Chapttr III

THE MINOR PARTIS3

In the recent years of contemporary politics, perhaps, no element or event has eluded the Tigllance of history and escaped public maory within so short a time as the minor parties of India.^ Sntered on the stage as election parties with an evanescent effervescence, most of them ended with the end of the general elections* What was more peculiar, these paz*ties were devoid of such vital elements as a written constitution, formal enrolment of members, periodic meetings and annual conventions, chosen aims or declared objectives and were lacking the most needed financial resources and the organisational structure essential to their operation. It cannot be legitimately said of th«i that they ever had a right expectation to rule a state or to form themselves into

As majority of the minor parties are now extinct, it was difficult to obtain direct information in all cases. Several communications, one after another, addressed to these parties (in some cases as many as twentyfive) failed to evoke any response and on many an occasion postal authorities had the courtesy to return them endorsing thereon the absence of the addressees. Ooing further to the areas of their origin, it was revealed that a nvnber of them had only a very short stay, and left no indication helpful as to pursue them in detail. The information given here in respect of such parties is in large part gathered from manifold sources quite unconnected to one another. Fra^ients were first traced out from many a book, pamphlet, newspaper and journal and then chronologically arranged. The links lost and the lacunae interposed had to be made or cemented up with the particulars obtained from various quarters during the field work, after due verification* 113 an opposition powerful • n v a ^ to stabilise democracy. This being the general trait* h m i m r exception might be found but certainly not upto the standard of minor party in the American sense. In the Ifaittd States "the term third party applies to minor parties that are strong enough to affect the chances of one or both of the major parties at the 2 polls” but there also as in India splits in major parties are a principal reason for their birth.^

The Gandhian Group

As previously stated, many a party has come into being as a result of dissensions and differences within the larger parties pazi;icularly the INC. Every party in the Gandhian Group has been an off-^shoot of the Congress and every one of then practically perished, a while after their formation* A party of Congress dissidents in Manipur, the Achumba Pampa Congress (Truth-Loving Congress) came into existence in 1949. The Manipur State, prior to its being taken over L by the Union Government on October 15, 1949, had a responsible govenyaent and a constitutional monarchy regulated by the Kanipur State Constitution Act 1947* It

^ Blection Civics - 19$2, Ohio, American Bducation Publications, p.22.

^ Idem.

^ T.P.Nenon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States, op.cit., p.303i says 194^ which appears to be a printer’s devil. 114 had In accordance with the Act a fifty-member state assembly to which elections were held in 1947 on the basis of adtilt franchise. The Congress, which in the pre-Independence days functioned in the name Manipur Mahasabha could not assume power in the state owing to the factionalism within.

Group rlTalry renewed when in 1949 Krishna Mohan Singh was elected president of the Manipur Congress with a bare two-vote-majority. The riral faction led by B. Tompok Singh, S. Somorendra Singh, R.K.Malpaksana Singh and others alleged mal-practices in the preparation of the electoral roll and they strongly disapprored the manner in which the election tribunal set up by the Assam PCC dealt with the election dispute. As they felt that truth was suppressed to the trtumph of fraud and falsity, they split away from the Congress and founded the Achumba Pampa Congress In order to remain honest to the ideals of the Congress. With the approach of the elections in 1951-52 some leaders of the Fampa Congress, notably R. K. Angousana Singh, and N* Nobokisor Singh, sought an election alliance with the Praja Santi Party, a Manipur princely party, and agreed with the proposal of jointly sponsoring the candidature of its leader Tbomcha Singh in the parliamentary election from inner Manipur constituency. This was unacceptable to Tompok Singh group who after a 115

storny but Tain opposition decided to break away from the Achunba Pampa Congress and to form a new party* Tompok Singh secured the support of R«K.Naipaksana Singh who had hither to been a neutral in the squabbles, and of Loitam Taima Singh to his plan and brought into being the Gandhi Sebok Sora (Gandhi Sevak Sabha <- Conference of the Servants of Gandhi) as opposed to the Congress and the Achumba Pampa Congress* However, the proposed alliance between the Achumba Pampa Congress and the Praja Santi Party did not materialise and the former supported the candidature of the Maharani of Manipur in the parliamentary election* Both the Achumba Pampa Congress and the Gandhi Sebok Sova did not fare well in the first general elections* Sventually in 1953 the Achumba Pampa Congress was merged with the Praja Socialist Party.^ After the elections the Gandhi Sebok Sova with the CPI, the PraJa Santi Party and the All-Manipur National Union formed the "Democratic Front" under the chairmanship of Tompok Singh for creating such agitations as necessary to bring pressure upon the Centre for the restoration of responsible goremment which it had abolished unconstitu­ tionally.^ As the Front gathered momentum, the apprehensive

^ Margaret W*Fisher and Joan V.Bondurant, The Indian ^^.groerience with Ocaocratic Elections, Berkeley, Institute of I^^mational Studies, (University of California), 1956, p*39<

^ Vide p. 139 116

Manipur Congress requested B.P.Challha, the then Assam Congress president to use his good offices to win Tompok Singh back to the Congress and if possible to get dissolved the Front. Chaliha did the job so well that Tombok Singh suddenly rejoined the Congress, without even consulting the executive committee of the Gandhi Sebok Sova. After the desertion of Tompok, the Gandhi Sebok Sova then led by

Maipaksana Singh, and the All-Manipur National Union were 7 merged together to form the Revolutionary *Iatlonalist Party.

One time *the strong man* of the old Madhya Pradesh Congress Pandit Dwarka Prasad Misra, prior to his exit from the Congress, was home minister in the Ravi Shankar Shukla Cabinet. Misra became openly critical of Nehru*s leadership

7 The aim of the party was to work for regaining parliamentary form of government for Manipur. In 1953 the party convened a maaenoth public meeting attended by more than ten thousand people, which adopted a resolution demanding immediate restitution of responsible government in the state. The resolution further stated that if no assurance from the Union Govez*nment was forthcoming within fifteen days, the party would start a state-wide movement to make Manipur an independent buffer state between Burma and India. Within two days after the passing of the resolution all the important leaders of the party including Maipaksana Singh were rounded up, charged under different provisions of the penal law particularly sedition, and convicted and sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment. This blow had crippled the party and today for all practical purposes, it Is ceased to be alive.

Misra was first minister for Development and Local Self-Government (Keeslng*8, Vol.VI, 1946-48, p*795^). 117 which ultimately led to his own displacement before the first general elections.

As the elections impending) Misra decided to form his followers into what was called the Bharatiya Lok Congress

(Indian People’s Congress). It contested the 1951-52 elections in Madhya Pradesh and in the Punjab securing the election symbol ’pitcher' but none of its candidates got through. Misra who stood simultaneously from three 9 constituencies, himself was routed and his election deposits were forfeited. A total of 5,119 votes cast in his favour tended to weaken his political stature and he 10 made a withdrawal from active politics.

Round about the end of 1951 group rivalries assumed such proportions in the Mahakoshal PCC that an ex-president of it, Thakur Chedllal himself led the rival group against the official Congress Party. Talks of settlement having failed, this opposition group founded the Swatantra Congress (Free or Independent

9 These constituencies were Jabalpur I, Chhindwara and Nagpur T, and Misra polled in these constituencies 4,71 324, and 77 respectively. "Report on the First General Elections in India, 1951-52» Vol.IT (Statistical), Table 15, PP.33?-333, 334, 335 and 333-339.)

10 Misra Is undeifstood to have rejoined the Congress in about the middle of 1961 XBcaatiagi in M.P. lid

Congress) but could not get recognition as a state party tram the Blection C(mmlssion. Hence choosing 'pair of scales' as their symbol, the party candidates stood as independents to fight the first general elections but drew a blank. And that was the end of the party* The Democratic National Congress of TraYancore, had an agitational background. It arose primarily to protect the Hindu interests, more especially the Hindu religious insti­ tutions, in the state from Christian intrusion. The Christian leaders both within and without the Congress by the close of the year 1949 became much dissatisfied with sub clause (ii) of clause 10 of article 23^ of the Constitution of India by which proTision has been made to pay annually a sum of Rupees 51 lakhs to the DeTaswom (Hindu Religious Institutions) of Travancore and Cochin for their day-to-day administration and for the general uplift of the Hindu society. They questioned the prorision and Impelled or Induced Chief Minister T.K.Narayana Filial who came to power with their support to bring forward a bill to control the Deraswom, to the passing of which was assured the backing of the Christian legislators. Hurt by these measures, Hindu sentimentalists led by Mannath Fadmanabhan and E.Sankar, two leading Congressmen representing the two major Hindu communities, the Nairs and the Ssharas, started a state-«ride agitation to get the bill withdrawn and simultaneously to interdict the Christians from interfering with the Hindu institutions. 119

The bill was opposed by H legislators within the Congress

Legislature Party including the two leaders and they voted against it defying the party whip. The 14 MLAs were expelled on June 16 , 1950 from the Legislature Party and also from the Provincial Congress. By this time the Congress in the state had much deteriorated. The circ\im- stances that led to the creation of the Democratic Congress Party mark the first stage of degeneration of the Congress in the state.

