MANAGING MINORITY An examination of nation-building and territorial politics in

Kristine Holder Department of Political Science

Subrniaed in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Faculty of Graduate Studies The University of Western Ontario London, Ontario August 1997

0 Kristine Holder 1997 National Library Bibliothéque nationale 1+1 ,,,a, du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographie Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395, nie Wellington Ottawa ON K1A ON4 OttawaON KIAOW Canada Canada

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The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial exbacts from it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or othemise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. A bstract The territorial and political integrity of Western European states are challenged fiom below by minority nationalism and regionalisrn. They are challenged from above by European integration. The case of France illustrates how a state can successfully manage minonty nationalism by pursuing a deliberate strategy of nation-building and, when this fails, by accornmodating the demands of minority nationalists and regionalists within the institutions of the central govement. European integration has limited the French govement's abiiity to manage regionalist movements. As French leaders become responsible for implementing an inmeashg number of European policies French civil servants can no longer %end the rules' in order to accommodate regionalist and minoiity nationalist demands at the implementation stage. Once regionalists and minority nationalists lose their influence at the implementation stage they wiil no longer accept their exclusion from the formulation stage. The institutions of the European Union provides opportunities for regionalists and minority nationalists to lobby in during the drafting stage of policy-making. In this way regionalists and minonty nationaiists can by-pass the French state. Although this has provided opportunities for regionalists to increase their own political status and the status of their , it does not oEer sirnilar oppominities for rninonty nationaiists. The nation-building efforts of successive

French leaders have been so successful that it is unlikely that minority nationaiists will attain enough support to challenge the integrity of the French state.

France, Brittany. Corsica, , minority nationalism, regionalisrn, nation-building, temtonal management. European integration

.S. Ill Acknowledgments

My greatea debt is to Michael Keating for sharing his knowledge and insight on minority nationalism and European politics and for his criticisms and suggestions on successive dr&s of this thesis.

I am also grateful to Janet Laible at Yale University for her suggestions and insights concemllig the chapter on European htegration, Dr. Klaus-lürgen Nagel for information on Occitania and Dr. John Lou* for sending me his bibliography on Corsica. 1 done, however, am responsible for any flaws and deficiencies in this thesis.

I also thank my parents for their suppon and encouragement throughout my education. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

Certificate of Examination Abstract Acknowledgements Table of Contents

Introduction

1 Theoreticai Ove~ew Difisionist Theory Primordialism and Enstmmentalism Economic Explanations The RoIe of Unassimilated Elites State Formation, Territorial Management and Political Caicularion

2 Breton, Occitan, and French Nationalisrn Administrative Unity Anti-State Nationalism - The Reaction of Traditional Elites Surnrnary of Ami-State Nationaüsm Managing Ami-State Nationalism Post-War Nationalism - The Emergence of Econornic Grievances Conclusion

3 1982 Decentralization Reforrns The 1982 Decentralization Laws - Opportunities and Limitations Corsica - neStatut Particulier Evaluating the Opportunities for Regional Government Conclusion - Decentraiization and Minority Nationaiisrn

4 Regional Representation and Minority Nationalism in the EU Introduction Subsidiarity European Regional Development Direct Influence in the EU Conclusion

5 Conclusion

Bibliography Vita The study of nationalism is a subject that has fallen in and out of popularity since the

1950s. In the 1950s. difisionist theory predicted that the formation of the modem nate dong with the processes of industridkatio~democratization, and capitalism would lead to the assimilation of minority cultures. Once this occurred, the members of formerly distinct cultural communities would transfer t heir loyalties to one overarching state nationalism, resuiting in the formation of nation-states.' The resurgence of minoiity nationalist movements in the induariaiixd, democratic countries of the West duhg the 1960s. however, proved the predictions of diarisionist theory to be incorrect. Consequently, students of nationalism attempted to explain the resurgence of minority nationalism by recognizing comrnon economic, cultural and historical factors which existed in the regions where minority nationalism was occumng. The literature that came out of this period was useful in predicting what factors could be used to create and foster minority nationalist sentiment, but it did not sufficiently explain why minority nationalism was occurring in each . Students at this time overlooked the important political relationships that develop between regions in which there are ethnic minorities and the central governrnents of their respective states. By overlooking these relationships. students failed to recognize the variety of policies states can use to accommodate rninority nationalism without sacrificing the temtorial integrity of the state. In

Chapter 1 of this study 1 review this literature on rninority nationalism and conclude by showing the supenority of the political explanations of rninority nationalism. In Chapter 2, 1 provide a case study of minority nationalist movements in Brittany,

'Deutsch. K. .\krtonnltmr and Social Contmttnicariorr Occitania and Corsica in order to illustrate how the French central govenunent hzs forrned political relationships with and pursued policies towards distinct communities and how these efforts have allowed successive French govemments to manage successflllly minority nationalism without sacrificing the tenitorid integrity of the state. The case of France was chosen for this study because it has traditionally boasted a highly centraiized administrative structure and a culturally homogenous population. Despite the image of a "one and indivisible " that successive French leaders have projected, the reality of the French state is that it was formed through the acquisition of culturally distinct comrnunities. Brittany, Occitania and Corsica are al1 culturally distinct regions in which each of the factors identified in the early Literanire on nationaiism has existed. Even though Breton. Occitan and Corsican nationaiists have attempted to use economic, political and social inequalities to formulate their demands in national terms and question the legitimacy of the state. none of these movements has presented a challenge to the unity of the French state. The reason minority nationalist movements fail to challenge the unity of the French state is that central authorities, siince the Third Republic have pursued policies which enabled it to preserve the integrity of the French temtory and to ensure the legitimacy of the state within its boundaries by popula. support for it and acquiescence to its political authority.' The most important and successful policy of French leaders was the creation of the French national identity. Beginning in the Third Republic, French leaders endeavoured to spread the

French national identity throughout the French state and in so doing, eradicate local identities.

Although local identities dlexia in France. the attempt at French nation-building was largely successful. Loyalties to local identities, where they exist, often come second to the French identity. This policy was so successfÙ1, that most French citizens do not even recognize a

7 'D. Unvin and S. Rohn, Ecotlomy, T-IO~J. Idenri4 p. 166. distinction between 'nation' and 'state'. When minority nationalist movements did chdlenge the notion of the French nation, French leaders were consiaently aiccessfùl at taking administrative measures to defuse these movements. Although administrative unity was often sacnficed to do this, this measure allowed the central govenunent to avoid any significant challenge to its temtorial integrity.

Chapter 3 is a review of the decentralization reforms of 1982 which explains why t hey were implemented and illustrates how the state has maintained the upper hand in temtonal govemance. It is important to note that minority nationalism had liale to do with the decision to implement the reforrns at this time. Rather, they occurred as a result of the Socialists' advantageous politicai position and their desire to gain the support of a new electorate composed of regionalists. A notable exception to this is the stu~partinilier which was granted to Conica and çeemed to address many of the demands made by Corsican nationalists. Although the reforms offered some new political and econornic oppomullties to regionalists, the reforms offered few opportunities for the expression and mobilization of minonty nationalism. A curent study on minority nationalism and temtorial management cannot ignore supranational developments which limit the sovereignty of states and provide opportunities for regionalists and rninority nationalists to express and attain demands independently of their respective states. In Chapter 4 1 introduce European integration to this study in order to evaluate the extent to which European integration weakens the integrative capacity of the state. The Mernber states are increasingly required to make policies which conform to the regulations which are forrnulated in the institutions of the European Union. Although policies cannot be passed without agreement between Member states in the Council of Ministers, the necessity of reaching agreement does reduce the sovereignty states have typically had over their domestic politics. As more policies corne under the regulation of the European Union, opportunities do arise for regionalists ta mobilize support around their programmes and to establish a presence in Brussels. Although the institutions of the European Union thus far have allowed regionalists only a consultative role, this activity h3s syrnbolic importance as it ailows regionalists and minority nationalists to project themselves as legitimate political actors. The opportunities available to regionalists in the European Union can only be used by rninority nationalists if territorial identities and cultural identities coincide. When they do rninority nationaiists do present a greater challenge to the legitimacy of their respective states. Because territorial identities and cultural identities rarely coincide in France, the French govemment has not faced, nor is it likely to face serious challenges to its territorial integrity. This differentiates it fiom other European countries such as the United Kingdom where Scottish minority nationalism and where Catalonian and Basque nationalisrn pose a more serious challenge.

In the concluding chapter i offer some speculation as to the future role of minority

nationalias and regionalists in Europe rnight affect the unity of the French state. As France becomes increasingly influenceci by policies made at the European level, it is only naturai that

regionalists and minority nationalists wiil demand to have their views and interests represented at the European level. If state ministers cannot do this for them then minority nationaiists and regionalists may atternpt to represent themselves directly in Europe. Although this does indeed challenge the administrative hegemony of the French state, its nation-building efforts have been so successful that this activity is udikely to seriously undennine its temtorial integrity. One of the challenges of doing a study on minority nationalism is to ensure that each of the terms necessary to the discussion on nationalisrn is used correctiy. The first distinction that must be made is between nation and state. Walker Corner has stated that states are easy to define and conceptualize, as they are the 'major subdivisions of the globe'.' In this thesis

1 refer to the temtory defined by state boundarïes and the political institutions that govem this temtory as the state. On the other hand, the concept of nation is more difficult to define and conceptdke because it is an intangible notion. The Intenmtiormi Rehions Dicfioriaty defines 'nation' as follows: A social group which shares a common ideology, cornmon institutions and customs, and a sense of hornogeneity. "Nation" is difficult to define so precisely as to differentiate the term from such other groups as religious sects, which exhibit some of the same characteristics. In the ~~atzon,however. there is also preserrt a srrottg gmp seme of belongrng associated with a partiadar ti.rriforycorisidered to be pecitliarb its owrr4

This definition, however, does little to dari@ the ambiguity of the nation as the term is used to refer to a variety of groups. Generally, the "particdar temitor-" referred to in the above quotation is the state The concept of nationalism, therefore, is most ofkn attached to the state. This is particularly true in the case of France where French leaders and most French citizens do not recognke a difference between the two terms. Below the state, however. other types of identities exist. These identities are often the basis for social movements which are formed in order to articulate interests and make demands on the state. Some of these movements cm be based on shared cultural characteristics such as language and religion. Other movements are based on a shared territory and they often are concemed with economic and development issues. In some cases territorial and cultural movements coincide. This is true of the Breton and Corsican movements, but not the Occitan movement. Aithough an Occitan temtory existed at one the, this temtory has ben divided into administrative regions. Therefore. the contemporary

Connor. W. "Tcminologicai Chaos" in (cd.) W. Connor. 1994. p. 92. Plano. J. and Olton. R. The International Relatioris Dicn'onary cited in Connor. 1994. pp.92-93. Occitan movement is based mainly on a shared cultural identity. This terminology becorna confùsing when sorne movements use their shared culture and territory as a basis upon which to make nationaiist claims and in this way challenge the legitimacy of the state. Therefore, nationaikm cm also refer to movements in which culture and territoiy coincide and even movements with only a shared cultural identity. In this study I refer to this kind of nationalism as minority nationalism. Without a shared culture, however, it is more diEicult to make nationalist claims as the common ideology and custorns which are a part of the nation are missing. The term applies to movements, based solely on a shared temtory, that challenge the integrity of the state. in the case of France, nationalism is attached most strongly to the state. During the process of regionahtion which occurred under DeGadle's administration, the French state played on the confùsion surrounding the concepts of nationalism and regionaiism by creating administrative units based on temtories that did not conform to cultural identities. By doing this, DeGaulle hoped to avoid the nationalist claims discussed above. Regionalkation in France, however. had the effect of creating loyalties based strialy on common temtorial identities. These regional loyalties have increased since the regional councils and presidents were given more political powers in the 1982 decenaalization laws. Consequently, below the French state there now exists movements based on dl three of the identities discussed above.

In C hapter 1 and C hapter 2 1 refer almost exclusively to rninority nationalists. In

Chapters 3 through 5 it is necessary to make more reference to regions and regionalists because most of the opportunities which aise fiom decentralization and European integration relate to the transfer of competencies to the regions as administrative units. Decentralkation increases the political power of minority nationalists ody if the distinct community coincides with a region. Similarly, the European Union offers more opportunities to regionalists than it does to minority nationalists. Minority nationalists in Spain and the United Kingdom, where culturai identity and territorial identities coincide, have found more oppominities to assert themselves as political acton in Europe. Consequently these movements have posed a more serious challenge to the their respective States. In France, however, it is still regionalists who have the most to gain From Europe. Peter Lynch has noted that the European integration has blurred the distinction between regionalists and minonty naîiorialists. Regional parties are now demanding the types of regional representation in European institutions that are more consistent with the roie of nation-states. Minority nationalists, on the other hand, are showing a considerable degree of pragmatism in relation to their definition of sovereignty by supporting the idea of sharing sovereignty within European instit~tions.~Despite the fact that the goals of regionalists and rninority nationalists are becoming increasingly sirnilar, it is stiil important to make a distinction between the two phenornena when studying the case of France. The combined processes of decentralkation and European integration presents challenges to the unity of the French state. The French state is chdenged from above by the fact that French policy- makers increasingly are required to implement policies that originate in Europe. Because European policies must be applied uniformiy throughout Europe, the flexibility that French civil servants once enjoyed in the implementation of policies has been significantly reduced. in tum, this has encouraged regionalists to be more assertive in infiuencing policy formulation. Because they can no longer expect to idluence the implementation stage, regionalists are less willing to accept their exclusion fiom the policy formulation stage. If French miniaers prove unwiuing or unable to reflect regional interests in Europe, regionalists wiU find it advantageous to establish their own presence in Bnissels. In this way regionalists challenge the sovereignty of the French state from below. Minority nationalists. however, have not presented the same challenge to the French

P.L'nch. .\ltrioric .Vationalimt and Eumpean Integration. p. 196. 8 state. Although some minonty nationalists have sought protection for their cultures in Europe, they have presented no sigruficant political challenge. Most minority nationalists still negotiate the autonomy they desire with state officials and are less interested in pursuing independent action in Europe.

A further limitation to the challenge of minority nationalists is the faa that French nation-builders have been largely successtùl in fostering a French national identity. Even most minority nationaiias, although seeking to protect their minority culture, still iden@ with the French nation as well. Because the idea of the French nation is so prevalent throughout France it is unlikely that the activities of minority nationalists in Europe will seriously undermine the temtorial integrity of the French state. CEIAPTER ONE THEOFUCTICAL OVERVIEW

Prior to the 1960~~minority nationalism in Western European states was not really an issue for research as students of nationalism assumeci that the formation of modem states had assimilated distinct comrnunities.' However, when the modern, industrialized countnes of the wea experienced a resurgence of minority nationalism in the 1960s, this assumption was proven incorrect. Consequently, the topic of muiority nationalism in deveioped countries was introduced as a topic to acadernic research. By isolating factors common to minority nationalist movements and the territones in which they were located, the literature of the 1960s and 1970s attempted to explain why the formation of modem states had not resuited in the assimilation of distinct communities. Although this was useful in predicting the demands minority nationaiists would make on the state and the issues around which they would mobilize suppon. they were not sufficient explanations of minority nationalism. By trying to explain d minority nationalist movements on the basis of cornmon causes, students at this time overlooked the importance of the political relationships that develop between minority nationaiists and state actors. The politicai explanations of minority nationalism therefore are superior as they recognize the importance of these political relationships to the on-going process of temtorial management. An important distinction between the early literature on minority nationalism and the political explanations is the objectives that each assigns to minority nationalists. The Literature of the 1960s and 1970s assumed that al1 minority nationalists endeavoured to attain

'K. Deutsch. .\Ytio,~olim, atid Social Conimunication. (The Massachussets Innitute of Technoloey. 1953 ): N. Srnelsrr. Social Cliarrge in the hdrismai Revohiriorr (Chiaigo: 1959): G.Almond and J. Colcman. nie Polirics of Dtn:trloping .-bras (Princeton: 1960) IO

independent statehood. The political theones on minority nationalism, however, recognized that minority nationalism can be used to anain a vatiety of concessions fiom the state. These concessions include increased political autonomy, recognition of culturd distinctiveness and protection for the minority language and economic concessions. The political explmations

also recognized that there are a nurnber of ways in which these demands can be satisfied. For

this reason. expressions of minority nationalism ofien cm be managed within the existing state or through a transfer of power which falis short of independence.

D~fusionistTheory

In Natiotlah ami Social Commlrnication, Deut SC h claims t hat the formation of

modem, industrialized states had assimilated comrnunities that were once culturaIly distinct. Before the creation of states, cornrnunities were physicaiiy isolated fiom each other because the lack of transportation made travel difficult. The fact that isolated comrnunities ofien spoke different langages was another banier to communication. Modem state-builders. however removed these barriers to communication by providing better roads and transportation, a postal service, a state language and universal education which was meant to ensure that every citizen learn to comrnunicate in the national language. In addition to providing the means to assimilation, state-builders also provided an incentive by offenng a share of the econornic prosperity and social benefits of industnalization and the capitalist economy as rewards for assimilation into the state culture.' Diffisionists assumed that assimilation would occur in the following four stages: "open or latent resistance to political amalgamation into a comrnon national state; minimal integration to the point of passive cornpliance with the orders of such an arnalgarnated govemment; deeper political integration to the point of active support for such a common

7 K. Deutsch. .Vutiotral~marrd Social Communication. and E. Weber. Peajcrnts into Frenchmen. pp 72-73. 11

state but with continuhg ethnic or culturai group cohesion and diversity and the coincidence of political arnalgarnation; and integration with the assimilation of dl groups to a common language and culture."'

When western industnalized countries were challenged by minority nationalist movements in the 1960s. it became apparent that this process had not occurred. The iiterature that resuhed 6om this ernpirical hding attempted to explain why this did not occur.

Prïmordialism and Instrrtmentalism The literature on minority nationalism was divided between primordialists and instrumentalias. Primordialists maintained that nationalism was based on permanent loydties which motivated people to resist assimilation or prevent others from participating in their nation. Pierre Van Den Berghe offered a sociobiological explanation which suggested that nationalism was a resuit of the loyalty one has for an extended family. According to this theory. Type 1 groups (race, caste and ethnic groups) are extensions of kinship and ethnic and race sentiments and should therefore be understood as an extended and attenuated forrn of kin selection. In order to organize and protect themselves fiom other similar groups, each Type 1 group maintains clear temtorial and social boundaries with other ethnic groups. Van Den Berghe did not deny that migration, conquest and interbreeding takes place, but he maintained that real kinship is not necessary to be the basis of such sentiments as nationaiism, tnbaiism, racism and ethnocentnsm . The idea of a supposed kinship is sufficient to evoke these sentiments. Ethnic and racial groups comrnand unreasoned loyaity because they are. at least in theory, "superfamilies". This loyalty has implications for the method by which states are formed. Paternalism works in monoethnic states because the concept of nation is an extension of hseleaion. For the sarne reason patemaiism is not possible in multi-ethmc

3 Although Connor is not a dit'fusionist. ht provides this List in "Nation-Buildingor Nation-Dcstroqing" in Edino~tariorralimt:The Quesi lor Lirdostanding (ed. ) W. Connor. p.33. states. In multiethnic states an ideology of reciprocity (cooperation for mutual benefit) can transcend ethnic boundaries. However, if there is cornpetition and codict over scarce resources, multi-ethnic states are dominated by one at the expense of othersa4 Although kin connection may be effective to create nationalism, primordial attachments are not iimited to this. They also include religion, community, common language and similar social practices. What is important to nationalism is that the primordial ties be strong enough that members of a community will resist inclusion in another group. Geertz characterizes such attachments as those which seem to follow more fiom a sense of "natural or even spirinial afhity than from social interaction".' The fact that primordial ties, that are more important to members of a particular nation than the benefits of assimilation, rnight exia irnplies that an increase in social communication will never result in the assimilation of various nations into a leading group. Instead, the increase in social communication is more Likely to increase conflict between nations. Connor recognizes that the notion of common ancestry is not sufficient to cause minority nationalism, but agrees that it is an important element in the resurgence of nationaiism. Although most national groups have, in fact, been proved to be 'variegated offspring of a number of peoples", it is not "what is" but "what people believe is" that has behaviourai cowequences. A nation is a group of people characterized by a myth of comrnon descent and tied to this myth is the notion of the homeland. The two notions together are a basis for nationalism. Those who live within the homeland are more likely to manifest greater animosity toward other groups and greater resistance to acculturation and assimilation. Another consequence of the "homeland psychology" is the hoaiiity which results fkom, what is perceived by inhabitants of a region, as an intrusion of "the native land"

*P. Van Den Bcrghe. *A Saiobiological Pc-tivsn in -Varionolism (4s.) J. Hutchinsom and A. Smith. pp.96- 102. 'c. hm.'Primordial and Ciiic Ties" in .Vationtxllrm. J. Hutîhinoon and A. Smith. pp.29-33. by non-natives Because this notion is based more on myth than reality, Connor suggest that a valuable source for understanding nationalism is the propaganda which is used by leaders to create the illusion of cornmon ancestry. it is not the historical reaiity of the propaganda which is important to the understanding of nationalism, but the nature of the mass instinct to which the propagandist appeak6 In contrast to prùriordialists, insrnunentalists deny the persistence of cultural ties (real or imagined) as a cause of nationalist movements. They claim, rather, that new cultural groups can be created for the purposes of politicai mobilization. This perspective does not render the prirnordialist view irrelevant in the understanding of ethnic groups that have had long and rich cultural heritages. It does suggest, however, that cultural persistence is not a useful predictor of whether or not ethnic movements will aise or whether such movements will be effective in mobilizïng support. Cultural persistence suggests only that it is likely that groups can be mobilized on the bais of specinc appeals and not others. Leaders of nationalist movements from traditional cultures select oniy those aspects which will be useful in promoting the interests of the group as they define them. The study of nationalist movements, accordhg to the instrumentalkt perspective, is the study of the process by which elites and counter-elites within nations select aspects of the nation's culture, attach new value and meaning to them and use them as symbols to mobilize the group, to defend its interests and to compete with other groups.' Although primordiaiism might be an effective element by which to originally mobilize support for a nationalist movement, a nation which has aspirations for autonomy or self- government must eventually abandon these characteristics as a means of defining the nation. A nationalist movement which is mobilized around primordialism is limited to prese~ngits

%. Cunnor. "Ethnonationaiismn in Etlrnonationaiwi the piesrjôr Laderstanding (d.)W. Connor, pp.75-78. 7 P. Brass. "Elite Compctition and Nation Formation" in .Yationaih (ais.) J. Hutchinson and A. Smith, pp.70- culture without legal institutions. It must also accept the cultural heterogeneity that results From being part of a multi-nation state. In order to define a nation as a political cornmunity or to make demands for self- govemment the nation must have a defined membership temtory. If membenhip within the nation's temtory is defined by primordial characteristics, the nation has ody two policies by

which to maintain the nation. The 6rst option is to assimilate ail of those in the temtory who

do not fit the primordial definition of the nation. The second option is to expel these inhabitants fiom the territory Because assimilation rnay not be possible and expulsion is not acceptable, nationalism is incompatible with prirnordialism.' In his study of the nationalist movernent in the Basque country, Linz illustrates how the primordial elements of the nation become less important as the movement becomes more nationalist. At the beginning of the movement the nation is defined by militant nationalists who emphasize certain primordial elernents. A sigruficant portion of the nation may reject the prllriordial elements which are emphasized by nationalists. These people are rejected by the nationalists as traitors or aliens. The characteristics which are used by the nationalists to define the movement will also be used by those who do not share any of the primordial characteristics to identify members of the minority. As a reaction agathe more radical political minority that makes demands derived from the primordial characteristics, opponents of the nationalists will formulate negative or repressive policies against those who share the primordial characteristics with the militants. In the final stage of the mtionalia movement both the nationalists and their opponents are likely to under evaluate the primordial elernents of the nation. Instead they emphasize the territorial component. The nationalists will do so in order to create a territorial base for

8 J. Linz. "From Primordialism to Nationalism" in .Vew ,Vuriorialhs of the Developed Hésr. (cds.) E. Tiryhan and R. Ropo~vsh.pp.303-753. a fiiture nation-state. The state will do the same to create a temtorial basis for reorganization of authority patterns. It will gant autonomy or to tenitonally elected bodies who reject the emotional and political implications of primordially based nationalism. The nationaüsts therefore, define temtory to increase their influence while the

centrai govenunent does the same to defuse the nationalists' infl~ence.~

Econoinic Erplanaîions The economic theories of minority nationalism explain its resurgence by the uneven development of industnalism and the capitalist economy. The progress which was achieved

through industriaiization and capitalism occurred only in particular places, thereby afEecting people differently. The positive effects of econornic development were felt mainly in the centres of states while the peripheries lagged behind. For people in the peripheries, acculturation turned out to be more like "a tidal wave of outside interference and control". The majority of the people in the penpheries was excluded from social mobility and felt exploited. 'O The intemal colonial mode1 compares the situation of modedng states to the situation that existed between the European powers and their overseas colonies. The colonial situation was one in which the colony's economy was developed to suit the needs of the colonizing power. It was specialized in the production of a narrow range of cornrnodities or raw materiais for export and was subordhate to the colonial power. According to the theory of intemal colonialisrn, a similar situation exists between the core and the penphery of modenllnng states. The penpheries are exploited by the centre as the centre controls the commercial transactions and trade arnong members of the periphery. Economic growth and commercial prospects tend to be concentrated in the centre and consequently, when job

