The Political Economy of Fisheries Management and Private Sustainable Fisheries Initiatives in Indonesia

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Asia & the Paciﬁc Policy Studies, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 576–589 doi: 10.1002/app5.40 Original Article

Archipelago of Gear: The Political Economy of Fisheries Management and Private Sustainable Fisheries Initiatives in Indonesia

Michael De Alessi*

Abstract 1. Introduction

Indonesia is a vast archipelago, stretching Indonesia, a developing country with 34,000 over 3,000 miles and including the heart of the miles of coastline (54,716 km) and a popula- Coral Triangle. Fisheries and marine conser- tion of over 240 million people, lies at the vation is fundamentally important to Indone- heart of the Coral Triangle. The Coral Tri- sia’s large population, but to date the political, angle is home to the world’s richest marine legal, economic and institutional socio- biodiversity, but also significant pressure and cultural settings for fisheries management and degradation due to both human and environ- marine conservation have been plagued by mental factors (Allen & Werner 2002). Along institutional and legal uncertainty. Even in with the ecological pressure on coral reefs cases where laws are clear, monitoring and from climate change and ocean acidification, enforcement are often unpredictable, or simply the legal and institutional environment in lacking. This has caused problems, but it has Indonesia is also eroding the resiliency of also created opportunities for innovative both natural and human systems. And the experiments at the local level, across the pressure is only increasing; per capita fish diverse cultural and political landscape of this consumption is rising rapidly, and national nation of islands. This article describes the government policies to increase fishing most notable examples of these experiments capacity (World Fishing and Aquaculture and how they may shape future marine conser- 2012) despite widespread unsustainable vation policy in Indonesia. fishing only underscore the need for fisheries management reform. Key words: fisheries management, political Marine resource management has generally economy of marine conservation, traditional followed the tenor of national government marine tenure, private sector initiatives, policy, which, after a long period of centrali- Indonesia sation, shifted to decentralisation in the late 1990s. Neither approach has effectively coped with Indonesia’s maritime complexity and diversity. From Indonesia’s independence from the Dutch in 1945 until the end of the * School of Aquatic and Fishery Sciences, Suharto regime in 1998, political power was University of Washington, Box 355020, Seattle, increasingly centralised, including control Washington 98195-5020, USA; email over natural resources. Most of this centralisa- Ͻ[email protected]Ͼ. tion took place after the Sukarno period

© 2014 The Author. Asia and the Paciﬁc Policy Studies published by Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modiﬁcations or adaptations are made. De Alessi: Archipelago of Gear: Fisheries Indonesia 577

(1945–1967). When Suharto took control in boats under 5 GT are registered rather than 1967, his government immediately passed licensed. Most of Indonesia’s fishermen are three far-ranging laws (Law 1/1967 on foreign small-scale, near-shore fishermen, often investment, Law 5/1967 on forestry and Law fishing for subsistence or small local markets. 11/1967 on mining) that further centralised As a result, the majority of fishing pressure in control over natural resources and facilitated Indonesia is widely dispersed and difficult to foreign investment in their extraction monitor. Add to this Indonesia’s complicated (Resosudarmo 2006). The Suharto government geography, large population and widespread also notably passed Law No. 5/1979 on Village poverty, and the result is minimal monitoring Governance, which created a uniform village and enforcement of the marine environment by structure and a hierarchy of control from the state. village all the way to the centre in Jakarta and The jurisdiction for nationally managed severely eroded village control over the man- fisheries is currently the area outside of 12 nm. agement of natural resources, including for- Additionally, boats over 30 GT may not fish estry and fisheries. inside of 12 nm (the limit for provincial juris- When the Suharto regime fell in 1998, a diction). Provinces regulate fishing from 4 nm period of decentralisation followed, leading to out to 12 nm, and of boats from 5 GT to 30 GT. more control for local government, but also Near-shore, smaller scale fishing (less than 5 ‘political uncertainty, inconsistent laws and GT) is the responsibility of the district govern- regulations, weak law enforcement, a weak ments. Most of the fishing effort in Indonesia governmental system and insecurity of land comes from these small-scale, near-shore fish- tenure’ (Resosudarmo 2006, p. 1). Notably, ermen. In 2010, the Indonesia Ministry of Law No. 22/1999 on local governance and Marine Affairs and Fisheries (MMAF) esti- Law No. 25/1999 on fiscal balance gave more mated the number of fishermen in Indonesia at political power, management authority and 2.6 million and the number of fishing boats at fiscal control to regional government. After the 570,827 (MMAF Indonesia 2011). This passage of this law, both provincial and district number has changed significantly over the last governments could pass laws as long as they few years, largely due to changes in how the did not contradict national law. Law No. numbers of fishermen have been measured, but 22/1999 also included specific language it is clear that fishing effort is increasing. devolving the management of marine and Fisheries are regulated and statistics are kept coastal resources to district governments, and by the Directorate General of Capture Fisher- the law that replaced it in 2004, Law No. ies within the MMAF. For the national govern- 31/2004, continued to devolve authority for ment and the provincial governments, fishing near-shore fisheries management to the local boats must be licensed, but there are no limits level (Table 1). Local control was also on the number of licences or on harvests from affirmed in Laws 27/2007 and 1/2014. those boats. In 2010, MMAF estimated that 30 per cent of fishing boats were ‘unmotorised’, 2. Fisheries Management in Indonesia: down from 52 per cent in 2000, when the total Basic Regulatory Environment number of fishing boats was estimated at 449,558. Even with a certain unreliability to Indonesia has a three-tiered system of fisheries the data, it does seem clear that fishing boats management. Boats over 30 GT (gross are steadily increasing in both numbers and tonnage) are licensed by the national govern- fishing power (Table 2). ment and must fish outside of 12 nm (nautical Internally, MMAF measures success based miles) from shore. Provinces regulate fishing on maximum sustainable yield (an outdated from 4 nm out to 12 nm, where licensed boat measure internationally). According to one sizes range from 5 GT to 30 GT. Near-shore, USAID review of government effectiveness, small-scale fishing (less than 5 GT) is the even ‘assuming that data and analysis are sci- responsibility of district governments, and entifically tenable, MMAF still has no man-

