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Udc: 351:35.078.3 UDC: 351:35.078.3 DOI: https://doi.org/10.32689/2617- 2224-2020-1(21)-42-56 Lashkina Mariia Hryhoriivna, psychologist-conflictologist, PhD in Public Administration, Assistant Professor, De- partment of Journalism, Advertising and Public Relations, Faculty of International Relations, National Aviation University, 03058, Kyiv, 1, Prospekt Lyubomyra Huza, tel.: +38 (050) 397 2912, e-mail: maria. [email protected] ORCID: 0000-0002-8331-1853 Лашкіна Марія Григорівна, психолог-конфліктолог, кандидат наук з державного управління, доцент кафе- дри журналістики, реклами і зв’язків з громадськістю, факультет міжнарод- них відносин, Національний авіаційний університет, 03058, м. Київ, пр. Лю- бомира Гузара, 1, тел.: +38 (050) 397 29 12, e-mail: maria.lashkina@gmail. com. ORCID: 0000-0002-8331-1853 Лашкина Мария Григорьевна, психолог-конфликтолог, кандидат на- ук по государственному управлению, доцент кафедры журналистики, ре- кламы и связей с общественностью, факультет международных отноше- ний, Национальный авиационный уни- верситет, 03058, г. Киев, пр. Любоми- ра Гузара, 1, тел.: +38 (050) 397 29 12, e-mail: [email protected] ORCID: 0000-0002-8331-1853 Bielska Tetiana Valentynіvna, Doctor of Science in Public Administration, Associate Professor, Associate Professor of the Department of Management and Pub- lic Administration, O.M. Beketov National University of Urban Economy in Kharkiv, 61002, Kharkiv, Str. Marshalа Bazhanovа, 17, tel.: +38 (066) 450 62 12, e-mail: [email protected] ORCID: 0000-0002-2792-4700 42 Бєльська Тетяна Валентинівна, доктор наук з державного управління, доцент, доцент кафедри менеджменту і публічного адміністрування, Харківський національний університет міського господарства імені О. М. Бекетова, 61002, м. Харків, вул. Маршала Бажанова, 17, тел.: +38 (066) 450 62 12, e-mail: [email protected]. ORCID: 0000-0002-2792-4700 Бельская Татьяна Валентиновна, доктор наук по государственному управлению, доцент, доцент кафедры менеджмен- та и публичного администрирования, Харьковский национальный университет го- родского хозяйства имени А. Н. Бекетова, 61002, г. Харьков, ул. Маршала Бажанова, 17, тел.: +38 (066) 450 62 12, e-mail: [email protected] ORCID: 0000-0002-2792-4700 CONCEPTS OF IRRATIONAL AND RATIONAL IN THE INFORMATIONAL SPACE OF UKRAINE: PUBLIC-MANAGEMENT ASPECT Annotaion. The authors claim that the field of rationality has changed in the national governmental activity. They point out that a new technological reality destroys established rules of coexistence in the society, a logic of interaction, a decision-making system, political theories and practices. The authors determine that concepts of rational and irrational in modern management practices, adver- tising, public relations have their transformational social and psychological fea- tures. The article substantiates that in the information space of Ukraine there are too much information noise, fakes, manipulative information messages that in- terfere with formation of rational thinking that influences decision making, both for each individual person and at the state level. It is argued that the archetypal methodology makes it possible to assume that relation between rational and irra- tional in the social consciousness of the Ukrainian society is unstable and variable and changes under external influences, in particular mass media. It is stated that in the society, having freedom and independence, we cannot be free from social influences. The authors predict that under such conditions a democratic princi- ple of “free speech” effectively transforms an informational space of Ukraine into a sphere of influence of corporate interests of different political groups. The authors assert that a cross disciplinary survey of the information space in regarding to formation of a concept of rational and irrational demonstrates an increase of influence on the irrational subconscious of the population. The article proves that there are attempts of media owners to influence processes of cognitive changes in the society, by the use of mythologization, prejudices and stereotypes of mass public consciousness; there is a shift to showcasing of political discourse, amplifying of information noise that leads to an increase in a number of people with a developed mode of irrational identity. 