

and April, 1948.'^^ Presumably the discrepancy between the

SCAPIN No. 61, "looting by Chinese Laborers", September 26, 1945» SCAPIN No. 1111—A, "Misconducts Committed by Koreans", April 29, 1946; Wagner, op. cit., pp. 59-60. 27 Far Eastern Stxrvey. op. cit. « Conde, pp. 41-43; Wagner, o£. cit.. p. 49.

^^SCAPIN No. 927/7 , September 10, 1946, 29 Wagner, og,. cit. , pp. 47-48.

Japan Report. Vol. V, No, 6, March 15. 1959, p. 3, 3T___ SKIG Activities Report, April, 1948, p. 5, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 4

two figures not only results from a difference in the

time period but arises from the fact that many of the

Koreans had arranged for individual travel home. It

was extremely difficult to tabulate these unorganized

movements. According to a third source, all repatriation

between l'îarch, 1945 and December, 1949 totalled around

1,818,000 including that which was controlled and that 32 which was not.

To complete the repatriation program of the

Koreans during the period of the Occupation, mention

must also be made of the 351 Koreans who requested

to repatriate to North Korea. Since North Korea was

then under Soviet Occupation, as South Korea was occupied

by American forces, it wis necessary for the U.S. end

the U.S. S.R. to reach agreement on this matter. Accord

was reached on December 19, 1946, and the 351 Koreans

had returned to North Korea by summer of 1947 under

much the same terms and circumstances as the repatriation 33 to South Korea.

^^agner, op. cit., p. 96. Kr. Wagner's Table of Volume of Korean Repatriation, 1945-1949 is reproduced as Appendix V.

^^SCAP, Summation. Vol. 15, December, 1946, p. 224; SCAPIN No. 829, March 19, 1946.

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NEW PR0BLEI48 FOR THE KOREANS REMAINING IN JAPAN

The Koreans who made the decision to remain

in Japan continued in many ways to stand apart from

the Japanese people, both by their own wish and by Japanese

practices. In 1947, the Japanese Government promulgated

the Capital Levy Tax for the purpose of leveling off

individual wealth. The tax was applicable to a~l l

Japanese, Koreans and Formosans who owned assets valued

in excess of 100,000 yen as of March 5, 1946. Allied

and United Nations nationals were not subject to the

tax and Koreans demanded that they be entitled to this

special exception. The Koreans claimed that, not only

was the tax unfair to the small number of them who would

be forced to pay it, but that because it was applicable

to them almost solely among the foreign nationals in Japan,

it was an insult to their national pride and prestige.

Mass meetings were held and a minor riot did erupt over

the matter, resulting in the arrest of some Koreans, 34 their trial and subsequent deportation to South Korea."

A second law was soon passed which also caused

Korean resentment. At the suggestion of SCAP, the

Japanese Diet passed the Registration Law of 1947 which

required the registration of all aliens in Japan for 35 administrative and control purposes. The law was

^^Wagner, op. cit., pp. 64-66.

^^Ibid., p. 66.

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not directly discriminatory in that it required the

registration of all aliens except members of the

Occupation forces. However, the law was reminiscent

of the pre-war days when Koreans had been required to

register and to carry identification cards bearing

photography and fingerprints. Furthermore, such a

registration would bring to l i ^ t the large number of

Koreans who had returned to Japan illegally, and it

would put an end to those Koreans who were enjoying

extra rations by using the cards of family and friends

who had returned to Korea.

Koreans also objected to the Registration Law

because they were required to register as stliens despite

the fact that they were considered Japanese nationals

and were subject to the Capital levy Tax. The Korean

organizations told their members not to obey the law,

and by the time the registration deadline had passed 37 on July 31, 1947, almost no Koreans had complied with it.

The deadline was extended but the result was only a slight

increase in the number of Koreans who registered, and

on August 22, 1947, SCAP issued a statement enrohasizing

that the registration was for the protection of alien *5S rights. The slow process of pressuring and persuading

the Koreans to comply with the law wais not successful

^^Far Betstem Survey. Conde, op. cit.. p. 43; Wagner, o p . c i t ., p. 66.

^ I b i d .. p. 67. ^Ibid.

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■until the end of October, 1947»^^

A third problem concerned the autonomous educa­

tional program which had been established by the Korean

community after Japan's surrender. There were valid

reasons for the establishment of the separate school.

The Koreans mistrusted Japanese schools and Japanese

educators for fear that they would revert to their

pre-surrender program of indoctrination. At that time,

Japanese schools were inadequate, suffering from over­

crowding and lack of facilities since many school

buildings had been destroyed. And, since most of the

Koreans hoped ultimately to return home, it was under­

standable that they felt it necessary for their children

to receive instruction in the Korean language. By

October, 1947, they had established 541 primary schools,

7 middle and 22 youth schools and 8 higher—level institutes,

with nearly 62,000 students and 1,500 teachers.

In the beginning, the Japanese had little objection

to the private Korean schools, even aiding them by

allowing them the part-time use of Japanese facilities.

SCAP was too occupied with its reform of the Japanese

educational system to give much attention to the Korean

educational projects. Yet, it was the intention of

SCAP to eventually bring the Korean schools under

39 Ibid.; Far Eastern Survey. Conde, on. cit.. pp. 43-44.

^^Vagner, op. cit., p. 68, citing Korean league, An Appeal. June 15, 1948

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Japanese law and on January 24, 1948, SCAP took the

step of placing the Korean schools under the Japanese

Ministry of Education and making Japanese educational 41 regulations applicable to Korean schools. Korean

children were required to attend public or private

schools that met legaûL standards and their teachers

were to be subjected to screening under Government 42 ordinance. This was a great blow to the Koreans whose

basic objective was the preparation of their children

for their role as Korean citizens. Strenuous protests

were made by the League in the form of mass meetings,

and the bulk mailing of letters to SCAP officials.

The first enforcement of the law resulted in violence

which erupted in Kobe where the Korean League was

especially strong. SCAP’s attitude was conciliatory

and it granted delays in closing some of the Korean

schools. After numerous League demonstrations in

other cities, the League reluctantly capitulated and

most of the schools did comply with the order to obtain

proper accreditation on SCAP’s terms.

These conflicts made evident that time alone

would not solve the "unassimilated minority" problem

but rather it appeared that prejudice against the

Koreans in Japan was increasing. Koreans were blamed

^^SCAP, SraTtnnation, Report No. 31, April, 1948, p. 303.

^^agner, op. cit.. p. 69. ^^Ibid.. p. 72.

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for Japan’s black market; the increase in crime; accused

of being the ceurriers of disease; of paying no taxes;

of having secured a financial stranglehold on Japan;

and of "being brave today after having cowered in fright

during the war."^ On July 13, 1947, a Japanese newspaper,

the Mainichi. stated that the Korean postwar way of

living unnecessarily irritated the feelings of the

Japanese, and accused the Koreans of entering the black

market, causing disturbances, and being responsible

for inflation because of their "over-eagemess to

protect their own livelihood"

In the Diet, on August 17, 1947» a member of the

Progressive Party, Saburo Shiikuma, stated:

Koreans form the nucleus of «1l black— market operations and their lawless actions influence all commercial transactions and social life in Japan today. They flaunt their transactions in contraband in the face of the police and pay no taxes whatever. It is rumored that one—third of the new yen in circulation is now in their hands. If this rumor is true, the helpless Japanese merchants will be no match for «11 the Koreans and Formosans. In fact, it is said that in Osaka and Kobe a11 open-air shops and eating houses have passed into Korean and Formosan hands.

The Koreans answered through the League that

they and their families had been forced to come to Japan

^^Far Eastern Survey. Conde, op, cit., p. 41.

^^Ibid. ^^Ibid.. p. 43.

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to work

at the hardest labor, in the coal mines at low wages from which compulsory 'donations* and •savings' were deducted, watched by armed guards and sheltered in flimsy houses under unsanitary conditions. sheltered The Koreans mad^w-a.u^zLr ^chat nearly everyone had to

buy or sell in the black market in oid.er to live and

that the other allegations were an attempt to incite

the Japanese to "drive the Koreans from their meager

holdings in commerce and force them back into their

former status as underdogs"•

It apparently was true that the Koreans did

engage in black—market activity end other violations 49 of Japanese law. However, the motivation for this

disregard for the law can be attributed to a lack of

normal employment opportunities, the result being great

economic hardship. Also, the Japanese did seem to

dramatize out of proportion any incident of Korean 50 lawlessness. These disciminatozry tactics further

accentuated the sense of insecurity the Korean minority

felt in Japanese society.

"^"^Ibid. ^^Ibid. 49 Ibid. Mr. Conde cites the illegal pi-actice of many Koreans who bought rice from Japanese farmers to sell in the cities at black market prices. However, it should be added that many Japanese indulged in this violation also as food was quite scarce during this period. Specific incidents involving violations of Japanese law by Koreans are contained in records of the 441st C.I.C. which was stationed in Tokyo during the Occupation. These records are presently stored in Japan or Hawaii.

^^Wagner, op. cit., p. 62.

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More recent statistics show that the Korean

percentage of criminal acts continued to be proportion­

ately high. In 1957» 22,400 Koreans were arrested for

various crimes - a ratio of 37.5 per 1,000 Koreans and 51 a rate six times the corresponding rate for Japanese*

At the end of 1957, 78,000 Koreans were receiving relief

under the Livelihood Protection Law — a rate seven times 52 that of the Japanese population. In 1959, a Korean

publication stated that 75 per cent of the Koreans were

jobless*

Despite these difficult living conditions, the

Koreans who had rejected repatriation evidently intended

to remain in Japan unless conditions in Korea were

greatly improved . Many had lost their identification

with their native country, having lived in Japan for

so many years. According to a Japanese source, by 1959

only 245 of the Koreans then in Japan had originally 54 come there as conscript laborers. The other hundreds

of thousands had been born there or had come there

voluntarily. Yet, although these large numbers want to

Japan Quaarterly. (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun-sha), "Koreans in Japan", P.M. Fujiyama, Vol. VI, No. 2, April-June, 1959, p. 139. ^^Ibid.

^^The Voice of Korea. (Korean Affairs Institute, Washington, D.C. ), Vol. K7T, No. 252, October, 1959, p. 2* This figure seems h i ^ and the accuracy of it might be questioned. Mr. Hogan Yoon, of the Korean Embassy, Washington, D.C. states that he does not consider it out of line, however, and bases his statement on research done by b-tTn on this subject fbr articles printed in the New York Times during 1955 and 1956.

^^The Voice Of Korea, op. cit., p. 2., quoting a statement made by the Japanese Foreign Office on July 12, 1959.

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live in Japan, they desire to live there in a semi-

autonomous position - enjoying the benefits of Japanese

citizenship but not subject to the responsibilities.

As an "unassimiliated minority" there appears to be

little hope for any immediate improvement of the generally

harsh conditions under which the Korean lives in Japan,

nor does it seem probable that there will be any lessening

of the feelings of mutual animosity between the two

peoples.

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SOUTH KOREA'S REACTION TO REPATRIATION

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BACKGROUND TO THE SOUTH KOREAIf ATTITUDE

At Yalta, President Roosevelt and Generalissimo Stalin bad agreed informal! y that Korea should win its independence and that if a transition period were necessary a trusteeship should be established. For forty years Korea been exploited by Japan, The Japanese had permitted few Koreans to secure an education and had made it difficult for them to obtain important positions in trade and industry thax woTild have given them administrative experience. As a result, there was some question whether the people were sufficiently, trained to assume the responsibilities of the government immediately.

This associated the USSR indirectly with the commitment to ultimate independence of the Cairo Declaration. It ^ s o revealed, although not publicly, the unwillingness of the American 1 Government to commit itself to immediate independence.

The above account by Secretary of State James F.

Byrnes reveals the pessimism with which the United States

viewed the chances of success for an immediate self-

government for Korea. And so, plans were made for

supervision of the Korean Government for a limited period

during which Koreans would receive training end develop 2 some experience in government. The decision to divide

Korea into two zones was a military decision made to

expedite the surrender of Japanese soldiers without

consideration for the political implications.^ However,

^James F. Byrnes, peaking Frankly, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947J, p. 221

^Vinacke, A History of the Far Bast in Modem flimes. Fifth Edition, p. 748.

^Ibid.. p. 749.

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the result was to effectively divide the country into

two definite political entities — the North allied to

the sphere of Communism and the South to the Western

powers. Aside from a war, it is difficult to envision

unification for Korea.

When it became apparent to the United States

that the Soviet Union would not cooperate in the

unification and independence of Korea under its own

government, the United States took the matter to the

United Nations which ordered free elections to be held

in Korea wherever the^' could be supervised by a represen­

tative of the U.N.^ The U.N. observers were refused

entry into the northern section, but they did supervise

the election held in South Korea. The people voted

for an Assembly which in turn elected Dr. Syngman Hhee

as the first president. Independence for the Republic

of Korea (ROK) was proclaimed on August 12, 1948.^

Dr. Ehee is a person who exerted great influence

in Korean affairs even while it was under Japanese

domination. He has devoted his life to championing

the cause of Korea's independence from Japan. He played

a large role in the passive revolt against Japanese rule

in March, 1919, known to the Koreans as the "Mansei

^Ibid., pp. 752-754.

^Ibid.

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Revolution".^ Dr. Ehee later headed the Korean

Provisional Government in Exile, which, although not

recognized by any governments, did serve to keep alive

Korean cries for independence. In 1942, Dr. Ehee let

it be known what he would require of Japan in the

event of her defeat: l)banishment of all Japanese

from Korea; 2)return of a!1 Koreans from Japan; 3)

recovery of all Korean books, records and works of

art taken to Japan; 4) rigid restriction of Japanese

fisheries, navigation (sea and aerial), and commerce;

5 ) return of Tsushima Island; and 6) an indemnity

from Japan covering her "pillaging of Korean resources

during her occupation", as well as damages from military 7 action in Korea.

Therefore, after the war, it is not surprising

that Dr. Ehee had personal enmity for Japan since

"for thirty-five years Syngman Ehee had made a

profession, almost a religion of being anti—Japanese"

Korea was not invited to participate in the 9 signing of the Peace Treaty with Japan in 1951.

^Clyde, op. cit.. footnote p. 814; Vinacke, A History of the Far Bast in Modem Times, p. 354.

"^Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee, (Dodd Mead and Co., New York, 1954), p. 187.

^The Nation, (Nation Associates, Inc., New York), 0. Edmund Clubb, "Ehee's War on Japan", November 5, 1955, p. 3 7 6 . Q Baron E. J. Itewe Van Aduard, Japan Prom Surrender to Peace, (Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1954), pp. 197- 199.

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However, it was apparent that efforts had to he made

to regularize relations between the two countries. As

a result, bilateral negotiations were begun in Tokyo

on October 20, 1951. The matters discussed were:

1. The regularization of relations by conclusion

of a basic treaty. Korea proposed that normal relations

be restored only after all of the pending issues had

been settled, whereas Japan wanted to resume basic

diplomatic relations first and then proceed to specific

problems.

2. The status of the Korean minority in Japan,

their nationality and future treatment.

3. The question of ownership of the Japanese

vessels that were in Korea at the time of Japan’s

surrender. SCAP had issued orders that 1 vessels

that were in Korean waters on August 9, 1945 and vessels

which had been registered in Korea prior to that date

were Korean property. Japan tried to reach a settlement

by giving to Korea fifteen merchant ships totaling

5,610 tons, nine fishing vessels totaling 336 tons

and 5 lend-lease vessels. Korea rejected this proposal.

4. The problem of fishing rights. Under the

terms of the San Francisco Peace Treaty (Articles 9 and

21) Japan was obligated to negotiate a fishing treaty

with Korea.

5. Settlement of the matter of Korean credit

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accounts and property claims in Japan. Korea was

demanding the return of all property that Japan bod

removed from their country, such as art objects, rare

books, gold and silver. Further the Koreans demanded

that payment for Korean labor recruits be settled and

that Japanese securities owned by Koreans be honored.