© 2014 The Author. Asia and the Paciﬁc Policy Studies published by Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University 578 Asia & the Paciﬁc Policy Studies September 2014

Table 1 Major Changes in Fisheries Law since the End of the New Order Period in Indonesia

Agricultural Ministerial Decree 392/1999

• Regulates fisheries and divides Indonesian waters into four fishing belts o Fishing Belt 1A for small-scale fishermen (boats less than 10 m, gear restrictions); from 0 to 3 nm o Fishing Belt 1B also for small-scale fishermen (but allows larger boats); from 3 to 6 nm o Fishing Belt 2 for intermediate fishermen (allows larger boats with in-board engines); from 6 to 12 nm o Fishing Belt 3 large-scale commercial fishing; from 12 to 200 nm

Law No. 22/1999 ‘Decentralization Law’

• Devolves near-shore management of marine and coastal resources to provincial and district governments • Sets district boundaries at 4 nm from the coast and provincial boundaries from 4 nm to 12 nm • Allows the adoption and integration of the customary laws and local territorial rights into local government policy (Siry 2011) Presidential Decree No.136/1999 • Created Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (ﬁsheries previously under Ministry of Agriculture)

Law No. 31 of 2004 Concerning Fisheries

• National-level fisheries and aquaculture regulation • All fisheries farther outside of 12 nm and all boats over 30 tons are managed by the national government • All fishing boats and business must be licensed—except for small-scale fishermen • Defines small-scale fisherman as ‘any person whose livelihood is undertaken to meet his daily needs’ (Law No. 31/2004, Article 1, Chapter 1, Sec. 11) • Includes assistance for small-scale fishermen, including recognition (but not formal legal recognition) of traditional fishing institutions

Law No. 32/2004

• Supplants Law No. 22/1999 (decentralisation of governance) • Further strengthens provincial government authority • Article 18: explicitly assigns management rights for marine resources out to 4 nm to the district (kabupaten) government, and from 4 nm to 12 nm to the provincial government (Hartoto et al. 2009)

Law No. 27/2007 on the Management of Coastal Areas and Small Islands

• Coastal zone management • Creates a concession rights in coastal waters known as HP-3 (Hak Pengusahaan Perairan Pesisir) • Concession rights may be granted to individuals (Indonesian citizens), adat communities and the private sector for up to 20 years, and may be used for extraction, conservation and tourism • Concessions must not detract from the sustainability of coastal and small island ecosystems and traditional communities, as well as free navigation • Further legislation required to specify exactly how concessions will be granted and who will have the authority to grant them

Constitutional Court Ruling # 3/PUU—VIII/2010, 16 June 2011

• Annulled all provisions of Law #27/2007 related to Coastal Waters Concessions (HP-3), in large part because of concerns that the concessions law would contravene the Constitutional mandate that natural resources be managed ‘for the greatest prosperity of the people’ (Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia—Indonesian Constitutional Court (MKRI) 2011) • The court also decided that the law evinced a preference for ‘entrepreneurs’ and other private entities over community control over concessions, despite language in the law mandating the protection of traditional livelihoods

