Download (4MB)

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Download (4MB) Establishing trusted Machine-to-Machine communications in the Internet of Things through the use of behavioural tests Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the University of Liverpool for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy by Valerio Selis April 2018 \Be less curious about people and more curious about ideas." Marie Curie Abstract Today, the Internet of Things (IoT) is one of the most important emerging technolo- gies. Applicable to several fields, it has the potential to strongly influence people's lives. \Things" are mostly embedded machines, and Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communica- tions are used to exchange information. The main aspect of this type of communication is that a \thing" needs a mechanism to uniquely identify other \things" without human intervention. For this purpose, trust plays a key role. Trust can be incorporated in the smartness of \things" by using mobile \agents". From the study of the IoT ecosystem, a new threat against M2M communications has been identified. This relates to the opportunity for an attacker to employ several forged IoT-embedded machines that can be used to launch attacks. Two \things-aware" detection mechanisms have been proposed and evaluated in this work for incorporation into IoT mobile trust agents. These new mechanisms are based on observing specific thing-related behaviour obtained by using a characterisation algorithm. The first mechanism uses a range of behaviours obtained from real embedded ma- chines, such as threshold values, to detect whether a target machine is forged. This detection mechanism is called machine emulation detection algorithm (MEDA). MEDA takes around 3 minutes to achieve a detection accuracy of 79.21%, with 44.55% of real embedded machines labelled as belonging to forged embedded machines. These results indicated a need to develop a more accurate and faster detection method. Therefore, a second mechanism was created and evaluated. A dataset composed of behaviours from real, virtual and emulated embedded systems that can be part of the IoT was created. This was used for both training and testing classification methods. The results iden- tified Random Forest (RF) as the most efficient method, recognising forged embedded machines in only 5 seconds with a detection rate of around 99.5%. It follows that this solution can be applied in real IoT scenarios with critical conditions. In the final part of this thesis, an attack against these new mechanisms has been proposed. This consists of using a modified kernel of a powerful machine to mimic the behaviour of a real IoT-embedded machine, referred to as a fake timing attack (FTA). Two metrics, mode and median from ping response time, have been found to effectively detect this attack. The final detection method involves combining RF and k-Nearest Neighbour to successfully detect forged embedded machines and FTA in only 40 seconds, with an overall detection performance (ODP) of 99.9% and 93.70% respec- tively. This method also was evaluated using behaviours from embedded machines that were not present in the training set. The results from that evaluation demonstrate that the proposed solution can detect embedded machines unknown to the method, both real and virtual, with an ODP of 99.96% and 99.92% respectively. In summary, a new algorithm able to detect forged embedded machines easily, quickly and with very high accuracy has been developed. The proposed method ad- dresses the challenge of securing present and future M2M-embedded machines with power-constrained resources and can be applied to real IoT scenarios. v Contents Abstract v Illustrations xi Abbreviations xvii Preface xxiii Acknowledgements xxv 1 Introduction1 1.1 Internet-connected Things...........................1 1.2 Real-Life Scenarios...............................4 1.2.1 Intelligent Transportation Systems..................4 1.2.2 Intelligent Healthcare Systems....................5 1.2.3 Intelligent Building Systems......................6 1.3 Threats Against Things and the Internet of Things.............7 1.4 Motivation, Aims and Objectives.......................8 1.5 Contributions and Outline of the Thesis................... 