Soldiers jump with Finnish, Polish, and Estonian special operations forces from Lockheed C-130 Hercules during airborne operations over Rovaniemi, Finland, as part of Finnish-led Northern Griffin, March 14, 2018 (U.S. Army/Kent Redmond)
Beyond the Gray Zone Special Operations in Multidomain Battle
By James E. Hayes III
n their quest to alter the post–Cold tional, economic, political, and tech- on land, at sea, in the air, and through- War world order, revisionist nations nological means to achieve their objec- out the electromagnetic spectrum.1 I such as Russia, China, and Iran are tives, often while remaining below the MDB’s animating principle, therefore, increasing their military capabilities to threshold of a decisive U.S. response. is the employment of ground forces to challenge the traditional U.S. suprem- To counter this new threat paradigm, gain temporary windows of advantage acy in arms. These potential adversaries the U.S. Army and Marine Corps have against a near-peer foe in order to are also linking their growing military developed a joint operational approach enable other components of the U.S. power to a willingness to employ it in known as multidomain battle (MDB). joint force. an integrated fashion with informa- Although it remains in the conceptual In their evolution of the MDB con- phase, both Services envision MDB cept, Army and Marine senior leaders as the combined arms concept for the assume that U.S. special operations forces 21st century based on the assumption (SOF) will play a critical, albeit currently Colonel James “Jamie” E. Hayes III, USA, is Chief of Staff in the Deputy Directorate for Special that future near-peer adversaries will undefined, role. This is a valid assump- Operations at the Joint Staff J3. contest U.S. superiority in all domains: tion given the lessons learned from the
60 Features / Beyond the Gray Zone JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 past 15 years of combat in Afghanistan operate jointly at the tactical level to influ- are unconventional warfare and foreign and Iraq, not the least of which is the ence the human domain for strategic and internal defense. Like opposite sides of idea that conventional and SOF forma- operational effects that truly sets it apart. a coin, unconventional warfare entails tions must operate in an integrated SOF’s broad range of missions dictates the employment of SOF to support an and interdependent manner in order to the need for small, purpose-built task indigenous resistance movement against ensure success on the modern battle- forces consisting of ground, maritime, a hostile power, whereas foreign internal field. Integration and interdependence and air elements optimized to engage in defense calls for SOF operators and con- lie at the heart of MDB, as the concept the irregular, population-centric conflicts ventional forces alike to assist a friendly envisions SOF conducting activities in occupying the contested space between government in defeating an insurgency or support of conventional forces and vice war and peace. This space, known col- other forms of domestic lawlessness. versa. But what specifically should we loquially as the Gray Zone, has become As mentioned, both the direct and expect SOF to do within the context of the focus of SOF’s recent efforts against indirect sides of SOF outlined in the MDB? What unique function could SOF terrorism and insurgency across the value propositions are important to the play in assisting the joint force to counter globe and has increasingly defined its conduct of operations in the Gray Zone. this new threat paradigm? raison d’être when compared to conven- However, only those activities focused tional forces.3 on the human domain in contested or Current Value U.S. Army Special Operations denied environments are truly unique to Perhaps the best point of departure Command further refines this under- SOF and not duplicated by conventional for envisioning SOF’s potential role in standing of SOF’s role in Gray Zone forces. For example, a U.S. Marine MDB is to examine what they currently conflict with the following value proposi- Expeditionary Unit possesses the capabil- offer the joint force. To that end, Joint tions: precision targeting operations, ity to conduct direct action and other Publication 3-05, Special Operations, crisis response, indigenous approach, and crisis response–focused missions and, provides a comprehensive definition of developing understanding and wielding under certain circumstances, may be bet- SOF characteristics: influence.4 While originally crafted to ter suited to the task than an equivalent showcase Army SOF’s strategic value to SOF formation. On the other hand, only Special operations require unique modes the Nation, these propositions can be SOF are specifically trained and equipped of employment, tactics, techniques, pro- generally applied to special operations for joint operations to advise, assist, and cedures, and equipment. They are often units from the other Services as well. employ local resistance fighters and other conducted in hostile, denied, or politically The first two value propositions—pre- irregular forces to act in support of U.S. and/or diplomatically sensitive environ- cision targeting operations and crisis interests. This optimization for operat- ments, and are characterized by one or response—address the more well-known ing with indigenous partner forces in the more of the following: time sensitivity, components of SOF such as unilateral di- Gray Zone is what makes SOF “special” clandestine or covert nature, low visibil- rect action and counterterrorism