Law No. 1/2014 on the Management of Coastal Areas and Small Islands

• Coastal zone management • Creates coastal business licences known as izin lokasi • Izin lokasi are vacated if not used for a period of 2 years, may be revoked at any time and are limited to the following activities: salt production; marine pharmacology, marine biotechnology; use of sea water (but not for energy); coastal tourism; laying of pipes and cables; and wreck salvage (Article 19) • Izin lokasi may not interfere with traditional livelihood and use of coastal resources (Article 20) • Foreign investment in coastal resources must include public access, which in Law 27/2007 included ﬁshing access (Article 26A)

Table 2 Rate of Change by Boat Size, 2000–2010 enforcement of laws and regulations in Indo- Ͼ 200 GT + 2.4% annually nesian waters (Dirhamsyah 2005): + 100–200 GT 9.4% annually • Lack of funds 50–100 GT + 10.8% annually 30–50 GT + 34.3% annually • Lack of equipment 20–30 GT + 10.2% annually • Lack of trained personnel 10–20 GT + 7.4% annually • Lack of integrated laws and regulations 5–10 GT + 5.4% annually • Lack of coordination between regulatory Ͻ + 5GT 5.4% annually and enforcement agencies Outboards + 7.0% annually No motor − 2.5% annually • Lack of environmental awareness • Inappropriate judicial system Source: MMAF (Ministry of Marine Affairs and • A vast maritime jurisdiction Fisheries, Indonesia) 2011. 3. Decentralisation and Traditional agement strategy in place for what to do if Marine Management maximum sustainable yield is reached’ (Bolongaita et al. 2009, p. 4). There is little The decentralisation of natural resource man- doubt that small-scale, artisanal fishing is gen- agement in Indonesia has continued apace erally underreported, and measures of harvests since 1998. This time period coincides with also ignore illegal fishing, which is a signifi- increasing recognition around the world of the cant problem. A 2007 study of the sea of relationship between territorial use rights in 1 Arafura in Eastern Indonesia, for example, fisheries (or TURFs ) and conservation, and in estimated illegal, unreported catches of over particular the importance of traditional, often one million tons in that area alone (Indonesia’s communal, control over access to resources reported catch to the Food and Agriculture (Johannes 1978; Cordell 1989; Ostrom 1990). Organization (FAO) is under five million tons) Traditional marine management exists in Indo- (Pitcher et al. 2007). Another investigation nesia, but varies widely across the archipelago. found that foreign-owned trawlers fishing in Almost any visit to the shoreline in Indonesia, Indonesia waters were reporting only about 30 however, reveals a host of stakes, fishtraps, per cent of their catch (Fegan 2006). Even offi- cages, seaweed farms, fish attracting devices cial statistics are not exactly detail-oriented: (FADs), permanent and semi-permanent the largest harvest total of marine fish reported fishing rafts, and even structures for people to to the FAO by Indonesia is categorised as watch over areas, or simply to sleep or rest. simply ‘marine fish, not otherwise identified’. Many of these structures are part of a set of Corruption is a problem throughout Indone- informal rules governing access to the area sia. On Transparency International’s (2010) they lie in, but many of these rules are tenuous corruption index, Indonesia ranks 110th out of and must be enforced on a case-by-case basis 178 countries. At sea, the Navy cooperative by their presumed owners (FADs, in particular, ‘INKOPAL’ apparently holds fishing licences are notoriously difficult to monitor). and has business relationships with foreign Adat is the Indonesian word for traditional, fishing companies fishing in Indonesian waters and hukum adat (adat law) often describes (Fegan 2006). MMAF has also been the customary law. Ulayat rights refer to the subject of corruption investigations, and one village commons. Territories are most evident MMAF review found that its approach to regu- around Maluku and also in West Papua, where lating fisheries was more concerned with the ulayat is part of the system of sasi, a tra- revenue generation than conservation (Siry ditional institution that allows for prohibitions 2006). on access during certain times. In the marine Corruption and statistical inaccuracy aside, environment, this is known as sasi laut. another review of maritime law enforcement 1. See Christy (1982) for the development of this identified the ‘principal problems’ facing the terminology.

© 2014 The Author. Asia and the Paciﬁc Policy Studies published by Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University 580 Asia & the Paciﬁc Policy Studies September 2014

