Tekniikan Waiheita 2/2010

Tekniikan Waiheita 2/10

BUILDING ‘ILMARINEN’S FINLAND’ COMPUTER CONSTRUCTION AS A NATIONAL PROJECT IN THE 1950S

Petri Paju

The Committee for Mathematical Machines (Matematiikkakonekomitea) was appointed in the spring of 1954, with the task of determining whether and how a ‘mathematical machine’, as electronic computers were then called, should be acquired for Finland. The Committee’s work was regarded as one of the first large-scale scientific projects in post-war Finland. This pioneering position was probably why the Committee needed to be justified with good arguments. The Committee’s decisions would express the more general standpoint(s) taken in Finland towards the postwar expansion of scientific and technical research and its consequences. The Committee quickly decided to obtain a computer, and furthermore to copy one from Göttingen in Western Germany.1

Tellingly, the vice-chairman of the Com- by Finland and Finnish companies in new mittee Erkki Laurila invoked the nation in technology markets. Already earlier, it had 1954 by referring to an ‘Ilmarinen’s Finland’ often been noted that following World as something worth striving for. The black- War II technology was a ‘national project’ smith Ilmarinen plays an important role in (kansallinen projekti) in Finland. This alleg- the Finnish national epic, the Kalevala (ed. edly shared, underlying perception of the Elias Lönnroth 1835/1849), where the national importance of new technology has smith can also be seen to embody techno- been used as an explanation of the Finn- logical prowess. Professor Laurila urged to ish successes related to high technology, for increase the technical capabilities and prac- example the rise of the Nokia Corporation tical skills among the leaders of the country from the mid 1990s on. In the dissertation, in order to make the Finns more independ- rather than applying the notion of tech- ent and not only a nation of writers and nology as a Finnish ‘national project’ as an wise men, ‘the Finland of Väinämöinen’, explanation, I have made it the object of but also a technological nation.2 scrutiny, viewing the concept as a historical and cultural construction. To examine what the Committee for HOW DID TECHNOLOGY BECOME Mathematical Machines meant for its par- A NATIONAL PROJECT IN FINLAND? ticipants, I ask the following questions: How was the Committee for Mathemati- Since the 1990s, a number of social sci- cal Machines justified, especially from the entists have pointed to technology and perspective of the national good, and what national aspirations and identity as having kind of motives did the actions of the something to do with the success enjoyed Committee manifest? I focus in particular

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on their motives in the computer field, in nationalism I follow the work of Benedict developing science and technology in so- Anderson and his well-known thesis of na- ciety, and in imagining Finland anew.3 In tions as imagined (political) communities. speaking of the Committee I include those This means that nations are not perceived associated with it, such as the builders of as given social units but rather as communi- their computer, the ESKO. ties whose coherence is imagined through The materials for the study consist of political and cultural practices. This thesis is a multifaceted collection of sources from to my knowledge the first attempt to apply Finland, Sweden and Germany. Archi- a similar approach to the history of compu- val material, such as minutes of meetings, ter technology. memoranda, lecture manuscripts, and in particular letters related to the work of the Committee, has been found in all three THE MANY BACKGROUDS OF countries and has been extremely valuable. THE COMMITTEE Published sources, such as magazine and newspaper articles, have also been used. In According to my findings, the Committee addition I have conducted seventeen inter- for Mathematical Machines (1954–1960) views.4 was preceded by earlier research on ana- Methodologically, I draw on the ‘new’ logue computers and also by several at- cultural history, in particular on microhis- tempts at arguing for the national benefit of tory approaches and the history of technol- technology. During the war, Finnish scien- ogy. In addition, the research is informed by tists working for the war effort in The Na- the multi-disciplinary field of science and tional Airplane Factory tried to overcome technology studies, for example the Social Finnish technological dependence on Ger- Construction of Technology approach. In many. These negative experiences of war- the history of technology, nationalism has time technological dependence formed a been examined as, for example, an influ- significant ground for the discussion on the ence on technological style (Thomas Hugh- need to increase technological independ- es). Finnish historians of technology have ence in the post-war period and the era of also discussed nationalism and technology the Cold War. A key figure in early Finnish to some extent – although not as co-con- computing, and later in Finnish science pol- structed cultural phenomena. icy, Erkki Laurila (1913–1998), had served Drawing on the history and sociology in the National Airplane Factory. When he of technology of recent decades, I regard became Professor of Engineering Physics technology, politics and culture as mutu- at the Helsinki University of Technology in ally constitutive. On the co-construction of 1946, he continued his pre-war studies on technology and national identity, an impor- analogue machines.5 tant inspiration in my research has been the In Finland it was especially professor work of Gabrielle Hecht. In The Radiance of Laurila who combined technological and France: Nuclear Power and National Identity af- cultural work. Laurila participated in several ter WW II, published in 1998, she examines organizations and groups, of which I have how the French, after their wartime humili- concentrated on one of the least known, ation, imagined a technological France and the Finnish Cultural Foundation (Suomen how they built the country’s technological Kulttuurirahasto), where Laurila was ap- prowess in order to maintain the greatness pointed to the executive committee in 1949. of France. Like Hecht, in thinking about The foundation advanced Finnish culture,