9. . ibid. 'OT. Nairn. The Maladies of Dcvsloprnent". in .Vationolim. (eds.) J. Hutchinoon and A. Smith. pp. 70-75. prospects ernerge, personnel is aiso recruited f?om the centre. Because the peripheries remain underdeveloped there is a great deal of migration out of the periphery. The centre perpetuates the economic subordination of the periphery through the practice of discrimination on the basis of language, religion and other cultural forms. The persistence of cultural distinctiveness in the penpheries is therefore, a function of the maintenance of an unequal distribution of resources between the centre and the periphery. Increased contact between the centre and periphery increases rather than narrows the econornic gap between the two regions. The peripheral nation, in response to this inequality, cornes to believe it would be better if it strengthened its own political power so

that it could change the distribution of resources to be more advantageous to the periphery." Therefore, econornic disparity accounts for the cultural rebirths which are expenenced in the

peripheral temtories. David C. Gordon explains the resurgence of rninonty nationalism in t his way; "lt is not that these groups actually uncover evidence of their ancient past as an

independent people, most O ft en culture is created contemporaneously to legitimate demands for the present day goal of independence or the achievement of economic equality."" AIthough the interna1 colonialism theory explains the preservation of ethnically specific

regions. it does not explain the resurgence of nationaiism in these regions. Most grievances alone are insufficient to mobilize protest at a level that threatens the existing arrangements between the centre and the periphery. Other theories suggest that militant nationalism is not the result of abject deprivation, but is the result of the disparity that exists between what people have and what people believe they should have or what they believe they could have in a different arrangement with the state. For a nationalkt movement to succeed, minonty nationalists mua nor only raise the expectations of the members of the minority culture, they mut also provide them with credible hopes for personal and group improvement. Finally, they mua convince the region that the realization of these improvernents is incompatible with the existing structural and constitutional arrangement with the centre.') Uniike the primordial theones, the economic theories suggest that the expression of nationalisrn is a rational behaviour in which an individual evaluates the chance of economic prosperity with the existing mgement with the state. Wshe aiso compares this to what one might expect if the arrangement was aitered. The decision to seek independence is similarly based on a rational assessrnent of the costs of separation. The factors involved in the calculation are listed by Polèse and include; trade, labour market and the importance of statewide economic policies. The costs of separation will be too high if the current relationship between the state and periphery: provides access to privileged markets in tens of trade and also provides protection fi-om third party cornpetition; if the region depends on labour exportation and the state is the major destination of such migration and if statewide economic policies have been more beneficial than harmful to the region. Conversely, if the region is not dependent on the state for markets or protection, members have no access to positions in the centre and the state economic policies have been more harrnfil than beneficial to the region, independence might be preferred as, in this scenario, the members of a minority culture have nothing to lose. ''

The Role of Unassimilated Elites The theones that give prominence to the role of unassirnilated elites in the creation of nationalism are sirnilar to the economic theories in that both suggest that nationalism occurs when the periphery does not acquire the sarne benefits as the centre. In the economic theones material benefits were emphasized, while in the following theories social mobility

13~.Esman nPerspectiveson Ethnic Conllict in Indumialized Societies" Eihnïc Conflict in rlw I?kstm Iïorld (ed.) M. Esman. 1977. p.378. set dso W. Becr "Intemal Colonialkm and Rising Exptations: Ethnic Activism in Contcmpoq France"Erltnic .4 uronomy - Comparaiive mamies (cd) R HaIl .p.Z09. 'k.Polk *Econornie intcpration. National Policies and the Ebtionaiity of Regionai Separation". in .Vau .\ationa/imts oftlre Duveloped f?'rst (4s.)E. Tiryakian and R. Rogowski. pp. 10% 127. is emphasized. According to the these theories, resistance to assimilation is not the cause of the resurgence of nationalism. Rather, it is the failure of upwardly mobile members of the minonty culture to acquire the expected benefits fiom assimilation. According Gellner, it is possible for primordial characteristics to exist, but he denies the tenacity of primordial ties; "Changing one's language is not the heari-breaking or social-destroying business which it is clairned to be in the romantic nationalist literatureif switching one's language was the only problem, no new nationalism need ever ari~e."'~Nationalism occun instead when entry into the dominant nation is either impossible or very ditficuit. Even if it is not difficult it might still be advantageous, at times, to set up a rivai 'nation of one's own'. If the unassimilated elites of the underprivileged region cm succeed in detaching it from the state, they will have a virtual monopoly on the desirable posts in the newly independent countryL6 The creation of nationalism in this sense is the product of value-maxirnizing behaviour. It is based on an accurate appraisal of self interest and social reality. If one is to choose nationalism, it has to promise the greatest net benefit. According to Rogowski, in a aate in which the penphery is subordinate, the upwardly mobile will assimilate only so long as promised rewards can be attained by and only by assimilation. When there is a sufficient number of elites who have not been assirnilated, the fonnerly iderior culture 41stnve to become a nation. The moa ardent nationalists will be the upwardly mobile because they will be guaranteed success in the newly independent state as their skills wiU be in short supply." The unassimilated elites of a region are iikely to be those who benefitîed fiom the post World War expansion of higher education. Esman identifies two social groups in particular that are iikely to produce national activists. The first of these is underpaid teachers who are

"E. Gellner. Thaighi md Change. p. 165. . 16.ibtd. pp. 1 59- 168. "R. Rogowslti. "Causes and Varietics ofNationalirrnWin .Vew Xa~iOn01ismsof dte Devebjwd liés1 (4s.) E. Tinakian and R. Rogowsh. pp. 87-94. 19 suffering £tom declining social prestige and low incornes. The second group is educated youth who, because of the decline in the legitimacy of the state, religion and class loydties. have tumed to ethnic identification to fil1 this void.18

Staîe Formution, Tern'torialManagement and Polircd Colcul

'8M. Eman. -*Pmpectivcson Ethnic Contlict'. p.376. In the samc volume W.Bax 'The Social Class of Ethnic Activists in Contempocary France" esplains that in France the expansion of the ducational systern resulted in large numbers of people finishing schod. qualilied to teach in univcrsities. The univcrsities. howevcr. wuld not offa mou@ positions for the number of qualificd graduatcs. This multed in an undercrnptoytd and overqudified 'muof teachcrs who were almost certain to be discontcntd. distinct iveness. Ig The extent to which muiority cultures are able to use their distinctiveness to formulate demands depends upon the amount of distinctiveness they have maintained. Urwin and Rokkan have noted that the development of the periphenes at the time of the induanal revolution was a decisive factor in determining whether or not the periphery would maintain its distinctiveness. If the peripheral temtory had established a written standard of the peripheral language and it was not econornicaüy dependent on the centre it had a favourable chance of maintaining its distinctiveness. Other factors which would cause the penphery to lose its distinctiveness are a discrepancy in resources which favours the centre and oppominities for migration out of or into the periphery." When a distinct culture has been maintaine-d, any apparent social, political or econornic inequalities cm encourage peripheral cornrnunities to formulate their demands in national ternis and question the legitimacy of the state. How the state responds to the dernands made by tenitorially based political movements is important. as it determines the demands the movements will make in the future. For this reason the temtod movement s seek to institutionalize the concessions they have achieved so they can create a "contextual legacy" within which future activists cm operate." The territorial objectives for any state are two-fold. The first is to preserve the integrity of the territory. The second is to ensure legitimacy within these boundaries by popular suppon for it and acquiescence to its political authonty." For any temtoriaily based politicai movement to challenge successfully the territorial integrity of the state, it must present a convincing programme for institutional change and establish its appeal to a sufficiently large constituency. In the beginning this is relatively easy as the movement can foIIow the contradictory policy of making demands on the state for more resources behind a

L'D. Unin and S. Roklan. ECOIIO~~.Temroy, Idenrip. p. 138. -%id. p. 94. 2 1 R. Thompson and J. Rudolph. "The Ebb and Flow of Territorial Politics in the Wcstcrn Worid" in Erlrnorern$yial Polirics. PoIiqv, ortd rlre Ilksrrni Flbrld. (ais.) R. Thompson and J. Rudolph. pp. 1-14. 7.Umin and S. Rohn.Econorny. Temiro- Idenrip. p. 1 66, coalition of temtorial defence. If the movement is to have any sort of longevity, however, it must develop its policies beyond mere protest and articulate a programme by which it plans to improve the region. This is risky for the movement as the programme may create divisions within it." The statdperiphery relations cm be exarnined on the bais of how far the state wide parties and bureaucratie elites can make the necessaty concessions to the movements and how far these concessions sewe to reinforce the temtorial movements." The concessions a state makes to the regions can be economic in that the state recognizes the regional clairns of econornic deprivation and provides subsidies or financial assistance to the region in order to foster economic developrnent. However, economic responses are ofien unsuccessfùl on their own. They rnight even have the opposite effect of encouraging anti-state nationalism in the discontented region. This occurs for two reasons. Fkt, by acknowledging territorially based discontent, no matter how necessary this may be, states encourage culturaily distinct communities to fonn their demands in nationalist terms. Secondly, econornic concessions raise expectations among the minority culture which are unlikely to be satisfied by state initiatives.'' The concessions a state offers might also be cultural such as allowing the use of minority languages in public schools and in local and regional govemments. Economic and cultural concessions are preferred by states to structural adjustments because they do not entail changes in the distribution of power. if concessions are possible, regimes will pay a high cost to maintain their integrity and c~ntrol.'~However, offenng economic and cultural concessions to distinct communities who have formulated demands in nationalist terms is rarely successfùl because the basic demands of minority nationalists are political and require

"M. Keating. .\linori@ und Statr .\oiim:alian. p.22. '%id. 25 D.Uruin and S. Rokkan. Ecorton~~v.Tewifo~. Idtintin) p. 178 and M. Esman, "Perspectives on Ethnic Contlict ...;~373. Esman. "Pcrspectivcs on Ethnic Contlict..." p. 38 1. a political response." Where economic and cultural concessions are not possible states are compelled to resort to structural adjustments. If this is necessary states will try to restructure temtonal govemance in pursuit of their own objectives." The options available to any state that rnust make a politicai accommodation are Ncumscnbed by existing institutional arrangements and the costs involved in making political concessions. Political accommodation is easier where nation-building in the past has been a built-in feature of integration. Therefore, it is easiest where central control has uivolved some kind of formai federati7irtion. If the existing political institutions have no decentralized structure, political accommodations might entail a radical change in the existing style of government, unless it is possible to incorporate regional elites into the central instit~tions.'~

The case of France provides an interesting case study because it has traditionally boasted a high degree of administrative centralization. For this reason, one might expect that the challenge of minority nationalist movements would require a radical change in this style of government in order to accommodate their demands. This, however, has not occurred. The next chapter will use the examples of Breton, Occitan and Corsican nationalism to illustrate how successful nation-building efforts have prevented minority nationalists in each of these three temtones from attaining any sustained widespread support. Even when minorïty nationalist movements have been their strongest, the French leaders have been able to either incorporate regional etites into the state's centrd institutions or restructure territorial govemance to satisG their own objectives.

'7 '7 D.Umin and S. Robn. Ecoriony. Territory Idenci@. p. 178. %A. Krating. Stme and .\linoriy .Yatior~olion.p.22 29 D. Umin and S. Rohn. Econony Twitop, Idenciy. p. 1 88. CaAPTER 2 BRETON, OCCITAN AND CORSICAN NATIONALISM

Despite the faa that France has been more successfùi at nation-building and managing its periphenes than other Western European countries, minority nationalism is stiil a problem with which the French state mua contend. Minonty nationalin movements have and continue to challenge the central authority of the French state. The Breton, Occitan and Corsican cornrnunities have displayed al1 of the factors that may be used to mobilize support for a minority nationalist movement that were considered in the previous chapter. Each of the three regions has a shared culture and history which can be a basis for creating minority nationalist sentiment. Traditional elites in each region have used minority nationalism as a means to defend their politicai influence fiom the challenge of state centralization. Finally, rninority nationalists in each of these communities have attempted to use economic, political and social inequalities to formulate their demands in national ternis and make demands on the state. This chapter examines each of these minority nationalist movements and demonstrates how the general propositions discussed in Chapter One apply to these cases. Although Breton. Occitan and Corsican movements have periodically challenged the integrity of the French state, French leaders have been successful in managing these minority nationalist movements. Pan of this success can be attributed to the early efforts of French leaders to cultivate a strong sense of French national identity. Their success in doing this has hindered minority nationalist movements f?om winning widespread support for any prolonged period of tirne. When minority nationalists have challenged the integrity of the state, the

French governent has satisfied the demands of minority nationalists by integrating regional elites into the institutions of the state or its national parties. Consequently, none of the three minority cultures has produced a nationalist movernent which has been able to integrate economic and cultural issues into a coherent political programme that offers a preferable alternative to the existing national arrangement. The French government has been so successfùl in these policies that there was no signifiant restmcturing of temtonal govemance until the 1982 decentralbation reforms. It is also significant that the 1982 reforms had liale to do with the demands of rninonty nationalists. '

French Nationaiism

Pnor to the Third Republic there was hardly any conception of a nationai identity arnong the masses in France. Early state formation was accomplished through a series of hiaorical compromises with the 's new subjects. This lefl the new subjects, for the most part, free to run their own affairs as long as the monarchy was guamnteed peace. a supply of grain and a steady flow of taxes.' Consequently, the rural inhabitants of France regarded the French government and representatives of the French state rnerely as agencies for the exaction of taxes and occasionally interfering to impose public order and mete out justice.' Although French was the language of rule and an instrument of administrative unity. linguistic unity does not seem to have been a policy goal of the At~czenRégrme.' Because the French Crown had linle concem with a linguistic conquest of the regions, French was a foreign language for one haif of French citizens at the beginning of the Third Republic. Rural communities that were isolated from one another and sustained by autarkic economies had no need for a unified language of communication which meant that local were

-RBalme. *French Regionalization and European intcgration: Tenitorid Ahptation and Change in a Unitan. State" in ï7te Eumperut Liiion mrd rhr Regiorrs (eds.) B.Jones and M.Keatine, p. 169. an3 W. Safran. "The Miticrand Rqmeand Its Policies of Ethnocultural Accommodation" Comparative Politics. p.42 - Keating. .\linorin, and Star .\'atiortnlisnt. p.34. 'E. Weber. Peasanrs into Frtrttdrnrtw . p.212. %id.. p.70. 25 maintained. The centralizing nature of the French state was an attempt by those who controlled the state to arrest the potentially centrifiigal forces that might develop out of this diversity6 The Jacobin myth of the one and indivisible Republic was conceived at this the as a necessary ideological tool to overcome the faa that the French state was composed of several societies. The ideal of the one and indivisible now created concerns about its shortcomings. "Diversity became imperfection, injustice, failure, something to be noted and to be remedied."' The iinguistic diversity and oniy partial administrative unity which was tolerated under the Ancien Régime, was intolerable to the leaders of the Third Republic, who now sought to impose uniform administrative stmctures and a uniform language throughout the French state. If'aii citizens were to accept the interests of the republic, they would first have to be able to understand what those interests were. Therefore, the Republicans needed a standardized language in order to spread their universalist ideology of liberation and democracy. In this endeavour. education was used not only to teach the , but also for the dissemination of secular and republican The French education system was indeed instrumental in teaching and encouraging the use of the French language but other factors aided in this endeavour. The changing economic and social conditions of the nineteenth century also made it advantageous to know and use the French language. Men cornmunities were isolateci fiom one another and economies were ciosed there was no need to cornmunicate with anyone outside of one's comrnunity. Consequently, there was Linle incentive to learn the French language because anything of value could be obtained

%id.. p .86. 'J .Loughh "R~onaiisnand Ethruc Nationalisrn in France" Centre-PeripliewRelations in IFesrmn Erwope (ais.) Y.Meny and V. Wright, p.225. E .Weber. Peasanlr ~iroFrenchnt~i,i. p.9. 'M. Keating. .\ fit~oriyarrd Slnte .Yariottalisni..pp.50-5 1 . and E. Wek.Peasams into Frenchmen. p.72. 26

with the local . During the Third Republic a system of roads and hproved communications was created and this brought mral communities in contact with each other

and with the city centres. nie opening of the economy and the creation of a national currency encouraged further communication and migration. Because the social tùnaion of language is to permit memben of a society to understand each other, when the national society became more signifiant than the various local societies, the national language was able to override local rivakg

Administrative Unity In addition to nation-building efforts, the leaders of the Third Republic centralized France's administrative system. These centralizing efforts were fuelled by the view of post- revolutionary democrats that the provinces were a haven of reaction, clericalism and royalisrn.

Havhg gained power as a result of popular upheavai, legislators feared losing power the sarne way.1° Hence, in order to control any anti-Republican elements that might be found in the periphery, intemediate foms of authority such as the old parliaments and aristocratie and derical privileges were abolished." In place of the old system of local govemment, legislators

established a standardized, hierarchical system of local govenunent with the déparrmtetit being

the top- tier." The prefect, who was to be the goverrunent's major agent of centralkation, was the link between Paris and the dépar~menzs. The Prefects were a creation of Napoleon, who resurrected the itztet&zts of the latter halfofthe seventeenth cenniryi3and were to act as his 'mini-emperors'. In this capacity they

'E .Weber. Peasarirr Into Frtvicltnrtw. p.72. . - -- P. Hainsvorth and M. Keating. Dec~~~naluat~onand Change in Conrempora~France. p.6 and V. Schmidt Denrocrariri~igFrance. p.5.

' ' M. Keating. Srare and .\fition'~.Yatiorralisni. p. 49.

'- J. Ha>ward.Governing France: The 011eand Indivin'ble Repirblic. p. 23. . - The utlcrrrdmrr under Colbert were the administrative instruments of political modemization and under Louis XTV thq were convencd into the main agents of the state's mnomic policy .J. H8?ward. Guveniing France. p. 30. would rule the déparments as his agents, mobilize land resources for the central govemment's purposes and ensure universal obedience to his will." Because the role of the Prefect was to control the activities of local officials, his formal powers were quite extensive. They included: the ability to suspend or disrniss a mayor; the power to dissolve the municipal council; the power to act in default; the power to check the legality of ail decisions made by the municipal council and amul them and the right to exercise stringent control over the commune's budget, which included the right to strike out any source of revenue he deemed expedient or against the public interest.'' In practice, however, as 1 wiil explain later in this chapter, the prefect did not exercise stringent control over local officials but developed a relationship of complicity with them instead.

Anti-State Nationohm - The Reaction of Traditional EIites By the end of the nineteenth century, France had undergone rapid and sweeping political, economic and social changes. Political refoms were implemented to bnng about more control over local officials while nation-building efforts resulted in the extension of the French language and the increased popularity of secular values. Together these changes causeci a breakdown in the traditionai forms of authority and ascnptive value ~~aerns.'~The first phase of minority nationalism was the result of this confrontation bet ween local identities and the expanding state.I7 Traditional elites (nobility and clergy) tried to comect economic and social devances to the cuiturai distinctiveness of their respective regions in order to create anti-state sentiment arnong the masses. The purpose of this was to protect the traditional elites from the threat

. . "Ibid. - c --%id. . p. 8. *-M- Stare .~urionalisni. . - Kating. md .\finorin p. 59. - Ibid.. p. 77. that the modem, democratic and secular Republic posed to their social positions.18 Movernents of this type, in which elites try to retain their influence in the periphery, involve a withdrawal &om the state and an attempt to preserve the traditional culture and economy.'' The economic grievances in the periphery were a result of the economic changes of the late 19th century, such as the opening of markets and the development of capitalist industry. French capitalist development and intemal free trade favoured the nonh and Paris regions, while in the south, locally based industries went into decline and few new industries developed to replace them." In the agricultural sector, small peasant proprietors, especially in the West and the south, were unable to raise the capital necessary to modernke and without control over access to national markets, they had great difficulty su~vingas independent fiers. Therefore, land agitation was closely associated with the development of territorial political movement s ." The development of these rnovements reverses the difisionist theory that predicts that industrial development and capitaiism will breakdown temtorial distinctions. Instead economic and industrial change aitered the balance of class and temtorial relations, thus bringing a series of territorial issues ont0 the political agenda." An analysis of the three regions in this chapter will demonstrate how state penetration influenced the development of minority nationalisrn and the grievances that were emphasized.

Brirrat y The incorporation of Bnnany into France was marked by the Treaty of 1532 which

-%id.. p. 109. . . -/ H. GuiIIorel. "The Social Bases of Rcgionalism in France: the Breton Crtse" The Social Origins of :Vational& .~lcnwneriu.p. 157. sa also E. Tiahan and N. Nevine "Nationalkm and Modcmity" in .Vew .Vationalims ofthe Developed &st (cds.) Tixyakian and Rogo\i-ski. p.73. -. E. R. --M.Ktating. Stare and .\fitton'ty .Vutiortalisn~..p. 58. --%id..-. p. 59. -- Diffusionists would argue that this was just the traditional clites 1st stand against rnodcrnization. The fact that minori? nationalkt movemmts have çontinued throughout the hh'cntitth mtun. howcvcr. falsifies this argument. ibid.. p. 58. manied Brittany's Duke Francois' daughter to King Louis IX. Although Brittany becarne a of France at this time, the terms of the Treaty of Union safepuarded Brittany's autonomy. Before the Revolution Brittany had been allowed to retain rnuch of its serni- autonornous character and the church and nobility remained the main agents in maintaining the cohesiveness of Breton society. Mer the Revolution, these elites used the cultural distinctiveness of Brittany as a defence against encroachments of the state." The society of

Brittany, at this Ume, related to the French nate through the mediation of the traditional elites which included the nobility, clergy and notables. The nationalist movements promoted by these groups were a means of defence against changes from outside Britîany which threatened to break up the society as well as being a rneans of conserving their own power base." In Brittany, these groups formed a counter-rnobilization agaha the Jacobin centre by seeking to preserve the Breton ianguage, Catholic religion and a rural agiculturai economy. Because Brinany was a peripheral temtory within France, it did not undergo the modernization process that was occumng in the centre. Located on the north-west peninsula in France, Brittany was traditionally a maritime economy which looked outwards rather than inwards to the rest of France. The creation of a national market and extemal tariffs were detrimental to the Breton overseas economy, whiie indu- was slow to develop in the region and the marketing of agricultural produce was a constant pr~blern.'~For tiiese rwsuiis Bnnany became increasingly marginalized within France. The population of Brittany consisteci of a weak bourgeoisie and a weak working class with a numerous peasant class, controiied by the nobilay and the Catholic church. Traditional elites, recognizing the opportunity which was present due to Brittany's isolation from the centre. oversaw a process of niral modernization. This process of rnodernization was

- W. k.The Lkapecced Rebellion: E[l,n;c .4crntism in Contempora~France. p.4 and J. Lougiilin. "Rqionalism and in France", p.2 13. "5. Loughlin. "Regiondism and Ethnic Nationalism ..." 1985. p. 213. - C --M. Kcating. Srcite and .\lIriorr& .\atiorinlim. p.59. intended to transfonn Brittany into an autarkicai society in which elites hoped to maintain their hegeemny by cutting Breton society off from the changes brought about by the expansion of the French state and the capitaiist economy." The increased communication and rnovement which was facilitated by the creation of a system of roads and the cûculation and use of a national currency which coincides with this penod, however. made this endeavour impos~ible.~'Instead, traditional elites maintained their position of influence through their ability to acquire state benefits (tariffs) to help protect the Breton market from extemal cornpetition. The purpose of nationalkt activity for the traditional elites in Brittany, therefore, was not to gain independence for the region, but to safeguard or improve their position within the existing institutionai arrangements between the centre and periphery. " The fïrst official organization to defend the Breton culture was the Uhion Régiondisi Bretonne ((URB which wanted the teaching of Breton in schools, preservation of folk customs, restoration of some Breton autonomy and some economic aid to the region." Aithough the group was anti-republican, it was not an independence movement. The group can be described as "monarchist, reactionary and profoundly committed to France albeit a decentralized, conservative, Catholic and monarchical France. "'O Anti-republican nationalism distinguished between the republican regime and France itself This psychological identification with a larger France worked against political independence. A notable example of the anti-republican emphasis of the LTRB is the fact that its leader placed more emphasis on the revolution than on the original union of Brittany and France. The historical watershed was not 1532 but August 4. 1789, the meeting of the EstatesGenerd which deprived Brittany

'' H. GuiIlorel, "The Social Bases of..." p. 157. See alço D. Stein and R. Rob.Econony Territory. Identig. p.94 t'or conditions which favour the sunival of cultural distinctiveness of pcripheries. -.- - "' Weber. Peasartrs inro Frer~chrnr~r.p.72. '' H Mdvell, "A Rationai Choice Approach to Political Regïonalism". Compararive Politics, July 199 1. 'W. Beer. i71e Litexpectrd Rrbellioli. p. 1 1 . '-. ' 'M.Keatinp. State and .\firlorin-. .Vatiortaiisni. p. 77. of its "autonomy and last liierties".'' The sigdicance of the this date is that it symbolizes the end of French feudalism. Despite the efforts of the Brittany's traditional elites to keep out the influence of the expanding French state, social divisions within Brittany began to manifest themselves by the beginning of the 20th century. Throughout Bnttany, French nationalization had been largely successful. The benefits of learning the French language to obtain employment opportunities and enhance one's social status led to a decline in the use of Breton. A middle class developed whose members began to question the authority of the traditional elite. W~thinthe regionalin movement, the URI3 was criticized as being backward looking and reactionary, causing two groups to break away in 19 1 1. The Fédératzorz Régïo~zulïs~ Brefomze (FRB) was composed of the part of the Breton bourgeoisie which favoured the progressive modernization of the Breton economy. The Parzz Natiorzdiste Breton (PNB) included elements ofthe urban petty bourgeoisie who wanted the Breton movement to move in a more radical direction, giving it a more nationalist and separatist t~ne.~'

World War 1 was an important break in the history of the Breton movement as it coincided with this process of disintegration. The state school, the new communications network and the compulsory rnilitary se~ceal1 served to expose Bnttany to the outside world." The results of this exposure were irreversible because it provided Bretons with a modem reference by which to compare the conditions in Bnttany . For this reason the Breton movement was transfomed more substantially dunng the interwar years. During these years a number of divisions appeared in the Breton movement. Some of the divisions were similar to those which were latent in French soaety in generai. They were: Lefi v Right and Catholic v anti-clerical.

