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Home , Korean War, Mark Gayn, Syngman Rhee

Volume 10 | Issue 27 | Number 3 | Article ID 3785 | Jul 01, 2012 The -Pacific Journal | Focus

Police Training, “Nation-Building,” and Political Repression in Postcolonial South 植民地独立後の韓国における警察官 訓練、「国家建設」および政治的抑圧

Jeremy Kuzmarov

American advisers from the OSS, FBI, Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN), and the New York Police Training, “Nation-Building,” Police Department began instructing Chinese and Political Repression inGuomindang leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai- Postcolonial shek)’s secret police, commanded by Dai Li, in the late 1930s. The focus, OSS agent Milton Miles wrote, was on “political crimes and Jeremy Kuzmarov means of effective repression” against the As American troops became bogged down first communist movement, adding that the in Iraq and then , a key component Americans were never able to “separate police of U.S. strategy was to build up local police and activities from guerrilla activities.” Clandestine security forces in an attempt to establish law police training in set a precedent for and order. This approach is consistent with Japan and South Korea under U.S. occupation, where police advisers provided training in riot practices honed over more than a century in control, set up modern communications and developing nations within the expanding orbit record-collection systems, and helped amass of American global power. From the conquest thousands of dossiers on alleged communists, of the and Haiti at the turn of the weaving information into a dark tapestry of twentieth century through Cold “threat” where sober analysis might have found interventions and the , police none.2 Civil liberties and democratic standards training has been valued as a cost-effective were subordinated to larger geo-strategic goals means of suppressing radical and nationalist centered on containing Chinese communist movements, precluding the need for direct U.S. influence and rolling back the progress of the military intervention, thereby avoiding the left. public opposition it often arouses and the expense it invariably entails. Carried out by Throughout the , the budget for police multiple agencies, including the military, State programs was highest in East and Southeast Department, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Asia. The had always prized the and, most recently private mercenary firms region as one of the richest and most such as DynCorp, the programs have helped to strategically located in the world, hoping to fortify and gain leverage over the internal convert it into what General Douglas security apparatus of client regimes and MacArthur characterized as an “Anglo-Saxon provided an opportunity to export and test new lake.”1 In postwar South Korea, the focus of policing technologies and administrativethis article, the United States helped to techniques, as well as modern weaponry and empower former Japanese colonial agents and equipment which has all too often been used consolidated the rule of , an for repressive ends. anticommunist who deployed police against

1 10 | 27 | 3 APJ | JF leftists seeking a transformation of the political government of So. Korea and connect up its economy and reconciliation with the North. economy with that of Japan.”5 While praising the principle that police in a democratic nation should be impartial and The American occupation was headed by nonpartisan, American advisers mobilized General John Reed Hodge, an Illinois farmer police primarily along political lines and built known as the “Patton of the Pacific,” who knew up a constabulary force which provided the little about Korea. He worked to build a backbone of the South Korean Army (ROKA). professional police force, which he believed to Counterintelligence (CIC) officers used be pivotal to “nation-building” efforts; its the programs to recruit agents for clandestine central aim was to stamp out the political left missions into the North, which was anand bolster Rhee’s power. A secret history of important factor precipitating the . the Korean National Police (KNP) argued, “No Political policing operations continued through one can anticipate what insidious infiltration the and 1960s, resulting in significant may develop, and [so] the police must be given human rights violations. The South Korean latitude to carry out the desires of the new police became known for and brutality, government; more so than would be necessary 6 and the US bore important responsibility for in normal times.” The KNP consequently this development. evolved as a politicized in the hands of many who had served in the Japanese occupation of Conscience and Convenience: TheKorea (which lasted from 1910 to 1945) and Consolidation of a U.S. Sphere saw almost all opposition as communist driven. The CIA bluntly noted that “extreme Rightists As notes in The Origins of the control the overt political structure in the U.S. Korean War, the ROK was more of an American zone mainly through the agency of the national creation than any other postwar Asian regime. police,” which has been “ruthlessly brutal in The CIA predicted that its economy would suppressing disorder. . . . [T]he police generally collapse in a matter of weeks if U.S. aid were regard the Communists as rebels and traitors terminated.3 As with Jiang Jieshi in China and who should be seized, imprisoned, and shot, Ngo Dinh Diem in South , U.S.sometimes on the slightest provocation.”7 diplomats tired of Syngman Rhee’s conservatism and unwillingness to promote During the period of Japanese rule, the national basic land reform, though they stood by him as police presided over a sophisticated a bulwark against .The CIAsurveillance apparatus, dominating “every considered the Princeton Ph.D. a “demagogue phase of daily activity,” according to the State bent on autocratic rule”whose support was Department, through “terror, intimidation, and 8 maintained by that “numerically small class practices inconceivable to the American.” U.S. which virtually monopolizes the nativerule was marred by colonial continuities, wealth.”4 including a blatant carryover of personnel. In principle, occupation officials sought to purge A crucial aim of US policy was to contain the collaborators and wipe out the vestiges of the spread of the northern revolution and to open old system by training police in democratic up South Korea’s economy to its former methods, instilling in them the maxim that they colonial master Japan thereby helping keep were “servants and not masters of the people.” Japan in the Western orbit. In January 1947, The new police slogan, according to the Secretary of State George Marshall scribbled a Americans, was “impartial and non-.”9 note to : “Please have plan In practice, however, political exigencies led to drafted of policy to organize a definitethe abandonment of those ideals.

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The AMG retained 80 percent of pro-Japanese accompanied on rounds by American military officers above the rank of patrolman, including officers.12 A reorganization plan was drawn up northern exiles experienced in suppressing the by Major Arthur F. Brandstatter, who was anticolonial underground. As William flown in from Manila, where he had served with Maglin, the first director of the KNP,the military police. A bruising fullback with the commented, “We felt that if the Korean element Michigan State football team in the mid-1930s, of the KNP did a good job for the Japanese, Brandstatter was a of the Detroit they would do a good job for us.” A June 1947 (1938–1941) and East Lansing police (chief survey determined that eight of ten provincial 1946) and professor of police administration at police chiefs and 60 percent of the lower- Michigan State University. He emphasized the ranking lieutenants were Japanese-trained, a importance of creating standard uniforms for crucial factor triggering opposition to the the KNP, improving communications, and police.10 To head the organization, Hodge abolishing the thought-control police, who had appointed Chang T’aek-Sang and Chough amassed 900,000 fingerprint files. Pyong-Ok, known for their “harsh police methods directed ruthlessly against Korean The United States Military Advisory Group in leftists.” Chang, a wealthy businessman with Korea (USMAGIK) responded to Brandstatter’s ties to the missionary community, hadreport by providing sixty-three police advisers prospered under the Japanese. The Marine who developed a network of thirty-nine radio Corps historian Harold Larsen described him as stations and fourteen thousand miles of “a ruthless and crass character with the face of 11 telephone lines, resulting in the upgrading of Nero and the manners of Goering.” communications facilities from “fair” to “good.” Manpower was stabilized at twenty thousand, and swords and clubs were replaced with machine guns and rifles. Americans were appointed police chiefs in every province, with the mandate of grooming a Korean successor. Typical was the background of Lieutenant Colonel Earle Miller, stationed in Kyonggi-do province, a twenty-six-year veteran of the Chicago police and supervisor of military police detachments and POW camps.13 Brandstatter, who commented in a December 1945 interview that the were “fifty years behind us in their thinking on justice and police powers” Syngman Rhee (left), Kim Koo and John noted that high turnover among American Hodge advisers was hampering the police program and predicted that, regardless of the amount of U.S. aid, the police bureau would become a In the first days of the U.S. occupation, chaos “political plum” belonging to “a big shot in the prevailed. Prison doors were thrown open, new government” (a prediction that proved police records were destroyed, and Koreans accurate).14 confiscated Japanese property, which led to violence. In some places, leftists seized power Starting with a budget of 1.5 billion won per and installed their own governments. The annum (over $1 million U.S.), the Public Safety police were demoralized and had to beDivision rebuilt police headquarters, adopted a

3 10 | 27 | 3 APJ | JF uniform patterned after that of the New York instruction in riot control and psychological Police Department, and eliminated the system warfare techniques such as dousing the of executed people with gasoline so as to hide in which officers were on call for twenty-four the manner of execution or to allow blame to be hours. It improved record collection byplaced on the communists. Douglas MacArthur importing filing cabinets and oversaw the forestalled the delivery of .50-caliber machine opening of a modern crime laboratory in guns and “in order to maintain [the] staffed by eight Korean technicians trained in appearance [of the constabulary] . . . as a ballistics, police-type reserve force.” Most of the officers were Japanese army . Although they chemical analysis, and handwriting techniques. were not authorized to make arrests, they Police advisers recommended routine patrols to consistently ignored “this lack of legal right.” foster improved community relations, and The constabulary gained valuable guerrilla established provincial training centers and, experience suppressing in Cheju-do under Lewis Valentine’s oversight, a national and Yosu, committing numerous atrocities in the process. It became infiltrated by leftists, police academy, which opened on October 10, however, who instigated several mutinies.17 1945. Many of the graduates, including forty- five policewomen, reportedly went on to Characterizing Koreans as “brutal bastards, “distinguish themselves as guerrilla fighters.” worse than the Japanese,” Hausman worked to Chi Hwan Choi, a graduate of the academy, purge radical elements, impose discipline, and rose bolster intelligence gathering. At these tasks he was successful, especially in comparison to 18 to become superintendent and chief of the American advisory efforts in . uniformed police.15 Like the Philippines constabulary, the ROKA developed into a formidable and technically Staff at the academy provided training in competent force. It was also renowned for its and riot control and lectures on brutality, however, and became a springboard anticommunism, and were supplied with over to political power, thus hindering democratic six thousand pistols and one thousand development. and rifles. J. Edgar Hoover’s G-men were solicited for instruction in surveillance,“The Gooks Only Understood Force”: The and wiretapping techniques, Evolution of a Police State which they had also provided to Dai Li’s secret police in China. In December 1945, USMAGIK Throughout the late 1940s, South Korea opened a school for detectives in Seoul and resembled what political adviser H. Merrell established a special “subversive sub-section,” Benninghoff referred to as a “powder keg ready which kept a blacklist of dissidents. American to explode.” An AMG poll revealed that 49 training generally emphasized the development percent of the population preferred the of an effective police force in light of the Japanese occupation to the American 19 threats of subversion and insurgency, creating “liberation.” Korea had both a tradition of a trend toward militarization of the police.16 radicalism and the oldest Communist Party in Asia, with experienced leaders who had led the In January 1946, USMAGIK began developing struggle against Japan. While food imports and the police constabulary, which provided the public health initiatives brought some benefits, foundation for the land inequalities, poverty, and the desire for (ROKA). The chief adviser, Captain James unification with the North made circumstances Hausman, was a combat veteran who provided ripe for revolution, as did official corruption