43 Keywords: archetype, management, influence, an informational space, deci- sion making, rationality, irrationality, a Ukrainian school of archetype. КОНЦЕПТИ ІРРАЦІОНАЛЬНОГО ТА РАЦІОНАЛЬНОГО В ІНФОРМАЦІЙНОМУ ПРОСТОРІ УКРАЇНИ: ПУБЛІЧНО-УПРАВЛІНСЬКИЙ АСПЕКТ Анотація. Визначено, що в національній державно-управлінській діяль- ності змінилося поле раціональності, і нова технологічна реальність руй- нує усталені правила співіснування у суспільстві, логіку взаємодії, систему прийняття рішень, політичні теорії та практики. Зазначається, що концепти раціонального та ірраціонального в сучасних практиках менеджменту, ре- клами, зв’язків з громадськістю мають свої трансформаційні соціально-пси- хологічні особливості. Обґрунтовується, що в інформаційному просторі України забагато ін- формаційного шуму, фейків, маніпулятивних інформаційних повідомлень, які заважають формуванню раціонального мислення, що впливає на при- йняття рішень як кожною окремою людиною, так і на державному рівні. Стверджується, що архетипова методологія дає можливість припустити, що співвідношення раціонального та ірраціонального в суспільній свідомості українського соціуму є нестійким та мінливим й змінюється під зовнішніми впливами, зокрема засобів масової комунікації. Зазначається, що в суспіль- стві, маючи свободу та незалежність, не можна бути вільними від соціальних впливів. За таких умов, прогнозують автори, демократичний принцип “сво- боди слова” фактично перетворює інформаційний простір України на сферу впливу корпоративних інтересів різних політичних груп. Доводиться, що оглядове міждисциплінарне дослідження інформацій- ного простору на формування концепту раціонального та ірраціонального демонструє підвищення впливу на ірраціональну підсвідомість населення. Відбуваються спроби власників засобів масової інформації впливати на процеси когнітивних змін у суспільстві, використовуючи міфологізацію, забобони та стереотипи масової суспільної свідомості; відбувається перехід до шоутизації політичного дискурсу, посилення інформаційного шуму, що призводить до підвищення кількості людей з розвиненим модусом ірраціо- нальної ідентичності. Ключові слова: архетип, управління, вплив, інформаційний простір, прийняття рішень, раціональність, ірраціональність, Українська школа ар- хетипіки. КОНЦЕПТ ИРРАЦИОНАЛЬНОГО И РАЦИОНАЛЬНОГО В ИНФОРМАЦИОННОМ ПРОСТРАНСТВЕ УКРАИНЫ: ПУБЛИЧНО-УПРАВЛЕНЧЕСКИЙ АСПЕКТ Аннотация. Обозначено, что в национальной государственно-управлен- ческой деятельности изменилось поле рациональности, и что новая техно- логическая реальность разрушает устоявшиеся правила сосуществования в 44 обществе, логику взаимодействия, систему принятия решений, политиче- ские теории и практики. Указывается, что концепты рационального и ир- рационального в современных практиках менеджмента, рекламы, связей с общественностью имеют свои трансформационные социально-психологи- ческие возможности. Обосновано, что в информационном пространстве Украины много инфор- мационного шума, фейков, манипулятивных информационных сообщений, ко- торые мешают формированию рационального мышления, влияет на принятие решений как каждым отдельным человеком, так и на государственном уровне. Утверждается, что архетипическая методология дает возможность предполо- жить, что соотношение рационального и иррационального в общественном сознании украинского социума является неустойчивым и непостоянным и изменяется под внешними воздействиями, в том числе, средств массовой ком- муникации. Указывается, что в обществе, имея свободу и независимость, не возможно быть свободными от социальных воздействий. При таких условиях, прогнозируют авторы, демократический принцип “свободы слова” фактически превратил информационное пространство Украины на сферу влияния корпо- ративных интересов различных политических групп. Доказывается, что комплексное междисциплинарное исследование ин- формационного пространства на предмет формирования концепта рацио- нального и иррационального демонстрирует повышение влияния на ир- рациональное подсознание населения. Происходят попытки владельцев средств массовой информации влиять на процессы когнитивных измене- ний в обществе, используя мифологизацию, предрассудки и стереотипы массового общественного сознания; происходит переход к шоутизации по- литического дискурса, усиление информационного шума, что приводит к увеличению количества людей с развитым модусом иррациональной иден- тичности. Ключевые слова: архетип, управление, влияние, информационное про- странство, принятие решений, рациональность, иррациональность, Украин- ская школа архетипики. “The government and media also play a role, protecting us from information, which most strongly contradicts our views….. Reporters and editors select, what materials should be presented to the public” From the Book “Social Impact,” edited by F. Zimbardo, M. Leype, 2000, р. 157. Problem statement. It should be tivity. Public-management practices of noted that the field of rationality has interaction in the information space are changed in a national governmental ac- very quickly transformed and take forms 45 that are unusual for humans. A new of Ukraine, how rational is the infor- technological reality destroys estab- mation and communication discourse lished rules of coexistence in the
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