-. '-Congresde I'=lssociariottBreroritre. 19 12 cited in H. Meadwell. "A Rational Choie Approach". p.4 13. - - --H. Guilfoxl, "The Social Basa of Regionalkm in France". p. 15 1. - - "ibid. The divisions that were pariicular to Bnttany were v regionalkm and Breton speakers v French speakers. Several groups emerged during this period representing

either side of the cleavage? One of the most important of these groups was the Partz

Autonomisie Breton (PB). The party's doctrinal platforni rejected separatism and replaced it with a demand for autonomy within a federalist structure. Their journal Breir A~ao (Brinany Forever) published systematic criticisms of the regionalist ideologies and practices and advocated a form of nationaikm which would encompass al1 classes and a 'return to autonomous national In 1932 fùrther divisions occurred in the Breton rnovement which resulted in the disintegration of the PB.The first group to leave were the Catholic Conservatives. That sarne year nationalias were successful in gaining control of the party and renamed it the Parti NatiotmIiste Bretot~(PNB). Consequently the federalist faction broke away. Another more

extreme faction within the PNB began a bombing campaign that lasted for the next few years. They operated under the name Gwem ha Du (Black and White) which were Brittany's

national colo~rs.~~As the religious and lefi-oriented members were no longer present in the PNB,the remaùiing members moved increasingly to the right in political orientation. The party becarne preoccupied with such themes as anti-Sernitism, anti-Marxism, elitism and the myth of the leader. The PNB's move to the right can also be explained by the failure of any group to

eaabiish a mass Breton movement. Because the Breton cause was first channeled through the Catholic organizations and national parties, there was no room for a mass Breton movernent. Without a popular support base, the actors of the Breton movement encouraged ideological and political remoteness." During World War U some of the PNB activists

-'W. Ber. The Chrxpecred Rebellion. p. 12. - c ' -1bid. p. 152. -'%id.. p. 12. - + ' H. GuiIlorel. --The Social Bases of Regionalism in France". p. 153. attempted to use the new fascist European context to realize their aims and collaborated with the Gemian Nazis. Aithough the number of Nazi collaborators was small, it was enough to stigmatize the movement and brought about stria repression by the French tat te.^'

Occitania The region of Occitania was beyond the control of France until the 13th century and a separate state might have developed independently or as part of greater Caralonia were it not for a series of political and religious events. The area of Occitania was incorporated through the Albigensian crusade which was led by Louis VI1 under the cover of religious motivations to remove the religious influence of the Cathars from the area." The Cathars constituted a cultural phenornenon that the Catholic Church could not tolerate and hence it tned unsuccessfully throughout the 12th century to reclaim the area of Occitania. In 1208 Pope Innocent iII decided to seek secu1a.r help and requested that Philippe Auguste of France aid in a Crusade against the Albigensians. Because he was already engaged in a war with England at the time, Philippe Augustus refused this request. His son, Louis W, however, later led the crusade which resulted in the conquest of . This crusade provides an histokal syrnbol to the Occitan people of a policy of genocide perpetrated by the 'barbkans' of the nonh against the 'civilized' of the south? The hiaory of fiom the 19th century until World War II was not as extensive as , nor did it gain as much popular support. Although early nationalkt movements opposed the centralism of the Third Republic, which gave the movement an anti-republican theme, the movements were mostly apolitical and were mainiy

"f. Loughlin. "Regiondism and Ethnic Nationalism in France". p. 2 1-1. . - ' MXcating. Sbre und.\ fmori~.\ationalism. p.3 1 . and H. GuiUorcl. "France: Religion Pcriphe~.Stak and Nation- Butldinp" in .!fobilization Cen~re-Penip~-Sauchvrs arrd .Variun-Btrifding, (ed) P. Torsiik pp.393-395. Aithough the south ofFrance was Christianizd earlier chan the north. the Catholic church abandonai it soon aftcr. Thc void Itfi by the Catholic church uas filled by the nmdOnniSt spiritual moverncnts of the Cathars which wttt readily acceptcd and spmd throughout the region maintaininp contact with the . .P - H. Guillorel. "France: Religion. Periphw. Statc and Nation-Building" .pp.393-395. literary or cultural renaissance movements. In contrast to Brittany, religious piety was not strongly entrenched among the peasantry, so while the literary and cultural movements tended to be anti-revolutionary. among the Occitan peasantry and town dwellers there was widespread suppon for the Republic." The cultural movement was inspired by and found expression in the Félibrige, a group of writers and scholars. led by the poet Frederic Mistral, who were dedicated to the revival of and who wished to create a literature based on the Occitan language.*' The langue d'oc is a romance language derived fiom and was predorninant throughout the south of France until the founeenth century. It flourished as an aristocratie and literary language dunng the but by the 1850s the language had been reduced to the status of a parois. By the end of the 19th century it had ceased to be written; it had become fiagmented into local idioms and the upper classes no longer used it except to deai with the 'manon the street'." Although the Félibrige opposed the centralism of the Third republic. its view of the relations between Occitan cultures and the dominant culture and between Occitan society and the French state did not encourage an active wish of resinance or a preoccupation with an image of a new . Its concems were rnainly ailnird and the Félibrige seems t O have been a movement that was several planes removed from the ordinary Occitan people. If people stili used forms of Occitan speech, these forms were highly localized and in constant evolution. An appreciation of the Occitan language did not really even develop among literate , as most people who learned to read, leamed to read ~rench? The main reason why there was little politicai expression within the Occitan movement during this time was that the commitment of the Occitans to viticulture kept the region

" M. Keating. Srare and .\litrurie .!'arionaiism. p.68. '-Ibid. ':P. Hains\vorth and M. Keating Decenaalizario>r and Clrattgr -45. and E. Weber. Peasants Into Fmchrnm. p.80. "E. Weber. Peasancs irtto Frrticlmtet~.p. 80. dependent on the French aate for the material benefits and protection that were necessary to maintain the viticulturai industry. The notables in the Languedoc region owed their position to their ability to deliver these benefits.'"Th cornmitment to viticulture can be seen in the fact that the most prominent expression of political nationalism was the 'Vintners Revoit' in

1906? Periodic crises of disease and overproduction led to peasant unrest and the beginnings of a cross-class regional alignrnent which united large landowners. small peasant producers and labourers and created a sense of soiidarity which was a factor in the developing rninonty nationalist movernent at the tum of the century." For ihe most part, however, the movement was concerned wit h cultural preservation and its intellecnial basis prevented it from attaining any widespread popular support.

Corsica

The relationship between France and Corsica and the development of minority nationalism on the island is markedly different to that of Brittany and Occitania. Corsica did not becorne part of France until 1769, which was much later than both Briaany and Occitania.

The French state was also much less involved in Conica than it was in Brinany and Occitania. Even afler the Revolution French authorities rernained largely indifferent to Corsica and when

nation-building efforts were canîed out in Conica, Conicans seemed to offer little resistance. "They [Corsicans] had apparently been fairly easily beguiled by the French assertion that culture came fi-om France and that al1 civilized social and political life as well as economic development came fi-om the French state.""

"U Kcating"Ru\mdicaaai and Lamentarion: the failurc of Regional Nationalism in Languedoc" Journal o/rlrea Sntdirs No. 14. p.28. "W. Ber. The L'rrerpecred Rebelliori. .p. 10. Although this \vas part of the uidesprcad Labour violence that was occurring houghout France at the iime. one of the leaders in Occitania linkcd the wine growcrs srnigglc to that of the Cathars Wnst Northm invadm. 4 - M. Kcating. State artd .\li,ioriy .Yatiortulisnt. p. 59. ;: P. Savigrar. "Corsicaand the French State" in Sutions Ilïthout a Stafe (cd.)C. Fostcr p. 1 18. Before its incorporation into the French state, Corsica had been under a long period of occupation by Genoa, which lasted fiorn the 13th century until 1768. A brief period of independence ( 1754- 1769), under the Corsican nationaiist Pascal Paoli, intempted this occupation and complicated the transfer of the island to French rule. This period of independence has provided contemporary nationalist movements with a romanticized and ideati~ed'~,but nonetheless reai reference point from which to claim separation or autonomy fiom rance." Because Genoa was unable to retain possession of the island, it ceded control of Corsica to France in 1 768." The long period of Genoan occupation resulted in Corsica developing traditions. societal forms and culture which were more Italian than Gallic.

There was liale urban development in Corsica, and what little there was, was limited to the Coast. Corsican society was rooted in agropastoral stmctures which were based on village cornmunity and disthguished by a system of clientelisrn known as the clan. The clan system of Corsica has more in common with traditions of Sardinian banditry and the Sicilian Mafia than with the notables of rural n rance."

Although the Corsican way of life was not immediately disrupted, the French did make some efforts at nation-building in Corsica. In fact, the French made plans for the administration of Corsica within a year of the initial conquest. These plans included roads, justice. schools and economic projects." French officiais aiso made attempts to destroy isianders' "rural habits and cnide forms ofjustice" such as the vendetta. The French language was also introduced to Corsica dong with the French educational system, French currency, and French police officers and gendarmes. Napoleon, himself a Corsican, introduced

'' It is otfen overlookd now that Paoli did not. even at the time of Corsican indepemdcnce. cnjoy the unanimous support of his countqmen. His chief rival \vas Emmanuel Matra who was chicf of onc of the most important clans on the island. R. Ramsay. The Corsicuri Tinrr Bomb. p.4. c- **M.Kaiiing and P. Hainnvonh. Decerrtrnlizatiorr and Change in Corttemporuty Fronce. p.93. -. '-Hainsworrh and Loughlin "LeProb1t;nie Corse" . p. 3-49. c - --P.Hainsuorth and J. Loughlin --LeProbl2nre Corse " Cotr~emporatyFrench CiviIùation p. 3 50. C -'P.- Savigear. "Corsica and the French State". p. 118. measures to ensure that Corsica remain attached to the Republic. For example, no govenunent poa on the island was to be held by a Corsican and the brightest children on the island were to be given every oppominity to receive a good education on the mainland.

Napoleon's purpose in this was to make Corsica as simiiar as possible to other parts of

France. 54 Despite these efforts, many of the traditional elements of Corsican society remained. Conican continued to be spoken by a majority of the population and Itaiian, the language of the educated class, was only slowly displaced by French. Paris also dowed the clan system to continue undisturbed which had significant consequences to the niture political and economic development of Corsica. In retum for their freedom 6om state control, the clans ensured that the island remain faitffil to whichever regime was in power in France, monarchist, Bonapartist or republican." Therefore, uniike in Bnttany and Occitania, traditional elites in Corsica used rather t han rninority nationalism t O retain their influence in Corsica. The maintenance of the traditional elements of Corsican society can be attributed more to the insularity of the population, than to any active opposition to French civilization on the part of the Corsicans. Corsicans themselves oflen appeared more willing to embody the political values of France than many of the inhabitants of continental France.56 In spite of the fact that many traditional elements of Corsican society were maintained, the island still experienced an economic upsurge at the beginning of the 19th century at which tirne there was a growth of the entrepreneurid bourgeoisie, modernization and diversification of agriculture and the begumings of industriai development. These economic gains, however, coUapsed by the end of the century as a result of the axending forces of monopoly capitalism.

C. -'R .Ramsay. The Corsicart Time Bontb. pp..9-10. = - -'P.himworth and J. Lmghiin "Lx Probhrr Corse-' p. 350. and J. Loughlin. .'Rcgionaiism and Ethnic Natiodism in France". p. 2 1 7. L - -'P. Savigm. "Corsica and the French State. p. 1 18. In particular, the introduction of the steamship and the railway in the 1830s brought cheap cornmodities fiom the mainland to Conica against which products of the local economy were unable to compete. As the economy of Corsica coilapsed, ernigration increased drarnatically." The economic decline of Corsica is a theme that would later be developed by minority nationalists. Much of the Corsican discontent is based on the cornplaint that the

French state has not done al1 that it proposed for Corsica, and what it has done has not been appropriate for the development of Corsica, but has been done in the spint of colonial enterprise? The accusation that France has reduced Corsica to the status of a coiony anses often in arguments for Corsican autonomy The econornic catastrophe also had important political implications for Corsica. as it aiiowed the clans to consolidate their power over al1 aspects of Corsican life. In faa, it was essential for the clans' sunival that Conica remain in a state of econornic degradation because this ensured that the clans could continue to operate a system of patron-client relationships which sustained their authority in Corsica.

The sunival of the clan system has also retarded Corsican political development.

Contrw to the democratic party politics that were developing elsewhere in , clan politics remain apolitical. Although the clans have adopted the "etiquettes of mainland France" and contest elections under the vanous party labels (RPR UDF, MRG) such labels are devoid of political content. Lefi clans act exactly as they did as Right clans and if the clan system is threatened the various clans will cooperate to ensure the su~valof the system as a wh01e.'~

'-P. Hainsworth and J. Loughfin. --Le Problimr Corsr " p. 35 1. From thc bcginning of the ninetanth century. Corsicans began &g emplqment uith the govemment senices which meant Icaving the island. Thest migres. howcva. sent rnoney home and at the end of their carcers retired in Corsica with thcir pensions. thus adding mon- to the Corsican cconomy. Emiption which occurrtd latcr in the 19th centuq-. particulariy after 1850 was motivatcd more by ne-ty than by opportunih. Corsicans bcgan leaving the island simply because thm wcre no opportunitics available for thm thcre. rcgardless of whethcr an? opportunities csisted e!sc.\vhc=re. "P. Sakipu "Conica and the French State". p. 118. - - -'P. iiammortfi and J. Loughiin -'L3 Prob/t!nte Corse " p. 352 and J. Loughlin '-Rcgiondism and ethnic Nationalkm in France" p. 2 17. The survivai of the clan system is another element of the nationalist argument in Corsica. Nationalias argue that the French democratic system has not been able to funaion for thern as it has elsewhere, meaning that France has been unable to rescue them fiom the worst feature of its history, the political hold of the cladOAlthough there was no anti-state nationalism in Corsica similar to Breton or even Occitan nationaiism during the 19th and early 20th century, the relationships that developed between the clan and French authorities and the consequences of the French presence in Corsica at this time formed the basis for future Corsican nationaiist programmes.

Despite the causes of Corsican nationalism that began to develop in Corsica from the beginning of the 19th century, most Corsicans raised under the nationalist education system set up at the beginning of the Third Republic identifieci strongly with France. By the outbreak of World War II, rnost of Corsiw despite factors of geoberaphy, ethnic origin and history, was totally committed to the constitutional link with France. Although there were a few nationalists by the time of World War II, their collaborationist activities with Italian fascists during the war discredited them with the majority of Corsicans who remaineci hostile to Itaiian irredentist claims on the island. The fact that Corsica was the first département of France to be liberated in June 1943, fùrther intensified Corsican identification with France.61

Surnmiuy ofAnti-State N~~tionulism Although each of the three cornmunities differed in the extent of rninority nationalism that they expressed at this time and each region emphasised different factors, the cultural, economic and poliàcal factors of rninority nationalism were present in al1 three regions. The opening up of local markets and the expansion of capitalism did not create the same advantages at the peripheries that were present in Paris and the north of France. In al1 three

'-P.Savigear. "Corsican and the French Sratc" p. 126. 6.-P. Hahmorih and J. imghiin. Pmbl&~e Corse ". p. 352.and R. Ramsay. The Corsican Time-Bomb. pp. 1&22. territones the expansion of the state economy was detrimental to their local economies. Instead of creating class alliances, the economic consequences of state expansion were felt across class bases and economic grievances could be expressed in national tenns. The most common demand minority nationalists made at this tirne was for material benefits from the state to protect their econornies. These demands detracted from any plan for autonomy because they could only be fulfilled through a continued relationship with the state. in both Bnttany and Occitania there were coherent programmes to preserve or revive certain elements of their distinct cultures. Breton elites attempted to maintain the Breton language and preserve the Catholic nature of the region. These demands were expressed through anti-repubiican sentiment which was meant to protect the interests of the traditional elites who were monarchical and Catholic. The dependency of the Occitans on material benefits fiom the state which maintained the viticultural industry prevented any strong anti-republican sentiment from developing. What opposition there was to the Republican nate faiied to attain widespread popular suppon because most of the peasantry were in favour of the secular values of the state. The nationalist movernent which did develop was essentially confined to intellectual attempts at reviving the Occitan language to its former status as a literary language. In Corsica there was basically no opposition to the infiuence of the French state. Traditional elites did not even attempt to create anti-Republican nationalkm because their ability to ensure support for any French regime allowed them to retain their unique political system and their hold on Corsican soci~ty~In spite of this non-resistance, much of the traditional Corsican society remained the same. The influence of the state did serve to make Corsicans more aware of their own culture, however, and this awareness would provide a basis for future Corsican nationdism.

Managhg Anti-State Ndonalism Despite the fact that these early encounters had all the elements present in minonty nationalist movements, the French state was able to manage the territorial upheavals that occurred at this time better than other Western European countries such as Spain or the

United Kingdom. Part of this success was due to the French effons at cultivating a national identity. The universal system of education provided the means to spread the French language and the democratic and secular values of the French Republic throughout its temtory.

Because knowledge of the French language was necessary for economic and social

advancement, moa of the new French subjects were eager to leam it. As more people learned the French language, local languages fell into disuse. Because rural inhabitants were illiterat e at the beginning of the 'ïhird Republic, later attempts to revive local languages were &en unsuccessful. The improved transponation, creation of a postal system, and common currency that were irnplemented by French state-builders increased the communications distinct communities had with each ot her and with park6' This also spread the values of the Republic and fostered the French identity, which most of the inhabitants of France were eager to accept. When economic and social grievances were expressed through minonty nationalist movernents wbich questioned the integrity of the French state, the French system of temtorial management disaggregated these demands and focussed them on a centralized system of territorial representatiod3 The traditional elites who exercised the most influence in the regions were included in institutions or informal networks which meant that their influence in the periphery became dependent on their continued involvement with the state. By doing this, French leaders sacrificed administrative centralkation in order to ensure the temtorial integrity of the state. Although there is debate as to the amount of centralization that was sacrificed in this endeavour, it is clear that the forma1 picture of the centralized state is an

^-E.Weber. Peasatrrr into Frericlimri,~.p. 6 3 . ' :M. Keating. State and .\linorip .Variona/~m.p. 133. inaccurate picture of reality. Sidney Tarrow suggests that the local notable or mayor attains and maintains power through his contacts with higher state officiais. Through these relationships the local notable acquires resources for the penphery fiom the centre. This in mm enhances his position in the periphery. The mayor's purpose in capturing resources for the state serves the interests of the

state more than the periphery, as it enables the state to regulate the periphery. In order for the local notable to attain the benefits he needs, he must also adopt policy values which are compatible to those of the national elite. According to Tarrow, it is those departrnents which have local plans that coincide with the nationai plan that receive the greatest material benefits fiom the state. By sacrificing the needs of the department to the objectives of the state, local notables retain influence at both the centre and the penphery. Tarrow sees the local notable as being apoiitical and nonpartisana Aithough this analysis tends to overemphasize the unity of French politics, it is also an argument which has been made by minority nationalists who maintain that the local notables are part of a system of exploitation of the peripheries by the centre? Vivian Schmidt, however. suggests that this analysis overestimates the extent to which

local officiais adopt the culture of the central administration and implement t hat culture.' She suggests that the fiagmented nature of the state's administrative system ailows local elected

officiais more fieedom at the periphery. According to Schmidt, local officiais have more political power in the penphery than either the central state or local officials themselves acknowledge. The old notables of the Third Republic, who had attained status through the accumulation of titles, may have maintained a relationship with the state that is sùnilar to what Tarrow describes. The Municipal Law of 1884, however, provided for the election of

"S. Tarrow , Benvern Centre and Prnplrep: GrwoouPoliricians in Itah, and France. "Robert Lafont desthis argument with respect to the regions in La Révolution Régionaliste (1x8)which will be discusd in detail latcr in this chapter. '' V. Schmidt. Demwarin'ng France. p.2 II. 43 rnayors and aiiowed for the emergence of a new class of notables who were able to gain the political power which could counter-balance the administrative control of the prefect. These elected notables were part of a new elite who accurnulated elected offices rather titles to enhance their position. The cz~mirlde mutzdats, whereby an eiected officiai holds office at local and national levels concurrently, ailows him to play the role of a privileged mediator between the centre and periphery. Because of this the local official is not as subordinate to their respective prefeas as official descriptions of their positions would suggest. Rather, it is ofien the prefect who must answer to the local officiaL6' Finally the local officia1 oRen has considerably more iduence over the agents of the field services than formai centraiization would suggest. Although the ministries operate according to a standardized dein principle, in pradce local agents make exceptions to these general rules in the periphery in order to ensure that local notables cooperate in the implementation of central policies.68 Schmidt, therefore, maintains that the clairns of local politicians to be apolitical and nonpartisan as well as their complaints against the centralized nature ofthe state are more rhetoric than reality. This rhetoric ailows local notables to evade responsibility for unpopular policies at the periphery and thus remain unaccountable to the local population^.^^

Post- War Nnrionaiism- The Emergence of Econoniic Grieva~~ces immediately foilowing World War II there was no si@cant minority nationaiism in France. The collaborationist activities of some minority nationaiists during World War II (particularly in Bnttany) discredited most other nationalist movements. This was a major setback for the regions in relation to the administration of the Fourth Republic. The new

.- ' J. Ha>ward. Goveming Fmice. p. 84. *%id.. p. 24. ' 'V. Schmidt. Demwotüing France. p.2 12-2 13. social forces in the periphery which were advocating regionalism were largely ignored by the leaders of the Founh Republic, who continued to maintain the traditional relationship with the local notables. During the Fifih Republic, however, regionalists and minority nationalists gained more prominence as result of both pressures fi-om new social groups in the regions and a desire Eom the central state to revive the national economy by gaining the support of these new social forces. Following World War II, while rnost of France entered into a penod of economic growth and expansion, the regions of Occitania, Brittany and Corsica continued in a state of economic and political decline. In response to this, the 1950s saw a reawakening of regionalist movements which continued into the 1960s." Although there was a renewed interest in regional cultures at this time, theforces vives, which were the social groups7' behind the new regionalist movements, emphasized economic issues over cultural ones. The forces vives maintained that the region was a more suitable unit to be invoived in econornic plannùig rather than the state or the dtprtmer~t.Regionaiism and minority nationalism at this time were both concerneci with modemization rather than defence of the traditional economy and social reIationships. In an attempt to revitalize the economy of the regions the forces vives organized themselves into corniris d'ixpa~rriori e'cormmiques. The first and most effective of these was the Comité &,des et de Liaisor1 des i~r~erêtsBretorrs (CELIB), w hic h minority nationalists in Corsica and Occitania later tried to emulate, but with less success. DeGadle's interest in the region as an administrative unit in the Fifth Republic was, in part, a response to these newly emerging pressure groups in the regions. The new focus on the region as a unit of administration was part of a strategy to neutralize regional pressures and restore central authority. The regionalisation of the edy Fifth Republic,

- - D. H.Fortier. "Brirtany Breiz .4fao1r1n.\'arions wiljlout a Srale led.) C . Fostcr. .. -These social groups included industrialists. trade unionists. modern farmcrs, profcssionals. public smants and academics. P. HainswoRh and M. Keating.. Decertaalirotion and Change. p.36. however, was more than a response to pressures from the regions. It was du, an expression of the desire on the part of DeGaulle to revive the national econorny. In his efforts to do so, De Gaulle was dieto gain the cooperation of the local notables, who resisted any reforms that rnight threaten to dismpt their relationship of complicity with the prefect. Regionalisation was a strategy that could create a direct link between the central state and the peripheiy which would allow him to circumvent the notables." The policy of regionalization, created new regional loyalties which were not based on cultural identities. At this the the didinction between minonty nationalists and regionalists becornes blurred. Because minority nationalists had taken up econornic issues, many of their objectives and programmes were identical to those of regionalists. Minority nationalists, however, continued to tie their cultural distinctiveness to econornic gnevances and included this in their programmes. In order to gain the cooperation of the forces vives, De Gaulle established

Comrnzssiot~sde développement L'co~lorniquerégiod (CODERs) in 1 964. These advisory bodies, which brought together local councillors, interest group representatives and govemment nominees, were meant to remove the influence of the regional cornites d'eWo~z icotromique by incorporating their members into this new agency of the central govemrnent. Mer the CODER had succeeded in breaking up the corniles d'expar~sio~i L;conorniqire it became apparent that the regional influence in these bodies was ineffective because the CODERs were colonized by local notables who proved unwilling to give up their local power. Consequently, many of the more dynarnic groups resigned. The policy initiatives for economic modemization in the region were also developed in a highly centraiized way through the Déligatio~za 1 'Aménagement du Territoire et a I 'Ac~iot~Régiotlale (DATAR)estabiished in 1963. The purpose of DATAR was to "give a regional dimension to national planning and encourage the dispersal of industry to the

- - 'V. Schmidt. Drnrwarizirrg Frartce. p. 77. regions"." Although regionalists first welcomed the economic investment and development that resulted from DATAR, the agency later becarne an issue of discontent as regionalists began to question whether or not the policies of DATAR actually benefitted their regions.

