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Commonly Used Abbreviations and Acronyms Appendix

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COMMONLY USED ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ........................................................................................................ APPENDIX A x . ACL Access Control List . AKMC Automated Key Management . ACO Access Control Officer . Center . ADM Advanced Development Model . AKMS Automated Key Management . ADP Automated Data Processing . System . AE Application Entity . ALC Accounting Legend Code . AMS 1. Auto-Manual System AES Advanced Encryption Standard . 2. Autonomous Message Switch AFIWC Air Force Information Warfare . ANDVT Advanced Narrowband Digital Center . Voice Terminal AH Authentication Header . ANSI American National Standards AIG Address Indicator Group . Institute AIN Advanced Intelligence Network . AOSS . Automated Office Support AIRK Area Interswitch Rekeying Key . Systems . AIS Automated Information System . APC Adaptive Predictive Coding . AISS Automated Information Systems . API Application Program Interface . Security . APU Auxiliary Power Unit . AJ Anti-Jamming . ARL Authority Revocation List . AK Automatic Remote Rekeying . ARP . Address Resolution Protocol . AKDC Automatic Key Distribution . ARPA Advanced Research Project . Center . Agency . AKD/RCU Automatic Key Distribution/ . ARPANET Advanced Research Projects . Rekeying Control Unit . Agency Network . 151 Commonly Used Abbreviations and Acronyms . ........................................................................................................................................ ASCII American Standard Code for . CAW Certificate Authority Workstation . Information Interchange . CBC Cipher Blocking Chaining . ASN1 Abstract Syntax Notation 1 . CC Common Criteria . ASPJ . CCA Advanced Self-Protection Jammer . Cardholder Certification Authority . ASSIST Program Automated . CCEP Commercial COMSECT . Information System Security Incident . Endorsement Program . Support Team . CCI Controlled Cryptographic Item . ASU Approval for Service User . CCITT Comite´ Consultatif International . ATM Asynchronous Transfer Mode . Te´le´phonique et Te´le´graphique . AUTODIN Automatic Digital Network . CCO Circuit Control Officer . AV Auxiliary Vector . CDC Certificate Distribution Center . AVP . CDR Authorized Vendor Program . Certificate Decoder Ring . CDS Cryptographic Device Services . BCA Brand Certification Authority . CDSA Common Data Security BCI Brand CRL Identifier . Architecture . BER Basic Encoding Rule . CEOI Communications Electronics BIN . Bank Identification Number . Operating Instruction BSD Berkeley Software Distribution . CEPR Compromising Emanation . C2 1. Command and Control . Performance Requirement . 2. Controlled Access Protection . CER 1. Cryptographic Equipment . C2W Command and Control Warfare . Room 2. Communications Equipment . C3 Command, Control, and . Room . Communications . CERT Computer Security Emergency . C3I Command, Control, Communications . Response Team . and Intelligence . CESG Communications Electronics . C4 Command, Control, . Security Group . Communications, and Computers . CFB Cipher Feedback . CA 1. Controlling Authority . CFD Common Fill Device . 2. Cryptanalysis 3. COMSEC Account . CGI Common Gateway Interface . 4. Command Authority 5. Certification . CHAP Challenge Handshake . Authority . Authentication Protocol . CALEA Communications Assistance for . CIAC Computer Incident Advisory . Law Enforcement Act . Capability . CAP Controlled Access Point . CIK Cryptographic Ignition Key . CAPI Cryptographic Application . CIP Crypto-Ignition Plug . CIPSO Programming Interface . Common IP Security Option . 152 Commonly Used Abbreviations and Acronyms ......................................................................................................................................... CIRK Common Interswitch Rekeying . CRC Cyclic Redundancy Code . Key . CRC CRC with 32-bit output . CIRT Computer Security Incident . CRL Certificate Revocation List . CRP Response Team . COMSEC Resources Program . CIX Commercial Internet Exchange . (Budget) . CK Compartment Key . CRS Certificate Request Syntax . CKG Cooperative Key Generation . CSE Communications Security . CKL Compromised Key List . Element . CLMD COMSEC Local Management . CSIRT Computer Security Incident . Device . Response Team . CLNP Connectionless Network . CSM Certificate Services Manager . Protocol . CSMA Carrier Sense Multiple Access . CMCS COMSEC Material Control . with Collision Detect . System . CSS 1. Central Security Service . CMS Cryptographic Message Syntax . 2. COMSEC Subordinate Switch . CNCS Cryptonet Control Station . 