C E N T R U M 15 Deniz Memedi1 Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu2

UDC: 341.7(560):316.485.26(497.115)

ROLI I DIPLOMACISË TURKE GJATË KONFLIKTIT NË KOSOVË

УЛОГАТА НА ТУРСКАТА ДИПЛОМАЦИЈА ВО ТЕКОТ НА КОНФЛИКТОТ ВО КОСОВО

THE ROLE OF TURKISH DIPLOMACY DURING THE CONFLICT IN

ABSTRACT

This paper aims to analyse Turkish diplomacy during the . In the period of 1990s, except in the Kosovo War, had an active diplomatic approach during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995) but also in the Albanian as a result of the collap- se of financial pyramid schemes in 1997. The Kosovo War was the next issue in the where Turkish diplomacy showed its activism both in international platforms and during NATO’s military operation called “Operation Allied Force”. Therefore, the main question of this paper can be formulated as: Was Turkey’s strategic interest the main reason for having an active diplomacy during the Kosovo War? The main argument of the paper is that in addition to cultural, historical and

1 Deniz Memedi is a PhD candidate in Political Science and International Relations at Yildiz Technical University. (Email:[email protected]. ORCID > https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3560-7166) 2 Prof.Dr. Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu is professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations,Yıldız Technical University. (Email:[email protected]. ORCID >https://orcid.org/0000-0003- 4287-1296) * The authors wish to express their sincere gratitude to Courtney Henry and Dr.Abdurrahman Gümüş for their diligent proofreading of this research paper. 94

C E N T R U M 15 kinship factors, national interests obliged Turkey to take an active approach during this war. Keywords: Kosovo War, Turkish Foreign Policy, Western Balkans.

INTRODUCTION

The Kosovo Question is one of the most studied subjects in the Balkans after the end of the .3 The break-up of Yugoslavia caused bloody wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbian para- military forces were also active in Kosovo and tried to expel the Albanian population from the region. The continuing tension in the region finally attracted the interest of the great powers such as USA, Great Britain, , etc, which started to deal with the Kosovo Question before it would turn to a new place of ethnic clean- sing. Turkey was among the regional powers which tried to be active in the process of conflict resolution. The great powers and Turkey had experience in dealing with the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in . Turkey was a country that supported peacekeeping policy, and participated in the United Nations peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Albania and lastly in Kosovo. The engagement of Turkey in the Western Balkans was legitimized by its historical, cultural and kinship ties particularly with the Muslim population of the region. The main question of the research paper focuses on the reasons that forced Turkey to take an active approach to the Kosovo War. In addition, this paper will discuss the origins of the Kosovo Question in the historical context, Turkey's position before the escalation of the conflict, the initiative taken by Turkish diplomacy and its contribution to international platforms. The research paper also addresses Turkey's participation in NATO's "Operation Allied Force". Furthermore, the Turkish role in humanitarian diplomacy, refugee care, participation in the international peacekeeping force (KFOR) and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) are other topics discussed in the paper.

3 Jens Reuter and Konrad Clewing (eds.), Der Kosovo-Konflikt. Ursachen, Verlauf, Perspektiven (Klagenfurt: Wieser, 2000). 95

C E N T R U M 15 1. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE KOSOVO QUESTION FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S

As early as the 1960s, mass demonstrations of in major cities of Kosovo took place. They demanded self-administration for Albanians and the recognition of Kosovo as a republic, along with the use of national Albanian symbols.4 These demonstrations resulted in some rights given by Belgrade, like the use of the Albanian national flag as an , restructuring the University of Pristina as a predominantly Albanian institution, increasing the number of books in the etc. As a result, the constitution of 1974 changed the status of Kosovo and made it an autonomous region with self-administration. 5 After Tito’s death, ethnic nationalism became more visible in the Federation of Yugoslavia, and a new period for Kosovo started. The University of Prishtina became the centre of national demands and reactions of Kosovo Albanians. The protests organized by students in March 1981 and demanding better conditions in the university were violently suppressed. This reaction provoked mass demonstrations of Albanians with national slogans such as "Kosovo of Kosovars", "We want Repu- blic", "We love the national flag", and "We want the unification of Albanian lands”. In six cities, almost 20,000 people took part in these demonstrations. More than 50 were injured and nine people died.6 When Milošević became the new president of Yugoslavia, Serbian nationalists started to demand the abolition of the special status of Kosovo. In 1987, extra security forces were transported to Kosovo and the ambition of Milošević to abolish the special status of Kosovo

4 Naim Musliu, “Demonstratat e nëntorit të vitit 1968 në Kosovë”, 17.01.2018, https://2lonline.com/demonstrata-e-nentorit-te-vitit-1968-ne-kosove/, [15.01.2021]. 5 R. Craig Nation, War in the Balkans: 1991-2002, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, August 2003, p. 224. 6 David Binder, “One Storm has Passed but others are Gathering in Yugoslavia”, 19.04.1981 https://www.nytimes.com/1981/04/19/weekinreview/one-storm-has-passed-but- others-are-gathering-in-yugoslavia.html, [05.01.2021]; Isak Sherifi, “Zhvillimet politiko-diplomatike në ish-Jugosllavi me theks të veçantë Kosova dhe Maqedonia 1981-2008”, (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of , Institute for European Studies, 2013), p.18; “36 vjetngademonstratat e vitit 1981” , 11.03.2017, https://telegrafi.com/36-vjet-nga-demonstratat-e-vitit-1981/, [05.01.2021] 96

C E N T R U M 15 became evident in 1988. 7 This provoked mass demonstrations by Albanians demanding full autonomy in January and February 1989. The Government of Belgrade suppressed the protests and revoked the status of autonomy of Kosovo on March 23, 1989. It was followed by other repressive measures like the ban of the Albanian newspaper Rilindja in August 1989, the dissolution of the Parliament of Kosovo, and the prohibition of teaching the Albanian language. Finally, an authentic martial law which granted full powers to the Belgrade forces was accep- ted and the autonomy of Kosovo ended.8 This act of Milošević has been considered as the main reason for the escalation of the Kosovo conflict and the sufferings in the following decade.9 The removal of the autonomous status of Kosovo by Milošević’s government in June 1988 (confirmed also in the constitution of March 1989) caused dissatisfaction among the Albanian population in the region.10 In response to that initiative, Professor Ibrahim , toge- ther with Rexhep Qosja, Fehmi Agani, and Bujar Bukoshi founded the Democratic League of Kosovo (1989). On July 2,1990, the Parliament of Kosovo declared independency from the Yugoslav Federation, and condemned the dissolution of the Parliament of Kosovo by the Federal Presidency as an illegal act.11 While the other federal states of Yugosla- via started to declare independence, the Kosovar leadership also pro- claimed the independence of the Republic of Kosovo on September 21, 1991. The independence referendum was supported by the Albanian community and 90 percent voted for independence. The government of Belgrade declared these developments as illegal acts and intervened. The Democratic League of Kosovo, under Ibrahim Rugova, pursued a policy of passive resistance – called as a Gandhian policy- against the