Many began to see these policies as subordinating the interests of their region to the benefit of the state and began to resent these policies. In response to what they believed to be economic subordination, some rninority nationalists used the intemal colonial thesis to describe the situation of their territories in relation to the centre. Although the intemal colonial thesis had apparent theoretical weaknesses, it was an effective tool for generating support for the various regionai movements. In La R&voliRegionaiiste, Occitan nationalist, Robert Lafont, addresses the question of underdevelopment in the regions. Lafont maintains that underdevelopment in tenitories such as Brittany and Occitania is not the result of natural consequences. These regions, until the latter half of the nineteenth century were thriving and possessed profitable resources. '' However, with the modemkation of agriculture and industry, Occitania and Bnttany were unable to keep up with the development that was occuning elsewhere in France. The state's policy of omér~agementdir T6rrltoire to remedy the inequalities in development were largely ineffective because the proposed remedies were formulated without any consultation with regional representatives." Consequently the national plans were simply instruments to use the regions for purposes which would best serve the interests of the state. The technocratie nature of the regional policies, in tum, created disaffection among local populations who expresseci little interest in political act ivit y. Such disaffection was evidenced in the lack of interest in municipal elections. This also served the interests of the state as it made it easier to expropriate resources and labour From the regions for the benefit of the

- - -.'P. Hainmorth and M. Kcating. Decentraluation and Change. p. 37. 'R..tafont. La Révolution Rt;gtonalis~rp.p. 78-79. - c -1bid.. p. 62. tat te.'^ Lafont's solution to this problem is to allow the regions more autonomy in both cuihiral and economic rnatters, so that the two could be tied together in order to develop the economy in accordance with the traditionai essence of the regions. These refoms would dlow regions to be free fiom both foms of colonialism - cultural and econ~mic.~A programme such as this would involve contracts between the state and the region which defined the powers to be allotted to each. Lafont, however, is vague as to the powers that should be devolved, stating simply that regions should be responsible for the affairs of the region and qualifies this by noting that smail regions, due to their Iimited capacities, would be granted only limiteci auton~rny.'~Finally, Lafont notes that it is necessary for the state to maintain powers in the areas of defence, health and, edu~ation.'~ Fougeyrollas aiso uses the intemal colonialism theory in his anaiysis of the economic problems of the regions and ties together cultural and economic issues sirnilar to Lafont. Fougeyrollas, however, envisions a role for the state which is substantiaily more diminished than what is proposed by Lafont. He suggests that the state of France be transformed to a federation in which the centrai goverment is responsibie for only foreign policy, defence and coordinating a federal plan. The unitary state will be divided into eleven regions which correspond to traditional linguistic comrnunities and economic similaritie~.~~Regions are to be responsible for ail bancial and cultural matters, but they will be required to pay a pomon of regional revenue to the federai treasury. Although every region will pay into the treasury, only those regions which are underdeveloped to the extent that they cannot modernize on

'Ibid.. p. 5 1. * - Ibid.. pp. 188-1 96. -. Xbid.. p. 22 1. hi.. p. 220. it is intdngthat Mont ~ouldinclude cducation as a function that should bc rtscrvod for the state. Other qonalists have made dcmands for grcatcr autonomy in the ficld of cducation as thcy fwl tt is for prtstrvation of rc@onai cuhucs and kingmges. In the 1980s the Socialists dccentraiization rtforms wcrc criticizcd for not allowing mou@ regional autonomy in education. (Sec Chapter 4) . . '-P.Fougqrotlas. Pour Cite France Fedirale.. p. 159. their own will receive money. Fougeyrollas believed that such restnictu~gwas necessary if the regions of France were to be cornpetitive upon France's entry into the European

Union." In effect, it appears that Fougeyrollas envisions a Europe of the Regions with the central govemments acting maidy as officiai heads of state."

The resurgence of minority nationaiism in response to economic deciine was more marked and focussed in Brittany than in Occitania or Corsica. Despite this, the fira nationalist movements in Brittany avoided any issues other than those related to cultural revivai, as the earlier Breton nationalists had been discredited by the few who had collaborated with the Nazis dunng World War II. However, the post-war economic crisis necessitated some kind of economic and political expression. This period saw significant nurnbers of workers abandon the traditional industries of farming and fishing. In addition to this, the industrial sector. which was already atrophied, could not provide the jobs necessary to accommodate the growing population. The scarcity of jobs caused by population surplus and social mobility intensified migrationAg3 In response to these economic and social problems, Breton nationalists fonned the

Comité dEtr~deset de Liaisor1 des Ii1rt'rét.s (CELIB) in 1949. This was the most farnous and best organized expression of Breton economic and political interests and served as a mode1 for Occitan and Corsican nationalists. By 1967 CELIB was able to unite 900 municipal councils and nearly 200 organizations ranging from representative bodies, charnbers of agriculture, Departmental union and unofficial organizations such as the dépormentui

'-%id. pp. 7-10. . - '-V.Schmidt, Dm~ocraruingFrance. p. 81. . - -'D.F.Fortier. "Breri.-i tao" p. 147. Federations of Farmers' Unions (FDSEAs) and vade unions. Suzanne Berger suggests that part of the reason for the success of CELIB was the weakening of class ideologies in French society. This lefi room for new ideologies to emerge around which new identifications could be fomed. CELlB was able to mobilize support by lobbying on behalf of t he regiond identity of Brittany rather than for benefits specific to any one class. As proof of this transformation, Berger cites a speech given by FDSEA President, Michel Hemery, in which he argues that the cntical cause of the Finistere's peasants' problems was the fact that they lived in a poor region." Rather than attributing the economic problems to the class of the farmers, he noted that these problems rnight bç specific to the region of Brittany. Although the sense of a distinctive race and culture undoubtedly contributed to the cohesion of CELIB, its driving force was not ethnic factors. It was concemed with economic factors that were denved from its geographic situation and demographic exodus. 86 It carried out two tasks: the fim was as a study group which andysed Breton economic problems and the second was as a parliarnentary pressure group which lobbied for solutions to these economic problems. During the Fourth Republic CELIB was fkequentiy successfid acting in its capacity as a pressure gr~up.~' The high point in CELiB's influence occuned in 1962 when it was able to obtain a pledge fi-om 84 Breton candidates in the general eldon to put the interests of Brittany ahead of those of the Party. Most of the Breton electorate was inclined to vote for the nght, however, allowing the Gaullist U.N.R. to win three quarters of the seats in Brittany. Consequently. CELiB lost much cf the support it had emed amongst members in

. . "J. Ha?w.ard, "From Functional Repmtation to Functiond Rcgionalism in France: the Battic of Brittany"Political Sfudirs Vol. XVIL No. 1 (1969) p.52. "S. Berger "Bretons and lambins: Rcflcctions on French" in Elltnic Conficf and die Festern World (cd.)M. Esman. p. 163. "J. Ha'ward .'Rom Functional Reprexntation" .p.52. . - - Ibïd.. p. 5 1. parliament.'' The final blow to CELIB came when the GauUist govemment introduced the

Comrnisssiori de De veloppemetii Économique er Régiorial (CODER).The decision of the CELIB to participate in the new organization for regional representation "set the seal on its defeat". Pressure to join the CODER came from the preparation of the government's Fifih Plan fiom which Brittany hoped to receive the means to revive its economy." The CODER stifled regional sentiment by channelling regional energies into a centralist device which was nibordinate to the regionoi prefect? The regional prefect was the only one who could cal1 the CODER into session and he decided the agenda. He and his staffdid the preparatory work for discussions and these discussions were lirnited to advising upon regional aspects of economic planning. The regional prefects participated in the CODER deliberations to ensure that the deliberations did not exceed their prescribed functi~ns.~'By integrating members of the CELIB into the CODER, the central govemment was able to defùse regional sentiment in Brittany and avoid any challenges to its authority that rnight ensue fiorn such sentiment. Once the rnoderate and organized elements of the regional movement were incorporated into the state apparatus, the remaining elements disintegrated into competing groups. A more political and explicitly autonornist group which had existed in Brittany since 195 7 was the Moznwmer~/pow l 'O~iisutiotide la Bretag>ie (MOB). It had the long term goal of independence and saw autonomy as a step towards that goaL91 In 1963 this group split and the U~imDémocratique Breforme (UDB) resulted. This group supports a European federation of regions and originally clairned to favour neither socialism nor capitalism. By 1970. however, the organization had expelled those members sympathetic to

"lbid.. p.57. ' ibid.. p. 59. wafd. "From Functional Rcpmentation". pp. 60-6 1. . . --J. Loughlin. '-Regionalism and Ethnic Nationalism in France". p. 21 5 the Front de Libérotiori Breton (FLB)and its gmchist libertans. At this tirne the party became anctly Leninist and aligned itself with the Comrnunist Party. Suppon for nationaiism in Brittany. sirnilu to nationalism elsewhere in France, was stimulated by France's disengagement from Algena. This support grew aer the Days of May in 1968. The example of Algenan independence was signifiant to regional movements in France as it put the officiai description of France as "one and indivisible" into question.g3In Brittany, the strike at the Juim Frmçais generated the most solidarity since the successful days of the CELIB. The strike was for. among other things, parity in wages with the workers at a similar firm in Paris. Other movements which occurred around this tirne included a protest by small milk producers against their cooperative and demonstrations against planned rnilitary bases. The solidarity of these demonstrations, however, was a solidarity of the lef't and they did not achieve the same kind of cross-class mobilization that the CELIB had ac~omplished.'~ The Breton movement also expenenced a culturai revival around this tirne. Accomplishrnents in this area included the admittance of Breton as a subject for the baccala~ireutin 1970, the publication of twenty penodicals by 1976, novels, plays and the revival of Breton music in the form of electnc folk-rock.95 Although Breton nationalism successfully revived elements of the Breton culture and enjoyed a temporary economic and potitical success. there has been an "almost complete indifference to the theses of nationalism in Brittany." Support for nationaiism rnight have existed at the elite level, but the rnajonty of Bretons expressed an attachent to the Republic.% The majonty of the nationalist movements for their part. also did not advocate or desire independence. Instead, most were interested only in a form of decentralkation which would give them regionai governrnent,

. .. *W.Beer. The L'nexpecred Rebelliorz,. p.38. "P. Hainsworth and M,Keating. Decena~limtiortmtd Change. p.9. *%id. p.9. *'.l.Loughlin."Regionalism and Ethnic Nationalism in France". p.? 17. 52 local economic powers and protection of the Breton culture. Therefore, the main efforts of these movements could be channelled into the political parties of the lefi which, during the

1960s. had adopted programmes which were able to accommodate rnany of the nationalists' demands.

Occirar~ia In Occitania, the resurgence of regional nationaiism aiso began with movements for a cultural revival with econornic and politicai movements emerging later. There was never any regional movement in Occitania, however. that accomplished the same degree of organization and integration that was accomplished by the CELIB. Aithough there were protests which were capable of mobilizing the varied interests, they were içolated events and the organization was not permanent.

The first group to fom after World War II was the Ikstimt d'&des Occitmes (IEO) in 1949. Initiaily the group carnpaigned for the revival of the Occitan culture and tried to agree on a written standard for the language." As the group became more political, however, members divided between traditionalists whose purpose was still to preserve the Occitan culture and modemizers who believed that Occitania must be developed into a modern and urban region ifthey were to achieve any sigmficant social or economic gains. In 1959 a small group of modemizers left the iEO to fom the nght wing Parti Natio~listeOccitan which favoured an independent Occitania. The mainstream members of the IEO subsequently adopted a policy in favour of decentralization which meant that the national parties of the lefi could gain the support of these membersA9*

As in Brittany, econornic stagnation was a cntical cause in the rise of nationalism, although there was less emphasis on modernization in Occitania. Here the large sector of

- M. Kcating. "RevendkarionZI lamenration". p.28. .- - P. Hainworth and M. Keating Decerttra/ri

region had been declining since the 1950s and the farmers were dependent on the French state to buy the surpluses that were produced. in the 1960s, however, France came under pressure from the European Community to cut back their support for declining industries such as ViticuIture." The Occitan regions were also not equipped to cornpete with the foreign wines ente~gthe French market. To protest the foreign cornpetition, vintners in Languedoc staged outbreaks of discontent which included actions such as burning tires in the streets and smashing bottles of imponed wine in super market^.'^ Because decisions concerning the European wine regime were made in Brussels, Paris officials could not supply local notables with the means to respond to this discontent in their traditional marner of winning subsidies or bringing materid benefits to the regi~n.'~'

Another cause for discontent was the state's strategy of amhagement dl4 Territoire, which Occitans perceived as a tool to keep the south in a permanent state of dependency and underdevelopment. In particular, they resented the tounst trade which inhabitants saw as a subservient trade which deprived the region of its self-respect."" Economic discontent, expressed at a strike at Décazeville against possible closure of the mine was able to mobilize a considerable arnount of suppon. From the impetus of the strike a new movement was formed by Occitan activist and scholar, Roben Lafont. The

Corniré oc cita^^ d'Éludes d'Action (COEA)used the intemal colonialists' interpretation of regional disparity to bnng together the cultural and economic themes of 0ccitania.'03 This alliance was ody temporary, however, and fell apart in 1971, after the events of 1968

' 1. ..-Ibid.. p. 1 '--W.Lem. -'Class Politics. Cultural Politics" Critique o/-!rtrliropologv Vol. 14. NO. 4 (1994) p. 397. . . -.'M.. .- Keating. "Revendication et Lamt.lttatiori., p.28. ---lbid.. p.28. . -" '-'P. Hainsuorth and M. Keaung. Decerrtraluaalrorr and Change. p.12. Set also R. Lafont La Révolun'on Rqïonalisre.for a cornpletc cxplanation as to how Lafont bnnps tqtthcr the issues of regional culture and tconomics. attracted new e1ements to the movement. Prior to 1968, the Occitan movement had been unable to reconcile the traditionalists with the modemizers. The events of May 1968 added even more elements to the movement. The addition of these new elements led to the dissolution of the COEA in favour of a more

militant Liitte Occitane. lW Touraine, in his study of the Occitan Movement concluded that

there was no one wle direction inherent in the movement and it was pointless to try and seek one as there was no principle of unity in the nature of the movement. Instead ofcreating a unified movement, Touraine suggested that the movement try to control the tensions between the various elements in order to direct the movement toward a weakly integrated but effective action.lo5 The goup had its most success when it made links with other social protest movements such as a series of protests against the Larzac rniiitary base between 197 1- 1972.1°6 There is some debate, however, as to whether the Larzac protest was really an Occitan issue. Although it did have indigenous support, it is unclear whether the protest were reaily Occitan or ifit was outside groups who took up the Larzac cause and acquired the indigenous Occitan support Iater. 'O7 Like the Breton movements, Occitan regionai movements were most successfÙ1 in presewing the Occitan culture. Politicaiiy and econornically, however, their lack of unity and absence of defineci goals prevented them fiom achieving any significant success as a regionai group. What distinguished the Occitan movement frorn other nationalist movements in France is the fact that it was part of a much wider challenge to the French society in which ethnic claims were united with other forms of discontent. This aspect of the movement allowed national political forces to borrow Occitan themes which hampered the development

.-4 --'M.Kcating. "R~endicutiorret Lametrtatiotr ".p.28. . -c ---A.Touraine. 'Sociol& intcn'cntion and the intcrnal bnamics of the Occitankt Movemcnt in .Léw h'ationalr'Jms of he Developed Ikt. (eds.)E. Tinakian and R. Rogowski. pp. 157-175. ..- --'P. Hainsworth and M. Keating. Decermalizario~aand Change. p 13. . .. -- W.Betr, The Citexpected Rrbelliott. p. 2 1. of an Occitan nationaiist movement. 'O8

Corsica The post-war emergence of nationaiism in Corsica was the first concerted programme of nationalism in the region, as it did not experience the lhh cenniry anti-lepublican nationalism that occurred in Brittany and Occitania. There were some allegations as to the colonial statu of Corsica in the inter-war period and movernents which were based mainly on ailturd issues nich as dernands for the teachùig of the Corsican 'dialect' in school and the reopening of the university in Corsica, but these programmes neither progressed nor gained a wide support amongst cor sic an^.'^ The arbitrary brutality of Mussolini's Blackshirts during the World War iI occupation of Corsica and the fact that Corsica was the firm region to liberate itself in June 1943 intensified pro-French sentiment amongst a population that already identified strongly with the French state.''' Soon after World War D, however, Corsicans began to becorne aware of their relative econornic deprivation in relation to the rest of France. The national economic recovery that began during the Fourth Republic made the economic weakness of Corsica more evident.

Soon Corsicans began to wonder ifTorsicans are "French why do they not participate in the benefits of the French economic revival."' The ernergence of Corsican nationdism was therefore founded on econornic concems. However, as the rnovement progressed, it becarne hcreasingiy evident that the main issues of Corsican nationalism were neither econornic nor cultural (although both were important elements in Corsican nationalism), but political. The essential concem for nationalists was that Corsicans were not benefitting from their current

... -''C. Codon and F. Morin. "Occitan Ethnicity and Politics" Critiqrte 0/.4nllrropologv.p. 120. . . '--P. State". 1 19. -.. Savigear. -'CorSica and the French p. '-'J.. Loughlin. "Regionalkmand Ethnic ..."p.2 18. . . , ---P.Savigear. 'Corsica and the Fmch State". pp. 120- 12 1 and P. Hainworth and J. hu#din. "Le Probléme Corse " pp.352-353. relationship with France. Hence a special political relationship which would grant Corsicans more autonomy in the development of the region was demanded by nationalists.'12 Throughout the coune of the 1960s and 1970s, the range of issues that were included in the autonomist programme included econornic deprivation, cultural erosion, depopulation, and electoral fiauci, al1 of which could be related to the general theme of Corsican colonization. The beginning of econornic discontent amongst the Corsican people coincided with

the regionalisation progamme of the Fourth Republic. This programme developed out of t he necessity to adapt the temtorial basis of the economy to the new econornic forces of

European integration. The Cor sican Plail d 'A ctiort Régiot2uie (PAR) att empted to reverse Corsican econornic decline through the development of tounsm and agriculture. To put the

PAR'S programme into effect, the governrnent set up two semi-state bodies: SETCO (Société pour l 'L'qitiprnent toiiristiqrrr de la Corse) and SOMlVAC (Société de la mise en valew

agricoie de la or se)."^ Although the activity of the PAR did result in econornic investment and development in Corsica, as the programmes advanced Corsicans began to question who

it was that benefitted from these developments. Hence the state's economic intervention in Corsica becarne an issue of contention which could be used to stimulate Corsican nationdism. The purpose of SOMIVAC was to develop agriculture by making loans and other necessary agriculturai infrastructure such as water supplies, imgation projects, rural electrification and the improvement of roads available."* One of the main efforts of SOMIVAC was the deveiopment of the Eastern Plain. Physically this policy made good sense and could be considered a success. The project made available 50.000 hectares of flat ard fertile land. ûther projects such as the building of water pumping stations and irrigation dams and of research stations that led to the development of new crops were also successfùiiy

. . - --'P. Savigear "Conica and the French State" p. 123. . . - and '*Le Corse" .-.--'P. Hainsworth J. Loughlin. Problime p.353. "'P. Savigar.'Torsica and the French State". p. 122 and R. Ramsay. î7re Corsican Tirne-Bomb, p.36. ~orn~leted.~~'Where the project went astray was in the distribution of land. The beginning

of SOMIVAC operations coincideci with the French withdrawal fkom Algeria and the Eastern Plain offered a convenient location to settle repatnated pieh noirs. Although officiai statements claimed that the majority of recipients of actual plots of land or of subsidies for existing plots were either Corsican or of Corsican origin, these daims were rejected by most Corsicans. In fact, the activities of SOMIVAC could not be unequivocally shown to have benefitted Corsicans and the bulk of the larger holdings did go to non-Cor~icans."~ The programme of SETCO also became an object of cntiasm in Corsica. Rather than benefit small Corsican hostellers, the development of tourism remained mainly in the hands of giant corporations such as ITT, SOFITEL, the Rothschild Bank, the Bank of Suez and the Compigriie Paquet. The hdof towism promoted by these groups was the construction of

vast tourist complexes which were denounced by the locai population as the "bal~~éarisation"

of Conica. Furthemore, it became known that these foreign corporations were importing both staff and food supplies into Corsica. Hence, the tourist initiatives aiso appeared to benefit France and foreign groups more than Corsicans themselves. "' Out of the opposition that developed in response to the two initiatives of SOMIVAC and SETCO,organized discontent began to emerge. The first two groups to forrn were the

Mouvemerir du 29 mvembre and the Défeese des htérêts économiques de Ia Corse @ECO). Both of these groups adopted a regionalkt approach simiiar to that of CELIB, but were unable to create a mass movement equai to CELiB or even to unite organizations and individuals. This failure led to the formation of the Comité d'Études et de Déjiense des intérêts de h Corse (CEDIC)by Paul-Marc Seta and Max ~Uneoni.''~ At the same time, more radical groups were emerging mainly among young

..L -'-P.Savigear. "Corsican and the French State". p. 122 and R. Ramsay. 7ï1eCorsican Time-Bomb. p.38. .. . -..- -'%id -- P. HBinsworth and J. Loughlin. "Le Problime Corse" p.354. .--

a * 'J. Loughlin. "Reponalism and Ethnic Nationalism in France" p.2 19. intellectuals living on the French mainland who resented the fact that underdevelopment in

Corsica forced hem to ernigrate to the mainland in order to find work. The Union Corse was formed in 1960 by Corsican students in Paris. In 1963 this became the Front Régio~iaiiste

Corse (FRC)which was politicdly to the lefi and defined Corsica's problems as a result of capitalism and c01oniaIism."~The members of CEDIC shared the FRCPPC anaiysis that Corsica was a colony. but retùsed its socialist critique of capitalism. '" In the 1966 legislative elections the CEDIC decided to run Max Simeoni as a regionalist candidate. The FRC refused ro take part in this election, asserting first that due to electorai malpractices the elections were unfair and secondly that the Corsican problem was that of a "nationality" whose destiny could not be modified by means of voting in continental ele~tions."~

Standing as a Rigiodisre, Simeoni received only 1 1 60 votes (out of 3 1,527 cast). The Gaullia candidate topped the poll with 9726 votes and won the seat on the second round, in which he received at least 5387 votes by postal vote. '" The results of this election seerned to confirm the point rnany autonomists were already making about the conduct of politics in Corsica which was that the island was the home of the clans who twisted politics to their advantage. This convinceci the CEDIC memben that the bea way to effect change in Corsica was not by chailenging the existing political parties on their own ground but to operate outside the normal range of political life on the island. At a congress on 3 September 1966, the CEDIC formed thernselves into the I 'Acfio~tRigiotialiste (ARC)which later became the

WC. l3 The programme of the UPC was to break the power of the clans by cleansing the

'-.T.Hainsworth and J. Loughlin. .-Le Problénie Corse" p.? 19. in 1971 the FRC published Muin busse sur une fie uhich has been an hporiant uPrk in the development of nationalist theses among Young Corsicans. in 1973 the FRC he the Partitu di L' Poprilu Corsu (PPC ). . - * ---1bid. . . . ---R.Ramsay. The Corsica~Time-Bonrb. p. 48. --- --%id. Postal vw'ng ~asthc uay in wfich Corsicans tiving on the mainland cast their votes in elections. Thcsc results. however.. --wm highlv susceptible to tampering by the clans. ---RRamsay Tire Corsican Tinae-Bomb. p. 48. And P. Savigcar. .'Corsiccl and the French State" p. 1 28. Thc ARC sas banneci in 1975 fiwing a protest at Aieria and chan@ its namc to the APC (;lssociationdes Patriotes corses) and later to the UPC !Li~iortedi L'Populu Corstr) which remains its present title. electoral system and by obtaining a statute of autonomy which would give Corsica large powers of financial, economic and cultural control.'" The constitution of the ARC is revealing as it illustrates the changing ernphasis of the autonomist movement. Where CEDIC had been largely concerned with economic issues, the Preamble of the ARC constitution presented the Corsican problem as a minority problem."' The wording of the Preamble is somewhat softened by the wording of the first article which described the movement's aim as king to "promote the economic, social and cultural development of Corsica through the achievement of the status of an autonomous region within the framework of the French