3. Constant Surveillance Service . CND Computer Network Defense . (Courier) 4. Continuous Signature . CNK Cryptonet Key . Service (Courier) 5. Coded Switch . COCOM Coordinating Committee for . System . Multilateral Export Controls . CSOR Computer Security Objects . COI Community of Interest . Register . COMINT Communications Intelligence . CSP Cryptographic Security Provider . COMPUSEC Computer Security . CSSM Common Security Services . COMSEC Communications Security . Manager . CONOP Concept of Operations . CSSO Contractor Special Security . COPS Computer Oracle and Password . Officer . System . CSTVRP Computer Security Technical . COR 1. Central Office of Record . Vulnerability Report Program . (COMSEC) 2. Contracting Officer . CT&E Certification Test and . Representative . Evaluation . COTS Commercial off-the-shelf . CTAK Cipher Text Auto-Key . CPS 1. COMSEC Parent Switch . CTCPEC Candian Trusted Computer . 2. Certification Practice Statement . Product Evaluation Criteria . CPU Central Processing Unit . CTTA Certified TEMPEST Technical . CRAM Challenge Response . Authority . CUP Authentication Mechanism . COMSEC Utility Program . 153 Commonly Used Abbreviations and Acronyms . ........................................................................................................................................ DAA Designated Approving Authority . DoD TCSEC Department of Defense . DAC Discretionary Access Control . Trusted Computer System Evaluation . DAMA Demand Assigned Multiple . Criteria . DOI Access . Domain Of Interpretation . DAP Directory Access Protocol . DOS 1. Denial of Service Attack . DARPA Defense Advanced Research . 2. Disk Operating System . Projects Agency . DLED Dedicated Loop Encryption . DASS Distributed Authentication . Device . Security Service . DMA Direct Memory Access . DCID Director Central Intelligence . DMAT Digital Music Access Technology . Directive . DMS Defense Message System . DCE Distributed Computing . DN Distinguished Name . Environment . DNS Domain Name System . DCS 1. Defense Communications System . DPL Degausser Products List (a section . 2. Defense Courier Service . in the INFOSEC Products and Services . DCSP Design Controlled Spare . Catalogue) . Part(s) . DSA Digital Signature Algorithm . DDoS Distributed Denial of Service . DSN Defense Switched Network . Attack . DSS Digital Signature Standard . DDI Deputy Director of Operations, . DST Digital Signature Trust . NSA/CSS . DSVT Digital Subscriber Voice Terminal . DDS Dual Driver Service (courier) . DTLS Descriptive Top-Level . DDT Deputy Director of Technology, . Specification . NSA/CSS . DTD Data Transfer Device . DEA Data Encryption Algorithm . DTS Diplomatic Telecommunications . DEK Data Encryption Key . Service . DER Distinguished Encoding Rule . DUA Directory User Agent . DES Data Encryption Standard . DIB Directory Information Base . EAM Emergency Action Message . DII Defense Information Infrastructure . EBCDIC Extended Binary Code Decimal . DISN Defense Information System . Interchange Code . Network . ebXML E-business XML standard . DITSCAP DoD Information Technology . ECB Electronic Code Book . Security Certification and Accreditation . ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography . Process . ECCM Electronic Counter- . DN . Distinguished Name . Countermeasures . 154 Commonly Used Abbreviations and Acronyms .......................................................................................................................................... ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature . EUCI Endorsed for Unclassified . Algorithm . Cryptographic Information . ECM Electronic Countermeasures . EV Enforcement Vector . ECPL Endorsed Cryptographic Products . EW Electronic Warfare . List (a section in the INFOSEC, . Information System Security Products and . FDDI Fiber Distributed Data Interface . Services Catalogue) . FDIU Fill Device Interface Unit . EDAC Error Detection and Correction . FIPS Federal Information Processing . EDE Encrypt/Decrypt/Encrypt . Standard . EDESPL Endorsed Data Encryption . FIRST Forum Of Incident Response and . Standard Products List . Security Teams . EDI Electronic Data Interchange . FIX Federal Internet Exchange Points . EDM Engineering Development . FOCI Foreign Owned, Controlled, or . Model . Influenced . EES Escrowed Encryption Standard . FOIA Freedom of Information Act . EFD Electronic Fill Device . FOUO For Official Use Only . EFTO Encrypt For Transmission Only . FPKI Federal Public Key Infrastructure . EGADS Electronic Generation, . FSRS Functional Security Requirements . Accounting and Distribution System . Specification . EGP Exterior Gateways Protocol . FSTS Federal Secure Telephone Service . EKMS Electronic Key Management . FTP File Transfer Protocol . System . FTS Federal Telecommunications System . ELINT Electronic Intelligence . FTAM File Transfer Access Management . ELSEC Electronic Security . FTLS Formal Top-Level Specification . E Model Engineering Development . Model . GASSP Generally Accepted Systems . EMSEC Emission Security .
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