missions and consequently offers the greatest po- ity, work with or through indigenous forces, that employ exquisitely refined targeting tential for contributions to MDB. greater requirements for regional orienta- processes and highly trained, rapidly de- tion and cultural expertise, and a higher ployable and scalable formations. These SOF and the Physics of MDB degree of risk. Special operations provide capabilities provide options for senior de- In its description of an approach for joint force commanders and chiefs of mis- cisionmakers throughout the spectrum of fighting a technologically sophisticated sion with discrete, precise, and scalable conflict, in addition to buying time and near-peer adversary, the Army’s MDB options that can be synchronized with activi- space for longer term Gray Zone activities white paper identifies multiple emerg- ties of other interagency partners to achieve to gain traction. ing enemy capabilities that will negate United States Government objectives.2 The latter propositions—indigenous traditional U.S. strengths in a future approach and developing understanding conflict. Topping this list are modern- Thus, SOF are by design organized, and wielding influence—speak to the ized integrated air defenses and long- trained, and equipped to succeed in indirect side of SOF Gray Zone opera- range precision strike capabilities that environments where the enemy may tions. They emphasize operating among provide adversaries with the ability to dominate one or more domains. This local populations as well as by, with, deny U.S. forces freedom of movement idea comports with the popular view of and through partner forces in order to while shielding theirs from preemptive special operations: namely, a small team deliver strategic and operational effects. or retaliatory strikes.5 This ability to of highly trained operators conducting Accordingly, these propositions require prevent access to a theater of operations missions in enemy-controlled territory. SOF operators who are proficient in not and then threaten forces operating there While relevant, this viewpoint does not only traditional combat skills but also undermines two longstanding tenets illustrate the totality of SOF capabilities, language and cultural understanding. of American warfighting: naval and air nor does it represent the unique character The mission sets that best exemplify supremacy. Since the Korean War, U.S. of SOF. Rather, it is SOF’s ability to this indirect side of Gray Zone activities ground forces have been unencumbered
JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Hayes 61 Green Berets assigned to 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Operational Detachment-A, prepare to breach entry point during close quarter combat scenario as part of Exercise 2-16 at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California, February 10, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Efren Lopez) by threats emanating from both the sea and reconnaissance (ISR) systems will with multiple dilemmas throughout the and air due to the joint force’s over- have virtual free reign of the battlespace, battlespace. whelming superiority in those domains. affording adversary commanders greater SOF contributions during the ini- Likewise, since the end of the Cold situational awareness while rendering tial phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom War, U.S. maritime forces have oper- U.S. forces blind. Combined with an offer a clear historical example of this ated with virtual impunity on the seas aggressive cyber and electronic warfare employment method and its efficacy. with no peer navy able to challenge the campaign that degrades command and During the outset of the campaign, SOF status quo. Looking forward, U.S. joint control systems, enemy formations could teams operating under the direction of force commanders will no longer enjoy paralyze U.S. joint force commanders’ the U.S.-led Combined Forces Special these longstanding advantages. U.S. air- ability to understand the operational en- Operations Component Command craft will fight to remain in, much less, vironment and direct forces to positions (CFSOCC) conducted multiple strikes control the sky. Concurrently, American of relative advantage. in all domains to set the conditions for warships will contend with sophisticated By applying their experience work- the coalition’s conventional land, mari- threats above, below, and on the surface ing in the Gray Zone, SOF can assist in time, and air components. Army special of the sea and accept losses not seen ameliorating these operational challenges operations aviators fired the first shots of since World War II in order to protect by offering other components of the joint the war to destroy Iraqi border observa- vital maritime lines of communication. force temporary windows of advantage tion posts on the country’s western and Adversaries’ growing capability to over enemy strengths. For instance, SOF southern borders, thereby depriving deny U.S. forces’ access and freedom conducting unilateral raids from the land, Saddam Hussein of his most reliable of maneuver will also lead to their sea, and air against enemy antiaccess/ early warning net.7 This action was soon dominance in the reconnaissance/coun- area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities can sup- followed by Rangers and Special Forces ter-reconnaissance fight.6 Free from U.S. port U.S. conventional forces’ freedom of infiltrating Iraq’s western desert to strikes, enemy intelligence, surveillance, maneuver while presenting an adversary conduct counter–theater ballistic missile