Sasi laut is primarily a system of opening Indonesian Constitutional Court in June 2011 and closing both areas and seasons, but may (Constitutional Court of the Republic of also include communal tenure, definitions of Indonesia 2011, Conservation and Community access rights, harvest regulations and distri- Investment Forum 2013). bution of benefits (Harkes & Novaczek Even before Law No. 27/2007 was struck 2002). Harvest regulations include prohibi- down, it was clear that decentralisation had tions on the use of poisonous plants and the done little to alleviate political uncertainty, use of bagans or floating net platforms. Tra- weak law enforcement, inconsistent laws and ditionally, these rules were enforced by an weak property rights (Resosudarmo 2006). institution known as the kewang, which had Decentralisation laws like No. 22/1999 and local policing authority (Syarif 2009). In 32/2004 direct provincial and district authori- Maluku, sasi areas are not formally demar- ties to manage natural resources without con- cated, but there is common recognition that travening national law, but in practice many they may be sold or leased by the community district laws do just that (Patlis 2005). In (Harkes 1999). Sasi in Maluku is perhaps the early 2014, a new Law of Coastal Areas and most well-known example of marine tenure Small Islands (Law No. 1/2014) was passed, in Indonesia, but others include Awig-Awig in which created a new form of near-shore Bali and Lombok, Mane’e in North Sulawesi, marine business licence (as opposed to a con- and Panglima laot in Aceh (West Sumatra) cession), known as an izin lokasi. The law (Adrianto et al. 2010). specifically allows for permit revocation, What is traditional, however, is open to although primarily for non-utilisation of the interpretation, beginning with Dutch efforts to permit (Klarissa 2014). The law specifically define adat through to present-day political lists the types of businesses that may apply opportunism. As noted by Franz and Keebet for a permit, which does not include fishing von Benda-Beckmann (2011, p. 168), ‘Adat in but does include coastal tourism (as well as Indonesia has become a generic term to indi- activities such as salt production, laying of cate an often undifferentiated whole consti- cables and wreck salvage) (UU 1/2014). The tuted by the morality, customs, and legal law also makes exceptions for hukum adat, institutions of ethnic or territorial groups’. As local and traditional communities, which will it was in the time of the Dutch, any attempt to inevitably be open to broad interpretation. codify or formalise any of these concepts is The door is open for stronger near-shore intricately tied to ‘the legitimation of political access rights not to be subject to national and economic power over natural resources licences or permits, but the law also does and the question on which law the road little to clarify national policy on TURFs or to “development” was to be built’ (von other forms of restricted access to marine Benda-Beckmann & von Benda-Beckmann resources. 2011, p. 180). One place where local management rights One such law was Law No. 27/2007 on the are strong is in Papua, especially in Raja Management of Coastal Areas and Small Ampat (off of the Southwestern tip of Papua). Islands, which allowed for the creation of Papua has its own ‘special autonomy’ legisla- near-shore concessions known as Hak tion, passed by the central government in an Pengusahaan Perairan Pesisir or HP-3. The attempt to quell the Papuan independence law included protection for local access to movement. In 2002, Law No. 26 established fisheries, and proponents believed the law the new regency of Raja Ampat, and a 2003 could be used to strengthen local tenure of decree from the Bupati (head of the regency) to marine resources. Opponents, however, create a kabupaten bahari (sea regency) worried that the law would allow private inter- further strengthened the ability of the district ests to deny access to local communities government to manage marine resources (Damanik 2011). Eventually, the concession within Raja Ampat. In places without strong portions of the law were struck down by the traditional management institutions, however,

© 2014 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University De Alessi: Archipelago of Gear: Fisheries Indonesia 581 new pathways to reform will have to be estab- through access to fish markets, kelompok lished out of whole cloth. nelayan may offer important pathways to reforming sustainable fisheries throughout 4. Fishermen’s Organisations Indonesia. (kelompok nelayan) 5. Industry-Led Sustainable Fisheries Local fishermen’s organisations known as Initiatives: Case Studies of New kelompok nelayan exist throughout Indonesia. Territories and Access Rights Although less well-researched than traditional systems, kelompok nelayan generally operate While the uncertainty created by the legal, at the village level, and are sometimes part of political and institutional environment in Indo- a larger kelompok, as is the case on Tomia nesia makes widespread reform difficult, it Island within the Wakatobi National Park also leaves open opportunities for social and (WNP). economic entrepreneurs to tackle fisheries According to legal scholar Laode M. Syarif reform head on—with varying levels of (2009, p. 52–3): success. Industry-led conservation and sus- Most Kelompok Nelayans are informal, and only tainable fishing efforts offer another pathway a few of them have a proper organizational struc- to reform in Indonesia, and are the focus of the ture. Kelompok Nelayans are usually established rest of this article. by traditional fishers to protect their common interest. Some Kelompok Nelayans, however, are well developed and play a significant role in their 6. The WNP and the Wakatobi Dive community. They even establish profitable Resort (WDR) Koperasi Nelayan (fishing cooperatives) and ini- tiate programmes and activities to protect their WNP was created in 1996, covering a chain of coastal areas. four small islands off of the Southeastern Some kelompok nelayan are based around corner of Sulawesi. The Park covers an area of fish markets and auctions as a way to protect 1.39 million hectares and contains roughly the financial interests of their members. 600 km of reefs, including barrier, fringing, Others arrange for a percentage of the fish patch and atolls (Soede & Erdmann 2003). The sold in the local market to go to ‘widows and national agency with primary responsibility orphans’ funds, as fishing is a dangerous for oversight of WNP is the Ministry of For- occupation. Still, others appear to exist estry, under national parks legislation passed simply to meet government criteria for recipi- in 1990. MMAF was created in 2000, and ents of development assistance. Others are control over marine national parks (of which working on conservation. One particularly there are six) was explicitly ceded to MMAF successful example covers the whole island in a legislation passed in 2004 and 2007 of Tomia off the Southeastern corner of (Nurhidayah 2010), and again in 2014 (UU Sulawesi. Known as Komunto, it began in 1/2014) Still, the WNP remains under the 2006 in response to an uptick in fish bombing jurisdiction of the Ministry of Forestry. and cyanide fishing, and seems to be having a After a long and drawn out process, a zoning significant impact. A majority of the fisher- plan for the park was put into place in July men on Tomia are members, and Komunto 2007. Under this plan, the majority of the park was able to use social pressure to reduce is a ‘local use zone’, with only fishing by bombing and set up a fish bank (reserve) in small-scale, local fisherman using traditional 2007. Komunto operates inside WNP, and has methods (such as hook and line and small gill been assisted by both World Wildlife Fund nets) allowed. The zoning also includes (WWF) and The Nature Conservancy (TNC). no-take zones, ‘protected areas’ and ‘tourist By organising fishermen and exerting both areas’, which together cover about 3 per cent social and economic pressure, possibly of the park (Wiadnya et al. 2011). In practice,

