Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Public Disclosure Authorized Report No: ICR00005245
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT IDA-H7260, IDA-61750, IDA-D2700
ON A
CREDIT AND GRANT
IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 3.5 MILLION Public Disclosure Authorized (US$5.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
TO THE
REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN
FOR THE SOCIAL SAFETY NET STRENGTHENING PROJECT
January 28, 2021
Public Disclosure Authorized
Social Protection and Jobs Global Practice Europe and Central Asia Region
Public Disclosure Authorized
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective December 6, 2020)
Currency Unit = Tajikistan Somoni (TJS) TJS 11.33 = US$1 US$0.69 = SDR 1
FISCAL YEAR July 1 – June 30
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ASIST Targeted Social Information System of Tajikistan (translated from Russian) AF Additional Financing CPF Country Partnership Framework CPS Country Partnership Strategy DCC Donor Coordination Council DSPP Division for Social Protection of Population EOP Executive Office of the President EU European Union FM Financial Management GBAO Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast GDP Gross Domestic Product GoT Government of Tajikistan ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MHSPP Ministry of Health and Social Protection of Population MIS Management Information System MLSP Ministry of Labor and Social Protection MoF Ministry of Finance MoH Ministry of Health NDS National Development Strategy NRSP National Registry of Social Protection PAD Project Appraisal Document PCG Project Coordination Group PDO Project Development Objective PMT Proxy-Means Test POM Project Operations Manual RSR Rapid Social Response SASP State Agency for Social Protection SMSES State Medical-Social Expertise Service SSNSP Social Safety Net Strengthening Project
TEC-19 Tajikistan Emergency COVID-19 TSA Targeted Social Assistance UNICEF United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
Regional Vice President: Anna Bjerde Country Director: Lilia Burunciuc Regional Director: Fadia M. Saadah Practice Manager: Cem Mete Task Team Leader(s): Oleksiy A. Sluchynskyy ICR Main Contributor: Ravindra Cherukupalli
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DATA SHEET ...... 1 I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES ...... 6 A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL ...... 6 B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION ...... 12 II. OUTCOME ...... 18 A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs ...... 18 B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) ...... 19 C. EFFICIENCY ...... 25 D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING ...... 28 E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY) ...... 29 III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME ...... 31 A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION ...... 31 B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION ...... 33 IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME .. 36 A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) ...... 36 B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE ...... 38 C. BANK PERFORMANCE ...... 40 D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME ...... 42 V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 43 ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS ...... 47 ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION ...... 58 ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT ...... 60 ANNEX 4. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM IMPACT EVALUATION ...... 61 ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS ... 65 ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS ...... 67 ANNEX 7. TEXT OF THE TSA BILL ...... 68 ANNEX 8. MAIN MESSAGES FROM KEY RELATED STUDIES AND REPORTS, 2012–19 ...... 73 ANNEX 9. TEXT OF THE DECREE AUTHORIZING TSA NATIONAL ROLLOUT ...... 75
The World Bank Social Safety Net Strengthening Project (P122039)
DATA SHEET
BASIC INFORMATION
Product Information Project ID Project Name
P122039 Social Safety Net Strengthening Project
Country Financing Instrument
Tajikistan Investment Project Financing
Original EA Category Revised EA Category
Not Required (C) Not Required (C)
Related Projects
Relationship Project Approval Product Line Supplement P123704-Tajikistan 19-Jan-2011 Recipient Executed Activities Government- implemented grant for targeting and payment of social assistance Additional Financing P165831-Social Safety 30-Jan-2018 IBRD/IDA Net Strengthening Project
Organizations
Borrower Implementing Agency
Ministry of Finance, Republic of Tajikistan State Agency for Social Protection (SASP)
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The World Bank Social Safety Net Strengthening Project (P122039)
Project Development Objective (PDO)
Original PDO The development objective of the Project is to improve the capacity of the Government of Tajikistan to plan, monitor, and manage social assistance for the poor through the development of a national registry of social protection and the provision of training, equipment and related items for improving said capacity.
Revised PDO To achieve national geographic coverage of the Targeted Social Assistance Program and to ensure integrated delivery of services.
FINANCING
Original Amount (US$) Revised Amount (US$) Actual Disbursed (US$) World Bank Financing P122039 IDA-H7260 3,200,000 3,199,630 2,968,454 P122039 IDA-61750 900,000 900,000 900,000 P122039 IDA-D2700 900,000 900,000 973,670 Total 5,000,000 4,999,630 4,842,124
Non-World Bank Financing 0 0 0 Borrower/Recipient 0 0 0 Total 0 0 0
Total Project Cost 5,000,000 4,999,630 4,842,124
KEY DATES
Project Approval Effectiveness MTR Review Original Closing Actual Closing P122039 16-Jun-2011 11-Oct-2011 02-Feb-2015 31-Dec-2015 30-Jun-2020
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The World Bank Social Safety Net Strengthening Project (P122039)
RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING
Date(s) Amount Disbursed (US$M) Key Revisions 06-Aug-2014 .33 Change in Implementing Agency Change in Results Framework Change in Components and Cost Change in Loan Closing Date(s) Change in Disbursements Arrangements Change in Legal Covenants Change in Institutional Arrangements Change in Financial Management Change in Procurement Change in Implementation Schedule 04-Apr-2016 2.71 Change in Loan Closing Date(s) 09-Mar-2017 2.85 Change in Loan Closing Date(s) 28-Sep-2017 2.97 Change in Loan Closing Date(s) 15-Dec-2017 2.97 Change in Loan Closing Date(s) 06-Mar-2018 2.97 Additional Financing Change in Implementing Agency Change in Project Development Objectives Change in Results Framework Change in Components and Cost Change in Loan Closing Date(s) 18-Dec-2019 4.24 Change in Loan Closing Date(s)
KEY RATINGS
Outcome Bank Performance M&E Quality Satisfactory Satisfactory High
RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs
Actual No. Date ISR Archived DO Rating IP Rating Disbursements (US$M) 01 21-Sep-2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0
02 30-Nov-2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0 Moderately 03 08-May-2012 Moderately Unsatisfactory 0 Unsatisfactory
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The World Bank Social Safety Net Strengthening Project (P122039)
Moderately 04 01-Jan-2013 Unsatisfactory .16 Unsatisfactory 05 01-Sep-2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory .19 Moderately 06 15-Apr-2014 Moderately Unsatisfactory .24 Unsatisfactory 07 23-Nov-2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory .43
08 30-Jun-2015 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.30
09 29-Mar-2016 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.71
10 14-Dec-2016 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.83
11 21-Jul-2017 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.97
12 11-May-2018 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.97
13 04-Feb-2019 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 3.42
14 31-Oct-2019 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 4.08
15 30-Jun-2020 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 4.84
SECTORS AND THEMES
Sectors Major Sector/Sector (%)
Social Protection 100 Public Administration - Social Protection 100
Themes Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%)
Social Development and Protection 100
Social Protection 100
Social Safety Nets 100
ADM STAFF
Role At Approval At ICR
Regional Vice President: Philippe H. Le Houerou Anna M. Bjerde
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The World Bank Social Safety Net Strengthening Project (P122039)
Country Director: Motoo Konishi Lilia Burunciuc
Director: Mamta Murthi Fadia M. Saadah
Practice Manager: Kathy A. Lindert Cem Mete
Task Team Leader(s): Menahem M. Prywes Oleksiy A. Sluchynskyy
ICR Contributing Author: Ravindra Cherukupalli
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The World Bank Social Safety Net Strengthening Project (P122039)
I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES
A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL
Country Context
1. Tajikistan is a small land-locked country in the heart of Central Asia,1 and largely mountainous, making it one of the least accessible countries in the world. The country is rich in water resources, which supports cotton production and creates ample potential for harnessing hydropower in aluminum processing. The total share of arable land2 is limited and steadily fell since the early 90s. The country’s difficult terrain contributes to poverty levels among communities at higher elevations and generally impedes access and communication between different parts of the country,3 especially during winter. Given its topography, the country is also prone to natural disasters and routinely experiences floods, landslides, earthquakes, and droughts.
2. The country withstood several shocks after independence in 1991,4 followed by gradual transition towards political stability until it was finally poised for change at the turn of the millennium. It endured a civil war soon after independence, witnessing the first glimmers of hope in 1997 with the signing of a peace accord, which forged a pathway toward more optimism, putting the country back on the road to progress. The general elections in 2000 ensured full implementation of the peace accord, including stabilizing the Government and taking the first steps toward the establishment of key democratic institutions and a gradual shift toward a more market-based economy. Between 2000 and 2008, the country experienced relative political stability and strong economic growth, with the economy growing at an average of 8.6 percent per year, and total investment, dominated by public investment, hovering around 20 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Over the same period, poverty declined steadily from 72 percent in 2003 to 47 percent in 2009.
3. The 2008 global financial crisis adversely affected the country, largely due to a dramatic fall in remittances from the majority of Tajik migrants working abroad.5 Tajikistan continues to be one of the world's most remittance-dependent economies, receiving net remittance inflows equivalent to
1 The Central Asia region comprises the countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 2 Total arable land (percent of land area) steadily fell from a high of 6.21 percent (1993) down to 5.26 percent by 2016 (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations /World Bank, World Bank Open Data). 3 The country is divided administratively into four regions or oblasts: namely, Sughd, Districts of Republican Subordination, Khatlon, Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO), and Dushanbe; 68 districts (or Rayons) and 397 jamoats (community- based management unit [municipality], and many Makhalyas or Mahallas [the smallest administrative unit of self-government]. 4 Under the combined effects of different shocks, including loss of large fiscal transfers from the center, a sharp deterioration in trade, and severe natural disasters soon after independence, the country suffered a severe contraction in real GDP between 1991 and 1996—about 60 percent cumulatively leading to a rapid increase in poverty. By 1999, about 80 percent of Tajik people lived below the poverty line, making it one of the poorest countries in the world. 5 Over 90 percent of Tajiks work in Russia—a major destination for migrants from the former Soviet republics. There are several agreements in place toward a common labor market with countries including Armenia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
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The World Bank Social Safety Net Strengthening Project (P122039)
somewhere between 40 percent and 45 percent of GDP.6 Remittances are a major source of household income and falling remittance inflows was one of the main transmission channels by which the 2008–09 global economic crisis affected the economy. The decline in remittances and in exports of cotton and aluminum led to a slowdown of economic growth to 3.4 percent in 2009. The global financial crisis deflated the real estate and construction bubble in Russia, and as a result, remittances fell by over 30 percent, from US$2.3 billion in 2008 to US$1.6 billion in 2009.
4. Despite high cumulative growth in the decade preceding the crisis, Tajikistan was and continues to be among the poorest countries in Central Asia. Tajikistan also faces energy shortages for 5–6 months during the year and periodically faces a food security problem. In 2009, its gross national income (Atlas method) was only US$800 per capita and almost half (47 percent) of the population were below the poverty line of US$37 in consumption expenditures per person per month. Not surprisingly, the estimated rural poverty rate in 2009 (49.2 percent) was over 7 percentage points higher than the urban poverty rate (41.8 percent). Further, the probability that a household fell below the poverty line also depended on where it resided and on the number of children in the household.7
5. In the aftermath of the crisis, the Government of Tajikistan (GoT) made proactive recovery efforts to attempt to set the country back on track. It responded to the slowdown by building on its anti- crisis action plan and formulating a program for immediate economic stabilization and rationalization of public expenditure in April 2009. A revised budget was presented focusing on ring-fencing social expenditure to maintain delivery of key public services, such as education and health, and prioritizing social assistance to vulnerable groups. It expanded employment opportunities through social programs such as the cash-for-work scheme and promoting entrepreneurship. The crisis also laid bare the gaps in the existing system for social assistance with the Government and donors—namely, the lack of an effective mechanism for channeling assistance to the poor.
Sectoral and Institutional Context
6. Tajikistan at the time had fragmented social assistance programs which suffered from inefficient implementation and leakages. The two main legacy social assistance programs focused on providing energy subsidies and school stipends to children from needy families. In 2009, the Government budgeted about US$4.9 million for electricity and gas compensation with at least half used to purchase and distribute energy-saving light bulbs. The next largest program on school stipends provided compensation to needy families with children in school from grades 1 through 9, in effect providing a conditional cash payment to ensure education access and learning. The third largest program involved giving aid to returnees and migrants from dangerous zones. Overall, programs suffered from weaknesses in beneficiary identification, lack of transparency in eligibility determination, and, as a result, poor
6 Between 2000 and 2010, personal remittances (as percentage of GDP) in Tajikistan steadily rose from a mere 6.34 percent (2002) to an all-time high of 44 percent (2008) falling considerably to 31.4 percent in 2009 after the financial crisis. Over the next decade, it steadily regained ground rising to 43.7 percent in 2013 but fell thereafter to 28.6 percent by 2019 (World Bank Open Data). 7 The estimated poverty at 62 percent and 54 percent respectively in the oblasts of GBAO, a mountainous and sparsely population region in eastern Tajikistan, and Khatlon, a low-lying province in southern Tajikistan sensitive to variable rainfall and fluctuations in the cotton industry, were far higher relative to Dushanbe, the capital city, at 34 percent. In the same vein, estimated poverty rates of households by number of children registered big differences—households with three children (62.4 percent) had poverty rates double those with no children (29.5 percent).
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The World Bank Social Safety Net Strengthening Project (P122039)
targeting and inadequate forecasting and budgeting, calling for more streamlined mechanisms for better- targeted and more efficient delivery of social assistance.
7. Nearly half (47 percent) of Tajikistan’s population in 2009 was below the poverty line of US$37 in consumption expenditures per month. Social assistance coverage of the poor was low (only 20 percent of the poorest quintile received benefits) and not well-targeted (only 23 percent of benefits accrued to the poorest quintile, with the rest leaking to better-off groups). These gaps called for a new Targeted Social Assistance (TSA) program that would improve targeting of the poor (lower leakages to the non- poor), protect the poor more effectively, and serve as a vehicle for donors to channel additional benefits and services. These conditions prompted the GoT to seek World Bank support to improve its system of social assistance, which resulted in the World Bank commissioning an in-depth report on the improvement of social assistance and its delivery to poor households in Tajikistan, delivered in 2010.
8. The 2010 World Bank report8 found that these legacy social assistance programs exerted almost no downward influence on poverty rates in Tajikistan and had an associated consolidated government budget that was the lowest not just for Central Asia, but across the wider Europe and Central Asia region. The consolidated government budget for social assistance in Tajikistan was small, at about 0.5 percent of GDP.9 At the same time, other Central Asian countries had a consolidated budget as share of GDP that was higher, falling somewhere between 1 percent and 2 percent, while the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development average was closer to 2.75 percent. The study also found that social assistance programs lowered the poverty rate by only 0.3 percentage points, due in large part to social assistance benefits being negligible and was responsible for introducing a proxy-means test (PMT) approach.10
Rationale for World Bank involvement
9. The need to prioritize the consolidation and reform of the country’s social assistance programs opened up a critical window of opportunity for stepped-up donor engagement and increased financing to the social protection sector in Tajikistan. It was abundantly clear that programs were inefficiently designed, targeted, and administered, with fragmented implementation and limited institutional capacity. A more credible and effective system of social assistance was seen as essential for the Government to better channel assistance to poor households and help them maintain their consumption levels, especially during economic downturns. To this end, donors were increasingly engaged in dialogue on system reform, with budget support grants from the European Union (EU), the Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank to support policy actions to reform Tajikistan’s social assistance system.
10. The June 2010 World Bank-EU Memorandum of Understanding cemented the World Bank’s cooperation with the EU on a small pilot to test delivery of a consolidated social assistance benefit in two of the country’s districts. This was an important first step in the journey toward gradual operationalization of the reform vision ultimately culminating in a national rollout. As part of initial
8 World Bank. 2011. Tajikistan - Delivering Social Assistance to the Poorest Households. World Bank. 9 Lindert, Kathy, and Anita Schwarz. 2009. “Social Protection Responses to the Global Economic Crisis in ECA.” Europe and Central Asia Knowledge Brief. Volume No. 1. World Bank. 10 The report came up with a preliminary PMT formula adopting an explicit mechanism for poverty targeting. The PMT was to be used as a ‘proxy estimate’ of welfare, which could then be used to determine eligibility for social assistance by establishing a maximum eligibility threshold.
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The World Bank Social Safety Net Strengthening Project (P122039)
learning, a GoT delegation visited Georgia to study its TSA program. The EU delivered technical assistance to the pilot and the World Bank supported development of the methodology. The pilot was launched in 2011 in two districts, Yevon and Istaravshan, with the objective to (a) consolidate the two largest social assistance programs into a single benefit, (b) test the PMT formula (developed by the World Bank in its 2010 report) for targeting the benefit to the poorest 20 percent of households, and (c) develop and test a system and a database for recording applications for social assistance and for assessing eligibility using a scoring formula. The World Bank also mobilized a grant of US$2.2 million from the Rapid Social Response (RSR) Multi-Donor Trust Fund to demonstrate proof of concept and strengthen the evidence base because a larger IDA-financed project to reform social assistance in Tajikistan was being prepared in parallel. This project, the Tajikistan Social Safety Net Strengthening Project (SSNSP) is the subject of this Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR).
11. The SSNSP financed with a US$3.2 million IDA grant aimed to build the tools and capacity of the Government to support its ability to achieve and manage reform of its social assistance. The project planned to build a National Registry of Social Protection (NRSP) and capacity in the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection (MLSP). It complemented technical assistance from the EU and the RSR grant, which supported the pilot and evaluation of the poverty targeting mechanism but devoted few resources to the institutional aspects of the reform or to capacity building.
Theory of Change (Results Chain)
12. The SSNSP’s Project Appraisal Document (PAD) did not include a Theory of Change.11 For this ICR, the project’s Theory of Change is constructed ex post, retrofitted from the Project’s Results Framework and its detailed description. The project activities, outputs, and outcomes, and long-term impacts12 and how these relate to the Project Development Objective (PDO) are captured in figure 1.
11 According to World Bank Guidelines, including a Theory of Change in PADs became mandatory as of May 2018. The SSNSP was approved by the World Bank’s Board of Directors on May 17, 2011, while the Additional Financing (AF) was approved in January 2018. 12 The long-term impacts are outside the scope of the project objective but are expected to happen in part because of the project.
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The World Bank Social Safety Net Strengthening Project (P122039)
Figure 1. Theory of Change for the Tajikistan SSNSP
Note: EOP = Executive Office of the President; MoF = Ministry of Finance; PCG = Project Coordination Group.
Project Development Objectives (PDOs)
13. The original PDO13 was to improve the capacity of the Government of Tajikistan to plan, monitor, and manage social assistance for the poor through the development of a national registry of social protection and the provision of training, equipment and related items for improving said capacity.
13 This was the PDO at approval from June 2011 (also reflected in the Financing Agreement dated July 13, 2011, between the GoT and IDA) through January 2018 when an AF (January 9, 2018) revised the PDO and indicators in the Results Framework to align with the updated design and program vision. The changes made in the AF were underpinned by implementation experience and demonstrated results which strengthened the case for a national TSA rollout to all 68 districts signaled by the introduction of the TSA bill for ratification in Parliament.
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The World Bank Social Safety Net Strengthening Project (P122039)
14. The key beneficiaries of the SSNSP are agencies of the GoT, which through reform of its social assistance system, would be better positioned to target and reach poor households nationally. The project was envisioned to directly benefit the GoT, and in particular, the MLSP and the MoF, by building their capacity to launch and manage the reformed system of social assistance and to generate, analyze, and share information on system performance. While the initial design assumed a fairly rapid rollout of the new mechanism, it soon became evident that the Government did not have a clear plan for the national rollout, which resulted in the first restructuring that narrowed the focus of the project on a preparatory work of establishing the institutional and human capacity. Eventually, under the additional financing that brought the coverage expansion back in focus, the project intended to benefit approximately 15 percent of the population in Tajikistan, focusing on extreme poverty, to reach close to 1 million people, who would receive social assistance benefits following the rollout of the new program.
Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators
15. As set out in the PAD at approval, the original key expected outcomes and outcome indicators were as follows:
• Coverage of the registry: the share of households, in percentage points, with records in the registry (NRSP or Pilot); coverage would rise from the more than 1 percent of Tajikistan’s households covered by the Pilot to 25 percent by the final year of the Project
• Eligibility compliance: the share of applicant households that are correctly classified as eligible or ineligible
• Payments compliance: (i) percent of payments from the Treasury that are disbursed by the payment agent; and (ii) the estimated percent of payments from the payment agent that are received by the beneficiaries
• Use of the registry for planning and budgeting
16. The project then underwent a series of restructurings because of the change in institutional context. The above initial PDO indicators were revised under the very first restructuring of the SSNSP in July 2014. The indicators were revised one more time as part of a January 2018 restructuring and AF to the SSNSP, when the PDO was also revised and new indicators added. Thereafter, the revised PDO and indicators remained unchanged until project closing in June 2020.
Components
17. The rationale for this project was to help the GoT build the institutional capacity and technical mechanisms necessary for the effective operation of a national system of social assistance. The objectives at approval were to establish an NRSP and build capacity in the MLSP, to complement ongoing assistance at the time from the EU, and the World Bank’s RSR grant to support implementation and evaluation of the pilot. The components of the SSNSP at approval and corresponding activities to deliver on the envisioned objectives were as detailed in the following paragraphs.
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The World Bank Social Safety Net Strengthening Project (P122039)
Component 1: National Registry for Social Protection (US$1.4 million)
18. This component was designed to support establishment of the NRSP, building on the implementation and evaluative lessons of the pilot. It would also help the Government to manage, monitor, and oversee payments of social assistance, for which it would provide an electronic registry platform that could eventually be leveraged by other social protection programs. A PMT was to be applied to identify the poorest households eligible for social assistance. This component also supported the supply of goods, including computer equipment and accessories and improved connectivity, to strengthen the capacity of the MLSP to implement a nationwide system of poverty-targeted social assistance.
Component 2: Capacity building (US$1.2 million)
19. This component was designed to support the training of government personnel at the central and local levels to implement and use the national registry. It would also build the capacity of the Government to use the registry to control and audit payments of social assistance. Finally, it would support a small unit of local consultants in the MLSP to help plan for the national reform of social assistance.
Component 3: Project Management (US$0.3 million)
20. This component was designed to support project management and coordination and for carrying out fiduciary tasks, including procurement, financial reporting and accounting activities, audit, and other reporting for the project. Specifically, the EOP was designated as responsible for all fiduciary tasks while the MLSP managed all aspects related to technical implementation. The EOP would implement the project through its PCG14 and the project would support consultancies for the PCG, its operating costs, and light rehabilitation of MLSP offices.
B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION
21. At approval in 2011, the project was under the overall oversight of the PCG within the EOP, with the MLSP responsible for implementation of the social assistance activities. Following a World Bank implementation review, the Government made a strategic decision in 2013 to move all responsibilities for implementation from the EOP to the line ministry and also transfer the social protection function between ministries (as detailed in the following paragraphs), which were the key triggers for the first restructuring to the project in 2014. The project underwent subsequent restructurings thereafter which were to essentially keep the project active while a delayed AF was being processed.
22. As a result, the key changes over the lifetime of the project were (a) change to institutional anchoring of the PCG and (b) the AF with a new and fourth component added and revisions to the PDO and Results Framework focused on the national rollout. The following section discusses these changes in greater detail.
14 The PCG is under the EOP and in the past, implemented the Public Sector Reform Project, which closed on October 31, 2011.
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The World Bank Social Safety Net Strengthening Project (P122039)
Restructurings:
First Restructuring (August 06, 2014)
23. The SSNSP underwent its first restructuring to reflect key changes made by the Government to the implementing agency and the ministry responsible for the social protection function. Changes made by the Government were as follows:
• Change of implementing agency. Based on a review of project performance, the Government initially decided to shift direct responsibility for management of the IDA project, including all fiduciary functions, from the EOP to the Ministry of Health (MoH). In November 2013, the Government transferred the social protection function from the MLSP to the MoH, renaming that ministry to the Ministry of Health and Social Protection of Population (MHSPP).
• Subsequent change to the ministry responsible for social protection. The MHSPP was then given responsibility for implementing activities from the MLSP, with both implementation and the social protection function under the MHSPP thereafter till project close. To improve autonomy, a new structure called the State Agency for Social Protection (SASP) was created in 2014,15 within the MHSPP's Division for Social Protection of Population (DSPP), which was responsible for SSNSP implementation thereafter.
24. The World Bank reflected the above changes as part of the restructuring and also extended the date of closing by six months to June 30, 2016, to accommodate for delays caused by institutional changes within the Government.
Second Restructuring (April 4, 2016)
25. This restructuring extended the closing date from June 30, 2016, to March 31, 2017. This was based on a request from the GoT for a nine-month extension of the closing date to accommodate plans for TSA program expansion in late 2016 to 15 new districts. This was also intended to give the Government additional time to decide on its priorities for borrowing and specifically around supporting infrastructure investments for the national TSA program rollout (planned in 2017).
Third Restructuring (March 9, 2017)
26. This restructuring provided for a six-month, no-cost extension of the project from March 31, 2017, until September 30, 2017, in response to a request from the GoT in November 2016 for an AF to the SSNSP and to keep the project active while the AF was under preparation and awaiting approval. The proposed AF intended to provide financing to support expansion of coverage of the TSA program to a total of 68 districts, thereby reaching a far greater number of the poor and vulnerable families and ensuring sustainability of the reform efforts. It also included plans for other social programs to leverage the social registry (NRSP) and establish an electronic mechanism for disability certification, as a separate module of the ASIST MIS.
15 The SASP was created by Decree No. 168 on March 14, 2014, and designated to be within the MHSPP’s DSPP.
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The World Bank Social Safety Net Strengthening Project (P122039)
Fourth Restructuring (RES28629, September 28, 2017)
27. This restructuring provided for an additional three-month, no-cost extension of the project from the earlier September 30, 2017, to December 29, 2017, to ensure the project remained active while the AF was being prepared and approved.
Fifth Restructuring (RES30451, December 15, 2017)
28. This restructuring essentially kept the project active while the AF was awaiting Board approval in the last quarter of 2017. Plans for the AF in early 2017 did not materialize, and a new request from the GoT in October 2017 for US$1.8 million to support the national rollout of the TSA program was made as preparations were already under way for project appraisal in November and negotiations in December 2017, which then required that the project stayed active beyond the December 29, 2017, closing date while the cleared AF package was approved by the World Bank’s Board of Directors.
Additional Financing (January 9, 2018)
29. This AF provided US$1.8 million in IDA grant and an IDA credit to the SSNSP. Amendments were made to the Financing Agreement that included (a) revising the PDO, by expanding its scope; (b) revising the Results Framework indicators correspondingly; and (c) adding a new component supporting national rollout of the TSA program, including the NRSP, revising implementation activities, and extending the project closing date by 24 months, from December 29, 2017, to December 31, 2019. The AF was also classified as category C, as no safeguard policies would be triggered.
Sixth and Final Restructuring (RES39729, December 18, 2019)
30. This sixth and final restructuring to the project was provided to extend the project by six months, until June 30, 2020. The extension was needed as the project awaited the delayed decree for national rollout of the TSA program (to an additional 28 districts to reach all 68 districts in the country) and to allow the project to complete the required activities around the disability certification to attain its development objective, fully utilize project funds, and achieve project indicator targets.
Revised PDO Indicators
31. In the July 2014 restructuring, the original PDO at approval did not change and only the PDO indicators were revised. Of the original PDO indicators (see earlier section), the first three PDO indicators were dropped, the fourth was retained, and five new ones were added. Specifically, the coverage indicator was dropped due to the continuing lack of clarity on the official plans for the TSA program rollout at the time16. Instead, the project focused more explicitly on building institutional foundation for the new program and its future rollout, including establishing a network of regional offices, taking on board a key recommendation of the Bank technical team. Eligibility compliance indicator was also dropped since the PMT formula was used to automatically determine eligibility, without human involvement. The payment compliance indicator was dropped too, as all payments are managed by the state Amonat bank and an account gets opened for each receiving household.
16 National coverage of the TSA was eventually reached through a subsequent restructuring and an additional financing.
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32. The PDO indicators listed below were applicable after the July 2014 restructuring up until the January 2018 restructuring and the AF.
• Coverage of the Targeted Social Assistance (TSA) Program (number of districts, target of 30 districts). (New indicator in July 2014)
• Beneficiaries of Safety Nets programs (number) - also a core indicator: Target not specified. (New indicator in July 2014)
• Beneficiaries of Safety Nets programs - female (number) - also a core indicator: Target not specified. (New indicator in July 2014)
• Beneficiaries of Safety Nets programs - Unconditional cash transfers (number) - also a core indicator: Target not specified. (New indicator in July 2014)
• Number of Jamoats where training and awareness has been provided on mechanisms of the new TSA program: Target of 200 jamoats. (New indicator in July 2014)
• Use of the registry for planning and budgeting. Target being that the new MIS will be fully used for the planning and budgeting needs of the ministry. (Old indicator at approval)
33. The reason for no targets specified in the core indicators on beneficiaries introduced in the July 2014 restructuring was that the Government had not yet come to a consensus on the final list of the pilot districts and the rate of coverage in those districts, and therefore it was felt that a final cumulative figure at project closing was far more representative of actual progress achieved.17
34. As part of the 2018 restructuring and AF, the original PDO was revised. Also, the PDO indicators in effect as of July 2014 were changed as follows: the first five were revised with updated targets (specific beneficiary targets were provided now that the plans for the national rollout got firmed up), the last one remained unchanged, and four new indicators were added.
35. The PDO was revised in 2018 to read as follows: “to achieve national geographic coverage of the Targeted Social Assistance Program and to ensure integrated delivery of services.” This was to reflect the intent to use the ASIST MIS and NRSP registry in consolidating multiple programs on a single digital platform, leveraging the institutional foundation the project had helped to lay down.
36. The revised PDO indicators below capture the final snapshot of all PDO indicators in the AF and linked to the two specific outcomes in the PDO. These indicators remained unchanged until project closing in June 2020.
17 As the PAD notes on page 5, “Historically, the GoT aimed to pay social assistance benefits from the largest social assistance program -electricity and gas compensation- to 20 percent of the population, or about 1.5 million people. The effort to cover such a large fraction of the population resulted in payments of negligibly low benefits. The GoT has not decided on the specific share of the population that it would cover following the national reform for social protection.”
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37. PDO indicators corresponding to Outcome 1. To achieve national geographic coverage of the TSAP:
• Coverage of the Targeted Social Assistance (TSA) Program: Number of districts: Target of 68 districts.
• Beneficiaries of Safety Nets programs (number) - also a core indicator: Target of 1 million beneficiaries.
• Beneficiaries of Safety Nets programs - Female (number) - also a core indicator: Target of 500,000 beneficiaries.
• Beneficiaries of Safety Nets programs - Unconditional cash transfers (number) - also a ore indicator: Target of 1 million beneficiaries.
• TSA Beneficiaries who are elderly women living alone*18 (number) - Target of 1,500 beneficiaries.
• TSA Beneficiaries who are women, heads of households* (number) - Target of 65,000 households.
38. PDO indicators corresponding to Outcome 2. To ensure integrated delivery of services:
• Number of Jamoats where training and awareness has been provided on mechanisms of the new TSA program: Target of 460 jamoats.
• Use of the registry for planning and budgeting. Target being that the SASP19 uses the NRSP to assess TSA budget needs, including regional monitoring.
• Number of certified disabled individuals registered in NRSP* (number) - Target of 145,000 beneficiaries.
• Number of certified disabled individuals registered in NRSP who have also been provided with TSA benefits* (Number) - Target of 20,000 beneficiaries.
Revised Components
39. The three original components of the SSNSP were unchanged under the 2018 AF though funds were added under Component 3, and a fourth and new component was added as discussed below.
Component 4: Supporting national roll-out of the Targeted Social Assistance Program, including the National Registry of Social Protection (US$1.5 million)
18 An asterisk (*) was added against the four new PDO indicators introduced in the January 2018 restructuring to distinguish them from the earlier set of PDO indicators. 19 With the MHSPP’s (DSPP and technically managed by the SASP.
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40. This component was designed to support the establishment of an effective system to manage the delivery of unified social assistance as a new and consolidated TSA program in the country and the national rollout. It extended activities that were already under way and core to the original project design, building on it with some additional but closely linked activities in support of the overall project objectives. Specifically, it supported (a) establishing additional regional coordination centers under the SASP with a broad range of service functions for TSA program clients and other programs, including minor renovations, provision of internet connectivity and stable electricity supply, transportation and office infrastructure, and so on; (b) upgrading work places for district and jamoat level staff, ensuring connectivity and stable electricity supply, and office logistics; (c) conducting public awareness and information campaigns around TSA, including design of communication strategy and production of information materials; (d) introducing improvements in the mechanisms of TSA beneficiary selection and benefit delivery;20 (e) strengthening the TSA grievance redress mechanism; (f) establishing mechanisms for participatory decision-making by local communities for TSA eligibility; (g) conducting a gender analysis of the TSA program to inform potential required policy and administrative changes; (h) conducting an impact evaluation and a beneficiary satisfaction survey of the TSA program to better inform policy design choices and further improvements in the TSA program; and (i) providing training to the regional-, district-, jamoat-, and central-level staff of the SASP and other relevant branches of the Government in new procedures of the TSA program.
41. The component also supported the design and development of a new mechanism and database of electronic disability certification for the State Medical-Social Expertise Service (SMSES). The proposal involved design of a blueprint for the new mechanism of electronic registration of all disability cases,21 as a sub-module of the NRSP, and also capacity building for staff of the SMSES.
Other Changes
Rationale for Changes and Their Implication on the Original Theory of Change
42. All changes were well justified and whenever made were in the interest of improving overall implementation. The first restructuring in 2014 reflected important changes in operational functions from under the PCG/EOP to the MLSP and ultimately to the SASP within the MHSPP. This was to have a visible impact on the quality and pace of implementation thereafter, improving coordination, speeding up procurement, and increasing disbursement (see subsequent sections for more detail). The project began to implement activities and expand the TSA program to more districts, necessitating more restructurings, and ultimately an AF in 2018 for an eventual national rollout of the TSA to all districts.
43. Figure 1 depicts the Theory of Change for the original PDO set at project approval in 2011. Although a Theory of Change was not articulated at approval, there certainly was one, which is reconstructed earlier in the ICR. The original PDO supports building the institutional capacity (training, equipment, and so on) and technical mechanisms (NRSP) necessary for the effective operation of a national system of social assistance. The revised PDO, updated as part of the AF in 2018, is “to achieve
20 This includes establishing limits on duration of receipt of benefits, introducing stratification of the PMT scores, and establishing differentiation in TSA benefits levels, depending on family size and other conditions. It is also proposed that the TSA selection threshold be dynamically set, depending on availability of funds and program performance. 21 At the AF, there were around 144,000 registered disabled citizens of all ages in various categories and 34 offices of SMSES that supported that function.
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national geographic coverage of the Targeted Social Assistance Program and to ensure integrated delivery of services”, and is a step up along the results chain based on setting up the necessary building blocks and capacity up to that point during implementation. The AF and its new PDO, in fact, further strengthened the original Theory of Change by keeping up the momentum on and expectations from the ongoing reform of the social assistance system through an envisaged nationwide rollout of TSA and automated systems (functioning NRSP and unified registry functionalities).
II. OUTCOME
A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs 44. The PDO remains very relevant and is well aligned with the World Bank’s country strategies for Tajikistan both at project closing (Country Partnership Framework [CPF] FY19–FY23) and approval (Country Partnership Strategy [CPS] FY10–FY13). Starting with the original PDO at approval,22 when first steps were made to reform the social assistance system—through evolution to the revised PDO under the AF—when based on prior accomplishments, the TSA program aimed for national geographic coverage and integrated delivery of services, with a functioning NRSP in place. In fact, more recently, and as the SSNSP neared closing, Targeted Social Information System of Tajikistan (ASIST MIS [translated from Russian]) was critical in providing rapid delivery of urgent assistance to eligible households when it was successfully leveraged by the Tajikistan Emergency COVID-19 (TEC-19, P173765) Project to provide a one-time emergency payment of TJS 500 to vulnerable households registered in ASIST. The project was a key element of the CPS at approval and well anchored in the Government’s own national development priorities.23 It broadly supported the first CPS objective on reducing the negative impact of the crisis on poverty and vulnerability, and specifically focused on reducing risk for vulnerable groups through enhanced social protection among its objective-specific results.24 The project continues to be relevant and is well aligned with the increased emphasis on human capital—which is one of the focus areas of the three pillars in the current CPF and among the key themes of the country’s long-term National Development Strategy 2016–30 (NDS 2030).
45. The project has done far more than just consolidating fragmented legacy social assistance programs, as it has catalyzed a paradigm shift in perception toward the social sectors. It has markedly changed perceptions of eligibility determination in social assistance programs among citizens and achieved hard-won reform which has helped to slowly tip the balance in nearly a decade of implementation toward ensuring greater focus on social sectors in national priorities. This important change is likely to have wide ramifications not just in the short to medium term, as the country grapples with the pandemic and is likely to face new shocks such as climate change, but also looking ahead, as it internalizes lessons to date and makes greater investments in its human capital.
22To improve the capacity of the GoT to plan, monitor, and manage social assistance for the poor through the development of an NRSP and the provision of training, equipment, and related items for improving said capacity. 23 The project actively supported the Government’s vision for the social sectors articulated in NDS 2006–15 and the Poverty Reduction Strategy III for 2010–12. 24 Specifically, the Tajikistan CPS FY10–FY13 noted that “IDA would provide technical assistance to improve targeting and administration of the safety net system as a whole” and as also reflected in the table on indicative CPS program financed by IDA and trust funds which clearly denotes support for social protection.
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46. The relevance of PDO is rated High both at appraisal and implementation completion.
B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY)
47. The project was successful in achieving its development objective and surpassed original targets in the case of nearly all outcome indicators and achieved them in the rest. By project closing, seven of the ten PDO indicators exceeded their targets, while the remaining three PDO indicators fully achieved their intended results.
48. Because of the change in the PDO, split ratings apply for the efficacy rating which is split between the pre-January 2018 AF and post January 2018 AF till closing. The pre-January 2018 AF time frame covers close to seven years of implementation from approval in 2011 until the 2018 AF and represented by the original PDO statement and the PDO indicators from the 2014 restructuring. The second time frame—2018 AF till closing—represents the nearly two and a half years from the AF in January 2018 till project closing in June 2020, represented by the revised PDO statement (which includes the national rollout) and the expanded set of PDO indicators.