7 Jens Reuter, “Die Kosovo-Albaner im ehemaligen Jugoslawien”, Georg Brunner and Hans Lemberg (eds.), Volksgruppen in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa (Baden- Baden: Nomos, 1994), pp. 187-194. 8 Juan Jose Otinano Vines, Romulado Bermejo Garcia, Los Conflictos de los Balcanes, (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Internacionales y Europeos "Francisco de Vitoria," Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Escuela de Guerra del Ejerrcito y Secretaria General Tecnica, Ministerio de Defensa, 2007), p. 318. 9 Gencer Özcan, “Türkiye’nin Balkan Politikasına İlişkin Düşünceler”, Mustafa Bereketli (ed.), Berlin Antlaşmasından Günümüze Balkanlar (İstanbul: Rumeli Vakfı, 1997), pp. 151-174, p. 151-152. 10 İlhanUzgel, “Balkanlarla İlişkiler”, Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşı’ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Vol. II: 1980-2001, Ed. Baskın Oran, 12th ed., (İstanbul: İletişimYayınları, 2010), pp. 481-523, here, p. 512. 11 Nation, op. cit., p. 224. 97

C E N T R U M 15 Serbian government. By this way, Rugova expected to gain interna- tional support for his political agenda, namely the recognition of the independence of Kosovo.12 The dissolution of Yugoslavia caused violent conflicts in Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The international community did not or could not intervene directly to stop these bloody conflicts. Furthermore, the independence of Kosovo was not recognized. After witnessing (experiencing) these developments, the Kosovar leadership continued their movement towards independence: They organised elections and Ibrahim Rugova was elected as the president of the state. Rugova made some failed attempts to negotiate with the Milošević regime like ope- ning the buildings of Albanian schools.13 When finally the international community headed by US, Germa- ny, France, Russia, Great Britan, intervened to stop the bloody conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Dayton Agreement was signed (November 21, 1995), the Kosovo Albanians also expected to be sup- ported. This agreement solved the conflict between Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats, but the Kosovo Conflict remained unsolved. There are different explanations why Kosovo was not discussed in Dayton. According to Richard Caplan, there are three main reasons why the issue of Kosovo was excluded in the process of Dayton. Firstly, the international western community thought that there was too much to negotiate with Miloše- vič, especially regarding the issue of surrender of war criminals deman- ded by The Hague Tribunal. Secondly, Miloševič 's cooperation was still considered necessary to fully implement the Dayton Agreement. And lastly, in Kosovo there was still no war, so there was no need to deal with its issues.14 Putting Kosovo on the agenda would jeopardize the achievement of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because the Kosovo issue was of high sensitivity for . Therefore, the interna- tional community assessed that it was not the moment to incorporate the issue of Kosovo in Dayton.

12 Enika Abazi, “Kosovo: War, Peace and Intervention in a Nutshell”, Turkish Review of Balkan Studies, Annual 6, (2001), p. 57-74, p. 59. 13 Muharrem Nitaj, “Ibrahim Rugova - njëjetë e tërë”, 21.01.2006 http://www.bbc.co.uk/albanian/news/2006/01/060121_rugova_profil.shtml, [11.01.2021]. 14 Enika Abazi, “Çështja e Kosovës dhe Diplomacia Ndërkombëtare (1991-1999): Një konflikt i parashikueshëm”, Studime Historike, 66/3-4 (2011), p. 187-216, p. 201- 202. 98

C E N T R U M 15 2. THE ATTITUDE OF TURKEY TOWARDS THE KOSOVO QUESTION UNTIL 1998

Until the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the relations of Turkey with Yugoslavia was characterized by cooperation and even alliances (the Balkan pacts of 1934 and 1954). The conflict in Bosnia worsened these relations but after the Dayton Agreement, Turkey opened an embassy in Belgrade and a normalisation process in Turkish-Serbian relations started. Turkey considered Serbia as an important actor in achieving peace and stability in the Balkans. After the outbreak of the conflict in Bosnia, Turkey supported the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However the declaration of independence by the leadership of Kosovo wasn't supported by Ankara. The main reason for that was the status of Kosovo as a province of Serbia with special status (based on the 1974 constitution of Yugosla- via), and proclaiming independence as a republic had no legal basis, as was the case with other states of former Yugoslavia. At the first stage of the conflict, Turkey acted very cautiously regarding the demands by Kosovo Albanians. According to the official statement of Turkey, the Kosovo's issue was interpreted as an internal problem of Serbia and had to be resolved through dialogue between Belgrade and the leadership of Kosovo. Turkey supported the idea of restoring the status of Kosovo prior to 1989, excluding the option of independence. Despite these reservations regarding the Kosovo Question, An- kara was the first capital that welcomed the leader of Kosovo Alba- nians, Ibrahim Rugova. On February 11, 1992, Turkish President Tur- gut Özal welcomed Rugova very warmly and promised to give political support in improving the status of Albanians in Kosovo. But even in this meeting, Özal openly stated that Turkey will not make promises about the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state.15 The Prime Minister in exile, Bujar Bukoshi, also visited Ankara on February 27, 1992 expecting the recognition of Kosovo's independence by the Turkish government. Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin declared

15 “Cili ishte burrështetasi i parë që kishte takuar Ibrahim Rugovën?”, 17.03.2015, https://telegrafi.com/cili-ishte-burreshtetasi-i-pare-qe-kishte-takuar-ibrahim- rugoven-foto/, [14.01.2021]. 99

C E N T R U M 15 that it was impossible and repeated that Kosovo was a Province of the Yugoslav Federation.16 In the first half of the 1990s, Turkey’s main focus was to stop the war and massacres in Bosnia. But soon after the Dayton Agreement in 1995, the next target of Miloševič’s regime was Kosovo. With the escalation of the conflict in Kosovo, the Turkish government started to change its attitude toward this issue.17

