SENATOR MITCH Mcconnell, Et Al., Plaintiffs, V. FEDERAL
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SENATOR MITCH McCONNELL, et al., Plaintiffs, Civ. No. 02-582 (CKK, KLH, RJL) v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., Defendants. NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, et al., Plaintiffs, Civ. No. 02-581 (CKK, KLH, RJL) v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., Defendants. EMILY ECHOLS, a minor child, by and through her next friends, TIM AND WINDY ECHOLS, et al., Plaintiffs, Civ. No. 02-633 (CKK, KLH, RJL) v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., Defendants. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, et al., Plaintiffs, Civ. No. 02-751 (CKK, KLH, RJL) v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., Defendants. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS, Plaintiff, Civ. No. 02-753 (CKK, KLH, RJL) v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., Defendants. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, et al., Plaintiffs, Civ. No. 02-754 (CKK, KLH, RJL) v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., Defendants. CONGRESSMAN RON PAUL, et al., Plaintiffs, Civ. No. 02-781 (CKK, KLH, RJL) v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., Defendants. REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, et al., Plaintiffs, Civ. No. 02-874 (CKK, KLH, RJL) v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al. Defendants. CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, et al., Plaintiffs, Civ. No. 02-875 (CKK, KLH, RJL) v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., Defendants. VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, et al., Plaintiffs, Civ. No. 02-877 (CKK, KLH, RJL) v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., Defendants. REPRESENTATIVE BENNIE G. THOMPSON, et al., Plaintiffs, Civ. No. 02-881 (CKK, KLH, RJL) v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION (May 1, 2003) COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, District Judge: I. INTRODUCTION The recent issues confronting Congress related to campaign finance are neither novel nor unfamiliar: The idea is to prevent . the great aggregations of wealth from using their corporate funds, directly or indirectly, to send members of the legislature to these halls in order to vote for their protection and the advancement of their 4 interests as against those of the public. It strikes at a constantly growing evil which has done more to shake the confidence of the plain people of small means of this country in our political institutions than any other practice which has ever obtained since the foundation of our Government. And I believe that the time has come when something ought to be done to put a check to the giving of $50,000 or $100,000 by a great corporation toward political purposes upon the understanding that a debt is created from a political party to it. Elihu Root, Addresses on Government and Citizenship 143 (Bacon and Scott ed. 1916) (original statement made before the Constitutional Convention of the State of New York in 1894). Many believe that when an individual or association of individuals makes large contributions for the purpose of aiding candidates of political parties in winning the elections, they expect, and sometimes demand, and occasionally, at least, receive, consideration by the beneficiaries of their contributions which not infrequently is harmful to the general public interest. 65 Cong. Rec. 9507-9508 (1924) (Statement of Sen. Joseph Robinson). We all know that money is the chief source of corruption. We all know that large contributions to political campaigns not only put the political party under obligation to the large contributors, who demand pay in the way of legislation, but we also know that large sums of money are used for the purpose of conducting expensive campaigns through the newspapers and over the radio; in the publication of all sorts of literature, true and untrue; and for the purpose of paying the expenses of campaigners sent out into the country to spread propaganda, both true and untrue. 86 Cong. Rec. 2720 (1940) (Statement of Sen. John Bankhead). The unchecked rise in campaign expenditures coupled with the absence of limitations on contributions and expenditures, has increased the dependence of candidates on special interest groups and large contributors. H.R. Rep. No. 93-1239, at 3 (1974). We have gone from basically a small donor system in this country where the average person believed they had a stake, believed they had a voice, to one of extremely large amounts of money, where you are not a player unless you are 5 in the $100,000 or $200,000 range, many contributions in the $500,000 range, occasionally you get a $1 million contribution. Many Members are tired of picking up the paper every day and reading about an important issue we are going to be considering, one in which many interests have large sums at stake and then the second part of the story reading about the large amounts of money that are being poured into Washington on one side or the other of the issue--the implication, of course being clear, that money talks and large amounts of money talk the loudest. 