Table 1. Original PDO (before AF) and Outcome 1 (post AF): Indicators and Achievements Pre-Jan 2018 AF Post Jan 2018 AF till closing END Actual END Actual (end of project/June 2020) Outcome TARGET TARGET Indicator From ISR From ISR From last ISR From last ISR seq 11 seq 11 seq15/June seq15/June 2020 /July 2017 /July 2017 2020 Outcome pre-Jan 2018 AF: improve the capacity of the Government of Tajikistan to plan, monitor, and manage social assistance for the poor (through the development of a national registry of social protection and the provision of training, equipment and related items for improving said capacity) Outcome 1 post Jan-2018 AF till closing: To achieve national geographic coverage of the TSA program Coverage of the Targeted Social Assistance (TSA) 30 40 68 68 (fully achieved AF target at project close) Program: Number of districts: Beneficiaries of Safety Nets 400,000 426,000 1,000,000 1, 283, 000 (surpassed AF target at project close) programs (number) (Core indicator) Beneficiaries of Safety Nets programs - Female 200,000 232,000 500,000 646,000 (surpassed AF target at project close) (number)- (Core indicator) Beneficiaries of Safety Nets programs - 400,000 426,000 1,000,000 1, 283, 000 (surpassed AF target at project close) Unconditional cash transfers (number) (Core indicator) Number of Jamoats Part of where training and 200 437** outcome 2 Part of outcome 2 under AF awareness has under AF
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Pre-Jan 2018 AF Post Jan 2018 AF till closing END Actual END Actual (end of project/June 2020) Outcome TARGET TARGET Indicator From ISR From ISR From last ISR From last ISR seq 11 seq 11 seq15/June seq15/June 2020 /July 2017 /July 2017 2020 been provided on mechanisms of the new TSA program* Use of the registry Part of for planning and Yes Yes outcome 2 Part of outcome 2 in AF budgeting* in AF TSA Beneficiaries who are elderly n/a n/a 1500 5150 (surpassed AF target at project close) women living alone (number) TSA Beneficiaries who are women, n/a n/a 65,000 130,000 (surpassed AF target at project close) heads of households
49. The two indicators with a single asterisk (*) in the table 1 were part of the set of PDO indicators pre-January 2018 AF and therefore retained to capture the full results picture before the AF. They were subsequently moved under Outcome 2 of the revised PDO from the January 2018 AF. Also, 437 jamoats with two asterisks (**) in table 1 correspond to additional rounds of training provided in the jamoats— the total number of jamoats in the 40 districts where TSA program operates is 275. In many of those, follow-up/additional training were provided.
Table 2. Outcome 2: Indicators and Achievements Pre-Jan 2018 AF Post Jan 2018 AF till closing Outcome Indicator END Actual (end of project/June 2020) TARGET From last ISR From last ISR seq15/June seq15/June 2020 2020 Outcome 2 post-Jan 2018 AF till closing: To ensure integrated delivery of services Number of Jamoats where training and awareness has been provided on 460 460 (fully achieved AF target at project close) mechanisms of the new TSA program Use of the registry for Yes (SASP using the NRSP to assess TSA budget needs, Yes planning and budgeting including regional monitoring) Number of certified 146,000 (surpassed AF target at project close) disabled individuals 145,000 National census of disabled has been implemented by registered in NRSP MHSPP over the period of Sept 2019- May 2020. Number of certified disabled individuals registered in NRSP who 20,000 23,800 (surpassed AF target at project close) have also been provided with TSA benefits
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50. Overall, all PDO indicators were either fully achieved or surpassed their targets during both time frames covering project implementation. Furthermore, table 3 provides updated figures in November 2020 from the ASIST MIS reporting module, capturing sustained progress since project closing. Note that the rapid expansion of the project beneficiaries between June and November 2020 is largely due to the ongoing national expansion of the TSA program.
Table 3. November 2020 Updates from ASIST Actual (end of Latest Figures Outcome Indicator END project/June Updates from MIS (as of TARGET 2020) Nov 19, 2020) Beneficiaries of Safety Nets 1,000,000 1, 283, 000 1,778,000 programs Beneficiaries of Safety Nets 500,000 646,000 913,000 programs - Female TSA Beneficiaries who are
elderly women living alone 1500 5,150 8,510 (number) TSA Beneficiaries who are 65,000 130,000 180,000 women, heads of HH Number of certified disabled 145,000 146,000. 149,000 individuals registered in NRSP Number of certified disabled individuals registered in NRSP 20,000 23,800 40,600 who have also been provided with TSA benefits
Intermediate Outcomes
51. Staff of the MHSPP, SASP, and SMSES, including at regional and district levels, were provided extensive training to improve their capacity and raise awareness of the TSA program. A total of 998 staff were trained by project close, exceeding the target of 950 staff. A number of training activities were conducted at all levels to strengthen the capacity of the Government in operating the TSA program. A set of comprehensive training and awareness materials was also developed.25 Relevant training on basic computer literacy was provided to data entry operators at the district level and information seminars were organized for jamoat workers. The project also employed 180 local social workers for raising awareness, eligibility screening, and enrollment, which further boosted performance of the TSA program locally. Given the COVID-19 lockdowns in the first two quarters of 2020 also coinciding with the last six months of the project, some of the staff trainings went online to accommodate social distancing measures.
52. Key legal documents and operational materials in support of the TSA rollout and the management information system (MIS) were developed during the course of the project. A full set of
25 Among others were sample application forms, frequently asked questions and answers for mahalla raises (officials), special instructions on how to fill the section on ‘Information about all family members’ income’ in the social assistance application form, brochures for the poor families and community members, flowcharts providing visual explanations of all steps of the pilot implementation, and a training module for introduction of the reformed social assistance system for staff of the Agency for Social Protection and Jamoats.
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administrative rules and regulations was prepared based on in-depth consultations. An important milestone was the signing into law in February 2017 of the TSA bill which laid a solid foundation for the national rollout of the TSA. The project supported preparation of the TSA operations manual and various directives guiding implementation of the new program both in the center and locally.
53. The NRSP was established and the ASIST MIS was fully operational by closing and made possible the data-sharing agreement with Amonat Bank to facilitate electronic reconciliation of all program payments. The ASIST MIS developed under the project to automate TSA programming and administration is now a core mechanism used for monitoring and budgeting and is accessible and operable at the central, regional, and district levels. This was facilitated by the reliable high-speed connectivity provided in all locations of the TSA program by the project. A dedicated and well-secured data center was also established in the new premises of the SASP and is considered among the most secure servers in the country after those of the MoF and Tax Administration. The new information system also allows for developing and integrating other modules beyond TSA, including cash transfers and other non-cash benefits. A new Information Technology (IT) division was also established within the SASP and separately staffed to institutionalize the function of information system management. One important result of the dialogue between the SASP and the Amonat bank was initiating the work on the data-sharing agreement to facilitate electronic reconciliation of all program payments to remedy the earlier absence of effective tools to supervise and monitor the payments process and track funds flow into individual bank accounts. While all TSA payments are deposited into individual bank accounts, delivery is often in cash by Amonat bank clerks to accommodate remote locations. Amonat bank provides reconciliation statements but they are on paper and need to be further automated and elaborated to be effectively used in the electronic verification process.
54. Five regional program coordination centers were established and functioning by the end of the project—representing a fully achieved target.26 Before the 2018 AF, the Financing Agreement mandated establishing, as a pilot, at least one data processing center, while the Government was successful in establishing two such program coordination centers. Subsequently under the AF, three more data centers were completed by the project’s close. Functions of these centers include program implementation monitoring, technical support to the district offices of the SASP, data entry, and selective data verification. The regional centers were also fully staffed and equipped with hardware, software, high-speed internet connections, and proper training provided by the project.
55. Three non-TSA programs, by project closing, were already using the NRSP to register and monitor beneficiaries, including the World Bank’s new emergency response TEC-19 Project approved in April 2020, representing a fully achieved target. The robustness and functionality of the NRSP were effectively leveraged by other programs including the program on disability assessment set up under the AF, the scheme for delivering a funeral grant to eligible beneficiaries, and the TEC-19 Project. Early results from the TEC-19 Project already point to a very efficient mechanism to deliver assistance, with the project reaching over 64,000 households by end of calendar year 202027. Its success has also led to the intent to cover additional vulnerable groups under the proposed AF to the TEC-19 Project, demonstrating the TSA
26 The centers were established in Khorog (GBAO) and in Dushanbe, Kulob (Khatlon oblast), Khujand (Sughd oblast), and Rasht (in Rasht area of the Rayons of Republican Subordination) 27 A December 28, 2020, update from the TEC-19 Project Implementation Unit to the World Bank reports that to date, the project has provided emergency social assistance to 64,469 low-income households with children under three years and disbursed a total of TJS 32,234,500 (equivalent to US$3,000,031).
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instrument’s flexibility, permitting the expansion from a set of poor households with children under the age of 3 to a beneficiary group that includes households with children (i) under the age of 7; and (ii) under the age of 18 with disabilities. Additional groups, including the poorest households, regardless of whether they have children, may also be included.
56. The policy and operational units within the MHSPP and SASP were fully staffed and functioning and coordinating with the offices at the district and jamoat levels. The SASP was fully established in new and renovated premises, with the data center, secure servers, and a firewall. The director of the SASP appointed as the project coordinator took charge of the TSA rollout. By the end of the project, the SASP was fully staffed and included a dedicated team of IT professionals providing technical support to operators in districts and regional centers with server administration carried out jointly with the project's IT consultants. An efficient and well-coordinated operation of a strong and multidisciplinary team of PCG consultants, operationally embedded into the administrative structures of the SASP, was at the heart of the project’s success. The team provided technical, fiduciary, and managerial support to the management of the SASP as well as policy, legal, and budgetary advice to the line ministry. Importantly, it was largely due to the technical contribution of the project team that adequate funding of the TSA operation was sustained in both benefit and administrative budgets.
57. The process of certification of disability was fully automated and operating based on the NRSP by the end of the project. Because of major efforts, the project completed a disability census and re- registration to collect data on the disabled, resulting in 146,000 disability files being collected, reviewed, and digitized, surpassing the intended target of 145,000. The process also involved an inventory of medical acts, their collection from various institutions, comparing existing registries at the SMSES and the ministry, verifying the compliance of medical acts with the current status and condition of a disabled person, drawing up the lists of disabled people for further verification, and, where necessary, conducting re- examinations. A new software module of disability certification was also completed to facilitate the electronic registration of new cases. The 24 centers of disability certification across the country were also equipped with necessary hardware and provided training, with new cases of disability being entered into the new system electronically by project close (around 140 new cases a week).
58. Almost all TSA beneficiaries reported being satisfied with the program and noted that the TSA program interventions responded to their needs, surpassing the intended target appreciably. Results from a 2019 beneficiary survey indicated that 98 percent of program beneficiaries were satisfied while the intended target was 75 percent. The proactive efforts by the project team to raise awareness, strengthen training, improve targeting, and automate processes had a very positive impact on the perception of the program. Not surprisingly, even as far back as 2011, when the pilot introduced the initial PMT to pick eligible beneficiaries in the two pilot districts, there was already instant and positive endorsement on the perception of fairness and transparency of the process in direct interactions with beneficiaries during early field visits and in focus groups.
59. Proactive efforts by the SASP at awareness raising on the TSA program through various media helped sensitize citizens to the program, especially in remote and mountainous areas that also tend to be poorer and more vulnerable. The project conducted intensive public awareness and information campaigns around TSA, including design of a communication strategy and production of information materials, and hired a dedicated communications consultant to help raise the profile of the SASP and lead the publicity effort on TV and in local newspapers and through the successful launch of several publicity
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events. Overall, the SASP assumed strong ownership of the new TSA program and intensified its efforts on widespread popularization of the TSA program. As a result, awareness and approval of the program among the population grew tremendously over the lifetime of the project—with the TSA program now well established and known for its fairness and transparency in the country.
Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome Table 4. Assessment of each Outcome for Efficacy
60. The overall rating for the outcome linked to the first timeframe is rated High, as the outcome was achieved with the PDO indicators either surpassing or fully achieving their targets. This initial period covering almost seven initial years of implementation was critical—beginning small (with the RSR-funded pilot) and incrementally building the systems as the TSA expanded. In many ways, the ‘heavy lifting’ to establish the systems and the credibility of the project and the overall program was undertaken in this phase justifying the rating. By the end of this period, the project had improved the Government’s (SASP) capacity to plan, monitor, and manage social assistance (original outcome statement). Exogenous factors such as the initial capacity constraints within the PCG and the subsequent change in implementing agency leading to efficient management under the new SASP demonstrated that the project tackled external challenges while staying on track to achieve its objectives.
61. Under the AF, the project was ready to take the program to a new level through expansion to the remaining 28 districts—thereby leading to covering all 68 districts—which corresponds to Outcome 1 under the AF of ‘achieving national geographic coverage’. The overall efficacy rating for the second time frame (covering the revised PDO) was rated Substantial, given that while targets were fully achieved or exceeded for both outcomes, they could have been achieved earlier had there not been a delay in the issuance of Decree No. 271 authorizing the national rollout. It should be noted that the delay in promulgation of the decree did not stop any of the activities outlined in the Legal Agreement. Significant work was already under way including delivery of equipment, furniture, and training to all the remaining districts and jamoats, as the decree was awaited to get the country prepared for the national rollout. Also, it is evident that the first timeframe rated and its success was in many ways responsible for the ease with which activities after the 2018 AF could proceed.
Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating
62. Overall efficacy rating is Substantial. This was based on the ratings in the earlier table 4. Set against the larger context of the decade-long reform, the project began its incremental journey with
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lessons from the small pilot in two districts and an offline MIS, which then helped expand the TSA to 10, then 25, and 40 districts by 2016/17 (before the AF), strengthening the case for the AF, and through legal mandate of the TSA bill, allowed for the ultimate national rollout to all 68 districts in Tajikistan. The project along the way also built the needed capacity and systems at all levels, and established a functioning MIS (ASIST), regional data processing centers, and an NRSP that has already benefitted, among others, the TEC-19 Project.
C. EFFICIENCY Assessment of Efficiency and Rating
63. The primary objective of the project was to improve the Government’s capacity and technical mechanisms for the effective operation of a national system of social assistance—many dimensions of efficiency were therefore assessed under the rubric of efficacy because achievement of the outcome indicators involved improving the efficiency with which Tajikistan delivers social assistance. At design, the project included an economic and financial analysis which drew upon key findings from the World Bank’s 2010 report (on social assistance in Tajikistan). Notably the study used a scoring formula estimated using the Tajikistan Living Standards Survey of 2009, with simulations showing that the targeting accuracy was expected to increase to 54 percent if the formula was to be applied by the public administration. It was also found that having the NRSP would improve efficiency of the social assistance system by increasing its effectiveness in reducing poverty, save scarce public resources by enabling the MoF to reduce reallocation of social assistance for other purposes at the district level, and also reduce errors and fraud. A rapid efficiency analysis was conducted along a few dimensions: (a) efficiency of the social safety net that the project supports, (b) cost-effectiveness of the infrastructure that the project built, and (c) the project’s own efficiency (in terms of preparation and implementation).
64. Evaluations undertaken at different stages of the project provided assessments of efficiency and of improvements in efficiency of the social safety nets.
• A 2012 evaluation of the 2011–12 pilot program undertaken in two districts found that the objective scoring mechanism of the PMT achieved better targeting than the legacy social assistance programs did in 2009—in particular, only 23 percent of the beneficiaries of the legacy programs fell among the poorest 20 percent nationally, whereas in the pilot, 48 percent of the beneficiaries fell within the poorest 20 percent nationally, representing an improvement in poverty targeting.
• The evaluation also found that while the benefits themselves were limited (less than US$7 equivalent per month per beneficiary household or 20 percent of the individual poverty line) and did not account for varying family size, there were notable gains to beneficiaries. Some 70 percent of households used the transfer to increase food consumption. For children, the number of missed school days decreased and school attendance increased. Transfers to female-headed households did not disincentivize work effort—if anything, more women sought work, likely substituting for children’s work effort.
• A 2014 analysis of safety nets, however, found key inefficiencies in program administration given that the TSA system at that stage was a hybrid manual-automated administration
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model that involved high reliance on local- and district-level units for the front-end, intensive manual processing, and excessive paper-based document requirements.
65. An analysis of the effectiveness of the TSA, done using a large-scale household sociological survey in 2019 (covering current and former beneficiaries and rejected applicants), found evidence of the ultimate effectiveness of the project and its beneficiary targeting mechanisms. These include the following:
• Near-universal (98 percent) acknowledgment of the importance of the cash transfers despite their low size
• Relative ease of application with beneficiaries visiting jamoat administrations no more than one to two times to complete documentation for participation
• Fewer than 20 percent of participants facing problems and difficulties when participating in the program
• Awareness of the objectivity of the decision to refuse benefits (as made by a computer program)
• Acknowledgment of the fairness of the TSA means-testing mechanism in comparison to the previous practice of compensation of electricity
• A link between program participation and girls’ education.
66. The same survey, however, found dimensions along which program effectiveness could be improved including the following:
• A lack of awareness of the centralized nature of decision-making
• About 60 percent of participants being unaware of the other types of social support they were entitled to as recipients of the TSA program—including benefits for payment of health treatment and education, one-time social payments, and burial allowance—with only about 15 percent of participants using these other benefits
• Delays sometimes of more than three months between filing and receipt of the first allowance (although this is due to the quarterly payment schedule)
• Awareness of instances of inequity in benefit distribution—about 25 percent of participants knew of relatively wealthy households receiving benefits over poorer ones
• Limited improvement in beneficiaries’ financial situation in light of the small size of the transfer payments.
MIS Cost and Comparisons
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67. A key deliverable of the project was the ASIST MIS developed in 2015 which is a major achievement. At an initial cost of around US$375,000, the MIS was cost efficient and compares very favorably with international experience. In fact, in the interest of time and cost efficiency and to avert potential delays from large IT procurement, the project was strategic and procured a system from an experienced vendor who had earlier developed a well-functioning system in the Kyrgyz Republic and customized it to the SSNSP context. A 2020 ICR for the Tanzania Safety Nets Project placed initial costs at US$1.63 million in 2016. In contrast, a 2016 review of MIS expenditure on social protection in Latin America, had initial costs ranging from US$1.7 million in Costa Rica, US$10 million in Colombia, US$17 million in Chile, US$83 million in Argentina, to US$90 million in Mexico28.
68. The initial MIS cost was a one-time sunk cost and is small in comparison to the social assistance payments disbursed by the GoT. Between 2016 and the first nine months of 2020, The TSA program disbursed over TJS 200 million in three categories of assistance (TSA, compensation for electricity and gas, and school allowances), or about US$21 million over five years. By comparison, the ASIST MIS costs less than US$1 million. Put in perspective: (a) on a per-safety net beneficiary basis, the initial MIS cost worked out to an average of US$0.29 per beneficiary29 at project completion and (b) if each beneficiary received TJS 400 in TSA annually and the entire MIS cost is written off in a single year (rather than amortized over its useful life), it amounts to just 0.7 percent of the social assistance actually disbursed,30 even as the efficiency of that disbursement increased.
Preparation and Implementation Efficiency
69. The SSNSP was prepared efficiently in around six months with an identification mission in November 2010 followed by intensive preparation in the following months, culminating in delivery of the project to the Board, and final approval in May 2011. The project benefitted considerably during the early stage of implementation from a World Bank-executable component of funding from the RSR of US$ 300,000 (TF096950) which was critical to evaluation of the 2011 pilot and also helped to finance mission travel and timely hiring of relevant experts as consulting services. The project also had frequent periodic missions (a total of 34 missions between 2012 and 2020 which included implementation supervision and technical missions) that were critical to sustaining the policy dialogue and keeping a close eye on implementation and also were cost-effective given that there was typically considerable cost-sharing across missions for other projects. Implementation efficiency, initially slow under the PCG at the EOP, was turned around considerably when the project was restructured in 2014 and disbursement rose appreciably for the first time with improved ratings sustained for the rest of the project.31. While the timeframe for the project was long and the Bank’s preparation and implementation support budget was significant relative to the IDA allocation, a significant effort was required to build political ownership of the reforms, coupled with sustained technical support. The Bank provided such consistent support both
28 Wylde,Emily. 2016. A Value for Money Assessment of the Tanzania Productive Social Safety Net. 29 Calculated based on (MIS cost of US$375,000/1.283 million beneficiaries at project close in June 2020). 30 The MIS cost expressed as share of average benefits disbursed in a year at closing was approximately US$53.2 million. This is calculated as TJS 400 per beneficiary per year × 1.283 million beneficiaries, or around TJS 513.2 million (or US$53.2 million, using a 2019 exchange rate of US$1 = TJS 9.53) 31 Percentage disbursement grew only slightly (from 5 percent to 7 percent) between 2012 and early 2014, with most other key ratings either at Moderately Satisfactory/Moderately Unsatisfactory. The decisive restructuring of the SSNSP in mid-2014 had a positive impact on implementation, resulting in a spike in disbursement to 13 percent as procurements were completed and more activities started being implemented.