11 1.6 Publication List................................. 13 2 Background and Related Work 15 2.1 Internet of Things............................... 15 2.2 Machine-to-Machine Communications.................... 18 2.3 Emerging Trends in the IoT.......................... 19 2.3.1 Social Internet of Things (SIoT)................... 19 2.3.2 Virtualisation Continuum (VC).................... 21 2.3.3 Fog Computing (FC).......................... 22 2.4 Information Security and Trust........................ 23 2.4.1 Encryption Techniques in the Internet of Things.......... 26 2.4.2 Definition of Trust........................... 29 2.4.3 Trust Management Frameworks.................... 31 2.4.4 Attacks against Trust Management Frameworks.......... 34 2.4.5 Trust Models for IoT.......................... 35 vii 2.5 Limitations of Current Solutions....................... 36 2.6 Summary.................................... 38 3 A New Threat and a Novel Solution: Machine Emulation Detection Algorithm 43 3.1 Threat Model.................................. 43 3.2 Real-Life Scenarios: Worst Cases....................... 45 3.2.1 Open Networks............................. 46 3.2.2 Closed Networks............................ 47 3.3 Virtualisation and Emulation Detection................... 48 3.3.1 CPU and Memory Tests........................ 49 3.3.2 Architecture-based Timing Tests................... 49 3.3.3 Remote Tests.............................. 50 3.3.4 Fingerprinting Tests.......................... 50 3.4 Solution and Algorithm Design........................ 51 3.4.1 Characterisation Algorithm...................... 53 3.4.2 Machine Emulation Detection Algorithm.............. 57 3.5 Results and Discussion............................. 60 3.5.1 Comparison with Other Techniques.................. 62 3.6 Summary.................................... 64 4 A Classification Approach to Detecting Forged Embedded Machines 65 4.1 Background and Motivation.......................... 65 4.2 Classification-based Algorithm........................ 67 4.2.1 Initial Dataset............................. 68 4.2.2 Feature Extraction........................... 69 4.2.3 Feature Selection............................ 71 4.2.4 Classification.............................. 71 4.2.5 Performance Evaluation........................ 73 4.2.6 Overall Evaluation........................... 75 4.3 Simulation and Results............................. 77 4.3.1 Comparison with MEDA....................... 84 4.4 Summary.................................... 84 5 Attack and Defence in Behavioural Tests 87 5.1 Threat Model.................................. 87 5.2 Fake Timing Attack.............................. 88 5.3 Detection Model................................ 91 5.4 Simulations, Results and Comparison with Other Algorithms....... 92 5.5 Classification of Unknown Devices...................... 97 5.6 Applicability of the Proposed Solution.................... 98 5.6.1 Architectural Reference Models.................... 98 5.6.2 Implementation Feasibility...................... 100 5.6.3 Real-Life Scenarios: Applicability................... 102 5.7 Summary.................................... 102 6 Conclusions and Future Work 105 6.1 Conclusions................................... 105 viii 6.2 Contributions and Findings.......................... 