Padmanabhan and Sanlcar mobilised the mass force behind them for the unification of the Hindu society by the formation of a common Hindu organisation called the Hindu Mahamandal and almost at the same time sought to create a political body to counteract the evils that obsessed the

Congress. The fourteen expelled MLAs met in Quilon on June 25, 1950 and formed a new party, the Democratic

National Congress "to uphold ^nd safeguard the democratic ideals of Hhe) Congress and give the people a new lead."^^ The despoliation of temples and the continued commission 1 ? of sacrileges, and pollutions of Hindu shrines in

Keesing’s Vol.VIII, 1950-52, p.11311. 12 As regards the destruction of the famous temple at Sabarimalai in Travancore in 1950, the report submitted to the Government of Travancore-Cochin by Kesava Menon, Deputy Inspector General of Police, Madras, who enquired into the Continued on next page. 120

Trayancore made the Hindus aware of the need of strengthening the new party* But a good beginning was not half done. The capitalist elenents within the Democratic Congress such as bus service owners and steaa boat company proprietors began to lean towards the goTemnent in order to safeguard their investment interests. The government itself was anxious to break up the Democratic Congress for its own safe prospects and therefore it did all what it could, to stimulate conflicts within the new party and to lure away its capitalist- financiers. The Hindu Mahamandal which brought the two leading communities of the state, the Sahava and the Nair together was now proving an attempt at the impossible because the leaders failed to cleanse out the traditional suspicion and jealousy existing between the two. The party was considerably weakened due to these reasons; yet it had decided to fight the elections in 1951-52 adopting the *cock* symbol. With the elections fast approaching* the leaders of both the parties, of the Congress and of the Democratic Congress, began to lose their self-confidtnce and they therefore worked out a successful compromise, the Democratic Congress

Footnote continued from previous page. incident, says "that Christians particularly, uneducated and illiterate Roaan Catholics, had enough reasons to destroy this ancient temple once and for all and to do away with all that it had stood for from bymne days." (The Times of India, Bombay, December iy57») "T.M.Targhese (a Christian leader, then Minister for Home Affairs)., told (State Legislative) Assembly that 105 temples in the state were deseerated after the Sabarimala incident* (The Times of India, Bombay, March 25> 1953)* 121

re-imtering th« ProTlnclal Congress. If anywh«r» in India a minor party could win some impressive election victories in 1951-52 with a preparation precipitate and poor, it was the Independent People's Party founded by Pandit Nilakantha Das of Orissa, a former Congress leader sent out of the party some years ago. Organised on the eve of the election, the party had at the helm, apart from Pandit Das, two other deposed Congress leaders of the state. It made an election alliance with the Orissa branch of the Forward Bloc (S) and got elected four of its candidates including two of the three of its founding leaders, to the State Assembly. It was a unique achievement for a party of its size and standing. Faced with a powerful challenge from the Qanatantra Parishad, and other opposition parties, the minority Congress^^ heading the Ministry in Orissa needed Pandit Das and his party most* negotiations were started with tempting offers to Das and his followers and at last Das decided to rejoin the Congress. In 1957, Das successfully contested an Assembly seat on a Congress ticket and was

The strength in the Orissa Legislature of different parties after the elections in 1951*52 was as follows:- Congress 67 Ganatantra Parishad 31 Indepemients 21 Socialists 10 CPI 7 Others 4 Total l60 122 later elected Speaker of the Orissa state legislatixre.^^ The Kisan Janata Samyukta Party (The Peasants* and People*8 United Party) of Rajasthan was a loose and hasty C(HBblnation of two organisations! the Janata Party (People's Partyi and the Kisan Sabha (Peasants' Union). By the beginning of the year 19^1» Congress politics in Rajasthan had become a battle of intricate cliques. Hiralal Shastri, the chief minister was accused of corrupt practices and was made to vacate his chair by the supporters of Jaya Narayan Vyas who ascended chief ministership on April 26, 1951*^^ The defeated Shastri founded the Janata Party to meet the Congress in the election field. Shastri sought an alliance with the Kisan Sabha, on materialisation of which the union of the two was named *the Kisan Janata Samyukta Party*. Shastri then turned to the Rajasthan state KMPP to bring about a united election front against the Congress. The step by step progress made by Shastri in his more against the Congress was indeed causing concern to the latter. The Congress leaders therefore decided to win Shastri over to their side by offering him tactical concessions. A

* substantial number of his party supporters had found place in the list of Congress candidates for the election and Shastri feeling this as a good bargain revired his old

The Times of India, Bombay, May 2d, 1957.

Kessing»s Vol.VIII, 1950-52, p.11577. 123 association with the Congress. His reeabracing the

Congress, enraged s<»ie of the Kisan Janata Samyukta Party men who, hence, had chosen six candidates to contest the election under the shade of the party but only to lose even their deposits. The Gandhi Janata Congress of the Punjab and the Progressive Congress of Assam were alike organised by

Congress dissidents of reformist views, the former in early

1954 and the latter before the second general elections in 1957* The departure of them however did not reform the Congress nor could they offer a new leadership to the people in opposition to the Congress.

The three men, said to be responsible to a large measure for the unpopularity and general demoralisation of the Congress in Kerala are Kumbalathu Sanku Filial, and T.M.Verghese of Travancore and Panampalli Govinda Menon from Cochin. Sanku Pillai and Verghese who were instrumental to the downfall of many previous ministries, made a conceited effort to re-establish their lost supremacy in the Congress which was foiled by their opponents. Verghese and Sanku

Pillai left the Congress and after a short interval with other disgruntled Congressmen held a 124 conT«ntion at Kayamkulam In Central Travancor« in Norenber 1956 out of which was born a n«w rival organisation the People's Party. The political reputation of these two men, was at its low ebb and therefore they were leaders without following by the time they established their party. The party lacked moral courage to face the electorate in the 1957 election but later at the instance of Sanku Pillai, sought successfully a aerger with the Kerala State PSP. An interesting feature of the several Congress splinter groups style theaselres as parties is that they are reluctant to part with the name of the Congress or Gandhi. Parties which did not borrow the names of Congress and Qandhi invariably adopted the enchanting word *people* from whom they were far away. Too weak to have an independent existence, many Congress splinter parties had to return to the Congress or to seek fusion with other parties. Rift and factions did help the men who left the Congress in founding rival parties but did not* however, consolidate them. The vigour with which they fought their mother organisation transpired away before they could infuse it into the new-born parties. Bvery one of the minor parties who drifted away from the Congress claimed to be honest; pex^ps so it was in some cases, but they did not prove their honesty with their organisations. By and large, there was a

All India Election Guide, Madras, The Oriental Publishers, 1956, p.319. 125

troaendous waste of political tntrgy which had it b«en canaliscd in proper direction^ had been conducive to the countzy in general and deaocraey in particular*

The Socialist Group

Of all the minor parties in the Socialist group the Socialist Republican Party (SRP) Is the aost important. A great endeavour at building up an opposition, the SRP in its inceptive days, had made such an impressive progress that political observers of the late forties speculated that it might unite and lead the scattered leftist forces in the 17 country. Founded by Sarat Chandra Bose on August 1, 1947 the party had a stable background, a strong organisation and a powerful personality to lead. That to be headed by such a personality was at once the cause of its strength and its weakness. In November 194^ Sarat Bose resigned from the interim government to mobilise the rei^urces at his command towards the establishment of an opposition party. "What we in India would like to have is a progressive systMi which will fulfil the social needs of the whol^ people and will be based on national sentiments. It will be a synthesis of nationalism and socialism. This is something i^ich has not been achieved by the National Socialists in

17 Kessing's Vol.VI, 194^6-4^, p.d7d2 126

Gcraany today. Our political philosophy should be a syathssis between national socialisn and coamunism* The conflict between thesis and antithesis has to be resolTed by 1 d a synthesis." This was what his party believed. The chief ains and objects of the party were, the •stablishaent of a union of socialist republics, an undivided India, cessation of coouionwealth links, linguistic autonomy, abolition of landlordiai, land to the tiller, nationalisation of basic and key industries, socialist industrialisation of the country and the propagation of the ideology of Subhas Chandra Bose otherwise called 'Subhasism*. To spread the ideals of his party and to bring about the left consolidation Sarat started a daily paper "the Nation" which becaae a forum for exchanging the views and opinions of the leftist elements. To test the strength of his party Sarat contested the bye>election caused by the death of Satish Chandra Bose, his brother, from South Calcutta constituency to the West Bengal State Assembly. In the election that was held on June H , 1949, Bose won a decisive victory over his Congress rival Suresh Chandra Das obtaining 19,030 votes against the 5,7^0 polled by his 19 opponent.

Sarat Chandra Bose, What We Believe, Calcutta, the Socialist Republican Party, 194^, P-7.

Kessing*s Vol.VII, 194^-50, p.10072. 127

But this rata of progress could not b« maintained uniformly for Sarat Bose had become a ▼ictin of chronic ill­ ness which resulted in his death on February 21, 1950. The party was so anich concentrated in his personality that his passing away adversely affected Its activities and future. The mouth-piece of the party *the Nation' had to be closed down sometime after his death and the party itself was so considerably reduced within a few years that it had finally agreed to bec

^ From a letter of Jyotish Joarder, general secretary of the SRP dated March 18, 1961 addressed to the writer. i2d through leftist co-ordination* H« ritvtd with displeasure the agitations foaented by his chief for getting Manbhum, a Bengali speaking district of Bihar, back to Bengal and for re-organising the states in India on linguistic principle. He differed widely with Sarat Bose on the question of absorbing into the party those SRF men and Asad Hind Volunteers I a citixen-amy organised to protect the minorities, who had migrated from Sast to West Bengal and inspite of the strong wishes of the latter that they should be taken in, Baksi did not alter his stand. Moreover, Baksi was reluctant to overburden so infant a party as the SRP with such a stupendous responsibility as the cause of the Bast Bengal refugees which Sarat Bose wanted it to shoulder squarely. Coming out of the forge the National Synthesis Party declared: "We must develop our laws and institutions in a way such that man does not exploit man* All our programmes must fit into that basic ftmdamental code of life and living. In the context of things they have to be largely socialist for the very simple reason that life today is largely public 21 in the highly organised mass society of the modem world." The programme included the attainment of an undivided India, severance from Commonwealth, enactment of a new constitution for India, redistribution of states on linguistic basis.

Froi a leaflet of the National Synthesis Party, Quoted in Asia Guide to the First General Elections, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1951* p*210. 129 liquidation of feudal states, introduction of planned national economy, collectivisation of large scale faming based on co-operatiTe system and nationalisation of key and basic industries and money institutions. Closely allied with the Bengal Volunteers, an old but still living terrorist group the National Synthesis Party showed an initial ferment to expand but it could neither muster a sizable following nor could it coneiand popularity* The party was lacking an able leadership and therefore a devoted rank and file. It could survive its tender days with the powerful expressions of its leader, but after a time it ceased to exist* It is difficult to ascertain what type of an ideological mixture was behind the All>Peoples* Party. It had a trade union background and so it carried with it some sort of an undefined socialism. Organised with an eye on the approach­ ing elections (1951-52), under the leadership of P.M.Sarwan, Binode Kumar Sarwan, Sarju Prasad Singh, Johan Christian and others, the All-Peoples Party was a congl<»eration of heterogeneous, social and vocational groups united behind, trade unionists, lawyers, professors and enlightened tribal leaders. The party's influence was confined to a few pockets in upper Assam, such as Dhekiajuli, Tezpur, Sootea, Oohpur, Jorfaat, Titabar and Teok, but its poll in these pockets was uniformly poor, accept in Titabar where it could secure a seat by a narrow margin in a mxiltangular contest. 130

Howeyer, after a tlM« the party had dwindled In •▼•rythlng but naae.