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on substance and in operations, underpinning the commendable achievements at project closing. With relatively modest investment, the project has made huge contributions that are likely to be sustained well beyond the project. It has strengthened the case for more spending on social sectors, contributing to more efficient use of public resources and providing a reliable platform to more efficiently channel future donor assistance.
70. The overall efficiency rating was rated Substantial.
71. Relative to the operational context at approval, the SSNSP at closing in June 2020, achieved the program efficiency of the country’s social assistance system it set out to reform nearly a decade earlier. It has successfully consolidated the country’s fragmented social assistance schemes, established a poverty-targeted TSA program that was rolled out nationally (reducing wastage and improving coverage), put in place secure and automated systems across the country (thereby increasing accountability and improving system efficiency and efficacy), and established a functioning registry which could lend itself to similarly improving targeting and fiscal efficiency of other government and donor endeavors (encouraging expansion and interoperability), and in so doing, also raised the overall profile of the social protection sector. The project also contributed to the operational efficiency of the TEC-19 Project when the tried and tested systems put in place by the SSNSP were leveraged to deliver emergency transfer to vulnerable households. In the absence of any formal cost-benefit evaluations or value-for-money studies commissioned by the project that would have provided more in-depth analysis, there is a reservation to assign a High rating on this dimension.
D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING
72. The overall outcome rating is Satisfactory. The project began in 2011 with a small pilot in two districts and over time grew to being institutionalized and codified becoming a consolidated national TSA program by project close in 2020.
• The relevance was rated High, as there were no shortcomings in the relevance to the current CPF.
• The overall efficacy was rated High in the first phase spanning 2011–17 (before the 2018 AF) when the ‘heavy lifting’ of the project to work toward the original project objective resulted in the intended outcomes being fully achieved and PDO targets mostly surpassing or achieving established targets. The overall efficacy rating in the subsequent second and shorter phase under the AF (2018–20) was rated Substantial, given the minor shortcomings surrounding the delayed decree induced uncertainty which did not affect activities resulting in the project still achieving both its outcomes and, once again, mostly surpassing or achieving established targets.
• The overall efficiency rating was Substantial, as it was in line with efficacy found in comparable programs internationally in the social assistance sector and given the transformative reform.
• Applying split ratings, the overall outcome rating is just past the midpoint (at a final score of 5.59) placing it between Satisfactory and Highly Satisfactory (table 5). The ICR proposes a
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Satisfactory overall outcome rating.
Table 5. Split Rating Method to Assign Overall Outcome Rating for the SSNSP
E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY)
Gender
73. Aligned with the CPF FY10–FY13 for Tajikistan at design and equally relevant to the CPF FY19– FY23 closing, the project placed emphasis on gender aspects. The project ensured active participation of women and further included specific targeting in design, specifically of female-headed households and elderly women living alone, indicators which are reflected in the Results Framework. This is especially relevant given that the ratio of female-headed households is high in Tajikistan because of the civil war and due to the out-migration of young male workers to neighboring countries. With nearly 35 percent of Tajikistan’s migrant households and 17 percent of non-migrant households headed by women, female- headed households are highly dependent on remittances and thus more vulnerable to shocks.
74. Results from a beneficiary survey in 2019 indicate that the project has contributed to the empowerment of women and supported opportunities for girls and young women to receive education. Among responding households, a significant share of the applicants was female (39.4 percent), with nearly half the respondents (47.3 percent among current participants and 46.6 percent among former participants) observing that the receipt of TSA benefits was owing to the women’s efforts and that, as a result, the woman’s place and authority in the household improved. Also, almost half of the households have girls or girls of school and student age—48.8 percent of current and 46.5 percent of former participants, while a very significant part of these respondents noted that support under the TSA program helps to ensure that these members households could receive education.
75. The project at closing reached over 50 percent of women while also exceeding its other gender- related targets. Systems put in place by the project show at closing that women were well represented among the TSA program beneficiaries. For example, data from the ASIST MIS indicate that female-headed households account for over 50 percent of TSA beneficiaries demonstrating, yet again, that women were
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proactive in applying to the program to see if they were eligible so that their households could qualify to receive TSA assistance. The project Results Framework at closing reflected that over half of the SSNSP beneficiaries were female (50.4 percent), with the program reaching 3,900 elderly women living alone (representing over two and a half times the end target of 1,500).
Institutional Strengthening
76. The project has made a tremendous difference, over its nearly decade-long implementation, to institutional strengthening at various levels. It has built capacity and trained existing and new staff at the central level and within the local government in jamoats and mahallas, increasing uptake and accountability of the TSA program.
77. The SSNSP contributed to building capacity of the MHSPP and was instrumental in the creation of the SASP. It has helped build a cadre of trained professionals within the Government now also familiar with World Bank systems and procedures through their engagement with the project. Further, staff engagement and capacity built in the regional data processing centers and in jamoats and mahallas nationwide (under the national rollout) have put in place more able human resources to not only run the TSA program but also to provide quality support for future endeavors and initiatives of the ministry in service delivery. Similarly, training to SMSES staff has helped consolidate and make transparent the disability certification process across the country through a new software module for that purpose.
78. The establishing of the five regional service centers has helped streamline processes and improved quality of client services by considerably shortening the time of TSA application processing. The regional offices of the SASP provide support to application processing at the district level as well as to capacity building, training, coordination in information campaigns, logistical coordination, and verification procedures. The project helped invest in infrastructure by providing fiber-optic internet connections to these centers so they are online and ensure faster service.
Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity
79. Preliminary results from the impact evaluation based on the 2019 household survey suggest that the program was effective in reaching the poor. Evidence shows that the program is contributing to reducing the economic gap between beneficiaries and the overall population. Operational evidence has shown that most TSA beneficiaries use their payment to offset energy costs. The current annual benefit amount is TJS 464 following indexing now in place because of policy dialogue through the project.32 There is however widespread acknowledgement that the benefit amount is quite low. That being said, there are additional benefits to being a TSA beneficiary as reflected in the next section. See annex 4 for a summary of preliminary results from the impact evaluation.
Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts
80. The status of being a TSA beneficiary has become highly valued as it opens up access to a host of other benefits and opportunities. It has also become the criteria to receive official status of being a
32 The TSA benefit amount per household from January 1, 2011, to June 30, 2020, was TJS 400 per year. After the adoption effective July 1, 2020, of the decree on TSA rollout to the remaining 28 districts, the benefit amount was increased based on indexation calculations to TJS 464.
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low-income family. In terms of access to other benefits, TSA recipients are entitled to a funeral allowance, reduction to school tuition, access to medical services including up to 50 percent discount for emergency surgery, and reduction of public transportation costs, for any of which it is enough to submit the ‘certificate’ of being a TSA beneficiary.
81. The TSA as an instrument showed an inherent ability to permit (i) an effective preparation and implementation of relevant utility reforms (electricity, water); and (ii) the design of an impactful policy response to the current COVID-19 crisis:
• The project has established a solid foundation to revive discussions on devising compensating mechanisms to offset the adverse impact of energy reforms on the poor. Recipients of social assistance have routinely used their payment for electricity bills and utilities (water and garbage removal). Given this context, and as part of the dialogue with the Government, the TSA has been recognized as a dominant instrument to address increased costs of electricity for the poor. In fact, the new Tajikistan Power Utility Financial Recovery Program (P168211), which has the TSA rollout as an important results indicator, intends to mitigate the impact of increasing electricity tariffs on vulnerable consumers through a combination of payments under the TSA and a lifeline/block tariff structure.
• The project increased preparedness for the COVID-19 response and facilitated the delivery of cash assistance to vulnerable households. The Bank working closely with Government was able to rapidly mount an effective response to the pandemic through the TEC-19 project and successfully deliver a one-time cash assistance payment to vulnerable households identified through the TSA program by leveraging the systems put in place and capacity built under the SSNSP. In fact, within first seven month of operation of the TEC-19 project, between June and December 2020, a total of $3mil in emergency assistance was delivered to 64,469 vulnerable families with children under the age of 3.
82. Mahallas over time have become more actively involved in the implementation of the TSA program and more can be done. This is both encouraging and desirable considering that they are closest to the community members and interesting because this participation is not provided for by the legal framework of the TSA program and to a large extent represents the performance of functions and powers assigned to the jamoats.
III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME
A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION
83. The preparation of the SSNSP in 2010 drew upon solid analytical work by the World Bank in response to the active interest within the GoT for reform of its social assistance system. Not surprisingly, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, countries in the Europe and Central Asia region including Tajikistan, began to take a hard look at the efficacy and financial sustainability of their legacy programs in the face of new vulnerabilities. A 2009 World Bank poverty assessment for Tajikistan observed that the social protection system in existence at the time was ill-positioned to be an effective instrument to reduce poverty, with social assistance spending very low (0.5 percent of GDP)—the lowest in the Europe and
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Central Asia region—and weak programs with marginal impact on poverty and inequality (drop in poverty headcount by 1.5 percentage points) and that could benefit from a new, unified social assistance program offering poverty-targeted cash transfers. The preparation also benefitted from a separate in-depth report prepared by the Europe and Central Asia social protection team examining the country’s social assistance programs, commissioned in response to a 2009 request from the Government, which by the time of the identification mission in November 2010 was ready for discussion with the Government and technical dialogue with the EU and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) (on disability issues).33 This analytical work provided a robust situational assessment of the social assistance system in Tajikistan and a solid basis for the proposed operational engagement at the time, which would culminate in May 2011 with an approved SSNSP.
84. The World Bank was fortunate to have in the Government a client that was not only ready but also well informed because of ongoing EU support to its social assistance programs. In 2009–10, with assistance channeled through the EU Technical Assistance Project, the MLSP developed new mechanisms and application forms around the Indirect Family Welfare Assessment and TSA procedures.34 The World Bank team also benefitted considerably from rich technical dialogue and synergies with the EU, leading to formalizing the pilot in two districts funded through the World Bank-managed RSR Trust Fund. The MLSP, keen for reform, had completed an EU-financed study tour to Georgia in June 2010 to observe its social registry and benefitted from technical exchanges with an international expert on the modalities of PMT testing in Kazakhstan and its approach to enrolling conditional cash transfer beneficiaries.
85. The World Bank’s RSR Trust Fund facility provided the timely financial impetus and fostered collaborative synergies with the EU for the pilot which was to be expanded under the SSNSP. The RSR at the time was an active funding source for social protection initiatives within projects and enabled financing of the targeting pilot in two districts to be managed by the MLSP and the EU which would serve as the proof of concept for further expansion under the proposed IDA funded SSNSP. By the identification mission for the SSNSP in late 2010, the team was already advanced in its dialogue with the EU and also using the mission for advance preparation for the RSR grant and worked with the Government to revise its Project Operations Manual (POM) defining how it would implement the RSR grant35.
86. Last but not the least, this was also an opportune moment for the World Bank to formally re- engage through a social protection operation after a long hiatus. While there were projects in education and health in the 2000s, there was no social protection-focused or social protection-led operation in
33 The World Bank and EU were already collaborating through an MoU signed June 11, 2010, for work on targeting which would later secure US$2.2 million RSR funding. The World Bank met UNICEF to learn about its support to the MLSP on disability issues in light of potential application for a Japan government disability-focused Trust Fund and MLSP interest in supporting persons with disabilities. Ultimately, disability focus was not part of the SSNSP at approval, although in the subsequent AF in January 2018, the World Bank was finally able to focus on this important area when a project activity focused on design and development of a new mechanism and database of electronic disability certification for the SMSES was included. 34 EU support to the MLSP from October 2009 through the Technical Assistance to the Sector Policy Support Program in the Social Protection Sector-Social Benefit targeting component valued at €900,000. 35 This was a key step since adoption of the revised POM was a condition for signature of the RSR Grant Agreement.
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Tajikistan for many years,36 and the shift in thinking in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis as governments provided an opportunity to re-examine their social assistance programs and a natural entry point to re- engage on social protection issues in the Tajik context.
B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION
87. The project got off to a good technical start with collaborative synergies among stakeholders to establish a proof of concept and build initial capacity through the targeting pilot producing an evaluation that provided key lessons and impetus for further scale-up. The Government launched the pilot of the new cash transfer program in Yavan and Istarvshan districts in January 2011 with RSR funding37 and technical support from the EU and the World Bank-developed PMT. The World Bank conducted a preliminary evaluation of the pilot in June 2012 which showed that its poverty-targeting mechanism was approximately twice as accurate in directing social assistance to poor households as the current legacy social assistance programs. However, the pilot's coverage of the poor was disappointing, because very few poor beneficiaries applied for benefits. Furthermore, the evaluation showed that the PMT tended to exclude single elderly people. Drawing upon lessons from the pilot, the MLSP planned to expand the pilot to eight additional districts (for a total of ten pilot districts) which included both isolated rural districts and fully urban areas. Importantly, the expanded pilot also applied a revised targeting mechanism reflecting data collected in 2012 and an adjustment to ensure coverage of the poorest single elderly people. This incremental approach was also well aligned with the Government’s capacity and desire to proceed in stages.
88. The implementation arrangements at approval under the PCG proved to be weak, affecting procurement and overall SSNSP activity sequencing in the early stages of implementation. Capacity constraints are endemic in Tajikistan and day-to-day project management under the PCG and poor coordination with the MLSP had a direct impact on SSNSP progress when momentum was critical.38 The PCG had not withdrawn the advance on the IDA grant for the project due to a delay in the Government's internal processing of the POM and complications with processing of the Manual of Procedures in the EOP. Initially, there was no procurement under the grant although it had been effective for a year. Even the RSR grant, directly managed by the PCG, was not immune to delays from slow procurement which affected key activities—notably the household survey to improve the PMT, registry/MIS tender, and so on—resulting in its extension by a full year from November 30, 2012, to end December 2013. The situation improved to an extent when the World Bank ensured placement of an experienced national consultant after which support from the PCG to the MLSP somewhat improved, although coordination remained weak. Most ratings stayed downgraded until the World Bank suggested a change to the implementation
36 The SSNSP and its significance—which would become apparent at closing with the reform of the TSA and the raised profile for social protection—take on further relevance given it appears the earliest project focused on social protection in Tajikistan dates back to the Tajikistan Pilot Poverty Alleviation Project approved in April 1997. The project helped set up the Tajikistan Social Investment Fund to address far more pressing issues facing a country that, at the time, was newly independent for just some years. 37 The RSR grant also contributed to study visits by Tajik officials to Moldova and to Turkey to learn about poverty-targeting methods in those countries and it supported a visit of several officials to the social assistance and activation meeting in Ahmedabad, India. 38 During most of 2012, procurement of the IT firm for the NRSP was delayed (Component 1). Similarly, capacity building (Component 2) was also affected since the PCG had not completed procurement of the consulting company that would evaluate MLSP capacity that would then inform training needs.
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arrangements, which was also well timed and aligned with the general trend toward restructuring of ministries which had taken hold by then within the Government.
89. An alternate approach for MIS development was adopted in 2013 to address long procurement delays which culminated in the ASIST system that became the operational cornerstone of the TSA program. Initially, to remedy delayed procurement of the MIS development under the PCG, by then still pending for almost two years, the World Bank made a strategic call to cancel the large IT procurement and go with another option which would not compromise on technical quality, while also achieving cost savings. The project decided to hire an experienced international MIS expert familiar with the Central Asia region and an established track record of developing MIS specifications and re-assessing business processes, in combination with a smaller-scale tender for a firm for the development and customization of the MIS.39 The World Bank stayed engaged on the technical front all that while with the client working in parallel on a set of comprehensive preparations for the registry development.40 The MIS development drew upon extensive field visits and consultations, assessment of business processes, and prototype testing to develop the ASIST system in 2015.
90. The first restructuring of the SSNSP in August 2014 when project responsibility moved under the SASP was instrumental in changing the pace and quality of implementation for the rest of the project. The SASP created in March 2014 within the MHSPP finally took over responsibility for TSA implementation and overall project management, after which project ratings improved considerably after over two years of poor ratings.
91. The TSA program was being expanded over time and also benefitted from refinements to the PMT to improve targeting and overall coverage and a second restructuring in March 2016 to accommodate 15 more districts. The Government expanded the TSA and associated implementation support activities and capacity building picking up traction and undergoing refinements over time. The World Bank supported the initial expanded pilot to 10 districts and contributed to a fine-tuned PMT methodology. The formula was adjusted, at the request of the MLSP, in particular, to include more single elderly people and single female-headed households. Outreach campaigns were stepped up to inform poor households about the benefit and attract more applications. Training and capacity building were sustained at the districts levels to keep up with TSA expansion and the need for improved documentation and processes and increased awareness of the program. Initially, the transfer of the TSA program from the MLSP to the MoH, for which social protection was not a priority, had significantly slowed the process of TSA rollout to the new districts. Activity picked up in 2014 with the shift of the TSA program under the SASP, and the program was able to then expand to 25 districts by 2014. A new PMT formula was developed in 2016 based on a national household survey and included a range of new indicators to improve targeting and also used to re-calibrate the MIS. The program was expanded further to a total of 40 districts by 2017 exceeding the original target (40 actual versus 30 planned districts), with close to 60 percent of the country covered and supported, after sustained consultations with the Government and MoF on the importance of increasing budgetary resources, with adequate allocation from the central budget. The
39 In the interest of time and efficiency, the system was procured from and customized by a vendor who has earlier successfully developed a similar system in the Kyrgyz Republic. This also ensured sustainability, as the same vendor then provided maintenance and development support to two similar systems in the region. In fact, these systems were also the basis for a subsequent successful deployment in Afghanistan in the context of a pensions scheme for the martyrs and disabled. 40 Including elaboration of the strategy of institutional reform (ensuring the registry had a proper institutional home) and also a number of exchange activities with countries that have implemented a registry.
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March 2016 restructuring allowed for the Government’s plans for expansion from the 25 districts it had reached to 15 more districts to achieve a total of 40 districts by the new closing date of end March 2017— which was subsequently extended in three additional short no-cost restructurings as the team sought more clarity on the AF.
92. Sustained dialogue with the Government on the criticality of keeping up funding for the program has ensured greater budget allocations and link to a budget unit that is indexed annually as well as agreement on benefit differentiation. Concerns surrounding program sustainability were related to allocation of budget resources by the Government for administration of the TSA program and an administrative budget of only 2 percent of the program expenses, which was insufficient to meet all program administration needs. Based on an assessment, produced by the project team, of the ministry to sustain TSA operations, the project was successful in being able to ensure an increase to 3 percent. A key milestone in February 2017 was the promulgation of the TSA law which has defined the overall operational context and laid the solid foundation for TSA program and its subsequent rollout (see annex 7 for full text of the law). At project closing, one of the recommendations was that the budget for administrative costs of the TSA program would need to be further increased to 4 percent to support efficient operation of the SASP, including at the regional level. By project end, the TSA benefit was also indexed which is a major achievement of the policy dialogue and institutionalization of the program. It is now linked to a ‘budget unit’ that is indexed every year. Through active policy discussions, the World Bank was successful in obtaining the Government’s agreement in principle on differentiation of TSA benefit by family size (that is, number of children). This has however not yet been codified.