Little concrete progress was made at this First

Conference and although subsequent Conferences have

been held, both informal and formal, there has been so

little agreement between the two countries that the above

issues, by and large, continue to remain unsolved.^

Korean Survey, Vol. VI, No. 5, May, 1957, pp. 4-5; Korea and Japan, COffice of Public Information, Republic of Korea, 1954), p. 14; Janan Report, "Current Issues in Japan-ROK Relations", Vol. V, No. 6, March 15, 1959, pp. 2-5Î Koreana Quarterly, "Korean-Japanese Relations", Vol. I, No. 1, Autumn, 1959, pp. 64-85; Korea — Its Land, People and Culture of All Ages, (Seoul: Ha3cwon-sa, Ltd., 1960), pp. 168-173.

^ T h e r e was one additional matter which was not listed as a major problem on the agenda. This was the sovereignty over the Tskeshima Islands(Tokto Islands) which were claimed by Korea. Japan had announced her sovereignty over these islands in 1905 during the Russo- Japanese War. The Korean Government maintained that the Cairo Declaration intended to bring Japan back to its 1894 status, which would deprive them of the islands. Of the formal conferences, the First Conference ended on April 15, 1952; a Second Conference opened on April 15, 1953 but was recessed indefinitely on July 23, 1953; the Third Conference lasted only from October 6, 1953 to October 21, 1953; a Fourth Conference began on April 8, 1958 but was suspended during February, 1959 when it became apparent that Japan was seriously considering a repatriation agreement with North Korea. Talks were resTuned in August, 1959 and the Fourth Conference is considered still to be in session but it has been character­ ized by long periods of recess and few concrete accomplish­ ments.

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Although without question, Koreans had reason

to want vengeance on Japan and to he distrustful of the

J apanese, it may he argued that Korea ' s intransigent 12 attitude was unreasonable. An important element in

Korea's unwillingness to compromise in its demands upon

Japan undoubtedly was and is caused by their fear that

Japan, with its superior technology, industrial capacity,

national discipline and past history might again attempt

to dominate Korea. There have been many actual statements

to this effect. As an official of the Korean Government

succintly described the Korean viewpoint:

Since the end of the occupation of Japan there has been a remarkable resurgence of the old pre-war Japanese nationalistic ^irit. Many of the democratic reforms imposed by the allied powers upon defeated Japan have been discarded; old military and political leaders are gradually resuming their places in the Japanese Government and the once outlawed notorious Zaibatsu mono­ polistic economic firms are ti^tening their control over Japanese finance, business and industry. Extreme rightist political groups are gaining power and there have been more than a few hints (some more than hints) that some political and economic groups in Japan may secretly be considering evenvual aggression in an attempt to_ reduce Korea again to a Japanese colony.

There is no concrete evidence to support this Korean

1 o The Nation, Clubb, op. cit., p. 376; The Economist, (London: The Economist Newspaper, Ltd.;, Vol. 180, August 11, 1 9 5 6 , p. 4 6 6 .

^^Korea and Japan, (Office of Public Information, Republic of Korea, 1954), p. 7.

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accusation, that Japan was or is again contemplating

to subjugate Korea and, considering the political tenor

in Japan and the world today, it is highly unlikely

that Japan would be able to achieve this even if some

few did contemplate such an endeavor.

In addition to the Korean fear of a new Japanese

penetration, the South Koreans were dismayed by the

difference in the attitude taken by Japan towards the

Communists. The South Korean policy was and is to oppose

Communism with every means in their power. The

Communist Party is outlawed in Korea.Whereas the

Japanese Communist Party is allowed to organize and

participate in general elections.Despite Japan's

ties to the West, since regaining her sovereignty,

she has negotiated with the Communist Powers in an

effort to regularize her relations with this bloc

and to develop with them the trade which is so vital

to her economy. As Japanese Prime Minister Satoyama

stated before the Diet on April 25» 1955:

. . . it is an undeniable fact that, however strongly opposed we may be to the Communist ideology, there now exists in the world certain powers which are adherents of communism. In dealing with such powers it would be etdvisable to respect each other's sovereignty and thereby to open normal diplomatic or economic relations to mutual advantage without propagandizing or

^^orean Survey. "Korean-Japanese Discord", Robert T. Oliver, Vol. 6, No. 5» May, 1957, p. 12.

■^^The number of Communists in the Diet for various years are as follows: 1949 - 35; 1952 - 0; 1953 - 1; 1955 - 2; 1958 - 1; I960 - 3.

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-trying to impose one's ideology on the other. I am firmly convinced that this very course should he adopted also as a means of forestalling another world war, the possibility of which is now f j lj.^ng all the people of the world with terror.

A third and most important deterrent to the

establishment of cordial relations between Japan and

the SOK was Dr. Hhee ' s presidential proclamation of the

"Peace Line", or as it is better known, the "Ehee Line".

On January 18, 1952, by unilateral action, the HOK

Government issued the presidential proclamation which

demarcated a wide zone in the high seas between Korea

and Japan, which extended to a maximum distance of 190

miles from the Korean coast, and stated that Korean

sovereignty extended over this zone and all resources

lying beneath the ocean floor. All fishing vessels of

other countries were banned from the area. 17 This area

included very rich fishing grounds where large numbers

of Japanese had customarily fished. Since fish account

for 90 per cent of the protein in the Japanese diet,

it consti-fcuted a serious problem for them to be denied

access to these fishing grounds. Japanese fishermen

ignored the restrictions of the "Hhee line" and,

beginning in the summer of 1952, Korea responded by

^^Par Santem Survey. "Japan Between Two Worlds", Harold S. Quigley, Vol. XXV, No. 11, November, 1956, p. 169. 17 Koreana Quarterly. Lee, op. cit.. pp. 69-75; Japan Report. Vol. V, No. 6, March 15, 1959, pp. 3—5*

^ J a p a n Renort. Vol. V, No. 6, March 15, 1959, p. 4.

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arresting and imprisoning any Japanese fishermen that 19 it could capture within the area. Up until 1954,

these fishermen were released and returned to Japan

after they had completed their sentences, but from 1954

and on the Koreans often kept them in continued detention 20 at a camp in Pusan.

Under existing international law, a three-mile

limit is recognized as the extent of the territorial

waters over which a country's sovereignty may prevail.

Because of protests of the ROK Government * s action -

not only from Japan but from several countries, including

the United States — the South Korean Government revised 21 the term "sovereignty" to "jurisdiction and control".

However, for all purposes, the interpretation and the 22 effect of the Korean proclamation remained the same.

19 Ibid. ; also Korean Survey. Vol. 6, No. 5, May, 1957, Oliver, op. cit.. p. 5.

20 Japan Report. Vol. V, No. 6, March 15, 1959, p. 5.

^^o r e a n a Quarterly. Lin, op. cit. , p. 73.

22 The Koreans continued to seize Japanese fishermen, generally sentencing them to six months to a year at hard labor, through 1957. On December 31, 1957, through United States mediation, the ROK and Japan signed an agreement calling for the mutual release of the Japanese fishermen and Koreans who had been sentenced by Japanese courts to deportation. However, during the muvual release operations Korea continued to capture Japanese fishing vessels and between January, 1958 and February, 1959 had seized an additional 12 fishing vessels and 124 fishermen.

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SOUTH KOREA’S POSITION REGARDING REPATRIATION

Regarding repatriation, the official Korean

position was that they would receive a!^ of the Koreans

in Japan, including any Korean Communists, providing

that the Japanese would pay a reasonable amount of 23 compensation to each returnee. The Korean Government

sou^t this payment as a token compensation for the

forced labor which Japan had exacted from its Korean

laborers. On this score, the Koreans accuse the Japanese

of first indicating that they would comply with the

request for compensation but later making compliance

dependent on the provision that part of the fund was to

come from the United States.The Koreans maintain

that when the United States showed reluctance to agree

to paying part of the compensation, Japan became evasive 25 and nothing further came of the negotiations.

Rhee’s intransigent attitude towards Japan is

illustrated by statements made by bim in an interview

during September 1955 :

Japan must agree to semtle our minimum de­ mands . . . Japan must withdraw unconditionally, claims to Korean property . . . together with 26 the renunciation of the insulting Kubota statement.

23 Syngman Rhee, Speech at the Anniversary of the 1919 Passive Resistance. March 1, I960, Seoul. ^"^Ibid. ^^Ibid.

^^Kubota was the Chief Japanese Delegate to the Third Conference. Ee allegedly stated: l) that the

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JapezL must recognize our fishery line, which was drawn for the purpose of maintaining peace between Korea and Japan. Japan must release Koreans held illegally .... Japan must not tolerate existence of two or three pro-Communist or anti—Republic of Korea organizations of Korean traitors in Japan which . . . seek to overthrow the Government of Korea. Japan must abandon its growing desire to trade end engage in other friendly relations with Communist North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union. Japan must renounce the protectorate and annexation treaties imposed upon Korea in 1905 and 1910. . . .

All indications were, however, that the Korean

Government realized that to have back in the homeland

the thousands of its countrymen from Japan would cause

serious problems for South Korea. Conditions in South

Korea had not been conducive to economic recovery. Kn

acute employment problem existed since South Korea is

primarily an agrarian state with few jobs for skilled or

even unskilled laborers. And there had been an overflow

of refugees from the Communist north which further

aggravated the employment problem. The Republic of

Korea could not support any non-productive group of citizens.

The Korean War had wiped out what economic gains had

been made and since this time, the country has been

largely dependent upon the United States Government

evacuation of the Japanese from Korea in 1945 was a violation of international law; 2) granting Korea her independence before the signing of a Japanese peace treaty was a violation of international law; 3) Japan's property claims in Korea were inviolate; 4) the Cairo Declaration's reference to the "enslavement" of the Korean people by Japan was based on wartime hysteria; 5 ) Japan's occupation of Korea had been beneficial to the Korean people.

^^The Nation. Clubb, op. cit., p. 377.

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2 8 financially, Korea had not been blessed with a period

of uninterrupted rehabilitation as had Japan, «-rd as

heretofore stated, it was questionable whether South

Korea had anything to offer these repatriates. Therefore,

one might conclude that the ROK maintained its uncompromis­

ing position in the repatriation negotiations largely

because it realized the difficulties of having this

large group of its former residents back in South Korea,

At the same time, the ROK apparently did not want to

appear to have deserted these people and so it exerted

what efforts it could to improve the lot of the Koreans

in Japan. One Korean newspaper called on the Government

to:

. . . stick to a firm policy and negotiate with the Allied Powers so that the autonomy of tbe Korean in Japan may be confirmed and the prestige of our nation as an independent nation maintained.

In January, 1950, two prominent Korean citizens visited

Japan to observe the conditions of the Koreans there,

and on their return requested their Government, "to

take up a firmer policy and appeal to the people here

for the 600,000 Korean residents in Japan" In their

report, they advised the South Korean Government that:

28 Koreans Quarterly. "Fiscal Policy for a Self- Supporting Economy in Korea". So Chin Choi, Vol. I, No, 1, Autumn, 1959, pp. 86-90. 29 SCAP, Translations of Korean Newspapers, from the Chosun, January 9, 1950.

^SCAP, Translations from Korean Newspapers, from Tong A, January 20, 1950.

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. . • ThedLr (i.e. the Koreans) legal status has been gradually but steadily lowered by the Japanese Government. They are lacking in political ideals and economically, they have been always at a disadvantage. The Japanese Government has been oppressing them very hard. . . . The Korean residents there have lost the spirit of being members of an independent nation. . . . the Japanese Government las been controlling the activities of the Korean residents so ingeniously that most of the factories belonging to the Korean residents have been unable to remain in operation, and consequently 70 to 80_percent of the Korean residents is now jobless.

These two Korean representatives recommended to their

Government that they strengthen their Legation in Japan

because it was suffering from a personnel shortage and

lacked the "capacity of acting as a competent representative 32 body". Further, they said that the Legation had

proved itself to be "nothing but a formal organ, failing

to meet the expectations of the Korean residents

there. ..." 33 They also requested the South Korean

Government to:

. . . take up a plan to bring over to the homeland the factory-facilities now idle in Japan, install some financial organizations in that nation and, at the same, time, bring over to the homeland and put to industrial ireconstruc- tion the many competent Korean technicians, most of whom are now jobless in Japan. . . . that the Government lead and aid financially the Korean students studying in Japan. . . .

Although the above suggestions might have held some

merit, in 1950 the South Korean Government was unable

to act on this or any other plan because of the commence—

32lbid.

Ibid ^^Ibid.

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ment of the Korean War. As previously mentioned, the

Third Conference with Japan had been terminated in

October, 1953. Some four and on-half years elapsed

before representatives of the two Governments met «ga-n-n

to discuss the multitude of problems that existed between

them.

The Fourth Conference began in April, 1958. Soon

thereafter, reports began to be circulated that Japan

was considering taking steps to solve its problem of

the Korean minority by repatriating to North Korea

those Koreans who had expressed a desire to go there,

Japan said it was taking such a step for "humanitarian

reasons".South Korea announced that "for humanitarian

reasons it would fight such a move with a11 of its

power . . . and that they would use naval vessels to

intercept any repatriation ships bound for hell on 37 earth in North Korea".

Japan Report. Vol. V, No. 4, February 15, 1959, p. 2.

^^Newsweek, (Newsweek, New York), Vol. 53, February 23, 1959, p. 50.

^"^Ibid.

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NS&OTIATIONS

WITH THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPIS'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

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FIRST STEPS TOWARDS NEGOTIATIONS

With, a view to realizing the repatriation of Koreans in Japan by their freely expressed will based on the freedom of choice of residence and the principles of the Red Cross, the Japanese Red Cross Society and the Red Cross Committee of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea agree as follows . . .

The above preamble is the introduction to the

agreement signed at Calcutta on August 13, 1959 between

the Japanese Red Cross Society and the Red Cross Committee

of North Korea relative to the repatriation of those

Koreans in Japan who wished to go to North Korea.

This agreement was the culmination of a campaign

begun by some of the Korean residents, as far back as 2 1953, for their return to North Korea. Their first

efforts gained little momentum since this was about the

time of the Korean truce agreement and the situation in

North Korea was unstable.

In November, 1955, the Japanese Red Cross contacted

the North Korean Red Cross in an effort to obtain the

release of fifty Japanese who were interned in North

Korea.^ As a result, the North Korean Red Cross (NKRC)

suggested that a Japanese delegation visit Pyongyang to

The Agreement is reproduced as Appendix VI. 2 Japan Report. Vol. V, No. 4, February 15, 1959, p. 2.

^Japan Times. Tokyo, January 29, 1956.

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discuss the matter. The Japanese accepted the invitation

and, headed by the President of the Japan Red Cross (JTRC),

Yoshisuke Kasai, departed for Pyongyang in January, 1956.^

Apparently, it was the belief of the committee members

that their sole task was to make the necessary arrangements

for the return of their countrymen. However, the NKRC

asked them to consider a proposal for the repatriation 5 of the Korean residents in Japan to North Korea.

They also wanted to add to the agenda a discussion

calling for further cooperation between the two Red

Cross groups. ^ Rather surprised and unprepared to discuss

these issues, the Japanese delegation asserted positively

that they would have to confine the negotiations solely

to the original intent of the conference. For a time,

the NKRC persisted and the Japanese threatened to break

off the talks. In the face of their stand, the NKRC

scquiseed and agreement was finally reached on February 26, 7 1956 for the return of the Japanese from North Korea.

^Ibid.

^Japan Times, February 24, 1956. ^Ibid.

*^Ibid.. February 25, 26 and 27, 1956. The agreement was for the NKRC to bear all expenses of the Japanese repatriates until they had entered the port of Shako. Each Japanese was to be given 20,000 yen in North Korean currency. Of the number held by the Communists, 12 decided to remain in North Korea.

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The Republic of Korea immediately accused the

Japanese Government of scheming with the Communists

and statements appeared in South Korean newspapers

accusing Japan and North Korea of having reached a

secret understanding for the repatriation of the Koreans Q in Japan to North Korea. One newspaper wrote that

Japan was "conniving with North Korea to repatriate

Koreans into Communist slavery and for the establishment 9 of trade relations".

From subsequent events, it would be reasonable

to conclude, as did one independent periodical, that

the two Red Cross Societies were acting as agents for

their governments and were to conduct negotiations

concerning the question of repatriation.^^ In fact,

one Japanese newspaper flatly stated that the two societies

had agreed to refer the question of Korean repatriation

to the International Committee of the Red Cross (iCRC)

for settlement.^ The South Korean accusation is further

strengthened by the fact that one member of the delegation,

Kisuke Miyakoshi, a former member of the Diet, did

actually sign a treaty for trade but his action was 12 reputiated by the Japanese Government. Although the

Japanese people were pleased with the outcome of the

K o r e a n Republic. Seoul, February 4, 1956. ^Tbid.