106 6.2.1 Introduction, Background and Related Work............ 106 6.2.2 A New Threat and a Novel Solution: Machine Emulation Detec- tion Algorithm............................. 107 6.2.3 A Classification Approach to Detecting Illegitimate Embedded Machines................................ 107 6.2.4 Attack and Defence in Behavioural Tests.............. 107 6.3 Future Work.................................. 108 6.4 Summary.................................... 109 A Appendices 111 A.1 Characterisation Algorithm.......................... 111 A.2 Characterisation Algorithm Outputs..................... 115 A.3 Machine Emulation Detection Algorithm................... 117 A.4 Classification-based Algorithm........................ 121 A.5 Architecture-based Timing Test on Raspberry Pi 2 model B........ 125 A.6 Architecture-based Timing Test: QEMU patch............... 127 B Appendices 129 B.1 Performance Results from MEDA, k-NN and RF.............. 129 B.2 Performance Results from k-NN and RF without the Normalisation Step. 134 B.3 Cumulative Frequency Histograms for Timestamp Features used to Detect FTA....................................... 136 Bibliography 139 ix Illustrations List of Figures 1.1 Trend of top attack news against things and the IoT infrastructure. Attacks against embedded things are highlighted. Attacks related to both things and the IoT infrastructure are shown. In 2013, things and the IoT infrastruc- ture were attacked for the first time and at the same time, while in 2015, compromised embedded things were used to attack the IoT infrastructure..8 2.1 Forecast of connected Internet of Things (IoT) devices............. 17 2.2 Social Internet of Things (SIoT) architecture................... 20 2.3 Types of relationship in the SIoT paradigm................... 21 2.4 Virtual Continuum in the IoT architecture.................... 22 2.5 Fog Computing in the Internet of Everything (IoE) system........... 23 2.6 An Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack against Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA). 27 2.7 Summary of information security and trust triads, showing CIA and
Recommended publications
  • Enigma2 Plugin Softcams Oscam Emu Sh4 1 179
    1 / 2 Enigma2 Plugin Softcams Oscam Emu Sh4 1 179 mezzo softcam key 1 Softcam For All HD Receiver – 14. mega-oscam/config/SoftCam. ... DreamBox , emu , enigma2 , OSCAM , Softcam , vu+ , vuplus NEW ... key Results 1 - 25 of 78 mezzo softcam key sh4-актуальный( SoftCam. ... file, software, yankse, dvb, mytheatre, progdvb, cwcamemu, plugin, .... Thx! C. com TSmedia Enigma2 Plugin by mfaraj57. ... the links of new Oscam Emu for Dreambox and Vu+ Enigma2 Images (OE 1. ... in filepush - [Player2 179/191] possible fix for chopped DTS You must be logged in at https://www. ... by using your Enigma2 receiver !. download softcam-feed-universal_2.. Enigma2 Plugin Softcams Oscam Emu Sh4 1 179 . Noticia Nueva version de Oscam Estás en el tema Noticia Nueva version de Oscam .... 1 OSCAM+SUPCAM NCAM+SUPCAM PLUGINS Linuxsat Active Code Plugins ... 4k Astra astra 19. html: enigma2 plugin extensions e2iplayer h git3701 + ef19340 r4 all (*. ... IPTV Player HasBahCa Обновился до крайней версии: 179. ... 1 to the new structure - new Softcam Manager - add emu on new style - add Cam .... Enigma2 Plugin Softcams Oscam Emu Sh4 1 179http://cinurl.com/123mb3. 0: 13-04-2015: 179 Jun 01, 2019 · the best file manager for E2 ever no ... 1 - sh4 is used for boxes like spark Openatv hbbtv plugin We've created the ... DM920 DM7080 DreamBox dreambox 900 emu enigma2 enigma 2 firmware ... For 4K ARMv7 receivers (Forum thread with latest version): enigma2-plugin-softcams-oscam .... Enigma2 Plugin Softcams Oscam Emu Sh4 1 Ipk The Daily. ... Cams: 1. CCcam 2. Mgcamd 1.38 3. Oscam Emu 11342-patched 4. .... 16 июл ...
    [Show full text]
  • Dreambox ONE Ultrahd