93. To make up for delays surrounding a final decision on IDA allocations linked to the Government’s request to the World Bank for the AF, the project had three no-cost restructurings between March and December 2017 to essentially extend the closing date while the AF was being prepared. The Government had failed to include the AF in its internal planning which needed resolution. Meanwhile, the extensions helped sustain the pace of activities and the expansion effort to the 40 districts. By the end of 2017, the TSA had already expanded to 40 districts and the AF was approved in January 2018 setting the stage for the national rollout and additional activities, with a closing date of December 31, 2019.
94. Under the AF, the project, while awaiting the official decree authorizing rollout to the remaining districts, proceeded with all activities to ensure the national rollout and integrated delivery of services were completed by project closing in June 2020. During this phase, three more data centers were added and the work on the disability census and electronic disability certification was completed, as was preparatory work for TSA rollout in an additional 28 districts.
95. The TEC-19 Project successfully leveraged the ad hoc emergency module in the TSA system while also playing an unexpectedly timely and catalytic role in the ultimate issuance of Decree No. 271 authorizing the national TSA rollout. The TEC-19 Project initially provided a one-time payment of TJS 500 to food insecure households with young children where food price shocks caused by the COVID-19 pandemic could negatively affect children’s nutrition status. The project used the emergency module in the TSA system (originally developed with UNICEF for shock response amid disasters) and applied the described eligibility criteria. On the decree, the stipulation during TEC-19 negotiations that the national rollout (awaiting formal recognition through the long pending Decree No. 271) be a disbursement condition meant that the decree had to be issued to officially recognize the TSA national rollout, only
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following which the TEC-19 Project could then have access to funds under its temporary emergency assistance component. See Annex 9 for text of the decree issued on May 14,2020 authorizing national rollout of the TSA program.
96. The early success of the TEC-19 Project with efficient and targeted delivery of emergency cash assistance has led to inclusion of new target groups under the proposed AF to the project. These would include other vulnerable populations who would also qualify for the one-time emergency payment of TJS 500: (a) poor households with children under seven years, (b) poor households with children under 16 years and headed by a female, and (c) households with children with disabilities under age 18 (from the database of the Agency for Social Insurance and Pensions), which will also lead to inter-agency data sharing and potential future links to civil registration and vital statistics.
IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME
A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)
M&E Design
97. The M&E design of the project was clear and provided a general overview of proposed M&E activities in the project. Given that the project was building from the ground up and incrementally, beginning with learning from the targeting pilot, presenting a broad overview of the essential elements of M&E made sense to allow both for flexibility and expansion necessary for such a project and to accommodate the operational context and local capacity considerations. Given that one of the key drivers for the project was to overhaul old processes and procedures (therefore, slow, less efficient, error-prone, and mostly paper-based) and bring in automation of social assistance delivery over time, the design envisioned that monitoring capacity would be built through the proposed MIS and the registry.
98. The project planned to conduct technical and process evaluations to inform implementation and improve effectiveness. According to design, the project would fund M&E activities by both the PCG and the MLSP, with the M&E specialist of the PCG responsible for overall data collection, analysis, and timely reporting on the project and related key performance indicators. The M&E specialist was also to liaise with the MLSP in the center and with the districts and jamoats in preparing the progress reports. Project management and annual progress reports would be submitted periodically and studies and evaluations were to be commissioned by the M&E specialist, particularly to help identify any unanticipated bottlenecks and design mechanisms that may hinder implementation or negatively affect project objectives.
M&E Implementation
99. Initially processes were not automated and an interim MIS was used to input data from beneficiary applications. Most processes in the legacy system were still mostly manual and involved collecting paper-based applications with no guidance document or standard operating procedures in place. In many instances, applications might even get lost in their journey from the local level through the district up to the national level. The 2011 pilot, used in the initial PMT developed by the World Bank,
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application processes were set up and entered data in a stand-alone MIS, and lessons from the pilot helped improve processes.
100. The midterm review in February 2014 clarified the original PDO statement helping strengthen shared understanding of the Results Framework objectives and improve results tracking going forward. The following useful clarifications from that exercise demystified the language in the PDO and provided more structure and operational clarity.
(a) Given (i) the MHSPP was designated by the Government as the main ministry responsible for the social protection sector and (ii) the SASP under the MHSPP was put in direct charge of implementation of the social assistance interventions, ‘Government’ would mean the MHSPP and SASP.
(b) Given the prime operational focus of the SSNSP was to support the establishment of the new TSA program as the main mechanism of the Government to identify and provide assistance to the poor households in the country, ‘social assistance for the poor’ would mean the TSA program.
(c) The scope of capacity-building activities was also clarified with the ‘capacity to plan, monitor, and manage’ to include digitization, management, and monitoring of electronic records of households who are TSA applicants and beneficiaries, and budgeting and financial planning functions associated with the TSA program and also reflected in a target for the indicator on the registry in the Results Framework.
(d) The ‘registry of social protection’ referred to the MIS and the registry that was to be developed by the MHSPP to administer the TSA program, including for processing of the TSA applications and making eligibility decisions and payments.
101. The SASP took on an increasingly active role in monitoring TSA performance aided by the ASIST MIS that automated and streamlined TSA program delivery. Following the launch of the new information system in 2015, monitoring capabilities greatly expanded. The SASP had a dedicated M&E specialist responsible for developing procedures and guidelines, and random verification of data entered in the system to ensure regular quality control and integrity of data. A Monitoring Division was also established to oversee implementation of all social programs under its management. As the program expanded, the SASP took on more initiative, regularly conducting stakeholder meetings focused on operational monitoring of the TSA performance, including proper documentation of issues and communication with the districts. In the districts, increasingly robust enrollment and verification procedures, extensive training in the jamoats, and the use of social workers to increase program awareness, clarified processes helping increase registration intake from the resulting seamless automation. The World Bank team worked closely with the project team and the staff of the SASP on elaborating the TSA monitoring framework, including on templates to generate reports based on their objectives, content, user profile, and frequency. With time, all reports on program performance were being generated electronically and allowed for customization. In the period following the 2018 AF when the time came to prepare for the national rollout, and given the MIS by then was already rolled out and operational in 40 districts, all the project had to do was essentially replicate the system in the remaining 28 districts.
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M&E Utilization
102. Data on project indicators were regularly collected and reported and employed for decision- making and planning purposes. The ASIST MIS routinely produces reports (including providing current updates reflected in this report from November 2020) and is fully online and has one of the most secure servers in the country. Programming and decision-making also benefitted from the various assessments and evaluations undertaken during the course of implementation (see Annex 8 for a summary of findings from key studies and reports produced over the period of 2012-19) which informed design and expansion of the TSA program and provided important lessons to influence policy dialogue and improve overall effectiveness. Further, M&E of the project also fully informed decisions on articulating the Bank’s engagement in Tajikistan on the pandemic through the TEC-19 project. In fact, all decisions on costing surrounding the TEC-19 project were based on latest statistics from the ASIST MIS and NRSP, and which was updated dynamically as discussions on project preparations evolved.
103. A good example of evaluation influencing program design is using the advice from the 2014 report to include additional categorical criteria for vulnerable women. This included women living with young or disabled children and single elderly individuals (who are often women), which was then also reflected in the Results Framework under the AF. As a result, the project introduced two PDO level indicators (under the January 2018 AF) to trace performance of the TSA program with regard to households with distinct social and economic gender disadvantages (female-headed households, elderly women living alone).
Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E
104. The overall rating for the quality of M&E is High. This rating was based on an objective assessment of the breadth and depth of project achievements with a bearing on M&E not just compared to the baseline in 2011 but also at project closing when systems developed in SSNSP were successfully leveraged in the Bank’s response to COVID-19. The project began with fragmented legacy programs that were poorly targeted, highly error-prone, and essentially paper-based with almost no automation or reliable budgeting and forecasting capabilities. The project closed with a body of evidence by way of studies and evaluations generated during the course of implementation that informed the development of a well targeted program that the TSA is today and established an MIS rolled out nationally, accessible from all TSA districts that strengthened program monitoring and overall accountability. Last but not least, the systems and processes developed through the SSNSP proved their sustainability factor when they informed project costing and implementation arrangement decisions of the social assistance component in the TEC-19 project (costing of various response options focused on analysis of the coverage of various vulnerable categories by the TSA program using its registry of beneficiaries in NRSP.
B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE
Environmental and Social Safeguards
105. The project was classified as a category C project and was expected to have minimal or no adverse environmental impacts. Overall, the project complied with the World Bank’s safeguards requirements. During implementation, when there was small-scale civil works and renovation and refurbishment of premises involved, the environmental assessment category was duly switched to
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category B (partial assessment) in the Implementation Status and Results Report, and subsequently switched back to category C at a later date when it was ascertained that all public works were completed. This was relevant when the SASP moved to a new building with renovation of office space and rehabilitation works involved, including for establishment of the data center within the SASP, as well as for the five regional data centers. In all cases, the scope of works was limited enough to not require the development of a separate environmental framework.
Financial Management
106. The project surmounted initial capacity constraints with the financial management (FM) function through the first restructuring in 2014 and registered visible improvements soon after that were sustained over the remainder of the project. At approval, the PCG under the EOP was responsible for procurement, FM, and monitoring functions. However, owing to weak capacity, the timeliness and quality of FM support delivered to the MLSP under the IDA and RSR grants was considerably affected. After the first project restructuring in 2014, there were two clear lines of administering the project— technical and fiduciary—with two corresponding lead positions supervising them. FM functions improved with a new fiduciary team, under the oversight of a full-time project officer, and coordinated well over time with corresponding administrative departments of the ministry and the SASP. Capacity was also strengthened early on through hiring an experienced consultant from the RSR team to the IDA project to ensure continuity, besides also bringing on board two additional accounting/disbursement consultants hired to support operation of the SASP.
107. Once systems and processes were in place, the FM arrangements of the project, including accounting and reporting, internal control procedures, planning and budgeting, external audits, and funds flow were considered satisfactory. Over time, the MHSPP was able to generate timely quarterly interim financial reports, directly from the 1C accounting software, that were acceptable to the World Bank. Project audit reports were generally issued an unmodified (clean) opinion on the project financial statements and the audited financial statements were assessed as acceptable to the World Bank. Owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, the submission deadline for the final independent auditor’s report was extended from June 30 to September 30, 2020, and upon delivery, was found to be acceptable to the World Bank.
Procurement
108. The procurement function in the project was initially beset by long delays and benefitted considerably from the 2014 restructuring after which ratings improved and steadied until project closing. Initially, coordination between the PCG and the ministry was considerably weak and procurement activities were slow paced. Efforts to support the MLSP were affected by poor procurement capacity in the PCG which was also responsible for procurement. The Technical Working Group also tasked with originating terms of reference for procurement of goods, services, and works was not effective. Key procurement steps were running far behind schedule for a prolonged period affecting the implementation and sequencing of activities in the early stages of the project when momentum was critical. Activities initially affected include work on the NRSP where procurement required for IT contracts was rendered even more complex as a result. Similarly, procurement for the firm to evaluate MLSP capacity was also delayed having an impact on decisions on procurement of training services and computers for the ministry that were to be based on recommendations of the capacity assessment report. The 2014 restructuring
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saw visible improvements, with the new ministry actively working to revitalize the procurement function. With time, the procurement staff produced robust procurement plans and increasingly handled large and complex procurement packages.
Table 6. FM and Procurement Rating Trends over SSNSP Project Lifetime
C. BANK PERFORMANCE
Quality at Entry
109. Strategic relevance. The SSNSP at design was well aligned with NDS 2006–15, among others focused on improving public administration and developing human potential and Poverty Reduction Strategy III for 2010–12 which included a social block and cross-cutting themes on institutional reforms. The timing for the SSNSP was also appropriate as the world was recovering from the 2008 financial crisis and countries, such as Tajikistan, with systems developed before the crisis were re-examining their social safety nets to find ways to consolidate and harmonize benefits and invest in system improvements for greater efficiency.
110. Technical underpinnings. Early technical discussions on the SSNSP with the Government drew upon the context set by a seminal 2010 report by the Europe and Central Asia Social Protection Unit of the World Bank which examined social assistance programs in Tajikistan. The report was prepared as an in-depth exploratory piece in response to a request from the GoT in 2009 to support improvement of its system of social assistance. The project team also benefitted greatly from in-depth dialogue on related work led by the EU. With project teams able to secure funding from the RSR Trust Fund, the stage was set for a fruitful joint collaboration between the World Bank and EU working with the MLSP to carrying out on a small-scale pilot in two districts (Yavan and Istarafshan) to develop, pilot, and evaluate targeting, registry, and payments mechanisms for channeling social assistance benefits to the poor.41 The idea was for the proposed IDA operation to then build on the lessons and experience from that RSR pilot to carry out further investments and capacity building for a national rollout of these types of mechanisms.
41 RSR funding for a recipient-executed grant for US$2.2 million for Tajikistan Rapid Social Response Trust Fund Grant for Targeting and Payment of Social Assistance Project was approved on July 15, 2011 (Grant No. TF098826).
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111. Project design and preparation. The project design was strategically relevant, drew upon a solid evidence of prior analytical work, and well aligned with government priorities. Project preparation was well coordinated with the Government and in dialogue with the EU. The overarching context described earlier gave the timely impetus, and the project team was proactive in moving ahead with preparation which commenced in November 2010 and ended with project approval in May 2011.
Quality of Supervision
112. The project benefitted from frequent supervision missions, which helped to proactively address implementation issues as they emerged. The team went through one change of task team leader early in the project in 2012, when progress on the ground was also still slow due to challenges with project management under the PCG. Continuity of the task team leader and the key technical team on the World Bank side was maintained over the lifetime of the project. A total of 34 missions (implementation support and technical missions) were undertaken between 2012 and 2020. The findings from implementation support missions focused on the performance of implementing agencies and project progress and next steps were duly reported in Aide Memoires and ISRs. The team also followed up virtually with the client and coordinated closely with the country office in Dushanbe to ensure timely follow-up. The project held a midterm review in February 2014 which helped inform implementation decisions and provided the basis for strategic changes.
113. The World Bank team took proactive measures to manage risks. After initially giving the project some time to establish routines and processes, the World Bank noted that key project management functions under the PCG were very slow and actively pushed for a change in implementing agency. The project restructuring in mid-2014 had a positive impact on implementation and increased disbursement. Where needed, the team was also proactive in working with the Government to elaborate detailed time- bound action plans to lend more structure and time lines and prevent undue slippages in implementation. Similarly, large-scale IT-related procurement were re-visited as needed to reduce scope to avoid potential risks of contract mismanagement or find other solutions while not compromising on quality.42
114. The World Bank team worked closely with the Government over the long reform journey and coordinated with other donors and stakeholders catalyzing greater engagement on and visibility for the social protection sector. Over the course of nearly a decade, the World Bank team worked diligently with the challenges and opportunities on the ground, exercising caution but also taking calculated risks where appropriate, to make the reform of the social assistance system a reality by project close and establish a well-administered TSA program nationally. During implementation, besides working closely with the EU, particularly in the early days of implementation during 2010–12 to establish the proof of concept of the targeting pilot with the MLSP, the achievements of the TSA over time, notably the setup of the NRSP and the modularity allowing for a universal social registry functionality, attracted the keen interest of other donors. The 2014 analytical report by the World Bank also helped summarize engagement and conceptualize issues, guiding further work on policy dialogue and project supervision. UNICEF approached the World Bank to explore synergies on using the registry developed under the TSA program for shock response measures in disasters. The impact of the social protection work also helped revitalize the Social
42 For the Registry MIS under Component 1, as noted earlier, the project hired an experienced international consultant with an established track record to develop a set of specifications for the MIS, with a smaller-scale tender for a firm for the development/customization of the MIS.
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Protection Working Group within the Donor Coordination Council (DCC).43 More recently, the COVID-19 pandemic has increased vulnerabilities and underscored the role of having targeted delivery systems in place. The TEC-19 Project was able to use the systems developed by the World Bank in the delivery of emergency cash transfers.
Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance
115. The World Bank performance is rated Satisfactory. The World Bank was responsive to client needs and engaged based on solid analytical underpinnings. During the course of the long supervision, the World Bank stayed steady and involved not just on routine issues but also on higher-level policy questions not losing sight of the reform in the distance, which ultimately helped raise the profile of social protection, and more broadly the social sectors in Tajikistan. As observed earlier, whereas the country has steadily had World Bank projects on health and education over the last two decades, there had been no social protection operation since the early 2000s. This changed with the SSNSP when the World Bank was able to put social protection back on the map in Tajikistan and set up a fully operational NRSP which was successfully leveraged most recently by the current TEC-19 project to deliver emergency assistance to poor households. Looking back at the decade-long engagement by the World Bank through the SSNSP and the value added it brought to the country through collaboration and capacity building which brought the project to the significant and commendable end point in June 2020, the World Bank performance merits a Satisfactory overall rating, falling on the borderline of Highly Satisfactory and Satisfactory rating.
D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME
116. The GoT has been committed to the reform of its social assistance system and the well-being of its people as reflected in the success of the TSA program. Beginning in 2009, the seeds of change were first sown when the Government actively sought World Bank and donor assistance to overhaul its social assistance programs to increase coverage of eligible and deserving beneficiaries, reduce wastage, and improve accountability. Today, 10 years after those first steps were taken, as the country stands at the threshold of the upcoming anniversary in 2021 of 30 years of independence, there is much to celebrate for the social sectors. The country is beginning to reap the benefits of a fully functional targeted national social assistance system as well as a first NRSP whose inherent flexibility is already benefitting other programs, including, facilitating utility reforms and most recently, for rapid response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
117. Social protection programs like the SSNSP face two key risks to their development outcomes: continued government interest to improve efficiency of the interventions and longer-term fiscal sustainability to cover and potentially expand benefits. With respect to continued policy interest, the achievements of hard-earned reform have catalyzed a visible shift in the GoT’s perception of the social sectors, and heightened interest in further dialogue on social protection policies among the donor community. The project has achieved national visibility and clearly left an impact on the social sector
43 The DCC was established to facilitate information exchange and collaboration within the development community and foster dialogue on shared priorities with the GoT. The DCC’s structure covers relevant sectors in 12 working groups that fall under five clusters (natural resources; food security and nutrition; infrastructure; human development; and governance, economic, and private sector development). The Social Protection Working Group falls under the Human Development Cluster chaired by the EU (Deputy Chair - UNICEF) and serves as a platform for coordination, cooperation, partnership, and advocacy on social protection.
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landscape further strengthening the case for more in-depth dialogue on social protection issues. This is especially relevant in the face of increasing economic threats and vulnerabilities triggered by the COVID- 19 situation, as development partners seek ways to provide effective support to social policies in Tajikistan. The fallout from the global pandemic on people and livelihoods makes an urgent case for effective and rapid short-term responses targeting the poorest and vulnerable and for a more well- articulated longer-term vision for social protection in Tajikistan.
118. Ensuring fiscal support to the program and longer-term sustainability of systems put in place by the project is taking on far greater urgency in light of the pandemic. This is especially relevant, as even pre-COVID, the TSA was largely under-funded, and with new and emerging fiscal challenges from the pandemic, there is need for strong commitment from the Government so that the hard-earned gains are not reversed. While Tajikistan registered strong growth in 2019, the fallout from the pandemic is likely to have an impact on the already limited fiscal space and domestic resource mobilization with potential implications for the TSA. With slowing activity in the region and in Russia specifically, remittance inflows, accounting for a sizeable share of income in the country, particularly in the rural areas, is likely to be adversely affected. Growth is forecasted to remain weak at about 3.5 percent in 2021–22 with the outlook expected to be much more negative if the pandemic conditions are prolonged, with pressure on the current account and fiscal deficits likely to increase.