^^The Economist, Vol. 193, No. 606, December 19, 1959, p. 1167

Japan Times. February 29, 1956. Ibid.

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meetings, their press strongly criticized the manner in

which the Communists had conducted their negotiations

and accused them of using the Japanese internees as

"human pawns" to win the North Koreans a formalization 13 of closer ties.

"UNOFFICIAL" NEGOTIATIONS BY TEE CROSS

In May, 1956, two representatives of the

International Committee of the Red Cross arrived in

Japan, apparently at the invitation of the Japanese

Red Cross Society. They inspected the Omura Detention

Camp where those Koreans who had entered Japan illegally

since the end of the war were being held. They con­

ferred with officials of the Japanese Foreign Office

and, although no public statement was issued relevant

to the subject of the discussions, it may be presumed

that some agreement was reached on a course of action

that would be followed for negotiating the repatriation 14 of the Koreans to North Korea# Certainly this was

the opinion of one South Korean newspaper which stated

in an editorial:

^^Ibid.

^"^Ibid.. Hay 7, 1956.

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The Foreign Ministry of the ROK sternly protests against the combined efforts of the JRC and the ICRC to repatriate ROK citizens to the North Korean Communist puppet bandits. This is certainly a political problem involving the Governments of the ROK and Japan, and the JRC forcible repatriation of ROK citizens from Japan to the area under the rule of the North Korean puppets is a direct violation of the charter of the Red Cross . . .

We have reason to believe that the Japanese Government and the Pyongyang puppet regime con­ cluded a secret agreement on the repatriation of Japanese citizens to Japan. This agreement was implemented with the tacit approval of the ICRC. The first implementation was the repatriation of 3Ô Japanese nationals to Japan from North Korea.

It is now clear that the repatriation of Japanese nationals was the first half of the deal. The second is the illegal repatriation of Korean nationals to the Communist side, and the Red Cross is going to be used as an agent for Japan, the North Korean puppets and their wicked political scheme . Behind the release of the 48 Japanese nationals is the Japanese scheme to-deport 600,000 Koreans residing in Japan. . . .

Nothing concrete came of the plan for the next

two years. Then, in September, 1958, the General

Federation of Korean Residents in Japan launched a

campaign for mass voluntary return to North Korea.

The Federation claimed that they bad an immediate response

^^Korean Republic. July 22, 1956.

^^The General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan was, more or less, the successor to the Korean League. The League was ordered to disband by the Japanese Government on September 8, 1949, specifically because it had participated in demonstrations and rioting against Japanese laws and interfered with Japanese police and revenue agents in the discharge of their duties. See Mr. Vagner’s discussion, op. cit., pp. 84—88. The General Federation is also Imown by the names of Chosun Soren, Chosun In Ryrmmarig. and Choryun.

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of 117,000 Koreans expressing their desire to repatriate

to the North.

Although the North Korean regime had banned

all immigration, it had li.:,fted this ban because it

evidently was in need of additional labor. As previously

mentioned, large numbers of Koreans had fled to South

Korea to escape the Communist rule. Particularly,

it needed workers for the coal-mines and this fitted

in quite well with the background of many of the Koreans

m- Japan. T 18

The South Koreans charged that the General

Federation was Communist-sponsored and reported that

the Pyongyang regime had contributed to it some 19 720,000,000 yen or approximately $2,000,000. The

ROK further charged that the Japanese had been responsible

for the growth of Communism in the Korean community

because their discriminatory treatment had created

conditions in which the Koreans could be easily 20 exploited by the Communists.

17 Japan Report, Vol. V, No. 4, February 15, 1959.

^^ewsweek. Vol. 53, February 23, 1959, p. 50. 1 q ___ The Voice of Korea. Vol. XVI, No. 252, October, 1959, p. 2. 20 Koreana Quarterly, Vol. I, No. 1, Autumn, 1959, Lee, op. cit., p. 69.

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OFFICIAI. NEGOTIATIONS

The Japanese Government hegen to regard the idea

■with increasing favor. It Took the position that "this

question should he dealt with solely in accordance with

the principle of the freedom of the choice of residence". 2 1

Oü January 31» 1959, Foreign Affairs Minister Fujiyama

Aiichiro announced that the Government was considering

the voluntary repatriation of the Korean residents to 22 North Korea. Shortly after, on February 13, 1959,

the Japanese Cabinet reaffirmed the principle of

"choice of residence" and announced that, as an initial

step, it had "decided to request the cooperation of

the International Committee of the Red Cross in con-

firming the wishes of Korean residents concerned".23

The Government specifically summarized their policy as

follows:

1. The principle that every person has the fundamental human right to leave or to return to his own co-untry . . . is clarified in the World Declaration of Human Rights. The Japanese Government’s present policy in handling the problem is in strict conformity with this accept­ ed principle.

2. The Japanese Government believes . . . that restriction, for political reasons, of the freedom of a person to choose his own residence is a violation of this very belief upon which the free nations are founded.

21 Japan Report, Vol. V, No. 4, February 15, 1959, p. 2. 22 Japan Times. January 31, 1959. 23 Japan Report. Vol. V, No. 4, February 15, 1959, p. 2.

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3. . . . the Japanese Government . . . has decided to request the International Committee of the Red Cross, . . . to confirm the wishes of the individuals concerned, accepting previous offers made by that Committee, and to respect the results of such confirmations.

4. Voluntary return to North Korea would be based on the free will of the individueil and would not be a compulsory repatriation by the Japanese Government. If a person, through his own free will, chooses to leave Japan «nd to live in another territory, the Japanese Government believes that it would be conforming to the principles of democracy to respect such wishes, regardless of the ideology of the authorities having control over such territory.

5. Since the Japanese Government’s position is solely that it will not prevent voluntary return to North Korea based on the free will of the individual, this position naturally bears no implication such as that of giving recognition to the North Korean authorities. It is not a violation of the sovereignty of the Republic of. Korea, nor is it an unfriendly act against it.

The South Korean reaction to this was to threaten

the Japanese that if the plan was carried out, "serious 25 consequences would follow". President Ehee accused

the Japanese of lending themselves "to a monstrous

scheme to lure one hundred thousand or more of them

(i.e. Koreans) to North Korea to be re-enslaved under

communisn. This is a conspiracy carried out in collabora­

tion with the communist enemy"During this period

Japan Report. Vol. V, No. 4, February 15, 1959, pp. 2-3. ^^Korean Republic. February 1, 1959.

^^Syngman Ehee, Speech at the Anniversary of the 1919 Passive Resistance. Seoul, March 1, 1959.

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when pressure had been building up for Japan to negotiate

with North Korea, the ROK and Japan hod been holding

talks on this same end other matters. These talks began

to collapse when Japan refused to give written assurances

that it would not consider "deportation" of the Korean

nationals to North Korea. The ROK delegation announced

on February 14, 1959 that it would not continue with

the talks until Japan had abandoned the "deportation 27 scheme". The ROK National Assembly adopted a resolu­

tion condemning the repatriation plan, charging that it

was illegal and voted to appeal to the United Nations 28 and the ICRC to prevent it. The South Korean Cabinet

met in an emergency session, also on Febrtiary 14, 1959,

and issued a statement reiterating that South Korea

would receive the repatriates at any time, but only

after Japan had paid compensation for the forced labor 29 of the repatriates.

Following the issuance of the Japanese Cabinet's

announcement that it had decided to request the coopera­

tion of the ICRC Prime Minister Kishi Nubueuke announced

that the ICRC would be asked to ascertain the number of

Koreans desiring to repatriate to North Korea.In

reply, an ICRC representative stated that if the ICRC

27 Korean Republic. February 15, 1959.

^®Ibid. ; also New York Times. (New York Times Co., New York), February 15, 1959.

^^Ibid. Japan Times, February 14, 1959.

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did become involved in the actual repatriation, it

would limit its duties to obtaining assurances that

the Koreans were given freedom of choice.

Japanese Red Cross officials and their North

Korean counterparts continued with anezchange of

views by cablegrams and finally it was agreed to hold 32 bilateral talks at Geneva beginning April 13, 1959.

The Japanese delegation was again headed by Yoshisuke

Kasai and the North Korea head delegate was li 11 Kyung.

Also present at the talks was a spokesman for South

Korea, Kim Yong Shik, then ROK Minister to France.

Minister Kim did not participate in the meetings but

did present his Government’s views on the proceedings 33 both to the ICRC and to the press.

The talks proceeded slowly because of disagree­

ment over the details for execution of the repatriation.

The Japanese side emphasized their desire to have the

ICRC play a significent role during the entire repatria­

tion program. The North Koreans were pressing to have

the lists of Koreans desiring repatriation compiled

by the General Federation, which as heretofore mentioned,

was apparently Communist-supported, 34 Agreement was

finally reached by June 18, 1959 but the signing was

^^ e w York Times, February 14, 1959.

Japan Times, April 13, 1959; Voice of Korea. Vol. XVT, No. 252, October, 1959, p. 2

^^ o i c e of Korea. Vol. XVI, No. 252, October, 1959, p. 2

^Ibid.

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delayed for two months while Japan waited for the

approval of the agreement by the ICRC. The latter

formally announced that it would participate and assist

the Japanese Red Cross in carrying out the repatriation

on August 11, stating as follows:

The International Committee of the Red Cross has decided to lend its assistance to the Japan Red Cross with a view to preparing the repatriation of Korean residents in Japan who express the wish to proceed to a place of their choice in their country of origin. This decidion . . . is dictated solely by the interest of the persons concerned. The International Committee notes that on October 16, 1958, the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea stated that it was prepared to receive those Korean residents in Japan who wish to proceed to north Korea, and to make ships available for their repatriation. On February 13, 1959, the government of Japan decided, on its own responsibility, to authorize these repatriations and to entrust the Japan Red Cross with the organization of the repatriation, with the assistance of the ICRC. Further, the agreement reached in Geneva on June 24, 1959, between the Red Cross Societies of Japan and the Democratic People * s Republic of Korea has sho%»n that the two societies intend to base their action on the principle whereby every person should have the right freely to choose his place of residence and, in particular, to return to his home country. Since, in the opinion of the ICRC, this principle of fhee choice implies that the Koreans in Japan have the possibility of proceeding to north Korea, of remaining in Japan or of going to south Korea, negotiations were started with the government of Japan and the Japan Red Cross. The ICRC has received satisfactory assurances from them in regard both to the conditions whereby the principle of the free choice of the persons concerned will be guaranteed, and to the position of Koreans who would remain in Japan. Lastly, the government and the Red Cross of the Republic of Korea recently informed the ICRC that Koreans residing in Japan who wish to go to the Republic of Korea would be authorized

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to do so as soon as the necessary arrangements for this purpose have been made with the Japanese government. The International Committee hopes that it will also be possible to reach an agreement for the organization of these repatriation. A mission of the ICRC will shortly be leaving for Tokyo to make arrangements for the International Committee • s participation in this matter.

Tt=TR agrebicbnt

With the announcement of ICRC support, the JRC

announced that its representatives would meet with

those of the NKRC at Calcutta on August 13, 1959 to

sign the final agreement. There were three salient

points to the agreement. Although the Japanese Red Cross

Society was to be responsible for registering the Koreans

who wished to return, it could request the cooperation

of the ICRC to ensure that the organization and operation

of the system for registration was "fair, impartial 37 and in conformity with the humanitarian principles".

Secondly, the repatriation was to include all Koreans

in Japan, even those who had acquired Japanese nationality *5S but wished to go to North Korea. Thirdly, the agreement

called upon North Korea to provide the vessels for the

return voyage at its eacpense, while the Japanese side

^^Voice of Korea. Vol. ZVI, No. 252, October, 1959, p. 2; Japan Report. Vol. V, No. 17, September 1, 1959, p. 3.

^^See Append ix VI. 37 The Agreement, Article 3.

^®Ibid., Article 1.

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was to be responsible for tbe expenses of tbe Koreans

while enroute from their residences in Jepan to the •50 port of embarkation at Niigata.

The agreement specified that the returnees were

to be ELllowed to take with them up to 45» 000 yen in

Japanese currency in the form of a check in pound

sterling. However, if a repatriate had over this

amount, he was to be allowed to deposit the excess

in a bank in his name from which he could make with­

drawals once in North Korea.In addition, personal

effects, household articles for the returnee and his

family's own use and professional instruments used in

pursuing his vocation could also be shipped. 41 It was

to be the responsibility of the Japanese Red Cross Society

to disseminate the procedures for repatriation to the 42 Koreans. The agreement was to be valid for fifteen

months, however, if the repatriation had not been

completed by the expiration date, there was a provision 43 for renegotiation for extensions.

^^Ibid.« Article 5 and Article 6.

"^°Ibid. . Article 6 ^^Ibid.

^^Ibid.. Article 8. ^^Ibid.. Article 9.

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SOUTH KOEBAN DENUNCIATION

The repatriation plan was bitterly denounced by

the Republic of Korea. It claimed that any plan to

repatriate Korean residents in Japan to North Korea

violated the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea.

On June 15» 1959, the ROK had severed all trade relations

with Japan including the purchase of Japanese products 44- with United States aid funds. The National Assembly

on June 17» 1959, adopted a resolution to "take p-~l 1

measures strong enough to block the Japanese repatriation 45 scheme".

Dr. Ehee promised to "use any and a.11 means

available to prevent repatriation". On the day that

the agreement was signed he said:

Korea shall not talk now of countermeasures. If the Japanese will meet us in sincerity, there is a chance of equitable solutions. If not, resort will have to be had to other means of safeguarding Korean interests and our people who reside in Japan. Let us do our best, a ^ Japan to do the same, and see what happens.

Despite the promises made by President Ehee and

other government officials that everything possible

would be done to prevent any repatriation of Koreans

44 Japan Quarterly. Vol. VI, No. 4, October-December, 1959, p. 526.

^^ o i c e of Korea. Vol. ZVI, No. 252, October, 1959, p. 2, "^^Ibid. ^"^Ibid.

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SOUTH KOREAN DENUNCIATION

The repatriation plan was bitterly denounced by

the Republic of Korea. It claimed that any plan to

repatriate Korean residents in Japan to North Korea

violated the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea.

On June 15» 1959» the ROK had severed all trade relations

with Japan including the purchase of Japanese products — . 44 with united States aid funds. The National Assembly

on June 17, 1959, adopted a resolution to "take 1

measures strong enough to block the Japanese repatriation 45 scheme".

Dr. Rhee promised to "use any and l means

available to prevent repatriation".^^ On the day that

the agreement was signed he said:

Korea shall not talk now of countermeasures. If the Japanese will meet us in sincerity, there is a chance of equitable solutions. If not, resort will have to be had to other means of safeguarding Korean interests and our people who reside in Japan. Let us do our best, ask Japan to do the same, and see what happens.

Despite the promises made by President Rhee and

other government officials that everything possible

would be done to prevent any repatriation of Koreans

Japan Quarterly. Vol. VI, No. 4, October-December, 1959, p. 526.

'^^Voice of Korea. Vol. XVI, No. 252, October, 1959, p. 2.

^^Ibid. ^"^Ibid.

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to North Korea, there was a group of Koreans in Japan

who accused, the HOK of inaction and doing nothing to

help. This rightist group was known as the Korean

Residents Association in Japan.On June 16, 1959,

three leaders had adopted a resolution declaring that

their organization could "no longer trust or support

the present Liberal Party or the government (i.e. the

ROK Government)The Association's President,

Kim Jae Hwa, stated that his group had received nothing 50 after ten years of pleading for funds. Lee Chun Tu,

one of the two other leaders, accused the South Korean

Government not only of failure to help Koreans in Japan

but of refusing to take them back to South Korea. Ee

stated that the ROK Government had even made it difficult

for a Korean in Jepan to obtain permission to visit

South Korea, and added that, "The anti—Communist Koreans

here won't go back home because the government won't

help them"•

The next day, on June 17, the ROK National

Assembly responded by recommending an immediate appro­

priation of 200,000,000 hwan for a "protection and

guidance program" and the Education Ministry allocated

another 100,000,000 hwan for Korean in Japan. This

300,000,000 hwan sum would be equal at that time to

^®Ibid. '^^Ibid. ^°lbid. ^^Ibid.