3. THE ESCALATION OF THE WAR IN KOSOVO AND TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

The ignorance of the Kosovo conflict by the international community in the process of the Dayton Agreement strengthened the dissatisfaction among the Kosovo Albanians. The pacifist approach of Rugova was blamed for this result. Many of them were in favor for a more active policy and armed resistance. In this context, the (KLA) which was established in the first years of 1990s attracted more popular support and started to play a critical role in the conflict. On the other hand, the activities of the KLA provoked harsher measures and brutal attacks by the Milošević government. The KLA operations were used by Milošević as a pretext to implement ethnic cleansing against the Albanians in Kosovo. In this regard, several massacres were committed in different places. What provoked the attention of the international community was the execution of the whole family of Adem Jashari in , including 25 women and children at the beginning of March 1998.18 The Tribunal for War Crimes in Ha- gue decided to gather evidence on this massacre. The Drenica massacre commenced the period of war which continued for seven months. Thus, the Kosovo war became an international issue.19

16Şule Kut, İsmail Soysal, Dağılan Yugoslavya ve Bosna Hersek Sorunu: Olaylar- Belgeler 1990-1996, (İstanbul: OBIV Yayınları, 1997), p. 15. 17 Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun, “Kosova’nın Bağımsızlığı ve Türk Dış Politikası (1990- 2008)”, Uluslararası İlişkiler, 7/27 (Güz 2010), p. 51-86, 58. 18 Enika Abazi, “Intrastate Conflicts, International Interventions and their Implications on Security Issues: Case of Kosovo 1”, COPRI Working Papers 32, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 2001, pp. 1-34, p. 17. 19 Cem Ogulturk, “Turkey's Balkan Policy after the Cold War in the Context of the Independence Process of Kosovo”, (PhD thesis, Yeditepe University, Graduate Institute of Social Science, Istanbul, 2012), p. 219. 100

C E N T R U M 15 After the Drenica massacre, on March 9, 1998 the Contact Group (USA, United Kingdom, France, and Russia)20 held a meeting and condemned the actions of the Serbian paramilitary forces. What was more important was their declaration threatening Belgrade with sanc- tions and arms embargo if the Serbian forces would not stop their illegi- timate actions in Kosovo and allow the international commission to investigate these incidents in Kosovo.21 The US-led international community sought to find a peaceful solution between Pristina and Belgrade. President Clinton declared that he would not allow a “second Bosnia” in Kosovo. Richard Holbrooke, a US special presidential envoy, together with the US Ambassador to Macedonia Christopher Hill met with Albanian leaders to persuade them to enter negotiations with Belgrade on May 10, 1998. In June 1998, Christopher Hill met the KLA representatives. The US proposed the restoration of institutions in Kosovo prior to 1989 and the nor- malisation of relations between Albanians and Belgrade. The demands of Albanians for a reconciliation were recognitionof Kosovo as a con- stituent element of Yugoslavia and unrestricted self-government inclu- ding the right for a referendum after three years and for the international community to be the guarantor of the implementation of agreement.22 Although the international community struggled to find a peace- ful solution, another massacre by Serbian paramilitary forces took place in Recak. The massacre happened on January 15, 1999 which shocked the world. There were about 45 victims, most of them were men bet- ween the ages 18 and 65 who were not in military uniforms in addition to a woman and a child.23The head of the OSCE monitoring mission in

20 Contact Group was established in 1994 and served as coordination forum of the crisis management efforts of the Germany, United Kingdom, Russian Federation, USA, France and Italy (since 1996). See more in Christoph Schwegmann, “The Contact Group and its Impact on the European Institutional Structure”, 01.06.2000, https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/contact-group-and-its-impact-european- institutional-structure, [16.01.2021]. 21 Ibid, 220. 22 Xhenis Sulimani, Neo Uillsonizmi, Politika e Jashtme e SHBA’së dhe konfliktet ne Jugosllavi, (Skopje: Logos-A, 2015), p. 70-72. 23 “World: Massacre in Kosovo”, 19.01.1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ europe/256364.stm, [12.01.2021]. 101

C E N T R U M 15 Kosovo, William Walker, condemned this act as a murder of innocent villagers.24 The Recak massacre alarmed the Contact Group to take more effective measures against Belgrade. After their meeting on January 22, 1999, they decided to bring the Serbian government and the Albanian leaders to the negotiating table. The direct negotiations, supported by NATO, started in Rambouillet (France), and continued between 6 and 17 February 1999. A compromise was not possible because the gap between the expectations of Kosovo Albanians and Belgrade was too wide (great). Belgrade refused any kind of NATO presence in Kosovo while the Albanians demanded independence.25 The international community decided to put pressure on both sides in order to increase the likelihood of a reconciliation by taking into consideration their insistence of the initial negotiating positions. Otherwise, the result would be as the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright pointed out in a press conference: "If the Albanians do not accept the agreement, the international community will not be able to help them. But in case the Serbs reject the agreement then we will have to takemilitary measures”. 26 The renegotiation or second round of negotiations between the parties started on March 15, 1999, where the international community had a concept of the draft agreement. Accor- ding to the draft agreement, Kosovo would have its self-government (president, assembly) but the territorial integrity of Serbia would be also guaranteed. After three years, an international conference would be organised to decide the status of Kosovo. Kosovar leaders accepted this draft agreement, but Miloševič refused. As the international community had warned earlier, Miloševič's rejection of the agreement paved the way for NATO to launch a military operation against Serbia.27 During this critical period, Turkish diplomacy was active in attempts to achieve a peaceful solution of the problem. On March 8, 1998 Ismail Cem visited Belgrade and conveyed the concerns of the

24 “World: Europe Racak killings: Who says what? “, 22.01.1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/259835.stm, [12.01.2021]. 25Sait Akşit, Mustafa Türkeş , “International Engagement, Transformation of the Kosova Question and Its Implications”, The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, 38, (2007), p. 79-114, p. 91. 26Sulimani, op.cit., 75. 27Enika Abazi, “The Role of International Community in Conflict Situation. Which Way Forwards? The Case of the Kosovo/a Conflict”, Balkanologie, 8/1, (2004), p.9- 31, p. 29. 102