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from the arts and humanities to the econ- from Göttingen, Western Germany. The omy and technology. This broad concept G1a was to be completed in Helsinki under of culture was derived from the Finnish a tight schedule (eighteen months or less), ‘national philosopher’ Johan Vilhelm Snell- and the construction process would train man (1806–1881), a Hegelian and a ‘Fen- some Finnish engineers as computer spe- noman’ (Finnish-minded and advocate of cialists. the Finnish language rather than Swedish), who had urged the Finns to develop their country both spiritually and materially. For THE G1A/ESKO COMPUTER the members of the Foundation, cultural policy was a tool to strengthen the Finn- The Max-Planck-Institut für Physik had of- ish national identity; this included Finnish fered Rolf Nevanlinna a blueprint of their achievements in technology. recently planned small scientific digital In 1954, Erkki Laurila submitted a pro- computer, the G1a, which the Committee posal to the relatively new State Board for could copy without charge in Finland. A the Natural Sciences, to establish a commit- German constructor, Wilhelm Hopmann tee to investigate the possibilities of having (1924–2002), planned to build the G1a a ‘mathematical machine’ available in Fin- computer as a follow-up version to the suc- land. By this time, Laurila had the support cessful G1 computer. Hopmann designed of some national scientific authorities in the G1a as an ambitious ‘minimal machine’; mathematics, one of them being professor a construction that would need only a mini- Pekka Myrberg, head of the board in ques- mal number of parts and would still be tion. After only a few weeks, the Committee useful to scientists in various fields.6 What for Mathematical Machines was appointed the Finns, Nevanlinna and Laurila, did not and could begin its work. know when opting to copy the G1a was The Academician Rolf Nevanlinna that the blueprint was then still under de- (1895–1980), an internationally prominent velopment – and it would take much longer mathematician, was appointed chairman of than they thought in 1954 to complete this the Committee. He too had previously ex- complex minimal construction. In Helsin- pressed an interest in the use of such new ki, the main constructor of the ESKO was machines. As Laurila had done earlier in Tage Carlsson (1929–2008). the Cultural Foundation and elsewhere, in The G1a/ESKO had its program the Committee for Mathematical Machines stored on paper tape; thus it was not a von Laurila emphasized the need to build Finn- Neumann type of computer, which has its ish know-how in mathematical machines. programs stored in the memory and which He argued that even the Finns (who in would ultimately prevail. Despite this, the general were used to importing technol- ESKO was expected to be adequate for in- ogy) could benefit from technical research stance for ballistic calculations for the Finn- and inventions if these areas were properly ish defence forces, which had from the start encouraged and funded. For Nevanlinna, been designated as the most urgent task for the most pressing and nationally important a Finnish computer. Other applications for reason to acquire a computer for Finland the computer would be in the various areas was the need to keep up with developments of applied mathematics (astronomy, prob- by promoting mathematics and sciences. ability calculus, and strength theory) repre- The Committee combined these motives sented in the Committee. by choosing to duplicate a G1a computer