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$600,000 at the official exchange rate hut only $250,000 52 on the free market. On June 25, 1959, another group

of Association leaders issued a statement offering

"loyal support throughout for the ROK Government"

despite "its poor policy toward Korean residents in 53 Japan". It announced that the Association would

send members into every prefecture of Japan in attempts

to persuade Koreans to either remain in Japan or to go 54 only to South Korea.

In Seoul Koreans staged demonstrations, many

in front of the United States Embassy, débité the

fact that the United States had refused to become 55 involved in the matter, Throu^ Lincoln White, of

the U.S. State Department, the United States did issue

a statement to the effect that "the United States has

consistently endorsed the principle of voluntary re­

patriation based on full freedom of choice".

In an interview held in the fall of 1959, President

Rhee told of his government's specific grounds for

objection:

1. Ninety—seven percent of the residents came from the south. 2. She ROK considered it a crime to send people into Communist slavery. 3. Japan had discriminated against the residents making them easy recruits for communism.

^^Ibid. ^^Ibid.. p. 5. ^^Ibid.

^^Ibid.. p. 2. ^^Ibid.

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4. The Communists had. been permitted to bribe, to lie, to intimidate, and even to use violence against the residents. 5. The northern sector is severely short of manpower and such deportations were considered a hostile act against the SOK. 6. All Koreans are citizens of the HOK, which is recognized by the United States and the Free World as the o n ^ legitimate sovereignty on the Korean peninsula.

President Rhee enlarged upon his views stating:

Ignoring the fact that the question of legal status and future of the residents was on the Korea-Japan Conference Agenda, the Japanese decided upon the deportations and asked the International Committee of tbe Red Cross to supervise them. When the ICRC demurred, the Japan Red Cross entered into direct negotiations with the Communists to the north — who supposed­ ly are not recognized by the Japanese Government — and concluded a deportation agreement.

How can you repatriate to a country which does not exist, and to territory where,-many of the affected individuals never lived?"

TEE MOTIVES FOR THE ACTIONS OF THE TERES POWERS

Certainly the motives of the three nations

directly involved are not difficult to understand.

The Korean minority presented an acute problem to Japan.

It was to her advantage to be rid of this large, un-

assimilable, troublesome minority. From the end of

the war, Japan had been searching for a solution to

the problem they presented. She had failed to reach

57 Sunday Can -Chronicle. Allentown, Pennsylvania, December 27, 1959, p. 20. ^^Ibid.

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any agreement on a solution with the ROK after years

of negotiations. Since a large number of the Koreans

were requesting to go to North Korea, there seemed to

be no reason why they ^ould not be allowed to go.

As long as Japan protected the Koreans * freedom of

choice in the matter, it appeared to be a fine solution

for at least part of the Koreans as far as Japan was

concerned. As a bonus, there was also the possibility

that Japan's action might force the ROK Government

to come to terms and make them more agreeable to

settling their out-standing differences on other matters.

It would appear that South Korea's position

was dictated in part by her emotional attitude towards

her two chief adversaries — Japan and North Korea.

Because of her economic dilemma, she had evidently

determined to refuse to accept any of her nationals

unless Japan agreed to "reasonable compensation" for

their "forced labor" during World War 11.^^ That the

ROK treasury needed such monies is undeniable and in

principle, perhaps, the demand was justifiable. However,

no breath of compromise on the issue was offered.

The South Korean stand apparently offered no solution

59 Apparently, Dr. Rhee did not generally discuss public ally the sum that he would consider "reasonable compensation". An American newspaperman, Warren TJnna, Staff Reporter for the Washington Poet, stated in an article in that paper on September 6, I960, that the sum demanded by the ROK was $1500 for each Korean. At this figure, the total for 600,000 Koreans would be $900,000,000. Therefore, depending on viewpoint, the adjective "reasonable"might be questioned.

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to the problem other than complete capitulation by

Japan to her demands.

Since Japan was not content to bargain ad

infinitum, she responded to the North Korean overtures.

This action was a most bitter pill for South Korea to

swallow for several reasons. First, the Japanese response

was actually a form of negotiation with the Communist

regime for despite the fact that the negotiations were

handled and conducted by the two Red Cross Societies

of the two nations, the Societies were acting with the

approval of their governments. The ROK feared that any

contact between the Communist regime and other govern­

ments might lead to recognition of the Communist Govern­

ment. As mentioned, one Japanese delegate did sign a

trade pact with the North Koreans only to have it

reputiated by the Japanese Government, Certainly,

however, with the Japanese need for trade outlets,

conditions could ripen whereby trade with North Korea

would be sanctioned by the Japanese authorities. Thus,

any type of negotiations provided opportunities for a

more permanent relationship to develop. Also, there

was a practical reason for ROK protests to the repatria­

tions. The skilled laborers leaving Japan for the

Communist north gave to North Korea a badly needed

increase in manpower. And so South Korea could claim,

with justification, that Japan was aiding and abetting

the enemy power.

The motives for the Democratic People * s Republic

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of Korea were -biie reverse of those of the R C Z - the

advantages for them were ohvious disadvantages for

the ROK. The increased lahor force was certainly

welcome particularly since many of these Koreans hed

been trained in Japanese industry. And despite the

fact that the agreement had been concluded by non­

governmental agencies, there nevertheless derived

therefrom an increase in North Korean international

prestige. lastly, the agreement could cause further

disruption in ROK-Japanese negotiations and relations.

This would not only have its effect on the two countries

involved, but on the United States and other Western

powers which would stand to gain from their establish­

ment of cooperative relations.

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THE EXECUTION OP THE REPATRIATION

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TSE PROCBDÜRAIi PIAN

On September 4, 1959, as the initial step, the

Japanese Red Cross issued a "Guidebook on Repatriation"

which outlined the procedure to be followed from registra­

tion of the Koreans to boarding the ships. ^ The details

of the Guidebook had been drawn up by the JRC with the

assistance of Marcel Junod, vice-president of the ICRC.

It consisted of three main parts: l) the actual repatria­

tion procedures; 2) the provisions for confirmation of

the returnees desire to leave; and 3) conditions 2 respective to residence in Japan.

The Guidebook specified:

1. Family members of friends would be

allowed to see the repatriate before the train left for

the port of embarkation. However, the returnee would

be restricted to the train while en route, and upon

his arrival at the port of embarkation at Niigata

would be restricted to the camp there.

2. The JRC Center at Niigata was to complete

the exit procedures in a four day period.

3. The last chance for changing his mind

would be presented when the repatriate met with officials

of the JRC and the ICRC at the Ceater. luring this

meeting only an interpreter and the officials could

be present.^

1 2 Japan Times. September 4, 1959. Ibid.

^Ibid.

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The Guidebook was greeted with immediate protests

from the General Federation which charged that these

instructions violated the provisions of the August 13

agreement,^ Specifically, it objected to the Japanese

refusal to allow its members the right to display the

flag of North Korea in Japan, Secondly, the Communists

opposed the regulation that forbade the repatriates

to leave their train while en route to the port of

embarkation as well as the rule forbidding interviews

with the repatriates at the port of embarkation. Lastly,

the General Federation protested the requirement calling

for confirmation of the desire of the repatriates to go

to North Korea which was to be made at the embarkation

center by the JRC in the presence of ICRC officials.

The first rule was obviously adopted by Japan

because she did not recognize the Government of North

Korea. To allow the Communist Korean flag to be dis­

played would further aggravate the South Koreans.

Japan’s reasons for the second regulation were probably

twofold — one being to prevent pressure from either side

on the repatriate; and the other being as a counter­

intelligence measure against the Communists. In defense

of the third requirement, the JRC replied that the

repatriate must be given an opportunity to express

his will until the time that he actually set sail,

and also to ensure that he was acting of his own volition.

^Ibid. ^Ibid.

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The JRC Guidebook stipulated that this last interview

be held at the embarkation center with a representative

of the ICRC present as a witness apparently because

the Japanese were greatly concerned over persuasive

pressure being used on the Koreans and because they

were concerned lest they be criticized for their handling

of the "freedom of choice" aspect of the movement.

Japan was determined to proceed, however, and on

September 16, 1959, it announced that the registration

for the repatriation would begin on September 21 and

that she expected the first ship to leave Niigata on

November 10.^ On the scheduled date, the JRC opened

3,655 registration places throughout Japan to receive

applications. Twenty-two ICRC officials observed the 7 proceedings in six groups.

Response to the registration was small because

of the strong opposition from the General Federation

and very few Koreans registered. The Federation

demanded retraction of the provision in the Guidebook

that called for confirmation by each Korean of his

desire to leave. Perceptively, the Federation complained

that the Guidebook "restricted their movements".^ It

further scored the security regulations at the embarkation

^Janan Times. September 16, 1959.

*^The Voice of Korea, Vol. XVI, No. 252, October, 1959, p. 3. 8 Japan Times, September 22, 1959.

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g port of Niigata as being too restrictive. The Federa­

tion also charged, that those provisions of the Guidebook

which purportedly guaranteed "free will" constituted

"excessive kowtowing to Syngman Hhee and Americanism".^^

On October 10, 1959, the new chairman of the North

Korean Red Cross, Kim Rung Ki, cabled the JRC that the

Guidebook "violated the Calcutta Agreement". ^

Japan continued with her own plans despite these

pressures and on October 12, chief Cabinet Secretary

Stsusaburo Shina announced that the Guidebook would 2.2 __ not be revised. In answer to the NESC cable, the

JRC advised that there apparently was some "misunder­

standing".^^ On October T15, the JRC asked the NKRC

to send their first repatriation ships so that the

repatriates could begin their journey by November 12, 1959.^^

It is interesting to note that at this point -

whether because of their dissatisfaction with the

provisions of the Guidebook or for some other reason

upon which one can only speculate — the North Koreans

remained silent and did not respond to the Japanese

request for a repatriation ship. 'When no answer had

been received by October 16, Foreign Minister Aiichiro

^The Voice of Korea. Vol, K7I, No. 2p2, October, 1959, P. 3. ^°Ibid. ^Ibid. ^ Ibid. ^^Ibid.

Japan Times, October IS, 1959; The Voice of Korea, op. cit., p. 5«

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Fujiyama reportedly requested members of the Socialist

Party - the Government * s rival party — to mediate the 15 stalemate. Despite these efforts, by October 18,

only 257 Koreans had applied for repatriation and

there were continued protests from the General Federation

concerning the "cruel treatment" of the repatriates.^^

During this period of uncertainty concerning

the future of the plan there was speculation that seme

Korean residents might take matters in their own hands.

Some thought the determined ones might attempt to

arrange for their own transportation to North Korea

as did ten Korean students in July, 1959. They had

applied for, and received exit visas from the Japanese

Government, traveled on a Russian ship headed for Europe

and, after a trip around the world, eventually sirrived

at Pyongyang. The Japanese Government took the position

that they "could not refuse such exit permits unless

they had committed crimes or disturbed public order".17

It was evident that the Japanese Government

wanted the repatriation plan to succeed. The very

fact that she had conducted negotiations with the

Communists of North Korea in the face of South Korean

accusations and pressures to refrain pointed up her

15 The Voice of Korea, op. cit., p. 5.

Japan Times. October 18, 1959. 17 The Voice of Korea, op. cit., p. 3.

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desire to consummate the repatriation. The departure

of the Koreans was to her advantage and, accordingly

she evidently acceeded to compromise. On October 27,

the JRC announced a relaxation of some of the regulations

contained in the Guidebook. In lieu of the rule

requiring that each individual repatriate be questioned,

the amendment provided for family—size groups to be

interviewed to obtain the reaffirmation of their desire

to go to North Korea. A spokesman for each group was

to make a decision for his entire group. In addition,

the JRC agreed to allow visitors at the repatriation 19 center "at the discretion of the authorities in charge".

These two amendments were approved by the ICRC

and were accepted by the General Federation and it was

announced on October 28 that the repatriation would 20 proceed. With the approval of the General Federation,

individual participation increased, end less than two

weeks later, the total of applications for repatriation

numbered 5,253.^^

^ J a p a n Times. October 27, 1959. ^^Ibid.

90 Ibid., October 28, 1959.

^^Ibid.. November 6, 1959.

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SOUTH KOREAN EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE REPATRIATION

Meanwhile, the publication of the Guidebook had

caused a renewal of the protests by South Korea. On

September 4, 1959, the day the Guidebook hf>d been

issued, the South Korean Government announced that it

had contributed $^0,000 to help destitute Koreans in

Japan as part of their campaign against the repatriation. 22

Then, on September 8, the ROK Ambassador in Tokyo,

Yui Tai Ha announced to the press that he might apply 23 for repatriation to embarrass the Japanese Government.

He stated:

Our Korean nationals are going to be sent to slavery. As ambassador I feel I have to protect any Koreans who are misled into making the wrongpChoice. I must use every means to that end.

Ambassador Tui said that he thought his application

would dissuade his countrymen because of "its sheer 25 incongruity".

The next day, on September 9, the South Korean

Foreign Minister, Oho Chung Whan, announced that his

nation was prepared to accept all Korean repatriates

22 Japan Times. September 4, 1959. 23 The Japanese allowed the Koreans to maintain a Diplomatic Mission in Tokyo and the chief representative, as a courtesy, was commonly referred to as embassador. The Japanese do not have any diplomatic representation in Korea.

Japan Times. September 8, 1959. ^^Ibid.

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from Japan, even the Communists. Ee said:

The Republic of Korea is prepared to accept the repatriation of 1 Koreans in Japan as soon as the Japanese Government settles the matter of their compensation. Korean residents who do not wish to be repatriated may remain in Japan as permanent residents of that country . . . Conditions for repatriation include only these two points: l) that Japan pay compensation for forced labor previously imposed on the Korean residents, and that such funds be expended in the resettlement of the returnees, and that, 2 ) residents be permitted to take pit of their property with them.

Minister Cho also said that during negotiations between

the ROK and Japan which had been held during the early

1950’s, Japan had "implied full recognition" of the

fact that the Koreans in Japan were citizens of South 27 Korea.

South Korea had welcomed the dispute over the

regulations of the Guidebook and had hoped to use this

to prevent the repatriation. Talks between the ROK-

Japanese delegates had been resumed on August 12 but

the South Koreans refused to negotiate seriously and

merely used the talks to issue general statements

which, in effect, indicated their hope to achieve the

return of all Koreans in Japan to South Korea. When,

on October 28, 1959, the Japanese announced that they

would proceed with the North Korean repatriation plan.

^^Ibid.. September 9, 1959. ^^Tbid.

^^Ibido. October 21, 1959.

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the ROK delegation evidenced outrage and declared that

there could be no possibility of further progress in 29 talks with Japan. Tet, on December 6, evidently

as a last-ditch effort to prevent the "deportation"

from taking place, the ROK Ambassador Tui proposed the

conclusion of a basic agreement calling for repatriation

of the Koreans to South Korea before they left for

North Korea.Because of their past performances

the Japanese Government regarded this proposal as a

diversionary tactic rather than a sincere offer to

come to terms on the matter.

As the time for the departure of the first group

for North Korea neared, the South Korean protests became

more intense and emotional. One Korean evidently tried

to carry out President Rhee’s order to resist the move­

ment "at all costs" by attempting to dynamite the Red

Cross center at Niigata. Cha Chin was arrested on

December 4 on charges of sabotage. He told Japanese

police that he had plotted with ROK Ambassador Tui and

the Third Secretary of the ROK Mission in Tokyo, The 3T Ammbassador disclaimed the story. “

99 Ibid.. November 9, 1959.

^^Ibid., December 6, 1959.

^^Ibid., January 4, I960.

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5EPATEIATI0N

With, all efforts of the EOS Government failing —

diplomatically end otherwise — the first contingent of

Koreans arrived in Niigata on December 12, 1959. Also

on December 12 two Soviet ships, the Tovarish and the 32 Krylion, arrived in Niigata with flags gaily flying.