C E N T R U M 15 Turkish government about the danger of this conflict which could threaten the security and stability of the Balkans if the bloodshed in Kosovo would not be stopped. Cem proposed the implementation of the education agreement reached in 1996. Former Turkish Ambassador in Belgrade, Alev Kiliç, claimed that after the proposal of the Turkish Foreign Minister, the Yugoslav government agreed to take necessary steps soon.28 During this visit, İsmail Cem did not visit Prishtina, per- haps not to give an image of supporting the independence of Kosovo.29 Despite these attempts by the Turkish government, Serbs did not react positively. President Miloševič stated that the situation in Kosovo could be resolved only within the framework of the Yugoslav constitution and laws, and he pointed out that "No one should interfere in our country."30 The bloodshed in Kosovo was not stopped despite numerous efforts by various actors, including Turkey.31 Meanwhile, the conflict between the Serbian paramilitary forces and KLA guerrillas became more intensive. In the meeting of the Contact Group on March 25, 1998, Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem was present.32 Ismail Cem had two proposals: the creation of a Balkan Peacekeeping Force which would act if the situation in Kosovo escalated. And the second proposal was the mobilization of the interna- tional community to help Macedonia and Albania in any potential crises they might face. Turkey feared the escalation and spread of the conflict in the whole region. The conflict in Kosovo could also provoke a conflict in Macedonia, where one third of the population was Albanian. This would result in the disintegration of Macedonia, which was seen as аn important ally for Turkey in the region. These proposals of Cem was not taken into consideration by the other members of the meeting.33 The US proposed to start the military sanctions immediately. Russia refused this proposal and promised to support a proposal for a comprehensive embargo by the UN on the Miloševič government. This

28“Kosova'daki kanı durdurun”, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/kosovadaki-kani- durdurun-39009126, 09.03.1998, [14.01.2021]. 29DemirtaşCoşkun, op.cit, p. 61. 30 Ibid. 31 “Dışişler Bakanlığı Tarihçesi -1998”, http://diad.mfa.gov.tr/diad/tarihce/1998- 2.pdf, p. 240-241, [15.01.2021]. 32 “Sırplarabir ay süre”, 26.03.1998, https://www.milliyet.com.tr/dunya/sirplara-bir-ay-sure-5365823,[15.01.2021]. 33 Fuat Aksu, “Kosova Krizinde Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası”, YDÜ Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, 3/1, (Nisan 2010), p. 51-89, p. 65. 103

C E N T R U M 15 resulted with an embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the Security Council of the UN.34 During the conflict in Kosovo, Turkey supported military the Republic of Macedonia. Additionally, Turkish and Macedonian gover- nments negotiated on the training of Macedonian pilots in Turkey and the delivery of 20 F-5 planes to the Macedonian army in June 1998.35 Turkey also contributed to the NATO naval force positioned in the port of Durres (Albania).36

4. TURKEY'S FEAR OF SPILL-OVER EFFECT OF KOSOVO'S WAR IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

The Turkish government was concerned about a possible spread of the conflict in the region and this was seen as a threat for Turkish strategic interests in the Balkans. The spill-over effect of the conflict in the region would firstly endanger the existence of Turks and other Muslim communities due to importance of religious and cultural ties for Turkish foreign policy towards the Balkans. Traditionally, Turkey cared about the fate of the Balkan Turks and other communities who suffered heavily during the times of political conflicts in the region (1912-1913, 1930s, 1950s etc.).37These conflicts caused the migration of communities with Islamic religious affiliation from the Balkans which sought shelter in Turkey. The last examples were the expulsion of Turks from Bulgaria in 198938, and the Bosnians escaping from the massacres of the paramilitary forces of the Miloševič regime. Additionally, Ahmet Davutoğlu emphasizes the significance of strengthening stability and the influence of Bosniaks and Albanians in the region in terms of achieving Turkey’s foreign policy goals and

34https://www.un.org/press/en/1998/19980331.SC6496.html, [15.01.2021]. 35 Sylvie Gangloff, “Turkish policy towards the conflict in Kosovo: the preeminence of national political interests”, Balkanologie, Vol.8, No.1, June 2004, https://journals .openedition.org/balkanologie/517#tocto1n2. 36 Gangloff, “Turkish policy towards the conflict in Kosovo”. 37 Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu, Doğu Rumeli’de Kayıp Köyler: İslimye Sancağı’nda Göçler, İsim Değişikleri ve Harabeler (Istanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 2008), pp. 28-66. 38 Neriman Ersoy Hacısalihoğou, Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu (eds.), 89 Göçü. Bulgaristan’da 1984-89 Azınlık Politikaları ve Türkiye’ye Zorunlu Göç (Istanbul: BALKAR & BALMED, 2012. For sufferings of Turks in Bulgaria see particularly: Neriman Ersoy Hacısalihoğlu, “1984-1985 İsim Değiştirme Meselesi ve Uygulamaları”, op. cit., pp. 171-198. 104

C E N T R U M 15 strategic interests in the Balkans. According to Davutoğlu, increasing the security of the populations living in the region, protecting their cultural identity, strengthening their economic and social infrastructure will make Turkey strong in both the conjuncture of peace and the conjuncture of tension.39 Lastly, the importance of the geostrategic position of this region, particularly International European route e-75, which represents a land connection of Turkey (through ) to Europe, should be underli- ned. This route is particularly important for the mobility of Turkish citizens from Europe to Turkey and vice versa, as well as for the transfer of goods. Any conflict in Macedonia and beyond in the region would endanger the trade route which automatically would harm the Turkish economy. During the Kosovo conflict, the Turkish government tried to be in contact and close cooperation with other Balkan countries. On April 16-17, 1998 a Balkan summit was organised in Antalya with the participation of Turkey, and Bulgaria. In this summit, there were presidents, foreign and interior ministers, who discussed the issue of Kosovo. Apart from the Kosovo issue, the discussions also focused on terrorism, , drugs, weapons and human trafficking.40 The three countries jointly expressed their readiness to continue their discussions with the Contact Group. They stated that borders of the states in the Balkans, are inviolable. Any measure which would be taken by relevant international actors toward the Federal Republic of Yugo- slavia, requires to take into account the political and economic stability of the countries in the region. Lastly, they declared that “A lasting solution for the Kosovo issue should be reached through peaceful and constructive dialogue between the stakeholders. The solution should be based on the full protection of human rights in Kosovo according to the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki principles and the standards of the OSCE”.41

39 Ahmet Davutoǵlu, Stratejik Derinlik. Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu, 12th ed. (Istanbul: KüreYayınları, 2003), pp. 316-322. 40 “Balkanlar Antalya'da”, 17.04.1998, http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/1998/04/17/r03.html, [08.01.2021]. 41 “Joint Statement Issued After a Meeting of the Presidents of Turkey, Bulgaria And Romania (Antalya, 16-17 April 1998) April 20,1998”, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/joint- statement-issued-after-a-meeting-of-the-presidents-of-turkey_-bulgaria-and- romania-_antalya_-16-17-april-1998__br_april-20__1998.en.mfa, [10.01.2021]. 105

