Those who wear Air Force blue are virtually shut out of the top warfighting posts. Why Airmen Don’t Command By Rebecca Grant

ir Force officers who run big regional commands are rare Abirds indeed. In Europe, for example, there have been only two—Gen. , who served as the Supreme Allied Com- mander Europe during the period 1956-62, and Gen. Joseph W. Ralston, who held the same post from 2000 to 2003. In fact, the only other regional command ever to be headed by an Air Force officer is Photo by Boris Grdanoski, Reuters/’Corbis US Northern Command, created after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks here. Two of its commanders—Gen. Ralph E. Eberhart (2002-04) and Gen. Victor E. Renuart Jr. (2007-present)—have been airmen. Other than that—zip. US Pacific Command, dating to 1947, has been led by 21 admirals but zero officers from the Air Force (or any other armed service). US Central Command, established in 1983, has had nine commanders, all from the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps. Not one of US Southern Command’s 30 commanders has been an airman. The newest regional entity, US Africa Command, drew its first commander from the Army. True, Air Force officers today lead both US Strategic Command and US Transportation Gen. , then Europe, leaves a meeting in Command. In the recent past, airmen have Skopje, Macedonia. commanded both US Special Operations Command and US Joint Forces Command. The first thing to say is that the record commanders on the Korean Peninsula and Airmen have also had their fair share of cannot be an accident of history; the numbers in the Vietnam and Iraq wars. rotations as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs are too stark. Indeed, notes the airpower The Air Force has supplied only the four of Staff, from Gen. Nathan F. Twining historian Phillip S. Meilinger, “The statistics mentioned—Norstad, Ralston, Eberhart, (1957-60) through Gen. Richard B. Myers are stunning.” and Renuart. The Army has been the over- (2001-05). The birth of the unified command system whelmingly dominant service, supplying 75 Still, with regional combatant commands roughly coincided with the birth of the Air of those 110 joint commanders. The Navy growing in importance, there’s a sense that Force, so random selection would have led has produced 25 of them, most of them in airmen have been overlooked and perhaps to roughly equal numbers of commanders the Pacific. Even the Marine Corps has out- even slighted. If airpower is the dominant among the services. As Meilinger (a retired paced the Air Force, providing six regional force in today’s military operations—and it Air Force ) totes up the score, there commanders, according to data prepared is—you would expect to see more airmen have been 110 theater commanders since by Meilinger. in command. Why are they not? World War II, counting the four-star joint When it comes to non-geographic-theater 46 AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2008 four-star command billets, USAF’s record commanders. From George C. Kenney in combatant commanders now had the whip has been better, but only marginally. USAF 1946 through Curtis E. LeMay and Russell hand. The combatant commander, in turn, has supplied commanders in 21 of 71 of these E. Dougherty and all the way to George Lee reported not to his own service branch but cases. (On Oct. 7, 1999, Atlantic Command Butler in 1992, all wore Air Force blue. rather to the Secretary of Defense, who is in became US Joint Forces Command and fact the immediate superior of the combatant its mission switched from geographic to A Transformation commander. In practice, the reporting is by functional responsibilities.) Even so, the Until fairly recently, moreover, ostensibly custom done via the JCS Chairman, who Navy significantly surpasses the Air Force “unified” regional commands were in reality has an advisory role. in this category of command, with 30 com- dominated by the doctrine and preferences The Gulf War. Desert Storm in 1991 manders. of the single service which served as the demonstrated, in spades, the new power Experts have cited a large number of principal supplier of forces to the region. and prestige of a regional commander. The possible reasons for the paucity of airmen In Europe and the Americas, it was the war made a global superstar of a once- serving in theater command. The list begins Army. In the Pacific, that was the Navy. In obscure Army officer—Gen. H. Norman with the peculiarities of the Air Force as an the Middle East, it was the Marine Corps as Schwarzkopf. When he assumed leadership institution and extends to the US military’s well as the Army. of CENTCOM, Schwarzkopf felt as though stunted view of airpower, politics of the In the relative quiet of the late Cold War, he had “stumbled upon a neglected frontier,” , and ’s the CINC job was not popular because