© 2014 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University 582 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies September 2014 no-take zones are only effective near fishing include more villages and a larger reef area. In villages that actively participate in enforce- 2012, there were agreements with 17 local vil- ment. As for the local use zones, fishermen lages and other administrative bodies around from outside of Wakatobi, especially nearby Tomia. Each village has a council or BPD port cities such as Bau-Bau and Kendari, regu- (Badan Permusyawaratan Desa) that receives larly visit the area to fish with large trawls as monthly payments. WDR stipulates that the well as dynamite and cyanide. According to BPD books be open to everyone, and at least local sources, two to five boats from Bau-Bau one community broadcasts the funds in the dynamite fished at the remote edge of the account every Friday afternoon over a village Kaledupa reef in January 2012. A WNP park loudspeaker. Funds have been used for bring- enforcement boat eventually chased them ing fresh water to villages, building roads and away, but only after two to three weeks of fences, and repairing and upgrading school dynamiting had already taken place. facilities. Monthly payments range from There are at least three other types of pro- approximately $100 to $700 a month, signifi- tected areas around Tomia that have not been cant by Indonesian standards. created under the aegis of the national park. Under the terms of the agreements, the reef The Coral Reef Rehabilitation and Manage- directly in front of the resort, the House Reef, ment Program (COREMAP) is an Indonesian is a no-take zone that appears to be respected. government project, funded by the World Bank The areas where WDR has agreements to regu- in Eastern Indonesia, designed to create a late fishing methods include dive sites around network of community-based protected areas. Tomia and the reef structure surrounding the Each community that participates in nearby Linea and Sawa islands. These areas COREMAP agrees to create and protect a are patrolled by locals working for the resort at small marine protected area (DPL or Daerah least once a day, 6 days a week. Perlindungan Laut) in return for community The WDR claims that its agreements are support and development assistance. based on hukum adat or traditional law. COREMAP has had a series of ‘phases’ with Around Tomia, however, adat law does not different levels of funding and activity, the include hak ulayat or customary territorial largest of which was phase II which officially rights. What is customary is that anyone from ran from 2007 to 2011. Around Tomia, most Tomia is free to fish on all of the reefs around local fishermen did not differentiate between the island (except now the House Reef). That is the areas inside and outside of the COREMAP subtly beginning to change with the precedents DPLs. A survey of fishing villages in Wakatobi set by the WDR agreements, which pay differ- showed that about half of the respondents ent amounts to different villages based on a thought that coral health was improving inside number of factors, including proximity to the the COREMAP protected areas, but almost 2/3 House Reef and to other protected areas. The thought that the DPL had no effect on fishing owners of the resort claim that the largest harvests (Buhari et al. 2011). Other layers of factor impacting payment is the size of pro- protection have been imposed by the kelompok tected areas and the level of protection, but nelayan, and also by the WDR. many fishermen and community leaders The WDR opened in 1995 on the island of believe that distance from the resort is the most Onemobaa, separated from Tomia by a narrow important factor. And the WDR monthly pay- channel. In 1996, the same year that the park ments reveal a clear gradient of compensation was officially created, WDR began paying radiating out from the resort. local communities around the island of Tomia The local acceptance of this gradient for over and to create a no-take zone in front of the 10 years indicates that while the reefs of Tomia resort (the House Reef) and to curtail destruc- may belong to ‘all Tomians’, in practice each tive fishing practices on other nearby reefs. village has more control over the reefs closest to Since this program began, the number and it. While the underlying sentiment and fears scope of the agreements have expanded to that led to the repeal of Law 27/2007 should not