Rep~b1ic.l'~It is still clear, however, that the autonomist movement in Corsica, by the late 1960s had developed to include cultural and politicai issues. Another type of nationalism which developed out of the long tradition of the use of arms in Corsica were movements which chose to take up arms against the French state. Various armed groups sprang up during the 1960s and 1970s and in 1976 these groups amalgamateci to form the From de Libéraiiori Natiotaaie de la Corse. (FLNC). Like the more militant groups in Bnttany and Occitania, the FLNC sought independence from France. Its

rnethod of achieving it was the plmting of bombs, which were originally confined to buildings and symbols of the French state to avoid the injury of persons. in more recent years their targets have expanded to include the homes of the cotzfzi>e>rfacixor people bom on the French mainland and living and working in Corsica and targets on mainland m rance.'" Although support for the FLNC is slight and the violent methods its members ernploy have tumed people away fkom the nationalist cause, throughout the years the more militant groups have

.. . --'J. Loughlin, "Rqonalism and Ethnic Nationdisin in Francc". pp.2 19-220. . -- --TL Ramsay. nie Cmcan The-Bomb. pp.4849. France =as fad~~th the Corsican problcm the day sht dtcidcd to make the island a deparremenr like ali the rest. France has nover been able to find a satisfactory solution to the problm. because she has clunp to the principles of an obtuse centralkm and closed her qcs Io the obvious fa& - facts which are gtographical. historicai, cultural and ethnic. .-. .--'-'R. Ramsay. The Corsican Tirne-Bonib. p.49. -- P. Hainsworth and J. Loughlin. -Le Problime Cor.se".p.355. applied pressure on the ARClIJPC to adopt more extremist tactics. In the face of this pressure the WC's refusa1 to act as an official Party has proven to be sornewhat of a weakness. In 1967 the less radical image of the ARC undoubtedly

helped to amact the support ofthe sections of the Corsican population who were concerned about the Corsican situation but fnghtened off by the pronounced socialism of the Uition

Corse. But in the mid- 1970s the ARC and its successors staged some dramatic incidents such as the one at Aleria which attracted massive p~blicity."~Men the leaders then tried to pull back f?om 'extra-political' action they had no recognizable party role to fdl back on. Despite this weakness, the ARC/UPC was undoubtedly the stronger of the two strands of Corsican nationalism. Concem over the Corsican culture, which had previously never been coordinated nor diligently pursued, now became a more prorninent pan of minonty nationalist programmes. Nationalias in Corsica had the wppon of those Corsicans iiving in mainiand France who were determineci to mate a Corsican cultural unity . The nationalist movement of the 1960 s rest ed on the suppon of these Corsicans living in exile. Two issues of particular importance to Corsicans have been language and education. The French state was slow to allow broadcasting time in Corsican and reluctant to accept Corsican under the Deixonne Law of

195 1." Another issue of contention was the repeated delays in the opening of the university in Corsica. Although these cultural matters were not the cause of the resurgence of nationalism, they did constitute a relevant element in sustaining the movement. Conicans working or attending school on the mainland have since the 1970s attended educational summer activities at Cone (site of the university) which have combined the study of the

. - --%1975 Edmond Simeuni. former leader of the UPC led an amed occupation of a vineyard owncd ùy a pied noir. This nsulted in serious rioting although it is disputed whether it was the occupicrs or the geridamcs who set off the rioting. J. Loughlin..-- "Rcgionaiism and Ethnic Nationaiism". p.220. -- 'Diesonne Law of 195 1 was the tirst lau to legaiizc the teaching of certain chiclanguagcs in public schools. W. SalTran. "The Mitterand Rcgimc..." p.4 1. Corsican language in prose and Song and the study and appreciation of Corsican traditions and folklore with the analyses of contemporary econornic and political problerns.lM The reason for this new emphasis on cultural fa~zorswas the rapid depopulation occurring on the island. Although econornic factors were a prominent part of this issue.

cuittire was du, relevant as Corsicans foresaw the extinction of their culture through a double process of Corsican emigration and foreign immigration. Reiiable figures on the Corsican population are difiicult to hd, but an overall &op in the number of people living on the island between the last decades of the 19th century and the last quarter of the twentieth cenhiry has been revealed. In the 1880s. the population in Corsica seems to have been in the region of 300,000. This population in the 1980s was down to about 230,000. More important to Corsican nationalists is the net emigration of Corsicans Born the island and the consequent decreasing proportion of Corsicans among the permanent inhabitants of Corsica."' Aithough this new concem had been added to the nationaikt programme by the 1970s. French authorities did not immediately recognize this concem. Therefore, by continuhg in their efforts to improve the island's economy, they actually exacerbated Conican fears that the Corsican identity was in danger of disappearing. 13' In 197 1. the publication of the Schémo dlAmétzagemeiit which mapped out the objectives to be pursued up to the penod of 1985, intensified suspicions of the extinction of the Conican identity."' The Schéma was basically a technocratie document, arguing in favour of measures to build on the recent 'successes' in ag.riculture and tourism. The document overlooked the crucial facts that the recent expansion of agriculture had taken place at the expense of traditional Corsican agriculture and that toda development was dominated by foreign trusts at the investment and managerial level

.-- -P. French State". --... Sa\igear."Corsica and the p. 126. ---%id...:- p.120. Ramsay. The cor si car^ Timr-Bomb. p.58. .:----R.

m. %id. p.59 and by North Afican and Itaiian immigrant workers in the labour force.lY

To add to this controversy, after the Schéma had been approved by the Council of Ministers on August 4, 1971, the Governrnent spokesman, Leo Hamon, noted in a news

confierence that developments projected in the Schéma were expected to result in an increase in the Corsican population from 200,000 to 320.000 in the penod up to 1985. Corsican activists immediately interpreted this to mean that, as Corsican ernigration would undoubtedly continue, the increase in population would corne fiom an influx of newcomers from continental France. This would significantly reduce the proportion of native cor sic an^."^ Although cultural and economic issues were major factors in the nationalist movement at this time, the essential issue for Corsicans was and continues to be their political association with France. The econornic and cultural factors that were included in the nationaiist programmes were simply illustrations of the fate of the Corsican people in their association with the French state. The response of the French state to Corsican demands up to 1982 was to refuse any special politicai status to Corsica. DeGaulleYspolicy was to continually invest in Corsica SI as to improve their economic situation. Some French officiais have argued that, in fact. through economic investment, the French government has recognized the special circumstances of Corsica. 13' President Giscard d'Estaing seerned to be somewhat more sympathetic to Corsican auionomists. He claimeci to be generally in favour of decentralizing decisions and recognized the existence of a regional group of people in Conica who were dzerent f?om others. But he stopped short of conceding them a right which would place the notion of the 'Corsican people' above or even on the same plane as the French nation. Giscard's opinion was that Corsicans might have their own characteristics but they were different from the inhabitants

"%id. . - C -'-Ra. .-- Ram-. The Corsican Time-Bomb. pp. 58-60. "'P. Savigear. " Scparatism and Centralism in Conica" in The TCbrld Todq. p.354. of other regions of the country only in the sarne way that the other regions difFered f?om one another. Therefore, any possibility of a constitutional recognition of Corsica's speciai status was out of the question.lJ7

Following this reasoning one rnight argue that the Conican, Wte the inhabitant of any other region or dépmtemee»r of France, can exercise control over the body politic through the democratic electoral system of France. Constitutional pressure can be applied through a variety of means including: elected deputies, the election of representatives to the councils and cornmittees of the instit~~tionsof French local administration and through professionai and other delegates attending the various cornmittees of regional administration.

To Corsican nationalists, however, the French democratic system is inadequate as it

has not been able to hnction for them the same as elsewhere. Most significantly, it has not been able to fiee Corsica fbrn the influence of the clan. For this reason, Corsican natiodsts see the clan as another instrument of French colonialism and have sought to obtain increased political autonomy in order to fight the influence of the clan and be free to improve economic and social conditions in Corsica according to their own programmes. 13*

Until the regional reforms of 1982 it was virtually impossible to ascertain the arnount of support t hat nationalist programmes enjoyed in Corsica. Highly publicized events, such as the occupation at Aleria seemed to attract significant support, but the amount of sustained support for these movements is less certain. Electoral results offer little information in this respect as the WChas for the most part chosen not to participate in the main political channels of France. When they have, results revealing dismal support could be dismisseci due to the persistence of electoral fkaud on the island. An additional challenge to the legitimate nationalist programmes in Corsica is the persistence of the extra-military activity of the FLNC. Aithough there is little popular support for the movement in Conica, its actions have

. -. - R. Ramsay. The Corsicatr Time-Bomb. pp.80-82. -.-. - -"P.Savigear.'Torsica and the Fmch State". pp. 126-127. 64

acquired a large amount of notoriety which serves to discredit the more intelligent nationalist programmes arnong the population of Corsica and officials in France.

Conclusion Although nationalias in Corsica were successfùl in making the Corsican people more aware of their uniqueness in relation to the French nation and in encouraging them to embrace this uniqueness, it is clear that the Corsican nationalist movement has suffered the sarne weaknesses as the nationalkt movements in Bnttany and Occitania. Each of these movements could identfi reasuns for economic and saciai discontent, as weil as reviving a certain amount of interest in the rninority culture. Despite the interest in rninonty cultures, however, the majority of the Breton, Occitan and Corsican populations are al1 equally cornmitteci to the French culture. Support for minority languages was more dificult to attain in Bnttany and Occitania due to fact that the languages had long ago been displaced by French. Attempts at Linguistic revival for the most part then remained confined to inteilectual movements. Ln Corsica, use of the Corsican language is more widespread, but this is due more to the insularity of the island than to any active resistance to the French language. Bretons, Occitans and Corsicans understood the problems of economic stagnation and underdevelopment and its relation to the economy of the French state, but minonty nationalists were unable to come up with coherent political programmes which would be preferable to continued association with the state. In fact, econornic underdevelopment was more often a reason for continued association with the state as this would at least provide financial grants and subsidies. Because none of the nationalist movements could corne up with alternative political programmes, the French administrative system and later the national parties of the left were able to incorporate the demands and members of the more organized and intelligent elements of the nationalist movements into French programmes. With these members gone the 65 nationalist movements declined into a variety of small orghtions with conflicting programmes, none of which was able to attract and maintain significant support. CRAPTER 3

1982 DECENTRALIZATION REFORMS

Beginning in 1982 the Mitterand govemment passed a senes of decentralization Iaws which had three main purposes: to transfer power away from administraton to elected politicians, to transfer functions downwards to local councils and to give the councils the financial and other means to fùlfill their new responsibilities.' The level of government that benetitted the most from this legislation was the region, as this was the first legislation to gram them significant forma1 powers. The decentralization laws upgraded the status of the regions to collectivité terriloriales, which made them equal in status to the déparnnet~ts.It also transferred executive powers from the prefect to the elected presidents of the dépor~etitsand regions and allowed for elected regional assemblies. The decentralization laws were thus intended to increase the powers of the regions in political. economic and cultural matters. ' Traditionally the panies of the French lefi had opposed most fonns of decentralization. By the 1960s however, the left had changed its position on decentralization.

Its long period in opposition made it necessary for them to develop an ideology that was distinct from that of the right and they realized that the regional question was "another stick with which it could beat the govemment. Furthemore, at the end of the 1960s. the Left's political programme was empty of content and this vacuum could be filled by ideas of the "new left" and the "new social movements". The lefi, therefore, abandoned its former Jacobinism and began to consider some of the demands being made by regionalists.'

-P. Hainsuorth and M. katino. Decetirr

regionalist S.

The 198 1 party document, La Frmm m Piwiel, which outlined the Parti Socialise's reasons for supporting decentraiization also touched upon regionalist and minority nationdist thernes. In particular it stated that regional cultures and languages had been suppressed and swamped in the same way as French was being swamped by the Engiish language and Amencan dture. It also echoed the regionalist cornplaints that centralized regional policies had unbalanced local economies and that local businesses had gained little from the tourist developments on the Mediterranean. Rather, local cultures had been devalued to tourist spectacles and holiday homes had pushed up land pnces? Despite the fact that many of these reasons echoed claims which had been made by minonty nationalist, the decentralization refoms, for the most part had little to do with minority nationalism.' The one notable exception to this is the statrctpartictrlier granted to Corsica which Corsican nationdists had been demanding since the 1960s. The statrf par~icirlierwill be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. The fact the Pmri SuciuIisie passed the decentraiization laws in 1982 had more to do

%id As edyas 1965 Michel Philipponneau. the Breton regiondisi and CELiB activist had daidai that regional govemmcnr could oniy comc throuph the partics of the Ieîl and many 0thfoiioued his esamplc in piitting thtir support bchind the national parties of the lett. P. Hainsworth and M. Kating. Dc~ceritraliza~onand Change. p.58-59. %. Hmsworth and M. Keating. Decenrrolirorior~and CItat~ge.p.62. Dissatistàction with ihc tourist devcloprncntr was a theme in thc Occitan and Corsican nationalist movanmts. 7 R. Balme. "French Regionalization" in nie European Lnion and the Regiorts (eds.) B. Jones and M. Kcating, p. 169. 68 with the Lee's strong position in local goverment and in the national parliament and their fùture electoral strategy. By implementing decentralization reforms which would empower the regions, the Partz Socialiste hoped to win the electoral support of the salaried and polarized regional elites who would have the most to gain from this legislation.' Schmidt maintains that the left's desire to decentralize cannot be fully explained except as part of a larger strategy to gain and retain the allegiance of this ele~torate.~ This chapter wiil examine the decentralization reforms in order to determine the effect this legislation had on the territorial pattern of govemance in France. It will ako examine new regional powers and see ifthey offer any opportunîties to minority nationalists. In particular, the section on Corsica wili examine how far the French state is willing to go to accommodate minority nationalism.

The 1982 Decentd~an~onLaws - Opportunities and Limitaiions The ability of the socialists to pass decentraiizing legislation depended on their ability to quickly pass a framework law based on as wide a consensus as possible and work out the details of the refom later. Those areas subject to the most organized or strongest pressures were addressed first, while those which were subject to little pressure or much counter- pressure were considered last, if at dl. This strategy ailowed the most significant decentralization refoms since the 3rd Republic to pass through the assembly, but it also meant that refom remained only partial. This affecteci the amount of power the regions were actually able to gain. Traditionally, any attempt at a significant transfer of powers to the regions met opposition in the assembly from members who held elected positions at the local level. As

8.Dupoirer. 'The First Regonal Elites in France (1986-1992): A Protilcnin The End of Ale French CnitqSmte (eds.) 1. Lou_Phlin and S. Mazeu.p.26. 9~.Schmidt Drmmtizing Frmtrr. p. 109. 1 noted in the previous chapter, local notables often constituted the strongest opposition to decentralizahon, as this would diminish the power they held through their relationships with the various agents of the state. To overcome this opposition, Gaston Deferre, Minister of the interior and Decentralization, inunediately transferred the executive power of the prefects to the &parhnentaI and regional presidents and lefi the details of this transfer to be worked out later. Once this initial breakthrough had been accomplished, Deferre expected that the newly powerfûl local officiais would be cenain to press for a quick transfer of the administrative functions, without which their executive power would be meaningless and for the financial resources which were necessary for them to fulfill their new obligations. This, in fact, did occur, but it lefl the socialist government open to criticism when they could not meet these demands. 'O This transfer of executive power abolished the prefea's a priori 'tirtelle' over administrative acts and budgets of mayors and replaced it with aposteriori legal control. The new powers of the prefects allow them to refer administrative matters to administrative tnbunals and budgetary matters to Chambres Régionales des comptes or to twenty-two regional accounting courts in the event that they questioned the legality of either of these. The prefect also became the state's sole representative in the periphery which meant that al1 decisions made by the field services of the state had to pass through the prefect." The transfer of administrative functions made the regions responsible for regional econornic planning and policy, industrial development and professional education." Because this transfer of power was not accompanied by any significant transfer of financial resources, however, the regions have been restricted in the extent to which they can perform their new

10 V. Schmidt. Dmocrurùing France. p. 1 08. "v. SchmdlDrmoc~c1n;~~Fmnce.p. 1 16. 1. Loughlin and S. Mazcy note that the prsfat's nsw powm ovcr the field senices inctaiscd the ptctict's powcrs allouing him to play a pivotal rolt in the planning and irnplcmentation of the mnomic pians. The change in namc to Commis~airesde fa Ripublique was only tcmpora?. in 1987 the title mas officially changai back to the prtfect. "Introduction". p.6. 12v.Schmidt. Dmocmnirng France. p. 12 1. hctions. Regional leaders can only increase their spending if they raise taxes or apply to the state for additional resources within the framework of the planning contracts. This lirnits the potential of the regional leaders to pursue independent initiatives. Although the govemment

insists that it has transferred resources and taxes to cornespond to the present cost of services, sorne regionai critics of the decentrabation reforms suspect that the aate merely transferred

the burden of the most difficult and expensive services to the localities. l3 Another limitation to the power of the regions is the fact that the decentralization reforms did little about restruchiring the temtory of local govemment. The government decided not to take powers away from any level of local governrnent and not to allow any local authority to exercise a ruzeile over another. The result of this was an arnbiguity in the division of functions which allowed a wide scope for competition among the various local authorities. The competition and complexity involved in the sharing of these fùnctions, together with the failure to significantly limit the nrmd des mmwbts, left opportunity for local notables to increase their power by working on the system at al1 levels of govemment; national, regional and diparmtenrol. The Socialist government put off enforcing any limits on the curniri de manabtes until

1985, at which time the law of Decernber 1985 limited elected officials to only two major political mandates. It also set up incompatibilities between certain elected positions (dépmtme~~talpresident and regional president). '' The delay in the limitation resulted fiom the fact that many rnernbers of the assembly held local and national positions and were reluctant to give up the traditional advantages for which the cumul de mrmdas ailowed. Therefore, the issue was swept temporarily under the carpet in order to avoid opposition to the decentralization laws.I5

13 J. Douence. "The Evolution of the 1982 ReRefis: An Overvitw " in nie End oJ the French Llnira~yStace (ais.) J. Loughlin and S. Mazey p. 15. and P. Hainsworth and M. Kcating. Dece~rrralùationand Change. p.87. 14 V. Schmidt. Dernaracizzng France. p.277. "P. Hainîworth and M. Katinp. Decenoaikacion and Clrange. p.74. 71

Another delay which affécted the sape of the regional reforms was the delay in direct elections for the regional assemblies. Although the decentralization laws allowed for the direct election of regional assemblies, these elections were continually postponed until March

16, 1986. The principal reason for this delay was that the popularity of the Socialist governent had declined so that their electoral outlook was bleak. Consequently, the party wished to put off elections which they felt they were certain to lose. The new powers of decentralization, however, could not be applied to the regional assemblies until &er these elections were held.16 On the other hand, the newly elected representatives of the municipaliùes and dépmmet~rstook charge of their new responsibilities as early as 1982-83. Because the déparnne~ztswere also allowed to establish technical services, the small communes becarne dependent on the Jipartme~itsrather than the regions. Once in power, it was difficult for regional politicians to make up for the time they had lost to the depurtmetzm/ leaders who had already consolidated a significant arnount of power." When elections were finaily held. the party lists were drawn up by leaders of the départmmts rather than regional assemblies and the councils were elected on a départmemal rather than regionai basis. This increased opportunities for the notables to assert their power by dorninating the electoral lists with traditional dkparrmemzf officials as well as inhibiting the development of a regional consciousness.lg

Corsica - The Statut Particulier The decentralization reforms and their effect in Corsica deserve speciai mention for two reasons. First the concessions ganted to Corsica were intended to defuse the nationalist movements by addressing many of the demands of Corsican nationaiists and encouraging

161. Duoence. "The Evolution of..... p. 12. "J. Duance. "The Evdution of. ..*. p. 12 and P. Hainnvonh and M. Keating. DecenirotLation and Change. pp.73-74. "v. Sehrnid~Dmwratizing France. p. 14 1 and J. Douence. "The Evolution of ..- p. 16. these elements to phcipate in electoral politi~s.'~Secondly, the decentraiization reforms in

Corsica were seen by both the Socialist goverment and observers of the decentralization refoms as a test case for the rest of France. Deferre was clear that he regarded devolution for Conica as the pilot scheme for decentralization througbout France. This led critics of the decentralization laws to base their evduation of the firture of decentrdization in the rest of France on its results in Corsica." The Socialkt reforms in Corsica ùicluded the decentraiization of powers to the island, the recognition of Corsica as a coliectivité térriroriale and the provision of a statut

mc~~lier which was passed by the French National Assembly on 2 March 1982. The srazur

partzç~diierrecognized a degree of Corsican spdcity and personaiity by Mrtue of the island' s geographicd and cuitural identity. It also provided for a Corsican Regional Assembly which would be diredy elected within six months afler the passage of this legislation which made Corsica the first region to acquire an elected assembly. The Assembly was elected according to a proportional system of voting and extensive surveillance was supplieci in order to control

against the customary electorai Fraud which previously plagued Corsican elections. A wide range of executive and consultative powers in fields relevant to the specific needs of the island such as; culture, transport, energy, planning and education, were devolved to the Regional ~ssembly." The most novel element of the Assembly is its capacity to communicate directly with the govemment (Article 27 of the law of 2 March 1982). The assembly's influence is limited, however, by the fact that it was granted no legislative powers.

"P. Hainsworth and M. Keating. Drcmtralizuriorr orid Charige. p. 103. %. Ramsay. 77~Corsiam Tinte-Bamb. p203 and P. Hainwonh and J. Loughlin. "LeProblrine Corse' p3a. The Junc 16. t 983 dition of The Guardiarr passed judgment on the dccentralization domsin the follouing way: "(no] matter how man? French pcople rcagme htthe island is a spccial case the sucftss othtruisc of its autonomous institutions wilI bc scen as a portent if not a prcccdent tôr the rest. What promiscd to k a pst cspcrirncnt in devolution for France as a whole is threatencd. if the Corsican c'rpericncc is anMing to go on. by a lack of gcnerosity and imagination bordering on duplicity. Unfess Paris can bring itselftotrust the French. much trouble lies ahcad." citcd in P. Hainsworth and J. Loughlin pp. 364-365. 11 P. i-hnsworth and M. Keating Decert~alizatiorrand Clrartge. p.98 and P. Hainmorth and J. Loughlin, "LeProbieme Corse" p358. and H. Hintjens. J. Loughlin and C. Olivesi. "The Status ofMaritime and insuIar France: The DOM-TOM and Corsica. in nie End of the Frmtch Lnitaw Srate, (cds.) J. Louphlin and S. Mazq. p. 133. This means that members can only solicit the Pnme Minister with advice but the Prime Mïnister is not obliged to foUow this advice. So far the government has been willing to accept Corsican recommendations in non-controvenial domains such as the developrnent and protection of the Corsican mountains and the Corsican coast. But matters which were political or emanated from regionalist groups were met by refusal or indifference." Other reforms included provisions for the Corsican language and the creation of two speciaiist consultative bodies to assist the Corsican assembly - the Council for Econornic and Social Mais and the Council for Culture, Education and the Quality of Life, abolition of the State Security Court and amnesty for the political prisoners that had been tried and sentenced by this Court, the dissolution of the Gaullist Secret Police (SAC), a promise to open the University of Corte and the appointment of Bastien Leccia, a Corsican, as the Govemment's Delegate for Corsican ~ffairs?