C E N T R U M 15 Another event in which Kosovo was the topic of discussion was the international meeting at the level of the Foreign Ministers of the South East European Countries held on June 8-9, 1998 in Istanbul. The states that participated in this event were Greece, Albania, Macedonia, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Turkey. The observers of this meeting were the representatives of France, Germany, Italy, Russian Federation, , European Commission, , NATO, OSCE, UN, World Bank, BSEC, Central European Initiative, Royaumont Process and Southeast European Cooperation Initiative.42 Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem as a representative of the host country made the opening speech pointing out his concern about the critical situation of Kosovo. According to Cem,“the violent conflicts in Kosovo should be stopped immediately and a lasting solution should be found before it becomes too late. All countries in the region should act with great responsibility”.43 The representatives of other countries also expressed their concern about ongoing violence and deterioration of the situation in Kosovo. They also declared their readiness to cooperate with the international organizations to find a solution for the Kosovo conflict.44 It is noteworthy that Turkey aimed to overcome the crisis by reaching a solution within the framework of the international commu- nity. This meant that priority should be given to dialogue, but in case it has no effect, military intervention headed by NATO alliance was not excluded.

42 “Final Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of South East European Countries Istanbul Declaration On Good-Neighbourly Relations, Stability, Security and Cooperation in South Eastern European Countries 09 June 1998”, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/final-meeting-of-the-ministers-of_-foreign-affairs-of-south- east-european-countries-istanbul-declaration-on-good-neighbourly-relations_- stability_-security-and-cooperation-in-south-eastern-european-countries_br_09- june-1998.en.mfa, [16.01.2021]. 43 “The Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Countries of South Opening Statement by Mr. İsmail Cem, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey 8-9 June, 1998”, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-meeting-of-the-ministers-of- foreign-affairs-of-countries-of-south-eastern-europe-_br_opening-statement-by-mr_- ismail-cem_-foreign-minister-of-the-republic-of-turkey_br_8-9-june_-1998.en.mfa, [16.01.2021]. 44 “Final Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of South East European Countries Chairman´s Summary on the Situation in Kosovo June 9,1998”, http://www .mfa.gov.tr/final-meeting-of-the-ministers-of-foreign-affairs-of-south-east-european- countries_br_chairman_s-summary-on-the-situation-in-kosovo_br_june- 9__1998_br_.en.mfa, [16.01.2021]. 106

C E N T R U M 15 Turkish diplomacy was actively committed to the issue of Koso- vo. On October 2, 1998, Turkish President Süleyman Demirel went to Macedonia for an official visit. Demirel expressed his concerns that in case of deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, Macedonia would feel the biggest consequences. That's why the international community should try to find a quick solution for the conflict. While, on the other hand, the President of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov, also called for the quick solution of the Kosovo issue, he expected a solution based on preserving the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and respecting the rights of minorities.45 This visit expressed the support of Turkey for Macedonia in case of escalation of the Kosovo conflict in the region. On the other hand, Turkey wanted to secure also the existence of the other Muslim communities (Albanians, Turks, Bosnians, Roma people) in Macedonia by improving relations with the Macedonian government. The next event in which the Kosovo conflict was discussed was the Summit of the South-Eastern European Countries' Heads of States and Governments held on October 12-13, 1998 in Antalya. This summit was important because it achieved a consensus for a joint declaration including Albania and Yugoslavia. Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz evaluated the summit as "political and diplomatic success" be- cause it had been the only international gathering where Yugoslavia and Albania achieved consensus for a joint declaration. Yilmaz once again repeated the Turkish view stating that the Kosovo issue should be sol- ved within the framework of the UN resolutions and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.46 The joint declaration called for an immediate stop of violence in Kosovo, and inauguration of immediate dialogue without preconditions. Moreover, the declaration emphasized that territorial integrity of Yugoslavia should be preserved, and a large degree of autonomy and self-government for Kosovo should be granted. 47

45 “President Demirel in Macedonia- Official contacts between Demirel and Gligorov concluded - Cooperation agreements signed between the two countires”, 03.10.1998, http://www.hri.org/news/turkey/anadolu/1998/98-10-03.anadolu.html#01, [16.01.2021]. 46 “Balkan countries summit- Prime Minister Yılmaz : “’Antalya summit is successful as Kosovo question has been discussed in an atmosphere where Yugoslavia partici- pates’”, 13.10.1998, http://www.hri.org/news/turkey/anadolu/1998/98-10-13.anadolu .html#03, [17.01.2021]. 47 “Yugoslavia joins Balkan nations in common position on Kosovo”, 14.10.1198, http://www.hri.org/news/turkey/trkpr/1998/98-10-14.trkpr.html#12, [17.01.2021]. 107

C E N T R U M 15 Despite the adoption of ajoint statement in Antalya, clashes between the Serbian paramilitary forces and the KLA continued as before. After this conference, at the end of December 1998, the Turkish Foreign Ministry, through the press release, called on parties involved in the conflict "to cease fighting immediately". Turkey stressed that the long-term peace in Kosovo should be achieved by providing rights to all people based on the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974.48 The restora- tion of the Constitution of 1974 meant securing the autonomy of Koso- vo while preserving the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. Although the attempts of the Turkish representatives did not have any direct effect on the ongoing conflict, they were among the factors encouraging NATO to intervene into the conflict.49

5. PARTICIPATION OF TURKEY IN THE NATO OPERATION IN KOSOVO AND REFUGEE CARE

All efforts by the international community to persuade Serbia for resolution of the Kosovo conflict by peaceful means failed. Serbia con- tinued to ignore the calls by the international and regional actors. Fina- lly, in 1999, international peace monitors evacuated Kosovo and NATO started to prepare a military intervention to stop the crimes of the Miloševič regime in Kosovo. Turkey as a member of NATO was part of this initiative. Without waiting for a resolution by the UN Security Council, NATO under the leadership of the US, started the air campaign called “Operation Allied Force” on March 24, 1999. This provoked the Ser- bian authorities to start ethnic cleansing in Kosovo where Serbian for- ces started to force the Albanian population to emigrate. The bombard- ment of strategic and military bases of Serbia continued 78 days, until the Russian representative Viktor Chernomyrdin intervened and con- vinced Miloševič to sign an agreement which was signed in Kumanovo on June 9, 1999 (Military Technical Agreement between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). On the same day, the UNSC accepted