© 2014 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University De Alessi: Archipelago of Gear: Fisheries Indonesia 583 be forgotten, it appears that the WDR, through A second protected area known as Daram direct negotiation and signed agreements, has was created in 2010 through a lease with two already started to establish clearer TURFs and villages farther from the resort, 15 nm and ownership rights over reefs, first on the basis of 20 nm away. Both of these protected areas local proximity to those reefs, and second by overlap with a larger protected area known as the island of Tomia as a whole. the Southeast Misool Marine Protected Area (MPA), created by local government in collaboration with conservation non-governmental 7. The Misool Eco-Resort (MER), organisations (NGOs). Unlike the areas pro- Raja Ampat tected by the resort, the larger MPA allows for traditional fishing activities and is aimed pri- The Raja Ampat region of West Papua has one marily at limiting destructive fishing by outsid- of the highest levels of species diversity in the ers. The fact that the resort was willing to Coral Triangle (McKenna et al. 2002). contract to create the Daram protected area Western Papua has some of the strongest suggests that enforcement in the broader MPA marine tenure in Indonesia, through a combi- is lacking. MER has set up its own patrols to nation of traditional access rights and a special enforce the protected areas, staffed by locals autonomy law that allows for more direct and paid for both by the resort and by numerous control of the region by the provincial and donors, most notably Wild Aid. Building on the district governments. Sasi laut is common in strong local system of sasi and the precedents Raja Ampat, and villages often recognise own- set by a nearby pearl farm, the MER no-take ership rights to marine resources based on clan agreements have clearly resulted in better- affiliation (McLeod et al. 2009). defined access rights to marine resources in the Strong access rights have allowed for a area and more effective enforcement of fishing number of private initiatives, most notably the restrictions. creation of two large no-take zones by the MER. The resort lies on a small island near the 8. Papua Diving, Raja Ampat island of Misool and was built on the site of a former dynamite fishing camp—evidence that In another part of Raja Ampat, Papua Diving, enforcement was largely non-existent in the which operates two dive resorts on Kri island, past. Much of the destructive fishing in the has had an agreement in place since about area where the resort is now located occurred 2004 to protect their house reef. According to in the 1990s and early 2000s, and was perpe- the owner, Max Ammer, the agreement limits trated by non-local fishermen passing through fishing to nearby villagers and only permits the area (Heinrichs 2008). pelagic fishing, not reef fishing. Papua Diving The resort opened in 2008, but created its has been in this location for almost 20 years, first no-take zone through an agreement with and a recent fish survey by a scientific team the nearest community in 2005 as part of the from Conservation International found 374 resort’s land lease. The protected area covers species on the nearest reef, the highest found roughly 200 km2, and prohibits fishing com- by the team, anywhere. Even without a rigor- pletely (apart from a traditional shellfish ous scientific comparison, it appears that local harvest once every 2 years). The family claim- protection and enforcement by the resort are ants to the area—two families from nearby increasing biological diversity in the area. island of Yellu—were identified by the local Prior to this agreement, Papua Diving had Adat Council (Heinrichs 2008). A precedent another agreement with 12 nearby villages that for subtidal leasing set by a nearby pearl farm had agreed upon the marine boundaries was important (Taylor 2008), and the lease was between them, and to which Papua Diving paid signed not only by the claimants, but also by a small amount every time it took divers into a authorities from the village, district and village area. The payments were for use of region. marine space rather than any specific conser-