These reforms did, in fact, answer many of the demands that nationalists had been making throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Consequently, nationalists now faced the challenge of clairning credit for having brought about change without appearing to have no thing left for which to campaign."The concessions granted to Corsica made it necessary for the various nationalist movements to re-evaluate their goals in order to decide whether these refonns were adequate and, if they were not, to ascertain in what ways they were not meeting the objectives of their respective programmes. In this way, the reforms created a more precise distinction between separatists and nationalists. Before the reforms, separatists often merged with those nationalist and regionalists who were simply seeking some element of self- government or with those who were fnistrated with the economic and social decline of the

77 -The July 1983 propositions in favour of teaching Corsican culture and languagc and the Novembtr 1983 propositions ghing Corsicans priority in local employncnt and recognition of the Corsican people are emples of rtcornmcndations which were ignored or reiùsed. H. Hintjens. et al. 'The Status oL." .p. 124. 9.Hainnvorth and M. Kcating. Deceniralizariai and Clto~tge.p.98 and P. Hainnrorth and J. Loughlin. "LeProbleme Corse".p.358. '9.Ramsay. The Corsrcon Tinte-Bomb. p.206. island. The reforms of 1982 made these programmes less ~ompatible.'~ The WC.which had formerly refused to operate within electoral politics, claiming that electoral fraud perpetuated the rule of the clans and made these elections another Uismunent of French colonialism chose to run members in the 1982 regional ele~tions.'~The results of the 1982 regional elections revealed a significant success for the WCwhich gained 12.6% of the vote. Between 1982- 1988. however, the nationalists suffered a 40% drop in their share of the regional vote." Despite the electoral reforms, the balance of political forces in the assembly and among the deputies for the region in the National Assembly in Paris, continued to reflea the traditional clan interests and strengths. The regional balance of power still favoured the coalition parties of the right in the late 1980s. headed by the local RPR which were presided over by Jean-Paul de Rocca-Serra in the regional as~ernbl~.~~~heGiacobbi family and its supporters continued to lead the Socialist left in the region. This put those nationalists who were elected to the assembly in the uncornfortable position of either being drawn into the world of Corsican politics, which they had formerly rejected, or continuing to cut themselves off from the island's poli tic^.'^ Corsican autonomists were also faced with the sarne financial constraints that other regional assemblies faced. The fact that the goverment did not transfer a significant amount of financial resources dong with the new executive powers meant that the assemblies were unable to effectively cany out al1 of their fùnctions. The WCdiagnosed this as a lack of autonomy that would play into the hands of the separatist forces, narnely the FLNC."

'5 P. Savigear. "Corsica"in Corirentporaty.\ lirrori~.~ar~o~ral~ (ed.) P. Watson. p.87. '%id.. p.87. 27 Ibid.. p.90.

'**~\tefdeclan ' on the right and of the southern pan of thc island for ihros dsuidedbid.. 9 1. 29 ibid, 9 1 -95. 3%. Hainsuwth and J. Loughlin. "Le Pmblnnr Corse".p.363. Although the FLNC agreed to a cease-fire immediately after the Socialias announced their reforms for Corsica, they abandoned it soon der, claiming that the statut pmticzdier was a "deceptive ruse to soften Corsica's colonized status vis-à-vis France". Consequently the FLNC recommenceci their terroria campaign to win independence for Conica. Although there is little popular support for independence in Corsica (only about 3%). the activities of the FLNC have had significant consequences for the more moderzte nationalists in C~rsica.~' The fact that violence has not declined since the 1982 reforms has led the inhabitants of Corsica to question the value of regionai constitutional change. In addition to this, state leaders and the clans have been able to win additional support in Corsica by adamantly condernning such violence." The reforms in Corsica represent the fùnhest the French state has been willing to go in terms of recognizing the uniqueness of a region. In fact, this uniqueness has been recognized funher in the bill of 3 1 Oaober 1990, which gives Corsican institutions a legal status that is more similar to that of the DOM (départemnts et territoires d'outre-mer) temtones than to those of rnainland m rance.^^ In the end, however, the concessions made to Corsica rnay inhibit Corsican nationdism. As the moderate and more intelligent members of the movement continue to act within the channels of the central state, the most prominent nationalist voice will be the FLNC. With many of the traditionai grievances answered and a widespread distaste for FLNC violence, Corsicans may corne to view a closer relationship with the state as being more advantageous to the island than any further autonomy.

Evaluab*rtgthe ûpportunities for Regional Government

Although the official description of French politics before 1982 supported the view

"~bid.. 1984. p.359. "P. Savigear. "Conica'. p.93. 33~.~intjms.et ai.. "The Stanis OC..". p. 126. of a totally centralized, blocked system of governrnent, in reality the system was more decentralized than this official view. Local officiais participated in informal circuits of power in the periphery, developing informal practices that enabled them to get around most of the blockages which were created by the formai legal system. In one sense theh the decent ralization reforms simply legitimized what was already occumng. The prefectoral tutelle had long ceased to be controlling and powerful presidents in the départments and regions had already gained a share of power." Decentralization reforrns have in this way made local officials more accountable by bringing the reality of their powers into the open. There were. however, some significant changes in the relationships between officiais at the local level. Despite the long delays for the elections of the regional councils and the départmer~talbasis of the eleaoral lists, a regional identity did emerge which has become more aggressive in establishing itself alongside the state and déparrents. Although the regions are somewhat artificial creations, they have established themselves as part of the politico-administrative system to such an extent that it would now be difficult to modiQ their number and t heir boundaries.3s This new regional identity has encouraged regional elites to assert regional priorities in econornic planning with the state and to pursue initiatives which have not been explicitly set out in the decentralization reforrns. In the early stages of regional activity, immediately foiiowing the first regionai elections, regional councils tried to draw up their own plans to be considered by the state. These plans, however, were hastily drawn up and regional leaders decided they could make better use of their tirne and resources. Consequently they abandoned the idea of drawing up their own plans and devoted their energies to negotiating contracts with the state. Negotiations between the state and the regions suggest that the regions have had a good deal of input. The state has trkd to use the planning contracts as a

%. Schmidt. Dentocrarizittg Fraice. p. 182. And P. Hains\\orth and M. Kcating, Derenoalüatim and Change. p.72. "J. Doucnce. *The Evolution oLa.p. 17. means to steer the regions toward its own projects, but most regions have proved expert enough for negotiations to be well-balanced and for their programmes to be adopted and panly financed by the tat te.'^ This success must be qualified, however, by noting that whatever input the regions have in the planning contracts, the state always has the upper hand in financial tem. State control is guaranteed by the fact that it loses nothing by holding out on signing the planning contract. whereas the region can lose a great dealJ7 Distribution of state aid to date reveals that the regions most able to carry out the state's prionties are the ones moa likely to receive aid, suggesting that decentrabation has fden short on its objective to reduce regionai disparities. So far powerful, prosperous and heavily populated regions have received the largest proportion of state aid. From this perspective structural planning seems to be more important as a policy objective than the reduction of regional disparitie~.~~This pattern is significant to the future of econornic developrnent as it suggests that as austerity measures are enacted in France. the regions will have to be more seleetive when submitting proposais for joint financing. Those regions most

Wrely to comply with the objectives of the state will, in al1 probability, be granted financial aid with relative ease. While those regions with independent plans designed to reflect regional specificity will be less li kely to qualiQ. The decentralization reforms, therefore, have increased regional awareness to the extent that regional leaders are now encouraged to set out regional development pnorities to be negotiated in the planning contracts. These contracts, however, have not allowed for anyihing near the degree of autonomy envisioned by Lafont and Fougeyrollas. The contracts have also ensured a continuous dialogue between the regional leaders and the state officials. This process. however. has also left an opening for the regional prefect

36~.Doucncc. -The Ewlution ~l...~.pp. 18- 19 and V. SchmidL horratizing France. p.295. "v. Schmidt Dmocratizirtg Framr. p.195. 38~.Balrnc and L. Bonnet. .From Regional to Satorai Policies: Thc Conuactual Relations Bstwen the Stats and the Regions in France* in ï71eEnd ofhe French Lititap Store (ais.) I. Loughlin and S. Mazey. pp.56-57. to reassert some of his power as he is placed in a key position within this process. Acting as the voice of the state, the pref- prepares regional plans and acts as a policy-broker in the early stages of policy fom~lation.'~

It is still early to conclusiveiy evaluate the political power of the regions as they are still a relatively young level of govemment. Schmidt clairns that the 1982 decentraiization could have as much. if not more of a "revolutionary" impact on French politics than that of the 3rd Republic, cithg the politicization of the départnteeriy regions and communes, the nse of party politics in the periphery and the increased political cornpetition among personalities at al1 levels of local govemment as potentially revolutionary changes. The increased cornpetition between the three levels of govenunent leaves the future position of the region somewhat arnbiguous. The future political influence of the region is dependent on its ability to establish itseifas a leader arnong the three levels of local govemment. So far this has not ocaimed. The sirnultaneous implementation of decentrabation created new tensions between the regions and other levels of local govemment which were unwilling to give up power to the newly established regions. In the planning process the regions are required to consult with the départmems and communes before submitting plans to the central state. Two factors militated against the regions' ability to consult adequately with the other two levels. First, the simple factor of time constraints precluded such consultations. Also, the regions, which are inexpenenced institutions, lack the political and legal authonty to negotiate effectively with the other local governrnents in situations of codict. Consequently the depariments and communes complained that the regions comrnitted them to projects without any pnor consultation. In response to this infingement, the départmems and municipalities have been pressing to play a more active role in the planning process." Because the regions were delayed in as&g their leadership role, they have been unable to consolidate enough power to prevent the assertion of départmentai and communal authority. The d&purtmentshave proven especidy adept at consolidating power to such an extent that they are uniikely to [ose influence for sometirne.'' There are certain factors which permit one to see a future expansion of the political influence of the regions. The limitations on the nrrnlrl de maiidots enacted in 1985. demanded a choice between the regional and departmental level of govemment, and consequently differentiated between the déprtme~ttuland the regional elite. A large majonty of the older and more nationdly prominent notables chose the departmetu which has lefi younger more intermediate notables to take charge at the regional level. Consequently, the regional elite is geared to a younger more urban electorate than the départmental elite. The first regional councillors came from the salaried class, which were more in touch with civil society and better qualified to manage the new local community than the départnzetltal and municipal elites. A survey of the local electorate reveals that most regionaiists are members of the intennediate professions, are urban and mobile, confident in the future of the region, identi@ with the region and defend its policies and projects."

Because of the social characteristics of the regional elite, they have proven willing to assert themselves in activities which were not specifically assigned through decentralization. In order to work around the politicai, financiai and legal constraints of the French system, regional leaders have sought to establish networks with other actors such as trade unions, private enterprise and to develop foreign relations in order to gain new sources of investment and exchange information to fùrther development initiatives. This activity is limited, however, to initiatives which do not codict directly with the interests and powers of the state."

"P. Hainsworih and M. Kcating. Decemrolizannottand Change. p. 89. 4' 'V. Schmidt. Deniocraruirig Fruricr. pp.334-285 and E. Dupoim. "Thc First Regional...*.p.3 1. 43 P. LeGales. "Reponal Econornic Policies: An Alternative to Fmch Econornic Dirigisme?" in The End of rhe French Liritaty Stace? (cds.)J. Loughlin and S. Ma~cy.p.8 1. 80

Although much of this acbvity remains largely symbolic, it is still efktive in creating a sense of regional identity. The decentralization reforms have therefore significantly shifted the territorial balance of power to allow regional leaders the opportunity to increase their influence in govement.

There is more opponunity for regionai leaders to pursue their own initiatives with private business and develop relations with other regionai leaders both within and outside of France. Both of these opportunities can serve to increase the profile of the region, especidy as the cornpetencies and idluence of the European Union continues to expand. For now, however, the state is still the central player in French politics. Much of the infiuence the regionai leaders are able to attain is still dependent on the financial resources and funding for development projects that they receive fiom the centrai govement. The future of the regioq as an influentid level of govement is also dependent on the ability of its leaders to consolidate its position in local government, thus reducing cornpetition from the departments and the municipalities. New oppominities to consolidate power and attain resources apart £Yom the state may exist for the regions at the European level and this will be considered in the final chapter.

Conclusion - Decentruiizati*on and Minority NoriondiSm Although the decentralization refom offered regionalists the opportunity to increase their political status and to foster a regional identity, these sarne oppominities are generally not avadable to rninority nationalists. hiring the process of regionalization in France, regions were deliberately chosen to not coincide with hjstorical identities. For this reason most of the regional identities that have forrned as a result of the decentralization reforms are based solely on temtory. The decentrakation reforms also did not address the econornic demands of rninority nationalists. Although the reforms provided for regional consultation in the planning contracts, it is the mon prosperous regions, which do not have a distinct cultural identity, who have benefitted the rnost from these plans. The fact that an economic gap remains between these prosperous regions and the peripheral regions, which are more ofien culturally distinct, suggests that the economic plans have not addred the economic problems of these regions. The fact that the state mut approve regional contracts, thus controlling how this money is spent, leaves little oppominity for minority nationdias to develop economic programmes based on the specificity of their regions? The greatest opportunities for rninority nationalists are found in the policies conceming language and the media. An indication of the govemment's cornmitment to facilitating the development of minonty languages is its decision to make money available for the foaering of these minority languages. This money was to assist in the active promotion of rninority languages beginning in elementary schools and , in case of demand, in nursery schools and kindergartens as welL4' Another enabling factor in the dissemination of ethnic dture is the November 9, 198 1 law which permitted the establishment of private radio stations. Although the motivation behind the law was not so much to facilitate the expression of ethnic diversity as it was to depoliticize and degovernrnentalize the media, ethnic groups have taken advantage of this law. tt is not clear, however, how effective these institutions are as instruments of ethnic consciousness -raishg or mobiiization. The provisions limiting their broadcasting radii to 30 km and forbidding commercial sponsorship localize the impact of these stations and imposes financial constraints. The local character of these networks might have a significant influence

"In the 1960s- Robert Laht ( 1967) and Pierre Fou-goilas (1 968) maintaincd that regional cconomic developmmt must be based the aich region's sprcific needs and must also take account of the cultural elements of society. Some conttmporan nationalists have the samc ideas. The European Bureau of Lesser Uscd Languagts maintains that industry must dowand encotmge the use of regional Ianpagcs in ordcr to .....( finish) For a discussion of minority languagcs and cconornic dtvelopmen t in France sec Obesentaroire Interrégional du Politique. L 'Identité des Régions en France et en Europe (Toukwsc ~ditiottspriva[. 1995). For a discussion on orthodox econamic modtls v. intcgrated area developmmt models sec Chaptcr J of this thesis and F. Moulaert...." in Culrure the Building Sione ofEurope 2002 (cd) L. Bcckernan. ''W. Sathn, --The Mitterand Rcgime and its Policies of Ethnocultural Accomodation". Compararive Politics. p.44. in Brittany or Conica as these communities are heavily clustered in a given area. Even here, however, broadcasting is inadequately unified and internai cornpetition oflen thins out their message. For example, in Brittany there are several Breton stations, some advocating political autonomy, others seeking modest cultural accomodation, and none of these offer more than an hour or two of daily Breton-language prograrnme~.~ Although the above refoms offer some opportunities for the dissemination of minority cultures, the Socialists may well have been hoping that the praaical expression of bretomité. corsitude. mciîanie would be restrained by "the ethnics themselves, who realized that to study their ethnic tongues would "hem them into a relatively backward and iimited world" while French would open doors to progress and ~ppominity.~' The case of Corsica demonstrates how far the French state wiii go to address the dernands of rninority nationaiists. The st~itwcr~Iiier is the furthest the French govemment has ever been willing to go to recognize the distinctiveness of the regions and addressed many of the demands of minority nationalists. However, there were limits to these concessions. The fan that the Prime Minister has rejected most of the recommendations from the Regional Assembly that are of a politicai nature or emanate fiom regionalists, indicates that the French government is unwilling to agree to anything that will jeopardize its control over the island. The economic restrictions faby the regional governent has restncted regionaiists from performing al1 of their new duties. This, in mm, has allowed the clan to maintain its power in Corsica. These economic restrictions have also made it difficult for the regionaiists to limit the activity of the FLNC, who have continued their terrorist campaign, claiming that the starrit particulier has not gone far enough in satisfjmg the demands of rninority nationalists. 83

Despite the fact that these issues rernain unresolved the French govenunent has maintained and possibly even increased its influence in Corsica. The reforms in Corsica have not broken the hold of the clan system in Corsica nor have they ended the violence of the FLNC. Because the French goverment has proven more capable of controüing this violence, many Corsicans now question the utility of further politicai autonomy. Rather, the shortcomings of the regionalists have convinceci these Corsicans that their needs wiil be more effectively met through continued association with the French state. Because the French govenunent was able to control the amount of powers and finances that were devolved to the regional levels of govemment, they have been able to maintain the upper hand in territorial governance. The European Union, however, challenges the ability of the French state to control the activities of regionalists and minority nationalists. By offering development funds and opportunities for political activity in Europe, the institutions of the European Union have encouraged some regionalists and minonty nationalists to seek the autonomy they have been denied in their own states in Europe. The next chapter will examine the opportunities that exist for regionalists and minonty nationalists in the institutions of the European Union and the challenges this presents to the temtond integrity of states. CHAPTER FOUR REGIONAL REPRESENTATION AND MINORITY NATIONALISM IN THE EU

Introduction

European unity became a serious political objective following World War 11 and was propelled by economic. strategic and political considerations. Econornically, the European Union was to provide a large home market which would enable European fims to compete

with American and Japanese rivals. Strategically. European integration was a means by which Germany could be re-established and CO-existwith the same western neighbours that it had invaded. The European Union was also encouraged by the United States as a way to contain the innuence of the USSR.' Politically, integration was first proposed by European federalists who were determined to avoid the inter-state nvalry which had led to the previous

two world wars. At this time, debate conceming European integration centred around the question of how much sovereignty states should surrender to Europe. As European integration progresses. however, the regional level of government is becoming more influentid in Europe and there is now much debate concerning what role the regions should have in Europe. The regions obviously have a stake in the future of European integration and are anxious to be included in the institutions of the European Comrnunity. The establishment and development of the European Union constitutes a change in

the territ onal distribution of power in Europe t hat presents challenges and O pportunities to

the states and the regions of Europe. As with other changes that have occurred in the

'M.J.Dedrnen. The Ongins and Dcvclopmcnt of the Eu: 19-45-95. pp. 11-25. territorial distribution of power in Western European countnes, the regional leaders and rninority nationalists have tried to exploit this change to their advantage. European integration provides new prospects for regional leaders and rninority nationalists who have a vested

interest in seeing a reduction in the capacities of the states. As the European Union deepens',

individual states wili lose some of their powers in the policy areas that must be regulated with other states. When these developments are accompanied by a substantial decentralition of responsibilities to regional and local govements, central institutions appear to be left with few remaining responsibilities. This observation has led some regionalists and minority nationalias to announce the decline of the state. They see this 'top-down' erosion of powers of the state, as providing new opportunities to assert themselves and affect policy in ~urope.)

Although the state has faced challenges to its sovereignty from above and below, the idea of -'top-down" erosion tends to overstate the dernise of the nation-state and does not take account of the capacity of states to adjust to the changing international climate.' It also does not reflect accurately the curent reatity of European integration which t hus far has been a state-centred process. The institutions of the European Union were formed through agreements between state leaders. Moreover European policies can only be passed once agreement is reached in the Council of Ministers which is cornposed entirely of state miniaen. Because only state muiisters can approve European policies, an opportunity exists for sate leaders to reclaim powers they previously had assigned to subnational governments.

The principle of nibsidiartiy, which wiU be disaissed later in this chapter, has become an issue of contention between the regions and the states because state leaders often use this principle to retain powers from the European Commission but do not extend the pnnciple any further

'~heMo processes to drrrik the expansion of the Eumpean Community are uidening and dapening. Widening refm to the inclusion of more Europn states in the European Cornmuni-.. while deepening refers to the estension of policy areas which arc to be integrated in Europe. %. L-h Mnority Nahonaiisrn and European intsgration. p. 14. See dso M. Keating. ..Regional Autonorny in the Changing State Order A Framcwork for Analysis" Regional Politics & folin, 23. 1992. pp.456 1. P.Loch Minori- Nationdism. p. 14. downwards to the regiow. Therefore the extent to which regional powers have gained access to the institutions of Europe is not as si@cant as the "top-down" erosion view-point would

suggest . To take account of the continuing influence and importance of states, however, does not suggest that there is no role or no opportunities for rninority nationalism in Europe. Rather, it is only to quaiiS, the influence the regions have had thus far. Although the subnational levels of government have not replaced the states as the main actors in Europe, and are unlikely to do so, there are ni11 important opportunities for rninority nationalists and regionaiins to use European issues as a means to mobilize support and to express demands. Minority nationalists and regionalists cm express demands and generate support for these demands through support or opposition to the European Union and its policies. The

prospective politicai, econornic and cultural opportunities in Europe can be used to generate support for European union and to project minority nationalists as important politicai actors and the regions as important levels of government. In addition to the political opportunities which have been discussed above, there are prospects for the regions to increase their economic independence and to asseri minority cultures within Europe. Economic stagnation and underdevelopment has limited the amount of independence regionai leaders could exercise because they remained dependent on their respective states for economic assistance. There are now opportunities for regional leaders to use transfrontier Links they have established in response to European integrahon and subsidies and development funds availabie through Europe to increase their economic independence from the centrai state. By winning development fùnds or appearing to do so, regional leaders can also enhance their own status as European actors.

Minority nationalists might aiso find opportunities to project minority cultures within Europe. The plurality of European cultures and the fact that there is no one hegemonic cuiture which is promoted by the centre of the European Union may make it more feasible for minority nationalists to expect to enhance their status in a context out side of their states.' By acting in Europe minority nationalists are also able to dispel the notion that rninority nationalist movements are inherently regressive and isolationist. Rat her, this activity affirrns the progressive nature of many of these mo~ements.~ Fears of the unfavourable effects of European integration on the political, economic and cuitural domains of the regions can also be used as a means to express and mobilize support for rninoriiy nationalism. The fears regionalists and minority nationalists have in losing the political gains they have made previously have been noted above. Further European integration, however, also presents challenges to the economies of the regions and to minority cultures. The widening and deepening of the European Union means that the economies and

cultures of the regions wiü come into greater contact with each other. This has increased the insecurities of sorne regionalists and rninority nationalists that the economic well-being and cultural integrity of their region will suffer in light of this increased contact. By opening

previously protected markets, market integration has increased the economic disadvantages of some penpheral regions with already underdeveloped economies. This has occurred

because regions with different production systems and dissirnilar productivity levels are put into direct competition and the penpheral regions lack the infrastructure and labour pool to compete effectively. Some minority nationalist movements have used this to increase support for their movements out of opposition to European economic policies.' Minonty nationalists also fear that the European Commission's cornmitment to

'Ibid.. p. 199. %. Lynch. Minorin Nationalirm. p.3. and R. Balme. --l.aoduction:Pourquoi le goimmemmr change-[-il d ëdaelle? Les poliriques du ~ieo-regiorinlisnr(d.) R. Balme p. 12. 7 For csamplc ihe UDB. wtiich is supportive of European integmtion has tendd to take a negativc vicw of the policies and institutions of the EC. For esample. as a socialist par5. it has identifiai the EC as a capitalkt institution whosc policies have perpctuateâ regionai dispanties within the rnernber States. Rathcr than oppose integration. tiowevcr. the UDB views Europcan inteption as a positive devclopmcnt in nccd of rchrrn. L'nch. P. Mnoriy .Varionalism. p .97. 88

cultural diversity may be centred on state cultures at the expense of minority cultures. They are consequently anxious to ensure that the EC offers some cornmitment to safeguarding rninority cultures and providing for the use of minonty languages. The regional govemment s in Belgium and Germany successfùlly lobbied to have an explicit reference to regional cultural diversity inserted into Article 128 of the European Union's cultural policy.' The objection of minority cultures to these possible economic and cultural outcornes cm be used to generate minority nationalisrn in the same way such factors were used by rninority nationalists in the 1960s and 1970s. during which time they used these concems to c1aixr1that the state was either insensitive to the needs of minority cultures or unable to fulfill these needs. On the other hand, if the policies of the European Union do satisfy the demands of minority nationalists, rninority nationalists cm use this as a justification for their independent activities in Bnissels. Hence, as European integration progresses there appears to be a struggle between regions and States to consolidate power at the European Ievel. State leaders have thus far been quite successful in maintainhg a dominant position in the policy-making and institution- building processes of the European Union. The finai outcome of European integration, however, ail remains vague enough to allow for cornpeting interpretations and for rninority nationalist groups to came out a role for themselves within it. Richard Balme describes the current state of the European Union as being a case of supposition rather than substitution of govemment level~.~The future role of regionalists and minority nationalists will depend partly on the evolution of European institutions. If the Council of Ministers continues to make final decisions concerning European

policy, the European Community will conform most closely to the intergovemmentalist model of integration. According to the intergovemrnentaiist model, state leaders are

%.~encllc.*-The New Cultural Policy ofthc EU' in Culture: Building Stone for Europe 2007 (cd.) L. Bschms. p.59. 9 R. Balme. "Ir~a.odtrctiort... " p.32. responsible for aggregating the interests of the societies of their respective States. If integration proceeds dong these lines, the position of national leaders will be enhanced and regionai politicians and rninority nationalists will continue to be excluded from the actual policy-making process. The imerests of regional groups will continue to be channelled, dong with the interests of other domestic groups, through the state ministers, who represent the various interests at the European level. Here the ministers will be able to choose which interests they want to defend in Europe. The necessity of bargainhg and forging agreements at the European level, fiees him from the constraints of the national parliament and electorate. Therefore, most regionalists or rninority nationalists which are interested in increasing or maintaining their powers at the European level are hopeful that European

integration does not proceed dong intergovemmentalist lines. la

-4 more desirable form of European integration for the regionaiists and rninority nationalists is a rnulti-layered federation in which they are equal partners with European and state actors. The essence of this kind of federalism lies "in the decentraiization of power

wherever needs can be satisfied, at lower levels of government, closer to the citizen. " " This

fom of integraiion rnay see the strengthening of the institutions of the and the Cornmittee of the Regions. This, in tum, will provide significant opportunities for regional leaders and muiority nationalias to increase their presence and allow for regional and rninority nationalist expression. Presently the significance of this activity remains largely symbolic. The importance of symbolic politics, however, should not be underestimated. The

'%OS Bmon &tan and Corsican rninority nationalkt movemmts are more interesteci in incdautonorny rather than outright independencc (those groups that have supportai independence have tàilcd to attain any sipificant lcvet of support). Thmefore each of these rnomrms are more intexsted in increasing their presence in Europe and hmce an intcrgovernrnental mode1 of integration would hder this objective. On the other hand. thc Scortish Nationalkt Pa*. which dots advocate constitutional independencc for Scotland. is supportive ofthe inte~o~~cmmmtatistmodcL insot'ar as Scotland is includtd among the list of membcr States who participate in policies and institutions of the Europcan Union. P. Lynch. 3finority iXOtionalism. p. 167. Il Mackcy citcd in Mutimer. D. "Thcories of Political intephon" Europcan Inteptions: Theorics and Approachcs (ab.)H. Michelman and P. Soldatis p. 18 1. 90

institutions of the European Union dlow regional actors to project themselves into the European policy-making arena, enhancing the status of the regional government and its leaders. This can re-enforce a sense of regional identity and political mobilization in the respective regions. The European arena is aiso a forum in which minority nationalist sentiment can be expressed. In this way, acting in Europe is a way for the aspirations of minority nationalists to be recognized without the cost of separatism. Lynch notes that the formation of a European level of government has resulted in rninority nationalists scaling down their aspirations. Rather than maintaining a zero-sum view of sovereignty, contemporary nationalists are more likely to take a pragmatic view of sovereignty which supports sharing sovereignty with European institutions." The remainder of the chapter will consider the new opportunhies for expressing minority nationaiist demands in Europe and wiU evaluate the potentiai of European institutions and policies to manage these demands. Finaily, this chapter will conclude with an overall interpretation as to the extent to which European integration has weakened the integrative capacity of the state and what this means to the potential for rninority nationalist groups to act out their aspirations for independence or increased autonomy within Europe.