The Marxian Group

Confined to Tripura, a forner princely state whose adalnlstratlon was taken over by the OoTemaent of India on October 15* 1949,^^ the Qanatantrlk Sangha (Democratic Party) had a good band of active local politicians to lead; Nandalal Chakraboz*ty) Blrachandra Dev Barma, Subodh Kvnar Qangopadhyaya > and Manlndra Klshore Choudhry, to mention a few. A party said to be of clean leftist leaning from Its formative stage, the Qanatantrlk Sangha, by the first general elections became a close associate of the CPI In Tripura. An election alliance with the CPI in 1951 ■*^2 was soon followed by crossHBsmbershlp between the two parties. In their intimate collaboration it was no task for the CPI to bring the Sangha down to the position of a satellite - 23 a fact which the forner would refuse to divulge. ^ The Praja Mandal (People's Conference) was formed in June 1953 by the Hindu tenants of Harlana areas of PSPSU

22 V.P.Menon, The Story of the Integration of Indian States, op.clt., p*302*

23 In answer to a written question whether the CPI would enlighten on its relationship with Tripura Qanatantrlk Sangha, B.T.Ranadlve when interviewed on January 13* 1959 at New Delhi told that he did not know anything about it. But from a more frank, but eq;ually high source of the CPI it was unofficially learnt on the same day that more than half the members of the Sangha was actual communists. 131 und«r tht leadership of Inder Singh- It was not adalttedly a Marxian fonution but osttnsiblj it nurtured enormous coonunist sentiments. Inder Singh himself was Moscow- returned and was then one in the good books of the Kremlin* Furthermore, he efficiently piloted in PSPSU the Peace

HoTMient sponsored by the commmists. A Congress ML a in 1952, he crossed the floor abruptly and Joined hands with the United Front leader Olan Singh Rarewala to oust the Congress ministry with Colonel Raghblr Singh atop. In the 1954 PBPSU elections he and his party allied with the communists, the Akall left and other leftists and brought into being the Democratic Front* The political manoeuvres of Inder Singh were not, however, helpful for the consolidation of his party or its survlTal* It was a loose and incoherent body of diverse elments like Brahmins, Scheduled Castes, Qujars, Jats and Ahlrs whose affinity to their castes often surpassed their religious unity and organisational loyalty. "Congress today is the political party of the Indian Big Business"the Indian Socialist Party’s "long subsi­ diary role to the Congress had rendered that party pale and 25 imbecile"; the Communist Party "were on a long expedition of errors.Hence unable to reconcile with these parties

Socialist Review, January 1949, (KSP Publication) Emakulam, Pouran Press, Vol*I, Ho.I, p.3» 25 Ibid., p.10. 26 Ibid., p.11. 132 a group of youngaen, many of whom fresh from college, founded the Kerala Socialist Party (KSP) in 1947, "determined to fight for the working class, peasants and common man."^^ The party commenced its operation zealously in four centres, Triyandnira, Quilon, Bmakulam and Trichur and gained strength among workers in Cochin and Charara whom they organised into powerful trade unions. The initial progress of the KSP, howeTer, had come to an inmediate standstill by its own defaults and deficiencies. It could create a stir among the studentry of the state but could not penetrate into the peasantry* It failed to convince the middle classes of its programme but on the other hand irritated and proToked th«n by trenchantly criticising the top Congress leaders at a time when they were held in high •stetm. The Communist Party posed the greatest challenge to its advancement which it was not equipped to face. The KSP had a batch of young leaders of equal intellectual calibre but did not have a rank and file adequate to with­ stand the weight above. It was top-heavy. In 1950, an ambitious section of the party led by M.H.Sreekantan Hair, K.Balakrishnan and T.K.Oivakaran broke off from the KSP and Joined the RSP. This split severely hit the party and its trade unionism for Sreekantan and Oivakaran were their top trade unionists having a fairly substantial hold over

Socialist Review, Jomary 1949, op.cit., p.15. Coastal area near Quilon irtiere mineral-sand industry is concentrated. 133

th« labour. Defection again debilitated the party In 1956 when another faction seceded and formed the Kerala Socialist League. The KSP in 194^ boycotted the elections and in 1952 it made conuion cause with the CPI and other leftists and formed the United Front of Leftists. It thus won a seat in the state legislature. The KSF again did not pax^iclpate in the 1957 elections but its leader Nathai Manjooran supported the Congress, which he dubbed the party of the Indian Big Business in 1949| "for a stable ministry in the state.” The aim of the KSP is the attaiment of an independent sovereign Socialist republic of Kerala on the Marxist- Leninist lines but lack of appreciation on the part of the people has frustrated its leaders* Its resources are very poor, but it is still alive* The KSP*s influence now is on the wane and its political value in the state today is trivial. Another party of the Cimgress dissidents but Marxian in orientation was the Kisan Masdoor Mandal (Peasants and Workers Conference) of Bhopal. It was an illustration how trade unions could inspire formation of political parties. The Mandal had at its back a big labour force, the 10,000- strong Masdoor Sabha (Workers* Union) one of the foremost labour organisations in the former princely state of Bhopal. The party was acclaimed *Mai Rah* or 'Mew Path* by its makers and supporters. It had for the elections 1951*52 a socialist programme on the Marxian lines and put up eleven 134

29 candidates including the president of the Mazdoor Sabha, Shakir All Khan for the State Assembly but only to be dis­ heartened in the end. All the eleven lost their battles and eight of them their security deposits too. The decline of the party was only an aftermath of its election performance. The very organisational set-up of the Communist Party makes split impossible and if a split takes place, it is an indication that the party machine was functioning defectively. And it was so, when a group of dissenters led by Teja Singh Swatantar^^ in the Punjab broke away from the CPI by the beginning of the year 194^ and formed "the Lai Communist Party”. In those days though P.C.Joshi was the party chief, B.T.Ranadive was advocating militant action to put an end to the bourgeois rule. Swatantar, a Moscow trained cwnmunist had the feeling that neither the reformist Joshi, nor the revolutionary Ranadive was serving the cause of true communism and before Ranadive's controversial Calcutta thesis was adopted^^ he and his faction resolved to leave the CPI. The group was termed 'heterodox reds* but they were certainly not renegades. The split was of personal

This figure is according to the Report of the Election Commission. It is leamt from another source that the party had put up twelve candidates in all.

30 Also seen spelt as Swatantra.

The Calcutta Congress of the CPI was from February 28 to March 6, 194^* 135

32 and group nature.-' Th# Lai Conmunists took part in 1951-52 •lections in the Punjab and PSPSU but with little success. In July 1952 the CPI reached an understanding with the Lai Communists and consequently the latter agreed to dissolve their party and seek CPI membership individually. "They admitted they erred and they agreed with the policy of the party.Still the mmbers of the Lai Communist Party were screened before their readmission and many were denied membership, which fact the CPI would like to be left to itself for tactical reasons.

The Secessionist Qroup

Brer since Mohammed All Jinnah enunciated the two nation theoxT which manifestly created a psychological gulf between the Hindu and the Muslim, the latter had always felt that it could not be bridged and a separate nationhood alone would equip th«i for an honourable living. A negligible but understanding Muslim minority had perceived the peril implied in nich thinking but that did not help, as the courage of their conviction could not transcend their religious or cMmunal loyalty* The effect is that, even after the emergence of Pakistan, large section of Muslims almost all over India look fonrard to a possible political

From an interview with B»T«Ranadive in Wew Delhi on January 13, 1959. 33 Idem. 136 union with their brethren In Pakistan* The Political Conference and the Plebiscite Front of Kashmir are embodied with this intention. The Political Conference is Just another version of the Muslim Conference which had a rebellious make up. The All- Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference founded in 1931 was conrerted into the National Conference in 1939 so as to enable non-Muslims of the state also to become its members. Unable to reconcile with this development a small but intransigent section of the old Muslim Conference headed by Chowdhry Ghulam Abbas and Mir Waiz Mohammed Yusuf came out and continued to function under the name *the Muslim

Conference*. When in 1947 its top leaders escaped to Pakistan some of their followez^ having been silent for a few years, from June 1953 onwards started functioning in the name 'the Political Conference* under the leadership of

G.M.Karra. The Muslim Conference prior to the partition of India worked in Kashmir as the de facto wing of the All- India Muslim League but the Political Conference, It is believed, is clandestinely engineered from Pakistan. The Plebiscite Front has almost a similar blood in it. Being turned hostile to India, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah was kept under Preventive Detention in 1953 together with some of his trusted followers. Most notable among them was Mirza Afzal Beg who according to Bakshl Ghulam Mohammed, the Premier of Kashmir was the "evil genius" behind Sheikh 137

Abdullah. Afaal Beg on his release in November 19H joined the Socialist Democratic Fnmt brought into being hj pro- Abdulla elMients in the Kaduiir State Assembly on October Id, 1954 under the leadership of G.M.Hamdani* Beg and Hamdani then Jointly planned an organisation outside the legislature and thus "a ’Plebiscite Front* with Beg as president and Hamdani as secretary was formed on August 10, 1955» by seven members of the Legislative Assorably and a Kashmiri member of the Indian Parliament to campaign for the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite under U.N. auspices, the withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani forces from Kashmir, the restoration of civil liberties, and free elections.But the overt object was disproved by the covert activities. "•••Mirsa Afzal Beg and his diehard followers not only refused to oo-operate but did everything to obstruct the Constituent Assembly in its work and to disrupt the peace of the state* They questioned the state's accession to India though the original accession decision was taken with their consent* They even challenged the representative character of the Constituent Assembly even though the Assembly was elected while Sheikh Abdullah was in power and Nirsa Afsal Beg himself was a minister of the state government.The effect was that "the tactics pursued by Mirsa Afsal Beg and his followers only encouraged

Kessing»s, Vol.! (1955-56), p.14657. The Times of India, Bombay, October 29, 1956. 13ft

Pakistan.Both the Political Conference and the Plebiscite Front are fortified with the spirit of Islam and intensely pro-Pakistani. "Having no sizable backing in Kashair the Muslim Conference and the Plebiscite Front soon found excuses for their decision to boycott the election"^^ in 1957. Despite all their shortc(XBings» they constitute a potential threat to Kashmir's relations with India. Most of their leaders are held under detention and that Itself amplifies how much the authorities are cautious, if not

afraid of them. Their presence, howeTer, testifies the growing pro-Pakistani sentiments at least among a section of the Muslim population in Kashmir and concurrent disaffection towards India which if to assume larger proportions would be

injurious to the policies that are being pursued by the National Conference.