© 2014 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University 584 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies September 2014 vation activities, but no divers would be taken live reef fish target species will likely have to degraded areas. According to Max Ammer, reproduced at least once by that size). Karas the system worked for about 3 years without Island lies just off the southern coast of West conflict, until the district government declared Papua, directly East of Maluku. It lies along a that any payments must go first through the popular part of the live reef fish trade route, so district government. Fees were paid to the gov- in the past it received frequent visits from fish ernment for one more year, until the district buyers, and its population of reef fish had government then instituted a district-wide tag declined. In part because of the opportunity system whereby all dive tourists were charged that this depleted stock presented, Pulau Mas to dive in Raja Ampat. After that, the agree- reached an agreement with the village head to ment was abandoned, along with direct pay- be the exclusive fish live reef fish buyer for the ments for reef protection. island. In return, Pulau Mas offered lower fishing pressure and a higher price when the 9. Karas Island and the Pulau Mas fishery recovers. Fishing Company The arrangement between the Karas Island village head, live reef fishermen and Pulau Another case that builds on the strong reef Mas fishing company strengthens access rights tenure of West Papua is an exclusive access around the island of Karas. Because the agreement between a live reef fish company arrangement is new, however, it is now clear and fishermen on the island of Karas. The live how access will be enforced once target reef fish trade sends high-value species, such species have grown more abundant, or how the as grouper, to Hong Kong to be sold live at community (especially of other, non-live reef restaurants (Lee & Sadovy 1998). Larger fishermen) will react to the higher prices paid fishing companies often collect fish in floating to one small segment of the community. If this cages called keramba, which are often manned arrangement does prove to be resilient, it may full-time and visited periodically by a collector set a precedent for how exclusive access may boat (Mous et al. 2006). High prices are paid improve the sustainability of both fisheries and for these fish. In Wakatobi, for example, in local livelihoods. 2012, freshly caught (but dead) reef fish were 10,000–30,000 rupiah per kilo, while one 10. Industry-Wide Reform of the Blue brightly coloured grouper weighing less than Swimming Crab (BSC) Fishery one kilo, alive, could fetch 200,000 rupiah or more. The Asian BSC (Portunus pelagicus) fishery These high prices have led to the problem of ranges from Japan and the Philippines through cyanide fishing, where free divers squirt potas- Southeast and East Asia to Australia (Food and sium cyanide at fish to stun them, killing many Agriculture Organization of the United other species and damaging corals in the Nations (FAO) 2012). In Indonesia, the BSC process but allowing fishermen to catch mul- fishery began in the mid-1990s, and is now one tiple reef fish at once while keeping them alive of the country’s most important export fisher- (although frequently of lower quality). ies, with most of the product going to the Cyanide fishing is illegal throughout Indone- United States. There are about 65,000 fisher- sia, but is still commonly practised. men involved in the Indonesian BSC fishery Pulau Mas is a live reef fish exporting and over 600 mini-plants where initial process- company based in Bali. It owns keramba in ing (cooking and picking) is done (Sustainable eight provinces in Indonesia, including Fisheries Partnership (SFP) 2011). Wakatobi and Raja Ampat. Pulau Mas only The diversity of locations, fishermen and buys from fishermen who have signed an intermediaries has led to a ‘high level of varia- agreement not to use cyanide fishing and to tion in all aspects of fishing and processing’ release any fish weighing less than 600 g (Warmbrunn & Hutabarat nd, unpublished, 4). (based on scientific advice, grouper and other Boats range from dugouts to larger near-shore

© 2014 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University De Alessi: Archipelago of Gear: Fisheries Indonesia 585 vessels, and gear ranges from pots to gill nets incentive for fishermen to stop catching them. and mini-trawls, but all are small enough to be Finally, there are also significant non-APRI essentially unregulated and unlicensed. The buyers and exporters. supply chain varies widely, and may include Because of non-APRI buyers, and because multiple fishermen, collectors, mini-plants the incentives along the supply chain favour (which may cook and pick, or just one or the the inclusion of undersized crab, it is not clear other) and processors. While some export pro- exactly what effect the minimum size limit is cessing plants are vertically integrated (that is, having. More rigorous monitoring and they buy the crabs directly from the fishermen, enforcement will ultimately have to start on then cook, pick and process the cooked meat), the water, and without any sort of exclusive most are not. Data gathered at landing spots in access or territories in the crab fishery, it will recent years show a decline in the average size be difficult to align the incentives of the fish- of BSC, indicating widespread overfishing ermen with a sustainable—and more (SFP 2011). profitable—fishery. The first American company to begin exporting BSC from Indonesia was Philips, in 11. The Lesser Sunda Sustainable 1994, in response to declining fishery in the Fisheries Initiative (LSSFI) Chesapeake Bay (NOAA 2010). Philips was a leading force behind the creation of both the The Lesser Sundas are a chain of islands US Crab Council, whose member companies stretching from Bali in the West to East Timor. represent 80 per cent of crab imports to the It includes Komodo National Park and lies United States, and APRI, the Indonesian Blue within the Coral Triangle, and in recent years Crab Association (Asosiasi Pengelolaan has been characterised by destructive fishing, Rajungan Indonesia), which accounts for overfishing, pollution and coastal development about 85 per cent of the BSC exported from (Wilson et al. 2011). Because of the islands’ Indonesia to the United States. In March 2011, proximity to each other and to the markets of the Crab Council encouraged APRI processors Bali, fish may be transported by truck with to set a minimum size limit of 8 cm (carapace significant loss of product due to spoilage—by width) for the crabs they sourced. MMAF sup- some estimates as much as 40 per cent. Reduc- ported the idea (although no regulations were ing losses through the supply chain is one of forthcoming), and in July 2011 APRI formally the investment opportunities targeted by the adopted the 8 cm size limit (SFP 2011) and LSSFI, which is led by P.T. Bali Seafood Inter- increasing the limit again in April 2014 to national, a Bali-based joint venture between 10 cm (Seafood Source 2014). Considering the US and Indonesian seafood companies. The complexities and uncertainties of regulatory LSSFI aims to develop a profitable, sustain- and legal institutions in Indonesia, price- able fishery in the region using exclusive driven measures to impose minimum size agreements with buyers and exclusive access limits are attractive, and APRI members have for fishermen to higher prices for sustainably real market leverage. caught fish, including both pelagic and reef Monitoring and enforcement are other species. The project also includes data collec- matters. Fishing effort is widely dispersed over tion methods and support for local enforce- large areas, and the numbers of both small- ment of fishing regulations, in collaboration scale fishermen and intermediaries are daunt- with NGOs such as SFP, TNC, WWF and LINI ing. Anecdotally, it is not difficult to determine (a local Indonesian NGO), as well as USAID, whether picked crab meets the minimum size MMAF and UC Santa Barbara. limit, but in practice the measurement is The LSSFI does not lack for vision and an labour-intensive, and there are clear incentives approach that takes into account the incentives for intermediaries to include undersized crab necessary for sustainable fishing at all levels, in picked meat. As long as undersized crabs are from fishermen to buyers to processors and purchased, even at a lower price, there is little exporters, from local to national government,