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UNCOVERING THE COMMITTEE’S and national arguments were present at the GOAL: A NATIONAL COMPUTING same time, and both played a crucial role. CENTER As soon as the construction work started in Helsinki, the computer was pub- Despite the importance of obtaining a licized widely in the press. Interestingly, in computer, I argue that right from the start public an associate of the Committee rep- the Committee intended not only to have resented its computer as a Finnish one. The a computer built but to create a national G1a computer was renamed in Finland as computing centre in Helsinki. This major ESKO. This was an acronym derived from attempt by the Committee has been virtu- ‘Electronic Serial Computer’ (in Finnish ally forgotten. The computing centre was spelling), as well as a popular Finnish male of particular interest for professor Laurila. name at the time. Moreover, ESKO could Already when the two engineers who were be seen as referring to the popular com- going to build the computer were studying edy Nummisuutarit (1864) by the ‘national computer technology in Göttingen during writer’ Aleksis Kivi (1834–1872), in which the winter of 1955, Laurila wrote a letter the young Esko was the central character. I stating that he would like to appoint one of interpret this naming and publicity as serv- the grant recipients, Hans Andersin, as di- ing to signify the national importance of rector of this future computer centre. This the new device. Additionally, I argue that by centralized usage of the expensive compu- this naming of the computer the Commit- ter technology was at the time an interna- tee aimed at constructing both technology tionally shared model. In early computeriza- and national identity. tion in Finland, both international exchange Importantly, the Committee wanted publicity because they had a science policy plan of their own, which was linked to the idea of a national computing centre. In the projected computing centre, Finnish computer specialists could start serving a wide array of clients with the centre’s new equip- ment. They could also train and employ more computer experts for the country. Through the computing centre the Com- mittee aimed at improving the technological capacity and opportunities for military, scientific, and industrial research in Finland. From its work for clients the computing

The cover of Suomen Kuvalehti magazine in March 1958 promising the ESKO to become a new “Sampo”, and depicting an IBM computer factory in the United States. Suomen Kuvalehti 11/1958.

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Tage Carlsson, with Veikko Jormo to his right, testing the ESKO computer in the late 1950s. These two men formed the technical working group for the Committee for mathematical machines. They build the ESKO in Helsinki during 1955–1959. For the source of the picture, see Paju 2008a, 430.

centre would derive funds for further sci- First, to implement the plan, a mem- entific research and development work – in ber of the Committee, Dr Kari Kar- computers and probably more generally. hunen, proposed to the annual meeting Tellingly of their motives, to support its of the Punched Card Association in 1955 centre the Committee planned to establish a joint undertaking to create a comput- a “commercial and non-profit association”. ing centre for Finland. This centre could This partly idealistic association could in- then acquire a large general purpose elec- clude state units as well as firms – such as tronic computer that would be available industrial companies and probably compu- for all to use. Second, the Committee’s ter suppliers, such as IBM in Finland. In agenda was promoted – along with the principle all organizations were welcomed. know-how of the nascent field in general I interpret this plan as having been perme- – by giving the first seminars on comput- ated by national idealism, uniting different ers in Finland during the academic year interests for the greater good of the future 1955–1956. technological Finnish nation. Moreover, I argue that this should be understood as a policy separate from official government: TEACHING THE PROSPECTIVE CLIENTS especially in the case of Laurila, but shared AND USERS OF THE COMPUTER by many other scientists and engineers. It CENTRE was a policy based on nationalism and tech- nocracy (relying on expert knowledge and Of the two simultaneous seminars, the one explicitly non-political). The master plan led by Hans Andersin at the Helsinki Uni- for a computing centre (circa 1955) can be versity of Technology was divided into two regarded as a scientific and technological parts. I interpret this division as reflecting policy on the part of scientists and engi- the organization of a computing centre that neers prior to (co-ordinated) state involve- Andersin and Tage Carlsson had learned on ment in such matters in Finland.7 their visit to a computing centre in Stock-