The Princely Group The Divine Right claimed by the monarchs of the west has its eastern version in the Sanskrit dictum *RaJa Pratyaksha Daivatam" lAich means "the King is the visible Qod". To the Muslims of the Orienti the ruler is

The Times of India, Gctob»r 29, 1956. Elections in Kashadjr, Hew Delhi, The Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1957, pp.16-17* 139

KhallfatuXlah (the represcntatlYe of Gk>d) on earth. Not only absolute monarchy but any political systra built upon ■ythieal or ideological foundation %rill be phenomenally more solid and enduring than a system unfounded on such a base prorided such Ideology or myth is capable of creating in it the faith of the people and of sustaining that faith. But the Indian monarchies outlived the last hundred years, more by the tutelage of the British than by their reliance on myths or doctrines. And when the British withdrew from the sub-continent, in their state of helplessness some of thmi hurriedly sought a contrlTance in political parties to retain their losing power. The Fraja Santi Party (Subjects' Peace or Welfare Party) Manipur was embodied with this end in Tiew. The Manipur Constitutional Act 1947 envisaged a parliamentary democracy with a limited monarchy for the state* The royal family then favoured the formation of the Praja Santi Party because the securance of a docile parliamentary majority was necessary to unite in the constitutional monarch the real power. It so happened in 19V7, when to the chagrin of the Congress Party t o m by internal strife, the younger brother of the Maharaja, Priyabrata Singh who was then the leader of the Praja Santi Party formed the first popular Cabinet in the state. But the life of the ministry was short as in 1949 the Union Government assumed direct control of the state by arbitrarily 140 dissolving the Itgislaturs and disaissing the goTemaent without taking appropriate step to get the Constitutional

Act repealed. The Fraja Santi Party eondefflned this "wanton Tilifica- tion of democracy" and Joined the All-Manipur National Union in raising the cry "Manipur for Nanipuris". It endeavoured to mobilise public opinion in the state against the Chief Commissioner's rule and the proposal to merge Manipur with Assam. It peacefully struggled to bring the

Constitution back into operation but the Centre nonchalantly

Ignored its legitimate demand. The Praja Santi Party fought the first general elections alongside of and against the other state parties and later made common cause with them to revive the popular institu­ tions of Manipur rendered lifeless by the Centre. But the

Union Government's inexorable stand on this issue frustrated the party and made it purposeless.

The Feudal Qroup Abolition of the feudal system prevailing in many parts of the country by legislation enraged the landed vested Interests of traditionalist views. Known in various names such as samindar, Jagirdar, etc*} the landlords in many states feeling aggrieved at the loss of their vested Interests, made preparation to offer resistance to the Congress government. In U.P., Kunwar Jagdish Prasad formed 141 th« Praja Party (People’s Party), to fight the Congress in the courts of law as well as in the election field. Although not successful, he nade an attempt to rally the 22,00,000 3d landlords of various sizes in IT.P. under the flag of his party. With the first aiaendfflent to the Constitution in 1951 courts upheld the Zamindari Abolition Act. This was a serious set back to the party. The party then turned to the election front where too its performance was not conducive to its continuance. As a successor to the old Unionist Party, "a combina­ tion of all communities, an organisation of landed vested interests"'^ of the undivided Punjab, it seems, the

Zamindara Kisan Sabha or the Zamlndara League appeared in the partitioned Punjab. Their object is to "establish a Panchayat Raj with the village as the basic unit and

jlq supreme source of authority." With its strength mainly confined to Kamal, JhaJJar, Rewari, Qurgaon, Hissar and Rohtak, the party follows the lead of Chander Bhan Chhlkara and S.Mohan Singh Thand. During the first general elections the party promised a

S.V.Kogekar and Richard L.Park, Reports on the Indian Qeneral Slections 1951-52, Bombay, Poptilar Book Depot, 1956, p.159. 39 S.NataraJan, Indian Parties and Politics, London, The Oxford University Press, 1947, p«27.

The Times of India Directory and Year Book 1954-55, p.1124* 142 feudal democracy as against the money lending Bania and Marwari classes and help to the poor peasants such as cheap credit, amenities of life, insurance for crops and cattle wealth, and rural representation in public services on coming to power. It has thus secured 412,223 popular rotes in 1951-52 elections but could return hardly two candidates to the state legislature and none to the House of the People. The party calls for privileged treatment to the Punjab in respect of recruitment to the defence services^^ and so forth. Supported by landlords, the Bharat Bho<»i Sevak Sangh (Indian Agriculturists* League), (Gwalior, Madhya Bharat) and the Kisan Congress Samiti (Peasants Congress Conference) (UJjain, Madhya Bharat) appeared as two election parties with a programme to reconstruct the broken rural economy and to make the cultivator the real master of the fruit of his labour. The Sangh put up six candidates and the Samiti, five to the Madhya Bharat Legislative Assembly but were rejected by the electorate* Closely allied with the Khedut Sangh^^ (Peasants' League) another party of the landowners that made an

The representation for the Punjab in the defence services (Army alone) is 31*3 per cent as far back as 1951* (New Age July, 1953, Political Monthly of the CPI, p.3^.) 42 A peasant-proprietors organisation. The General Secretary of the Khedut Sangh in a letter dated March 15, 1959 says ".... Khedut Sangh is a non>political organisation of the farmers of Gujarath and is not a political body." 143 attempt in 19^1-52 to capture some legislature seats was the Lok Paksha (People’s Party) of Gujarath then in the composite Bombay. The Khedut Sangh - Lok Paksha, as the alliance was called, had the suppozt of Acharya Kripalani's KMPP. The Lok Paksha brought forth a programme for agrarian reforms and rural improvements, but it evoked little interest in the electorate. The party ceased to exist after the elections. Behind the Travancore-Cochin Republican Praja Party, was a different kind of landed interest, the plantation- estate owners mostly concentrated in Kottayam district of Travancore. With A.T.George, a big estate proprietor at the summit, the Republican Praja Party was the edifice of a host of similar vested interests including some capitalists of the neighbouring areas, who wanted to enter the legisla­ ture for promoting their personal gains. Money was plenty at the paz*ty*s disposal but paradoxically men to fill the rank and file were few. Backed by abundance of finance, the party faced the voters in 1951-52 with an obvious over­ confidence. All the candidates put up by the party including its opulent leader were defeated. It realised that the influence of money upon the individual voter was no more a certainty when he was free from fetters and impositions. Originated in 1951» the party was met with an abrupt end. 144

Th« Llniculstlc Group

Fortified in the east by the mighty ranges of the West- • m Ghats overgrown with dense evergreen forests, and sprinkled and spangled In the west by the blue waters of the heaving Arabian Sea, Kerala, palm-fringed, emerald-clad, from Cape Comerln in the south to Kasergode in the north is

a strip of land of luxuriant vegetation which demonstrates an indivisible geographical unity. Physically this beautiful country with its gardens and groves, hills and dales laced and embroidered with glittering rivers and rivulets, runnels and streams has nothing in common with the dry, melancholy open expanses of Tamil Nad lying on the other side of the Western Ghats* Centuries ago emigrants from Tamil Nad found this cool and shady land with its traditional hospitality was too good for a permanent living especially Its rice>rich south. And of late, with the growth of rubber, tea and cardamom plantations in the high ranges of Travancore, thousands of migratory labourers frc» Tamil Nad poured into these areas on a dally-wage

system. They developed a political consciousness quite contrary to that of their Malayalee neighbours and looked to Tamil Nad for political inspiration. The Travancore Tamil Nad Congress, the Tamil Nad Congress and the Tamil Nad People*s Front were the products of this tendency. The Travancore Tamil Nad Congress (TTNC) and the Tamil Nad Congress (TNC) were parties of some years standing, the 145 foracr with considerable followings, but the People's Front was an election party apparently of some Tamil leftist ele­ ments. But the three parties inspite of their differences, were fellow-travellers to the same destination. They stood for the secession of the seven taluks^^ of Travancore namely Thovala, Agastheeswaram, Kalkulam and Vilavancode in the south, Shencottai in the east) Derikulam, and Peeraade in the high ranges, and their unification with Madras. The TNC was founded by Thanulingam Nadar and the TTNC by the dissident leaders of the THC. With the formation of the TTNC, the TNG almost lost its strength. In course of time the remote control of the TTNC had gone into the hands of such a political tactician as Kamaraja Nadar of Madras. Putting Nesamony and Kunjan Nadar, two local chiefs of the TTNC in the front lines, Kamaraj mployed every strategy to foment animosity between the Tamils and Malayalees in order to capture the Tamil areas particularly the four southern taluks sung as the "granary" or "rice bowl" of Travancore. In the democratic Travancore State and later in the Travancore-Cochin State, between the rift-ridden Congress and the left-party-combination, the TTNC, maintained for almost eight years the political equilibrium to its best advantage. It also brought the downfall of at least two

What is understood by taluka in other parts of India is taluk in the South. 146 ministries. The TTNC was the d<^inant organisation in Southern Trarancore and there it was virtually left without a rival in the battle ground of election. In 194^ when the first popular ninistry was fonaed by the then Congress leader Pattoa Thanu Pillai, the Congress Party had a strength of 97 in the 120H>ember state legislature,^^ which actually reduced the TTNC to a state of impotence. A feeling of neglect thenceforward rooted in them which was easily mirrored before them by outside elements as political oppression of the Tamils by the Malayalees. The situation was further aggravated by the authoritarianism of Thanu Pillai. The Tamils became an intransigent lot under the TTNC and their feelings were exploited by politicians of the neighbouring Madras and the comnunists of Kerala. In the 1952 elections, Congress strength in the state was reduced to 44 in a House of 109, but the TTOC won a solid eight. They thus got into the Congress-TTWC coalition ministry headed by the late A.J .John in Maz*ch 1952 but in September 1953 they voted against the motion of confidence moved by John as their demand to recognise them as the official Congress Party in the seven taluks which they claimed to be of Tamil majority, was not acceeded to by the Congress High Command. In the elections that followed in 1954, they retained 12 seats as against the 45 gone to the Congress in