Departure preparations were accompanied by many gala

celebrations and farewell parties. The atmosphere was 33 high with optimism and gaity. The confirmation

interviews were completed with no one reported to

have altered his decision.With matters having

proceeded smoothly, the 975 Koreans in the first group

boarded the two ships on December 13 and made ready to

sail the following day.

The EOK Government reacted by placing their

military forces on alert status on December 13.

Realistically, however. South Korea was not in a

position to attack either Japan or the repatriation

ships since the ROK military forces were subordinate

to the United Nations command which was headed by an

American general. Further, the ROK was con^letely 3K dependent on the UN for logistic support. " The most

^^Asahi Shimbun. (Asahi Shimbun-sha, Tokyo), December 12, 1959. (Translation) 33 Ibid.. December 9, 1959 through December 13, 1959,

^^Ibid.. December 13» 1959.

orton, on. cit., pp. 435-436; Koreana Quarterly. Vol. I, No. 1, Autumn, 1959, "Problems of the Korean Military Armistice", Han-key Dee, pp. 55-56.

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dreaded possibility was that President Eh.ee mi^it

trigger some action that would violate provisions of

the Korean armistice and cause a renewal of hostilities

with the Communists to the North. Since the repatriation

ships were Russian, presumably they would have received

Soviet protection in the event of attack. However, even

this possibility was considered remote as reflected in

the statement of the Russian Captain of the Tovarish

on December 13:

I don't think they (i.e. the ROK) will attack us. We have the Russian flag flying. They will be afraid of this flag.

None of the above fears were realized. The first

two repatriation ships arrived in Chongjin in North 37 Korea on December 16, 1959 after an uneventful voyage.

South Korea had not made any attempts to make good their

threats to stop them. President Hhee's actions were

probably defensive in nature but they did serve notice

that he would not take defeat without a protest. These

protests did serve the purpose of making South Korea's

position known and to some extent "saved face" for the

young republic.

Asahi Shimbun. December 14, 1959. 3*7 Ibid., December 16, 1959; Jan an Times. December 17, 1959.

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IN TEE n'AZE OP REPATRIATION

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NORTH KOREAN RECEPTION

Reports emanating from North, Korea appear to

he a mixture of h i ^ emotion and propaganda. One

observer described the arrival of the repatriates as

follows:

. . . No sooner had the train pulled into the station than the returnees jumped down onto the platform where they were embraced by Pyongyang citizens. . . . Then came endless shouts of (long live). . . . When I saw this touching scene I was moved to tears. . . .

Pointing out that a new happy life was promised to those who had come back home. Premier Kim II Sung continued; 'You are guaranteed all freedom due to the citizens of our Republic. You will be provided with jobs and every other condition for living. I hope al 1. of you will make an active contribution to socialist con­ struction by devoting your all whethej it be learning or physical strength'. . . .

There were many ecstatic comments end reports in the

North Korean press which purportedly had been made by

the repatriates. Examples of these testimonials include :

"The n-’'ÿitmare is gone"; "I feel true happiness" ; and, 2 "A life of abundance". One Korean related that, "We

were given employment and allotted flats earlier than

we expected. We were asked at the reception center

what of job we wished and two days later everything

^ o r e a , (Pyongyang), No. 43, I960, "Welcome Home", p. 1, quoting Kenro Shimsmoto, a reporter for the Yomiuri, a Japanese newspaper.

^Ibid.. No. 46, I960, pp. 6-9.

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I returned on the second repatriation ship. . . . At my wish I was allowed to work at the copper refinery shop of the Mampo Smeltry. I'iy heart swells with joy at the thought that I have become a worthy worker in the fatherland *

Today all the people live without worry about food, clothing and housing. The workers in our smeltering plant are provided with cosy modem houses. Parents do not have to worry about the education of their children. A T 1 the children are educated from primary course to university at the state expense.

Dater reports are just as flowery in description

and praise conditions in their new home. After nine

months, a North Korean publication stated:

It is nine months since the repatriation boats carrying the first batch of Korean returnees from Japan arrived at the Chungj in wharf...... a total of 7,748 families, 31,261 persons altogether have returned home in thirty groups. 94.6 percent of the returned families are of South Korean origin. AT 1, of them are well aware of the fact that South Korea is a land of darkness.

Upon arrival in the fatherland, l the repatriates received fine m o d e m houses and jobs in accordance with their wishes and skill. . . . There are among the returnees 971 Japanese women and 6 Japanese men. . . .

And so it went. The Soviet ships made the round trip

on numerous occasions, each time carrying approximately

1,000 Koreans from Japan to North Korea. By I-Iaroh IS,

I960, 13,069 had left.^ The number totaled 47,016 by

^Ibid.. No. 44, I960, pp.4-5.

^Ibid.. No. 45, I960, pp. 10-11.

^Ibid.. No. 52, I960, pp. 17-18.

^The Washington Post. Inarch IS, I960.

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•7 November 6, I960. The JRC estimated that the number

would probably reach 100,000 by the time the repatriation

program had been completed.^

ROK PROTESTS CONTINUE

The accomplishment of the repatriation was a

great victory for the Comrcunists and a great defeat for

President Ehee politically at home and diplomatically

abroad. Rather pathetically, during March, I960, the

ROK belatedly suggested that 600 Koreans come from Japan

on a guided tour of South Korea in an effort to discourage 9 more of them from going North. Â little later, on

April 4, I960, the ROK and Japan agreed to resume trading

and again to attempt negotiations on the establishment

of diplomatic relations. It was later announced that

negotiations would be resumed on April 15, I960.

Despite the denial of both Japanese and Korean officials,

reliable sources indicated that the United States had

played a role in bringing the two together.

It would seem, however, that despite his failure

to prevent the repatriation. President Rhee's attitude

towards the Japanese had not softened nor was he any

more willing to compromise and come to terms with them.

*^rbid., November 7, I960.

®rbid., March 30, I960. ^Ibid.

^°Ibid.. April 5, I960.

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In an. interview with, an American newspaper correspondent

on April 7, I960, Dr, Hhee said;

. • • Japan is a threat to the peace of Asia. Any modification of Korea's policy towards Japan would be extremely difficult, . « • In a broad sense we expect Japan to respect our independence, tr^at us as equals and put aside her old ways of arrogance and superiority.

During April, I960, a revolution occurred in

South Korea removing Dr. Ehee from power. Shortly

after he departed for Hawaii with his wife where he now

resides in voluntary exile. An interim government took

over the reins with Huh Chung named as acting president.

There was widespread speculation that there would be

changes in South Korea’s attitude and policies towards

Japan since many had considered Dr. Rhee's own personal

animosity as the greatest stumbling block to the resur^tion

of normal relations with Japan. Hopes for a breakthrough

were quickly dashed, however, when on May 5» I960, Acting

President Huh announced that before any other issues with

Japan could be solved, the latter must abandon the repatria— 12 tion of Koreans to the Communist North. A week later,

he reiterated his stand and further accused Japan of

being the base for North Korean Communist agents infil­

trating South Korea.Regarding the "deportation"

^ J a p an Times. April 7, I960. The interview was with Scripps—Howard correspondent, Jim G. Dueas.

^ T h e Evening Star, (Washington, D.C.), May 5, I960.

^^Ibid.. l'îay 12, I960.

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he stated:

« . « non—Koreans do not understand the resentment of the Korean people over the shipment of Korean citizens to the Communists in the North» Japan claims this is a ' humanitarian * act. We contend that true humsnitariani sm would never.^^ contend that true humsnitariani sm would never. . permit sending people into Communist slavery,

EXTENSION OF TEE REPATRIATION PROGRAE'î

In the beginning, glowing reports in letters

received from the repatriates in North Korea encouraged

those in Japan to apply for repatriation. Although

the early returnees complained of the lack of consumer

goods, they wrote that they had been warmly welcomed and

made to feel u s e f u l . A n d so as the months passed and

registrations increased, the JRC realized that the program

could not be completed within the fifteen month period

allotted in the Calcutta Agreement. Possibily keeping in

mind the previous long-drawn out meetings with the Commun­

ists that had preceded the original agreement, the JRC

proposed meetings with the NZRC for extension of the

repatriation plan prior to the November 12 expiration

date. On August 5, I960, the 1\KRC agreed to hold talks

in Niigata to extend the agreement.Eight members of

^^Ibid.

~^The Washington Post. I'iarch 30, I960.

^^Jaoan Quarterly. Vol. VII, No. 4, p. 527,

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a KZHC delegation arrived in Niigata on August 25.^^

Disagreement began from the moment of arrival

of the NKRC delegates. Evidently for reasons of national

security, the Japanese Government issued an order

forbidding members of the North Korean delegation to

send press cables home. The situation reached an

impasse. As a compromise, on September 3, the Japanese

Government announced that it would give permission to

two of the delegates to cable press dispatches to

Pyongyang. 19

The talks deadlocked again over tbe major proposal

by the JRC for increasing the number of Koreans in each

shipload to facilitate an earlier conclusion to the

repatriation and for limiting the extension period for 20 further repatriation to six months. By completing

the repatriation as soon as possible, Japan obviously

hoped to bring an earlier end to South Korean pressures

and protests and perhaps to improve generally the

atmosphere in her relations with this country. And,

since from Japan’s end, repatriation had been proceeding

smoothly, there was no reason why the program should not

be speeded up and brought to a final conclusion. North

^'^Ibid.. p. 528.

Japan Times. September 3, I960. ^^Ibid.

20 The Washington Post. September 15, I960.

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Korea did not want to speed up the program, however,

2~i and also wanted an unlimited extension, ~ And so negoxia-

tions were at a stalemate. A spokesman for the Japanese

Government stated that the position taken hy the JP.C

was final and that it would not hack down. The spokesman.

Chief Cabinet Secretary I^asayoshi Ohira, pointed out that

agreement to a size—month extension wozld not preclude a

second extension should it become necessary. 22 The NKRC

delegation responded by accusing Japan of "insincerity"

and of trying to "ram the prcgrao through as soon as possible". 23

Members of the delegation charged thc.t Japan's proposal had

been "politically motivated". With both sides holding

firm, the iSSC delegation made preparations to leave for

home and threatened to stop the repatriation ships. 25 At

the same time, the General Federation of Korean Residents

in Japan began demo^istrations to : ersuade the Japanese

Government to agree to a longer ezctension oeriod. 2Ô

Negotiations between the two Red Cross Societies

were finally resumed and despite all difficulties,

resulted in a one-year extension of the -rogram. The

agreement was signed on board the Russian repatriation

^The Washington most. September Ip, I960. pp Korean Republic, September 20, I960. 23 Jaoan Times, Septei.foer 18, I960. 24 Korean Republic, September 20, I960.

^^Ibid.. September 24, I960. ^^Ibid.

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ship, the Tobarish, at Niigata on October 27, I960.

Japan hg.d ccnpronised by agreeing to the one-year

extension but she won her point to have the prograza

speeded— up as the IhCEC agreed to increase the average

group of returnees from 1,000 to about 1,500. 28

The remaining Koreans registered for the repatria­

tion traveled to north Korea without eveat. It became

apparent that the JRC would be able to con lete the

program by the expiration date of the extension end so

no further efforts were made to obtain further extension.

The agreement expired on November 12, 1961 and the

Japanese Minister cf Justice arno.-nced thc.x a total of

93,360 persons had gone to North Korea. Of this number,

85,654 were Koreans, 7,454 were Jam one se euzd tlze remaining 29 252 were of other Asian nationalities.

27 The ashington ?ost, October 29, I960. PS Jaoan Times, October 28, I960. 29 These figures were given by hr. huroiwa, an information officer at the Japanese Smbassj', Kashington, D.C, hr. Kuroiwa also noted that, although complete facts are lacking, there are reports emanating from North Kzrea that some of the repatriates are now trying to return to Japan, hr. Kuroiwa stated that, to his knowledge, the Japanese Government does not intend to investigate these reports nor to make efforts to obtain tie return of these Koreans.

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RECENT SOUTH ZOREAi. ATTITUDES

Vfiaile the extension talks were going on in

Niigata, Acting President Euh of the ROK was replaced

"by Premier Jonn 01. Chang. The day after his election.

Premier Chang announced that he would seek cooperation

with Japan. Ee said :

Unlike the days under the former Hhee regime when anything Japanese was denounced, Japan is showing an attitude different from the past — an attitude toward—friendly relations at this new turning point.

Soon after, on September 6, I960, Japcn's new

Foreign Minister Kosalza Zentaro, paid a two-day goodwill

visit to Seoul, hoping to pave the way for a solution 32 to tie pending issues. Although nosaka stated that

he did not intend to discuss specific issues on his visit,

it was of importance to note that the visit toon place

without serious Norean protest during t—e .oricc when

Japan was holding talks with t::e NlllC. There were only

minor demonstrations in Seoul protesting nosaka's visit. 3

The visit marked the first time in fifteen years that a

Cabinet minister of Japan had visited horea; tl.e first time

that a Japanese commercial airliner had been allowed to

lend in Korea; and the first time thc.t the Japanese flag

had been flown in that country since the end of the war.

As further evidence of a change in attitude, the South

•^^The Evening Star, August 20, I960. "^^Tbi:

•^^The Washin.-ton Post. September 6, I960.

•^'^The Jaoan Times. September 7, I960.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8 7 Korean Government released some forty Japanese fishermen

who had been held for violating the Rhee line,"^^

Kosaiia's visit was pronounced by both countries

to have been succès., ful and of "tremendous significance"

They jointly announced that both countries would trj’-

to settle various problems between themselves on the

basis of "equality and respect for sovereignty and with

a spirit of mutual understanding".

However, despite these encouraging %:ronounce.ients,

hopes for a real change in South Korea's position cn

two of the im'ortant issues were quickly dashed. On

September 17, 1560, the Admi 'istrative Yice-ni. .ister of

Foreign Affairs, Yong Shik Kim demanded the im ..ediate

suspension cf Japanese negotiations with the North Koreans

on the extension cf rep at ri:.t ion. Mi istcr Kim stated

'cuncc-d doubt

zrity at all".^ ' This, coupled

with the state:.ent on Septe-.foer 14 by the RON Foreign

Minister Cnong II Kyung that his Government's attitude

towards the Rlzee Line remained unchanged, seemingly

closed -he door on hopes for a South Korean compromise.

Japan Times, September 7, I960.

^•^The Washington Post, September 7, 19ÔC

'^Korean Republic, September 17, I960.

Japan Times, Se/.tember 14, I960.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8 8 On the other hand, although remaining stationary

on some issues, Korea apparently does want to improve

relations i.'ith Japan in those areas where it sees direct

advantage for itself. On September 22, I960, ROK

Minister of Commerce and Industry, To Han Chu, announced

that he had asked the new head of the Korean Mission in

Tokyo, To Syup Ohm to negotiate with Japan for a large

increase in trade between the two countries. Minister Chu

stated that he hoped to increrse Korean exports to Japan

to $30,000,000 in 1961, up from an ave- age of $10,000,OCO

a year. 39 Minister Ohm also anno-onced that hi a Government

had plans for several welfare projects to help the Korean

residents in Japan. These included a S6C,000 free health

clinic, a $537,000 model school, a $40,000 information

center to be in Tokyo, and $2,000,000 in loans for 40 entemrises to be owned by Koreans.

Formal negotiations between the two countries

began again on October 25, 1961, but, at the jresent

time, agreement has not yet been reached and relations

have not been normalised. Concerning the future of

relations with the ROK, Japan continues hopeful that a 41 reasonable seotj.ement can be made. ' Because of

30 ^Korean Republic. September 23, I960.

"^°I b i d .

^^Japan Report, Vol. 7, Ko. I5 , September 30, 1959, p. 9, Foreign Minister Koseka's Foreign Policy Speech.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8 9 ■fciie several recent changes in Korea's G-cverrunent, it is

difficult to predict what course of action, she vrill take

in her negotiations with Japan.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHÆP23R VII

CONCLUSIONS

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The underlying oasis of the difficulties that

now ezzst between Japan and Korea, including the prohlen

of the Korean minority, is the indirect result of the

overall weakness of Korea as a nation as opposed to the

strength of Japan. During the era of Japanese expansion,

Korea ceased to exist as a country and her people were

subject to Japanese rule and Japanese law. She became

an exclusive field for Japanese exploitation. The Korean

Kinority was created because of and during the time of

the Japanese exploitation of Korea. Realistically, however,

this fact has only an i-iiroct bearing on the situation

as it exists today. bhile the disparity in relative

strength :f the two countries exists today as it did

before, Japan is no longer the exploiter of the pre—World

War II period. Consequently, the solution to the problem

is not to be found by assessing end assigning degrees

of responsibility for the past.