it he later wrote. He was also brutally frank nomination and Congressional confirma- would keep a top officer away from his about how he got the job. “Central Com- tion processes. military branch and its own forces. Power, mand had traditionally alternated between To begin with, it seems reasonably clear by and large, rested with the services. In the Army and the Marine Corps, and since that, for a long time, the Air Force did not that framework, it was better for an airman the current commander, Gen. George Crist, was a marine, his successor would almost certainly be the man [the Army Chief of Staff] chose.” He was that man. Victory in the Gulf propelled Schwarzkopf and the CENTCOM post into the spotlight. The combination of rapid victory and global media surrounded Schwarzkopf with glamour not seen since the days of Eisenhower and MacArthur. The rise of regional policy. After the troops left the Gulf region, the US and sev- eral allies stayed behind to maintain no-fly zones in the southern and northern portions of Iraq. For 12 years, CENTCOM contained Iraqi power from the air while, to a less important degree, Navy warships enforced sanctions at sea. However, the command continued to alternate between the Army and the Marine Corps. The strangeness of ground-force specialists commanding an air and maritime theater led some to question why Air Force generals were not considered for this top regional post. It was against this backdrop that the ab- sence of USAF generals in command began to stand out. It seemed that airpower was being left out of the big game in town. All of the three factors, but especially the Gen. Lauris Norstad is one of only two airmen to serve as the Supreme Allied Com- accent on regional policy in the post-Cold mander Europe. War world, turned the combatant command- ers into important players in defense policy. place much emphasis on the leadership of to command Strategic Air Command or Suddenly, emphasis was on partnerships regional commands. As Meilinger described Tactical Air Command than to take over and alliances. Regional commanders found the state of mind at the time, “The epitome for largely administrative and diplomatic duties themselves at the leading edge of cooperative airmen was to be Chief or ACC [Air Combat in some distant geographic theater. engagement, larger military training enter- Command] commander.” Everything else, Then came three transformative develop- prises, and so forth. he went on, was “table crumbs.” ments. They were: Back in Washington, policy-makers, in Throughout the long Cold War, USAF’s The Goldwater-Nichols Act. Signed turn, were listening more closely to the views mission was focused tightly on nuclear into law in October 1986, Goldwater-Nichols of regional commanders. What they had to deterrence underwritten by heavy bombers. altered the national chain of command so that say had new weight in the reformulation of Air Force generals had a lock on the awe- combatant commanders had direct authority defense strategy and plans. The mid-1990s some power of Strategic Air Command, a over forces in their area of operations. Instead saw new emphasis on joint doctrine and “specified” or single-service command. Over of Army, Navy, and Air Force components joint vision statements, with impact on its 46-year existence, SAC had a total of 13 planning and directing their own operations, service actions. AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2008 47 USAF Gen. Nathan Twining, Chairman USAF Gen. George Brown, Chairman of USAF Gen. David Jones, Chairman of of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1957-60. the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1974-78. the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1978-82. Some argued that the regional com- became a four-star command. The thinking right resume for the European post. His manders should have a stronger voice in the was that most militaries in the region were combat credentials and staff experience were Pentagon’s planning, programs, and budget run by soldiers, so the US should also send well-matched by in-depth assignments in deliberations. Those commanders had long an Army man to deal with them and tighten research and development of new technolo- been generating annual integrated priority the links with foreign officers. That concept gies—an especially important factor in the lists, naming the top new systems desired changed only in 1997 with the appointment European Theater. Most important, Ralston by their commands, but the lists always had of a Marine Corps to lead the com- during his years as vice chairman had earned gotten polite brush-offs. Now, some wanted mand. Still, while the post now has been the confidence of the Joint Chiefs and the to give the combatant commanders real and held by soldiers, sailors, and marines, it has Pentagon leadership. significant