4 10 | 27 | 3 APJ | JF and heavy-handed rice collection policies in that brought Rhee to power. In the enforced by the KNP. Hodge wrote in a memo countryside, they extracted rice from the that “any talk of freedom was purely academic” peasantry “the same way as under the Japanese and that the situation left “fertile ground for except with worse treatment,” and in cities the spread of communism.”20 jailed student and labor leaders and even school teachers for merely mentioning In a February 1949 study the State Department communism in their classrooms.23 noted, “Labor, social security, land reform, and sex equality laws have been popular in the North and appeal to South Koreans as well.” Emphasizing that although increased regimentation, heavy taxes, and the elimination of individual entrepreneurship were sowing the seeds of discontent, the northern regime still enjoyed greater popularity than that of the South because it “gave a large segment of the population the feeling of participation in government” that was absent in the South.21 This document acknowledged the lack of popular legitimacy of the southern regime, recognizing that it could survive only through force. Syngman Rhee with John Muccio

Resistance was led by labor and farmers’ associations and People’s Committees, which Once in custody, suspects were tortured organized democratic governance and social through such methods as kidney punching, reform at the local level. The mass-based South hanging by the thumbnails, forced eating of hot Korean Labor Party (SKLP), headed by Pak peppers, and electroshocks in the attempt to Hon-Yong, a veteran of anti-Japanese extract confessions. A standard entry in the with communist ties, led strikes and carried out police registry was “died under torture” and acts of industrial sabotage, eventually“died of heart failure.” One prison report becoming infiltrated by agents of the U.S. Army referred to a young girl whose face was Counter-Intelligence corps (CIC).22 Trained in covered because she had been struck with a sophisticated methods of information gathering rifle butt and another a man who had gone deaf and population control, the KNP maintained an from beatings. Some KNP units morphed into “observation section” focused on political death squads (such as the “Black Tiger Gang,” activity, which provided information to U.S. headed by Chang T’aek-sang) and assassinated intelligence and at times even spied onopposition figures, including, it is alleged, Yo Americans. (Ambassador John Muccio reported Un-Hyong, a nationalist who promoted that the Pusan embassy was under constant reconciliation between North and South.24 surveillance by “little men with notebooks.”) American military commanders often promoted With government authorities accusing almost brutal tactics. CIC agent Donald Nichol anyone opposed to their policies of being reported in his memoirs that the KNP were communists and traitors, police raided homes, advised to “dump [untrustworthy agents] off arrested newspaper editors for printingthe back of a boat, in the nude, at high speed or “inflammatory articles,” and intimidated voters give him false information plants—and let the during fraudulent elections, including the one enemy do it for you.”

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Despite attempts to develop professionalism, and used money gained from shakedowns to salaries were so inadequate, according to one entertain themselves in “Kisaeng houses” and army report, that police were “forced to beg, fancy drinking and eating establishments. The buy, or steal other items besides rice which go head of the youth section of the Farmers’ Guild with the making of a regular diet.”Another in Ka Pyung testified that he had been arrested report stated that the KNP “lacked enthusiasm” in the middle of the night and held in a dirty in cooperating with the army’s Criminal cell for five days. Other leftists, including Investigation in halting the illicit sale juveniles and women, spoke about being beaten of scrap metal and other American products, as to the point where gangrene set in and pus they “often took a share of the cut.”25 American seeped out of their legs. Cho Sing Chik of Sung- relations with Korean officials were marred by Ju recounted his experience under detention of mutual mistrust. Police adviser David Fay told seeing a roomful of people who had been General Albert Wedemeyer that in his province, crippled by mistreatment. He stated that many “not one problem of police administration had of the worst abuses were committed by firemen been presented to the Americans fororganized into an emergency committee to discussion.”26 support the police and collect money for them. “The police not being able to themselves beat In July 1946, Captain Richard D. Robinson, the people turn them over to the firemen and assistant head of the AMG’s Bureau of Public the firemen work on them,” he declared. Opinion, conducted an investigation which Another witness testified that the police were found police to be “extremely harsh” and “worse than under the Japanese who were intimidation such that people were afraid afraid to do such things [as torture]. . . . Now they have no respect for their superiors.”28 to talk to Americans. Believing that oppressive methods were driving moderates into the Director Chough Pyong-Ok, a Columbia communist camp, Robinson was outraged when University Ph.D. who made an estimated 20 he witnessed Wu Chai, a former machine million yen (about $200,000) in bribes during gunner in the Japanese army, using the “water the first two years of the occupation, admitted treatment” to get a suspected pickpocket to that the KNP were “partial to the ideas of the confess and had his arms forced back by means rightists,” though he insisted that “all those of a stock inserted behind his back and in the arrested have committed actual crimes.” The crooks of his elbow. When confronted, Wu said CIA reported in 1948, however, that the police he did not believe he had done anything wrong, were taking action against known or suspected which appeared to Robinson to reflect a communists “without recourse to judicial deficiency in his training. Robinson was later process.”Stressing the importance of speedy threatened with court-martial by Hodge’s court procedure and judicial reform in assistant, General Archer Lerch, and was strengthening the legitimacy of the police, harassed by the FBI, examples of the military’s Robinson recommended to Hodge that he attempt to silence internal critics.27 remove those who had held the rank of lieutenant under the Japanese and whose In October 1946, at a conference to address actions were “incompatible with the . . . public grievances, witnesses testified that the principles of democracy in the police system.”29 KNP was bayoneting students and extorting from peasants in the administration of grain Roger Baldwin, a founder of the American Civil collection. Due process, they said, was rarely Liberties Union, set up a branch in Korea in the abided by, and warrants were rarely issued. attempt to abolish torture. The exigencies of Police looted and robbed the homes of leftists maintaining power and destroying social

6 10 | 27 | 3 APJ | JF subversion from below, however, tookrecords, enjoyed a “drunken picnic” arranged precedence. Pak Wan-so,a South Korean writer by relatives of the prisoners. In another case, who had been imprisoned and tortured by the the rightist gangster Kim Tu-han got off with a police, charged: “They called me a red bitch. small fine for torturing to death two leftist Any red was not considered human. . . .They youth association members and seriously looked at me as if I was a beast or a bug. . . . injuring eight others (one of whom was Because we weren’t human, we had no emasculated). At the trial, the judge refused to rights.”30 call as witnesses counterintelligence officers who had taken photographs and supervised the The KNP maintained a symbiotic relationship autopsies. Such double standards were with right-wing vigilantes, whose headquarters generally supported by American authorities were located next to or inside police stations. owing to larger power considerations.33 They were described by the journalist Mark Gayn as resembling “Hollywood underworld According to information officer John Caldwell, who was ardently anticommunist and pro-Rhee, killers.” Their ranks were swelled by an influx a majority of the Americans in Korea operated of Northern refugees bearing deep grievances under the premise that “the ‘gooks’ only against communism. Chang T’aek Sang, who understood force,” a key factor accounting for became prime minister, was on the board of the the embrace of repressive methods.34 A 1948 National Youth Association, which the CIA report by the lawyers Roy C. Stiles and Albert characterized as a “terrorist group in support Lyman on the administration of justice asserted of extreme right-wing politicians.” Its head, Yi that “acts considered to be cruel by western Pom Sok, was a Dai Li protégé and OSS liaison standards were only part of the tested oriental recruited in 1945 by Paul Helliwell and William modus operandi. Low evaluation of life results Donovan of the OSS. Later appointed as in the acceptance of human cruelty.” Police defense minister, Yi received $333,000 in adviser Ferguson, a beat cop from St. equipment and assistance from Colonel Ernest Louis, commented, “Orientals are accustomed Voss of the internal security department to set to brutality such as would disgust a white up a “leadership academy” with courses in man.” Yet another report remarked that, combating strikes and the history of the Hitler “concepts of individual rights were jugend (Hitler Youth), whom Yi admired.31 incomprehensible to the oriental. Opposed to the very idea of a labor union, his men beat leftists and conducted surveillance It would take much vigorous training backed by 35 and forays across the Thirty-eighth Parallel, prompt punishment to change their thinking.” with CIC support. There were even attempts to Such comments illustrate the that assassinate Sung.32 underlay the trampling of civil liberties and undermining of the progressive policing model. In the rare instances when right-wing paramilitaries were prosecuted, they were In February 1948 the State Department often given red carpet treatment. In May 1946 produced a report, “Southern Korea: A Police in Taejon, for example, fourteen rightists were State?” acknowledging that the KNP had a arrested after attacking suspected communists well-known “rightist bias,”which led police to and assume the function of a political force for the suppression of leftist elements. Although the stealing rice from farmers. While taking them authors admitted that the “charges that the to court, KNP officers stopped at the house of U.S. is maintaining a police state through its one of the prisoners and, according to internal military government is not subject to flat