    Dreambox ONE UltraHD Bedienungsanleitung Digitaler Satellitenempfänger zum Empfang von freien und 1x Smartcard-Leseschacht DreamcryptTM verschlüsselten DVB-Programmen. 1x USB 2.0 UltraHD 1x USB 3.0 Twin DVB-S2x Tuner ® HDMI 2.0 out Gigabit Netzwerk-Schnittstelle WIFI 2.4/5 GhZ Dreambox OS Bluetooth Dreambox API Vorwort Sehr geehrte Kundin, sehr geehrter Kunde, herzlichen Glückwunsch zum Kauf Ihrer Dreambox ONE UltraHD. Diese Bedienungsanleitung soll Ihnen dabei helfen Ihre Dreambox richtig anzuschließen, die grundlegende Bedienung zu erlernen und darüber hinaus die zahlreichen Funktionen kennenzulernen. Beachten Sie bitte, dass sich der Funktionsumfang Ihrer Dreambox durch Software-Updates stetig erweitert. Sollten Sie die Software Ihrer Dreambox aktualisiert haben oder Fehler in der Bedienungsanleitung feststellen, schauen Sie bitte in den Downloadbereich unserer Homepage www.leontechltd.com ob eine aktualisierte Bedienungsanleitung zur Verfügung steht. Wir wünschen Ihnen viel Freude mit Ihrer Dreambox ONE UltraHD. Die Dreambox trägt das CE-Zeichen und erfüllt alle erforderlichen EU-Normen. DiSEqCTM ist ein Warenzeichen von EUTELSAT. Dolby und das Doppel-D-Symbol sind eingetragene Warenzeichen von Dolby Laboratories. ® HDMI , das HDMI-Logo und „High Definition Multimedia Interface“ sind Marken oder eingetragene Marken von HDMI Licensing LLC. Änderungen und Druckfehler vorbehalten. i i Inhaltsverzeichnis 1 Vor Inbetriebnahme des Receivers 1 1.1 Sicherheitshinweise ...............................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Authentication Services in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks
    Authentication Services in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks LOgiciels-Réseaux Willy Jiménez 08013 -LOR Hakima Chaouchi Maryline Laurent-Maknavicius _______________________________________________________________________________ Authentication Services in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks ABSTRACT The deployment of wireless ad hoc networks is useful for people when they desire to communicate even if they are not connected to any infrastructure, with the purpose of playing games, sharing internet connection, or exchange files. In some ad hoc scenarios, they might know each other, so they can establish trusted relationships. However, if the number or users and mobility increase then it is more complicated to trust all users and a security mechanism is required. Few researches has been done in this field to find security solutions for MANETs deployments; one of them proposes a framework where the traditional AAA services are distributed inside the network with the idea of allowing secure exchange of services that could be chargeable. Based on this framework, we evaluate technical solutions, focusing mainly on the Authentication service; in order to have real implementations. One possibility is using virtualization technology to offer a de-centralized authentication service. Another solution is the development of a secure version of a routing protocol that uses a de-centralized authentication service as a previous requirement to allow any node to join the ad hoc routing domain. Willy Jiménez Hakima Chaouchi Maryline Laurent-Maknavicius Etudiant Maître de Conférences
    [Show full text]
  • Universal Remote Code Book