influence over resources, at the never gone to an airman. Even with the Cold War over, the SACEUR expense of the services’ “organize, train, job was the crown jewel of theater commands. and equip” powers. The Navy Hold Ralston served ably until retirement in 2003. This raised a troubling question: If regional The appointment of Air Force Gen. Joseph However, the next attempt to appoint an commanders were to have a bigger role in W. Ralston as Supreme Allied Commander airman to a regional command did requirements, and none of them were airmen, Europe was a headline-making event. Ralston not fare so well. who would convey USAF’s perspective? took over for Army Gen. Wesley K. Clark, This time around, Pentagon leaders nomi- In July 2000, Air University’s College of who had fallen out of favor in the wake of nated an airman, Gen. Gregory S. Martin, to Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Educa- Operation Allied Force, the 1999 NATO succeed retiring Adm. Thomas B. Fargo as tion published a paper titled, “Once in a combat operation in Serbia. Ralston’s ap- the leader of Pacific Command. In the end, Blue Moon: Airmen in Theater Command,” pointment marked the first time since 1963 though, it was clear that neither Goldwater- written by Air Force Lt. Col. Howard D. that an airman had headed up a big regional Nichols nor any other mortal force could Belote. Belote’s study located the problem command. blast the Navy out of that chair. in the fact (as he saw it) that “airmen ap- Ralston’s career at first glance seemed We now know that emotion and tradition pear to have a narrower upbringing and less to run counter to advice on how to build a have conspired to give the Navy a lock on exposure to the political process than other regional combatant commander. A fighter that command. In the service’s historical service members.” Further, Belote’s research pilot with extensive Vietnam experience, narrative, the US fleet and aviators turned the suggested that Army and Navy command- Ralston held a number of command jobs tide of World War II in the Pacific. Since then, ers tended to log numerous assignments within the Air Force and spent significant the emotional attachment to the command within the theaters in which they eventually amounts of time on the staff in research, at Pearl Harbor has scarcely dimmed. There commanded. development, and acquisition. He attended is a logic to keeping such a large maritime Belote based his conclusion, in part, on Army Command and General Staff College theater in Navy hands, yet similar logic has the declared views of one Richard B. Cheney, and later the , but these been discounted in other commands. For then a former Secretary of Defense but not were his only assignments outside the Air example, Navy and Marine Corps officers yet a vice president. In an in- Force until he became vice chairman of the take turns with USAF officers at the helm of terview with Belote, Cheney contended that Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1996. US Strategic Command, the lineal descendent the Army and Navy tended to have placed in Ralston was considered for nomination of USAF-dominated SAC. the command queue many officers “who’ve as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In summer 2004, Secretary of Defense worked their way up” in a specific theater. He withdrew his name amid reports that he Donald H. Rumsfeld tried to break the Navy The Air Force had not. had engaged in an extramarital affair years hold on the Pacific. Known for scrutinizing Tradition obviously factored heavily into before, when he had been legally separated all service nominees for key posts, Rumsfeld selections, and the Air Force wasn’t the only from his wife. Army Gen. Henry H. Shelton also had shown himself willing to reject service to get shortchanged. United States was selected, making it three in a row for service nominees for joint or senior service Southern Command seemed to have been the Army. billets, often running through several names locked in for the Army from 1963, when it In reality, though, Ralston had just the before settling on a candidate. Those in charge 48 AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2008 Photo by Jacques Langevin, Corbis Sygma