7 10 | 27 | 3 APJ | JF refutation,” they held that the police programs democracy?”38 sought to inculcate democratic principles, which are “the antithesis of a police state.” Such sentiments lay at the root of mounting Native agencies, however, were not able to civil strife across the country, to which “achieve a full understanding of theseauthorities responded the only way they knew principles,” owing to a “heritage of Japanese how—with further police repression and oppression” and “the fact of occupation—the violence. In Taegu, was declared excesses, disorders, and growing painsafter riots accompanying the development of a self- 36 precipitated by police suppression of a railroad governing society.” These remarks provide a strike left thirty-nine civilians dead, hundreds striking admission of the lack of democratic wounded, and thirty-eight missing. Fifteen standards and illustrate the kinds of arguments hundred were arrested, and forty were given adopted by public officials to absolve death sentences, including SKLP leader Pak, themselves of responsibility for the unfolding who fled to the North. Over 100,000 students violence in the ROK. walked out in solidarity with the workers, while mobs ransacked police posts, buried officers “We’re Having a Civil War Down Here”: alive, and slashed the face of the police chief, in The October 1946 Revolts and Prison a pattern replicated in neighboring cities and Overcrowding towns. (In Waegwon, rioters cut the police According to the U.S. Army’s official history of chief’s eyes and tongue.)39 Blaming the violence the Korean occupation, the “public’s ill feeling on “outside agitators” (none were ever found) toward the police, which police abuse had and the “idiocy” of the peasants, the American engendered, became a potent factor in the riots military called in reinforcements to restore and quasi-revolts which swept South Korea order. Colonel Raymond G. Peeke proclaimed,

37 “We’re having a civil war down here.” The in October 1946.” In South Cholla province, director of the army’s Department of after the KNP killed a labor leader, Njug Ju Transportation added: “We had a battle Myun, and jailed unemployed coal miners mentality. We didn’t have to worry too much if celebrating the first anniversary of Korea’s innocent people got hurt. We set up liberation from Japan, angry peasants concentration camps outside of town and held dynamited a police box and ambushed a strikers there when the jails got too full. . . . It prisoner convoy by throwing stones. was war. We recognized it as war and fought it Constabulary detachments hunted those as such.”40 deemed responsible with the assistance of American troops, firing into crowds. Hundreds By mid-1947, after the AMG passed a national died or were injured. An editorial proclaimed: security law expanding police powers, there “We cannot take the humiliation any longer and were almost 22,000 people in jail, nearly twice must fight against and theas many as under the Japanese. KNP director barbarity of the U.S. Army. . . . In , William Maglin later acknowledged in a Japanese exploitation was abolished and land was given back to the people through the 1999 article that “in their retaliation for agrarian and labor laws. In South Korea, the murders and indignities [during the 1946 riots] property of the Japanese imperialists was taken police went too far in arresting large numbers over by the Americans and Korean reactionary of communists, leftists, and leftist elements. . . . The people are suffering from sympathizers.” Many were sentenced by oppression and exploitation. This ismilitary tribunal, while others languished in

8 10 | 27 | 3 APJ | JF prison without counsel. Thousands were held in exercise and forced to work at making straw outlying camps, including seven members of rope without sufficient light. Prisoners engaged the National Assembly charged with leading a in hunger strikes and led jail breaks. In “communist conspiracy.”41 Kwangju on August 31, 1947, 172 inmates overpowered guards, and seven drilled their During an inspection of Wanju jail, Captain way to freedom. Two years later in , near Richard D. Robinson found six prisoners Seoul, 237 guerrillas from Cheju Island were sharing a mosquito-infested twelve-foot-by- killed by police and U.S. Army soldiers after twelve-foot cell accessible only through a small breaking free into the neighboring hills; trapdoor and tunnel. In other facilities, inmates another eighty-five were captured alive.45 In were beaten and stripped naked to keep them sum, the prison conditions contradict the myth from committing suicide. The latrine was that the American influence in South Korea was usually nothing but a hole in the floor. Food benign. As in later interventions, the repressive was inadequate, winter temperatures were sub- climate catalyzed the opposition and hastened zero, and medical care was scant. Prisoners armed resistance. were not allowed to write letters or have outside communications and usually had to “A Cloud of Terror”: The Cheju Massacre sleep standing up. In Suwan, inmates were and Korean War Atrocities forced to sleep in pit cells without heat. Their water was drawn from a well located next to a Some of the worst police crimes occurred in depository for raw sewage, causing rampant suppressing the uprising on the island of Cheju disease, including a scabies epidemic.42 at the southern tip of the country. The source of the upheaval was unequal land distribution In April 1948, to relieve overcrowding, Major and police brutality, as the CIA acknowledged. William F. Dean, a onetime Berkeley patrolman, Hodge ironically told a group of congressmen recommended the release of 3,140 political that Cheju was a truly“communal area . . . prisoners whose offense consisted only of peacefully controlled by the People’s “participation in illegal meetings andCommittee,” who promoted a collectivist and demonstrations and distributing handbills.”43 socialist philosophy “without much Comintern 46 Authorities established work camps in order to influence.” In March 1947, as the AMG tried “utilize the capabilities of the inmates in useful to assert its authority, the KNP fired into a occupations,” which often entailed performing crowd and killed eight peaceful demonstrators, duties for the American military. Enacting the then imprisoned another four hundred. ideals of the progressive movement, U.S. Pak Kyong-jun was dismissed and advisers introduced vocational training, a replaced by Yu Hae-jin, an extreme rightist rewards system, prison industries, and movies described as “ruthless and dictatorial in his 47 and recreation. They brought in , dealing with the opposing political parties. constructed juvenile facilities, and established KNP units and right-wing youth groups a guard training school with courses in modern terrorized the People’s Committee and cut off penology, fingerprinting, and weapons.44 the flow of food and construction supplies, turning the island into an open-air prison. In What effect the reforms had is unclear; what is response, the Cheju branch of the SKLP, long certain is that prisons remained riddled with known for its anticolonial defiance, established abuse. According to the U.S. Army, guards guerrilla units in the Halla Mountains displayed a “harshness that was repugnant to supported by an estimated 80 percent of the Department of Justice legal advisers.” At the population.48 In April 1948 the spread Inchon Boys’ Prison, inmates were deprived of to the west coast of the island, where guerrillas

9 10 | 27 | 3 APJ | JF attacked twenty-four police stations. KNP and North Korea by the CIA’s chief, constabulary units operating under U.S.Albert Haney, a key architect of the 1290-d military commandand aided by aerialprogram, and Hans Tofte, a hero of the Danish reinforcements and spy planes swept the underground who later served under OPS cover mountains, waging “an all-out guerrillain . A large number were killed, owing extermination campaign,” as Everettto the infiltration of the secret teams by double Drumwright of the American embassyagents, though Haney doctored the intelligence characterized it, massacring people with reports to cover up their fate.51 bamboo spears and torching homes. One report stated, “Frustrated by not knowing the identity In the summer of 1950, to keep Southern of these elusive men [the guerrillas], the police leftists from reinforcing the Northerners, KNP in some cases carried out indiscriminate and ROKA units emptied the prisons and shot warfare against entire villages.” Between as many as 100,000 detainees, dumping the 30,000 and 60,000 people were killed out of a bodies into hastily dug trenches, abandoned population of 300,000, including the guerrilla mines, or the sea. According to archival leader Yi Tôk-ku, and another 40,000 were revelations and the findings of a Truth and exiled.49 Reconciliation Commission, women and children were among those killed.52 The British Police atrocities in the suppression of the journalist James Cameron encountered insurrection in Yosu left that port town in prisoners on their way to execution only yards ashes. After the declaration of martial law on from U.S. Army headquarters and five minutes October 22, 1948, constabulary units under from the UN Commission building in Pusan. Captain James Hausman rounded up suspected “They were skeletons and they cringed like rebels, stripped them to their underwear in dogs,” he wrote. “They were manacled with schoolyards, and beat them with bars, iron chains and . . . compelled to crouch in the chains, and rifle butts. Cursory screenings were classical Oriental attitude of subjection. undertaken, and several thousand wereSometimes they moved enough to scoop a executed in plain sight of their wives and handful of water from the black puddles around children in revenge for attacks on police them . . . . Any deviation . . . brought a gun to stations. The corpses of many of the dead were their heads.”53 placed in city streets with a red hammer and sickle insignia covering the chest. Order was The most concentrated killing occurred in the restored only after purges were conducted in city of Taejon, where the KNP slaughtered constabulary regiments that had mutinied in thousands of leftists under American oversight. support of the rebel cause, and theOfficial histories long tried to pin the atrocity perpetrators executed by firing squad.50 on the communists. The conduct of the KNP was The Yosu and Cheju massacres contributed to the decimation of the leftist movements, which not an aberration, however, but the result of deprived Kim Il-Sung’s armies of support after ideological conditioning, training in violent crossing into South Korea on , 1950, counterinsurgency methods by the Americans precipitating the Korean War. When fighting and Japanese, and the breakdown of social broke out, the KNP, expanded to seventy mores in the war. H istorian Kim Dong- Choon thousand men, joined in combat operations, described the police killings represented later receiving decorations for “ruthlessamong the “most tragic and brutal chapters” of campaigns against guerrilla forces.” Many a conflict that claimed the lives of 3 million officers were recruited for secret missions into people and left millions more as refugees.54

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Managing the Counterrevolution: Police subversive” capabilities, creating a central Training and “Nation-Building” in South records system, and lecturing on the severity of Korea in the War’s Aftermath the “communist threat.” U.S. military advisers oversaw police units carrying out “mop-up” (death squad) operations against “bandits” and spies, in which civilian deaths were widely reported. In a precursor to the Vietnam Phoenix program, efficiency was measured by the number of weapons seized and guerrillas captured and “annihilated,” usually at least four times more than the number of police wounded or killed.57