48Eylem Altunya, “The Kosovo Crisis and Turkey (1991-2001)” (PhD thesis, Bilkent University, Institute of Economics and Social Sciences, Ankara, September 2003), p. 119. 49Gencer Özcan wrote in 1997 that during the war in Bosnia, Turkey was always the protagonist that complained about Belgrade within the international community, Özcan, “Türkiye’nin Balkan Politikasına İlişkin Düşünceler”, 167-168. 108

C E N T R U M 15 the Resolution 1244 supporting the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s acceptance of the principles for a political solution of the conflict. According to this resolution, the violence would stop immediately, the Serbian military forces and police would withdraw from Kosovo and an international civil and security presence in the region with NATO participation would be established.50 Before the NATO operation, the Albanian Prime Minister Pandeli Majko, paid an official visit to Ankara, on March 2-3, 1999. Majko had meetings with Turkish President President Süleyman Demirel, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit and the Commander of Armed Forces, General Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu. The topic of discussion was the resolution of the Kosovo crisis and protection ofAlbania against a possible Serbian attack. The Turkish government promised the Albanian leadership for comprehensive military support in accordance with developments on the ground.51 The NATO intervention without a resolution by the UNSC can be justified with the failure of the international community to prevent genocide in the war of Bosnia. The leaders of NATO countries did not want to make the same mistake as in Bosnia, namely to react late after a genocide. On the other hand, the Western powers were aware by the near past that Milošević‘s government would never accept any solution voluntarily. Finally, the NATO forces started Operation Allied Force on March 24, 1999, by bombing Serbia's strategic military points. 112 US aircrafts and 102 aircrafts from other NATO countries including Turkey took part in this operation.52 On the first day of the operation, Turkish Foreign Ministry made a declaration legitimizing the NATO air operation and the Turkish participation in it. According to this declaration, the Milošević regime was responsible for the conflict since it did not cooperate with the international community. In Kosovo, the violence was increasing and the huge number of displaced refugees added a serious dimension of humanitarian tragedy to the issue. For Turkey, it was above all a humanitarian duty to be a part of the "Operation Allied Force". Turkey

50 “Kosovo Air Campaign, Operation Allied Force”, https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/ natohq/topics_49602.htm, [13.01.2021]. 51Hajro Limaj, Midis Ankarasë dhe Tiranës: 1990-2000: Nga Ditari i Një Atasheu Ushtarak, (Tiranë:Emal, 2012), p. 178-180. 52 Rebecca Grant, “The Kosovo Campaign: Aerospace Power Made It Work”, An Air Force Association Special Report, (1999), p. 8. 109

C E N T R U M 15 had historical, humanitarian and cultural ties with the region and was interested in maintaining peace and stability in the region. Therefore, it gave full support to the NATO Council's decision for military operation as a NATO member.53This position of Turkey was also confirmed by the Turkish National Security Council.54 After the beginning of the NATO operation, the Serbian army in northern Albania bombed the territory several times with artillery. By taking into account this situation on March 29, 1999, Albanian Prime Minister Majko demanded Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit to make a statement for the media expressing the support of Turkey in protection of the sovereignty of Albania.55 Thereupon Ecevit declared that “the Turkish state and the Armed Forces of Turkey are alongside the brother Albanian people and will not allow anyone to touch the borders and territorial integrity of Albania. If it’s necessary, Turkey together with Albania will defend the sovereignty and integrity of Albania and Albanian people”. 56 During this period, Turkey sent the necessary military equipment to the Albanian army.57 During the NATO military operations, Turkey participated in the beginning with 11 F-16 fighter jets on air defence operations, and one frigate in the . Then, in May 1999 the number of Turkish jets increased to 18.58 The duties of the Turkish fighter jets were not only limited to air defence but also they participated in bombing operations in Yugoslavia.59 The total flight time of the Turkish jets was

53 “Press Release Regarding the NATO Air Operations Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia March 24, 1999”, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/press-release-regarding-the- nato-air-operations-against-the-_br_federal-republic-of-yugoslavia_br_march-24_- 1999.en.mfa, [18.01.2021]. 54Müge Kınacıoğlu and Aylin G. Gürzel, “Turkey’s Contribution to NATO’s Role in Post–Cold War Security Governance: The Use of Force and Security Identity Formation”, Global Governance, 19/4 (August 2013), pp. 589–610, p.600. 55 “Kosova e vitit 1999, Turqia gati trupat të ndërhyjë ushtarakisht”, 18.03.2013, https://telegrafi.com/kosova-e-vitit-1999-turqia-gati-trupat-te-nderhyje-ushtarakisht/, [22.01.2021]. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 Ali Balcı, Türkiye Dış Politikası, İlkeler, Aktörler, Uygulamalar, (İstanbul: Etkileşim Yayınları, 2013), p. 224. 59Mehmet Akif Sabuncu, “NATO’nun Yugoslavia’yi Bombalama”, 06.04.2019, https://www.gazetebilkent.com/natonun-yugoslavyayi-bombalamasi/, [17.01.2021]. 110

C E N T R U M 15 over 2000 hours.60 Turkey also contributed to the supply of food and water to the region.61 On April 27, 1999, Turkey opened the airports of Balıkesir, Bandırma, and Çorlu.62 Turkey was also ready in case of ground operations by NATO for which a battalion of a mechanized unit and an armoured unit was composed.63 During the military intervention, the expulsion of the Albanian population by the Serbian forces became more intensive. The number of refugees increased tremendously. Neighbour states Macedonia and Albania were overpopulated with refugees. Turkey also took active part in refugee care through the Turkish Red Crescent that has done important contributions in this field. They constructed refugee camps in Macedonia and Albania. Around 6400 refugees were sheltered in these camps. 18000 Kosovo refugees came to Kırklareli, to the refugee camp “Gaziosmanpaşa.”64 The same camp was used in 1989 for the Turkish refugees from Bulgaria.65 The Turkish government declared the bro- therhood between Turks and Albanians repeatedly during this crisis. After declaring that Turkey would be ready to shelter 20,000 refugees from Kosovo, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit pointed out the follo- wing:“This is a humanitarian duty. The Albanians and Turks from Ko- sovo are our brothers and our relatives”.66 Turkish President Süleyman Demirel made visits to the refugee camps and accused Serbs of committing genocide against the Albanian people. Demirel declared