147 Cong. Rec. S2958 (daily ed. March 27, 2001) (statement of Senator Fred Thompson). Although these statements each reflect discrete points in the history of campaign finance regulation in this country, they reflect the same sentiment: over the course of the last century, the political branches have endeavored to protect the integrity of federal elections with carefully tailored legislation addressing corruption or the appearance of corruption inherent in a system of donor-financed campaigns. In the area of campaign finance regulation, congressional action has been largely incremental and responsive to the most prevalent abuses or evasions of existing law at particular points in time. For example, consistent with the Constitution, Congress has been permitted to prohibit the use of corporate treasury funds for contributions and expenditures to federal candidates and their parties, forbid the use of union dues in connection with federal elections, cap contributions by individuals to candidates and parties, offer presidential candidates the option of financing their general election campaigns with money from the public fisc, and subject coordinated expenditures to contribution limitations. This process has been evolutionary, and the deliberative nature of the legislative effort is not unexpected given the fact that campaign finance is an extraordinarily challenging area to legislate, 6 particularly given the strong First Amendment interests at stake. On the one hand, congressional action in this area plainly implicates an individual’s right to be free from government regulation, a right that is unquestionably at its apogee in the context of political speech. On the other hand, legislation in this area is designed to embolden public confidence in the political system, which thereby ultimately encourages individuals to participate and engage in the electoral process. See Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n (“Colorado I”), 518 U.S. 604, 609 (1996) (per curiam) (observing that in assessing the constitutionality of FECA’s various provisions the Supreme Court “essentially weigh[s] the First Amendment interest in permitting candidates (and their supporters) to spend money to advance their political views against a ‘compelling’ governmental interest in assuring the electoral system’s legitimacy, protecting it from the appearance and reality of corruption”); see also Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (“Perhaps foremost among these serious issues are cases that force us to reconcile our commitment to free speech with our commitment to other constitutional rights embodied in government proceedings.”). Mindful of these competing constitutional interests, Congress has moved deliberately and often slowly to address evasion or abuse of the law. Building a consensus in an area so penetratingly close to the heart of the First Amendment requires serious consideration. In fact, in the case of the legislation presently before the Court, the legislative process took over 7 six years of study and reflection by Congress.1 This thoughtful and careful effort by our political branches, over such a lengthy course of time, deserves respect. See, e.g., Rust v. 1 Although campaign finance reform was considered during the 104th Congress, see, e.g., Campaign Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 3820, 104th Cong. (1996) (considered on the House floor, but failed by a vote of 162-259, 142 Cong. Rec. H8,516 (daily ed. July 25, 1996)), deliberations on BCRA’s precursors did not begin until the One Hundred and Fifth Congress. The bills introduced in the One Hundred and Fifth Congress, One Hundred and Sixth Congress, and One Hundred and Seventh Congress, relating to campaign finance, include, but are not limited to: “Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997,” H.R. 493 (105th Cong.); “Campaign Reform and Election Integrity Act of 1998,” H.R. 3485 (105th Cong.); “Campaign Finance Improvement Act of 1998,” H.R. 3476 (105th Cong.); “Bipartisan Campaign Integrity Act of 1997,” H.R. 2183 (105th Cong.); “Campaign Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1998,” H.R. 3582 (105th Cong.); “Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997,” S. 25 (105th Cong.); “Senate Campaign Financing and Spending Reform Act,” S. 57 (105th Cong.); “Campaign Finance Reform and Disclosure Act of 1997,” S. 179 (105th Cong.); “Clean Money, Clean Elections Act,” S. 918 (105th Cong.); “Grassroots Campaign and Common Sense Federal Election Reform Act of 1998,” S. 1689 (105th Cong.); “Voter Empowerment Act of 1999,” H.R. 32 (106th Cong.); “Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1999,” H.R. 417 (106th Cong); “Clean Money, Clean Elections Act,” H.R. 1739 (106th Cong.); “FEC Reform and Authorization Act of 1999,” H.R. 1818 (106th Cong.); “Campaign Integrity Act of 1999,” H.R. 1867 (106th Cong.); “Citizen Legislature and Political Freedom Act,” H.R. 19 22 (106th Cong.); “Campaign Reform and Election Integrity Act of 1999,” H.R. 2668 (106th Cong.); “PAC Limitation Act of 1999,” H.R. 2866 (106th Cong.);”Open and Accountable Campaign Financing Act of 2000,” H.R. 3243 (106th Cong.); “FEC Reform and Authorization Act of 2000,” H.R.