^ Kesslng*s Yol.VII, 194^-50, p.9597. 147 a 11d>ffl«mber legislature* To •xelude the probable ccHBlng of the leftists led by the comaimists to power, the Congress 8uppox*ted the PSP with its 19 seats in the State Assembly to form a ministry on March 16, 1954 headed by Pattom Thanu Pillai. The TTMC hated Thanu Pillai not only as a political adyersary but a protector of the interests of the landowners of ■kaout the Nair community liring in the South against the Tamil cultivators. In August 1954, following the refusal of Thanu Pillai to agree to their demand for the truncation of the Tamil majority taluks, powerfully backed by KamaraJ and dexterously engineered by the communists, the TTNC launched an agitation obTiously to influence the judgement of the States Re­ organisation Commission which was to visit the state by then* The agitation turned to be awfully violent, but Thanu Pillai did not have the patience to avert such a situation by timely tactics, and he determined to meet violence with violence. That was what the agitators too wanted. Police opened fire^^ and the disturbances were quelled. Revengeful of their formidable opponent Thanu Pillai the TTNC again extended support to the Congress and the latter accepted the offer to replace the PSP Ministry in February 1955*

The firing was justified by a judicial officer of the calibre of K.Sankaran a former Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court. H d

The TTNC won their demand admost ftilly when in 1956 on the recofflmendations of the States Reorganisation ComiBissiont the four disputed southern taluks and that slice of Shencottai Taluk lay east of the ghat ranges of Travancore were trans­ ferred to Madras. As regards the remaining taluks the Cotmnission had given the verdict that they were non-Tamil and the Tamil labour population there was migratory in nature and was without any real estate. The purpose being served, the TTNC was reduced to an appendage to the Madras Congress. The TTNC leaders, Nesamony whom the Travancore Tamils exalted as "Arasangal** (uncrowned king), Kunjan Nadar, their "dictator" and others before whom once the people who wanted to spare the cultural and geographical unity of Travancore stood imploring, had found themselves stranded in the midst of a company more alien to them than the Malayalees. Relegated to an inferior position Nesamoni and party have no voice over KamaraJ and his followers. The TTNC on January 22, 1957 obviously without alternative, announced its decision to work as the branch of the Tamil Nad Congress, in the newly formed Ktftiya Kumarl district comprising of the four Tamil taluks separated from Travancore. Its rank and file, when linguistic passion subsided and position of vantage lost, look to Nesamoni who is still their undisputed leader to revive their old ties with nearby Travancore which they abandoned in fury* The regeneration of the TTNC as an independent party might be a matter dependent upon the future 149 reactions of Nesamonl.^^ The TNC and the Tamilnad People's Front lacked popular support and they were disappointed in the 1951-52 elections. The Kamatak Skikaran Sangh (Kamatak Unification Partywas formed by a section of rebel Congressfflen led by S.K.Hosmanii an ex-president of the Kamatak Provincial Congress, to fight for the inmediate nerger of the four

Kannada speaking districts of the composite Bombay with

Mysore to form one Kannada state. Allied with the KMPP, it fought the first general elections without any return and its idea to form a unified Karnataka got a cold reception from the old Mysore where public opinion was largely in favour of maintaining the distinct identity of the state. The party, neyeztheless, carried on its work in the Kannada speaking districts of Bombay for creating popular opinion in support of its stand and while doing so, the announcement by the Centre of the appointment of the States Reorganisation

Commission on December 29, 1953 had disarmed it. Haring lost its raison d^etre, it gradually fizsled away. Linguistic antagonim in the Manbhum district of Bihar arose with the imposition of Hindi over the Bengali speaking

^ A new party called the Rwaierger Party in the Kanya Kumari district has been organised, and it has submitted recently a memorandum to the President of India requesting the union of the district with Kerala (The Times of India, Bombay, October 15, I960).

47 Also found referred to as United Kaimatak Party. 150 people. Manbhum, a predominently Bengali area, was an integral part of Bengal prior to 1911 in which year it had come under the administration of the Lieutenant-GoTemor of Bengal to form a new province with the areas now constituting Orissa* From then, the Bengalis inhabiting the district were a discontented lot due to the political isolation from their brethren in Bengal. In 1921 Manbhura had an able leader in the late Nibaran Chandra Das Gupta to start the work of the

Congress there. "The Congress leadership in t^ls district did not take the lead of Gandhi as merely a political weapon designed to achieve political independence only but took up his doctrine, his creed, his philosophy as the best ways to achieve the political and social emancipation of the people of India as visualised by Gandhi himself. Barly in 19/^7 the Nanbhum Congress made a unique attempt at organising a Panchayat Raj in more than three thousand villages of the district to realise the ideal of Gandhi's Gram Swaraj (Village Self-Government). For its success the use of Bengali language and the reunification of Manbhum with Bengal were considered necessary by the District Congress. But Bihar which was opposed to the idea of

^ Arun Chandra Ghosh, A History of Manbhum Loke Sevak Sangha, p.1. This history runs into four typed sheets was prepared at the request of the writer by Arun Chandz*a Ghosh Secretary, Loke Sevak Sangha in April 1959 exclusively for aiding the preparation of this thesis. Labanya Prova Ghosh, Loke Sevak Sangha NLA in West Bengal Assembly also rendered her timely help for this purpose. 151 secession of Manbhua, eaploytd "all kinds of unclean methods to foist Hindi upon the Bengali speaking areas like Manbhum

(Purulia), Dhalbhum, Santhal Parganas, Pumea, etc. And there began in 194^ the aggression of ruthless suppression of Bengali language and of foisting Hindi upon the Bengali LQ population.** Against this the people and the Congress of the district rose in protest* They appealed to the Congress High Command to interrene in their favour but it was apathetic. Aggrieved at this they launched a peaceful Satyagraha throughout the district to realise their demands. But the Congress and the goTemment it headed in the state were unresponsive. They finally therefore severed their connections with the Congress in the state but held fast the ideals of Gandhi to the admiration of their political opponents. It was Gandhi's oft-repeated wish that the INC after the attainment of freedom * should be converted into a Loke Sevak Sangha (People's Service League) and should devote itself to the service of the masses. The Manbhum

Congress seceders, as the official Congress Party remained cold, moved forward to translate the last wish of Gandhi into its concrete form. Thus was organised the Loke Sevak Sangha in 194^. Headed by Atul Chandra Ghosh, Manbhum District Congress

LO ^ Arun Chandra Ghosh, A History of Manbhum Loke Sevak Sangha, op.cit.,^p.3> 152 president from 1935 to the party stood to offer resistance to the "neo-Hlndi iraperlallsm of the Congress government", and for the retmion of Manbhum with West Bengal. Largely as a result of the party's work Manbhum was divided and the major portion of it now forms the district of Purulia with a population of 11 lakhs was transferred to West Bengal. In 1952, the party contested three seats in the Bihar Legislative Assembly but wen only one. In the new Purulia district in the 1957 elections the party's performance was remarkable. Out of the eleven Assembly seats allotted to Purulia, the party had secured seven and from the only parliamentary constituency of this district, its candidate alone could win. Oandhlan in ideology, technique and approach, the Loke Sevak Sangha has a dedicated rank and file. Peasants, Adivasis and other toiling masses are Its backbone.

The Denominational Group

Restricted to their respective communities the parties of the Denominational group are either strugglers for more concessions or supplicants for more favoured treatment. Their central idea is to secure social Justice for the communities they represent and thus to serve the cause of democracy* Scattered over the foothills of the impregnable

^ Arun Chandra Ghosh, A Histox*y of Manbhum Loke Sevak Sangha, op.cit*, p.3* 153

Himalayas, across the picturesque Darjeeling, stretching orer to the evergreen panoramic tracts of Assam, are a people renowned for their martial qualities > the Goorkhas* Until recently they had no politics of their own. With the spread of modem education among their upper strata and consequent deTelopment of political consciousness, a feeling of separate identity in them originated giving rise to the desire to have an exclusive organisation, the Goorkha League. The chief objective of the League is the realisation of a hill state comprising of the district of Darjeeling and some adjacent areas. In the strict sense, the League is a socio-political organisation. In 1952 the League was engaged in a solitary fight in the election arena but thereafter it was seen maintaining close contact with the Congress for its primary aim is how much it can gain for its community* Twins of the same mother from the twin districts of the same state were the Tamil Had Toilers Party and the Commonweal Party of Madras. The Tahnikula Kshatriya Sangha (Fire-race Kshatriya Association), an ergani«ation of the Naickers and a few other local castes who from the recent past have started claiming Kshatriyahood, was the mould which cast these two parties,the former in 1950 and the latter in 1951* Indeed, they had the support of the Congress

A group of NLAs mostly of the M K who were informally interviewed on February 17, 1959 at the Legislative Hostel, Government Place, Madras, could enlighten Lipartially on these parties. 154 factlonaries, anti-Brahnin ••ntimentallsts and a host of petty landlords and agrieoltvirists. The Tamil Nad Toilers Party had its centre in the South Arcot district and after its fomation gathered aoMtntiM under the stewardship of its founder S.S.Raaaswamy Padayaehi* The Tahnikula Kshatriya Sangha of the North Arcot district was not a silent spectator at this* It had brought into being the Commonweal Party under the leadership of H.A.ManickaTelu Naicker. The Kshatriya Sangha wanted representation in the goYemment services and admission in colleges especially for professional courses on community basis, which although odd to audibility were in great demand in Madras then as now. In 1951-52 elections the Tamil Nad Toilers' Party won a sweeping victory in its birth district* It had secured nineteen seats in the Madras legislature and four seats in the House of the People. The Commonweal Peurty also had its due share. Six of its candidates were returned to the State Assembly and three to the House of the People. In the 376Haember Assembly the Congress Party could retain only 152 seats. NeYertheless, in April 1952, C.Rajagopalachari who was nominated to the LegislatiTe Council, constituted a Congress ministry with the help of some independents. Eajagopalachari noted for his dipl<»atic ability to woo and win his opponents together with Kamaraja Nadar known for his silent political strategy, successfully negotiated with Manickavelu Naicker for the merger of his party with the 155