USAF Gen. , Chairman of Then-Lt. Gen. Charles Horner (l) and Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf speak at a press the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2001-05. conference in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, during the first Gulf War. of guiding senior officer career moves learned military’s premier officers, but Martin grace- soon. As Belote said, “If ... airpower is to to expect major churn from Rumsfeld. fully withdrew his nomination, stating, “I have the game ball, should not someone who So, with Fargo edging toward the door and believe it in the best interests of the Pacific has devoted a career to airpower quarterback with senior admirals speculating which of Command and the Air Force Materiel Com- some of the games?” their number would wind up at Pearl Harbor, mand [Martin’s venue at the time] for me Three transformations are vital. Rumsfeld unexpectedly nominated Martin, to withdraw my nomination, even though First, the Air Force must groom its leading a stellar Air Force officer, to take the top I have not been involved with the KC-767 generals for command positions. Today that Pacific job. tanker program.” means not only staff assignments but tours When it happened, a PACOM public where Air Force officers gain credibility affairs officer issued to Stars and Stripes Get In the Game as warriors. As Belote’s study pointed out, a remarkably bland statement: “US Pacific Adm. William J. Fallon was summoned understanding ground operations—which Command is like all joint commands. It can from his post at the Navy’s Fleet Forces have dominated US military thought—is also be commanded by qualified officers from any Command in Norfolk, Va., to take over the essential. The recent experiences of airmen service.” For his part, Fargo praised Martin now open post in the Pacific. in Iraq and should go far toward as “a superb officer.” McCain’s disruption of the Martin nomi- broadening the base of air and space warriors Privately, however, the Navy was shocked nation marked the start of a retrenchment armed with outstanding joint skills. senseless. More to the point, the same was for the Air Force. In March 2007, Fallon Second, the airman seeking a top combat- true of senior members of the Senate and was selected to move from the Pacific to ant command must catch the eye of those in House. One of the shockees was Sen. John take the helm of Central Command in the the political process. At all costs, the Air Force S. McCain (R-Ariz.), a retired Navy officer Mideast. The surprise move ended 24 years should guard against running its promotion who had served in the Pacific and was a POW of Army and Marine Corps leadership of process based on “political acceptability,” in Vietnam. McCain’s father, Adm. John S. CENTCOM. Clearly, there was no prejudice counseled one retired Air Force four-star. At McCain Jr., had been PACOM commander about handing command to a Navy man. It the same time, the record bears out a need in the years 1968-72. appears that no one from the Air Force was for acclimating prime candidates to circles The stage was set for confrontation. It even seriously considered. outside of the Air Force. Sending forward the came during an October hearing of the Senate Not long afterward, retirement opened best candidates demands a blend of experi- Armed Services Committee on whether to up the top post at Southern Command. This ence on top of the excellence that got the confirm Martin in the Pacific post. Although prize, too, went to the Navy. officer to three stars in the first place. officers called to testify must swear to speak Whether the reasons are personal or insti- Third, all evidence is that the institutional truthfully and candidly, Martin’s hearing tutional or both, the Air Force has long been Air Force needs to find a way to fight harder turned into a minefield. underrepresented in top command jobs. The or politic better for those general officers Senate questions submitted in advance to disparity matters more than ever as the re- whose names do go forward. “We need Martin had concentrated heavily on topics gional commands become a focus of defense to do a far better job in the political arena of interest in the Pacific. In the hearing, strategy. At the least, the airmen’s perspective fighting for our people,” said Meilinger. however, McCain bore in on Martin about is likely to be given short shrift. “We seem not to want to dirty our hands former Air Force acquisition executive Dar- It seems undeniable that the pattern must with the political process, and we pay for leen A. Druyun, who had been convicted of change—if not immediately, then reasonably that seeming fastidiousness.” ■ contracting favoritism and ultimately served jail time. Martin said he had seen “nothing Rebecca Grant is a contributing editor of Air Force Magazine. She is president of inappropriate” when he worked with her IRIS Independent Research in Washington, D.C., and has worked for RAND, the several years before. McCain angrily de- Secretary of the Air Force, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Grant is a fellow clared, “I’m questioning your qualifications of the Eaker Institute for Aerospace Concepts, the public policy and research arm for commands.” of the Air Force Association. Her most recent article, “The Long Arm of the US It was an oily insult to one of the US Strategic Bombing Survey,” appeared in the February issue. AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2008 49