Typical was a report in February 1954 in which adviser Edward J. Classon lauded the discovery and destruction of an enemy hideout in Sonam in which thirty-one “bandits” were killed and fifty-four captured.58 Another report referred to OPS adviser Robert N. Bush and South a police drive in December 1953, Operation Korean Counterpart. Courtesy Sgt. Gary Trample, which “reduced the number of Wilkerson, Indiana State Police. ‘bandits’ from 691 to only 131 [in the Southern The Korean War ended in stalemate in 1953. Security Command],” the remainder of whom Syngman Rhee remained leader of the ROK were now “widely scattered” and “represented 59 until his death in 1960, when, after a brief little danger to the population.” power struggle, he was replaced by General In the face of repression and waning support Park Chung Hee. Throughout the 1950s and among a war-weary population, guerrillas 1960s, American policy elites conceived of South Korea as a laboratory for the promotion resorted to kidnapping and extortion in an of free-market and modernizing attempt to survive. A police report dated May 55 1, 1954, noted that five “bandits” under the reforms. cover of darkness raided the homes of two Operating on a budget of $900,000 per year, farmers, tied up their families, and demanded police programs were designed to wipe out the millet, salt, potatoes, and clothing, which gives 60 last vestiges of guerrilla resistance anda good sense of their desperation. In promote the stability on which economic December 1956, public authorities announced development could take root. Concerned about the success of pacification efforts. They claimed police corruption and outdated technical to have arrested the last known “guerilla equipment, the CIA noted that South Korea had bandits” of the anti-American regiment, a emerged from the war with a “rigid anti- seventeen-year-old girl, Koon Ja Kim, and communist national attitude and vigilant . . . eighteen-year-old Sam Jin Koh, in a mop-up repressive internal security system . . . which campaign in Chullo-Pukto province. Seven has resulted in the virtual elimination of all but subversives were shot, including commander the most covert and clandestine communist Kaun Soo Pak, age thirty-three. The photos of operators.”56 Various revenge regiments were Koon and Sam under police arrest were in existence, whose mission was to hunt down broadcast in in order to Northern collaborators. American training publicize the KNP’s strength in reestablishing focused on building up espionage and “counter- law and order.61

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Throughout the duration of Rhee’s rule, the “Tiger” Kim presided over further atrocities as police remained mobilized for paramilitary vice commander of the military police in Pusan operations. Interference in elections and ballot during the Korean War. His appointment as stuffing remained prevalent, as did customary head of the public security bureau was a practices such as surveillance, blackreward for his loyalty to Rhee and reflected the propaganda, and torture.62 Rhee used the KNP’s continued emphasis on police to undertake “extralegal and violent counterinsurgency and utter disregard for tactics” against opponents. In , human rights. Ambassador John Muccio, who police opened fire on student demonstrators later oversaw another in Guatemala, protesting the recent fraudulent elections, characterized Kim’s methods as “ruthless yet killing or wounding several hundred. Koreans effective,” typifying U.S. support for brutal in the United States picketed the , tactics, as long as they were directed against demanding that America take a stand against “communists.”66 “the brutal, degrading butchery.”63

The Korea Times reported on the arrest and beating of Kim Sun-Tae, an MP, after he protested staged elections in 1956. Ik- Heung, minister of home affairs, and Kim Chong-Won, head of the public security bureau, who worked closely with Captain Warren S. Olin, a career army officer, ordered troopers to “nab the bastard” and kept him in detention for five days, during which time he was “treated like a dog.” The newspaper editorialized, “There can never be a representative democracy with men like Lee and Kim in positions of power.”64 Born to a poor Korean family in Japan, Kim Chong-Won was trained in the 1930s in Japanese military academies, whose rigorous ideological conditioning and harsh, dehumanizing methods set the course for his career. Known as the “ Tiger,” he decapitated suspected guerrilla collaborators during the suppression of the Yosu rebellion with a Japanese-style sword and machine gunned thirty-one detainees in the Yongdok police station. In Yonghaemyon, Kim’s men arrested civilians after finding propaganda leaflets at a nearby school and shot them in Police Chief Chang Taek-sang with a man front of villagers, opening fire on women and who may be Tiger Kim (left) children who ran from the scene. Over five hundred were killed in the massacre, for which Kim was sentenced to three years in prison, Viewing the police programs as a great though he was amnestied by Rhee.65 success, the State Department sought to

12 10 | 27 | 3 APJ | JF replicate them in Vietnam, where the U.S. and including the use of fingerprinting, patrol cars, the French faced a similar problem ofand lie detector tests. A veteran of the Spanish- communist infiltration and an “inability to American War who cut his teeth training police distinguish friend from foe.” Colonel Albert in Manila, Vollmer was more liberal than many Haney, in his internal outline of the 1290-d of his contemporaries in defending program, boasted that “U.S efforts behind the communists’ right to free assembly and speech ROK in subduing communist guerrillas in South and in criticizing drug prohibition laws. He Korea, while not generally known, wereworked to curtail the “third degree” and exceptionally effective at a time when the embraced a social work approach to policing, French were spectacularly ineffective invisiting local jails each morning to talk to Indochina.”On May 27, 1954, Lieutenant inmates and urging his officers to interact with Colonel Philippe Milon of the French army was members of the community on their beat.70 briefed by American officials on KNP techniques of surveillance and population Apart from in his attitude toward communism, control,, which he sought to incorporate as a these are the kinds of ideals that Foreaker, a model.67 specialist in criminal and security investigations, sought to promote in South In 1955, after transferring police training to the Korea, and later in Indonesia, Ethiopia, State Department under 1290-d, theGuatemala, and Vietnam. He commented, “Our Eisenhower administration provided over $1 work here [in the 1290-d program] is in the million in equipment to the KNP. Lauren “Jack” total field of public safety rather than in police Goin, an air force officer with B.A. and M.S. work alone.”71 Foreaker’s successor as Oakland degrees in criminology from the University of police chief, Wyman W. Vernon, was part of the at Berkeley and director of the advisory team, later serving in Vietnam and Allegheny Crime Lab in Pittsburgh, set up a Pakistan. Like Foreaker, he had a reputation as scientific crime lab equipped withan incorruptible reformer, having established a fingerprinting powders and the latest forensic special planning and research unit in Oakland technology. (He later did the same in Vietnam, staffed by Berkeley students to analyze and Indonesia, Dominican Republic, and Brazil.)68 address police problems, including poor Advisers from Michigan State University’s relations with minorities. The Oakland police Vietnam project, including Jack Ryan, Ralph nevertheless continued to be viewed as an Turner, and Howard Hoyt, served asarmy of occupation in the black community, consultants and helped set up a communication their brutalization of antiwar demonstrators system. They then went on to Taipei, where, on and Black Panthers during the 1960s a visit sponsored by the CIA-fronted Asia exemplifying the limits of the Berkeley Foundation, they instructed police led by the professionalization model.72 Shaped by the Generalissimo’s son Chiang Ching-kuo in conservative, hierarchical, and lily-white rooting out Maoist infiltration.69 institutional milieu from which they came, Foreaker and Vernon were generally ill- The 1290-d police training program in South equipped to bring about enlightened police Korea was headed by Ray Foreaker, retired practice in South Korea, where they faced an chief of police in Oakland, and a twenty-seven- alien cultural environment and a war climate year veteran of the Berkeley police force, that brought out the most violent tendencies of where he had been mentored by August the police. Vollmer, the “father of modern law enforcement.” During his tenure as Berkeley In the attempt to instill greater chief, Vollmer pioneered many innovations, professionalism, the State Department sent

13 10 | 27 | 3 APJ | JF twenty top-ranking KNP, including General Hak war orphans. The PSD pledged $553,688 and Sung Wang, head of the national police college, assisted in developing a work farm outside and Chi Hwan Choi, chief of the uniformed Seoul based on the Boys Town juvenile police, trained by the Americans in the 1940s, detention center in .75 for courses at the FBI Academy and at leading criminology institutes such as Berkeley,Coinciding with the passage of mandatory Michigan State University, and theminimum sentencing for drug offenses in the Northwestern Traffic Institute.73 A dozen more United States, the International Cooperation were sent to the Los Angeles PoliceAdministration established police counter- Department, headed by Chief Willie Parker narcotics units, which raided opium dens and (1950–1966), who was known for cleaning up launched Operation Poppy, deploying army corruption and for his right-wing politics and aviation units to detect and destroy poppy 76 insensitivity toward racial minorities and the fields. These campaigns were undermined by poor.74 police and governmental corruption. A report from the U.S. Army’s Criminal Investigation Division pointed to ties between Japanese gangster Machii Hisayuki (known in Korea as Ko Yung Mok) and ROK naval intelligence, stating that he was “too strong politically to be touched by the police,” despite having murdered a Korean boxer. American troops also participated in the black market, working with their Korean girlfriends and local “slickie” boys to sell drugs, cigarettes, and pirated consumer goods such as watches, cameras, and radios.77 Their involvement in crimes, including vehicular manslaughter, arson, rape, and murder, dominate police reports of the period.78

In the late 1950s, the State Department suspended the police programs, acknowledging their contribution to widespread human rights violations. The United States was integral in creating a repressive internal security apparatus that made even hardened Cold Warriors blanch. A 1961 cabinet-level report