Congress. In rstum he was given a alnlsterial post. ♦ But Padayachi could not be won over easily. His party took active Interest with other leftists In setting up the United Democratic Front with the hope of forming a non- Congress ministry in Kadras. The Tamil Nad Toilers* Party also assisted the late Dr^Syama Prasad Mookerjee to form an opposition group in Parliaitentt the National Democratic 52 Party on May 27> 1952. But from the point of view of material benefit to the cowmmity it by and large represented, it re-examined the entire position when Kamaraja Nadar became the Chief Minister on April 13> 1954 in place of Rajagopalacharl Nadar succeeded in persuading Padayachi to accept a Cabinet ■ttibership uriio in turn favoimd Nadar by Joining the Congress taking his party with him* He was* however, dropped out unlike ManickavelUf when Nadar re-constituted his Cabinet

after the general elections in 1957* The Harijan Mandal* Kashmir may be called a weak Kaslnir counterpart of the former SCF. Its existence is limited to four constituencies of Kashmir State reserved for the Scheduled Castes in aceordance with the Constitution of Kashmir which had come into force on January 26, 1957> l

Kessing*s Vol.H, 1952-54, p.12357. 156 the lot of the untouchables In the state, for their social amelioration and economic betterment. Its aims are indeed noble, but its political competence to achieve them is problematical. The partition of the Indian sub-continent brought to this country another people deprived economically and disabled socially * the refugees* They flowed into this land from east and west to make India their home. A large number of them troa Sind settled down in Ajmer. A much revered personality among these Sindhi refugees, Kaka Tilok Chandjee took the lead in establishing a party known as the Purusharathi Panchayat in June 1951• The object of the Purusharathi Panchayat is to bring about union and harmony between the displaced persons and the original residents of Ajmer and to contrive plans for the uplift of the former, socially» politically and economically.^^

The Panchayat has played its role in rehabilitating the refugees and in securing to them the co-operation of the local inhabitants in their constructive activities, and in proioting their political interest. It fought the first general elections in Ajmer with such a measure of success that it had been recognised as a state party until the states

53 Fron a letter dated Novwnber 5> 1953 of Kaka Qovindramji, general secretary of the ^rusharathi Panchayat addressed to the writer. 157 rtorganisation when Ajaer was msrgsd with Rajasthan* In all the elections including that of local self-govemnenti the party had proved that the refugee areas are its pocket boroughs. With its incapacity to surmount the barriers imposed by its own narrow scop* and object» the Panchayat's coming up as a political party is dubious but it may thrive as a social welfare organisation*

The Liberal Group

Moderation is the reflection of matured mind, of well- balanced thinking and a road safe enough to make a wise

Journey in the conflict between reactionary obduracy and revolutionary extremism. The impulsive youth and the refractory senile will not find it pleasant to put up with it* Saner counsel is a bitter pill to swallow but certainly a sure remedy. Time has now proved that the diagnosis, prescriptions and restrictions made by the eminent Liberals of India were not only in the best interest of the country but were for the sure cure of her political ills befmre she was wedded to parliamentary democracy. A tradition founded by a galaxy of distinguished Indians was a rare privilege of the Liberal Party. The liberal leaders, Sir Surendra Nath Banerjee, Sir Phiroseshah Mehta, Sir Dinshaw Wacha, Justice

M.G.Ranade, Q.K.Gokhale, Sir P.S.Sivaswamy Iyer, the Rt.Hon* Srinivasa Sastri and others were men of great distinction. 15a

The Liberals were full-fledged Congressmen and their aim was to achieve the country's Independence through constitutional and peaceful means. The extreaists advocating desperate course for the attainment of self-govemnent, therefore, came out in violent disagreement with them at the 23rd

Congress Session at Surat 1b 1907* The split was one of creed, action and approach, and the Liberals realised that they could never come to terms with the extremists. They therefore formed a Moderate Party in 1909 which later transformed into the National Liberal Federation of India but ftmctioned within the Cmigress until 191 d in which year they formally seceded because the extremist-dcminated

Congress rejected the Montagu~Chelmsford reforms which in their opinion deserved a fair trial. The Liberals co­ operated with the working of the government and served the

country when the Congress was negative. But from the second half of 1923 onwards started the decline of the Liberals; they lost all the successive elections to the Swarajists. The greatest drawback of the Liberals was that they were not politically dishonest as to give false promises to the masses and they, by the very nature of their brought up, were men isolated from the masses. Being practical thinkers, they did not mix religion with polities nor did they incite the ■ob to violent action under the cover of innocence or the

studentry to desert educational institutions. 159

The Liberal Party with its glorious tradition, is still a party of coomonsense, but it lives in seclusion. In dttBocracy the strength of a party is largely neasured by the number of votes it could ouster but "as an election party, at present the Liberals* prospects are very poor.**^^ The

Liberal principles include constitutional action, respect for law, belief in constructive work, fonnilation of public policy in consonance with •thical standairds and a public life sublimed by private virtues. The Liberal Party stands for a civil state as opposed to secular, for civil liberties and for an educational lift fX*ee from governmental control and political interference. Iconomic efficiency is the keynote of its economic policy* Nationalisation should be gradual and selective and equitable compensation be given whenever private owners are deprived of their property. It also wants an uncorrupt, decentralised, simplified administra­ tion and welcomes an independent judiciary selecting its own

judges. All these indeed sound well but it is not tradition but

action that is required for their implementation. The party had not taken part in the last two general elections nor did it lend its support to anyone. Its present is understandable

The Liberal Party in India, Retrospect and Prospect, Bombay, Rational Liberal Federation of India, 1949, p.6. 160 bttt "as for th« future of th« Liberal Party, that question future alone can answer, and, as the saying goes,

»he who lires will see*."^^ The need of a centre party^^ is currently a talk among politicians who neither want democracy to be disfigured by retrogressiyes nor want it to be murdered by Maximalists.

Normally dwelling in luxurious surroundings, these 'pazi^y centrists' are not a united group but isolated thinkers taking hardly any pains to do what they think and speak.

HoweTer, a small beginning towards this end could be seen in Sudhir Hendre's Liberal Democratic Party started in 1956 in Bombay. Hendre perceived "today in India both the Congress Party and the Communists have become votaries of *left* reaction.So, he wanted a centre political party to balance the right and left reactions. His party*s programme was almost similar to that of the Liberal Party but it placed more emphasis on the economic aspect.

The party could not move among the masses nor it could more the masses. The wind was nnfayourable to the sails of

V.N.Naik, Indian Liberalism (A Study) Bombay, Padma Publications, 1945, p*353* C.RaJagopalachari and M.R.Masani have foraally outlined the formation of a new centre party in Madras called the Swatantra Party on June 5, 1959. (The Times of India, Bombay, June 6, 1959 - see Appendix A.) 57 Sudhir Hendre, Draft Programme of the Liberal Democratic Party of India, Bonbay, Laxml Narayan Press, 1956, p.d. 161 the Liberal Democratic Party and it had no well trained crew.

Hendre's call to the people to Join the party could not salvage it from sinking* He himself therefore in 19^7 stood as an independent candidate for the House of the People from

Bombay City but was defeated by his conuaunist rival S.A.Oange.

The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms which the Congress rejected and the Liberals accepted introduced diarchy into the Indian provinces. Diarchy was remindful of the old double goverrment that worked in Bengal for a time during the early days of the Bnglish Sast India Company* In 1920, when Gandhi mooted the idea of non-co-operation, stalwarts of patriotism like Lala Lajpat Rai opposed it. But the

Congress was passing into the Qandhian era: it boycotted the legislatures and denounced the elections. Wisdom soon prevailed and on January 1, 1923 by the joint endeavour of C.R.Das and Motilal Nehru the Swaraj Party^^ was formed to make council entry possible. As opposed to the policies of the Congress and consequently of the Swaraj Pazty, Lala

Laj pat Rai and Pandit Nadan Mohan Malaviya brought into being the Nationalist Party* Strong as it was inside the

Jawaharlal Nehru» An Autobiography, London, John Lane The Bodley Head, 1936, p.63* Actually, the informal announcement of the formation of the party had come from C.R.Das upon his resignation as the president of the Congress consequent to the rejection of the resolution urging council entry, at the Annual Session of the Congress in Gaya in December 1922. 162

Ittgislature "the Nationalist Party met with a great measure of success.. But the death of Lajpat Rai in I92d had aortal reflections on the spirit of the party. In the intervening period cane the ConoBunal Award of Ransay MacDonald by which the Muslims* Suropeans, Sikhs, Indian Christians, Anglo-Indians and among the Hindus the depressed classes were to get separate electorate. Qandhi came out in

Tshement protest to the taking away of the depressed classes from the Hindu fold and he undertook a fast unto death on

September 20, 1932 which led to the historic negotiations between Dr.B.R.Ambedkar representing the untouchables on one side, and the Rt.Hon.M.R.Jayakar and Sir TeJ Bahadur Sapru on behalf of Gandhi on the other* As a result an agreement known as the Poona Pact was reached on September 24, to the triumph of Gandhi.

But except in this case, the Award was not unacceptable to the Congress although it criticised its anti-national character. This led to a heated controversy within the Congress and that section of the Congress who wanted to reject the Award in toto led by Pandit Nadan Mohan Malaviya with the support of M.S.Aney formed on July 31, 1934 a

second Nationalist Party of India with a view to combat the Award. Wider in outlook, different in objective, the new

^ Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography, op.cit., p.160. 163

Nationalist Party nourished ths saat sentiments of the old. In the imfavonrable ebb and flow of the subsequent political tides in the country, the Nationalist Party lost its purpose. It had hence gone into a political reclusion* However, in 1951-52 it made an appearance with the intention of fij^ting the Bombay elections in which it was routed. The defeat was

enough for the relapse of the party. The All India Republican Party was founded on January 26, 1950, the first Republic Day of India, in Madras by H.D.Rajah and his political associates* The party stood for four fundamental rights, namely, right to freedom, right to live,

right to labour and right to leam^^ and extolled these as the four pillars of the democracy it envisaged. The party arose with the indignation that "all the features of totalitarianism which disfigured the administra­ tion of Hitler and Kussolinl have been reproduced in this country under Congress auspices*" It discovered "the Congress is not a party; it is the dictatorship of a hierarchy.Naturally therefore, "the formation of a constitutional opposition and the offering to the people an

Speeches and Statements of Shri.H.D*Rajah in Parliament, Madras, Swatantra Printers, 1952, p. (cover back) H.D*Rajah, Presidential Address, All India Republican Party, First Convention 1951> Madras, Bharat Devi Press, p.4*

Ibid., p.5. 164

64 alternative leadership to the Congress”, was Its resolution*

The party therefore outlined a multi-point policy by which it announced its intention to "sever the connection with

British Commonwealth",^^ to "fl^t for giving up of prohibition 66 and save the country from gangster rule", to "give free scope for producers of wealth to enter into more production" to give agriculturists "not only honour but also profit" and to redraw "the map of India on linguistic basis".It was disdainful of the Hindu Code Bill and demanded the 70 withdrawal of this "monstrous piece of legislation".