60 Ahmet Çevikbas, ”Müttefik Güç Harekâtı İnsani Müdahalelerin Bir İstisnasımıdır? NATO'nun Kosova'ya Yönelik Harekâtının Uluslararası Hukuk ve Askeri Bakış Açılarından Değerlendirilmesi”, Savunma Bilimleri Dergisi, 10/2 (Kasım 2011), p. 18-57, p. 31. 61 Ayberk Bozkurt,“Turkey as a NATO Ally in the Post-Cold War Period”, (Unpublished Master’s thesis, University of Tallinn, Programme of International Relations and European-Asian Studies, 2018), p.17. 62 İlhan Uzgel “Balkanlarla İlşkiler”, Baskın Oran (ed.), Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşı’ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt II:1980-2002, (İstanbul: İletişimYayıncılık, 2009), p.512. 63 Carol Migdalovitz, “Kosovo: Greek and Turkish Perspectives”, United States Congressional Research Service, Washington D.C., 27 May 1999, p.3 64DemirtaşCoşkun, op.cit, p.65. 65 Sedat Ergin, “Demirel ve Kosova krizi”, 14.04.1999, http://www.hurriyet. com.tr/sedat-ergin-demirel-ve-kosova-krizi-39073145, [23.11.2018]. 66 Christiane Amanpour, “NATO nations to take in Kosovo refugees: U.S., Turkey, Germany offer temporary asylum”, 04.04.1999, http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9904/04/kosovo.refugees.02/index.html, [20.01.2021]. 111

C E N T R U M 15 that Miloševič would be responsible for war crimes and he would not achieve his goals in Kosovo. In this way, the Turkish government gave moral support to the Kosovo Albanians. President Demirel appointed Ahmet Acet as ambassador in Belgrade and special representative for Kosovo. The ambassador duty was to forward the messages of the Turkish President regarding the supply of necessary things for the refugees to Albanian and Macedonian governments. Meanwhile,Turkish Foreign Minister Cem attended the meeting of foreign ministers of EU countries together with the members of the international charitable organizations in Luxembourg to plan humanitarian help for Kosovo refugees.67 The Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov appreciated Turkey for providing help for care of Koso- var refugees in Macedonia. He also pointed out that Turkey was the only NATO country which maintained its promise for refugee care.68 President Demirel addressed the US President Bill Clinton with an official letter about the drama of Kosovo Albanians, on April 6, 1999. Demirel pointed out that “as we continue together with the decisive steps toward this issue, at the same time we need to take urgent measures against the human catastrophe as a result of Miloševič's policies of ethnic cleansing. For this reason, it is necessary to act swiftly to ease the pain of innocent people who have fallen victim to inhumane crimes”.69 In this way, Turkey also acted as an agent to mobilise the world for the victims of the Milošević regime. The active role and contribution of Turkey in the NATO operation during this conflict was not unnoticed. During the meeting of leaders of the NATO countries in the US on occasion of NATO's 50th anniversary, US President Bill Clinton, expressed gratitude to Turkey for all efforts made as a NATO member. President Bill Clinton pointed out that “Alliance had a determinant position regarding the issue of Kosovo. Turkey's role and leadership in this regard are an example for our allies. Turkey's rapid response in helping refugees has gained great appreciation in USA and in the rest of the world. We will continue to cooperate closely on the

67 “Balkanlar'a Demirel damgası”, 08.04.1999, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/ balkanlara-demirel-damgasi-39072184, [15.01.2021]. 68 “Sadece Türkiye sözünü tutu”, 10.04.1999, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya /sadece-turkiye-sozunu-tuttu-39072534, [16.1.2021]. 69Limaj, op. cit.,196. 112

C E N T R U M 15 issue of Kosovo”. 70 The Kosovo intervention by NATO led to the collapse of the Milošević regime and enabled a new period of normalisation of relations in the Balkans.71

6. PARTICIPATION OF TURKEY IN THE INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION AND SECURITY FORCES IN KOSOVO

The NATO military intervention put an end to the brutal regime of Miloševič in Kosovo. The UN Security Council adopted the Resolution 1244 and with this resolution, the administration of Kosovo was given to the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).72 With the decision of the UN Security Council, NATO states formed a multinational peacekeeping force KFOR (Koso- vo Force). KFOR entered Kosovo on June 12, 1999. UNMIK (United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo) started its rule in Kosovo on July 1, 1999.73 On the initiative of the Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan established the group "Friends of Kosovo" consisting of 16 countries and three international organizations to consult regularly with govern- ments and organizations to implement the mandate of UNMIK.74 Meanwhile, Turkey participated in the KFOR with 1000 soldiers who were stationed in Mamusha, Dragash and Prizren in Southwestern Kosovo with predominantly Turkish or Turkish speaking population.

70 “Clinton'dan, Demirel'e Kosova için 'teşekkür'“, http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/1999 /06/05/g07.html, [16.01.2021]. 71 Sabine Willenberg, “Die Beziehungen zwischen Serbien und Bosnien & Herze- gowina durch das ‘Brennglas Kosovo’”, Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen, 47/5-6 (2007), pp. 7-21, p. 10. 72Xhihat Aliju, Sibel Vezaj, "NATO'nun Yugoslavya'yı bombalamasının 19. yılı", 24.03.2018, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/natonun-yugoslavyayi-bombalamasinin- 19-yili/1098051, [17.01.2021]. 73 Peter Bartl, “Kosovo”, Lexikon zur Geschichte Südosteuropas, eds. Edgar Hösch, Karl Nehring, Holm Sundhaussen, (Viyana, Köln, Weimer: Böhlau Verlag, 2004), pp. 378-381. 74 “Secretary-General holds high-level “Friends of Kosovo” meeting on UN efforts to rebuild shattered province", https://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/secretary-general- holds-high-level-friends-kosovo-meeting-un-efforts-rebuild-shattered; “Daily press briefing of office of spokesman for Secretary General”, https://www.un.org/press/en/1999/19990625.DB062599.html , [17.01.2021]. 113

C E N T R U M 15 Around 100 Turkish policemen also participated in the Interim Civil Administration of Kosovo.75 The Turkish military mission in Kosovo as a peacekeeping force was regarded as a return of Turkey for the first time in Kosovo after the retreat of Turkish military forces during the Balkan Wars 86 years ago. The transport of Turkish military through the Balkan countries caused reactions and critics in some Balkan countries. When the first Turkish contingent under the command of Brigadier General Mehmet Ali Erdoğan arrived in Prizren, the inhabitants of Prizren, consisting mostly of local Turks, greeted the Turkish military convoy festively.76 The Turkish army was accommodated in a soldier barracks named "Sultan Murad Barracks" remembering the Ottoman Sultan who was killed in 1389 during the Kosovo Polje Battle and was buried there. The Serbian side perceived this as a second Turkish invasion in the region. Turkish military units in Kosovo started to organize different cultural and educational activities, helped the construction of the destroyed schools, and made various donations starting from books, clothes and food products for the citizens of the region. In this way, Turkish military missions contributed enormously to the improvement of the image of Turkey in Kosovo.77 Another unit of 163 Turkish soldiers were additionally stationed in Albania to help to the Kosovar Albanian refugees there.78 KFOR and UNMIK continue their work present day, but after the independence of Kosovo on 17 February 2008 and the adoption of a new constitution, UNMIK's functions decreased. The responsibilities of KFOR were partly transferred to the after its establish- ment on January 1, 2009. After the declaration of Kosovo’s independence on February 17, 2008, Turkey was among the first countries recognising the indepen- dence of Kosovo.Costa Rica (17.2.2008), USA, France, Afghanistan,