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holm (1954). In the autumn, the audience It is worth noting that people from consisted of the managers of punched IBM Finland had also participated in the card departments and other potential cus- seminar taught by Andersin. Actually one tomers of the foreseen computing centre. of the three IBM employees there seems The teaching examined the basic and broad to have been the same person who in 1956 principles of modern computing, along was promoted to chief executive officer of with all the latest international trends. In IBM Finland. In the autumn of the same the spring of 1956, on the other hand, An- year Andersin, who was one of the two dersin went into the details of computer most prominent associates of the Com- technology and discussed the practicalities mittee, was hired to work for IBM. Judg- of for example repairing shut-downs and ing from the composition of the seminar, computer errors – in a particular computer, the Committee evidently was not excluding the ESKO. In other words, he was training IBM Finland from its possible partners. The specialists for the customers to hire. This is company management, however, probably because the computer in a computing cen- saw the situation more competitively, which tre of a ‘small country’ would be operated could be one reason they recruited Anders- by the customer’s own specialists, not ones in. It may also be relevant here that IBM employed by the centre. It can be concluded Finland, nationally the leading punched that the Committee and particularly Hans card machine vendor, was mostly run by Andersin were preparing for their comput- Swedish-speaking Finns, who in general ing centre to start work. Simultaneously, had since the end of the nineteenth cen- to follow the ideas of Mika Pantzar,8 via tury emphasized shaping Finland through publicity and teaching the members of the international exchange. Andersin too be- Committee were constructing a need both longed to this influential Swedish-speaking for computers and for a new policy of pro- minority. In contrast, the Committee chair- moting science and technology in general. men were Finnish-speaking and in favour Things, however, did not proceed as of strengthening Finnish independence in planned. The potential customers of the technology as well. computing centre, such as the ‘punched In 1956 the Committee members spoke card men’, were evidently not particularly of automation on several occasions and in- interested in the plans of the Committee. vited foreign experts to present their ideas This can be deduced from the fact that in on topics relevant to the Committee. The parallel with the seminar in the spring of Committee members usually did not men- 1956, Hans Andersin and Tage Carlsson tion the ESKO, still under construction, or developed a plan of their own. Andersin the plan for a computing centre, but I argue wrote to his German colleague Wilhelm that the motives of the Committee went un- Hopmann that he and Carlsson were about changed in 1956–1957. In addition, Erkki to start a Scandinavian company to import Laurila became increasingly involved in the computers, which later would also offer development of nuclear energy research in computer service. They represented Kon- Finland. In this area, and others, the imag- rad Zuse’s products in Finland. Konrad ining and construction of ‘Ilmarinen’s Fin- Zuse planned to manufacture G1a comput- land’ proceeded and was strengthened. The ers, or did so until the prototype project in general positive attitude towards what was Göttingen was first delayed in 1956.9 This perceived as modern technology enhanced setback also made the two Finns quickly the effectiveness of public campaigns and abandon their business plans. various other measures.