Arthur Thurston, CIA, OPS tellingly referred to the KNP as the “hated instrument of the Rhee regime.”79 The Kennedy administration nevertheless revived police Korean officers trained in prison management training under Rhee’s successor, Park Chung at George Washington University returned Hee, a former member of the South Korean home to reform the ROK penal system. Drawing Communist Party who later hunted Korean on the ideals of progressive penology, they resistance fighters in during World revived efforts to establish rewards and parole, War II with the Japanese Imperial Army. After promoted industrial training, and created mutinying during the 1948 Yosu rebellion, juvenile reformatories to address skyrocketing General Park escaped execution by informing delinquency rates resulting from a profusion of on onetime associates, allegedly including his

14 10 | 27 | 3 APJ | JF own brother, and subsequently rose through KNP retained a crucial role in suppressing the military hierarchy with the assistance of working-class mobilization and monitoring Captain Hausman, who remained in country as political activity. Surveillance was coordinated a liaison with the ROKA. After the 1961 coup in with the Korean Central Intelligence Agency which Park seized power, he presided over a which was developed out of police intelligence period of spectacular economic growth,units trained by the United States. OPS resulting from visionary state planning,advisers in the CIA—including Arthur M. technological development, war profiteering, Thurston, who left his official job as chairman 80 and a massive interjection of foreign capital. of the board of the Farmers National Bank in The ROK Supreme Council meanwhile passed a Shelbyville, Indiana, for months at a time, law mandating the purification of political telling friends and family he was going to activities. Living conditions remained difficult Europe—helped set up intelligence schools and for the majority, as Park collaborated with the a situation room facility equipped with maps management of large (conglomerates) and telecommunications equipment. By the in using police and hired goons to suppress mid-1960s, Korean Central Intelligence had strikes, and keeping wages low in order to 350,000 agents, out of a population of 30 attract foreign investment. Forbes magazine million, dwarfing the Russian NKVD at its glowingly promoted South Korea in this period height. CIA attaché Peer De Silva rationalized as a great place to do business because its ruthless methods by claiming, “There are laborers worked sixty hours per week for very tigers roaming the world, and we must low pay.81 recognize this or perish.”82

From 1967 to 1970 the OPS team in Korea was headed by Frank Jessup, a Republican appointee as superintendent of the Indiana State Police in the mid- 1950s and veteran of police programs in Greece, Liberia, Guatemala, and Iran. A sergeant with the Marine Corps Third Division who served in counterintelligence during the and as chief of civil defense with the U.S. federal police, Jessup was a national officer of the American Legion. Lacking any real knowledge of Korean affairs, he subscribed to the worldview of the American New Right, with its commitment to social order, military preparedness, and counterrevolutionary activism at home and abroad. His politics were characteristic of the advisory group, which included William J. Simmler, chief of detectives in , with experience in the Philippines; Peter Costello, a twenty-four-year veteran of the New York Police Department, Frank Jessup, OPS Director South Korea who helped run the dirty war in Guatemala; and Harold “Scotty” Caplan of the Pennsylvania Characterized as a quasi-military force, the State Police.

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Peaking at a budget of $5.3 million in 1968, the OPS organized combat police brigades and village surveillance and oversaw the interrogation of captured agents and defectors. It also improved record management, trained industrial security guards, oversaw the delivery of 886 vehicles (35 percent of the KNP fleet), and provided polygraph machines and weaponry such as gas masks and grenade launchers.83 The KNP claimed to have apprehended 80 percent of North Korean infiltrators as a result South Korean police arrest protestors 84 during the Kwangju incident in 1980 of American assistance.

Sweeping under the rug the tyrannical aspects In January 1974, President Park passed an of Park’s rule, modernization theorists in emergency measure giving him untrammeled Washington considered U.S. policy in South power to crack down on dissenters. Amnesty Korea to be a phenomenal success because of International subsequently reported an the scale of economic growth, which was appalling record of police detentions, beatings, contingent in part on manufacturing vital and torture of journalists, churchmen, equipment for the American army in Vietnam. academics, and other regime opponents. The United States was especially grateful to Leftists (dubbed chwaiksu) confined in Park for sending 312,000 ROK soldiers to overcrowded prisons were forced to wear red Vietnam, where they committed dozens of My badges and received the harshest treatment.87 Lai–style massacres and, according to a RAND In May 1980, KNP and Corporation study, burned, destroyed, and 85 killed anyone who stood in their path. The ROKA officers, a number of them participation of police in domestic surveillance veterans, killed up to three thousand people in and acts of state terrorism was justified as suppressing the Kwangju pro-democracy creating a climate of stability, allowing for uprising. Students were burned alive with economic “take-off.” Together with Japan, as the officers laid siege to the South Korea helped crystallize the view that a city. A popular slogan from the period nation’s police force was the critical factor proclaimed, “Even the Japanese police officers 86 needed to provide for its internal defense. and the communists during the Korean War weren’t this cruel.” These words provide a fitting epitaph to the American police programs, which, over a thirty-five-year period, trained some of the forces implicated in the massacre and provided the KNP with modern weaponry and equipment used for repressive ends.88

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status quo were subjected to imprisonment, torture, and often death. Their plight has largely been suppressed in the West, along with the buried history of U.S.-ROK atrocities in the Korean War. Undisturbed by all the bloodshed, the practitioners of in Washington viewed the intervention in South Korea as an effective application of the doctrine. Police advisers were consequently called upon to pass along their technical expertise so as to fend off revolution in other locales, including South Vietnam, Police at Kwangju again with cataclysmic results. Jeremy Kuzmarov is Jay P. Walker Assistant In a study of police torturers in the Southern Professor of History at the University of Tulsa. Cone of Latin America, Martha K. Huggins and He is the author ofModernizing Repression. a team of researchers concluded thatPolice Training and Nation-Building in the ideological conditioning and the political American Century and The Myth of the climate of the Cold War helped shape their Addicted Army: Vietnam and the Modern War behavior and allowed for the rationalization of on Drugs. actions that the perpetrators would normally This is a revised and expanded version of have considered abhorrent, and now do in the 89 chapter four in Modernizing Repression. clear light of day. Their insights are equally applicable to South Korea, where police Recommended Citation: Jeremy Kuzmarov, violence was justified as saving the country "Police Training, 'Nation-Building,' and Political from a dangerous enemy. Conceiving of police Repression in Postcolonial South Korea,"The as crucial to broader state-building efforts, the Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol 10, Issue 27, No. 3, American programs were designed in theory to July 2, 2012. professionalize police standards and incorporate the kinds of progressive style Notes reforms that were prevalent in the United States. However, they became heavily1MacArthur quoted in John Dower, “The U.S.- militarized and focused on the suppression of Japan Military Relationship,” in Postwar Japan, left-wing activism, resulting in systematic 1945 to the Present, ed. Jon Livingston, Joe human rights violations. American intervention Moore, and Felicia Oldfather (New York: empowered authoritarian leaders and provided Pantheon, 1973), 236. On the long-standing security forces with modern surveillance U.S. drive for in the Asia-Pacific, see equipment, forensics technology, and weapons Bruce Cumings, Dominion from Sea to Sea: which heightened their social controlPacific Ascendancy and American Power (New capabilities. The vibrancy of the laborHaven: Yale University Press, 2009); Richard movement and political left was curtailed, thus Drinnon, Facing West: The Metaphysics of contributing to a weakening of civil society. Indian-Hating and Empire-Building (Norman: The working classes were largely left out of the University of Oklahoma Press, 1980). For Park-era economic boom, and North-South strategic planning after World War II, see rapprochement was made impossible.Noam Chomsky, For Reasons of State (New Throughout the Cold War, challengers of the York: New Press, 2003).

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2 See Alfred W. McCoy, Policing America’s 8 Roy C. Stiles and Albert Lyman, “The Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and Administration of Justice in Korea under the the Rise of the Surveillance State (Madison: Japanese and in South Korea under the U.S. University of Wisconsin Press, 2009); Bruce Army Military Government in Korea to August Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: vol. 2 15, 1958: Paper by American Advisory Staff,” , The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947–1950 Department of Justice, RDS, Records Related to (Princeton: Press, 1990), the Internal Affairs of Korea, 1945–1949, 31. decimal file 895 (hereafter cited RDS, Korea.

3 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: vol. 9 Harry Maglin, “Organization of National 1, Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Police of Korea,” December 27, 1945, USAFIK Regimes, 1945–1947 (Princeton: Princeton Okinawa, box 25; Everett F. Drumright to University Press, 1981); “The Position of the Secretary of State, “FBI Training,” December U.S. with Respect toKorea,” 22, 1948, RDS, Korea; Philip H. Taylor, Council Report 8, April 2, 1948, PSF, “Military Government Experience in Korea,” in Papers, HSTL. American Experiences in Military Government

4 in World War II, ed. Carl J. Friederich (New Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, Korea: The York: Unknown War (New York: Pantheon,1988), 23; Dong-Choon Kim, The Unending Korean War: A Rinehart, 1948), 377; Harold Larsen, U.S. Army Social History, trans. Sung-ok Kim (Larkspur, History of the United States Armed Forcesin Calif.: Tamal Vista Publications, 2000), 80. Korea, pt. 3, chap. 4, “Police and Public When asked by the journalist Mark Gayn Security” (Seoul and Tokyo, manuscript in whether Rhee was a fascist, LieutenanttheOffice of the Chief of Military History, Leonard Bertsch, an adviser to General John R. 1947–48). Hodge, head of the American occupation, responded, “He is two centuries before10 Gayn, Japan Diary, 390; Cumings, The —a true Bourbon.” Mark Gayn,Japan Origins of the Korean War, 1:164; Col. William Diary (New York: William Sloane, 1948),352. H. Maglin, “Looking Back in History: . . . The