119. The COVID-19 pandemic is in many ways a test case for the country’s social protection infrastructure. As Tajikistan grapples with the pandemic and its aftereffects, the continued sustainability of the TSA program will be a focus, given the uncertain economic outlook, the potential increase in the share of the vulnerable requiring expanded social protection benefits, and the likely decline in sources of funding. The Government needs to stand committed in the short term to mobilize resources toward social transfers. An important achievement of the project is that the Government has robust tools to protect those most at risk who are eligible for assistance, something the TSA now routinely makes possible, in addition to its budgeting and forecasting capabilities. Given the commitment shown by the Government to social assistance and its effective administration, there is cause for optimism that the Government will find a way forward.
120. Overall, the risk to development outcome is rated Modest.
V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Policy-level Considerations
• The project has demonstrated that while social assistance reform can be a long process, particularly in a setting with weak implementation capacity, it is, nonetheless, ultimately rewarding with far-reaching benefits and consequences for both the government and its citizens.
• The success of the reform journey depends as much on the political will to seek change at the highest levels of government as on strong and demonstrable implementation results from the ground at every juncture. In other words, both are equally important to sustain the process and to achieve success.
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• The project has echoed international experience by demonstrating that a fair and transparent poverty-targeting mechanism is pivotal to gaining strong public support and buy-in for reform. The biggest success of the TSA program is the paradigm shift in the perception of eligibility determination in social assistance programs in the country. Beneficiaries now have confidence that decisions are made by an objective computer algorithm completely devoid of human bias.
• Better targeting of beneficiaries has both an equity and an efficiency dimension—those most in need receive benefits, and there are social protection system-level savings when resources are moved to better-targeted households. A big resistance to social protection is the perception that money is wasted due to inefficient delivery, which can be addressed by demonstrating value for investments in social protection.
Implementation/Program-level Considerations
• Upfront clarity on the institutional anchoring of the project implementation unit is key to ensuring that the project gets off to a productive start. Experience has shown that situating the project implementation arm within the policy/implementation-focused department of a government ministry is most effective.
• The role of local communities (in this case, mahallas) is critical and proactive efforts to ensure their active involvement should be made early on into implementation.
• Weak project implementation capacity, particularly on procurement, can raise project risks and potentially derail implementation, also affecting the overall appetite for seeking reform within the government. The World Bank is now, in the case of procurement, able to take timely efforts early on to support clients with weak capacity through hands-on extended implementation support (HEIS) to mitigate adverse impacts on implementation progress, and this might be advisable for clients where capacity is low.
• Decisions around the frequency and rationale for project restructuring should take the overall implementation and policy contexts into consideration. This is particularly relevant when routine project implementation may not always be in lockstep with the slower pace of reforms. Critical lynchpins during implementation such as, for example, a necessary judicial approval or the timeliness of an executive decision within Government ultimately have a direct impact on the overall pace of implementation and project timelines, therefore necessitating project restructuring.
• Internalizing change takes time and often involves a gradual shift in mindset that accompanies the transition from a limited context of a small pilot to the more all- encompassing and broader scope of a full national program. It is important, therefore, that the project always and clearly communicates the objective of a pilot as building block for a national program, to ensure sustainability of the effort. The design of a pilot intervention should always have a scalability in mind.
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• Awareness raising, including through well-planned public awareness campaigns among local communities to discuss objectives of an intervention or its proposed changes is key to building trust and improving the benefit take up rates as well as overall efficacy of implementation.
• One of the key elements of success in the project was the introduction of a middle layer consisting of regional data and service centers which made centralized services in the capital far more accessible to the districts and jamoats.
• Important institutional preparations and administrative changes to business processes are first needed before work on the design and implementation of an MIS/registry.
• Building a registry takes time in any country context, and even more so, in capacity- constrained settings. Building this fundamental capacity requires considerable patience and technical assistance over time before the registry is at a level of functional and geographic coverage where it can be deemed ready to be effectively leveraged to channel government and donor assistance.
Longer-term Sustainability and Future Design Considerations
• Fiscal and operational sustainability beyond project closing is a concern, particularly as relates to financing the MIS/IT systems operation, retention of staff, and ensuring adequate and predictable budget allocations from the Government, including for administrative expenses, to ensure responsiveness to the poor and maintain credibility of the TSA program.
• The next milestone for a program such as the TSA program would be the transition to a differentiated benefit addressing the variance in consumption levels based on household size and living conditions, helping address current efficiency limitations associated with a flat benefit reaching families of different sizes with varying needs. Of course, it would also be important to ensure regular updates to the benefit as part of annual indexation mechanism.
• Periodic recalibration of the eligibility threshold (including for the TSA program) is critical for the system to be able to respond dynamically to different needs and shocks—both in time and in space—and to surmount the current static mode which tends to affect family eligibility and effective utilization of the program budget, particularly on geographic coverage.
• Additional investments are needed to maintain and widen public awareness about the TSA program and to strengthen citizens’ feedback mechanisms for improvements to the program, while reducing exclusion errors based on computerized selection algorithms, including by engaging local communities in decision-making over TSA eligibility.
• As governments increasingly revisit the relevance of their jobs policies, it is important to focus on introducing graduation elements and improving coordination between social assistance and labor market programs. Social safety nets that link up with employment and other services can help people transition from reliance on social transfers to employability.
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.
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ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS
A. RESULTS INDICATORS
A.1 PDO Indicators
Objective/Outcome: To achieve national geographic coverage of the TSAP Unit of Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Baseline Original Target Measure Target Completion Coverage of the Targeted Social Number 2 35 68 Assistance (TSA) Program: Number of districts 30-Jun-2011 01-Aug-2014 30-Jun-2020
Comments (achievements against targets):
Unit of Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Baseline Original Target Measure Target Completion
Beneficiaries of Safety Nets Number 0 1,000,000 1,283,000 programs (number) 30-Jun-2011 09-Jan-2018 30-Jun-2020
Beneficiaries of Safety Nets Number 0 500,000 646,000
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programs - Female (number) 30-Jun-2011 09-Jan-2018 30-Jun-2020
Beneficiaries of Safety Nets Number 0 1,000,000 1,283,000 programs - Unconditional cash transfers (number) 30-Jun-2011 09-Jan-2018 30-Jun-2020
TSA Beneficiaries who are Number 850 1,500 5,150 elderly women living alone 31-Oct-2017 09-Jan-2018 30-Jun-2020
TSA Beneficiaries who are Number 39,000 65,000 130,000 women, heads of households 31-Oct-2017 09-Jan-2018 30-Jun-2020
Comments (achievements against targets): Cumulative number of all beneficiaries
Objective/Outcome: To ensure intergrated delivery of services Unit of Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Baseline Original Target Measure Target Completion Number of Jamoats where Number 0 200 460 training and awareness has been provided on mechanisms 30-Jun-2011 01-Aug-2014 30-Jun-2020 of the new TSA program
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Comments (achievements against targets):
Unit of Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Baseline Original Target Measure Target Completion Number of certified disabled Number 0 145,000 146,000 individuals registered in NRSP 31-Oct-2017 09-Jan-2018 30-Jun-2020
Number of certified disabled Number 8,000 20,000 23,800 individuals registered in NRSP who have also been provided 31-Oct-2017 09-Jan-2018 30-Jun-2020 with TSA benefits
Comments (achievements against targets):
Unit of Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Baseline Original Target Measure Target Completion Use of the registry for planning Text No Yes Yes and budgeting 30-Jun-2011 30-Jun-2011 30-Jun-2020
Comments (achievements against targets):
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A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators
Component: Component 1: Establishing the National Registry for Social Protection and Supporting Development of the Targeted Social Assistance P rogram
Unit of Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Baseline Original Target Measure Target Completion Legal and operational materials Text None A full set of A full set of in support of the rollout of the administrative rules administrative rules TSA and MIS and regulations and and regulations the draft social prepared. In February assistance law 2017, the Targeted Social Assistance (TSA) bill was signed into the law by the President. The TSA Rollout decree approved in May 2020
30-Jun-2011 01-Aug-2014 30-Jun-2020
Comments (achievements against targets):
Component: Component 2: Capacity building for Launching and Initiating the Rollout of the Targeted Social Assistance Program
Unit of Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Baseline Original Target Measure Target Completion Staff of MHSPP, SASP, and Number 0 950 998
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SMSES, including at regional 30-Jun-2011 09-Jan-2018 30-Jun-2020 and district levels, provided with training
Comments (achievements against targets): Cumulative number
Component: Component 3: Project Management
Unit of Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Baseline Original Target Measure Target Completion Policy and Operational Units Text No SASP is fully set up, State Agency for Social within the MHSPP and SASP including all required Protection (SASP) is are staffed and functioning staff to operate the fully set up, including TSA the new Data Center. Director of SASP appointed as the Project Director and is in charge of the effort of the TSA rollout. The SASP is fully staffed. Additionally, the project is funding a team of technical consultants, who assist SASP in managing the TSA implementation and
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the rollout. The project has been providing support to the social protection unit of the MOHSP in formulating policy and preparing draft law, draft Government decrees, including budget estimates and coordination of policy developments with the MOF and other Government stakeholders.
30-Jun-2011 01-Aug-2014 30-Jun-2020
Comments (achievements against targets):
Component: Component 4: Supporting national roll-out of the Targeted Social Assistance Program, including the National Registry of Social Protection
Unit of Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Baseline Original Target Measure Target Completion Number of fully established Number 0 4 5 and functioning Regional Program Coordination Centers 30-Jun-2011 01-Aug-2014 30-Jun-2020
Comments (achievements against targets):
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Unit of Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Baseline Original Target Measure Target Completion Number of non-TSA programs Number 0 3 3 that use NRSP to register and monitor beneficiaries 31-Oct-2017 09-Jan-2018 30-Jun-2020
Comments (achievements against targets):
Unit of Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Baseline Original Target Measure Target Completion Certification of disability fully Text No Yes Yes automated and operates on basis of NRSP 31-Oct-2017 09-Jan-2018 30-Jun-2020
Comments (achievements against targets):
Unit of Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Baseline Original Target Measure Target Completion TSA beneficiaries who are Percentage 0 75 98 satisfied that the TSA program interventions respond to their 31-Oct-2017 09-Jan-2018 30-Jun-2020 needs
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Comments (achievements against targets): According to a survey of the TSA beneficiaries conducted close to the project completion, 98% of beneficiaries think that the TSA program is important for their households.
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B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT
Objective/Outcome 1: Improve the capacity of the Government of Tajikistan to plan, monitor, and manage social assistance for the poor (through the development of a national registry of social protection and the provision of training, equipment and related items for improving said capacity (Original PDO pre-Jan 2018 AF) | Achieve national geographic coverage of the TSA program (Outcome 1 under Revised PDO post- 2018 AF) 1. Coverage of the Targeted Social Assistance (TSA) Program: Number of districts 2. Beneficiaries of Safety Nets programs (number) (Core indicator) 3. Beneficiaries of Safety Nets programs - Female (number)- (Core indicator) 4. Beneficiaries of Safety Nets programs - Unconditional cash transfers Outcome Indicators (number) (Core indicator) 5. Number of Jamoats where training and awareness has been provided on mechanisms of the new TSA program* (under Outcome 2 after AF) 6. Use of the registry for planning and budgeting* (under Outcome 2 after AF) 7. TSA Beneficiaries who are elderly women living alone (number) 8. TSA Beneficiaries who are women, heads of households 1. Number of fully established and functioning Regional Program Coordination Centers 2. Legal and operational materials in support of the rollout of the TSA and MIS Intermediate Results Indicators 3. Policy and Operational Units within the MHSPP and SASP are staffed and functioning 4. Staff of MHSPP, SASP, and SMSES, including at regional and district- levels provided with training
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1. Procurement of hardware/software, high speed internet, and furniture for two data centers 2. Hiring of key staff within MHSPP and SASP 3. Initial Capacity Assessment to gauge training needs and competencies in MLSP at different levels 4. TSA Operations Manual and MIS business processes developed 5. ASIST MIS developed and rolled out in phases to all 40 districts by end 2017 6. Relevant training, including on computer literacy, TSA processes Key Outputs by Component provided to MHSPP and SASP staff, and those in region and district (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1) level 7. A set of comprehensive training/awareness materials developed 8. Public information campaigns and training on TSA mechanisms 9. Report on pilot and other initial studies/evaluations (2011–14) 10. New and updated PMT to improve targeting 11. TSA Bill draft with expert inputs promulgated into Law (February 2017) 12. Key studies and evaluations (2018/19 Household survey, rapid operational review).
Objective/Outcome 2: To ensure integrated delivery of services (Outcome 2 under Revised PDO post-2018 AF)
1. Number of Jamoats where training and awareness has been provided on mechanisms of the new TSA program. 2. Use of the registry for planning and budgeting. Outcome Indicators 3. Number of certified disabled individuals registered in NRSP. 4. Number of certified disabled individuals registered in NRSP who have also been provided with TSA benefits. 1. Staff of MHSPP, SASP, and SMSES, including at regional and district Intermediate Results Indicators levels, provided with training.
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2. Policy and Operational Units within the MHSPP and SASP are staffed and functioning. 3. Number of fully established and functioning Regional Program Coordination Centers. 4. Number of non-TSA programs that use NRSP to register and monitor beneficiaries. 5. Certification of disability fully automated and operates on basis of NRSP. 6. TSA beneficiaries who are satisfied that the TSA program interventions respond to their needs. 1. Procurement of hardware/software, high speed internet, and furniture for three additional data processing centers 2. Hiring of staff for the regional program centers 3. Training for staff of MHSPP, SASP, and SMSES, including at regional and district levels in remaining districts for national rollout 4. A set of comprehensive training and awareness materials was developed for jamoats as part of national rollout Key Outputs by Component 5. Disability assessment, funeral grant scheme, and emergency COVID- (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 2) 19 project uses the NRSP 6. Large-scale door-to-door beneficiary census 7. New software module of disability certification launched 9. Hardware and training to the 24 centers of disability certification across the country 10. Electronic registration of disabled in new system (currently close to 140 new cases a week being processed).
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ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION
A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS
Name Role Preparation Menahem M. Prywes Task Team Leader(s) Dilshod Karimova Procurement Specialist(s) Yelena Vinogradova Team Member Gabriel Francis Team Member Sarvinoz Barfieva Team Member Shafique Jamal Team Member Zlatan Sabic Team Member Joost de Laat Team Member Joseph Paul Formoso Senior Financial Officer
Supervision/ICR Oleksiy A. Sluchynskyy Task Team Leader(s) Dilshod Karimova Procurement Specialist(s) Niso Bazidova Financial Management Specialist Kristine Schwebach Social Specialist Ravindra Cherukupalli Team Member Ngoc Dung Thi Tran Team Member Yelena Vinogradova Team Member Alisher Rajabov Team Member Rustam Arstanov Environmental Specialist Ivan Shulga Team Member Ayshe Muratova Team Member
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The World Bank Social Safety Net Strengthening Project (P122039)
B. STAFF TIME AND COST
Staff Time and Cost Stage of Project Cycle No. of staff weeks US$ (including travel and consultant costs) Preparation FY10 .800 4,022.72 FY11 48.508 470,596.18 FY12 0 - 239.74 Total 49.31 474,379.16
Supervision/ICR FY12 16.600 441,464.33 FY13 13.675 253,398.17 FY14 12.964 119,080.99 FY15 25.005 152,235.81 FY16 19.079 111,422.42 FY17 13.927 78,965.71 FY18 19.659 148,402.07 FY19 16.897 128,913.63 FY20 11.993 114,906.56 Total 149.80 1,548,789.69
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ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT
Actual at Project Amount at Approval Percentage of Approval Components Closing (US$, (US$, millions) (%) millions) Component 1: Establishing the National Registry for Social Protection and 2.30 2.30 100 Supporting Development of the Targeted Social Assistance Program Component 2: Capacity building for Launching and Initiating the Rollout of the 0.70 0.70 100 Targeted Social Assistance Program Component 3: Project 0.2 0.50 250 Management Component 4: Supporting national roll-out of the Targeted Social Assistance 0 1.50 0 Program, including the National Registry of Social Protection Total 3.20 5.00 156
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ANNEX 4. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM IMPACT EVALUATION
Adapted from Tajikistan Social Assistance Assessment, J. Gazeaud and W. Seitz, World Bank, June 2020.
Background
1. As part of the collaboration between the GoT and the World Bank in improving the effectiveness of social protection, the World Bank conducted a diagnostic study on social assistance programs. The main objective of the study was to determine the extent to which social assistance is reaching poor and vulnerable populations and whether some implementation aspects in the targeting process could be improved.
Conceptual Framework and Methodology 2. The study intended to answer a number of key questions including (a) whether poor people are reached by social assistance programs, (b) if there are significant inclusion or exclusion errors, and (c) whether the current programs are adequate and if the systems are effective. The study used a nationally representative household survey conducted in Tajikistan in 2019. The main objective of the survey was to determine the extent to which poor people receive support and to assess the scale of exclusion and inclusion errors.
Data Sources 3. The household survey interviewed just over 4,000 households in 2019. The survey focused on four main categories of households and purposively oversampled some of them to be able to provide reliable estimates for each group. The four groups are (a) national population; (b) those who received social assistance in the pilot; (c) those who received social assistance in the pilot, but no longer did at the time of the survey; and (d) those who applied to the program, but were rejected. The questionnaire collected information on a broad number of topics: household composition, migration, education, health, employment, banking and savings, social benefits, household income, consumption expenditure, and dwelling characteristics.
4. Information collected in the survey enabled calculation of both household income and household consumption expenditure, which were used as welfare indicators once adjusted by household size and composition as well as differences in prices. In this analysis, the preferred welfare measure is per capita income, which was used to order the population from the poorest to the richest. It was also used to identify the poor, defined as the group of people who declared no income beyond social benefits.
Assessment of the Targeting Performance of Social Assistance Characteristics of TSA beneficiaries 5. The analysis presents key summary statistics for the four groups of interest: current beneficiaries, former beneficiaries, rejected applicants, and the national population. These statistics allow comparing the different groups across various socioeconomic dimensions, including characteristics of the household (and of the household head), assets ownership, indicators of life satisfaction, and subjective poverty. To obtain representative information, sampling weights were applied to all estimates.
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6. While urban households represent around 30 percent of the national population, a majority of beneficiaries are urban households. Compared to the national population, beneficiaries have smaller households, more elderly persons, less migrants and return migrants, and less assets. They are less likely to state that they are completely satisfied with their life or that they belong to the upper-middle class. Most of these characteristics are generally associated positively with poverty, which suggests that the program was effective in reaching the poor.
7. The analysis regresses on the four main measures of welfare on household characteristics to ascertain which variables are most associated poverty. The four measures include total income, an asset index, an indicator of whether the household self-reports as being poor, and life satisfaction. Results show the following:
• On average, poor households are less likely to have a bank account, have more children and elderly persons, and are less likely to have migrants (and return migrants). They are also more likely to have a female head of household. Interestingly, urban households are on average poorer and earn lower incomes. This is consistent with what Ravallion et al. (2007) called the urbanization of poverty, highlighting the fact that poverty reduction in low- and middle-income countries is increasingly an urban challenge.
• In terms of distinctive features between rural and urban households, analysis found that urban households are generally smaller and more likely to be female headed. They also have fewer migrants. This may also explain why average incomes of urban households are lower and why they identify as poorer, despite higher asset ownership.