Subsidian'ty The concept of subsidiarity is a potential tool for allowing regions more influence in the European institutions and policy-making. This concept has been popular amongst the regions as it maintains that decisions should be taken at the level of government closest to the people. However, this is only one interpretation of the principle of subsidiarity. The European Commission and the Member States have utilized other interpretations of this principle in order to justify the extension of their own powers. The concept itself is defined

"M Kniting. 'Regional Devolution: The West Eumpean Expcriencs* Public Monq and Uanagmicnt (Oclober-Dccsmbcr. 1996) p.6-8. and Lynch. P.lfttlorip .\'arronalim. p. 196. in fundamentally Merent ways in different pans of the Maastricht Treaty. Article 3B defines subsidiarity as a procedural criterion which determines when and how the EC should be involved in European policy making." Article 4 on the other hand, defines subsidiarity as a substantive pnnciple in which "Member States resolve to continue the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen in accordance with the p~cipleof subsidia~ity-"~"These two definitions together provide a principle by which each level of govemment can justiQ an increase in its areas of junsdiction. The ambiguity of the term has allowed subsidiarity to becorne; "the Euroconcept al1 can admire by giving it the rneaning they want."" Subsidiarity was first put on the European political agenda in the 1970s by Christian Democrat members of the European Pariiament, who wished to justifL the enlargement of the cornpetencies of the European Commis~ion.~~Christian Democratic doctrine recognizes a fùndamental distinction between the state and society. The state serves the public good and protects the legai order. Its role is to create the conditions under which lower social bodies and families can attain their ends. State intervention is justified only when the public good is threatened. Once circumstances have been improved by the state's intervention, the state should retreat. In principle; "the state in Christian Democratic political doctrine has a wide competence with respect to the dornain of possible intervention, but is restricted with respect to the duration of political mediation.17 The principle of subsidiarity in the Christian

""~heCommunin shall act within the lirnia of the powmconfi upon it by this Tmty and of the objectives assigned to it thcrein..in artas which do not t'al1 under its esclusive competence. the Comrnunity shall deaction. in accordancc uith the principle of subsidiari'. onfy if and so hr as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiendy achieved by the Member States and can thmfore. by rcason of the scak ofthe etïccts of the proposai action bt bctter achitvcd by the Comrnunity." citcd in A. Scott. J. Peterson, and D. Millar. "Subsidianh:'A Europe of the Regions v. the British Constitution?"Journal: of Comrnon Market Studics 32(1) Uarch 1994, p.49. '%id.. p.50. '5~conomist.4 July 1992. citcd in K. Van Kcrsbergcn.. and B. Verkek. 'The Politics of Subsidiarity in the Europcan Union" Jotirnal of Conmon Slarkrrr Stridies 32(2) Je 1994, p.220. 1%id.. p. 2 17. Democratic sense can be used to justiQ the Commission's involvement in any policy area if it can show that the policy area serves the completion of the Common Market." The principle of subsidiarity continued to be used in the European Parliament to defend the extension of the Commission's cornpetencies until the adoption of the SEA in

1986. At this time, national authorities became increasingly worried about the slow and incremental widening of responsibilities assumed by the European Commission. Subsidiarity

then became a tool of aates to curb the fiiriher widening of these cornpeten~ies.~~Thus states are more inclined to use subsidiarity in the procedural sense in order to adhere to a strict division of powers that lirnits the jurisdiction of the European commission. Regionai authorities have seized on the substantive principle of subsidiarity which directs policies as close as possible to the citizen. In this way, regional authorities argue for a more prominent role in the development of EC policies. In one sense, subsidiarity is a justification for long-standing demands for decentralization. The regionalists' use of subsidiarity is also a consequence of rising feus that further European integration will erode the powers that subnationd governments currently have." The principle of subsidiarity does provide regional authonties with an opporhmity to justiG their demands for direct representation at the European Ievel. The Commission, for its part, has supported a greater involvement by subnationai govemments at the European

level for two reasons. First, regional involvement legitirnizes the policies of the Commission by providing viewpoints fiom a level of govenunent closer to individual citizens. Secondly, regional govemments act as a counter-balance to the innuence of the states. National leaders, however, challenge this substantive definition of subsidiarity. Subsidiaity is more comrnonly

'%id. p.228. lgIbid.. p.2 18. 20. Marlis and McAdams. .*Social Movcments and the Changing Structure of Political Oppominicy in the Europcan Union" West European Politics l9(2) April. 1996. p.265. interpreted as a need to pass powers back to the state, but generally no funher than this."

European Regionai Developnient A major area of dispute between the aates and the regions is the European Regional

Developrnent Fund. Here the regions have used the principle of subsidiarïty to justi& their inclusion in the policy-making procedure. Despite these regional efforts, member states have retained their control over this policy-making area-

The generai aim of reducuig regional disparities was mentioned in the Treaty of Rome (1960), but nothing of substance was done at the Comrnunity level before its first enlargement. The October 1972 agreement for the enlargement of the Community inciuded a clearly defined intention to establish a Comrnunity regional policy." Because economic htegration opened previously protected markets, production systems that were characterized by highly dissirnilar productivity levels were put into direct competition with each other. This increased the economic disadvantages of regions which were already underdeveloped. The fact that states had to abandon the policies that they had uaditionaily used to protect declining industries and duceregional disparities increased the economic dificuities of these regions. " In response to the detrimental consequences of economic integration, The European Commission and the Member States agreed to create a European regional policy. The creation of the regional policy was dependent on the ability of state leaders to agree to common regulations that could be applied unifonniy to regions in need of assistance. Shce the creation of this ERDF the Member states have continued to exert a great arnount of control over who receives funds and how these fhds are spent. Beginning in 1984, however,

'1 M. Keating. "Europeanism and Regonalism" Thc Eusopean Union and the Regions (ais.) B. Jones and M. Keating p.22

"cheshim. P. et ai. * 1957 io 1991: Moiing Toward a Eumps of the Regions and Regionil Policy" in IndusIn'd Change and Regional Economic Transfomarron. (cds.) L. Rodwin and H. Sazanarni. pp.278-279. " R Nanem."EU Coherion and Territorid Rcsûucniring in Ihe Membcr States" Cohcsion Poliq and Evmpeon Inregration in (ed.)L. Hooghe. 1996. p.63. the Commission and the regions have aîtempted to reduce this infl~ence.'~ The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)had three wmponems: a financial instrument for regional policy; a series of meauires designed to improve CO-ordination beenthe European Cornmunity. the Member States and regionai and local authorities in their efforts to prornote regionai deveiopment; and other EC hnds and institutions which would operate with a deliberate regional bias." At this time the European Commission

ïntended for this policy to reflect a genuine Community initiative, but was largely fnistrated in this by Member States. Although the Commission pushed for a radical set of policy measures, the Council of Ministers responded by approving a watered down version which restricted the amount ûf re@onal policy powers that would be transferred from Member States to the Commission. The ERDF was consequentiy conceived so that individual Member States exened strong influence over how hnds were spent and which regions received

assistance.'6

Before 1988, the dominant style of decision-rnahg was one of "splendid isolation".

Member States were Free to choose policy pnorities and implement them while the Commission was sovereign in accepting or tuming down applications for Funding." In the early years of the regionai hnd. the vast bulk of the budget (95% of the total quota section) was spent on project by project assistance." This meant that rnost of the rnoneys were distributed on the bais of fixed national quotas. National govemrnents decided which regions were eligible for assistance and there was no effective rnechanism to ensure that money for assistance went to targeted regions. Although govemrnents needed to produce

projects to receive fiinding, ohthey sirnply sent in gants and infrastructure spending which

24 Hooghe. L. "Building a Europe uith the Rcgons: The Chanmg Rolc of the Europcan Commission" in Cohesion Pole and Ewopean Integranon (ed.)L. Hooghe. 25 Amsûmg. H "The Rolc and Evolution of Europcan Communin, Rqyonal Policy" in (ais.) B. Joncs and M. Kta~g,1995. p.35. "id.. 9.36. 27 L.Hoogtie. "Building A Europe ~7th..." p. 102. :%. Armstrong. "The Rolc and Evolution ..." p.39. were already planned and in many cases had already ben cornpleted." Only the remaining 5% of funds (non-quota assistance) could be used at the discretion of the Commission and was Qiven via programmes - not on a project by project basis." By 1984 the Commission had begun to attempt to Uiclude subnational governments in the process of determinhg the allocation of regional development funds. This stimulateci

new forms of regional mobilization. The European Development funds represented a new source of finance which had the potential to alleviate economic stagnation and underdevelopment in peripheral regions. Aithough minority nationalists had previously used economic grievances to increase minority nationalist sentiment in their regions, the realities of underdevelopment ensured that the regions remained dependent on the state. The Regional Development Funds, therefore, offer minority nationalists the opportu~tyto develop their programmes, in spite of economic stagnation in their regions. Economic stagnation rnight even become a more centrai theme to these programmes, as both regionalists and minority nationaiists can use the principle of subsidiarity to claim the right to have responsibility for securing regional funds. The 1984 reforms indicated a change in the 'splendid isolation' style of decision-

makùig. Policy-maken predicted t hat the quota section (renarned project assistance) would rapidly deciine in the next three years (fiorn 95% to 80%) and the non-quota section (renamed programme assistance) wocld rapidly expand. Programme assistance is more flexible than project assistance and the Commission has more control over where the money is allotted. The expansion of programme assistance represented a shift in power from the member States to the ~ommission.~~

The Commission continued to expand its power in the 1988 refonns, the incentive for

"L. Hmghe. and M. Keating. The Politics of Eumpan Union Regional Policy' Journal ofEwopeon Public Policy. p.372. '%. Armstrong. "The Role and Evolution..." p.39. 31 . ibid. p.39. Sec also Hooghe. L. "Building a Europe with the Rcgions ..." for an account as ta how the Commission extendcd its intlucnct in the regonal policy. which was the targeted 1992 cornpietion of the common market. The peripheral nates demanded a more secure financial policy which would compensate for the disadvantages which were expected to resdt from their assent to the single market programme. The reforms, however, were meant to be more than hancial compensation for disadvantaged countries. They were also rneant to aid indigenous development by bringing officials from the Commission, rnember states and subnational governments together in a sustained pmnership. Subnationd governments were included because they would have an intimate knowledge of the problems of the region. The previous policy style of "splendid isolation" had now become one of sustained partner~hip.~'

Through the proposed partnership arrangement the Commission was tryïng to

institutionalize links of access and support between the Commission and the regions. Where regions were reco-ed (Itaiy and Spain) they were empowered as fomal governent institutions and where they were not (Greece, Portugal and Ireeland) steps were taken to bring the management of regional policy as close as possible to the local populations, through the devolution of functions to local administration ~nits.~~The Commission's intention in proposing these changes was to have regionai and local authorities bargain with the European

Commission and national state executives in order to make decisions conceming the irnplementation of EU funded deveiopment programmes. This wouid give regionai authorities the opporninity to be directly invoived in European decision-making. The Commission, in its attempt to appiy uniform rules of regional development

throughout states which had highiy divergent territorial relations, altered existing patterns of politicai contr01.~This partnership arrangement brought together actors with potentially

dBkring perspectives and interests with no pre-estabiished hierarchy. Regional leaders couid

37 U Camagu "kdopmcnt Sctnuios and Polciy Guidelines for the Lagping Rqons in the 1990s" Rcponal Studics 2q.1)p.364 "~.~anctti.-.EU Cahaion and temtod Ratmcninng'* p.65. 'y.Hmghe. œintroduction" p. 12. 97

clairn that they had the greater right to take responsibility for the acquisition of development bdsas they had a better understanding of the economic needs of their region. When state ministen were given the responsibility for quiring and allotting these funds, regional leaders claimed that the regionai econornies would be developed in order to conform to the overaii economic objectives of the state, thereby subordinating economic needs of their regions to those of the state. This theme has also been developed by minority nationalists who are criticai of the ort hodox temtorial development models favoured by States, which ignore the interdependency between local cultures and economic development. h4inority nationalists claim that if the culture of a region is ignored, the infiastmcture provided by developrnent

programmes wdi not be compatible with the cornpetencies capabilities and vocations of the

local work force. if this is the case, labour mut be imported to the region to fiU positions for

which the local work force is not qualified and the region fails to benefit fiom this development. '' ûther minority nationaiists are critical of the onhodox development initiatives because they do not address the fact that minority languages have histoncaily been accorded a lower

statu in the woridorce. Speakers of rninonty languages are oflen required to acquire a new language before employment oppomuiities can become available to them. Some minority nationalists beiieve that this has had nrgative implications for the coliective self-esteem of rninority cultures and they wish to see this redressed. Although the economic impact of these negative self-perceptions are difficult to quant@, minority nationalists claim that they are clearly not conducive to developing a culture of entrepreneurship in which a prerniurn is placed on self-reliance, initiative and pro-activity. These nationalists would not only like to ensure that economic development programmes initiated in their regions take account of local

35~.Moulaen In Culture: Building Stone for Europe 2002 (cd.) khans cultures, but that the Commission and states dea comrnitment to fostering the use of local

ianguages. 36 Although there are examples of successful IOcalized deveiopment programmes3', there is a lirnit to the extent of cultural specificity upon which such programmes can be based. A weakness found in rnany of these grassroots initiatives is that they underestimate the determinative importance of larger economic and social structures, which resdts in overly idealistic programmes with no real chance of suc ces^.^^ For this reason, these programmes are usefui in projecting minonty cultures in Europe, but generaiiy do not develcp beyond the theoretical stage. Despite the claims regionaikt and rninority nationalists have made for their right to be included in the process of negotiating European development funds and the efforts of the Commission to hclude tkm, there has not been a crucial restructuring of relationships within the EU. Athough there has been a great deal of regional mobilization, its effectiveness is questionable. The fact that most of the regions that receive the bulk of the regionai funding do not open offices in Brussels suggests that a more effective means to obtain funding is to go through national ministers. State leaders and, to a lesser extent, the Commission determine the budget for stmctural funding, not the regional govemments. State executives

also determine who wiU be included in the partner~hip.~~Fuithemore, in 1993 the Commission retreated somewhat fiom the regional poiicy, suggesting that states may regain some of the influence they had prior to 1988." For regions which do attempt to influence the Commission directly, their activity

36 A.Pnce. et ai. "The Divcrsity Dividcnd: Languagc. Culture and Economy in an intcgratcd Europc"(Bmsscb: Europcan Bureau for Ltsscr UdLanguage. 1 997) '-Set A. Price. et ai. '-The Divcrsity Dividcnd" for examples oftconomic and cducational initiatives in Handcrs. Walcs. ireland. Valencia wtiich sak to crcatc busincsses baseci on Locai cultures and in which the local language is spokcn. '%. Moulami in mou tu te: the Building Srmefor Eumpe. '9Marks G. a ai. "Compctencics.Cracks and Contlicts: Regional Mobilization in the European Union" Comparative Politid Studics 29(3)April, 1996. p. 180. '4.Hooghe. and M. Keating. -The Pditico of EU Regonai Poiiq"p.391. tends to be uneven and conditioned by traditional relationships with their respective states. The influence each region has at the European level is detennined by its economic importance, poiitical skilis, administrative infiastructure and their abiiity to mobüize civil society behind the regonal goverment. For these reasons, regions in decentraiized states have a Qreater advantage. There is very little coordination or aggregation of regionai deman& at the European level and quite often regions are in competition with each other for fiinds.'' Some regions have established offices in Brussels. but there is linle a region can do to influence the allocation offûnds. Even if regions could infiuence this decision, the national govemment could stiU recover the money under some other heading. The regional presence in Bmsseis, however, is stili symbolically impo~t.By having representation in Brussels and proclaiming links with the Cornmissio~regional potiticians can clah credit for funds which would have corne in any case. When the fùnds do not corne, potiticians can aiii clah that they are in Brussels, working for the region."

Direct Influence in the EU As European integration progresses, an increasing number of poiicies will have to be regulated among the member states. This not only limits the sovereignty of the states to formulate and implement poiicies, but it also means that regionalists and rninority nationalists increashgly have to direct their attention away from the national policy making arena to the European Union. In the future, this might increase the activity of minority nationalists and regionalists in Europe. Presently, the most important channel of intluence in the EU remauis via national govemments. Generaiiy, the more effectively regionai interests are integrated into the national policy-making system, the bener they wiU be looked after in Brussels." if the

national governrnent can be persuaded to represent a regional interest, t hen the region can be

assurd that its position wiii be defended in the Council of Ministers. where final decisions are

made. The sate is also irnponant when it cornes to the irnplementation stage. An important characteristic of the EC poiicy process is implementation failure. This in pan reflects the inauence exerted by national level pressure groups when Community directives are translated into domestic legislation. Maintainhg contacts with national officiais throughout the

formulation and implementation nages is a useful way for regional leaders to ensure that poiicies that benefit their regions are made and implemented? As the European Union deepens, regions will become increasingiy affected by

European policies. For this reaçon. regional leaders and minorhy nationalias may be reluctant to channel their demands solely through their respective States. in the national arena their demands are pitted against a national majority. For policies which are particularly important to the regions, relying exclusively on representation in the Council of Ministers rnight prove

nsky because the process of negotiation at this stage &en leads to trade-offs between

national executives due to the necessity of reaching conclusions.*' At the European level. however, regionalists and minority nationalists wiii be only one arnong a large number of national groups, none of which is dominant. In order to try to influence policies that are of panicuiar importance to them, many regionalists and minority nationalists have set up offices in Brussels. They are sa excluded from the final decision-making process, but they are able to lobby policy draflers in the early formulation stage.

'karks. G.And McAdam. D. *.'SociaiMovemniu" p. 265 and Kating M and Hooghe. L.'@By-Passingthe Nation-Statc? Regions and the EU Policy" in European Cnion: Power and Poliq-:\faking (cd.) S. Richardson. p.220. *W.Grant "Pressure Groups and the Europcan Community: An Overview" Lobbying in the Europam Cornmuni@(ah) S. hkq and J. iùchardson, p.28. '-%des G. a al.. 'Cornpanicics. Cracks and Contliccs'' p. 187 and W.Grant, -'Pmsurc Groups and the Europtan Community" pi8. Hooghe and hilarlcs also note that the grcattr the ovtrlap berwttn wmpctmcics of regional govcrnmcnt and the EU, the rnorc likcly it is rhat regtonal governrnent uiIl mobilizs in Brussels. L. Hooghe, and G. Marks. "Europe mith the Regions" Publius: The Journal of FedcraIism 26( 1 ) 1996. p.83. The staE of most regional offices are aware of that they do not exert significant political power in the European arena. Regdations restrict the decision-making capacity of the commission in mersüke the ailocation of regionai fùnds and political decision-making is confineci to the Council of Ministers. The regional presence in Brussels, however, has two more subtle roles. The first of these is information exchange. This fùnction is especidy critical for those regional govements that have broad-ranging cornpetencies, as they are Sected by European regdations on many fronts? A presence in Brussels ailows regional govemments to gain advance waming of European policies that are king formulated. For regional lobbyists, the greatest oppominity to influence European policy is at the drafting stage which takes place in the Commission. A drafter is usually in need of uiformation and a lobbyist who is recognked as being

trustworthy and a provider of good information cm have an impact at this stage. Regional

staff in Bmssels are thus able to provide information and regional viewpoints to the Commission officiais, who are othenÿise dependent on national govemments for information." This f'unction rarely entails riiaking explicit demands on supranational officials. Instead, they endeavour to explain the costs and benefits of alternative policies from the standpoint of the regions."

At the same time, the dofregional offices in Brussels are able to pass information fiom the European level to their respective regional govemments on policies that are Likely to affect their region. Regional leaders can use this information to apply pressure on state ministers. Mthough they have no formal role in the decision-making process, regional govemments in this way can challenge the gatekeeping role of the central state executive between domestic and European politics."

%A. Kcating and L. Hooghe. *By- Passing the Nation-Stats?' pz22 'k Hu4 'Zobbying in Brusscls: A View from Within" in Lobbying in the Europcan Cornmunity (eds.) S. Mazcy and J. Richardson. p.83 and Marks. G.and McAdam, D."Social Movmmts and ..." p.261. %hrks. G.et al. 'fompctcncies Cracks and Conflicts" p. 183. '%id. The second purpose the regionai offices serve is a symbolic one. The presence of regional authorities in Brussels allows these leaders to project the region into the European arena and present themselves as pmicipants in the policy-making process. In this way, regional politicians can take credit for certain EU initiatives which would have corne in any

case, through the workings of the relevant policy-making process. The open bureaucracy of the Commission encourages lobbying while the decision-making is dciently non-transparent to allow a variety of actors to take credit for the outcorne.' if regionalias or muiority nationalists are unable to affect European policy they can still use dissatisfaction with the renilting poiicy and its anticipated consequences as an issue around which to mobilize support for their nationalist movement. In addition to individual offices and lobbying efforts, regions have alro formed transnational links based on a variety of conunon features. The Assembly of European Regions (AER), founded in 1985 by Nne interregional associations. has developed a close workmg relationship with the European Commission. This organization has pushed for the

greater involvement of the regions in European issues, such as the Cornmittee of the Regions and the inclusion of the subsidiarity principle in the Maastricht ~reaty." Marks and Hooghe have identifiecl three other types of transnational networks which

exin alongside the AER and the Coud of European Municipalities and Regions (whose role is similar to GR). The first type of network is created by the Commission and is attached to specific programmes and initiatives which are generally meant to facilitate development and econornic advancement. '' The second set of networks result fiom self-directed mobilization among regions

'%. Keating. and L. Hwghs. "By-Passingthe Nation-StaW p.22. S 1 G.Marks. and L. Hooghe, "Europe With the Rcgions" p.87. '%. Uarlrs and L. H@e. '-Europe Witti the v'pp.87-88. Examples of this kind of nctwork arc the Exchange of Expcncnce Promrnc (EEP) uhich ai& uansfers of knowhow ktwm dcvtlopd and disadvantagcd wonsand Recife(Regions and Cities of Europe) which funds subnationai nctworks focussed on sclI4wlp and cxchangc progrrimrncs. which share cornmon territorial features or policy problems. Networks of this kind are oflen concemed with reducing economic inequalities. It is often dficult for these networks to

recruit widely as the diversity of members and interests often causes strains within these networks. This htsthe amount of meaningfiil information exchange that occurs and results in ineffective lobbying. Although the Commission is eager to exchange information, it is reluaant to do this with regional associations which are narrowly ba~ed?~

The third type of network is aiso self-mobilized, but consists of relatively successfül regions. These networks are driven by economic factors and are concemed with attracting business and industry to the regions. The fact that most transfmntier networks are driven by economic imperatives has had mixed effion minority nationalism If a minority culture and region coincide, rninority nationaiists cm use these networks to their advantage. First of dl, the contacts they forge with other regional leaders can aiiow them to project themselves as international acton. This, in turn cm enhance their status with their region. Secondly, the economic development and information exchange that results fiom these ne~orkscan reduce the region's dependency on the state institutions.