    Universal Remote Code Book www.hestia-france.com TV CENTURION 0051 0169 CENTURY 0000 A CGE 0129 0047 0131 0043 ACER 1484 CIMLINE 0009 0028 ACME 0013 CITY 0009 ADA 0008 CLARIVOX 0169 0037 ADC 0012 0008 CLATRONIC 0009 0011 0051 0002 0083 ADMIRAL 0019 0108 0002 0001 0047 0003 0129 0030 0043 0000 COMBITECH 0248 ADYSON 0003 CONCORDE 0009 AGAZI 0002 CONDOR 0198 0051 0083 0003 0245 AGB 0123 CONRAC 0038 1395 AIKO 0003 0009 0004 CONTEC 0003 0009 0027 0030 0029 AIWA 0184 0248 0291 CONTINENTAL EDISON 0022 0111 0036 0045 0126 AKAI 1410 0011 0086 0009 0068 0139 0046 0004 0006 0008 0051 0061 COSMEL 0009 0088 0169 0200 0133 0141 CPRTEC 0156 0069 CROSLEY 0129 0131 0000 0043 AKIBA 0011 CROWN 0009 0169 0083 0047 0051 AKURA 0169 0074 0002 0009 0011 0245 0121 0043 0071 CS ELECTRONICS 0011 0129 0003 ALBA 0028 0027 0009 0011 0003 CTC 0129 0068 0083 0169 0047 0245 CTC CLATRONIC 0014 0248 0162 0062 CYBERCOM 0177 0038 0171 0002 0009 ALBIRAL 0037 0206 0205 0207 0208 0210 ALKOS 0164 0169 0042 0044 0127 0047 ALLORGAN 0157 0026 0061 0063 0067 0068 0103 ALLSTAR 0051 0107 0115 0154 0168 0185 ALTUS 0042 0228 0209 0343 0924 0933 AMPLIVISION 0003 0248 0291 AMSTRAD 0011 0009 0068 0074 0002 CYBERMAXX 0177 0038 0171 0002 0009 0108 0071 0069 0030 0123 0206 0200 0205 0207 0208 0013 0210 0211 0169 0015 0042 ANAM 0009 0065 0109 0044 0047 0048 0049 0061 ANGLO 0009 0063 0067 0068 0087 0103 ANITECH 0009 0002 0043 0109 0107 0115 0127 0154 0155 ANSONIC 0009 0014 0168 0170 0185 0228 0229 AOC 0134 0209 0218 1005 0894 0343 ARC EN CIEL 0126 0045 0139 0924 0933 0248 0291 ARCAM 0003 CYBERTRON
    [Show full text]
  • Specializovaný Velkoobchod Od: 25
    Maloobchodní ceník platný Specializovaný velkoobchod od: 25. Února 2013 s digitální satelitní a pozemní přijímací technikou IMPESAT spol. s r.o. tel: 376360911~13 - - 602359996 Zahradní 742/III fax: 376360914 25. února 2013 339 01 KLATOVY [email protected], [email protected] Digitální satelitní přijímače ID model zkrácený popis parametrů cena bez DPH cena s DPH CS box mini HD 114 CS box midi HD HD,USB PVR ready, HDMI, USB2.0, 1xCA, Fast Scann,Display,USB backup NOVINKA 1 890 Kč 2 287 Kč 114a CS box mini HD HD,USB PVR ready, HDMI, USB2.0, 1xCA, Fast Scann,Irdeto,USB backup prog. sezn. 1 750 Kč 2 118 Kč 182 CS box midi HD-Sky Výhodný set-přijímač+karta Skylink ICE-Výměna 2 220 Kč 2 686 Kč 182a CS box mini HD Skylink Výhodný set-přijímač+karta Skylink ICE-Výměna 2 090 Kč 2 529 Kč 184 CS box midi HD-M7 Výhodný set-přijímač+karta M7 Standard 2 290 Kč 2 771 Kč 184 CS box mini HD Skylink Výhodný set-přijímač+karta M7 Standard 2 090 Kč 2 529 Kč Humax SAT-HD 1 Humax IRHD 5100S Sat. HD,USB PVR , HDMI, 2xUSB2,1xCA Irdeto,1xCI,- záruka na přijímač 36měs. 2 630 Kč 3 182 Kč 247 Humax W-Lan Stick USB adaptér 150N WiFi klíč pro rec. Humax 5100 IRHD, rychlost dat až 150MBp 490 Kč 593 Kč 538 Humax IRHD 5100 Sky Výhodný set-přijímač+karta Skylink Výměna - záruka na přijímač 36měs . 3 050 Kč 3 691 Kč 647 Humax IRHD 5100 Sky Výhodný set- přijímač+karta M7 Standard - záruka na přijímač 36měs.
    [Show full text]
  • Virtualization Technologies Overview Course: CS 490 by Mendel
    Virtualization technologies overview Course: CS 490 by Mendel Rosenblum Name Can boot USB GUI Live 3D Snaps Live an OS on mem acceleration hot of migration another ory runnin disk alloc g partition ation system as guest Bochs partially partially Yes No Container s Cooperati Yes[1] Yes No No ve Linux (supporte d through X11 over networkin g) Denali DOSBox Partial (the Yes No No host OS can provide DOSBox services with USB devices) DOSEMU No No No FreeVPS GXemul No No Hercules Hyper-V iCore Yes Yes No Yes No Virtual Accounts Imperas Yes Yes Yes Yes OVP (Eclipse) Tools Integrity Yes No Yes Yes No Yes (HP-UX Virtual (Integrity guests only, Machines Virtual Linux and Machine Windows 2K3 Manager in near future) (add-on) Jail No Yes partially Yes No No No KVM Yes [3] Yes Yes [4] Yes Supported Yes [5] with VMGL [6] Linux- VServer LynxSec ure Mac-on- Yes Yes No No Linux Mac-on- No No Mac OpenVZ Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes (using Xvnc and/or XDMCP) Oracle Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes VM (manage d by Oracle VM Manager) OVPsim Yes Yes Yes Yes (Eclipse) Padded Yes Yes Yes Cell for x86 (Green Hills Software) Padded Yes Yes Yes No Cell for PowerPC (Green Hills Software) Parallels Yes, if Boot Yes Yes Yes DirectX 9 Desktop Camp is and for Mac installed OpenGL 2.0 Parallels No Yes Yes No partially Workstati on PearPC POWER Yes Yes No Yes No Yes (on Hypervis POWER 6- or (PHYP) based systems, requires PowerVM Enterprise Licensing) QEMU Yes Yes Yes [4] Some code Yes done [7]; Also supported with VMGL [6] QEMU w/ Yes Yes Yes Some code Yes kqemu done [7]; Also module supported