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IBM STARTS THE COMPUTING RACE computer had begun, the Committee had IN FINLAND asked the bank management for permis- sion to use the new IBM computer for In late 1957, a major punched card user, the public services. The bank gave the national state-owned Post-Savings Bank, ordered an Committee access to the computer for the IBM 650 computer. At the time the ESKO purpose of various scientific and technical was thought to be almost finished as well. calculations, including some for the military What followed was a race between the two command centre, as in a computer centre. parties: who would inaugurate the first In this case, the two strategies of importing computer in Finland? As part of this com- technology and improving domestic capac- petition, the ESKO was made public when ity and know-how worked together for the it was close to being finished in spring 1958. national benefit. In the popular national weekly magazine Suomen Kuvalehti, the (second) cover present- ed the ESKO as a new ‘Sampo’, referring THE COMMITTEE’S LEGACY PREPARES again to the Kalevala. The Sampo is a magi- THE WAY FOR THE FUTURE NOKIA cal source of wealth, forged by the famous and technically skilled smith Ilmarinen – In 1959, the mathematician Olli Varho of and worth fighting for. Tellingly, this line on the Committee thus temporarily succeeded the magazine cover was accompanied with in running a computer centre using the IBM a picture of an IBM factory manufacturing computer at a state-owned bank. Probably computers. Inside the magazine, the report- thanks to the popularity of this activity, at er criticized importing computers when a the beginning of the 1960s three comput- domestic computer, the ESKO, was also ing centres were started in Helsinki. The available.10 Thus the magazine and journal- ESKO, finalized in 1959–1960, was placed ists crafted and/or were used to craft an im- in a new computing centre at the University agined technological Finland. of Helsinki, where it was used until 1962. The G1a and the ESKO, however, However, it was unreliable in operation, faced another delay in the summer of and experts regarded a computer using 1958, and IBM won the competition. The programs on paper tape as outdated. Both first computer operated in Finland was the IBM and the Finnish Cable Works (Suomen IBM 650, called ‘Ensi’, or ‘First’, installed Kaapelitehdas) received expert personnel in the state-owned bank. IBM had made a from the national Committee, which ended special effort and cut delivery time to less its work in 1960. The Finnish Cable Works than a year. Within the Committee, this was the high-tech predecessor of the Nokia haste uncovered previously hidden tensions Corporation. between the engineers and the mathemati- Summing up: the greatest benefit from cians. These partly conflicting motives sur- the project of the national Committee for faced in the question of where to locate the Mathematical Machines went to the two ESKO when it was finished. To avoid con- competing companies, IBM and the Finn- flict, the University of Helsinki, the choice ish Cable Works, and to individuals on or of chairman Nevanlinna, was agreed on as associated with the Committee. Most no- the future location. tably, the Finnish Cable Works started a After this competition, the national computing centre similar to that planned by Committee quickly accepted defeat. Re- the Committee since the mid-1950s. In the markably, even before the race for the first spirit of the Committee with regard to the

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development of national capabilities, the guments played a role in re-imagining the company also established its own research country, including reference to earlier em- and development department, using rev- blems of national construction via litera- enues generated by the computing centre. ture, such as metaphors from the Kalevala, This computing centre and the R&D de- and other achievements of spiritual (intel- partment later evolved into the Electronics lectual) national culture. I do not mean, Department of the Nokia Corporation.11 however, that some permanent condition All in all, through the Committee members of ‘Ilmarinen’s Finland’ was achieved in the and associates working in companies and 1950s. Rather, I suggest that an important universities, the educational impact of the change began to take effect in the ways Committee would continue in principle to Finns thought about themselves and about benefit all Finnish computer users for many their capabilities regarding researching and years to come. producing new technologies. This change had been in the making in both the cultural arena and in that of economics and tech- ‘ILMARINEN’S FINLAND’ AS AN nology probably since the 1920s, soon after ARGUMENT FOR A TECHNOLOGICAL Finland’s independence. FINLAND IN THE MAKING The planners of ‘Ilmarinen’s Finland’, such as Erkki Laurila, were part of a larger I use the term ‘Ilmarinen’s Finland’ to ar- group of pro-technology people, for whom gue that technology did not just become a ‘technological nationalism’, as I call it, be- ‘national project’ in post-war Finland, but came an important motive to develop their was explicitly made so. Various national ar- organizations and the country. In practice, there was no unanimity in the ‘national project’ of either the Committee or the larger group. Conversely, the promotion of technology seemed not to be a united national project but a variety of such projects. For Laurila, for instance, ‘Ilmarinen’s Fin- land’ meant first and foremost greater national technological independence, whereas others would rely primarily on importing the new technology. The interaction of these different groups, and the long-term changes that occurred in technological na- tionalist thinking, are some of the questions that call for further research.12

The cover of the author’s doctoral dissertation.