62 Features / Beyond the Gray Zone JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 operations. Backed by coalition airpower, cross-domain threats and, in many in- than 400 unit members), Detachment these teams conducted a series of com- stances, provide more enduring effects. 101 maintained a persistent presence plex direct-action raids that effectively Indigenous forces offer SOF and, by in Japanese-controlled Burma and, in prevented Saddam from threatening extension, the joint force commander a doing so, provided temporary windows Israel and Jordan with Scud missiles while more comprehensive understanding of of advantage to other components of the denying his ground forces access to Iraq’s the operational area and insights on the Allied joint force operating in the China- western approaches. In the Arabian Gulf, human domain that can be leveraged Burma-India theater. In support of the SEALs and their Polish SOF counterparts against an adversary. SOF teams con- Allied air component, Detachment 101 assaulted key infrastructure along the ducting unconventional warfare, unlike elements designated targets for 75 per- waterways near Al-Faw Peninsula in order their counterparts tasked with unilateral cent of the 10th U.S. Air Force bombing to secure maritime access points for coali- missions, can mass indigenous forces to missions and rescued 425 Allied airmen tion naval vessels.8 destroy enemy air and maritime A2/AD from capture.10 Additionally, Detachment In addition to direct action, SOF capabilities and then occupy those loca- 101’s fierce Kachin guerrillas raided employing their Gray Zone expertise tions in order to prevent regeneration. numerous Japanese airfields, thereby de- in MDB can assist in regaining the Due to their connection with the local grading the enemy’s air superiority from initiative in the reconnaissance/counter- populace and ability to threaten enemy the ground. Their operations to harass reconnaissance fight. SOF ground and lines of communication, SOF—paired Japanese lines of communication also maritime reconnaissance teams provide with indigenous forces—can also redirect bought time for the British 14th Army the capability to emplace persistent eyes enemy resources from opposing U.S. and other conventional Allied ground on enemy targets in order to meet joint conventional land forces to conducting a units to reform and reorganize after force commanders’ intelligence require- manpower-intensive counterinsurgency their initial setbacks, and then set the ments, thereby filling a gap left by the effort. Thus, SOF teams working in conditions for their successful counterof- loss of ISR platforms due to enemy ac- the human domain offer the joint force fensives in Burma during the latter stages tion, weather, or other adverse battlefield commander opportunities to shift battle- of the war. conditions. As necessary, these teams can field dynamics to U.S. advantage with a CFSOCC’s activities during the quickly transition from reconnaissance to minimum investment in personnel and opening phase of Operation Iraqi other missions as the battlefield situation material assets. Freedom in April of 2003 delivers a evolves, and even assist in tipping and History abounds with examples of the more recent example of SOF paired queuing airborne ISR platforms once cross-domain, force multiplication effects with indigenous forces for strategic and conditions are set for their re-introduc- of SOF operating with indigenous forces. operational effects. In contrast to the tion into the fight. Looking back to World War II, the Office unilateral operations of its southern and CFSOCC’s experience in Iraq also il- of Strategic Services (the forerunner of western task forces, CFSOCC’s Joint lustrates the value of SOF in the unilateral present day SOF and intelligence orga- Special Operations Task Force–North reconnaissance role. Special forces with nizations) fielded numerous units that (JSOTF-N) enlisted the assistance of attached Air Force combat controllers assisted resistance movements in Europe thousands of Kurdish Peshmerga fighters provided vital information on enemy and Asia. These organizations and their to achieve its objectives. JSOTF-N, while dispositions at the Karbala Gap and other locally raised counterparts gathered intel- originally envisioned as the supporting key chokepoints along the coalition axis ligence, rescued downed aircrews, and effort to a conventional land assault from of advance and continued their reporting tied up thousands of enemy troops in Turkey into northern Iraq, soon became despite sandstorms that grounded other counterguerrilla operations, all of which the only force able to take the fight to ISR assets.9 Like their direct-action breth- set the stage for conventional Allied of- Saddam’s forces in the north once the ren, these SOF derived much of their fensives against the Axis powers. Turkish government refused to grant success from previous deployments to the The Office of Strategic Services’ the Army’s Fourth Infantry Division Middle East conducting foreign internal Detachment 101 offers a powerful ex- permission to conduct operations from defense and other Gray Zone activities. ample of SOF’s cross-domain potential Turkish soil.11 Undaunted, JSOTF-N’s Their operators possessed a deep, tactile with indigenous partners. Formed in Special Forces infiltrated via Air Force understanding of the operational environ- 1942 after the Allied defeat in Burma by special operations aircraft, linked up with ment as a result of repeated interactions the Japanese Imperial Army, Detachment their Peshmerga counterparts, and then during this pre-hostilities phase and could 101 recruited and trained thousands of facilitated a follow-on parachute drop therefore exploit that knowledge once Burmese Kachin tribesmen for missions of the Army’s 173rd Airborne Brigade combat operations commenced. deep in enemy-held territory. In addition into northern Iraq. With the 173rd Unilateral operations aside, SOF to earning credit for the highest kill/ placed under the operational control of teams working by, with, and through loss ratio of any unit in U.S. military his- JSOTF-N, the combined U.S.-Kurdish indigenous surrogate forces are also tory (killing or wounding over 15,000 team quickly defeated a unit of the terror- a potent tool to counter adversary Japanese soldiers while losing fewer ist group Ansar al-Islam before turning
JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Hayes 63 Special forces launch surface-to-air missiles during training mission on Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, June 11, 2014 (U.S. Air Force/Tyler Woodward) their attention to Saddam’s forces fixed second front against Saddam’s forces. Like a veneer of legitimacy for their objec- on the Green Line separating Iraq from their predecessors in Detachment 101, tives, foment unrest in target popula- the semi-autonomous Kurdish region. JSOTF-N demonstrated the effectiveness tions, and sow distrust and discord in During the ensuing battles, JSOTF-N of massed indigenous forces striking in the Western institutions such as NATO and and their 60,000-strong Kurdish partner enemy’s rear areas. As what’s past is pro- the European Union. force attacked and defeated four Iraqi logue, today’s SOF aligned with willing Accordingly, adversary nations will divisions, thereby preventing Saddam partners can generate these same effects in employ nonkinetic, psychological effects from repositioning significant forces support of other joint force components to enhance their more traditional military to counter the coalition’s main thrust conducting MDB. capabilities, employing them in tandem against Baghdad.12 with conventional ground, maritime, and Upon closer examination, one discov- Engaging in the air forces or as the vanguard of aggres- ers that JSOTF-N’s victories in northern Nonkinetic Fight sive military action against U.S. interests. Iraq can be attributed in large part to the Carl von Clausewitz opined about the Much like their physical A2/AD systems, relationships established between SOF and distinctions between the moral and potential enemies will manipulate the in- Kurdish partners during pre-hostilities ac- physical factors in war and, in doing formation sphere to stymie the U.S. joint tivities. In fact, many of JSOTF-N’s senior so, emphasized the importance of the force’s ability to understand and shape officers and noncommissioned officers had moral over the physical.14 Recent events the operational environment. participated in Operation Provide Comfort in Ukraine, Syria, and the South China SOF’s continuous presence con- in 1991, during which SOF provided Sea illustrate that potential adversaries ducting Gray Zone activities in over 80 humanitarian relief to Kurdish refugees recognize the importance of winning countries in a given year provides the fleeing Saddam’s reprisals after his defeat the psychological battle and are willing joint force a significant psychological in the first Gulf War.13 Consequently, to devote considerable resources to that deterrent against potential adversaries and these SOF leaders leveraged the trust end. By using a combination of political can assist in regaining the initiative in the established over a decade earlier to pro- subversion, information operations, and cognitive realm.15 Prior to hostilities, SOF duce an indigenous force that opened a cyber activity, adversary nations proffer teams conduct foreign internal defense
64 Features / Beyond the Gray Zone JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 missions to enhance the combat skills (JTF-510)—later renamed Joint Special of diplomatic, informational, military, and professionalism of partner-nation Operations Task Force–Philippines—fo- and economic activities. The Russian military and paramilitary forces. As a cused on working with the U.S. country government’s ability to manipulate result, partner forces’ increased capability team and its local Philippine partners in a the information sphere is particularly to provide security raises the confidence comprehensive civil-military effort.16 In significant, as its use of propaganda, mis- of the local populace, rendering them contrast to the more kinetically focused information, social media, and deception less susceptible to the effects of adversary SOF campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, all combine to create a sense of chaos and propaganda and information operations. JTF-510 took the opposite approach due uncertainty that helps attain Russian stra- Concurrently, SOF teams training with in large part to historical Philippine sen- tegic objectives while remaining below foreign partners gain valuable insights sitivities to American troops conducting the threshold of a conventional Western on the operational environment with operations on the archipelago.17 military response.19 Accordingly, MISO respect to the human domain that can Targeting the main ASG stronghold teams are well suited to respond to this be exploited by the joint force during on the island of Basilan, JTF-510 MISO threat. By modifying tactics, techniques, subsequent combat operations against a teams established a robust