The policy and programme of the party were high sounding but its operational side was ifloiobile and was lacking in energy and drive. The elections it fought proved to be political rebuffs. To add confusion to its inaction, by the latter half of 1957» a second Republican Party had come into existence when the SCF of the late Dr.Ambedkar was renamed as "the Republican Party of India" by his followers led by N.SivaraJ. Immediately after the new development,

^ H.D.Rajah, Presidential Address, All India Republican Party, First Convention 1951, op.cit., p.1. 65 Ibid., p.?. 66 Ibid., p.9. Ibid., p.10 Ibid., p.11. H.D.Rajah, Presidential Address, National Draocratic Convention, 26th January 1953* Madras, Swatantra Px*inters, p.10. 70 Ibid., p.l6. 165

Rajah merged his party with th« IMDC, a party of Congress dissenters of Madras, as according to him there was sameness in principles and policies between the two**^^

The Regionalist Group

The integration of the former princely states into larger units was not altogether without people's opposition* In Cochin, although restricted to a minority, it took a different turn and went ahead with the plan of forming a

political party with the object of maintaining the status quo. The Cochin Party as it was called, had a few public men of local prominence like C.V.Iyyu, Itteera Ambooken,

Mohammed Kattiserry and Kunjirama Menon* 7? The party feared that the bigger Travancore' with which Cochin state was merged, would d<»iiinate every sphere

and deprive the people of Cochin of their due share in

government and public life. The Cochin Party therefore 73 demanded annulment of the union of the two states and to restore "Cochin for Cochinltes**. The Cochin Party contested twelve seats for the State Assembly but lost all but one.

From an interview with H.D.Rajah at Madras on February 20, 1959.

Travancore was five times bigger in area than Cochin.

The two states were united on July 1, 1949* (V.P.Menon, The Story of the Integration of Indian States, op.cit., p.291.) 166

This was enough for the party to realise that the integration of the two states could not be undone by their neagre strength. Furtheraore, events that followed in Travancore-

Coehin had proved that the fears of the Cochinites were unfounded; they in fact* were reassuring. So the Cochin Party leaders considered it wise to leave the party where it was and not to press the issue any further. Thus a quiet end awaited the party. The wrecking of the constitutional set-up of Manipur and the imposition of the Chief Cotamissioner's rule in 1949} were indeed retrogressive acts which caused a political stir throughout the state. Public feeling ran high in Manipur at this **deliberate strangulation of denocracy" and a new party called the AIl-Hanipur National Union had taken shape with better aass base than the Praja Santi Party* under the leadership of S.Indramani Sin^ and Nilamani Singh, to give expression to the popular reaction. The party claiaed a distinct nationality for Maniparis and demanded an independent statehood for Manipur. The iouBediate objective of the party was to restore to Manipur the constitutional government it had, at the time of its accession to India. Naturally therefore, the National Union received the liberal patronage of the members of the royal house so much so in the first general elections, the sister of the Maharaja of Manipur, Binodini Devi fared as the most conspicuous candidate of 167 the party.

The accord that the party had dereloped with the fomer

ruling fasilyi engendered the popular sumise that it was a

royalist in disguise seeking to gather the masses in aid of the Praja Santi Party. True, both the parties acted in

concert in the agitational field and the National Union did not have a progranme or outlook much different from that of the PraJa Santi Party. Nevertheless, the National Union was

distinguishably of a different blood and it was zealously

wedded to its shibboleth "Manipur for Manipuris". On termina­

tion of the first general elections, the National Union together with the Praja Santi Party, the Gandhi Sebok Sova, and the CPI, raised the Democratic Front to agitate for the return of representative government but it collapsed due to the inconsistency of its leaders* The National Union

enjoyed an appreciable measure of popular support but that was not enough to make the Centre indulgent. New Delhi's

inflexible attitude induced the party to Increase its

strength by integration and finally the National Union

became one of the two constituents of the new "Revolutionary 75 Nationalist Party of Manipur."

7* Tld« p. l u 75 Vide p. tiA foot-note ^ 163

Th« Tribal Group

As a rule almost sTsry minor tribal party is foundsd on the basis of ^one tribe one party* and it does not admit any one from outside. The tribal communities themselves are

Incorporated intimately and there is a high degree of discipline, and mutual trust among their members. To form a political party in such a c(xmiiunlty is therefore just a matter of understanding the political side of their life.

The tribal politics on the whole is simple, dlTorced from craft and forensic complexities. Their political parties therefore do not have prolific literature and regulating documents. Although the general rule is ’one tribe one party*, there are however parties open to all tribes and also tribes with plural parties. Impox*tant among such tribes are the Nagas, the Khasis and the Mlzos. The parties of the Nagas are, the Naga National Council (NNC), the Naga National

League, and the Mao Maram Union; the first is founded by the Nagas of Assam, and the second and third, the Nagas of

Manipur. As has been mentioned before, it was at the British

Inspiration, the Naga National Council was brought into being in 1946.^^ In doing so the British rulers in India

Blpinpal Das, The Naga Problem (op.cit.), p.13 says the NNC was formed in 1945. 169 had only taken advantage of the Nagas* love for independence and their desire to be left alone to live a life of their own. "The Nagas of India number 400,000 and divided into 77 over 20 tribes differing widely in language and customs.” Quite a few living in the Interior of the dense forests even today are head-hunters as they were all once but the majority are a healthy, sturdy-built people of steady mind and steel nerves, choosing between freedom and death if it

so comes* They live in a mountainous region spread over Assam and Manipur and a portion of Burma, approximately of

over 10,000 square miles still undetennined by survey 73 experts. The NNC at first wanted full autonomy for this

area but later under the presidentship of A.Z.Phizo demanded

a sovereign independent Nagaland because ”they assert that

they were never a part of India, that culturally and linguistically they had always been distinct from India 79 and the Indian religions never reached the Naga hills.’’ It may not be mistaken that the Ifagas' earnestness for independence is from the beginning an earnestness for an

Kessing*s Vol.X, 1955*56, p.15276. Being essentially a people living in forest and hilly areas their population figure cannot be accurate. Bipinpal Das IPage II introduction to "The Naga Problem”) assesses their number as between four and five lakhs including their population in Burma*

The figures provided by the Surveyor General of India and the Government of Assam differ. 79 Bipinpal Das, The Naga Problem, op.cit., p.6. 170 unaToldable secession from India. They are driven to this desperate altematiye by the proYocative tactics and go repudiation of promises often resorted to by the government and also by the oppression of an ununderstanding bureaucracy failed to catch up with the spirit of the regenerated India. The HNC is an indirectly elected representative body of the Nagas inhabiting the Naga Hill distz^ct of Assam. Pyramidically built, it has Just below it, the tribal councils - one for each sub>tribe > which stand above the local tribal councils each of which is constituted for a fixed number of villages. As the central organisation, the

NNC's decision are undisputed, smoothly conveyed from above down and implicitly obeyed by all. The Nagas have great

do The agreement reached between the Government of Assam and the NNC in 1946 on the question of tribal autonomy was later refuted by the late Gioplnath Bardoloi, then chief minister of Assam. Again the Hydari Agreement made between the NNC and Sir Akbar Hydari, then Governor of Assam on behalf of the Government of India, in June 194^ on the same question was refused to be acknowledged by his successor Sri Prakasa in November 1949. di In March 1953, the bureaucrats who ruled the Naga Hills refused permission to the NNC to submit a memorandum to Prime Minister Nehru when he visited the Naga Hills. The result was that when the Prime Minister went to address the Naga masses, they marched away from his sight. Naga villagers were forced to work as labour for construction of roads and other development projects. Armed police used to visit Naga villages and homes and take away forcibly rice, vegetables and poultry. There were even reports of theft by policemen. Serious allegations of raping of Naga women by armed policemen were heard, and to crown all, there were orders to dissolve the age-old tribal councils. Reports of interference with their customs and practices were numerous. Almost a reign of tenror was let loose. (Bipinpal Oas, The Naga Problem, op.cit., p.26.) 171 faith in it and they are prepared to make any sacrifice for the cause it advocates.

The breach of pronise on the part of the authorities, first nade the Nagas flabbergasted and frustrated and subsequently nuide then infuriated and revengeful* They boycotted elections and non*co>operated with both the goTemments. Mountain dwellers are phenomenally ind<»itable.

As means of negotiations failed, they at last have resorted to arms. Government took repressive measures and military followed the civil police on January 31» 1956. And it was alleged "that the Army had indulged in an orgy of rape, pillage and murder, that 2,000 people whose villages had been burned do%m were starving in the Jungle and that over 62 500 were in prison." The civil war is still being fouf^t. The massive military operation may have its pyrrhic triumph. But the

Naga mind will be unconquerable even to the deadliest war weapon; it can be conquered only by a mind, sympathetic, understanding, humane and full of benevolence.

The Naga National League and the Mao Maram Union are parties formed by the Nagas living in the Mao hills of Manipur. Maos are a sub**tribe of the Nagas numbering about 2d,445. In the first general elections to the Manipur

Reishang Keishang, Naga M.P.'s speech in Parliament on August 23, 1956 (Kes^ng's Vol.I 1955-56, p.15277). 172

Electoral College, the Naga National League candidates,

Tho Ahral and Kasolowll opposed the Mao Maram Union candidates

Daso Thoiso and Hepuni Kaikho, but were defeated by their

rivals. Thus the two seats allotted to the Mao hills in

Manipur were bagged by the Maram Union.