5 Korean National Police”Military Police Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Professional Bulletin (Winter 1999): 67–69; Modern History (New York: Norton, 1997), 210. John Muccio to Secretary of State, August 13, 1949, Department of Justice, RDS, Korea. Ch’oe 6 “A History of the Korean National Police Nûng-jin (“Danny Choy”), chief of the KNP (KNP),” August 7, 1948, RG 554, United States Detective Bureau, called the KNP “the refuge Army Forces in Korea, Records home for Japanese-trained police and traitors,” Regarding the Okinawa Campaignincluding “corrupt police who were chased out (1945–1948), United States Militaryof North Korea by the communists.”Cumings, Government, Korean Political Affairs, box 25 The Origins of the Korean War, 1:166, 167. In (hereafter USAFKIK, Okinawa). North Korea, by contrast, police officers during the colonial period were purged, and 7 Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean authorities worked to rebuild a new police War, vol. 2, The Roaring of the Cataract, force of people without collaborationist 1947–1950, rev. ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University backgrounds. This was a factor accounting for Press, 2004), 186, 187; Gregory Henderson, the legitimacy of the revolutionary government, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge: Charles Armstrong notes, although the security Press, 1968), 143. structure still built on the foundations of the

18 10 | 27 | 3 APJ | JF old in its striving for total information control. Okinawa, box 25. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 15 1945–1950 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, “Summation of Non-Military Activities in 2004), 205. Korea,” November 13, 1945, GHQ-SCAP; “History of the Korean National Police,” August 11 Edward Wismer, Police Adviser, to Director 7, 1948;“Police Bureau Renovates Good But of National Police, June 6, 1947, USAFIK, RG Wrecked System,” The Corps Courier, February 554, Records Regarding Korean Political Affairs 12, 1946, USAFIK Okinawa, box 26; (1945–1948), box 26; Kim,The Unending “Summation of Non-Military Activities in Korean War, 185; Cumings, The Origins of the Korea,” September 1946, GHQ-SCAP, 18; Korean War, 1:502. An American police “Summation of Non-Military Activities in supervisor commented that there was enough Korea,” February 1948, GHQ-SCAP, 187; “Chief evidence on both Chang and Chough to“hang of Korean Uniformed Police Visits U.S. Provost them several times over” (ibid.). HodgeMarshall,” Journal of Criminal Law, justified their appointment by pointing to their Criminology and Police Science 44 (July–August fierce anticommunism and loyalty to the 1953): 220. American command. The CIA characterized 16 Chang, managing director of the bank of Taegu “Summation of Non-Military Activities in in the 1940s who hailed from one of Korea’s Korea,” November 13, 1945, USAFIK Okinawa, oldest and wealthiest families, as “anbox 26; J. H. Berrean to Major Millard Shaw, intelligent, ambitious opportunist who, while Acting Advisor, Department of Police,, basically friendly to the United States, is erratic 1948, USAFIK Okinawa, box 25; D. L. Nicolson and unreliable when excited.” NSCF, CIA,box to J. Edgar Hoover, March 29, 1949, RDS, 4, HSTL. Korea, file 895; Henderson, Korea, 142–43. On the Chinese precedent, see Mary Miles,“The 12 Stiles and Lyman, “The Administration of Navy Launched a Dragon,” unpublished Justice in Korea under the Japanese and in manuscript, Naval War College, Newport,R.I., South Korea under the U.S. Army Military chap. 28, “Unit Nine, School of Intelligence and Government in Korea to August 15, 1958” RDS, Counter-Espionage.” Korea; “History of the Korean National Police,” 17 August 7, 1948, USAFIK Okinawa, box 25; Major Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisers in Larsen, “Police and Public Security,” 5, 6. Korea: KMAG in Peace and War,The Historical Series, ed. Walter G. 13 “Interview with Lt. Col. Earle L. Miller, Chief Hermes (Washington, D.C.: OCMH,GPO, 1962), of Police of Kyonggi-do, 15 Nov. 1945to 29 Dec. 13; Bruce Cumings, The Korean War: A History 1945,” February 3, 1946; Harry S. Maglin, (New York: Random House, 2010), 134; Peter “Organization of National Police of Korea,” Clemens, “Captain James Hausman, U.S. December 27, 1945, USAFIK Okinawa, box 25; Military Adviser to Korea,1946–1948: The “Summation of Non-Military Activities in Intelligence Man on the Spot,”Journal of Korea,” September 1946, GHQ-SCAP, 18; Strategic Studies 25, no. 1 (2002):184; John “Summation of Non-Military Activities in Merrill, Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the Korea,” February 1948, GHQ-SCAP, 187; War (Newark: University of Delaware Press, Arthur F. Brandstatter, Personnel File,1989), 100. Michigan State University Archives. 18 Allan R. Millett, “Captain James R. Hausman 14 “Interview with Major Arthur F. Brandstatter, and the Formation of the Korean Army, Police Bureau, 7 December 1945,” USAFIK 1945–1950,” Armed Forces and Society23

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(Summer 1997): 503–37; Clemens, “Captain Yenching Library); Daily Korean Bulletin, June James Hausman,” 170; Allan R. Millett,The 14, 1952, NSCF, CIA, box 4, HSTL. Lee Sang War for Korea, 1945–1950: A House Burning Ho, editor of the suspended Chung Ang Shin (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), Mun, and Kwang Tai Hyuk, chief of the 173. newspaper’s administrative section, were characteristically sentenced to eighteen 19 Joyce Kolko and , The Limits of months’ hard labor for printing “inflammatory Power: The World and United States Foreign articles.” For harsh police repression of the Policy, 1945–1954 (New York: Harper & Row, labor movement, see Hugh Deane, The Korean 1972), 290; Richard D. Robinson, “A Personal War, 1945–1953 (San Francisco: China Books, Journey through Time and Space,” Journal of 1999), 40. International Business Studies 25, no.3 (1994): 436. 24 Millard Shaw, “Police Comments on Guerrilla Situation,” August 6, 1948, USAFIK Okinawa, 20 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, box 26; George M. McCune,Korea Today 1:267; Henderson, Korea, 145; Richard C. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), Allen, Korea’s Syngman Rhee: An Unauthorized 88; Kim, The Unending Korean War,186; Portrait (Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle, 1960). Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War,2:207.

21 U.S. military intelligence may have Max Bishop to Charles Stelle, “Answers to collaborated in the assassination of another of Questions on the Korean Situation in Light of the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops,” February 10, Rhee’s rivals, Kim Ku, who was opposed to 1949, RG 59, RDS, Records of the Division of American intervention. Ku’s assassin, An Tu- Research for Reports (1946–1952), hui, was released from Taejon penitentiary box 4, folder 1. after a visit by a U.S. Army counterintelligence officer and was afterwards promoted to army 22 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution; major. Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 25 1:267; Donald Nichol, How Many Times Can I Nichol, How Many Times Can I Die,135; Die? (Brooksville, Fla.: Vanity Press, 1981),119; “Summary Conditions in Korea,” November John Reed Hodge to Douglas MacArthur, 1–15, 1946, USAFIK Okinawa, box 25; September 27, 1946, USAFIK Okinawa, box25; “Summation of Non-Military Activities in “Communist Capabilities in South Korea,” Korea,” June 1947, GHQ-SCAP, 26. Some of Office of Reports and Estimates, CIA, February these rackets involved U.S. soldiers. An army 21, 1949, PSF, Truman Papers, HSTL. colonel, for example, looted over four thousand cases of precious artworks from museums, 23 “Summation of Non-Military Activities in shrines and temples. After he was caught, he Korea,” September 1946, GHQ-SCAP, 18; was sent home on “sick leave.” Robinson, “Strikes/Riots,” September 1946–May 1947, “Betrayal of a Nation,” 290. USAFIK Okinawa, box 25, folder 3; “Summation of Non-Military Activities in Korea,” September 26 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 1946, GHQ-SCAP, 17; 27; Everett F. Drumright 2:188. to Secretary of State, “Amending of Organization of National Traitors Acts,”27 “History of the Police Department,” USAFIK December 22, 1948, RDS, Korea, file 895; Okinawa, box 25; Robinson, “A Personal Henderson, Korea, 146; Richard D. Robinson, Journey through Time and Space,” 437; “Betrayal of a Nation,” unpublishedRobinson, “Betrayal of a Nation,” 155. In North manuscript, 1960, 147 (courtesy of Harvard Korea, while dissidents were sent to labor and