    [Show full text]
  • Data Sheet Cheetah 600.Cdr
    CHEETAH 600 USB 2.0 WIRELESS ADAPTER 802.11b/g/n Wireless USB Adapter Key Features :- ◆ Comply with IEEE 802.11n, IEEE 802.11g and IEEE 802.11b standard ◆ The USB interface provides two working modes: the mode of centralized control(Infrastructure) and peer to peer (Ad-Hoc) ◆ Using MIMO technology, the creation of multiple parallel spatial channels, to solve the bandwidth sharing problem, wireless transmission rate up to 300Mbps ◆ Using CCA technology, automatically avoid the channel interference and make full use of advantages of channel bundling, ensure that the neighbors will not affect the use of wireless network ◆ Support 64/128/152 bit WEP encryption, support WPA/WPA2, WPA-PSK/WPA2-PSK and other advanced encryption and security mechanism ◆ Provide simple configuration, monitoring program ◆ Support wireless (Roaming) technology, to ensure efficient wireless connection ◆ Application: Raspberry PI, Mag250/254 IPTV STB, Skybox, TV BOX,DVB, Dreambox, Desktop, Laptop, 3D printer, Navigation systems. Short Features :- ◆ Mimo Technology ◆ 2.4 Ghz Frequency ◆ DVR Support ◆ Gold Plated Connector ◆ Stable 300 mbps Speed ◆ Secure Wireless Connection ◆ Working on Raspberry PI, IPTV STB, DVB, Desktop, Laptop, 3D printer, Navigation systems. www.ivoomi.co Version : 1.0 CHEETAH 600 USB 2.0 WIRELESS ADAPTER 802.11b/g/n Wireless USB Adapter Introduction:- iVOOMi wireless USB adapter CHEETAH 600 enables notebook/desktop computers having USB interface to connect wirelessly with other clients in the network. It complies with IEEE 802.11n standard and is backward compatible with IEEE 802.11b/g standard. The CHEETAH 600 wireless USB adapter can achieve wireless data transmission rate up to 300Mbps which enhances the sharing of files, photo, audio, video and gaming experience over wireless network.
    [Show full text]
  • Comparison of Platform Virtual Machines - Wikipedia
    Comparison of platform virtual machines - Wikipedia... http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_platform... Comparison of platform virtual machines From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia The table below compares basic information about platform virtual machine (VM) packages. Contents 1 General Information 2 More details 3 Features 4 Other emulators 5 See also 6 References 7 External links General Information Name Creator Host CPU Guest CPU Bochs Kevin Lawton any x86, AMD64 CHARON-AXP Stromasys x86 (64 bit) DEC Alphaserver CHARON-VAX Stromasys x86, IA-64 VAX x86, x86-64, SPARC (portable: Contai ners (al so 'Zones') Sun Microsystems (Same as host) not tied to hardware) Dan Aloni helped by other Cooperati ve Li nux x86[1] (Same as parent) developers (1) Denal i University of Washington x86 x86 Peter Veenstra and Sjoerd with DOSBox any x86 community help DOSEMU Community Project x86, AMD64 x86 1 of 15 10/26/2009 12:50 PM Comparison of platform virtual machines - Wikipedia... http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_platform... FreeVPS PSoft (http://www.FreeVPS.com) x86, AMD64 compatible ARM, MIPS, M88K GXemul Anders Gavare any PowerPC, SuperH Written by Roger Bowler, Hercul es currently maintained by Jay any z/Architecture Maynard x64 + hardware-assisted Hyper-V Microsoft virtualization (Intel VT or x64,x86 AMD-V) OR1K, MIPS32, ARC600/ARC700, A (can use all OVP OVP Imperas [1] [2] Imperas OVP Tool s x86 (http://www.imperas.com) (http://www.ovpworld compliant models, u can write own to pu OVP APIs) i Core Vi rtual Accounts iCore Software