75 Caner Sancaktar, “Türkiye'nin Balkanlar Politikası:1990 Sonrası Balkan Acılımı”, (ed) Hasret Çomak, Caner Sancaktar, Türk Dış Politikasında Yeni Yönelim- ler(İstanbul: Beta BasımYayım, 2013), 669-670. 76 “86 yılsonraPrizren'de", https://www.yenisafak.com/arsiv/1999/temmuz/05/ dishaber/dis1.html; “Türk Askerinin Kosova'da Karşılanması – 1999”; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cxw-rdYZfeY&ab_channel=EvrimYOK, [18.01.2021]. 77 Sancaktar, op.cit, 669-670. 78Altunya, op. cit., p. 134. 114

C E N T R U M 15 Albania, Turkey, United Kingdom (England) (18.2.2008). Turkey continued to support the recognition of the independence of Kosovo and lobbied for this purpose with different diplomatic means.79 The relations between Turkey and Kosovo since 1999 are not characterised, however, only with positive developments. One of the issues is the status of the Turkish language in Kosovo, which prior to 1999 was one of the official languages. But the new statute of Kosovo prepared by Bernard Kouchner - Kosovo representative of UNMIK, on 25.07.1999 did not accept the Turkish language among the official languages. This caused dissatisfaction among the Turkish population in Kosovo and in Turkey.80Another important issue is that the Albanian leadership in Kosovo do not believe in the constitutional principle of “multi-ethnic” state and there is permanent assimilation pressure over the Turkish minority with the claim that they are not of Turkish origin, but they are Albanians even if they use Turkish language. This increases the dissatisfaction of the Turkish minority in Kosovo. Another sensitive topic is the presentation of the Ottoman history in the history textbooks of Kosovo. The anti-Ottoman and anti-Turkish propaganda in the history textbooks inherited from the Socialist period continues in the history textbooks of Kosovo and the Turkish demands for changing the textbooks have been ignored by the Kosovar authorities.81

CONCLUSION

The post-Cold War period created space for an active approach of Turkish diplomacy to the neighbouring countries. One of the promi- nent examples among them was the Balkan region. The Balkan region, more specifically the geography of the former Yugoslav federation, in the 1990s faced with a series of successive conflicts in which the intervention of the international community was necessary. It started in

79 Halis Ayhan, “Kosova’nın Bağımsızlığı Sürecinde Uluslararası Güçlerin ve Türkiye’nin Tutumu”, Avrasya Etüdleri, 33/2008-1, pp. 113-134. 80Kader Özlem, Türkiye’nin Balkan Türkleri Politikası (1991-2014) (Bursa: Dora, 2016), pp. 300-308; İbrahim Üstün, “1999 Etnik Çatışmalar Sonrası Birleşmiş Milletler (UNMIK-United Nations Mission in Kosovo) Geçici Yönetiminde Kosova’nın Durumu”, Atatürk Dergisi, 4/2 (2004), pp. 295-309, https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/26128 81 Fatih Fuat Tuncer, “Kosova Güncel Tarih Ders Kitaplarında Osmanlı/Türk İmajı”, Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu (ed.), Balkan ve Karadeniz Ülkelerinde Güncel Tarih Ders Kitaplarında Osmanlı/Türk İmajı (Istanbul: YTÜ BALKAR, 2020), pp. 183-226. 115

C E N T R U M 15 Slovenia and Croatia, continued in Bosnia and ended in Kosovo. All these conflicts were generated by the regime of Slobodan Milošević who practiced the nationalist rhetoric and used the Yugoslav cause to keep the unity of Serbs in one state. This policy caused massive human costs and economic consequences to the Balkan region. The international community taking into account the experiences in the previous conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia, closely followed the circumstances in the Kosovo War. A series of diplomatic attempts were made to end the conflict in Kosovo but failed as a result of the Milošević regime's lack of co-operation. The last initiative was NATO's "Opera- tion Allied Force", which ended in the aggression of Serbian forces. Turkish diplomacy aligned with the international community had an active approach to the Balkans in the Bosnian conflict (1992-1995), Albania's civil war as a result of the collapse of financial pyramid schemes (1997), and lastly in the conflict of Kosovo. By elaborating the issues discussed in the paper, it can be said that Turkey during the Kosovo War, in an attempt to find a satisfactory solution for both parties, has held a series of bilateral meetings with various parties in the region but also has been active on international platforms dealing with the Kosovo issue. When diplomacy could not achieve the expected result, Turkey, as a member of NATO, encouraged a military intervention and joined the "Operation Allied Force" opera- tion, which was successful in ending the war. It is worth noting that during the conflict, Turkish humanitarian diplomacy provided assistan- ce to a large number of Kosovo refugees in Albania and Macedonia through the Red Crescent but also by providing shelter to refugees, Turkey received recognition from the international community. In addition to the historical, cultural and kinship elements, it can be concluded that the national interests were decisive that "obliged" Turkish diplomacy to be present and active during this conflict. Prolon- ged extension and expansion of the conflict would also mean a possible blockage of the European route E-75 which is crucial for the movement of people and goods from Turkey to Europe and vice versa. The second factor had to do with the protection of the Turkish community in the Balkan region. The extension of this conflict would endanger the exis- tence of Turks in the Balkan countries. This meant that Turkey would lose an important factor of her presence in the region. And finally, from the strategic point of view, - as Ahmet Davutoglu emphasizes in his book - achievement of Turkish foreign policy goals in the Balkans goes

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C E N T R U M 15 through the strengthening of the position of Bosniaks and Albanians in the region. Only in this way, Turkey will be at peace in its geography. This active approach of Turkish diplomacy continued in the post- conflict period by participating in the KFOR peacekeeping mission and playing an active role in lobbying for the recognition of Kosovo's independence on various international platforms.

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