Historically Speaking The Plains of Abraham at 250 eptember 13th marks the 250th an- By BG John S. Brown cial agriculture. By 1750, more than a Sniversary of the Battle of the Plains of U.S. Army retired million white settlers clustered along the Abraham, the decisive event leading to Atlantic seaboard, complemented by the the fall of Quebec and eventual British victory in the labor of 200,000 blacks. (also called the Seven Years’ War). , on the other hand, was better designed to Nothing less than the fate of a continent was at stake—a serve the corporate interests of France’s monarchy and struggle to be decided between two powerful nation- privileged elite. It was an extractive commercial empo- states, very different colonial philosophies and diverse rium, trading widely with the Indians for furs and other long-term prospects. portable wealth but not developing much agriculture or The British Colonies in were populous, other settled industries. Success in this area of commerce prosperous and chaotic knockoffs of the Old Country. No depended on good relations with the Indians, who proved particular effort had gone into screening immigrants. In- far more likely to become allies of the French than of the deed, many viewed the Colonies as an ideal depository for British, since the former put so little pressure on their quirky religious groups, political casualties, redeemable lands. Good relations often included intermarriage. To convicts and the indentured poor. A sizeable proportion of minimize friction, religious heretics, political dissidents women went into this mix, and the population grew dra- and the otherwise unfit were unwelcome in New France. matically as economies diversified among subsistence agri- French Huguenots were denied the option of settling there culture, commercial agriculture, cottage industries, fishing, and instead settled in the British-owned Colonies. shipping and commerce. Appropriated Dutch New York New France had a governor who actually ran things and Swedish Delaware increased ethnic diversity and col- continent-wide, whereas multiple appointees passing for laterally increased tolerance for settlers who came from governors in the British Colonies had limited venues, fre- other-than-English stock, as did requirements for labor in quent quarrels with local legislatures and plenty of second- these expanding economies. Native Americans (hereafter guessing from London. New France may have been better Indians) were generally pushed beyond the physical mar- organized than the factious British Colonies, but it was far gins of the land-hungry British Colonies. Black slaves were less populous—approximately 65,000 Frenchmen scattered imported to assist with the grueling demands of commer- in a wide arc from the Gulf of Saint Lawrence through the

The bold tactics of British Gen. James Wolfe, mortally wounded on the Plains of Abraham during the siege of Quebec in 1759, led to the fall of the city and Anglo- American expan- sion in New France. (Engraving by William Woolet, 1776, after a paint- ing by Benjamin West) ess Library of Congr

100 ARMY I September 2009 Great Lakes and Mississippi Valley to the Gulf of Mexico. Wolfe’s numerous attempts to force positions or gain ma- British Colonial population size did not readily translate neuver advantage failed for more than two months. Time into military power. Militiamen could be potent locally but was running out—winter ice would trap Wolfe’s support- did not have much capacity to project power. Expedi- ing fleet, local supplies were negligible, and wintering in tionary combat required money. The British Colonies were the open amid Indian and militia depredations could be prosperous but too chaotic and minimally taxed to gener- disastrous. After considerable reconnaissance and some de- ate reliable funding streams. New France was better off in ception, Wolfe committed to a daring stroke. During the that regard, but both major powers relied upon revenues, night of September 12–13, the bulk of his force landed be- fleets and regular soldiers from the home country to pur- neath the bluffs north of Quebec, followed a battalion of sue major operations in the New World. The French also provincial rangers up a precipitous trail they had hastily relied heavily on Native American allies. seized, and formed up in line of battle on the plateau de- Hostilities commenced in 1754 and went poorly for the scending into the city—the Plains of Abraham. Wolfe was British at first. A disastrous defeat on the Monongahela between French forces in Quebec and a sizeable French col- River drove them out of the Valley, their expe- umn that had been dispatched to monitor one of his decep- dition against fizzled, and seesaw warfare tion efforts. Montcalm, surprised but not cowed, rushed along the Lake Champlain-Lake George water route ended out of the city to attack with an approximately equal force. in the fall of Fort William Henry and the massacre of much The battlefield favored the drilled musketry at which the of its garrison in 1757. Perhaps worse, emboldened Indi- British excelled, and they employed it at close quarters with ans, at times in concert with the French and at times not, horrific effect. Both Wolfe and Montcalm were mortally ravaged the length of the frontier. Thousands of settlers wounded, but Wolfe’s subordinates were up to the tasks of were killed and tens of thousands fled in terror. finishing the fight, seizing the city and sustaining the cam- Reeling from such defeats, Britain’s forceful new prime paign. The French attempted to retake Quebec before the minister, William Pitt, resolved to invest heavily enough in British fleet could return the following spring, but failed. A the North American fighting to win it. He built up a force of British naval victory at far-off Quiberon Bay crippled 20,000 regulars potentially reinforced by 30,000 expedition- French naval power and further isolated New France. Mon- worthy militia and supported by an ample fleet. The new treal fell to converging British columns in September 1760. force combined traditional musketry and bayonet tactics with the looser light infantry sniping of the frontier. Within olfe’s bold stroke shaped a continent. The French a year the British had captured the strategic Atlantic fortress Wand Indian War presented the last clear chance that of Louisbourg, reestablished themselves in the Ohio River Native Americans had to contain Anglo-American expan- Valley and captured Fort Frontenac on . sion. Supported by such a great power as France, they Such victories would remain peripheral and indecisive, could have contested the Appalachian crossings indefi- however, as long as the twin bastions of Quebec and Mon- nitely. Once fertile, self-replicating Anglo-American agri- treal guarded the Canadian heartland along the Saint cultural communities were established in the Ohio River Lawrence River. New France was an entrepot, not a ho- Valley, however, the die was cast. The frontier crisis had mogenous realm subject to customary rules of conquest. forced such transcolonial cooperative efforts as the Albany As long as it could be resupplied—even if sporadically— Conference, and embattled colonists increasingly used the from Europe and maintained active alliances with the Indi- word Americans to identify themselves as a unique people. ans, it would be an indefinite barrier to British ambitions American officers such as COL George Washington went in the New World. With respect to the Atlantic approach, to school on the relative advantages of British and colonial the fortress of Quebec, perched on high bluffs dominating fighting techniques. Ironically, the British tried to reestab- the outlet of the Saint Lawrence, was the key terrain. lish the revenue-producing French commercial emporium In June 1759, young British Gen. James Wolfe landed in the trans-Appalachian west; this was soon swept away near Quebec with around 9,000 men, mostly regulars. He by the bumptious American mixed economic culture that was opposed by the Marquis Louis-Joseph de Montcalm was their truer legacy. ( with approximately 14,000 men, five regular battalions vastly reinforced by militia and Indians. Montcalm wisely Recommended Reading: refused open battle with the fabled British musketry. Anderson, Fred, Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War BG John S. Brown, USA Ret., was chief of military history at and the Fate of Empire in British North America, the U.S. Army Center of Military History from December 1754–1766 (New York: Knopf, 2000) 1998 to October 2005. He commanded the 2nd Battalion, 66th Borneman, Walter R., The French and Indian War: De- Armor, in Iraq and Kuwait during the Gulf War and returned ciding the Fate of North America (New York: Harper- to Kuwait as commander of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Di- Collins, 2006) vision, in 1995. He has a doctorate in history from Indiana Fuller, J.F.C., A Military History of the Western World, University. His book, Kevlar Legions: Army Transforma- Volume II (New York: Da Capo Press, 1987) tion 1989–2005, is forthcoming.

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