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“re-education” camps, the use of torture to 144. extract confessions was abolished and 34 according to the leading authority on the Kolko and Kolko, The Limits of Power, 288; revolution, rarely practiced. Armstrong,The John Caldwell, with Lesley Frost,The Korea North Korean Revolution, 208. Story (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952), 8; Robinson, “Betrayal of a Nation,” 156. 28 “Korean-American Conference,” October 29, 35 1946; and “Report Special Agent Wittmer, Roy C. Stiles and Albert Lyman, “The G-2,Summary, November 3, 1946, USAFIK Administration of Justice in Korea under the Okinawa, boxes 25 and 26. Japanese and in South Korea under the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea to “Korean-American Conference”; Robinson, 15, 1948,” paper by American Advisory Staff, “Betrayal of a Nation,” 151; “South Korea: A Department of Justice, RDS, Korea, file 895; Police State?” February 16, 1948, RDS,“Joint Korean-American Conference,” October Division of Research for Far East Reports 1946, USAFIK Okinawa, box 26; Gayn,Japan (1946– 1952), box 3; “Communist Capabilities Diary, 423. in South Korea.” 36 “South Korea: A Police State?” February 16, 30 Kim, The Unending Korean War, 123. 1948, RDS, Division of Research for Far East Reports, 1946–1952, box 3. 31 James I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941–1950 37 Larsen, “Police and Public Security,” 60. (: University of Press, 1985), 77; Gayn, Japan Diary, 371. Yi Pom Sok’s OSS 38 “A History of the Korean National Police connections are revealed in Robert John Myers, (KNP),” August 7, 1948, USAFIK Okinawa, box Korea in the Cross Currents: A Century of 25; “Let Us Avenge the Victims of Kwangju,” Struggle and the Crisis of Reunification (New People’s Committee pamphlet. August 25,1946, York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 74. USAFIK Okinawa, box 25; Cumings, Origins of the Korean War, 1:364–66, 550. 32 Adviser Millard Shaw considered the cross- border operations acts “bordering on39 George E. Ogle, South Korea: Dissent within terrorism” which “precipitate retaliatory raids . the Economic Miracle (London: Zed Books, . . from the North.” Report, Major Millard 1990), 12; Henderson, Korea, 147; Cumings, Shaw, Acting Advisor, “Guard of the 38th The Origins of the Korean War,1:356–57. At Parallel by the National Police,” November Yongchon, 350 kilometers from Seoul, a mob of 1946, USAFIK Okinawa, box 25, folder 3; ten thousand disarmed and kidnapped forty Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, policemen after ambushing the police station 2:195. The first to challenge the standard and burned the homes of rightists. interpretation was I. F. Stone inThe Hidden 40 History of the Korean War (New York: Monthly John R. Hodge to Douglas MacArthur, SCAP, Review Press, 1969), originally published in April 17, 1948; Police Diary, Major Albert 1952. Brown, Survey, October 1946, USAFIK, Okinawa, box 26; “Summation of Non-Military 33 “Police Fraternization and Being Bribed by Activities in Korea,” July 1947, GHQ-SCAP, 34; Prisoners,” August 28, 1946, USAFIK Okinawa, Henderson, Korea, 146; Cumings, The Origins box 26, folder 10; G-2 Periodic Report, “Civil of the Korean War, 1:357. Henderson notes Disturbances,” Seoul, Korea, September 1947, that not one identifiable North Korean agent USAFIK Okinawa, box 25; Henderson,Korea, was involved in the , which leftists

21 10 | 27 | 3 APJ | JF claimed exceeded anything that had taken GHQ-SCAP, 196; Larsen, “Police and Public place under the Japanese. Security,” 133, 145; Bertrand M. Roehner, “Relations between Allied Forces and the 41 “Summation of Non-Military Activities,” Population of Korea,” Working Report, Institute February 1948, GHQ-SCAP, 182; Richard J. for Theoretical and High Energy Physics, Johnston, “Political Jailing in Korea Denied: University of Paris, 2010, 168. Authorities Say 17,867 Held Are Accused of Theft, Riot, Murder and Other Crimes,”New 46 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, York Times, , 1947; Richard J. 2:252. Johnston, “Seoul Aids Police in Checking Reds,” 47 New York Times, September 6, 1949; Richard J. Cumings, The Korean War, 122; Millett, Johnston, “Korean Reds Fight Police and “Captain James R. Hausman and the Formation Others,” New York Times,, of the Korean Army,” 503. 1947;“Summation of Non-Military Activities in 48 Korea,” September 1946, GHQ-SCAP, 22; “Cheju-do: Summation of Non-Military “Summation of Non-Military Activities in Activities,” June 1948, GHQ-SCAP, 160; Merrill, Korea,” December 1947, GHQ-SCAP, 165; Korea, 66. Henderson, Korea, 167; Maglin, “Looking Back 49 in History,” 69. “Field Report, Mission to Korea, U.S. Military Advisory Group to ROK,” RG 469, Mission to 42 “History of the Police Department” and Korea, U.S. Military Advisory Group to the “Investigation of the Police,” July 30, 1946, ROK, Records Related to the KNP (1948–1961) USAFIK Okinawa, box 25; “Visit to Wanju Jail,” (hereafter KNP), box 4, folder Cheju-do; August 1, 1946, USAFIK Okinawa, box 27, Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, folder 1; “Sanitary Inspection of Jails,” USAFIK 2:250–59; Merrill, Korea, 125. My thanks to Okinawa, box 26, folder 4; Gayn, Japan Diary, Cheju-do native Sinae Hyun for providing me 406, 407; Robinson, “Betrayal of a Nation,” with a clearer understanding of the internal 152. dynamics fueling the violence during this period. After the massacre, the U.S. military 43 Major General W. F. Dean to Lt. Commander command oversaw an increased police John R. Hodge, “Review by the Departmentof presence and stepped up local training efforts Justice of Persons Confined to Prisons or Police at the Cheju-do police school, which they Jails Who Might Be Considered Politicalfinanced. William F. Dean to Director of Prisoners,” April 5, 1948, USAFIK, Records of National Police, July 30, 1948, USAFIK the General Headquarters, Far EastCommand, Okinawa,box 26, folder Cheju-do. General Correspondences (1943–1946), AI 50 1370, box 1. Merrill, Korea, 113; Time, November 14, 1948, 6. 44 “Summation of Non-Military Activities,” April 51 1948, GHQ-SCAP, 170; “Summation of Non- “Award of UN Service Medal to the National Military Activities in Korea,” July 1947, GHQ- Police, Mission to Korea, Office of Government SCAP, 22. Services, Senior Adviser to KNP,” February 10, 1954, PSD, GHQ-SCAP (1955–1957), box 1, 45 “Summation of Non-Military Activities,” folder Awards and Decorations; “Policy January 1948, GHQ-SCAP, 181; “Report of Research Study: Internal Warfare and the Daily Police Activities,” USAFIK Okinawa, box Security of the Underdeveloped States,” 27, folder Civil Police; “Summationof Non- November 20, 1961, JFKL, POF, box 98; Kim, Military Activities in Korea,” August 1947, The Unending Korean War, 122; Tim Weiner,

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Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA to Recommended Action for 1290-d,” in Foreign (NewYork: Doubleday, 2007), 56, 57. Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, pt. 2, Korea, ed. Louis Smith (Washington, D.C.: 52 Charles J. Hanley and Jae-Soon Chang, GPO, 1993), 183. “Summer of Terror: At Least 100,000 Said Executed by Korean Ally of US in 1950,” Japan 57 “Bandit Activity Report,” May 1, 1954, KNP Focus, July 23, 2008. (1953–1955), box 4; Park Byong Bae, Chief, Security Division, “Operation Report,” July 1, 53 James Cameron, Point of Departure (London: 1954, and “Periodic Operations Report,” May Oriel Press, 1978), 131–32; McDonald, Korea, 27, 1954, KNP (1953–1955), box 4; “Results of 42; also Nichol, How Many Times Can I Die, Police Operations,” July 15, 1954, KNP 128. CIC agent Donald Nichol, a confidant of (1953–1955), box 2; “Summary of NSC Action Rhee, reported that he stood by helplessly in 1290-d Report on Korea,” DDEL, OCB, box 17, Suwan as “the condemned were hastily pushed folder Internal Security. into line along the edge of the newly opened grave. They were quickly shot in the head and 58 “G-2 Section Report,” February 2, 1954, KNP pushed in the grave. . . . I tried to stop this (1953–1955), box 4. from happening, however, I gave up when I saw I was wasting my time” (ibid.) 59 “Quarterly Historical Report,” , 1954, KNP (1953–1955), box 4; also “G-2 Section 54 Hanley and Chang, “Summer of Terror”; Report,” March 25; May 2, 1954. Bruce Cumings, “The South Korean Massacre at Taejon: New Evidence on U.S. Responsibility 60 “Johnny” to Police Adviser, “Bandit Activity and Cover-Up,” Japan Focus, July23, 2008; Report,” May 1, 1954, KNP (1953–1955), box 4. Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, 25; Kim, 61 The Unending Korean War;Halliday and “Police Wipe Out Last Known Guerrilla Band Cumings, Korea; Charles J. Hanley, Sang-Hun and “Red Bandit Chief Slain, TwoKilled,” Korea Choe, and , The Bridge at No Times, December 1956, NA. Gun Ri: A Hidden Nightmare fromthe Korean 62 War (New York: Holt, 2000). Henderson, Korea, 173.

63 55 On U.S. strategic designs in Southeast Asia, William Maxfield to Director, NP [National see , Blowback: The Costs Police], ROK, February 16, 1954, KNP and Consequences of American Empire(New (1953–1955), box 1; Gregg Brazinsky,Nation York: Henry Holt, 2000); Gabriel Kolko,Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans Confronting the : United States ,and the Making of a Democracy (Chapel Hill: Foreign Policy, 1945–1980(New York: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), Pantheon,1990); John W. Dower, “Occupied 28–30; Report of an Japan and the American Lake, 1945–1950,” in Mission to the Republic of Korea, March America’s Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian- 27–April 9, 1975(London: Amnesty American Relations, ed. Edward Friedman and International, 1977), 29; William J. Lederer, A MarkSelden (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), Nation of Sheep(New York: Norton, 1961), 79; 186–207. “Combined Korean Communities in USA Picket White House to Protest Carnage of Korean 56 Colonel Albert Haney, “OCB Report Pursuant Youth,” , 1960, DDEL, OCB, White to NSC Action 1290-d,” August 5,1955, DDEL, House Office, Central Files, General File, OCB, box 17, folder Internal Security; “Analysis Korea, box 821; Peer De Silva, Sub Rosa: The of Internal Security Situationin ROK Pursuant CIA and theUses of Intelligence(New York:

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Times Books, 1978), 163. PoliceScience 43 (July–August 1952): 250–55; Lauren J. Goin, William H. McKee, and Paul L. 64 “Solon Alleges Police Attack,” Korea Times, Kirk, “Human Hair Studies: Application of the October 26, 1956; “Captain Warren S. Olin: Micro-determinant of Comparative Chungmu Distinguished Medal Density,”Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, with Silver Star,” March 1, 1955, Republic of and Police Science43 (July–August 1952): Korea, courtesy National Archives and Records 263–73. Administration, St. Louis; see also “Culprit Charges Police Plotted Murder,” Korea Times, 69 MSUG Monthly Report, October 1960, December 15, 1956; “May 5 Riot Nets Prison MSUA, Vietnam Project, box 679. On the Term for 14,” Korea Times, May 14, 1956. A repressive nature of Chiang’s secret police Pacific war veteran from New Jersey, Olin went apparatus in , see Jay Taylor,The on to head the army’s Criminal Investigation Generalissimo’s Son: Chiang Ching-kuo and the Branch in Vietnam. Revolutions in China and Taiwan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000). Taylor quotes 65 Kim, The Unending Korean War,201–2; a CIA operative who reported hearing Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, executions being carried out in a soccer 2:265. For eight months in 1947, Kim was stadium: “Ching-kuo got all the communists but Chang Taek-sang’s personal bodyguard. also a lot of others” (211).