Income Sources and Social Assistance
8. In terms of average income by household category, figure 4.1 reports the income for each of the four groups of households, with and without social benefits. These include earnings from labor (cash and in-kind), agriculture, remittances, and benefits (if stated). The average household in the national population reports monthly incomes of about TJS 1,570. Earnings of current beneficiaries of the TSA program are much smaller, at around TJS 860. Interestingly, former TSA beneficiaries as well as rejected applicants appear to earn incomes very similar to current beneficiaries (respectively TJS 970 and TJS 820). This suggests effective self-targeting but perhaps imperfect mechanisms to determine eligibility of the program.
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Figure 4.1. Mean Income by Household Category
Note: This figure displays incomes by household category, including incomes from labor (cash and in-kind), agriculture, remittances, and benefits (if stated). Amounts reported as monthly average per household (in deflated somonis). Sampling weights applied to obtain representative information for each category of households. N=4051.
9. In terms of composition of incomes, the analysis found that the majority of earnings comes from labor—especially for the national population—followed by remittances, and agriculture (figure 4.2). The national population earns on average TJS 1,070 from labor, against TJS 520 for current beneficiaries, and TJS 590 for former beneficiaries and rejected applicants. About 24 percent of the national population receive remittances, against only 15 percent of beneficiaries. Benefiting from the TSA program and other social benefits contribute to reduce the gap between beneficiaries and the overall population. Current beneficiaries received on average TJS 360 in benefits, that is two times more than the national population. Benefits not only include TSA transfers (about TJS 100 per month), but also other transfers such as old age pensions, disability allowances, and energy subsidies. Total monthly income including all benefits is 1,220 for current beneficiaries. In contrast, including benefits, rejected applicants now appear to earn a lower total income than beneficiaries (TJS 980 versus TJS 1,220).
Figure 4.2. Income Sources by Household Category
Note: Amounts reported as monthly average per household (in deflated somonis). Sampling weights applied to obtain representative information for each category of households. N=4051.
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10. In terms of the amounts perceived from the main social assistance programs in Tajikistan, figure 4.3 presents a comprehensive picture. Old age pensions represent the main source of benefits for all categories of households. They correspond on average to TJS 120 per month for the national population, TJS 160 for current beneficiaries of the TSA program, TJS 140 for former beneficiaries, and TJS 100 for rejected applicants. Coverage rates of the different schemes vary. In the national population, 36 percent of households are covered by old age pensions, 14 percent by disability allowances, and 6 percent by other transfers (bread winner lost allowance, unemployment benefits, maternity leave, and so on). Interestingly current beneficiaries of the TSA program are better covered by all these schemes, with 60 percent of households benefiting from old age pensions, for instance. This suggests that beneficiaries of the TSA program are better informed about social assistance programs in general, or that the different schemes have similar eligible populations (or targeting mechanisms).
Figure 4.3. Benefits by Household Category
Note: Amounts reported as monthly average per household (in deflated somonis). Sampling weights applied to obtain representative information for each category of households. N=4051.
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ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS
Official Letterhead Ministry of Health and Social Protection of the Republic of Tajikistan State Agency for Social Protection of the Population 734003, Dushanbe, 3 Loic Sheraly Street, Tel. (372) 224-52-78, fax (372) 224-52-94
Date: 29/12/2020 Ref. No: 1.1/1301 Dushanbe Mr. Oleksiy Sluchynsky Task Manager of the World Bank Social Safety Net Strengthening Project (P122039)
Dear Mr. Sluchynsky,
The State Agency for Social Protection of the Population of the Ministry of Health and Social Protection of the Population of the Republic of Tajikistan expresses its deep gratitude to you and to the World Bank for the close collaboration in the area of the reform of social protection in the Republic of Tajikistan.
The joint work carried out as part of the Social Safety Net Strengthening Project (P122039) helped to lay down a strong foundation for the targeted social assistance (TSA) system and its rollout nationwide.
We have carefully reviewed the implementation completion report for the project, which provides a detailed and accurate picture of the evolution of the project, as well as its achievements and problematic aspects. Our Agency' specialists, in coordination with the Project Coordination Group, provided certain technical comments of clarifying nature, as well as detailed statistical reports, including those using data from the Targeted Social Assistance Information System (ASIST), which should be useful for completing the work on the draft.
I look forward to our continued and effective collaboration for the benefit of the most vulnerable and needy population groups and to further improve the national social protection system of the Republic of Tajikistan.
We take this opportunity to renew to you and to the World Bank the assurances of our highest consideration.
Sincerely, Director of the Agency A. Holzoda
Signature of A. Holzoda
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BORROWER’S CONTRIBUTION TO ICR: Key social assistance indicators
Borrower’s contributions included interviews, questionnaires, statistical updates (including one below), as well as clarifying comments on the draft ICR report.
Name Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year 10 months 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 of 2020 Number of districts and cities covered by targeted social 2 2 10 25 25 40 40 40 40 68 assistance Number of population of districts where ASP is implemented 408,323 417,273 1,270,369 2,431,065 2,503,997 4,187,439 4,187,439 4,443743 4,532618 9,221700 Number of households in regions where TSA is implemented 67,383 68,850 210,133 402,257 414,569 664,673 664,673 677,966 677,966 1,383,335 Number of TSA receivers at the end of the reporting period 10614 11184 43,229 49,112 60,133 41,241 84,986 94,675 98,858 160,812 Payments of targeted social
assistance from the state budget 3,801,873 3,660,100 2,581,330 15,081330 21,187636 21,677452 28,580997 38,628,828 39,032515 38,365477 of the Republic (in somoni) Number of poor families who
received compensation for 230,050 154,907 126,082 107,213 101,865 100,733 127,600 82,174 81,084 84,251 electricity and natural gas Compensation for electricity and natural gas use (in somoni) 27,067519 25,765660 21,470198 16,507911 20,315687 17,828954 21,963628 21,844,429 25,562351 17,547054 Number of poor families that
received allowances for children 197,354 190,524 164,396 138,331 166,771 112,302 113,721 106,862 122,792 0,00 studying in schools Payment of school allowances from local budgets (in somoni) 7,931772 7,620960 5,141604 5,533240 3,874730 3,937030 3,248864 2,095,580 2,455,840 0,00
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ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
1. Gazeaud, J., and W. Seitz. 2020. Tajikistan Social Assistance Assessment. World Bank.
2. World Bank. 2019. Household Survey Results as part of Assessing the Effectiveness of the Program Targeted Social Assistance in the Republic of Tajikistan. Analytical report.
3. World Bank. 2019. “Gender Aspects of Implementation of the Targeted Social Assistance Program (TSA) in the Republic of Tajikistan.” Policy Brief.
4. World Bank. 2019. Operational Review of the Current State of Targeted Social Assistance (TSA) for Low-income Families in Tajikistan, World Bank, November 2019.
5. World Bank. 2019. Country Partnership Framework for the Republic of Tajikistan for the Period of FY19–23.
6. World Bank. 2018. Tajikistan Systematic Country Diagnostic: Making the National Development Strategy 2030 a Success - Building the Foundation for Shared Prosperity.
7. World Bank. 2016. Poverty Mapping in Tajikistan: Method and Key Findings.
8. World Bank. 2014. Analysis of the Safety Nets in Tajikistan: Considerations for the Transition towards Greater Consolidation and Stronger Poverty-focus.
9. World Bank. 2014. Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity in Tajikistan: A Diagnostic, World Bank.
10. World Bank. 2013. Tajikistan Country Gender Assessment.
11. World Bank. 2010. Republic of Tajikistan, Delivering Social Assistance to the Poorest Households. Report No. 56593-TJ.
12. World Bank. 2010. Tajikistan Country Partnership Strategy: FY10–13. Report No 50769-TJ.
13. World Bank. 2009. Tajikistan: Poverty Assessment.
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ANNEX 7. TEXT OF THE TSA BILL
LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN "On Targeted Social Assistance"
This Law defines the legal, financial, and organizational basis for providing targeted social assistance to poor citizens (families) of the Republic of Tajikistan and is aimed at improving their social status.
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS Article 1. Basic concepts The following basic concepts are used in this Law:
• Targeted social assistance. Providing monetary or material assistance to poor citizens (families) • Criterion of need. When the welfare index of a citizen (family) is below the established minimum • Poor citizens (families). Citizens (families) recognized as poor in the order established by normative legal acts of the Republic of Tajikistan • Difficult life situation. A situation that disrupts the daily life of a citizen (family), complicating the solution of his problems • Targeted social assistance register. An automated database on poor citizens (families) in the Republic of Tajikistan, organized by a structural unit of authorized government agencies, containing information on applications, targeted social assistance, and other information on social assistance.
Article 2. Legislation of the Republic of Tajikistan on targeted social assistance The legislation of the Republic of Tajikistan on targeted social assistance is based on the Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan and consists of this Law, other normative legal acts of the Republic of Tajikistan, and international legal acts recognized by Tajikistan.
Article 3. Purpose of targeted social assistance The purpose of targeted social assistance consists of the following:
• Helping to alleviate the difficult life situation and supporting poor citizens (families) whose minimum income is below the criterion of need • Creating conditions that provide poor citizens (families) with opportunities to improve their living standards • Strengthening social support to poor citizens (families) • Enabling a decrease in the level of poverty of the population • Enabling efficient use of budgetary and extra-budgetary funds
Article 4. Basic principles of targeted social assistance The main principles of targeted social assistance are the following:
• Accessibility of targeted social assistance to poor citizens (families) • Consideration of appeals from poor citizens (families) and determination of the need for targeted social assistance • Gradual recovery of poor citizens (families) from poverty • Purposeful use of the envisaged funds through their distribution in favor of poor citizens (families) in need.
Article 5. Financing of targeted social assistance Financing of expenses on provision of targeted social assistance shall be performed at the expense of foreseen funds of the state budget, and also at the expense of other sources not prohibited by legislation of the Republic of Tajikistan.
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Article 6. Right to receive targeted social assistance Poor citizens (families), whose minimum income is lower than the criterion of need are entitled to receive targeted social assistance. The following family members are not considered when determining eligibility for targeted social assistance:
• Persons under full state care • Persons performing military service • Persons serving their sentence in correctional facilities.
CHAPTER 2. POWERS OF STATE AUTHORITIES TO PROVIDE TARGETED SOCIAL ASSISTANCE
Article 7. Competence of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan to provide targeted social assistance Competence of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan to provide targeted social assistance include the following:
• Implementation of the state policy on providing targeted social assistance • Determination of the authorized state body on rendering targeted social assistance • Determination of the procedure of consideration of appeals, size, purpose, and provision of targeted social assistance • Establishing norms of needs and the procedure for determining the poor citizens (families), as well as the list of persons entitled to receive targeted social assistance • Adoption and approval of regulatory legal acts on targeted social assistance • Implementation of other authorities established by legislation of the Republic of Tajikistan.
Article 8 Powers of the authorized state body to provide targeted social assistance The authorized state body on rendering targeted social assistance has the following powers:
• Implements the state policy to provide targeted social assistance • Establishes the form and types of necessary documents for targeted social assistance • Makes appropriate decisions on providing targeted social assistance • Keeps a register of targeted social assistance • Exercises other authorities determined by legislation of the Republic of Tajikistan.
Article 9 The powers of local executive bodies of state power, local self-government bodies of settlements and villages to provide targeted social assistance Local executive bodies of state power, local self-government bodies of settlements and villages shall, within the limits of their authority, take measures to provide targeted social assistance as prescribed by law.
CHAPTER 3. PROCEDURE OF ADDRESS AND FORMS OF TARGETED SOCIAL ASSISTANCE
Article 10. Applying for targeted social assistance An application for targeted social assistance is submitted by a citizen or on behalf of his/her family, guardianship and trusteeship bodies, other legal representatives of a citizen in writing to the departments and sectors of social protection of the population of local executive bodies of state power for providing targeted social assistance at the place of residence.
The form of application and other documents necessary to receive targeted social assistance is established by the authorized state body.
Article 11. Forms of targeted social assistance
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(a) Targeted social assistance is provided in the following forms: • Cash benefit • Material assistance (b) Monetary allowance is appointed by the general size considering members of poor families who are entitled to receive a monetary allowance in the procedure established by the authorized state body. (c) In the case of cohabitation of several families with separate family income, the cash allowance is assigned separately for each family. (d) The material aid is given to poor citizens (families) in the order established by the authorized state body. (e) Material assistance to poor citizens (families) depending on their needs is provided in the form of fuel, food, medicines, clothes, footwear, sanitary and hygienic means, other items of prime necessity, purchased by the authorized state body, full or partial payment for housing and communal services, and other services. (f) Local executive bodies of state power, self-governing bodies of settlements and villages, individuals, and legal entities may provide material assistance envisaged by paragraph 5 of this article to poor citizens (families).
CHAPTER 4. THE PROCEDURE OF APPOINTMENT AND TERMINATION OF TARGETED SOCIAL ASSISTANCE
Article 12. Appointment of targeted social assistance Targeted social assistance to poor citizens (families) is appointed by the decision of the authorized state body.
Article 13: Indicators to be taken into account in determining the welfare of poor citizens (families) To determine the level of welfare of poor citizens (families) the following main indicators are considered:
• Family composition, social status, and education of the head of the family, number of disabled people, minors, and other disabled family members • Income of poor citizens (families) in monetary or commodity form • Property of poor citizens (families) • Housing situation • Homestead and other land plots at the disposal of the family • Number and types of livestock of poor citizens (families) • Other indicators, necessary in the order established by the authorized state body, to determine the level of welfare of poor citizens (families).
Indicators that determine the level of welfare of poor citizens (families) may vary depending on geographical, economic, and social characteristics of the regions of the republic.
Article 14. Periods of appointing targeted social assistance Cash allowance is assigned from the day of application for receiving the mentioned aid if within one-month necessary documents are provided in the order established by legislation of the Republic of Tajikistan.
• Targeted social assistance may be assigned for the entire period of implementation of the targeted social assistance system.
Article 15. Recalculation of amount of cash benefits Cash benefits are recalculated in the following cases:
• Change in family income • Family composition change • Increase in the need criterion
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• Other circumstances that may give rise to a recalculation of benefits.
Article 16. Grounds for termination of targeted social assistance Targeted social assistance is terminated on the following grounds:
• Refusal of a poor citizen (family) from targeted social assistance • Establishment by the authorized state body of the fact of unreliability of presented information on income, property, family structure, and other information necessary for granting of targeted social assistance • Death of a single recipient of targeted social assistance • Other circumstances stipulated by normative legal acts of the Republic of Tajikistan.
Article 17. Rights and duties of employees of authorized state bodies on making decisions on providing targeted social assistance While considering documents for decision-making on appointment of the addressed social aid employees, the authorized state structures have the right to
• Require the documents necessary to provide targeted social assistance; • Conduct interviews and meetings with the applicant; • Conduct an investigation to determine the composition and degree of need of the family by interviewing the applicant, relatives, other co-residents, family members, and neighbors; • Request the necessary information and references from relevant authorities; and • Check the accuracy and validity of certificates and other documents for the appointment of targeted social assistance in organizations, regardless of the organizational and legal forms.
Employees of the authorized state bodies are obliged to accept documents by
• Checking the correctness of the application, compliance of the information contained in it with the submitted documents, and availability of necessary documents to provide targeted social assistance and • Warning the applicant about the consequences of concealment of presentation of unreliable information, which is connected with the right to provide targeted social assistance and (or) on which the amount of such assistance depends, as well as to inform the body, which appointed targeted social assistance, about the change of family composition and place of registration.
Because of consideration of appeals of citizens (families) for receiving targeted social assistance the authorized state body in an order established by legislation of the Republic of Tajikistan is obliged to respond in writing about the adopted decision.
Article 18. Rights and obligations of citizens (families) who apply for targeted social assistance Citizens (families) who have applied for targeted social assistance have the right to receive free consultation about receiving targeted social assistance. Recipients of targeted social assistance are obliged
• To inform the authorized state body about changes which can serve as a basis for change, continuation, or termination of granting them (their families) targeted social assistance (information on family structure, removal of disability, incomes, other information influencing the size of targeted social assistance), within two weeks from the date of occurrence of the specified changes and • Use opportunities to overcome difficult life situations on their own.
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CHAPTER 5. REGISTER OF TARGETED SOCIAL ASSISTANCE
Article 19. Register of targeted social assistance
(a) To record and control the correct and timely provision of targeted social assistance to citizens (families), the authorized state body creates a register of targeted social assistance. (b) The register of targeted social assistance is formed and used in accordance with the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan ‘On Information’. (c) The register of targeted social assistance is formed from personal data obtained from the applicants and beneficiaries of targeted social assistance, as well as from the database of other public authorities. (d) The content of personal data on citizens (families) in the register of targeted social assistance, the procedure of keeping the register of targeted social assistance, the terms and forms of information presentation, and use of the data contained in the register of targeted social assistance are established by the authorized public authority.
CHAPTER 6. FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 20. Liability for non-compliance with the requirements of this Law Individuals and legal entities shall be held liable for failure to comply with the requirements of this Law in an order established by legislation of the Republic of Tajikistan.
Article 21. Procedure for enactment of this Law This Law shall enter into force on January 1, 2018.
President Republic of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon
Dushanbe 24 February 2017 №1396
LAW Accept Approved Majlisi Namoyandagon Majlisi Milli Madjlisi Majlisi Oli RT Majlisi Oli RT November 10, 2016, №62 6 February 16, 2017, №335
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ANNEX 8. MAIN MESSAGES FROM KEY RELATED STUDIES AND REPORTS, 2012–19
1. In 2012, a rigorous impact evaluation of the pilot showed that the program improved targeting and was almost twice as effective as the legacy programs, generated positive satisfaction among the population, improved their perceived financial situation, and improved perception of food security among beneficiaries and raised actual food consumption by 16–25 percent.
2. In 2014, the World Bank delivered a study on analysis of safety nets in Tajikistan and the policy options. The report found that the cost of eliminating poverty (bringing everyone up to the poverty line) was estimated at 6.6 percent of GDP. In addition, a significant proportion of the non-poor population were vulnerable to negative shocks to consumption, with over 62 percent of the population consuming at less than 20 percent above the poverty line. The effectiveness of current social assistance programs was also weak on all accounts: (a) while 47 percent of the population were below the poverty line, only 11 percent of poor households received a social assistance benefit: or more non-poor than poor, by almost 30 percent, received social assistance; (b) the adequacy of benefits was low, with social assistance benefits averaging 2.4 percent of household consumption across beneficiary households for households in the two lowest quintiles (the poor) and social assistance is only 1.3 percent of their consumption; and (c) targeting was weak: only 15 percent of social assistance benefits went to poor households.
3. The 2014 report also summarized the main elements of moving forward in developing an effective and efficient safety net in the country: (a) strong poverty targeting of the assistance programs to reduce leakages of benefits to the non-poor; (b) consolidating programs wherever possible, otherwise harmonizing program rules and standards; (c) using the efficiency savings from consolidation and harmonization to help raise benefit levels; (d) strengthening central oversight over the appropriate use of social transfers; (e) more efficiently using technology to create efficient administration and provide better services to beneficiaries; and (f) delivering a differentiated benefit by relating the TSA family benefit to the number of children in the family. On benefit differentiation by family size, as noted earlier, while the Government is in agreement, it has not yet codified this approach.
4. Between 2015 and 2017, a refined and updated PMT formula was applied to further improve targeting of the TSA program. The new PMT formula was developed on the basis of a national household survey. It included a range of new indicators to help better target the neediest households in the country. The process of rollout began in 2016 and the MIS was calibrated to incorporate changes in the new PMT formula.