At the end of World War II, over 2,000,000

Koreans were in Japan - either voluntarily or involuntarily -

at Japanese instigation. Any advantage that existed

for the Koreans in Japan was only because economic conditions

there were slightly less onerous than in Korea.

The end of Phe war found Japan a defeated and

occupied ccuntry. It brought Korea her liberation from

Japan. But liberation from Japan did not bring Korea

immediate independence, economic recovery or political

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stability. In. fact, liberation from Japan only resulted

in a second military occupation - two antagonists vying

to influence the development of Korea were substituted

for one enemy. In this position, Korea was faced with;

l) complete economic chaos; 2) a political vacuum, created

by Japan’s defeat; and 3) the rival ambitions of the

United States and the Union of ^hcialist Soviet Republics,

Despite these adverse conditions, there was a

possibility that Korea might have achieved economic and

political stability but the geographic division of

her country ef * cctivel:,' eliminated any chance she mi.ght

have had of benefiting from the defeat of Japan. Since

the industrial north and the agricultural south had

been interdependent, the division dealt a fatal blow

to any ho :e for Korea to become a self-sustaining country.

The division rc suited in rival governments with dia­

metrically opoosite political idealogies. It resulted in

Korea bei-g used as a battleground by tl.e mwo opposing

world carps.

Conditions in both Korea end J a an - ad a definite

influence in the permetuaticn of the Korean minority.

Raced with, the choice of living in defeated Japan or

strife—ridden, baeekruut ivcrea, the minority had to make

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their decision. I-Iost ox them returned to their homeland.

But some 600,000 decided to remain in Jaoan. This latter

group must be considered as a separate element. In the

pre-1945 shears, they had occupied the position of a

conquered people subjugated and exploited and segregated

from the mainstream of the Japanese population. Japan's

surrender changed only some of these factors. Although

no longer a conquered people, mutual antagnosism remained.

Although no longer directly subjugated and exploited,

discrimination remained. Employment opportunities were

few and living sta_-.dards remained harsh and certainly

lower than those of the average Japanese. Rinally, the

Korean minority remained segregated from the Jaoanese

people. This latter aspect was tne result of their own

desire as well as from Japanese attitude. The Kaean

minority remained "unassimilable".

Immediately after World War II, the Koreans

had three choices: to return to South Korea, or North

Korea, or to remain in Japan. After the summer of 1947,

it had narrowed to two — either to return to South

Korea or to remain in Japan. Rrom the time Japan

regained her sovereignty in 1J52 until December, 1959,

for all practical purposes the Korean in Japan had no

choice - he remained in Japan. Rrom December, 1959

until November, 1961 he could choose between remaining

in Japan or going to North Korea. At the moment, he

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again has no choice - he must stay in Japan.

During the first period of repatriation, the

majority of the Koreans returned to South Korea with

only a handful going to North Korea. Roughly 25 percent

of their number chose to remain in Japan. During the

second repatriation period, only small numbers were able

to return to South Korea. Since an equal number illegally

ree—tered Js.pan from South Korea, the total nu ber of

Koreans in Japan during this period remained constant.

In the period from December, 1959 to Roveo.ber, 1961,

almost 100,000 were repatriated to North Korea. Yet,

the number of Koreans remaining in Japan still totals

nearly 600,000.

From all indications, it would seem that any

future choice for the Korean in Japan lies in the

apparently never—to—be—consummated hope t'lat Japan and

Korea will solve their differences. It would seem

unlikely that any more will be repatriated to North

Korea since all who desired to go have had had the

opportunity, and the problems arising from negotiations

with North Korea would be a drawback to their reinstitu­

tion. Certainly such a move by Japan would again result

in vehement South Korean objections and would not create

a climate for RCK—Japan accord.

At the sazoe time, however, there apparently

seems to be small hope that, barring one remote possibility.

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any large group of the Korean minority will repatriate

to South Korea. This one possibility that could set

this off lies in the remote contingency that Japan and

the HOK will agree to mutually acceptable terms. Because

it is to Japanese advantage to be rid of the Korean

minority, she is apparently willin ; to pay any reasonable

premium required to achieve this end. An sxample of the

Japanese attitude is the manner in which she negotiated

and compromised with North Korea in order to ach:eve

the repatriation of 100,000 Koreans while at the same

time refusing to discuss proposals for trade with ohat

country. In this respect, it is reasonably evident that

Japan conducted herself as openhandedly and as fairly

as the circumstances warranted. As for South Korea,

there is no compelling reason for her to compromise on

her demands on this issue as it is not directly to her

advantage to have large numbers of her nationals returned

from Japan. She has no industry to support these people.

South Korea is actually gaining by postponing their return

since they would be but a drain on her economy. Obviously,

the only way in which these people could benefit Korean

economy now would be if Japan paid them a "reasonable

compensation". And unless this compencamicn was very

reasonable indeed. South Korea would not greatly benefit.

It is possible, however, for the situation of the Korean

minority to cause so many problems for the Japanese that

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she wiUL want to rid herself of the problem at any cost.

And should this occur, she would then accede to the

financial demands of South Korea.

Unless some of the above situations do occur,

however, it is unlikely that agreement on the future of

the minority will be reached. Of necessity then, the

Koreans will remain in Japan under the same conditions

as previously experienced by them. Because there is

little chance of their assimilation, the future for these

people is not too optimistic.

In the final analysis, the removal of no one

factor of the problem would prove to be a panacea.

Bven if Japan and Korea were in complete agreement,

it is doubtful whether all or even a majority of the

Koreans in Japan wou_d return to South Korea. Since it

is doubtful under present political circumstances that

Japan would force these people to return, it is apparent

that Japan will have to cope with the Korean minority

for some time to come.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9 6

SUPPLBI.!31-:T

On Hay 26, 1962 the following Associated Press

release appeared in The Washington Post:

TOKYO, Hay 25, (AP) Japan has refused a North Korean request to continue repatriation of Koreans for one more year when the current agreement expires Nov. 12. The foreign ministry gave two reasons - the number of Koreans gathering at the repatriation center has been decreasing, and Koreans can get to North Korea on an individual basis if they want to. So far, 75,472 Korean residents of Japan have gone to North Korea under a repatriation program which started in 1959* Another 29,609 have applied to go.

Subsequent investigation revealed that the Associated

Press release was correct and that a non-publicized

repatriation of Koreans from Japan had been carried on

since the expiration date of November 12, 1961. This

fact was verified by Hr. Lee Garrett, an Associated

Press representative, through its Tokyo b'ureau.

Hr. Kuroiwa, the Japanese Information Officer

at the Japanese Embassy, Washington, L.C., was unable

or unwilling to provide any further information on the

extension of the repatriation agreement nor could he

resolve the discrepancy in the number of repatriates.

Hr. Kuroiwa stated that he had no further information

at the Embassy.

Hr. Kim, of the Korean Embassy, ad.vised that

the Koreans were aware of the fact of the continued

repatriation of their nationals to North Korea but

stated that the Embassy had no detailed information.

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This writer then queried the representatives of

several Japanese newspapers which maintain offices in

Washington and received further confirmation of the

Associated Press release as it appeared in The Washington

Post. Hr. I-Iaeda, of the Asahi Shimoun, translated an

item of Hay 25 from this newspaper substantially reiterating

the information given in the Associated Press release.

Hr. Thayer, a State Department Officer of the Par East

Section was also contacted. He, too, verified that

Koreans were currently leaving Japan for North Korea

and disclosed that the United States' official policy

had been to "approach the problem diplomatically and to

show no concern with it".

Letters were then written to various Red Cross

officials and to the Ministry of foreign Affairs in Japan

concerning specific information on the extension of the

program. Ko reply was received from the Ministry but

on June 19, 1962 an answer was received from Mr. Risaburo

Ziuchi, Research Director of foreign Affairs Department,

Japanese Red Cross Society, stating that:

1) The Accord on Repatriation of Koreans residing in Japan, signed by the Japanese Red Cross Society and the North Korean Red Cross Society was extended for a second time on July 31, 1961 to expire November 12, 1962, without any changes in its terms.

2) Since the beginning of repatriation operation in December, 1959 until the 9th of June, 1 9 6 2, number of persons who left Japan for North Korea, including Koreans and other nationalities is: 7 6 ,4 7 7 (by 94 voyages of ships).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9 8

A second reply received from the Intem.ation.al

Red Cross in Geneva reiterated the information received

frcm Mr. Kiuchi and added further th-t "about 20,000

persons have registered for subsequent departures, but

it is not known how many of these will in fact leave . . . . "

Copies of the two letters appear in the Appendix.

It is therefore clear that the Japanese and the

North Korean Red Cross Societies did, in fact, extend the

repatriation agreement but that the Japanese Government

did not give it publicity nor, apparently, did the South

Korean authorities. It would appear thf.t the Japanese

were reticent in publishing these facts, evidently hoping

to avoid a South Korean outcry but obviously they were

not yet willing to forego this partial solution to their

Korean minority przbT.em by stopping the repatriation

as long as some Koreans in Japan desired to leave for

North Korea. further, it would seem that Japan's sole

reason for announcing that she will not negotiate for

renewal of the repatriation program when it does expire

on November 12, 1962 - if indeed she does not i-hen this

time passes - is because there are not enough Koreans

remaining who want to go to North Korea. It is apparent

from the statement released to the press that Japan will

not prevent Koreans from making private arrangements

to leave the country. Japan might be described as acting

in the open to improve the atmosphere of her relations

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with, the ROZ, however, acting quietly at the same time to

alleviate a long festering national problem.

The surprising fact is the RûZ's failure to

lodge a public protest in the matter and her seeming

attitude of disinterest. Evidently, they, too, are

anxious to be on better terms with Japan end have decided

not to force the issue. further. South Korean internal

conditions have not improved within the past year end

they are in no better position to handle any returnees.

Perhaps the main reason for the lack of active protest

and the adoption of this new attitude towards Japanese

action might lie in the fact that the new ROZ Government

has changed Korea’s policy towards Jaoan. One at least

can speculate, however, on how much the removal of President

Hhee from power has h^d to do with any change that has

taken olace in South Korean attitude.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. b i k l i o g -r a e h t

A. BIBLIOGEAPEIBS

Bibliography of Asian Studies. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Journal of Asian Studies, 1959.

Sort on, Sugh, and. others. A Selected List of Books and Arts on Japan. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954.

Hall, John W. Japanese History: A Guide to Japanese Reference and Research Materials. A m Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1954.

Kigashiuchi, Yoshio. Literature on Contemporary Japan. Tokyo, 1951.

Ike, Nobutaka. The Hoover Institution Collection on Japan. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1958.

Jones, Helen D. and Robin L. Winkler. Korea; An Annp-fcatecL Bibliography of Publications in Western Languages. Washington, B.C.: Library of Congress, August, 1950.

HcCune, Shannon. Western Language Materials on Korea. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1950.

Nachod, Oskar. Bibliography of the Japanese Empire. 1906-1926. 2 vols. London: Edward Goldston, 1928.

Pritchard, Earl H. Bulletin of Far Eastern Bibliography. 1 9 5 6-1 9 4 0 . Washington, B.C. : Committees on Par Eastern Studies of the American Council of Learned Societies, 1946.

3. GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

Conover, Helen P. Non—Self Governing Areas. 2 vols. United States Library of Congress. Washington, 1947.

Consulate General of Japan. Japan Report. New York: 235 East 42nd Street, Informât ion Office.

Gane, William J. Military Government in Korea. United States Army Headquarters, Poreign Affairs Section, Seoul.

Republic of Korea. The Korean Problem. Seoul: The Ministry of Poreign Affairs, 1959.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Republic of Korea. Korea and Jaoan. Seoul: Office of Public Information, 1954.

Stalbeim, Nels W. and J. P. Suagee. The Impact of the War and Japanese Imperialism upon the Economy Political Rehabilitation of Korea. United States Department of the Army. Washington, January, 1947.

Tackley, Margaret E. and John Miller, Jr. , and Owen J. Carroll, Major, USA. Korea. 1951-1955. United States Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History. Washington, 1956.

Supreme Commander for Allied Powers. Directives to the Japanese Government. (Library of Congress No. J674.N24)

. Catalog of Directives to the Japanese Govemm<»n-fc - SCAPINS. (Library of Congress No. J674.N243.)

. Catalog of Directives (Administrative) to the Japanese Gover^ent — SCAPIN-A's. (LÏbrfiû^ofCongress No. J674.N244.)

. Index of SCAP Directives. (Library of Congress No. D802.J3S8.)

Catalog of SCAP Directives. (Library of Congress No. Z5506.S8.j

. Summation. 15 vols. (Library of Congress No. D802.J5A3.}

. Selected Data. (Library of Congress No. D802.J3SS4.)

. Press Translations. 4 vols. (Library of Congress No. DSS89.A32. jl

. Natural Resources Section. (Library of Congress No. HC461.S8.)

. Administration of Japanese Mining Industry. Report No. 6. (Library of Congress No. HC461.S8.;

. Basic Problems of Coal Mining Industry. Report No. 3.

. Press Translations. (Library of Congress No. DS301.88.)

United States Army Military Government in Korea. South Korean Interim Government Activities. Seoul, 1947 and 1948.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. United States Department of the Army. Report on the Economic Position and Prospects of Japan and Korea. Public Information Division, Report of the Johnston Committee. Washington, 1948.

United States Congress. Korean Aid Hearinvs. Committee on Poreign Affairs. 81st Congress, 1949.

United States Department of State. Korea, 1945—1948: A renort on Political Developments and Economic Resources with Selected Documents. Washington, 1948.

United States Department of State. Korea's Independence. Publication 2935» Par Eastern Series 8. Washington,

United States Embassy. Daily Translations of Newspapers in Seoul. 1950. (Library of Congress No. DS901.U6.)

United States Embassy. Japanese Newspaper Abstracts. Library of Congress No. DS801.U5.) 1950.

. Japanese Periodicals Abstracts. (Library of Congress No. AI19.J3U5.)

C. NEWSPAPERS

Asahi Shimbun. Tokyo. Translations of various dates.

Korean Republic. Seoul. April, 1959-December, I960 and subsequent single issues.

Korea Times, Seoul.

Sunday Call—Chronicle. Allentown, Pennsylvania. December 27,1959,

The New York Times, New York. Various issues.

The Japan Times. Tokyo. Piles for 1956, 1958, April, 1959- Deeember, I960 and subsequent single issues.

The Times-Picayune, New Orleans. Various issues.

The Washington Evening Star. Washington, D.C, Various issues.

The Washington Post, Washington, D.C. Various issues.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. D. PERIODICALS

America.» America Press, 920 Broadway, New York. Issue of îlarcii, 1959.

The Atlantic. Atlantic Monthly Co., 8 Arlington St., Boston. March, 1922 issue.

Economist. Economist Newspaper, Ltd. , 22 Ryder St. , St. James', SHI, London. Various issues.

Far Eastern Survey. American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., 333 Sixth Ave. , New York. Various issues.

Intemational Affairs. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, St. James' Square, SWl, London. Various issues.

International Labour Review. International 3jabo\zr Office, 917 15th St., NW, Washington, D.C. Vol. 22, 1946.

Japan Magazine. Japan Magazine Co., Tokyo. 1919 and 1920.

Japetn Quarterly. Asahi-Shimoun-sha, Tokyo. 1959 and I960.

Japan Year Book. Tokyo. Various years.

Korea. Published monthly at Pyongyang. Numbers 43 t h r o u ^ 57 with the exception of nxambers 51 and 53*

Korea News. Published trimonthly by the Korean Central News Agency, Pyongyang. Numbers 1—14 excepting numbers 10,11, and 12.

Korea Today. Published monthly at Pyongyang. Nos. 50, 55, and 53.

Korean Survey. Korean Pacific Press, Washington, D.C. Various issues.

ZoreATiA Quarterly. International Research Center, Seoul. Autumn, 1959.