66 Muccio, quoted in Cumings, The Korean War, 70 Gene E. Carte and Elaine Carte,Police 183. One document preserved at the National Reform in the United States: The Era of August Archives which points to the close symbiotic Vollmer, 1905–1932 (Berkeley: University of relationship between U.S. advisers and General California Press, 1975), 49; Nathan Kim was a letter from Colonel Joseph Pettet of Douthit,“August Vollmer, Berkeley’s First Chief the Public Safety Branch thanking him for “the of Police, and the Emergence of Police wonderful party you gave us on October 29, Professionalism,”California Historical Review 1954. The food and entertainment was superb 54 (Summer 1975): 101–24; O. W. Wilson, as always at a ‘Tiger’ Kim party.” Joseph Pettet “August Vollmer,” Journal of Criminal Law, to Chief Kim, November 1,1954, KNPCriminology, and Police Science 44 (May–June (1953–1955), box 1. 1953): 95.

67 “Quarterly Historical Report,” July 10, 1954, 71 Ray Foreaker to Michigan State College, East KNP (1953–1955), box 4, folder 3; Albert R. Lansing, March 9, 1956, KNP (1955–1957), box Haney, “Observations and Suggestions1, folder 3. Marc Logie, who fought with the Concerning OISP,” January 30, 1957, DDEL, GMD and French foreign legion, succeeded OCB, box 18, folder Internal Security. Foreaker as PSD chief.

68 to Thomas Wilson,72 See William Turner, The Police Establishment Assistant Chief of Public Safety Division, Senior (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1968), 170. Adviser to KNP, USOM Mission to Korea, June On racial problems, see Edward Keating, Free 5, 1956, KNP (1955–1957), box 4, folder 3; Huey! (San Francisco: Ramparts Press, 1971), “Periodic Operations Report,” May 27, 1954, and the memoirs of Black Panther leaders. KNP (1955–1957), box 4; “1956 Guide,” KNP (1955–1957), box 1, folder National Police 73 “List of Police Officers Who Have Been to the Laboratory File. On Goin, see Lauren J. Goin, United States,” KNP (1948–1961), box 3, folder “Details Reproduced by Metal Casting,” Journal Korean Student Records; “Chief of Korean of Criminal Law, Criminology, andUniformed Police Visits U.S. Provost Marshall,”

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Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and The Park Chung-Hee Era: The Transformation Police Science 44 (July–): 220. of South Korea (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011); Scott Anderson and Jon Lee 74 Turner, The Police Establishment, 72; Joseph Anderson, Inside the League: The Shocking G. Woods, “The Progressives and the Police: Exposé of How Terrorists, Nazis, and Latin Urban Reform and the Professionalization of American Death Squads Have Infiltrated the the Los Angeles Police” (Ph.D. diss., UCLA, World Anti-Communist League(New York: 1973). Dodd, Mead, 1986), 52; Cumings, The Origins

75 of the Korean War,2:266. Park’s treachery “Juvenile Reformatories,” , after the Yosu rebellion resulted in the purge of 1955, KNP (1953–1955), box 1, folder 3; hundreds of constabulary officers and the death “Information Related to the Establishment of a of many former friends. Hausman’s Reformatory,” KNP (1953–1955), box 2. involvement in the coup is acknowledged in Clemons, “Captain James Hausman,” 193. 76 American embassy, Tehran, to Secretary of

State, “Use of Light Aircraft in Opium81 Current Foreign Relations, “Korea Purifies Eradication Campaign,” September 26, 1969, Political Activities,” , 1962, JFKL, RG 286, USAID, Operations Division, Africa and NSF, box 431; Ogle, South Korea, 23. the Near East and South Asia Branch, box 62, folder 2. 82 Lauren J. Goin, Lt. Shannon, and Arthur M. Thurston, “Survey of Civil Internal Security 77 J. P Anninos, “Narrative Report of Korean Forces, Republic of Korea,” May 1966, RG 286, Gangster Operations in Pusan,” February 11, USAID, OPS, Programs, Surveys, and 1954; and “Operations of Gangsters,” KNP Evaluations, box 6; Johnson, Blowback, 107; De (1953–1955), box 1, folder 3; “Narcotic Trade Silva, Sub Rosa, xi. De Silva incidentally helped and Black-Marketing,” July 2, 1955, KNP recruit Nazi spy Reinhard Gehlen after World (1953–1955), box 1, folder Monthly Narcotics War II and was involved with the Phoenix Reports; “Black Market,” June 20, 1955, KNP program in Vietnam. An OSS spy in the (1953–1955), box 1, folder Black Market Kunming station in China in World War II, Activities. Thurston also served with the police programs 78 “Report on Conduct of Korean Military Police in Indonesia, Libya, and Somalia. Personnel,” , 1955, KNP (1953–1955), 83 “Korea: A Political-Military Study of South box 1, folder 3; “Report of Accident with Korean Forces, Intelligence Annex to Study on Fatality,” March 16, 1955; and “Summary of UN-ROK Incidents Reported by the KNP,” May Korea, Prepared by Defense Intelligence 1955, KNP (1953–1955), box 1, folder 2; Agency,” April 1962, JFKL, NSF, box 431; “Summary of US-ROK Offenses and Incidents,” Thomas A. Finn and James A. Cretecos, KNP (1953–1955), box 1, folder Coordinating “Evaluation of the Public Safety Program, Committee Law and Order; “Demonstrations at USAID, Korea, , 1971–July 18, 1971,” Inchon,” August 18, 1955, KNP (1953–1955), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDABZ913.pdf; box 3. Goin, Shannon, and Thurston, “Survey of Civil Internal Security Forces, Republic of Korea.” 79 “Policy Research Study: Internal Warfare and On Jessup’s tenure in Indiana, see Marilyn S. the Security of the UnderdevelopedStates,” Olsen, Gangsters, Gunfire, and Political POF, box 98, November 20, 1961. Intrigue: The Story of the Indiana State Police (Indianapolis: .38 Special Press), 2001, 75; 80 See Byong Kook-Kim and , eds., Julien Mader, Who’s Who in the CIA (Berlin: J.

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Mader, 1968), 261. of International Affairs, 1975), 9; Brazinsky, Nation Building in South Korea.Many 84 “Korea: A Political-Military Study of South ideologically driven scholars adopt the same Korean Forces,” April 1962, JFKL, NSC, box perspective in presenting Korea as a successful 431; Byron Engle to Frank Kolnacki, December case of U.S. foreign policy, Brazinsky included. 13, 1968, TSD, box 5, folder Korea; Lauren J. Paul Wolfowitz argued in a 2009New York Goin, Memoir, April 1991, Institute of Inter- Times editorial that South Korea should serve American Affairs Collection, Courtesy ofas a model for U.S. “nation-building” in Iraq. University of Illinois at Springfield Archives, Special Collections. CIA agent George87 Report of an Amnesty International Mission “Speedy” Gaspard stated that police under his to the Republic of Korea, 27 March–9 April command “killed 119 [North Korean] agents . . 1975, 8–9, 37. See also “New Repression in . . We didn’t take any prisoners, that was South Korea,” New York Times, May 29, 1980; difficult to do. They wouldn’t just surrender.” In Suh Sung, Unbroken Spirits: Nineteen Years in George Schultz Jr., The Secret War against South Korea’s ,trans. Jean Inglis Hanoi (New York: Harper Collins, 1999), 58. (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001). 85 “Alleged ROK Massacres,” RG 472, Records 88 See Henry Scott-Stokes and Jai-Eui Lee, eds., of the Armed Forces in South East Asia The Kwangju Uprising: Eyewitness Press (RAFSEA), Criminal Investigations Branch, Accounts of Korea’s Tiananmen, foreword by boxes 34–36; Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Kim Dae Jung (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2000); Herman, The Political Economy of Human Timothy Shorrock, “The U.S. Role in Korea in Rights: The Washington Connection and Third 1979–1980,” Sisa Journal, February 28, 1996, World Fascism (Boston: South End Press, 1979), 313; Frank Baldwin, Diane Jones, and www.kimsoft.com/Korea/Kwangju3.htm; Kim, Michael Jones, America’s Rented Troops: South The Unending Korean War,ix; Johnson, Koreans in Vietnam (Philadelphia: American Blowback, 116. Richard Holbrooke, who later Friends Services Committee, 1975); Bernd served as special envoy to Afghanistan, was Greiner, War without Fronts: The USA in among the State Department officials who gave Vietnam (New Haven: Yale University Press, a green light for and then covered up the 2009), 190. atrocity.

89 86. Interview with Jack Goin, December 9, Martha K. Huggins, Mika Haritos-Fatouros, 1975, and Byron Engle, January 27, 1976, in and Philip Zimbardo, Violence Workers: Police William D. Steeves Jr., “The U.S. Public Safety Torturers and Murderers Reconstruct Brazilian Program, Its Evolution and Demise” (master’s Atrocities (Berkeley: University of California thesis, George Washington University, School Press, 2002), 8.

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