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CONCLUSION ful new actor to take over science policy; New evidence of the postwar Finnish cul- this was now considered the best way to tural policy shows that the argument of the ensure a coherent process of national de- national importance of technology has a velopment. In the private sector, the Finn- longer history than is at present recognized. ish Cable Works became Laurila’s favoured This is at least partly in contrast to recent strong actor in building national know-how studies, which often see Finnish science in electronics. These findings strongly sug- policy as starting in the 1960s. These studies gest that the essential intellectual founda- misunderstand and underestimate the sci- tions for a future technological nation had ence policy initiatives taken prior to state- been, to a great extent, established by 1960, dominated science policy.13 After examining even though the national construction of the activities of professor Laurila and his Finland of high technology was only just colleagues at the Finnish Cultural Founda- beginning. tion, I suggest that in the 1950s some of them intentionally tried to shape the way Petri Paju is a Postdoctoral Fellow funded by the Finns thought about technology and their Academy of Finland and works at the University of technological prowess. As in France, this Turku, Finland, in the department of Cultural His- mutual construction of technology and na- tory. tional identity may have reshaped both. I suggest that these arguments have played a 1 substantial role in the long-term processes This article is based on an English summary for of the development of technology in and the author’s Ph.D. dissertation ”Building ‘Ilmarin- with society and culture. These results may en’s Finland’: The Committee for Mathematical Machines and computer construction as a national be relevant in studying the cultural founda- project in the 1950s” (Original title (in Finnish): tions of the present-day Finnish system of ”Ilmarisen Suomi” ja sen tekijät. Matematiikkakone- innovation, and the values inherent in it. komitea ja tietokoneen rakentaminen kansallisena kysymyksenä 1950-luvulla.) The dissertation was Somewhat surprisingly, I find the major accepted at the University of Turku in the summer significance of the Committee for Math- of 2008. See Paju 2008a, 522–530, and Paju 2008b. ematical Machines, in addition to its ben- For book reviews etc. see my home page at http:// users.utu.fi/petpaju/ eficial educational impact, to be that it en- 2 Väinämöinen is a wise man or shaman in the Kale- countered difficulties and needed to change vala; and later a symbol of the “spiritual side of cul- plans. The significance of these difficulties ture” as opposed to Ilmarinen’s materiality. Laurila, was that they forced individuals like Erkki Erkki, ”Väinämöinen ja Ilmarinen,” Uusi Kuvalehti (Ancient Heroes, from the national epic Kalevala, Laurila to rethink their strategy for achiev- in Finnish), vol. 3, no. 35, 1954, p. 6. The original ing a technological Finland. The Commit- Kalevala, edited by Elias Lönnrot, was published in tee provided them with important lessons two parts, in 1835 and in 1849. 3 in developing Finnish culture and society. However, in this summary article, other results than the ones concerning the details and complexi- Towards the end of the 1950s, Laurila in ties of the national construction are perhaps over- particular abandoned his national idealism emphazised because of limited space available. 4 for a more realistic concept of how to get For the sources in English and a developed treatment the Finns to collaborate. Consequently, in of the Finns’ international contacts, see Paju 2008b. 5 the so-called Linkomies Committee (1958– Cf. Paju 2000. For Laurila’s publications on analogue machines, see Paju 2008b. 1963), where Laurila participated in shap- 6 See Hopmann 2000. ing the future of Finnish science policy, 7 he agreed to support the state as a power- Cf. for instance Lemola 2002.