When a minority culture and region Q not coincide, however, this can undermine the coherence of the nationalist movement, as is the case with the Occitan movement. The regions of Languedoc- and Midi-Pyrénees have pursued independent economic objectives through transnational networks. Although this has enhanced the stahis of each respective region, it has Bagmented the Occitan nationalist movement." The Comminee of the Regions provides regions with a purpose in Europe which is more official than the informa1 lobbying efforts. The Cornmittee of the Regions gives the regions and other Ievels of local govemment an officiai mandate within the institutional mareof the EU. 55 At Maastricht member states agreed to create a Comminee of the Regions (COR) which would have consultative rights over the formulation and implementation of regional policies. The Maastricht Treaty directs the Councii of Ministers and the Commission to consult with the COR on regional matters. Although this is strictly an advisory role regional representatives are able to have some infiuence over European policy. Fkst the members of COR speak for regional and local govemments that implement the European policies. Secondly, some of its members are in a position to pressure their respective national governments directly through the Council of Ministers or within their

respective national arena. '6 Despite its consultative capacity, intemal divisions within COR have inhibited the regions fiom havhg a signincant influence on policy. The disagreements and connias which surrounded the establishment and work in COR hdicate that the regions of Europe &en can

be divided and non-cooperative. Severai cleavages were revealed in the Cornmittee including those between weak and strong regionai govemments and between regional govenunents and other levels of local govemment. The local/ regionai split is especiaiiy relevant to minority cultures which occupy regions. Many regionalists feel that a Comminee of the Regions should not include other subnaîional levels of government. Oflen regionalists must compete with other levels of local government, such as city mayors, for infiuence wit hin their states. Because other local levels of govemment are aiiowed representation in the COR, regionalists must also compete with them in this institution. Allowing this competition to occur within the COR undemiines its intended purpose. which is to represent regional interests in Europe."

The weak v. strong regional government cleavage was manifested in a dispute over

5 5 T.C hristianscn. *Second Thoughts on Europe's Third Lcvel" Publius: The Journal of Fedcralism 26:1. p.74. 56 G.Matks. and L. Hooghe. "By-Passing the Nation-Statt" p.75. 57 This division is relevant to the Fmch rcgions. who must wrnpctc with deparaenral prcsidents and mayon for pohticai powcr. whether or not to dow COR members to be represented in plenaries and Commission meetings by delegated deputies. This has been a long-standing practice in the German

Bundesrat and was, therefore, taken for granted by German mernbers. This debate was significant to Gemian, Belgian and Spankh regions as they had selected hi& ranking regional officials for COR membership. Their idea was to grace CORwith important persona, while

the detailed wdtative work would be transferred to delegated officials. This practice was

not allowed because a rnajority of CORmernben voted not to dow members to delegate their participatory and voting rights to subordinate of fi ci al^.^' The tension that exista in COR represents the general tension that exists in the EU

between the great variety of intrastate arrangements and the requirement of a uniforni

produre ùi Europe. More significant for the regional influence, is the degree to which the diversity in COR represents a diversity between states rather than regions. ïhe fact that central governments are responsible for choosing COR representatives. these representatives are socialized to practice traditional state poiicy procedures and that these representatives ofien project state interests, suggest that the Committee of the Regions is more like a Committee of state representati~es.'~ These divisions are impediments to regions developing their influence to its fullest

potential in Europe, but they are not insurnountable. Many of the regions in the COR are relatively new and inexpenenced levels sf government which have yet to consolidate power and establish themselves in their own states. If the regions are able to attain their own national foiiowings, estabiish a position of power over other levels of local govenunent and set fixed prionties, their potential for purposeful and cooperative activity at the European level will increase. The Cornmittee of the Regions, itself, is also a relatively new institution in cornparison to other European institutions and hence it is also too early to render a final

5 8 T.Christianscn. --SecondThoughts ..." pp. 102-103. 59 ibid. p.105. 106

judgment on its potential. Even as a young and fiagmented institution, the COR has a symbolic importance to the regions. The Cornmittee institutionalizes the presence of the regions in Brussels and gives them an official mandate to participate in European politics. Their presence in COR gives regional authorities even more reason to ciah credit for favourable EU policies and subsidies that are channelled to their regi~n.~

The Euro pean Parliament is another institution which can potentially dow regionalists and minority nationalists representation in Europe, although representation here so far has been insignificant. The European elections provide regions and minority nationalist with an opportunity to increase their role in Europe beyond that of a lobbying capacity. In order to take advantage of this opportunity some minority nationalist and regionaikt pariies have fodinter-party alliances f?om which they hope to guarantee resources and politicai status for their partie^.^' The ditfidties inherent in these interparty alliances are similar to those faced by other transnational organizations examined in this chapter. This is the problern of developing a coherent programme that goes beyond the bare outlines of principles. Because of the diversity of interests that are brought to these alliances, it is often difficult to develop a programme with real comrnon policies, rather than lowest common denominator cornmitments. Wrthout a substantive programme, regionalist and minority nationalist alliances have rarely been successful at obtaining representation in European electi~ns.~'

Conclusion The evolution of the European Regional Development Funds demonstrates the way

62 For an illustration of the problcms facing regionalkt and minons nationaiid parues sec L>nch's section on the Europtan Fm Alliance in ibid. p. 142-1 54. in which states have ben able to duence European institutions and policies in order to maimain the upper hand in European politics. The fàct that institutions cannot be forrned and policies cannot be passed without the consent of the Member states has ensured that they remain the major acton in Europe. Consequently nationai channels are stili the moa effèctive means to influence European poiicy. As European integration deepens, the sovereignty of member states will be rexiuced in those policy areas that must be regulated with other states. Regionalists and minority nationalists see this reduction in the capacities of states, as an opportwiity to increase their autonomy by asserting themselves in Europe. Because policies made in Europe &ect the regions, regionalists and minority nationalists have becorne less wihg to rely on aate leaders and rninisters to represent their Uiterests in Europe and have sought direct representation in Europe.

The institutions of the European Union provide new opportunities for regionalias and minority nationalists to gain representation for themselves and their interests in Europe. The most direct way regionalists and rninoriry nationalists have anempted to do this is by opening offices in Brussels in order to lobby European poticy-makers. Here regional staff are able to learn early of European policies, provide information and regional viewpoints to poiicy drailers and to pass information f?om Europe to their respective regional govements. The Cornmittee of the Regions and the European Parliament (to a lesser extent) provide a means for more formal regional representation in Europe. Although the COR remains a consultative institution it does give regional leaders an official mandate in Europe, thus enhancing their political status. Through European elections, regionalkt and minonty nationalist parties can seek representation within the European Parliament, once again increasing their political status. But. they have been unsuccessful in winning rhis representation so far. A problem common to both the COR and the inter-party alliances is that it is difficult for diverse regions to agree to conmion goals and formulate cohesive programmes. This diversity represents a signifcant obstacle to efféctive political action. Despite the fùture possibiiities for increased regional and minority nationalist infiuence in the European Union, much of the& present activity remains largely syrnbotic. Symbolic politics, however, dso play an important role in enhancing the status of the regions and winnuig nippon for rninonty nationalist movnnents. Whether or not policies made in Europe are favourable to the regions or minority cultures, minonty nationalists and regionalists can use these policies to enhance their status and win suppon for their programmes. If a favourable policy is passed regional leaders and minority nationalists can take credit for obtaining this favourable outcome through their lobbying activities in Europe. On the other hanci, ifa policy has detrimental consequences, regionalists and minority naîionaiists cm use this as an example of the nates unwillirigness or inability to represent their interests in Europe. Athough European integration has blurred the distinction between minority nationaüas and regionaiins, this distinction still exists and has to be recognized. Most of the opportunities the European Union provides to regionalists can only be appiied to minority nationalists in situations where culture and temtonal identities coincide. When they do, as in Scotland and , the same economic and political oppominities that are available to regionalists are also available to rninority nationalists. Minority nationalias can then use these opportunities to challenge the legitimacy of the state. In France, however, temtonal identity and regional identity rarely coïncide and so this distinction is more sigiilftcant. Other than the economic and political opportunities discussed in this chapter, the institutions of the European Union offer few other oppomuiities for the expression of minority nationalism. In pmicular, they do not address the cultural concerns of minority nationalists in Europe. Aithough some minority nationalists had expected that the wider ~uropn-contextwould provide more oppominities for the expression of minority cultures, minority nationaiists have become more fearful tthat the widening and 109

d-g of the European Union wiil ovenvhehn their cultures and bring about their decline. Some minority nationalkt have expressed discontent with the fact that the institutions of the European Union have not made a commitment to minority languages and that the Commission's commitment to cultural diversity seerns to refer only to state cultures. Minonty riationalists are also unhappy with the European Commission's emphasis on orthodox economic dwelopment models which do not take account of the cultural specificity of the regions. For this reason, rninority nationalists believe that the European Regional Development Funds are another way for the States to deveiop the regions in the interests of national economic objectives, rather than addressing the specific needs of the regions. Finaiiy, for those nationalists who have traditionally sought independence, the amount of autonomy currently available through initiatives and institutions in Europe is unOcely to satisfy their ambitions. Proof of this cm be seen in the ideas of Scottish Nationalist Party. Although the SNP recognhes oppoRunities for independent action in Europe, they still insia on constitutional independence from the United Kingdom to allow them to rnaximize these oppomuiities. CONCLUSION

The majority of this thesis was devoted to using the case of France to illustrate how a specific country's policies of territorial management duence the coune of rninority nationalist movements. The early literature on minority nationalism recognized economic, ethnic, historical and cultural factors which reoccurred in rninority nationdia movements and erroneously assumed that these factors were sufficient to explain the emergence of minority nationalism. The importance of the political explanations was that they recognized that tenitorid management is an ongoing process that occurs between the regions and the States which embody them. Therefore, minority nationalism cannot be predicted by the existence of specific factors, but must be explained in the context of the political relationships that develop between a central governrnent and ethnically distinct regions. Nationalisrn can be used by groups which share a comrnon cultural or culturaYtemtorial identity to make demands on the state. In response to these demands, a

state cmmake a variety of concessions including; increased political autonomy, recognition of cultural distinctiveness. protection for rninority languages and econornic concessions. In this way state leaders accommodate minority nationalism without sacrificing the temtorially

integity or legitimacy of the state. Even though the literature of the 1960s and 1970s could

not predict or explain the causes of rninority nationalism, it was usefui in predicting the kinds of demands minonty nationaiist would make and the factors they would use to mobilize support and make demands on the state. Mnority nationalist movements in Bnnany, Corsica and Occitania were chosen for this study because the course of these movements illustrates that the existence of econornic grievances, a defined rerritory, a distinct culture and/or a shared history are not sufficient conditions to sustain a rninority nationalist movement. Although minority nationalist 111

movements have chailenged the integrity of the French state at various times, none of these movernents has been capable of any sustained suppon against the state, nor have they posed a signifiant challenge to the territorial integrity or legitimacy of the French state. Rather, the French central govement has consistently maintained the upper hand in the politics of territorial management. Beginning in the Third Republic, French leaders endeavoured to create a French national identity they would spread throughout the French territoty, with the purpose of eradicating local identities. This was to ensure that 'nation' and 'aate' became one and the same concept in the minds of French citizens, so as to avoid the divisive consequences that rnight arise out of cultural diversity. When minority nationalist movements did challenge the notion of the French nation, French leaders were consistently niccessfùl at taking administrative measures to defuse these movements. These two strategies have ensured that French leaders thus far have fùifilled successfûlly the following two-fold objective as set out by Unvin and Rokkan: to preserve the integrity of the French temtory and to ensure the legitimacy of the state within its boundaries by popular support for it and acquiescence to its political authority.' A ment mdy on minority nationalism and temtorial management, however, would not be complete without taking account of the supranational factors which also chaüenge the territorial integrity of states. For this reason, the latter portion of this study explained the challenges European states face in light of theu membership in the European Union and the opportunities this presents for minority nationalists and regionalists to express demands and influence policy in Europe. It also examined the possibility of managing these demands in the institutions of the European Union rather than at the state level. Nthough decentralization alone did not ser-iously undermined the infiuence of the

ID. Um~nand S. Rob.Econommvy Tem'top. Idmtiy. p. 166. central govemment in French politics, the continuhg development of the European Union constitutes what could be the most sigdicant challenge to the territorial integrity of the French state. The widening and deepening of the European Union together with the cornpetencies granted to the regions by the decentralization reforms have provided greater independence for regional politicians. While this viewpoint of top-dom erosion can be overstated the duai processes of decentralization and Europeanization have provided the

French regions with increased legitimacy and new oppominities for political activity at the European level. These opportunities may, in turn, provide minority nationalists with new ways to express th& demands, mobilize support for these demands and attaui the objects of these demands more independently than before. Obsexvers of French regiondism and the activity of regional leaders in Europe, çuch as Balme', ~adrech',and Mazey*, note that regional potiticians are more tightly controlled than other regional politicians are, such as those in Beigium, Spain and Gennany. At the sarne time, however, they acknowledge a change in the relations between the French state and the regions and point to the increased opportunities for regional actors in Europe and the willingness of regional poiiticians to take advantage of these opportunities as the cause of this change.

.b French politics and policy making become increasingly integrated into the greater

European whole, regional po titicians will be inmeasingly required to respond to policies which are made beyond the French administraiwe structure. As the policies of the European Union continue to afktthe intemal relationships and politics between the regions and the centrai adminimation, regional actors wiU be irnpeUed to respond to these changes by seeking greater

'R Balme. "French Rcgonalization ...O in The European Liiion and the Regions (ais.)B. Joncs and M. Ktating, pp. 167-190. 3 R. Ladrech. '-Europtanization of Domestic Poltics and Institutions: The Case of France" Jownol of Commun .\farker Studies (32 1: 1 . J S. Marey. "French Regions and the Europcan Union* in The End of the French L'nitra, Su&? (ais.) J. Loughlin and S. Mazcy. pp. 132-1 57. involvement and input into the formulation of regional policies. If regional viewpoints are not represented by national ministers and leaders, the rules and procedures of the European

Community allow for and encourage the participation of regional politicians (aithough only in a consultative role) in irs institutions. The decentrakation reforms have prepared the Fraidi regions to gain access to Comrnunity decision-making, particularly for the process of negobathg Cornmunity Support Frameworks, since this process is similar to the process used in French regional planning contraas.'

A second cause for the greater assertiveness of regional actors relates not only to the increasing innuence of European policies and the need for regional actors to respond to these changes, but also to the challenges this poses to French policy-making traditions. Traditionally, French policies have appeared highiy uniform because the govemment's central ministers have been lefi to unilaterally formulate policy without pnor consultation with societal interests. Unifionnity at the formulation stage, however, was only tolerated because of the flexibility that existed at the implementation stage. Therefore, even though, policies appeared to be formulated in a highly centraIized manner and were theoreticaliy to be applied unifomily throughout France, civil servants had considerable latitude in interpreting the laws.

It was this ability to 'bend the niles' or to make 'exceptions to the rules' which allowed for responsiveness to French society and made societal interests accept their exclusion from the formulation stage.6 The policies and regdations that originate in the European Union, however, cannot be irnplemented with similar flexibility. Oppominities for input into the European policy- making process are provided at the formulation stage. In the early stages of policy formulation, draflers are eager to obtain information and encourage input from a variety of sources. By the time policies reach the implementation stage, there are few oppominities lefi

'R. Balme "French Regionalkation...-. p. 187. 6 J. Hapwd. Govoning France, p.23. and V.Schmidt Democrarutng France. p. 182. to affect changes and the leaders of the Member States are expected to ensure uniform application of the policies.' Because of the culture clash between the European Union and the French administrative practices, French civil servants have not always done a vev good job of representing French interests within the European Union admini~tration.~ The procedures of European Union policy-rnaking wiii consequentiy affect the attitudes of regional leaders. The exceptions that were previously expected in the implementation of French policier are illegitimate in the European mode1 of policy-making. Because regional Leaders cannot expect French civil servants to be flexible in their implementation of European Union policies, they will naturally be more resistant to exclusion from the formulation stage of European policy. If national ministers cannot be relied upon to represent regionai interests, regional leaders wiIi hdit more effective to act directly in Europe. French regional leaders have responded to the challenges of European integration in several ways. Many have included their regions in tramfkontier organizations which are made up of regions fàcing similar challenges in adapting to integration, and moa often to the market integration in particdar. Because most of these organizations have developed out of the necessity of attractllig investment and firms to the regions, their main fùnction is to facilitate information exchange among member regions in areas of economic and technological development and retrainingg These organkitions cm enhance the aatus of the regions and their leaders by allowing regional leaders to establish an international profile through theu contacts with regional leaders fiom other countries, although this enhanced profle rnay not be recognized outside of the leader's region. Ofgeater importance to minority nationalism is the faa that these organizations have

7 - V. Schmidt. and R. Huii. "Lobbyîng in Bnisstls", p.83. *v.Schmidt. 19%. p.... 9 LP Monde. Match 8-9. 1992. p.7. and Ladrech, R. "Europeanization of ..." the potentiai to reunite historicai regions separateci by state boundaries, thereby reviving traditiod nhnic and ailtural loyalaes. However, the notion of the French nation is so saoag that these loyalties are uniikely to pose any serious threat to the temtorial integrity of France. In addition to transfrontier organizations, sixteen out of the twenty-two regions in France have opened offices in Bmssels either independently or in cooperation with other regions in order to directiy hfiuence European policy. Although the staff of these offices can act only in a consuitative capacity, their presence in Bmssels dows them to gain expenence in the process of European policy formulation which wiU enhance their ability as lobbyias.

They are aiso able to lem early of European policies and pass this information to regional presidents who can in tum pressure the French government to represent them in negotiations in the Councii of Ministers.1° Those who are the most skeptical of the regionai presence in Brussels view this activity as nothing more than amusement for regional politicians. Others daim that French regional leaders should not clah to be equal to. by virtue of their associations with, the representatives Eorn the Gemian Lander or Spanish provinces because the French powers are nowhere near equal to theirs." Even when one acknowledges the iimited powen of the French regions, however, it is still possible to see that an irnponant rote for regionalists is fonning. Their presence in Brussels provides important training and information to be used both in national and

European policy formulation. As the opportunities to alter policies at the implementation stage become fewer, regionai leaders will have to use these resources more assertively in order to ensure European policies are not detrimental to their regions. The new opportunities that are provided to regional leaders in the European Union and the ways in which it has restncted French policy implementation, wili not necessanly

Bdme "French Rcgionalization" te Monde March 8-9.1991. p.7 11Le .Clonde. March 8-9. 1992 .p.7. redt in inaeased support for rninority nationalist movements. Because the French regions were formed strictly as administrative units, and were chosen so as not to coincide with historic identities, the activities of most regional leaders have nothing to do with ethnic or cultural issues. Rather, most regional activity revolves around obtaining European regional development fùnds or development initiatives which are intended to make the regions more appealing to foreign corporations and investors. In other words, moa regional activity occurs as a response to econornic hperatives rather than a desire to maintain a distinct culture or assert a minority culture within Europe. As evidence of th& Balme points to the paradox that the metropoiitan regions, in which there is little or no minority nationalist sentiment, are the ones whose identity is most strengthened by European integration, while the penpheral regions, although benefitting from Comrnunity regionai programmes, are poiiticaiiy linle affected by integration and look to direct negotiations with the state to enhance their autonomy. " In the case of Occitania, the administrative regions' new access to Brussels has undermined the nationalist rnovement. These new administrative regions, such as Languedoc- Roussillon and Midi- are quite different from each other and consequently pursue different objectives in Brussels. Although this aaivity may strengthen the regions individudy, it increases the heterogeneity of the already incoherent Occitan nationalist rnovement .l3 The culturai imperabves of rninority nationalist movements are concemed mainly with preserving locai identities in the face of econornic change and ensuring that local Ianguages are recognmd in the institutions of the European Union. l4 These movements, however, do not atmmuch popular support and their progammes oflen are not developed beyond the level of academic discussion.

Minority nationalists in Britrany, Occitania and Corsica have aiso sought representation in Europe through election to the European Parliament. Although no nationalist party is capable of obtaining enough votes on its own, minority nationalists have

achieved some aiccess in European eleaions by fonning alliances with other parties. In 1989, Breton, Basque, Corsican and Occitan nationalists fonned a regionalist diance with the Greens to participate in the European elections. Through this alliance, the Corsican nationalist, Max Simemi, was eleçted io the European Parliament. This first venture into the

European elections was considerd a success for minority nationalists. However, this success was a one-off event and by 1994 the regionalist alliance with the Greens had collap~ed.'~ As it was in the past, popular support for minority nationaiist movements remains inconsistent and has oflen depended on the ability of nationalist leaders to use weli-pubiicized protests as politicai capital. In this endeavour, Europe does provide issues around which minority nationalists potentially can win support. lfminority nationalists perceive that they are subject to policies that are detrimentai to their regions, they cm use this as proof of the central govemment's insensitivity to their region's interests. In the past, however. such appeals have rdted only in short-term successes. The fint reason for this is that the central govemment has always been able to implement policies in response to increases in rninonty nationalism that CO-opt minority nationalist leaders and satisfy nationalists' immediate demands. A reason which is of greater consequence to the hture of rninority nationalism is the fact that early attempts to create a French national identity which was capable of overshadowing al other identities has proven to be largely successfÙl. Although minonty nationalism ernerges periodicdy as a reaction against certain conditions or events, the French

''P. L~h..\iinori~.Vationnlism. p. 102. kt du> p. 142-165 The UDB. UPC and Porti Occiion dso belong to the Europcan Frœ AIliancc which is a transnational fdcration of nationalist and regionniist parûcs whosc purpose is to facilitate the formation of a rcgonaiist political group in the £P. 1.18

identity is pervasive throughout France. Mon rninority nationalists place their demands for increased autonomy within the French state and negotiate these demands through national channels, indicating their own afnnity with the French nation. For the small group of nationalists who do seek independence, it is unlikely that their

aspirations wiU be Satisfied at the European level. Although the Commission has encouraged the involvement of subnational govenunents in Europe, it still recognizes the supremacy of states. The ability to lobby European policy-makers and the fkeedom to forge transfiontier alliances are unlikely to satis@ the aspirations of those nationalists who seek independent natehood. lUthough support for independence rnovements in France is slight, the continued existence and activity of the FLNC in Corsica suggests that a presence in Europe faüs too short of independence to satisQ these nationalists. In light of the effects of decentraikation and European integration in France, it does appear that a significant change in the relations between the centrai goverment and the regions is occurring, even ifit is occ-g more slowly than in other . However, the greater challenge to the French state is likely to corne from the regions as administrative units rather than flom minority nationaiist movements. Although regional leaders in France do not enjoy the same cornpetencies as those in Gemany, Belgium and Spain, there are increasing opportunities for them to increase their involvement in French and European policy-making. The fact that France's membership in the European Union has forced French ministers and leaders to adapt theù policy-making procedure to dow for more uniform implementation suggests that d kinds of societal interests will becorne more aggressive in asserting themselves in the formulation stage of policy-making. In order to ensure the smooth implernentation of these po licies, it is likely that French central authorities will have to allow regional leaders and other interest groups to have more input into policy formulation. In order to remain the dominant actors in Europe, however, it is more likely that French politicians will hdways to accommodate these new interests at the national level, rather than 119 encourage their presence in Europe. It is important for regional politicians, therefore to secure a place for themselves in the French poiicy-making process. Their success in doing this and their continued pencein Europe will enhance their statu within their regions and wili also enhance the status of the regions in Europe.

Limitations und Topinfor Futtker Study

The main purpose of this midy was to illustrate that minority natiodsm was the result of specific political relationships that develop between the central government and the temtories of that state. Minonty nationalist movements within France seemed to be a paràcularly usefûl case to study because the central govemment has managed to maintain a uniquely high degree of centralkation in spite of the existence of historically distinct communities and the presence of bonwhich typically facilitate nationalist movements. By considering three minority nationalist movements within France, I was able to find that they shared common weaknesses. This aiiowed me to Myconclude that these weaknesses mua be a redt of the interactions between the temtories and the central govemrnent, rather than being specific to the movements themselves. It would not be a sufficient illustration of this theory to show that only one of these temtories had not produced a sigruficant nationalist movement, as this fdure could just as easily be attributed to the lack of minority nationalist sentiment in that specific region or organizational weaknesses Uiherent in that specific movernent. in other words, the Mure of minority nationalist rnovements in Occitania could not be relateci to policies of the French central govemrnent if a ~ccessfblminonty nationaiist movement existed in Brittany. By studying more than one region in France, 1was able to rule out this possibility. This study, however. is not sufficient to prove the theory that minority nationalist movements are a redt of the political relationships that exist between the central govemment and ethnically distinct regions becaw it considen only one country. A true test of this theory 120 would be to examine the relationships that develop in several countries between the central government and regions and would explain how the dserences between these states result in varying degrees and forms of rninorïty mtionaiism. Simiiariy, my hdings that the administrative units of regions are a greater challenge to the administrative unity of France than the minority nationaiists movements are to the territorial integrity of France, cannot be generaiized to apply to any other country in Europe. In fact, the French state has punued cuitural and administrative unity more diligentiy than other European states. It is, therefore, logidto assume that it is possible for other European

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