The Nation. Nation Associates, Inc., 333 Sixth Ave., New York. November, 1955*

Newsweek. Newsweek, 444 Madison Ave., New York. December, 1959*

Pacific Affairs* Institute of Pacific Relations, 1407 Sherwood Ave., Richmond. September, 1949*

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Soviet Press Tractsla.tione» Par Eastern Institute of Washington (Seattle). 1948.

Time. Time, 540 N. Michigan Ave., Chicago. October «-nd December, 1959.

Vital Speeches of the Day. City News Publishing Co., Inc. 33 W. 42nd St., New York. April, I960.

Voice of Korea. Korean Affairs Institute, 1507 M St., NW, Washington, D.C. Various.

World Today. Oxford University Press, Press Hoad, Neasden, London NW. 1954, Vols. 10.11, and 12.

E. BOOKS

Bert on, Hugh. Japan's Modem Century. New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1955.

Byrnes, James P. Speaking Frankly. New York: Harpers and Brothers, 1947.

Clyde, Paul H. The Par East. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., Second Edition, 1952.

Conroy, Prancis H. The Japanese Seizure of Korea. 1868—1910. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, I960,

Korea — Its Land. People and Culture of A~n Ages. Seoul: Hakwon-sa, I960.

Latourette, Kenneth Scott. The American Record in the Par East. 1945-1951. New York: The lyiacMillan Co. , 1952.

Moore, Harriet L. Soviet Far Eastern Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945.

McCune, G. M. and A. L. Grey. Korea Today. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950.

Nam, Ch'ang-u, Japanese Penetration of Korea. Palo Alto: Stanford University Hoover Institution, 1959.

Oliver, Robert T. Syngman Rhee. New York: Dodd Mead and Co., 1954.

Reischauer, Edwin 0. Japan. Past and Present. New York: Alfred A. Khopf, Second Edition, 1954»

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Sosinger, L. K. and Associates. The State of Asia: Contemporary Survey. New York; Alfred A. Khopf, 1951.

Vlnacke, Harold M, A History of the Far East in Modem Times. New York: Appleton-Century—Crofts, Inc., Fifth Edition, 1950.

. Ear Eastern Politics in the Postwar Period. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1959.

Van Aduard, Baron E. J. Lewe. Japan from Surrender to Peace. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954.

Wagner, Edward W. The Korean Minority in Janan. 1904- 1950. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1951.

Weems, Clarence N. Korea. Dilemma of the Underdeveloped Country. New York: Foreign Policy Association, World Affairs Center, I960.

F. lilSCELLANEOUS

Appeal of the Japanese Fishing People. Tokyo: Japan- Korea Fishery Headquarters, Harunouchi Building, 1953*

Rhee, Syngman. Speeches delivered at the Anniversary of the 1919 Passive Resistance on March 1, 1959 and March 1, I960 in Seoul.

This We Contend. Seoul: Korean Bar Association, 1959. Pamphlet on the fisheries problem.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPSinDIX I

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. KOREANS IN JAPAN BY PREFECTURE

IN NCVEÎ-IBER, 1945

Prefecture Number Prefecture Number Hokkaido 140,000 Fukui 35,000 Aomori 6,000 Yamanashi 14,000 Iwate 230,000 Nagano 25,000 Miyagi 190,000 Kihu 28,000 Akita 120,000 Shizuoka 31,000 Yamagata 160,000 Aichi 65,000 Fukushima 320,000 Mie 43,000 Tochigi 160,000 Miyazaki 15,000 Shiga 22,000 Okayama 35,000 Kyoto 76,000 Hiroshima 60,000 Osaka 320,000 Yamaguchi 15,000 Hyogo 130,000 (at Shimonoseki) 20,000 Nara 22,000 (at Sensaki) 10,000 Wakayama 30,000 Tokushima 28,000 Tottori 15,000 Kagawa 8,000 Shimane 25,000 Ehime 23,000 Gumba 4,000 Koku 75,000 Saitama 13,000 Fukuoka 190,000 Chiba 16,000 (at Hakata) 20,000 Tokyo 90,000 Saga 35,000 Kanagawa 75,000 Miyazaki 95,000 Niigata 15,000 Oita 32,000 Toyama 26,000 Kumamoto 28,000 Ishikawa 16,000 Kagoshima 20,000

TOTAL - 2,400,000

SOURCE: William J. Gane Military Government in Korea Headquarters, U.S. Army, Foreign Affairs Section, Seoul

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. NATIONALITIES OP PORBIONERS IN JAPAN (as of March. 31, 1959)

Nationality Number Nationality Number

North and South Koreans 613,811 Spanish 378 Chinese 44,988 Dutch 362 Americans 10,192 Portuguese 342 English 1,618 Swiss 340 Germans 1,252 Indone sians 304 Canadians 1,183 Austz*alians 259 Indians 676 Swedish 258 French 609 Brazilians 245 Italians 419 Others 2,746 Filipinos 382

POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN PRINCIPAL PREPSCTURES Prefecture Total Foreign Population Percentage

Osaka 142,795 20.99 Tokyo 82,354 12.10 Hyogo 67,870 9.98 Aichi 42,145 6.19 Fukuoka 35,805 5.26 Kanagawa 32,829 4.83 Yamaguchi 28,612 4.21

FOREIGN POPULATION REGISTERED IN MAJOR CITIES

City Number City Number

Osaka 105,453 Kobe 30,800 Tokyo 73,670 Nagoya 19,601 Kyoto 32,583 Yokohama 16,594

At the end of March, 1959 there were 630,364 registered (permanent) foreign nationals in Japan from 67 countries. 96.83 per cent of the foreign residents are Koreans and Chinese, a majority of whom have either lived in Japan prior to the war or were horn in Japan. . . . The rate of increase in the population of foreigners in Japan aversiges about 10,000 persons anually. More than 55 per cent registered foreigners reside in Osaka, Hyogo, Aichi, Kyoto and Tokyo prefectures, indicating their preferences for the urban areas. At the same time, foreigners can be found living in some 3,852 of the 4,142 cities, towns and villages of Japan, with 278,601 (45.7^) concentrated in the six major cities of Osaka, Tokyo, Kyoto, Kobe, Nagoya end Yokohama. SOURCE: Japan Report. Vol. 5, No. 19, October 5, 1959

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. T p y ^ m a s L

Am at Ammay, IW l, t b w vtre ftwrrtpiw In n naWonaUtt—. tte VBamtitg chart staovs tha brm hkam by

NBttanslliy Nhmber of Rssidsats Percentage of TPtal

K orea 680,207 89 China 45,505 7 United States 11,536 2 United 1,726 ) Germany 1.828 ) Canada 1,196 ) b d ia 756 ) 2 F rance 626 ) Stateless 623 ) Odxers 5,933 )

The preponderance of Korean and Chinese nationals is due to the fact A at Koreans and Taiwanese who were Japanese nationals p rio r to Jinan's defeat have remained in Japan without their status being fixed by law and are therefore classified as foreigners. As can be seen from the chart over 96 per cent of the foreigners in Ja^san belong to this9 .gro<

Among the tendoicles which emerge from the pattern of residency of foreigners in Japan, it is found that the Koreans and Chinese live in Japan fo r a wide variety of reasons and their residence is for comparatively long periods of tim e. In the case of other residents such as Americans, they generally come to Japan fo r q>ecific reasons such as for m issionary work or business, and they return to their homeland after a specified period of tim e.

Of the total foreign population, 294,226 live in the six m ajor cities of Japan.

T cA yo 84,849 K y o to 32,000 Y okoham a 16,817 O saka 108,481 N agoya 20,312 K obe 3 1,7 6 7

A study of the distribution of foreign residents by prefectures shows that Osaka Prefecture (Osaka C ity include*^ leads w ith 22.6 per cent of the total population, followed by Tokyo M etropolitan Prefecture with 13.07 per cent, Hyogo Prefecture (including Kobe) with 10.4 per cent, Aichi Prefecture (including Nagoya) with 6.54 per cent, Kyoto Prefecture (including Kyoto City) with 6.17 per cent and Kanagawa Prefecture (including Ytdcohama) with 5.07 per cent. These six d istricts account fo r 63.85 per cent of the total foreign population in Japan.

Forty five per cent of the Koreans residing in Japan are dom iciled in the K inki area around Ifyoto, Osaka and Kobe, while the provinces closest to the Korean peninsula, namely, Yamaguchi, (Noyama, Fukuoka and Nagasaki account fo r 15 to 20 per cent. The rem ainder are distributed over the northern prefectures.

The distribution of Chinese residents follows the pattern of distribution of foreigners other than Koreans, and they are concentrated in the Tokyo-Yokohama and Kyoto-Osaka-Kobe areas. Forty-two per cent or 19,217 Chinese residents live in the Kyoto-Osaka-Kobe area and 35 per cent or 16,107 Chinese reside in the Tokyo-Yokohama district. A sim ilar distribution pattern can be seen in the case of residents of other nationalities. Taking the American residents as an ezanqtle, 6,613 Americans out of the total of 11,526, or over 57 per cent, liveTckjo- in the Xpkohama area and 1,416 or 12 per cent in Ae Kyoto^Osaka-Kobe area - which means that 69 per cent or alm ost seven tenths of the Americans in Japan live in these two districts. ~ o O o ~ SüUHCKï Ja-pan Ke-;or-t. Vol. VII, N o . 1 0 , June l b , 190l

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. OCCUPATIONAL COKPOSITION OP POPULATION IN KOREA Indus'txy Commerce an.d Public and lear Agriculture and Mining Communications Professional 1926 83.1 2.2 6.1 2.3 1930 80.5 2.3 6.4 2.6 1934 78.6 2.4 6.5 3.1 1938 75.6 3.9 7.4 2.9 1944 71.1 11.7 8.5 2.9

SOURCE: Korean Economic Mission Department of State, June, 1947

EDUCATIONAL STATUS OP POPULATION IN KOREA IN 1944

Level Number

Graduate Students 7,374 College Graduates 22,064 Middle School Graduates 199,642 Junior High School 49,942 Graduates National Primary School 1,637,042 Attending National Primary School 254,805 Literate but self-taught (No formal schooling) 980,122 Uneducated (No formal schooling) 19,642,775 SOURCE; Results of 1944 Census, Chosen Governor-General, May, 1944

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Dlstrlbutlaa of Ebreaa BeBldante In Japan, by Occupation, I5A 8

Occupation Humber of Percent of residents total

In labor force 245,042 41.7

Agriculture 4 ,2 3 8 0.7 Forestry 5,4 5 0 0.9 Fishing 414 a/ Mining 3,612 0.6 Manufacturing Technician 2 ,5 5 1 0.4 General worker 148,914 2 5 .4 Transportation & comaunlcatlon 8,5 2 5 1-5 Other workers 11,353 1.9 Trade 41,440 7 .1 Business operator or manager 4 ,7 2 6 0.8 Goveriunent, b / 1,4 5 8 0.2 Professional 2,6 9 7 0 .5 General clerical 9,664 1.7

Hot in labor force 3 43,12 8 5 8 .3

Living on property income c/ 17,380 3 .0 Students and pupils 6 5,932 11.2 Others d/ 2 50,31 6 44.1

Total 588,170 100.0

a/ Leas than O.5 percent, b/ Includes school teachers- c/ Data appear high; the scope of this category is not known, d/ This category nay Include some unemployed. Other unemployed may *” be listed under their occupation when employed.

95 -

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. SOUECBl Sdvafd W. Vagner jBte tôfean Minority in Jap* 1904-1950. Yoltnae of Korean Bepatriation, 19^5 - 19^9

Repatriation Koreans Controlled Uncontrolled a/ in Japan

Status as of March 19^5 2,400,000 a/

Mar - 15 Aug 45 400,000

1st Period 15 Aug - 30 Nov 45 275,000 b/ 550,000

2nd Period 1 Dec 45 - 30 Apr 46 469,511 50 ,000 1 May 46 - 30 Dec 46 54,634 £/

3rd Period 1 Jan^7 - 30 Oct 4? 7,551 1 Nov 47 - 31 Aug 48 5 ,0 0 6

4th Period 1 Sep 46 - 31 Dec 49 6 ,55c £/ Total 813,292 1,000,ooc

Status as of November 1948 611,758 d/

a/ Estimated. Both SC A? and USAMGIK underestimated the number of Koreans In Japan at the end of the war, and failed to take Into consideration the extent of the uncontrolled population movement. Official count did not begin until 1 October I9 4 5, although SCA? estimated that 150,000 had crossed, controlled and uncontrolled, prior to that time. SOAP and Japanese Government repatriation figure was $45,420 as of 30 April 1950 . USAMGIK fLxal figure was 1,115,550 as of 3I August 1946. Republic of Korea revised figure as of 3I December 1949 was 1,414,256. b/ Estimated from official sources. c / Negligible uncontrolled movement during this period, d/ Does not correspond exactly to total derived by subtraction because of estimated nature of status as of March 1945 and of uncontrolled movement. SOURCE: Controlled movement USAMGIK, South Korea Interim Government Activities SCAP, S^iTmrwtlon of Non-Mllltary Activities In Japan Republic■of Korea, Statistical Summation Status as of March 1945. League of Koreans Residing In Japan, cited In USAMGIK, Repatriation, Seoul, Korea, 1946, p. 14. Status as of November 1946, Japanese Government, Attorney-General’s Office, Civil Affairs Bureau, cited In Nippon Times, March 9, 1949, P. 4.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CROSS soam r mm b e d c # o s s C 6 m - M RIEE OF THE OSM OGKAIIC FEC W if^ BE- PUBLIC W KCHEEA BEGABKN6 1HE TM UN. TABT BEPATBIATION OF KOBEAMS IN JAPAN OTapaaeae FOfai^ Miniitzr trandttloo] With a view to realizing the repatriation of Eoreass in Japan by their freely expressed will bpsed on ' d o m of choice of residence and the princi]^ei , Cross, the Japanese Red Croas Society and ' Committee of the Democratic People's _ agree as follows: i A a o a a l Returnees shall be X sarita* ta Jipaa,I b e M I I ^K o re a n s who have acquiredta #*taa atatanHta. who wish re-

ing mtaon ladhr a#a, ta# 4nH#m oi the r m m m «h e <^ t a g | M t a ( M pawar or «f tai.yrd iaas ta#B peas*#. J B » i s whose exit is eta eataortasd u n d w tas isieaa#* tasss asta vsgslsHnet of Japan tad be ezchtasd tawn returnees. Aancix 2 1. Persons who wish repatriation shall submit applica­ tions in the form set by the Japanese Red Cross Society directly to the Japanese Red Cross Society in person, and shall go through necessary procedures for repatriation. Aj^lications «hall be based on free will, and «hall meet the requirements provided for in this Agreement. Z In case requests are received from those persons who submitted applications for repatriation, that they will not return for personal reasons, the Japanese Red Cross Society shall dispose such requests. The alteration of the will to return shall be permitted until a certain time before embarkation. Aancue 3 ' 1. The Japanese Red Cross Society shall organize a system for registering persons who wish to return. This registration system shall be made of the present organi­ zation of the Japanese Red Cross Society with necessary reinforcements, and shall be operated by it. 2. The Japanese Red Cross Society shall request the International Committee of the Red Cross to take such measures as the latter deems necessary and appropriate to ensure that the organization and operation of the sys­ tem for registering persons wishing to return be fair, impartial and in conformity with the humanitarian prin­ ciples. The measures referred to above shall be as follows: a) The Japanese Red Cross Society shall request the International Committee of the Red Cross to give advice when the former organizes the system for registering per­ sons wishing to return. b) The Japanese Red Cross Society shall request the International Committee of the Red Cross to ascertain whether the operation of the registration system referred to above is proper or not. c) The Japanese Red Cross Society shall request the International Committee to give necessary advice on the operation of the regisUatkm system referred to above. 3. The Japanese Red Croas Society shall request the International Committee of the Red Cross to make public throu^ radio broadcasts that this Agreement is in con­ formity with humanitarian spirit and the priaei^es ot the Red Cross. A bstclx 4 "Die delivery aird reception of the persons wh o have completed the procedures for repatriation shall he made between the representatives of the Japanese Red Cross Society and the Red Cross Committee of the Democratic Regie's Republic of Korea at the port of emharication. The delivery and reception referredto in the p re c e d ­ in g # a n m t a taalLoom nlete h r tan *»«»*»«— o f the lis t Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of retuTiMMs «ad the Ammëtae'taexwilf. ' "