    [Show full text]
  • Foreign Library Interface by Daniel Adler Dia Applications That Can Run on a Multitude of Plat- Forms
    30 CONTRIBUTED RESEARCH ARTICLES Foreign Library Interface by Daniel Adler dia applications that can run on a multitude of plat- forms. Abstract We present an improved Foreign Function Interface (FFI) for R to call arbitary na- tive functions without the need for C wrapper Foreign function interfaces code. Further we discuss a dynamic linkage framework for binding standard C libraries to FFIs provide the backbone of a language to inter- R across platforms using a universal type infor- face with foreign code. Depending on the design of mation format. The package rdyncall comprises this service, it can largely unburden developers from the framework and an initial repository of cross- writing additional wrapper code. In this section, we platform bindings for standard libraries such as compare the built-in R FFI with that provided by (legacy and modern) OpenGL, the family of SDL rdyncall. We use a simple example that sketches the libraries and Expat. The package enables system- different work flow paths for making an R binding to level programming using the R language; sam- a function from a foreign C library. ple applications are given in the article. We out- line the underlying automation tool-chain that extracts cross-platform bindings from C headers, FFI of base R making the repository extendable and open for Suppose that we wish to invoke the C function sqrt library developers. of the Standard C Math library. The function is de- clared as follows in C: Introduction double sqrt(double x); We present an improved Foreign Function Interface The .C function from the base R FFI offers a call (FFI) for R that significantly reduces the amount of gate to C code with very strict conversion rules, and C wrapper code needed to interface with C.
    [Show full text]
  • Computer Architectures an Overview
    Computer Architectures An Overview PDF generated using the open source mwlib toolkit. See http://code.pediapress.com/ for more information. PDF generated at: Sat, 25 Feb 2012 22:35:32 UTC Contents Articles Microarchitecture 1 x86 7 PowerPC 23 IBM POWER 33 MIPS architecture 39 SPARC 57 ARM architecture 65 DEC Alpha 80 AlphaStation 92 AlphaServer 95 Very long instruction word 103 Instruction-level parallelism 107 Explicitly parallel instruction computing 108 References Article Sources and Contributors 111 Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors 113 Article Licenses License 114 Microarchitecture 1 Microarchitecture In computer engineering, microarchitecture (sometimes abbreviated to µarch or uarch), also called computer organization, is the way a given instruction set architecture (ISA) is implemented on a processor. A given ISA may be implemented with different microarchitectures.[1] Implementations might vary due to different goals of a given design or due to shifts in technology.[2] Computer architecture is the combination of microarchitecture and instruction set design. Relation to instruction set architecture The ISA is roughly the same as the programming model of a processor as seen by an assembly language programmer or compiler writer. The ISA includes the execution model, processor registers, address and data formats among other things. The Intel Core microarchitecture microarchitecture includes the constituent parts of the processor and how these interconnect and interoperate to implement the ISA. The microarchitecture of a machine is usually represented as (more or less detailed) diagrams that describe the interconnections of the various microarchitectural elements of the machine, which may be everything from single gates and registers, to complete arithmetic logic units (ALU)s and even larger elements.