information and procedures developed in the Gray near-peer adversary. operations cell with a combined team of Zone in order to legitimize the actions of SOF military information support Philippine military, U.S. Embassy public alliance partners in the Baltics and other operations (MISO) teams are yet another affairs, and host-nation media outlets. By regions threatened by Russia, information nonkinetic tool to apply against adver- employing carefully designed radio, print, warriors can fight effectively against the sary efforts to dominate the cognitive and television messages that legitimized aggressive designs of this near-peer com- realm. Trained and organized specifically the Philippine government and security petitor. Like their Russian adversaries, to influence both enemy and friendly forces, MISO operators working in the SOF MISO teams thrive in the “left of audiences, MISO teams employ a wide information operations cell comple- boom” pre-hostilities space. Their asym- array of outlets (radio, television, social mented JTF-510’s other lines of effort metric advantage, however, comes in the media) to counter enemy propaganda directed at foreign internal defense and form of integration with U.S. interagency and misinformation. MISO teams work conducting civil works projects with local community and partner-nation capabili- with U.S. country teams, partner security communities on Basilan.18 As a result, ties to deliver meaningful effects against forces, and other stakeholders to help win JTF-510 and its Philippine counterparts threat messaging. the battle of ideas and prevent adversaries effectively isolated the ASG from the from exploiting political, societal, and populace and secured Basilan from A Multidomain Tool, economic fault lines that can lead to con- Islamist extremism. Not a Panacea flict escalation. Although JTF-510’s success on The demands of the future battlefield— This ability to fight the psychologi- Basilan was in many respects a product of characterized by increased lethality, cal battle passively (SOF teams working the Philippines’ longstanding ties to the complexity, and the loss of traditional with partner security forces) and actively United States and other unique circum- U.S. supremacy in all domains—will (MISO elements conducting influence stances, it does illustrate the power of a certainly test the tactical skill and strate- operations) offers significant benefits deftly crafted SOF information opera- gic acumen of SOF operators. To maxi- to a joint force commander conducting tions campaign influencing the human mize SOF’s effectiveness in this future MDB, particularly in an environment domain for outsized effects. When placed fight, commanders must be willing to where other components are strug- against the MDB template, we can envi- accept a greater level of risk to the force gling to get into the fight. For example, sion such an effort influencing friendly than has been customary during recent SOF-trained security forces paired with audiences to resist the aggressive actions operations. We can safely assume that effective MISO can prevent adversaries of a near-peer adversary in his homeland SOF teams conducting unconventional from fomenting civil unrest at partner- and consequently buying time and space warfare and other dangerous tasks nation ports and airfields, thereby for other components of the U.S. joint against a capable and determined near- facilitating conventional U.S. ground and force to effectively respond. peer adversary will not have the same air element deployment into the theater Countering Russia’s highly developed protections afforded to their predeces- of operations. unconventional warfare capability is sors in Afghanistan and Iraq. Rather, SOF’s recent experience conducting one potential use of SOF’s expertise in SOF will most likely operate without Gray Zone activities against terrorists in the informational realm. As evidenced the benefits of routine medical evacu- the southern Philippines offers a glimpse by the recent deployments to Crimea ation and fire support, as these assets of MISO’s potential contributions to and Ukraine’s Donbas region with its may be degraded by enemy action, allo- MDB. Deployed in 2002 to assist the shadowy paramilitary fighters known cated against higher priority missions, Armed Forces of the Philippines in de- as “Little Green Men,” Russia seeks to or possess insufficient operating range feating the outlaw Islamist Abu Sayyaf undermine U.S. and Western interests to assist deployed teams. Therefore, like Group (ASG), Joint Task Force–510 through a sophisticated combination their conventional ground, maritime,
JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Hayes 65 4 ARSOF Value Propositions (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, March 12, 2016), 1. 5 Multidomain Battle, 2. 6 Ibid. 7 Leigh Neville, Special Operations Forces in Iraq (New York: Osprey Publishing, 2008), 10. 8 Ibid., 24. 9 Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen, and David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Op- eration Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 54. 10 William R. Peers and Dean Brelis, Behind the Burma Road (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1963), 24. 11 Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 78. 12 Ibid., 90. 13 Gordon Rudd, Humanitarian Interven- tion: Assisting the Iraqi Kurds in Operation Provide Comfort, 1991 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2004), 64, available at
66 Features / Beyond the Gray Zone JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018