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The Spirit of Empiricism? an Analysis of Empiricism As a Stance

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The Spirit of Empiricism? an Analysis of Empiricism As a Stance The Spirit of Empiricism? An Analysis of Empiricism as a Stance. by Navarre Di Carlo B.A., Thompson Rivers University, 2011 A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS in the Department of Philosophy Navarre Di Carlo, 2013 University of Victoria All rights reserved. This thesis may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without the permission of the author. ii Supervisory Committee The Spirit of Empiricism? An analysis of Empiricism as a Stance. by Navarre Di Carlo B.A., Thompson Rivers University, 2011 Supervisory Committee Dr. Jeff Foss, (Department of Philosophy) Supervisor Dr. Patrick Rysiew, (Department of Philosophy) Departmental Member iii Abstract Supervisory Committee Dr. Jeff Foss, (Department of Philosophy) Supervisor Dr. Patrick Rysiew, (Department of Philosophy) Departmental Member In The Empirical Stance Bas van Fraassen sets out to uncover the spirit of empiricism: “what is empiricism, and what it could be, if it is to be a viable philosophy today?” (2002, p. 31). In answer to this question van Fraassen rejects the canonical characterization of empiricism as a philosophical position established on a thesis (such as all knowledge comes from sense experience), and argues that we must endorse empiricism as a philosophical position established in a stance. But what the empirical stance is or entails exactly, van Fraassen has failed to make clear. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze and philosophically evaluate empiricism as a stance. In light of my analysis, however, I will argue that van Fraassen has not provided a concrete characterization of stance empiricism (or indeed stances in general), and that the concept remains problematically vague. In Chapter, 1 I begin with a review and analysis of The Empirical Stance. I discuss van Fraassen’s arguments against the canonical characterization of empiricism, as well as the initial sketch of what stance empiricism is or entails provided by van Fraassen. Furthermore, I offer what I see as the clearest characterization of stance empiricism that can be seen form the initial sketch van Fraassen has provided: that the empirical stance is an epistemic strategy, with a commitment to empirical inquiry. In Chapter 2, I refute a prominent critique which has been made against van Fraassen’s ‘stance-ism’ – that stances are problematically relative. This critique is particularly problematic for stance empiricism as it compromises two of van Fraassen’s proposed characteristics of empiricism. In the remaining chapters I argue that stance empiricism is a problematically vague concept. In Chapter 3, I argue that it is not entirely clear what role experience, and the empirical, is to play in the empirical stance. In Chapter 4, I discuss two characterizations of stances which are similar to that which I draw at the end iv of Chapter 1. I go on to argue that in light of van Fraassen’s response to such characterizations we can see that they are inadequate in being able to fully encapsulate the concept of a stance. In Chapter 5, I conclude by arguing that for stance empiricism (and indeed any stance) to be a coherent position it must be limited to something in terms of being definable by some necessary beliefs. Furthermore, I offer a potential objection to my thesis – that for van Fraassen vagueness is a nonissue; I rebut this objection by arguing that even by van Fraassen’s own lights stances are problematically vague. v Table of Contents Supervisory Committee ................................................................................................. ii Abstract ............................................................................................................................ iii Table of Contents .............................................................................................................. v Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................... vii Chapter 1. Soul Searching. Empiricism, and What It Could Be. ................................. 1 1.1 Three Arguments Against the Canonical Characterization of Empiricism. ............. 3 1.1.1 That Empiricism Is Not a Factual Thesis: Looking at the History of Empiricism. ................................................................................................................ 3 1.1.2 Rebellion: The Attitude of Empiricism? ............................................................ 8 1.1.3 What Empiricism Cannot Be: The Failure of Empiricism as a Factual Thesis. .………………………………………………………………………………9 1.2 The Last Chance for Empiricism: Embracing the Stance. ...................................... 14 1.2.1 What is a Stance? ............................................................................................. 15 1.2.2 The Meta-Stance. ............................................................................................. 16 1.3 Stance-ism: Trying to Put it All Together............................................................... 21 Chapter 2. “Some Say the View is Crazy, But You May Adopt Another Point of View.” Stances and Relativism. ..................................................................................... 25 2.1 Relativism, Stances, and the Problem of Legitimate Philosophical Critique. ... 28 2.1.1 Jauernig: The Empirical Stance Cannot Provide an Adequate Critique of Metaphysics. ............................................................................................................. 28 2.1.2 Are Our Values Just Preferences and Sentiments? .......................................... 30 2.1.3 The Prospect for Legitimate Philosophical Engagement Between Stances. .... 32 2.3 Relativism, Stances, and Philosophical Conversion. .............................................. 37 2.3.1 Ho: The Problem of Conversion Between Stances....................................... 37 2.3.2 Prospects For Constructive Philosophical Discourse at the Level of Stances. 39 2.4 Philosophical Progress at the Level of Stances....................................................... 48 2.5 Concluding Remarks Regarding Stances and the Problem of Relativism. ............. 52 Chapter 3. Experience – More Than Meets the Eye. ................................................ 56 3.1 Experience in the History of Empiricism. ............................................................ 58 3.1.1 The British Empiricists. ................................................................................. 58 3.1.1.1 Locke............................................................................................................. 58 vi 3.1.1.2 Berkeley. ....................................................................................................... 62 3.1.1.3 Hume. ............................................................................................................ 64 3.1.1.4 Observations Drawn From Modern Empiricism........................................... 67 3.1.2 Logical Positivism. .......................................................................................... 67 3.1.2.1 A Problem with Understanding the Observable. .......................................... 70 3.1.3 Constructive Empiricism. ................................................................................ 71 3.2 Experience in Stance Empiricism. .......................................................................... 75 3.3 Avoiding Naiveté About Experience. ..................................................................... 81 Chapter 4. Cast Back Into Obscurity. ......................................................................... 85 4.1 Functional Characterizations. ................................................................................. 86 4.1.1 Teller: Stance as an Epistemic Policy. ............................................................. 87 4.1.2 Rowbottom & Bueno – Stance as a Mode of Engagement and Style of Reasoning. ................................................................................................................. 91 4.2 Naiveté in the Functional Characterization............................................................. 92 4.3 Cast Back Into Obscurity. ....................................................................................... 96 Chapter 5. “Have You Ever Been Experienced?” ...................................................... 98 5.1 Stances, Beliefs, Pragmatic Coherence, and Rational Permissibility. .................... 99 5.2 The Problem With Vagueness. ............................................................................. 102 5.3 Concluding Remarks. ............................................................................................ 106 Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 110 vii Acknowledgments Foremost, I would like to express my deepest thanks to my thesis supervisor Dr. Jeff Foss for his assistance in developing, and refining this thesis. Without Dr. Foss’s insight, comments, critiques, patience, and moral support this thesis could not have been completed. I would also like to thank Dr. Patrick Rysiew for his helpful, and insightful comments, and criticisms. I also would like to express my gratitude to the University of Victoria’s Department of Philosophy for their generosity in providing me with funding throughout the course of my degree. I must also acknowledge the Thompson Rivers University Department
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