    [Show full text]
  • Netbsdのクロスビルドのしくみと インストール済みlive Imageの作成
    OSC 2012 北海道 たまには謎マシン抜きの話をしてみよう NetBSDのクロスビルドのしくみと インストール済みLive Imageの作成 Izumi Tsutsui [email protected] NetBSDの特徴 特定の機種に依存しない設計 各種ソースが Android や MINIX に流用されたり ものすごい数の機種への移植 55~58機種くらい(?)を一応いまだにサポート クロスコンパイル開発環境 NetBSDを使っていなくてもNetBSD開発が可能 クロスコンパイルとは 「セルフコンパイル」 バイナリを作るマシン=バイナリを実行するマシン ⇒バイナリを作ったマシンでそのまま実行 「クロスコンパイル」 バイナリを作るマシン≠バイナリを実行するマシン ⇒作ったバイナリを実行するマシンに転送して実行 クロスコンパイル用語 「ターゲット」 ⇒バイナリを実行するマシン 「ホスト」 ⇒バイナリを作成するマシン 「ツールチェイン」 ⇒コンパイラ、アセンブラなどの クロスビルドバイナリ作成用プログラム一式 NetBSDとクロス開発環境 NetBSD 1.6 (2002年) から公式にサポート OS標準の配布物だけで全部をクロスで作成可能 ・カーネル ・ユーザーランドバイナリ ・man ページ ・リリース用配布バイナリ一式 tar.gz ・インストール用フロッピーイメージ ・インストール用CD ISOイメージ (3.0以降) ・インストール済み Live イメージ (6.0以降) クロスビルド実行コマンド “build.sh” スクリプト 面倒な設定不要なクロスビルド実行スクリプト “build.sh -U -m i386 tools” →i386用ツールチェインバイナリ一式作成 “build.sh -U -m i386 release” →i386 リリース用バイナリ一式作成 “build.sh -U -m i386 live-image” →i386 インストール済み Live イメージ作成 なぜクロスビルドなのか(1) にわとり卵問題 「バイナリを実行するマシンでバイナリを作る」には 「バイナリを実行できる環境」が必要 ⇒まだOSすら動いてないマシンはどうするの? OS以前にハードから自作した場合は?? 当然 ターゲット≠ホスト のクロス開発が必須 なぜクロスビルドなのか(2) 遅マシン対策 ・移植バブル期のターゲット⇒現役引退ハード多数 ・お世辞にも速いとは言えない ・PCのほうがよっぽど速い ・NetBSD/news68k カーネルコンパイル時間(当時) ・NWS-1750D(MC68030/25MHz): 3時間20分 ・自作PC (AMD K6-2/350MHz): 5分 ……苦労してでも5分で作れる環境用意しますよね なぜクロスビルドなのか(3) 全自動ビルド化 ・セルフビルド時代でもリリース作成は自動化済み ・NetBSD/news68k のリリース作成に1週間とか ⇒速いマシンでやれば全機種毎日テスト可能? ・ツールチェイン作成~ビルド~リリース一式作成 を全自動で実行して結果チェック releng.NetBSD.org http://releng.NetBSD.org/ デイリービルド結果サマリー Summary of daily snapshot builds ある日のNetBSD -current 59 successful builds, 1 failed builds さらなる自動化 デイリービルドの弊害 ・「ビルド至上主義」問題 ・とりあえずエラーを消すやっつけ修正する人が発生 ・「ビルドできたけど壊れてて動かない」という問題
    [Show full text]
  • Dreambook Ver 2
    Dreambook for begyndere med dreamBoxen Kun til undervisningsbrug Du kan finde mere hjælp på chatten IRC server: skysnolimit-irc.net #ssf #digsat DreamBox DM7000 WWW.SSFTEAM.COM Indholdet er dels lavet af mig og andre på ssfteam.com/digsat.net og andet er fundet på nettet og oversat til dansk. Hvis du mener der er noget som ikke skal være her, så send mig (Alpha) en pm på vores forum www.ssfteam.com Indhold: Tekniske specifikationer om DreamBoxen......................................................................................3 Første image lægges ind på dreamBoxen........................................................................................6 Opsætning af netværk på DreamBoxen.........................................................................................13 Opsætning af Parabol med motor på DreamBoxen........................................................................14 Satellits Configuration med flere end fire LNB............................................................................18 Signalmåler med: Dreambox, Trådløs Laptop, Web-interface og DreamSet..................................21 Sikker måde at skifte img..............................................................................................................24 Flashwizard ver 5.2.......................................................................................................................25 EMU og hvilke mapper skal filerne i.............................................................................................29 De forskellige
    [Show full text]