5. Between 2018 and 2019, several rounds of beneficiary surveys were conducted. In 2018, focus group interviews in various districts indicated that beneficiaries (a) appreciated the assistance extended by the Government, including a broader package of services that came with TSA eligibility; (b) observed a reduction in the discretion and personal bias of the local authorities because the decisions on eligibility were being made automatically by the system; and (c) most often spent the assistance to pay off arrears related to energy costs.
6. In March 2019, an impact evaluation was launched with a nationwide survey covering close to 4,000 households. The same survey has also helped further fine-tune parameters of the PMT formula and assess beneficiary satisfaction. Results suggest that the program was effective in reaching the poor. The study also found that the poor were effective at self-targeting and benefiting from the TSA program.
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7. In November 2019, a rapid operational evaluation was also conducted, indicating that the TSA program had significant buy-in among both administrators of the program and the general population. The mechanisms of operational and financial controls engaged several government entities and provided for transparent, efficient, and reliable operation of the system and an effective framework for addressing problems pointing to the improvement in monitoring and control mechanisms over the years of program operation.
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ANNEX 9. TEXT OF THE DECREE AUTHORIZING TSA NATIONAL ROLLOUT
Government of the Republic of Tajikistan RESOLUTION
as of May 14, 2020 № 271
Dushanbe
On the implementation of the mechanism of determination and payment of the targeted social assistance in the Republic of Tajikistan.
In accordance with Article 16 of the Constitutional Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan” and Article 57 of the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On Regulatory-Legal Documents”, the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan had decided:
1. To approve the procedure for the determination (granting), financing and payment of the targeted social benefits to low-income families and citizens (attached). 2. Determination and payment of the targeted social benefits to low-income families and citizens of the Vakhsh, Vose, Dangara districts, Dusti, Kushoniyon, Nosiri Khusrav, Mir Sayyid Ali Hamadoni, Kubodiyon, Khuroson, Jaihun and Abdurrahmani Jami districts of the Khatlon region, the cities of Guliston, Isfara and Istiqlol, as well as Asht, Mastchoh, Jabbor Rasulov, Bobojon Gafurov, Devastich and Spitamen districts of the Sughd region, the Varzob district, the cities of Vakhdat, Rogun and Tursunzade, as well as Ismoili Somoni, Sino, Firdavsi and Shohmansur boroughs of Dushanbe, to effectuate from July 1, 2020. 3. To cover administrative expenses and keep the records of the mechanism for determination and payment of targeted social benefits, authorize the State Agency for Social Protection under the Ministry of Health and Social Protection of Population the Republic of Tajikistan to use no more than 3 percent of the total amount of funds provided in the republican budget for the payment of targeted social benefits. 4. The Ministry of Health and Social Protection of Population the Republic of Tajikistan and local executive bodies of state power to undertake necessary measures to implement this mechanism. 5. To recognize as invalid the following resolutions of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan:
- Resolution №244, dated May 2, 2007, "On the payment of benefits to low-income families who have children studying at secondary schools of the Republic of Tajikistan"; - Resolution №379, dated August 1, 2008, "On Strengthening of social assistance to low-income families and citizens"; - Resolution №437, dated July 3, 2014, No. 437 "On the continuation and implementation of the pilot mechanism of targeted social benefits for low-income families and citizens".
Chair of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan
Mr. Emomali Rahmon
Attachment to the Resolution № 271of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan dated May 14, 2020,
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Procedure for awarding, financing and payment of targeted social assistance to low-income families and citizens
1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 1. The procedure for the determination (granting), financing and payment of targeted social benefits for low- income families and citizens (hereinafter referred to as this Procedure) defines rules for determining the low-income families and citizens, as well as the conditions for the determination, financing and payment of targeted social benefits to low-income families and citizens in all cities and areas of the Republic of Tajikistan. 2. The low-income of families and citizens are determined on the basis of the “Methodology for determining the low income of families and citizens”, where such methodology is developed and approved by the Ministry of Health and Social Protection of Population of the Republic of Tajikistan, acting as an authorized state body for disbursing the targeted social benefits (hereinafter - the authorized state body) in agreement with the Ministry of Finance of Republic of Tajikistan and the Agency for Statistics under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan. 3. The Targeted social benefits are determined and paid to families and citizens permanently residing on the territory of the Republic of Tajikistan, according to estimates of their material and living conditions and the level of their well-being recognized as low-income. 4. Targeted cash transfers are mainly intended to compensate the costs of using the electricity and natural gas for low-income families and citizens, access of their children to education and for solving other social problems of families.
2. AUTHORITY OF THE STATE BODIES IN THE FIELD OF PROVISION OF THE TARGETED SOCIAL BENEFITS 5. The state authorized body implements the state policy in the field of providing the targeted social benefits, develops and approves the forms and types of necessary documents for the purpose of the targeted social benefits. 6. The State Agency for Social Protection of the Ministry of Health and Social Protection of the Republic of Tajikistan (hereinafter referred to as the Agency), in the process of the implementation of the mechanism for determining (granting) and paying the targeted social benefits to low-income families and citizens, is responsible for the targeted and efficient use of the allocated funds, as well as for the correct determination of low-income families and citizens, performs the functions of coordinating the activities of the relevant structures of the social protection of the local executive public authorities and monitors the implementation of this Procedure. 7. Local executive bodies of the state power organize the activities of the sectors of social protection of the population, urban and rural jamoats, housing and municipal utilities and mahalla committees for the implementation of the mechanism for determination and paying the targeted social benefits to low-income families and citizens, and supervision of the implementation of the tasks assigned to them. 8. In order to prevent corruption factors and ensure transparency in the process of identifying families and citizens who really seek assistance in the form of targeted social benefits, local executive bodies of the state power establish local-level commissions and determine the composition and powers of these commissions. 9. Self-government bodies of villages and rural settlements, housing and municipal utilities and mahalla committees shall examine documents submitted by citizens, including the “income and property certificate” of all family members, verify the documents and the information indicated in it and confirm their correctness.
3. PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINATION (GRANTING) OF THE TARGETED SOCIAL BENEFITS 10. Citizens of the Republic of Tajikistan who consider themselves as a low-income and, for objective reasons, are in difficult living conditions and do not have the opportunity to independently get out of these conditions, apply for the targeted social benefits to the self-governing bodies of towns and villages, housing and municipal utilities or to the mahalla community committee. 11. The responsible persons of the self-government of towns and villages, housing and municipal utilities or the mahalla committees shall provide the necessary documents free of charge, including the forms “Application for the determination of targeted social benefits”, “Certificate of family composition” and “Information on the income and property of all family members” to citizens applying for the targeted social benefits. 12. The necessary documents specified in clause 11 of this Procedure are developed, approved and published by the authorized state body and on a free basis are provided to the self-government of towns and villages, housing and municipal utilities and mahalla committees. 13. Filling on behalf of all family members of the application and the form “Information on the income and property of all family members” is the authority of the head of the family. If the head of the family is absent for a
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valid reason of more than six months, one of the family members who have reached the age of majority has the right to apply for the targeted social benefits. 14. The application reflects the consent of the applicant and his family members to collect additional information about the family, its property and income, as well as to verify the information provided, in order to make a fair decision on the assignment (or rejection) of the targeted social benefits. 15. In case of illness or departure of the head of the family for a period of more than three months, the indicated person must indicate in the application his authorized representative who will fulfill his authority to receive the targeted social benefits during his absence. The power of attorney is issued in the established manner sector of social protection of the population of the executive authority of the city or region. 16. In the case of cohabitation of two or more families having an independent household, each family can independently submit an application for the appointment of targeted social benefits. In this case, the self- government bodies of villages and dekhots, the housing and municipal utilities or the mahalla committees are considering the necessary documents for receiving social benefits for each individual independent family. 17. The application with the submitted documents is registered in the registration book of documents on the assignment of the targeted social benefits, which is maintained by the self-government of towns and villages, housing and municipal utilities or the mahalla committee, and the applicant is provided with a tear-off form of the application, which indicates the date of receipt and registration number of the application. 18. An application for the assignment of the targeted social benefits, a certificate of family composition and information on the income and property of all family members are approved by the signature of the chairman of the urban or rural jamoat, the head of the housing-municipal utility or the mahalla committee of the applicant’s place of residence. 19. Self-government bodies of towns and village, housing and municipal utilities or mahalla committees accept citizen’s applications with attachments and submit them to the local authorities of social protection within 10 days following the submission. For each low-income family and citizen who applied for the targeted social benefits a personal file shall be maintained with the local authority of social protection. 20. Responsible people at the local authority for social protection of the population shall determine the general indicators of the well-being level of a citizen (family), upload a statement, as well as certificate into the unified database for targeted social assistance (hereinafter - the Register of targeted social assistance) on the composition of the family, information on the income and property of all family members and the data of the applicant’s passport, not later than within 10 days. 21. Targeted social benefits are determined or rejected upon data processing by the central server of the information system for the targeted social benefits in accordance with the requirements of the Methodology for the determination of a low-income families and citizens. 22. For single elderly citizens in the difficult life situations the targeted social benefits are assigned and paid on an exceptional basis. Persons considered as a single elderly citizens are persons who have reached retirement age (women over 58 and men over 63 years old) who cannot independently meet their needs and do not have close relatives who could take care of them. 23. Families who have disabled members (I & II categories) or who have more than two disabled members, as well as single parents who have a disabled child, are given an advantage in determining the determinants of the standard of living. 24. When determining the right for targeted social benefits, the following family members are not taken into account: - persons who are fully supported by the State; - persons performing the military services; - persons serving sentences at the correctional facilities. 25. The results of processing data on the determination or rejection of the targeted social benefits are entered into a single database of the targeted social benefits Register before the 10th day of the next month, on which the local authority for social protection sends the applicant a written notice or electronic message (SMS) through either the self-government bodies of towns and villages, the housing and municipal utilities or mahalla committee within 10 days. 26. At the local social protection authority, the applicant’s social individual cases are maintained for three years and then shall be lodged in the archives. 27. Families and citizens who were rejected targeted social benefit are given the opportunity to re-apply for targeted social benefits after 6 months in case of changes of their level of well-being and family composition.
4. ORDER OF FINANCING AND PAYMENT OF THE TARGETED SOCIAL BENEFITS 28. Financing of expenses for the payment of the targeted social benefits to low-income families and citizens
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is carried out within the funds provided in the National budget for the payment of the targeted social benefits and from other sources not prohibited by the legislation of the Republic of Tajikistan. 29. The amount of the targeted social benefits for each low-income family and citizen is assigned from the day of determination for twelve month period, and makes up to 8 (eight) indicators for calculation and is paid quarterly in the amount of 2 (two) indicators for calculation. 30. The targeted social benefits to a low-income families and citizens is paid in cash or by transferring payments to the recipient’s designated bank (deposit) account, as well as using debit cards issued by the State Savings Bank of the Republic of Tajikistan “Amonatbank” (hereinafter referred to as “Amonatbank” branch) at the place of residence of the applicant. 31. The amount of the targeted social benefit, which was not received in a timely manner for reasons attributable to the head of the family and citizen, is paid in the following months. If the assigned targeted social benefit is not received within six months, then the unpaid amount is deposited back by the State Savings Bank of the Republic of Tajikistan “Amonatbank” (hereinafter “Amonatbank”) to the National budget. 32. In case of non-payment of the targeted social benefits for reasons attributable to the body responsible for the determination and payment of targeted social benefits, the responsible officials shall be held accountable in the manner established by law. 33. The payment of the assigned targeted social benefits is terminated in the following cases: 34. if during the audit it was revealed that the applicant provided inaccurate information or concealed information that influenced or could affect the process of determining the right for targeted social benefit; 35. if a low-income family and citizen moved to another locality (city or district) or moved outside the country for permanent residence; 36. -in case of death of the head of a low-income family and a citizen on whose name the targeted social benefit was issued, the payment of targeted social benefits is cut out starting from the next quarter after the occurrence of such cases. 37. In case of the payment termination of the targeted social benefits in connection with the death of household’s head, one of the members of his/her family, recognized (in the prescribed manner) as the head of the family, may apply for the targeted social benefits, not paid to the head of the family. 38. In the process of determining and paying of the targeted social benefits - the social protection unit of the local executive authority and the Agency carries out the verification in order to determine the accuracy of the information provided by applicants on household income and property. Verification is carried out for the following purposes: 39. Prevent submitting of a false information by the applicant; 40. Analysis of factors contributing to the appearance of errors, and providing suggestions for improving implementation of the mechanism for determining and paying the targeted social benefits; 41. Targeted use of the funds disbursed from the National budget. 42. General rules and specific conditions for the payment of the targeted social benefits, as well as accounting and reporting procedures between responsible authorities are determined based on instructions developed and approved by the Agency and Amonatbank. 43. In order to finance the payments related to the mechanism for the determination and payment of the targeted social benefits, the Agency compiles a budget estimate (in three copies, within the volume of the funds allocated for these purposes from the National budget) and submits it for approval to the Ministry of Health and Social Protection of the Republic of Tajikistan and the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Tajikistan. 44. The targeted social benefits are financed from the National budget through the main department of the Central Treasury of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Tajikistan based on the approved quarterly allocation of funds. 45. Based on the data received from the local authorities of social protection, the Agency submits an application to the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Tajikistan to disburse the targeted social benefits according to the payment orders, until the 10th day of the next month. The form of a payment order is established by the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Tajikistan. 46. The Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Tajikistan transfers money to a settlement accounts of the Amonatbank department according to the payment orders, and responsible employees of the specified department shall ensure the subsequent transfer of funds to the personal accounts of recipients of the targeted social benefits on the basis of the letter and the list of the State Agency for social protection attached to it. The Amonatbank branches, in turn, provide the subsequent transfer of the amount to the deposit account of the beneficiary. 47. The Agency draws up a monthly list of recipients of the targeted social benefits in electronic form and with a cover letter shall provide such lists it to the Amonatbank branches, as well as a list of low-income citizens and families to whom the targeted social benefits are paid for the first time. 48. The branches of Amonatbank in the manner prescribed by the regulatory legal acts, based on the submitted name lists, within 3 working days shall:
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- open a personal account for each recipient of the targeted social benefits (at the first appointment of the targeted social benefits), to which the received amount will be deposited; - at the request of the recipient of the benefit, open a deposit account (for depositing the amount of the targeted social benefits); - in case of suspension of the payment of targeted social benefits, freeze the recipient’s account. 49. The local authority of social protection, in turn, monthly draws up a list of recipients of the targeted social benefits, a list of families and citizens who were first assigned for the targeted social benefits and a list of people who are no more receiving (due to termination) targeted social benefits, with the use of forms approved by the authorized state body and presents such lists to the Amonatbank branch before the 10th day of the current month. 50. Lists for the payment or termination of targeted social benefits are prepared in two copies. One copy is provided to the Amonatbank branch, and the other copy is maintained at the local social protection authority for reporting purposes. 51. In case of errors in the name list, this list shall be returned to the local social protection authority within one business day, who must address errors during one working day. 52. The Payment of the targeted social benefits is carried out in accordance with an applicable banking rules, and subsequent monitoring of a payments is carried out by a responsible employee of the Amonatbank. 53. The payment of the targeted social benefits is carried out through the service branches of the Amonatbank at the place of residence of the recipients of the targeted social benefits. If necessary, the amount of the benefit is delivered to the recipient's place of residence by an authorized person of the respective service branch of the Amonatbank branch according to the list presented by the local social protection body. 54. If the cases specified in clause 35 of this Order are discovered, the person who received the targeted social benefit returns the illegally received amount to the cash desk of the Amonatbank branch and this amount is deposited to the Agency’s bank account within two business days. 55. In case of illness, death or temporary absence of the head of the family at the place of permanent residence, the amount of the targeted social benefits may be received by his/her confidant with the power of attorney. 56. An authorized employee of the local authority of social protection once every quarter (based on the results of the previous quarter) analyzes the payments and draws up a reconciliation report on the actual amount of the targeted social benefits, together with the responsible employee of the Amonatbank branch with the use of form approved by the authorized government body. 57. Fees for banking services of Amonatbank are set at 0.8% of the total amount of the list of recipients of the targeted social benefits. Banking fees are paid to the bank account together with the provision of a list of recipients of the targeted social benefits for payment orders.
5. PLANNING OF EXPENSES FOR PAYMENT OF THE TARGETED SOCIAL BENEFITS 58. Fund forecasting for the payment of the targeted social benefits and other expenses provided for these purposes in the state budget, is carried out by the Agency based on requests from local authorities of social protection. 59. Based on requests from the local authorities for social protection, the Agency submits its preliminary report on the amount of the targeted social benefits program to the Ministry of Health and Social Protection of the Republic of Tajikistan annually by March 10. 60. The Ministry of Health and Social Protection of the Republic of Tajikistan calculates the necessary amount for the next year budget based on a preliminary conclusion of the Agency and submits it to the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Tajikistan. 61. The report on the use of the budgetary funds is submitted to the Agency by the local authorities of social protection on a quarterly basis before the 15th day of the month following each quarter. The Agency quarterly submits the corresponding report on the use of budget funds to the Ministry of Health and social protection of the Republic of Tajikistan and the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Tajikistan using the form approved by the authorized body. 62. The Ministry of Health and Social Protection of the Republic of Tajikistan and the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Tajikistan shall regularly monitor and evaluate the implementation of this Order, the targeted use of funds for the payment of the targeted social benefits and annually submit the information to the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan.
6. ACCOUNTING OF A CITIZENS RECEIVING THE TARGETED SOCIAL BENEFITS 63. In order to take into account low-income families and citizens who receive the targeted social benefits and
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to ensure the control over the correctness and timeliness of providing the targeted social benefits, the authorized state body rolls-out and maintains a unified automated database of recipients of the targeted social benefits. 64. A single automated database of recipients of the targeted social benefits is maintained and used in accordance with the requirements of the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On Information”. 65. All information regarding the provision of targeted social benefits, including income and property is maintained in the files of recipients of the targeted social benefits, and used to make decisions on granting or rejecting of the targeted social benefits. 66. Low-income families and citizens who are assigned for the targeted social benefits in accordance with the decree of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan dated July 3, 2014, No. 437 “On continuing the implementation of the pilot mechanism for targeted social assistance to low-income families and citizens”, will receive such benefits before the expiry of the term of such payment, and then on a general basis in accordance with the requirements of this Order may apply to receive the targeted social benefits.
7. CONTROL OF THE RIGHT APPOINTMENT AND PAYMENT OF THE TARGETED SOCIAL BENEFITS
67. Monitoring of compliance with the provisions of this Order, in particular the reliability of the information provided in the form “Information on the income and property of all family members” and the targeted use of the state budget funds aimed at disbursing the targeted social benefits, is provided by the State Service for Supervision of Health Care and Social Protection Affairs of the Ministry of Health and Social Protection of the Republic of Tajikistan, local financial departments and administrations. 68. Families and citizens who have provided inaccurate information about their incomes and property and, as a result of which unfoundedly received any targeted social benefit, shall replenish the received amount to the settlement account of the Amonatbank and are deprived of any further right to receive the targeted social benefits within 12 months from the date of termination of the benefits. 69. Jamoats of towns and villages, housing and municipal utilities or mahalla committees provide the information to the Agency on the implementation of the mechanism for assigning and paying the targeted social benefits to low-income families and citizens by the executive authorities of the district (city) and the local authorities of social protection every six months.
8. APPEAL OF THE DECISION ON THE PROVISION OF THE TARGETED SOCIAL BENEFITS
70. Citizens have right to apply to the local executive bodies of the state power or an Agency on the lawfulness of decision on the appointment or rejection of the targeted social benefits, as well as on the actions (or inaction) of authorized employees. 71. Appeals, applications and complaints of citizens about the provision of the targeted social benefits are reviewed and addressed in the manner prescribed by the legislation of the Republic of Tajikistan.
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