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8 See for instance Pantzar 2003. PAJU, Petri. ”Tietotekniikan esihistoriaa suomalai- 9 sin voimin. Kun Erkki Laurila toi matematiikka- See also Petzold 2003. 10 koneen idean Suomeen ja tarjosi sitä kaikille Mäkeläinen, Osmo, ”ESKOsta uusi Sampo” 1944–54.” (Pre-history of Computing by Finns. (ESKO—The New Sampo, in Finnish), Suomen Kuva- When Erkki Laurila Introduced Mathematical lehti, no. 11, 1958. Machines in Finland and Offered It to Everybody 11 See Paju 2008a, ps. 440–444, 451–455. Cf. Häikiö 1944–54, in Finnish.) Tekniikan Waiheita. Vol. 18, 2001. 1/2000, 6–13. 12 Since the dissertation, I have examined one of PAJU, Petri (2008a). ”Ilmarisen Suomi” ja sen the later national projects in the 1970s and the tekijät. Matematiikkakonekomitea ja tietokoneen results confirm that similar national ideas and ide- rakentaminen kansallisena kysymyksenä als continued to influence the same people and this 1950-luvulla. (Building “Ilmarinen’s Finland” : field in general. See Paju 2009. For a comparative the Committee for Mathematical Machines and study regarding the development of computing computer contruction as a national project in and the cold war in Czechoslovakia and Finland, see the 1950s, in Finnish). Publications from the Paju and Durnová 2010. University of Turku C 269, Turku 2008. Also 13 Cf. Lemola 2002. available electronically in: https://oa.doria.fi/ handle/10024/37737 PAJU, Petri (2008b). “National Projects and In- ternational Users: Finland and Early European SOURCES computerization”. IEEE Annals of the History of Computing. Vol. 30, 4/2008, 77–91. Suomen Kuvalehti 1958 PAJU, Petri. “Computer Industry as a National task. Uusi Kuvalehti 1954 The Finnish Computer Project and the question of state involvement in the 1970s.” In Impagliaz- zo, John & Järvi, Timo & Paju, Petri: History of Literature Nordic Computing 2. IFIP AICT 303. Springer, Berlin 2009, pp. 171–184. HECHT, Garbielle. The Radiance of France. Nuclear PAJU, Petri & DURNOVÁ, Helena. “Computing Close Power and National Identity after World War II. to the Iron Curtain: Inter/national Comput- MIT Press, Cambridge, 1998. ing Practices in Czechoslovakia and Finland.” HOPMANN, Wilhelm. “The G1 and the Göttingen Comparative Technology Transfer and Society. Family of Digital Computers.” The First Comput- Forthcoming in 2010. ers – History and Architectures. Eds. Raúl Rojas PANTZAR, Mika. “Tools or Toys—Inventing the Need and Ulf Hashagen. MIT Press, Cambridge 2000, for Domestic Appliances in Postwar and Post- 295–313. modern Finland,” Journal of Advertising, vol. 32, HÄIKIÖ, Martti. Nokia Oyj:n historia 1. Fuusio. no. 1, 2003, pp. 83–93. Yhdistymisten kautta suomalaiseksi monia- PETZOLD, Hartmut. ”Hardwaretechnologische layritykseksi 1865–1982. (History of Nokia, Part Alternativen bei Konrad Zuse.” Geschichten der 1: Merger. Merging into a Finnish conglomerate Informatik. Visionen, Paradigmen und Leitmo- 1865–1982, in Finnish.) Edita, Helsinki 2001. tive. Hrsg. Hans Dieter Hellige. Springer Verlag, LEMOLA, Tarmo. “Convergence of national science Berlin 2004, 79–137. and technology policies: the case of Finland.” Research Policy, vol. 31, 8–9/2002, 1481–1490.