1. Vessels for thereturn Amll be provided by the Korean side at its expense.The matters to be observed by such vessels shall be provided for in the Annex. 2. The Japanese side shall designate the port of Niigata as port of embarkation, and the Korean aide shall desig­ nate Najin, Chongjin and Hungnam as ports of disem­ barkation. 3. The matters concerning the dispatch of vessels for the return shall be decided on the basis of the number of persons wishing to return and the preparation of the dispatch of vessels. It is planned that such persons shall be assembled at intervals of about seven days, and approxi­ mately one thousand of them shall be assembled each time. According to the increase or decrease of the number of such persons, however, proper alterations shall be made through consultations between the Red Cross organizations of Japan and Korea. 4. In case it becomes necessary in view of the number of persons wishing to return, such measures as are re­ quired for the enlargement and increase of the facilities and transportation shall be taken through consultations between the Red Cross organizations of Japan and Korea. 5. The first repatriation vessel for returnees shall sail from the port of embarkation within three months from the date of coming into force of this Agreement con­ cluded between the Red Cross organizations of Japan and Korea. 6. The Japanese Red Cross Society shall, each time in advance, notify the Red Cross Committee of the Demo­ cratic People’s Republic of Korea of the approximate number of persons wishing to return, the designated port and the date of the arrival of repatriation vessel at the designated port. 3

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Xadx v«nel far the rctom taiaH arrive a t'Oie detatasiatod port on a # daalgnated date noühd undar the preceding pcragr^ih. It may be changed, however, thrcogh con­ sultations between the two Bed Cross Sodetiea, in case there arise circumstances beyond control sudi as the weather conditions, etc. 7. The Japanese side shall furnishmxpplia to, and Tnaintain mTnTwiiniratifina w ith SUCh VCSSels, and afford other necessary facilities as well as cooperation. The expenses thereforshall b e borne b y the Korean side. Axiicuc 6 1. The Japanese Red Cross Society shall afford the fol­ lowing facilities to returnees in a manner prescribed by it: a) Expenses for transportation and meals, frei^t for goods up to 60 kilograms per person, and diarges for first-aid to be incurred during the time between the departure from present residences and arrival at the port of embarkation shall be paid. b) Accommodation, meals, first-aid and transportation during the time between the arrival at the port of e m ­ barkation and embarkation shall be provided. 2. Returnees m a y take with them up to 45,000 yen in Japanese currency, in the form of a check in pound ster­ ling. A n y person w h o is in possession of Japanese currency in excess of the above m a x i m u m shall deposit such an excess in the bank in his name, on which he shall be per­ mitted to draw under the relevant laws and regulations of Japan if he applies therefor at a later date. In case such person intends to use it in Japan for his o w n pur­ poses, he shall be permitted to draw on it in the Japanese currency under the relevant laws and regulations of Japan. Securities, including shares and public bonds, or deposit passbooks shall not be taken. 3. Items that m a y be taken hom e by a returnee shall be his personal effects required for the travel, household articles required for his or his family’s use and profes­ sional instruments required for his o w n use in pursuing his vocation. Items on thf export of which an embargo Is placed under the relevant laws and regulations of Japan and items the possession of which is illegal under the same laws and regulations shall not be taken home. 4. N o customs duties shall be imposed on any property carried ho m e by returnees. 5. The Japanese side shall continue to recognize law­ ful titles of a returnee to his properties which he cannot take home under unavoidable circumstances. 6. The Korean side shall pay all the expenses incurred after the embarkation of returnees, such as those for transportation, meals and accommodation, and shall pro­ vide medical and surgical services free. It shall also guarantee all requisites for the stabilization of the living of returnees after their arrival, such as their hnu.«ing. employment and education.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ,1,9 The representatives of tiw Bed Cross Committee of the Democratic People’s Bepoblic of Korea shall board each repatriation vessel, and such representatives shall stay within the port area during the time their repatria­ tion vessel is in harbor, to engage in the reception of returnees and liaison and in giving cooperation and assis­ tance to returnees in connection with their repatriation. A jciicle 8 1. The Japanese R e d Cross Society shall ma k e effort as far as possible, to ma k e the contents of this Agreement and the procedures for repatriation, etc. kn o w n to Koreans in Japan through press and news propagating media. 2. To the persons among returnees w h o wish to settle their nationality problems, necessary cooperation shall be afforded by the Red Cross organizations of Japan and Korea. 3. The communications required for the implementa­ tion of this Agreement m a y be m a d e through telegraphy, mail or at the designated port between the representatives of the two Red Cross Societies. A rticle 9 This Agreement shall be valid for one year and three months after its signature. However, in case it is recog­ nized that the repatriation works cannot be completed during this period, it m a y be renewed through consulta­ tions between the Red Cross organizations of Japan and Korea, as it is or with necessary amendments. Done at Calcutta on August 13, 1959, in duplicate in the Japanese and Korean languages, both equally authentic.

For the Japanese Red Cross Society: (signed) Yoskisuke Kasai

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Fur Ihr Kud Cross (’omniittce of the Demucrfitif People's Republic of Korea: (Signed) Li Ii. K yl'ng ANNEX I, Each repatriation vessel shall sail straight from the port of departure and shall arrive at the port of Niigata on the date designated by the Japanese Red Cross Society. ;; Each repatriation vessel shall wire to the Japanese Red Cross Society, three days in advance of the date of its an ival designated by the Japanese Red Cross Socjety, the name of the port of departure, the expected date and hour of departure, the type and name of the vessel, the call sign, the frequency used, the gross tonnage, the draft, the cruising speed, the capacity for returnees, the name of master, the number of crew and their nationality or nationalities and the number of passengers other that the crew and their nationality or nationalities. 3. Each repatriation vessel shall go through the pro­ cedures regarding entrv and clearance through the inter­ mediary of an agency (hereinafter referred to as ‘‘the agency”) arranged for by the Japanese Red Cross Society. 4. Each repatriation vessel shall, immediately after its departure from port, notify the Agency by wire thereof, as well as of the expected date and hour of its entry into port. It shall further notify the latter, six hours in advance of its arrival, of its location and whether there has been any sick persons during the voyage. The coast station with which such vessel is to com­ municate shall be Niigata Station, call sign: JKP, fre­ quency: 438 kilocycles. 5. Each repatriation vessel shall stop at the anchorage for quarantine of the Port of Niigata (near a point at lat. 37'58' N. and long. 139”03.5' E.), and shall undergo the inspection by the competent Japanese Government authorities. Thereafter, it shall enter the port under pilotage and lie at anchor at the designated ;,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. lug 1111)1111 II s lu 1111' i.'linpi'U'm . .jiipiU i'M ' .lu itiiirii 11'^ M iau b(’ Japaneso or English. 8. The- foltiiwiiig paptT.s shall h<- .sui'i.allcc! or pre­ sented by each repafrialinn ve.s.sel up<’i; entering port: Report nf entry: 4 copies Maritime declaration of heal'ii: 1 copy Crew li.st: 3 Copies Passenger list: 3 rnpie-; List of .ship’s es: 1 copy List of consignments' 1 copy Deratting certificate or derattiiig exemption oertilicato: to be presented for inspection International ccrliiicato of vaccination or revaccination: to be presented for inspection, n. The following papers shall be submitted by each repatriation vessel before departure from port: Report of departure: 4 copies Crew list; I copy Passenger li.st: 1 copy (excluding the list of returnees) 10. Each repatriation vccspl shall I'ay in foi-i'icn ex­ citance 1" ’ 1 11*1 ' ' O' ' ' ; ' Cl ,'S. ’ " 'h e ' .tC ' iiri'Scrit^cci Ijj .10)1' It shall deposit the agency with a foreign exchange bill for 7,000 U.S. d-.hsrs m 2,.500 pounds sterling not later than three days prior to its arrival. If there arises any deficit in such deposit, a fresh deposit shall be made. In this case, the agency should make, upon con.sulta- tion with the repatriation vessel, such an arrangement as would enable such vessel to receive necessary amount at any time. 11. Such ve.ssels .-.hull ob.servc thi .Lipancsc laws and regul.ation.s and further follo-.i 'he iiotrorti* m.s h\ 'die competent Japanese agcm-y m * an y mg "til ih.c tran.s- portalion of returnees.

THE VOICE OF KOREA PtmUStrSi'.D MONTHI.V 3 V THE KOREAN AFEAIRS INSTITUTK, INC Yongieung Kim. Président: Harry S. Kim, Vice-President; Warren Y. Kim, Secretary: C. Ho Kjm, Treasurer: Dorothy

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Ar-IERICAN OCCUPATION POLICY TOWARDS TNS NGREAI-T I-ilNORITY

Alth-ough not a direct factor in influencing the

specific prohlem posed, it is appropriate to add further

information on and to discuss the American Occupation

Policy towrrds the Norean minority which is not included

in the body of the thesis. The Korean minority created

many unexpected and annoying problems for the Occupation

forces. largely, this may be attributed to the fact

that SCAP was not prepared lor the problems presented

by this minority in Japan as it was assumed that tne

Koreans would quickly return to their homeland when given

the opportunity. As a result, no basic policy had been

formulated. Therefore, as difficulties with the minority

developed, each separate office acted independently and

decisions were made on a day to day basis without

consideration of a consistent or organised policy in

dealing with the Koreans.

In the beginning of the Occupation, SCA? 's attitude

towards the Koreans was a sympathetic one i_. view of

the fact that the I.ore ans constituted a group whic'a had

been an oppressed segment of the population. Sarly oCA?

directives freed ahem from the legal repression and

discrimination which they had suffered under the

Japanese.^ SCAB decreed that Koreans electing tc remain

SZAIBUi 95, Kern oval of Restrictions on Political, Civil and Religious liberties", October 4, 1945; end SCAPIK 5 6 0 , "Employment Policies", November 25, 1945, which directed the Japanese G-ovemoent to "insure that no discrimination (in emplojmoent: policies) will be exercised . . . against any worker by reason of nationality, creed

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. in Japan ce offered tie sane rights of employment as

J.-'oenese ..aricn.c Is in c : wearable circumstances as well

as e:v-ending to them the right of emplo-rment by the

Cccuoation forces withers iiscriminaticn. Specifically,

t ;c iooupaticn forces iid employ o: few Koreans as interpreters,

end tr-aislarcrs acj.rii.i_ the;.-, the privileges of other

foreign nationals co.ch as Arz.oy iocc, billet space, etc.,

A--SO, Korean property wa.o not ^rd inarily requisitioned

for PCcm -ation use. nater SCfK directives provided that

Koreai'-s -anacle mo work wco.ld be eligible without discrimina­

tion for relief in one form of supplies, food, clothing,

tnax the Koreans be placed on

nice se namioi.al in all major areas

■of economic n:c sc-'-i.-K. _ife, SGAr, at the same time,

accorded a privileged position to the Koreans in other

areas, r,or"-_ oularly in their position before Japanese

courts. In sc ..c- anctanoes this served to place the Korean

beyonm : re me ■. : f Japanese law. Conc'irrently, however,

ec'.d i.i ;•-.-pram h .ti.cn tc t'..e basic policy of the Occupation

^OCAfl.. 404, "Relief and Welfare Plans", December S, 1 SCi_?ll '.''75, "Public Assistance", Pebraary 27, 1Ç46.

CAPuf 757, "Revier of Sentences Imposed Upon cr=.'nps and Certain Other Nationals", February 19, 1946, leo sentences imposed by Japanese Criminal Co'ur'ts upon Koreans . . . who furnish adequate proof of their intention to return to Korea . . . shall be subject tc rep'iev.' and further action by the Supreme Commander for Allied

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Forces that the Koreans were to be considered separate and

apart from Japanese nationals, SCAP issued directives

which legally lumped the Koreans with the Japanese.

Examples are the SCAP directives which allowed the Japanese

Diet to pass legislation making Koreans liable for

paying the Capital Levy Tax and Income Taxes on an

equal basis with Japanese nationals but excluding a~! 1

other foreign nationals with the exception of Formosans

and Hykyuans from the scope thereof.

As time passed and it beca-r.e clear that many

Koreans did not intend to repatriate, she Occupation

Forces considered more effective proposals to eliminate

the major disturbances created by the presence of the

Korean minority in Japan. In any event, such disturbances

resulted in the SCAP policy statement of November 12, 1946,

which provided that, "Koreans who refuse to return to

their homeland under the SCAP repatriation program will

be considered as retaining their Japanese nationality".

Despite vigorous Korean protest, SCAP did not alter its

basic policy in this respect and from the date of this

order shifted the responsibility for Korean matters

to the Japanese Government to solve within the policy

framework outlined by SCAP.

Records of specific incidents involving Koreans,

as well as information ccnc:.ming individual violations

by them, of Japanese law and SCAP directives are probably

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. contained in the records of the 441st C.I.C. which,

at this time, are stored in Japan and Hawaii.^ A few

records of the 441st C.I.C. covering the Occupation

period are in the repository at Fort rlolahird, Maryland,

but these are, for the most part, concerned with the

personnel records of the Corps and it is doubtful

whether they would contain any information relative

to problems of the Korean minority in Japan.

4 Mention should be made of the fact that the present 441st C.I.C. operates in another area, having been only recently reactivated and bearing no direct "lineal descent" from the 441st C.I.C. that was on duty during the occupation in Japan.

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3, Parc Shtba, Hinato-ku

TOKIO

JtUM 19, 1962

Mrs. Virgisia Darmamtadtar 5401 Cliva Place Ha. Sprisgfiaid, Virgiaia U.S.A.

Hear Madam, 1 wiah ta aefcaavladge raealpi af year latter dated May 2 9 , 19^2 and forwarded te tu from the offlea ef ear Seelety'a Eerera Bapatriatiaa Ceater ia Hiigata City. 1 pay raspeet far year effort of writing a thaeie far the Amariaaa Uaivereity, Haehiagtaa, U.C. I am pleased to reply te year qaestieam as fellawet

1) The Aaaard ea Bapatriatiaa ef Earaame residing ia Japan, signed by the Japanese Bed Cross Sesiaty and the H a r ^ Eeraaa Bed Cress Seeiety tms_ extended fej a seeand time PB-Jwly 31. 1961 to eznire Hevember 12. 1 S, witheat any ehaagas ia its to 2) Siaea tite baglaaiag ef rapatriatiea eperatien in Deaem&ar 1959 matil the 9th of Jaaa, I9 6 2 , aamhar ef parsema who left Japan far Nerth Eerea, iaoladiag Eareans and ether natieaalities is* 76,477 (by 94 voyagea ef ships). I sheald be very happy if the above iafarmatiea eanld satisfy year meed. If you have any farther details yea wish to knew, tumid yea please write me? I am ready to give yea the related infarmatien. Vith all sty best wishes and high regards. Siaoerely years.

LsabaPa EIOCBI Basaareh Direotar ef Peraiga Affairs Departstant, Japanese Bad Cress Society

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Geneva, June 20, 1962

JPM/RN 025

Dear Madeun,

We wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter of May 29, for which we thank you.

The I jreemeni signed in Calcutta on August 13, 1959, between the Red Cross of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea aind the Japanese Red Cross was extended a first time at Niigata on October 27, I960 for one year from November 13, I960, and a second time on July 31, 1961 also at Niigata for a further year. It will in fact expire on November 12, 1962.

The two National Red Cross Societies signed on November 2^, i960 at Niigaia, a further agreement bringing from 1,000 to 1,200 the number of Koreans who could be transported each week from Hiigata to Chong-Jin (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea). This agreement practically only had effect during the first months of I96I vdien a few departures exceeded 1,100 persons. Since the summer of I9 6 1 , the number of departures has, so to speak, not ceased to decrease. These now only take place twice, sometimes only once a month.

According tc information in our possession 76,^77 persons had left Japan for North Korea by June 10, last, on which date the 9^th ship had sailed from Japan. About 9 ^ of these numbers was composed of Japanese nationals, mostly Japanese women who had kept their nationality in spite of having contracted marriages with Koreans and who did not wish to be separated from their families.

About 20,00c persons have registered for subsequent departures, but it is not known how many of these will in fact

Mrs. Virginia DARMSTADTER $401 Clive Place No. Springfield, Virginia, OSA.

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