An area of 5iH6 square miles, ^ formerly consisting of

25 Khasi Hill states, was consolidated to form the Khasi> Jaintia Hills district on Janttazy 26, 1950 to be an integral part of Assam. In this district live 363,599 Khasis and

Jaintias who like the Nagas have formed three parties. They

have their own economic grievances. Of the 363,599 Khasis

and Jaintias, only 5^,512 have taken to urban life and the

rest 305,087^^ are still typical rural folk spread over 800 villages^^ who earn their livelihood by sale of oranges,

betel leaves, arecanuts, bamboos, cinnamon tamala (in local

language 'tezpatta') and potatoes for which Khasi Hills are famous. In the days earlier to the partition, these

agricultural products found their thriving market in the

nearby Sylhet district the transfer of which to Pakistan

Figures given by the Surveyor General of India. The Assam Government has a different figure to offer (India ~ A Reference Annual - 195^, op.cit., p.555).

The Times of India Directory and Tear Book 195^-59 (Bombay, Times of India Publications), p.365*

Report of the Conmissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for the year 1953, Delhi, Manager of Publications, p.22. 173 has not only deprived the Khasls of their vital market but also the long established routes through which their agricultural connodities were brought and sold. The Pakistani ban on the border trade and troop concentration along the boundary line have made the day-to-day life of the Khasis more difficult. Although all the three Khasi parties promised to ameliorate the lot of their people, they were opposed to one another. The Khasi-Jaintia Durbar is a paz*ty of the Khasi trtbal chiefs of traditional authority. Being so, its leadership is rested and conservative. In 1951-52 Khasi notables like G.Gilbert Swell and T.W.Roy contested elections for the Durbar. The Khasi-Jaintia National Federated States

Conference, had the patronage of the late Rev.J.J.M.Nicholas

Roy. It is a progressive organisation of the Khasis under the leadership of A.Alley who contested and secured a seat in the 1951-52 elections to the Assam State Assembly. The smallest among the three Khasi parties is the Khasi Jaintia Rural Organisation. Perhaps it is also the weakest. It had Independently participated in the first general elections but the outcome was disappointing. Of the various tribes of Assam and Hanlpur the Lushais who have among them a large number of Christian converts, are the most educationally advanced. They are next to the people of Travancore-Cochin in the matter of literacy. Of the males 46.15 per cent and of their females 16.6? per cent 174

B6 d7 are literate- The Lushais are enumerated to be 1,96,202 of whofli 1,^9,297 have taken the nane Mizos^^ perhaps to aake conspicuous the social superiority they have attained by education and by change of religion in contrast to the rest of their clan who still adhez*e to the ozdginal name Lushais.

The Mizo Union and the United Mizo Freedom Organisation, the two Mizo political parties are therefore less emotionally appealing to the Lushais* More progressive than the Freedom

Organisation, the Mizo Union has a branch in Manipur.

The Mizo Union stands for the political unification of the Mizo tribe now spread chiefly over Assam and Manipur by doing away with the administrative barriers that stand between them. It therefore favours the merger of Manipur with Assam. The United Mizo Freedom Organisation demands the Lushai Hills district c(KBprlsing an area of d,143 square miles to be independent or alternatively its integration with Burma. Organised in 1946 the Mizo Union is national- minded and close to the Congress in Ideology and programme.

It is the dominant party in the Lushai Hills. The Freedom Organisation on the contrary claims a separate nationality for the Mizos and is less popular with the people of the

^6 Report of the Conmissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for the Tear 1953» p.26.

d7 Idem. Idem. 175

Mlzo Hills. In the first general elections the Freedom

Organisation faced complete defeat at the hands of the Miso Union. The Mizo commimity is ruled by 313 hereditary chieftains whose all round traditional authority the Mizo Union

▼isualised as hindrance to progress. Known locally as *Lals* these chieftains have been the biggest impediment to administrative and Judicial informs. The leader of the Mizo

Union R.Thanhlira had dtiring the election days announced that the Union would put an end to the Mizo chieftaincy. The Freedom Organisation led by Lalhmingliana and others however favoured the continuance of the ’Lais*. Between the Mizo Union and the Freedom Organisation lie two sets of conflicting fundamentals, one emanates from the realism of the progress and the other, from the traditionalism of the old. The Oaros are another important tribe, 2,42,075 strong inhabiting the Garo Hills district of Assam which has an area of 3,149 square miles.^ The Garo National Council, their 91 political organisation is under Captain Williamson Sangma.

Report of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for the Year 1953* p.26.

^ According to the State Government survey 3,152 square miles. 91 Minister for Tribal Affairs of Assam until October 7, i960 when he resigned in protest to the Asssub Government's official language policy. 176

In 1951-52 three members of the Garo National Council were returned to the Assam Legislature, who with an independent

Garo member Joined the Congress Legislature Party* In 1954i the Garo Council leaders played a prominent part in establish- ing the BITU with the object of realising an autonomous tribal state within the Indian Union. Formed as early as 1946 the Tribal League, unlike many other tribal parties, is not restricted to any particular tribal group but is open to all tribesmen irrespectlTe of their tribes or sub-tribes and is wider in scope and objective.

Nonetheless, it is predominantly confined to the tribal people in the plains of Assam and has failed to erolve as a common tribal political ox^ganisation. Its electoral 93 strength is inconsiderable. The Kukis of Manipur were not behind other tribes in organising parties, and led by 2arrem, Paolen, Sumkhohen, Solet and others, their political party, the Kuki National

Association, in the flz*st general elections contested seven

Electoral College seats but lost all but two.

Two other tzlbal parties that originated in Manipur are the Paite National Council and the Zeliengirong Union. In

Vide Chapter IV, p. 93 Much in the lines of the Tribal League, there was another party under the name, the Hills Peoples' Party which is understood to have taken part In the first general elections. To its membership, it is said, as its name suggests, all people of hill origin were admitted. However no authentic information, direct or indirect was available about this party. 177 the 1951-52 Manipur Electoral College elections, the Palte National Council put up a single candidate, its leader Salkhan, but was defeated. The Zellengrong Union however scored a cent per cent Tlctory when its two candidates, Athuibo and Keiben were elected to the College.

With the tribal enfranchisement, a look back on the aborigines, made the Congress Party conscious of the fact that it had no locus standi among them. The aborigines of

Bihar and Ortssa have already by the forties become followers of Jaipal Singh whose Adivasl Mahasabha posed a threat to the Congress in the tribal constituencies of these two states. The Congress therefore commissioned Lai Ranjit

Singh Barlha, the tribal minister in the pre-1952 Orissa Congress ministry, to start a rival organisation of the tribals to meet the Adivasl Mahasabha desirably in the election field. Barlha accomplished the task entrusted successfully and his party, the Adivasl Congress in the 1951-52 elections put up a few candidates who were supported by the Congress. The party had s

sfnblance of a alnor party as understood in the west. In the oceidental draocracies "Biaer parties might be said to condition and modify major parties somewhat as the habitat 9k of an organism determines its characteristics.” It is» in fact, much more in the United States since the "Republican and Democratic victories depend on the balance of power held 95 by ... Toters" irtio are under the influence of minor parties. To this standard none of the minor parties here

could rise except perhaps in some constituencies. The lack of bargaining strength on the part of the

minor parties is not wholly due to their organisational debility but to a great extent* is attributable to the lack

of a powerful national party to oppose the Congress as the

Republicans face the Democrats in the USA or the Labour

encounters the ConsenratiYes in the UK and vice versa. It is only in a tough tug of war between two equals, aid and assistance are sou|^t by ea

within a short span of ten years make political observers to murmur: "as they have come so they have gone". Minor parties by and large have been victims of this inevitable fate, in almost all democracies with dominant major parties. In

Wilfred B.Binkley, American Political Parties, (Their Natural History) Mew York, Alfred A.Knopf, 1954, p-1^2.

95 Election Civics 1952, op*cit., p.22. 179

Australia for example "the minor parties which emerged in the period between 1931 and 1946 were short-lived and sterile; they added nothing to Australian political life except confusion and corruption.It is then no wonder if a younger and more recent democracy like India followed suit. There is a sharp fall in the number of minor parties in America too» "partly due to the eventual adoption of their issues by a major party" and partly, the huge amount of money it takes to "campaign for nation-wide recognition” and the procedural difficulty that comes in the way of 97 entering on the ballot.

With all their inherent shortcomings and inspite of their eventual disappearance, unlike their Australian and

American counterparts, these minor parties in India have accomplished something significant and invaluable to dttnocracy. Of course, they could not be strong and healthy opposition in the legislature nor could they displace the ruling Congress in any state. But it is a fact that these minor parties wittingly or unwittingly, directly or indirectly, conveyed the message of democracy and freedom to various parts of the country and were an attempt at imparting

S.R.Davis and Others, The Australian Political Party System, op.cit., p.106.

97 Election Civics 1952, op.cit., p.22. ido political education to millions of citizens literate and illiterate alike, who thus had come to know something of practical democracy and of democratic institutions* their form, content and conditions* Next that stands to the credit of the minor parties is the training they have given in political leadership. Donocratic leadership implies a long process of seasoning and conditioning as it is not by inheritance or imposition.

Its technique and tactics are persuasive and conciliatory and it reposes on confidence and consent. Mumerosity of minor parties greatly enhanced the opportunity for training in democratic chieftaincy. Hundreds of men pulled the gocarts of leadership through the levels set by the minor parties on whose languishing many of them chosen positions in various lower or higher organisations of medium and major parties. Furthermore, the minor parties have brought about a great understanding in places where they have functioned, between the people and democracy and established relation favourable to democracy between the leaders and the people.

In a country as India where the fears perpetuated by various patterns of autocracy are yet to be got rid of, unless there is in every comer a trained democrat to guide and inform the populace, a borrowed ideology like democracy can hardly survive. Many leaders of minor parties by their middle class and lower middle class origin, were close to the common idi people to whom they could speak on a number of topics related to democracy. When the local people had become responsive, these party leaders began to more with the swing of their emotional pendultxn and took up their causes as their acclaimed x^presentatlTes* This mutual responsiTe- ness, although could not be continued for long in all the places where it had developed because of the preaature extinction of several minor paz*ties, was certainly in favour of basic democratic growth. The leaders of the minor parties were alive to local problems and they on the whole dealt with local issues with which the people were immediately concerned. This pulsation of democracy at the stagnant bottom of India's millions, however, is no small achievement which thinkers of

posterity would find difficult to devaluate.