© 2014 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University 586 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies September 2014 and through the academia, NGOs and devel- 2011. Still, the fact remains that conservation opment agencies that share an interest in sus- is impossible when dynamite fishing goes tainable fisheries and livelihoods. Direct unchecked, or when minimum size limits are engagement and partnership with the public adhered to by one group of fishermen but not sector in the definition of rights and territories by another in the same area. That leaves imple- is ambitious, but fundamental to the success of mentation on a case-by-case basis, but points the project. But dependence on local and dis- to the possibility of establishing criteria within trict public sectors to take many potentially regional or national legal structures to accom- controversial steps to limit access to both modate local reforms, including criteria for the fishing grounds and markets is also risky. recognition of local tenure. Under Law No. 1/2014, it appears that provin- By their nature, localised reforms cannot cial and district governments still have the solve wide-ranging ecological problems, such authority to manage fisheries and marine areas, as climate change or the conservation of but their will to do so is less clear. If success- migratory species. Under Indonesian law, ful, the LSSFI will be a remarkable model of however, which is both decentralised and engagement at all levels of government, the loosely enforced, localised reforms currently fishing industry and the academic/NGO/ offer the best hope for near-shore conserva- development community, as well as for tion. Of course, without a strong legal struc- market-based sustainable fishing in Indonesia. ture, that hope is complicated by how improvements may be enforced. Where tenure 12. Conclusions is well-established in Indonesia, so too are cultural and social norms for dealing with trans- Indonesia’s current policies of decentralisation gressors. The lobster gangs of Maine (United and local government control over the near- States) famously enforced similarly informal shore marine environment offer a wide array of norms through intimidation and occasional possibilities for innovative, market-driven property damage (Acheson 1987). In places reforms—as well as a frustratingly complex where tenure is just being established, inter- and uncertain legal and political environment lopers, especially when they are not local, will that calls into question the efficacy of broad test the limits of enforcement of these emerg- reforms. Given that context, it should not be ing systems. surprising that most examples of near-shore In Papua, where access rights are recognised marine conservation success are highly by both local government and local communi- localised. Variations in social, cultural, legal ties, the MER contracted for two large no-take and economic institutions, even between zones. Without such traditional access rights, neighbouring villages, dictate that successes the WDR was only able to reach an agreement are not easily replicable. These examples do, for a no-take zone right in front of the resort; however, have certain attributes in common. elsewhere, the agreements allow fishing with In all of the cases considered in this article, simple restrictions on gear. In Wakatobi, locals businesses that depend on either healthy reefs are not averse to chasing away unrecognised or sustainable fisheries are working to either fishermen who approach reefs within sight of change the open-access nature of marine their village, but in locations farther from the resources in Indonesia or strengthen informal village, they rely on official responses (such as access rights. Access to markets may also be they are) to illegal fishing. limited, but more often than not, changing the Official engagement with marine tenure incentives faced by fishermen and others often leads to political opportunism, even in requires limits on access to specific areas. Papua, where an arrangement between Papua Efforts to establish such restrictions are con- Diving and 12 surrounding communities to troversial, and ripe for political opportunism, pay for access to dive sites was undermined by as evidenced by the concerns that led to the the creation of a district-managed, district- annulment of the marine concession law in wide access fee. The same applies to sustain-

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