First published in Clark G. Reynolds (ed), Global Crossroads and the American Seas, Missoula, Montana, Pictorial Histories Publishing Co., 1988, pp. 197–219.

3 Japanese Merchant Shipping and the Bridge over the River Kwai



he publication of ’s novel The Bridge on the River Kwai and its Tsubsequent release as one of the most popular films ever made has meant that quite an obscure place and incident is well known throughout virtually all of the Western World, including Japan. While Boulle’s work was purely an excellent piece of fiction it did have a limited basis in reality – the real story being much more remarkable than the one which is now widely accepted as the truth.1 My own connection with these events came when I was invited to write a biography of the late Sir Philip Toosey. In civilian life this businessman was a merchant banker and a director of several shipping lines, but in the Second World War he was the senior British officer at the bridge camp on the River Kwai. He occupied the position, therefore, that was portrayed by in Pierre Boulle’s version of events. While much of my research was concerned with the man and his commercial and family background, Toosey’s experiences in Thailand naturally provided a focal point of the study. A great deal of attention was necessarily given to the way that Toosey reacted to the circumstances in which he found himself. Why, for example, was it necessary to build a railway between Thailand and Burma, of which the bridge over the Kwai was an integral part, at this particular time? Once this query had been satisfactorily answered, it led on to a desire to investigate the particular difficulties that were involved in the project and how they were overcome. Then, when it was appreciated how high was the cost in human lives and misery, came a need to analyze its achievements and to consider if the enormous efforts that were made were worthwhile. Finally, when it became apparent that the enterprise had made a major contribution to the Japanese campaign in Burma, this led to a further enquiry into the steps which the Allied authorities took to minimize its effectiveness. From an early stage it was quite clear that the construction of the Thai- and the building of the “Bridge on the River” were undertaken to help supply the Japanese forces in Burma. But why go to the tremendous expense and suffer the appalling trauma of creating a permanent way through some of the worst terrain and

56 JAPANESE MERCHANT SHIPPING AND THE BRIDGE OVER THE RIVER KWAI weather in the world when the Imperial armies could have been provided with all their requirements more cheaply and conveniently by sea through the port of Rangoon? This question is a complex one that this paper will attempt to answer. Part of the explanation is that the extent of Japan’s early conquests in the six months which followed Pearl Harbor far exceeded the most sanguine of her expectations. Another aspect was the relative weakness of the Japanese mercantile marine, for its development lagged considerably behind that of the fighting services and was ultimately to prove one of Nippon’s Achilles’ heels! This drawback was emphasized from almost the beginning of the Pacific War by the success of the American submarine fleet. By exacerbating the shortage of merchant ships, especially oil tankers, Japanese strategy was severely threatened and a large number of measures had to be adopted to make the best use of whatever tonnage was available. One of these emergency decisions which Tokyo was obliged to take was to supply the Japanese forces in Burma via and not through Rangoon. Apart from saving valuable shipping capacity for use elsewhere this policy had the added attrac- tion of removing vessels from what was becoming a dangerous route that was exposed to increasingly heavy air attacks from planes based in India. However, there was no overland supply link between Bangkok and Burma, so one needed to be constructed before the policy could be implemented. This the Japanese High Command decided to undertake.

I When Commodore Perry arrived in what is now known as Tokyo Bay in 1853 he found a country that had changed little over the previous two and a half centuries. This “Era of Seclusion” had given Japan a long period of peace and stability, but it had also caused the nation to stagnate while the West was making swift technical and commercial progress. The political consequences of Japan’s decision to open its ports to the West need not be repeated except to say that the fall of the Tokugawa regime left the new Meiji government facing enormous tasks. These included the reorganization of the polit- ical, industrial, and social structures of the country, and from the beginning it was understood that the aim of making Japan a strong and independent nation ruled out excessive foreign borrowing or any undue foreign presence. In this respect shipping was seen as a vital activity, and government policy was directed to encourage development so as to save foreign exchange and to prevent the kind of exploitation which had occurred elsewhere in the Far East. It was perceived as having both commercial and strategic aspects which needed to be expanded for the benefit of the nation. The traditional shipping industry in Japan had been engaged in the transport of items like rice and saki around the coast. As they were forbidden to move away from home waters these Wasen had made little technical progress and had remained small in size. The sight of Western vessels encouraged change, and both the central and local administrators quickly purchased ships from abroad. As will be seen in Table 1 these imports were mainly small coastal ships. The majority were iron steamers built in

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