Jt-,
THi~ \'OP~ NOT FOR SAtE VOLUME xxxn SEPTEMBER 1952 NUMBER 6
Editor in Chief LT. COL. D. L. DURFim
North American Edition EditOT; MAJ. G. DRE.SSER AS81stant Editors: CAPT. R. H. HANSEN. WOJG R. L. S"I"NI'fo'11 Spanish·American Edition Editor: LT. COL. R. GIMENEZ-DE LA ROSA Asststant Editors: MAJ'. R. AMY. LT. G. ENJUTO Brazilian Edition Editor: LT. COL. W. F. BOUC;AS. Brazilian Army AS81stant BdlloTS: LT. COr.-IDR. T. N. FRANCA, Brazilian Navy. MAJ. E. R. MAlA, lJ1Q,ziltall A1'1ny MAJ. N. FREIXINHO, Brazilian :tt;Y Administrative Officer Production' Manager CAPT. A. HAALAND CAPT. J. C. SHAYDAK
CONTENTS
OUR AUTHORS - ____ • ______• ______------___ ... ______2 'fIlE SECURITY OF ALASKA AND THE TUNDRA ARMY ------... ----- ____ Lt. Col. T. O. Blakeney. Armor 3 NrXT MONTH ______--______------______• ___ • 12 THE AIR INVASWN OF HOLLAND ______. ______Maj. J. A. Huston, In! 13 NOTES ON THE} TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT Of' ATOMIC WEAPONS ______Col G. C. Remhardt, CE 28 WHAT'S TnE SCORE? ______, ______Col_ B. T. Rose, AGe 38 fo'l TVRE OF YUGOSLAVIA UNDER TITO ___ ------_- -- -- ______Col. S. J. Rasor, Inf 46 TUREE YEARS OF NATO ___ .. _____ .,."______------______58 Mll.lTARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD ______• ______63
F(I~EIGN MILITARY DIGESTS ______------_- -_ -- ---__ • ______--______- ______73 A Criticism of Ai,. Power Strategy ------.------______'73 Men, .lUnss. and Technique ______------______78 Limited and Unltmited 'frar ___ • ______.. ______82 Combat in Cities ______------. - ______85 The Arming of OUT Maritime Reconnaissance Squadrons ______88 Employment of Commonwealth and United States Field Artillery ------______96 The Battle Group ______------__ ------. __ -______--______' ______102 Neu, Threat-Soviet Navy ____ ~ _____ ------. ___ ------___ -- ______-______104 Carrier Development ______._ ------_ - - - _ - __ ------___ ------_____ -____ 108 ll,.IKS OF INTEREST TO THE MILITARY READER ______110
M:LITARY REVIEW-Published monthly by the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansa , in the English, Spanish, and Portuguese languages. Entered as second·class matter August 31, 1934, at the Post l.ilice at Fort LeavenwQrth~ Kansas. under the Act of March 3, 1879. Subscription rates: $3.50· (U.S. cur.. rency J a. year in the United States and other countries of the Western Hemisphere: $4.50 a year in all other countries. Reprints are authorized, provided credit is given the uMILITARY REVIEW:' CGSC. Fort Leaven worth, Kansas. ()llR l\lll'I'II()R.S
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas O. Blakeney gust 1952). A. short biographical sketch served with the 1st Armored Division and of him was carried in each of the issues the 760th Medium Tank Battalion, during tpentioned above. \ World War II, in North Africa and Italy. Colonel Buel T. Rose served in Europe, Subsequent assignments included service during World War II, as Assistant Gl with Army Field Forces Board No.2 and (Replacements), Headquarters, 12th Army Task Force Frigid, as well as with Head Group; and, later, as a member of the quarters, United States Army, Pacific, European Theater General Board. In ·the in Hawaii. After graduating from the early days of the war, he served as a com Regular Course at the Cpmmand and Gen pany officer in the 9th Infantry, as Adju eral Staff College in 1951, he was re tant of the Fort Sam Houston Reception tained by the College as an instructor. Center, and as G1, Headquarters, South Major James A. Huston is currently as ern Defense Command. After the war, he signed to the Office of the Chief of Mili served as Director, Military Personnel, tary History, Department of the Army, Headquarters, Eighth Service Command; where he is preparing a historical study Assistant G1 (Personnel), Headquarters, of the American airborne program, for in Fourth Army; and in the Office of The clusion in a volume of the United States Adjutant General. A graduate of the Com Army in World War II. He is the author mand and General Staff College Infantry of several articles which have appeared in Division Course in 1943, and the Regular the MILITARY REVIEW: "Thoughts on the Course in 1948, he has been an instructor American Airborne Effort in World War at the College since 1951. II" (April-May 1951) and "Tactical Use Colonel Sam J. Rasor served, during of Air Power in World War II: The Army World War II, with the 9th Infantry Di Experience" (July 1952). The first part of vision at Fort 'Bragg, North Carolina, and his article "The Air Invasion of Holland" in various assignments with infantry re appeared in the August 1952 issue of the placement training centers. Subsequent MILITARY REVIEW, together with a brief assignments included service with the 32d biographical sketch of him. Infantry Division in the Philippines and Colonel George C. Reinhardt, a former Japan, and with the 88th Infantry Divi instructor at the Command and General sion which was guarding the Morgan Line Staff College, and presently assigned to between Italy and Yugoslavia. From 1947 The Engineer Center, Fort Belvoir, Vir until 1949, he commanded a battalion of ginia, is the author of "The Logistical the 351st Infantry Regiment in the Free Command-Its Origin and Place in Modern Territory of Trieste. A graduate of the Warfare" (January 1951), "No Matter Command and General Staff College and How. You Slice It ..." (July 1951), "Who the Armed Forces Staff College, he has Failed to Get 'The Word'?" (June 1952), been an instructor at the Command and and "How Do We 'Get The Word'?" (Au Gen~ral Staff College since July 1951. 'THE SECURITY Of ALASKA""
AND THE TUNDRA r ARMY
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas O. Blakeney, Armor Instructor, Command and General Staff College
The views expressed in this ILrticle uation is remarkably parallel to that ex are the author's and are not necesisting just prior to Pearl Harbor, and, sarily those of the Department of the again, we find ourselves with something Army or the Command ILnd General less than we would desire for adequate Staff College.-The Editor. defense of the northern territories. The economy of fo.rce dictated by conditions in 1941 is as applicable today as it was SOME 4 months before the Japanese then. The potential threat to Alaska--or attack on Pearl Harbor, General Simon to Canada and the United States through Bolivar Buckner, the Army commander in Alaska-is no less a threat today. It is Alaska, summed up the precarious mili obvious that the threat must be countered tary situation then by stating, "There as it was in 1941, without seriously alter exist alarming deficiencies in both Army ing our military commitments elsewhere. and Navy facilities in Alaska. Each garri son is sufficient only to cope with minor We ca,n assume that all military means raids or delay serious landing attempts which can be spared have been allocated for a short time.... Due to the utter for the defense of this northern outpost. lack of roads and railroads ... the Army When all the military power that can be garrison cannot be regarded as anything spared has been given, and this is still in but local defense forces. There exist no adequate, then some other source of power means now of determining when or where must be tapped. Other nations have been the enemy is corning and no way of stop faced with a similar problem for centuries. ping his approach if we know it." The English, defending their isle during the blitz, had to supplement their military No military man can intelligently argue fqrces with an effective horne guard. Every the fact that it was necessary to employ able-bodied man in Switzerland is a the principle of economy of force in Alaska trained soldier able to spring immediatell' during World War II. If we cannot have to his country's defense. adequate forces everywhere, then we must ~mploy our mass where it will bring the The Problem Is Plural greatest good and take a calculated risk "The security of Alaska must inclupe elsewhere. consideration of the terrain and climate Today, the United States is again faced (great distances and extremes of tempera with uncertain world conditions. The sit ture), and the shor~ge of trained man-
Logistics and manpower. are major issues in the security of Alaska. By ~raining the native Alaskan to defend his homeland, we can alleviate our manpower shortage and reduce our logistical requirements there ~ ',' " MILITARY REVIEW, SEPTEMBER '19~Z
power. All of these affect tactics, logistics, can be used to transport sufficient sup , transporb~tion, communications, and the plies, by water, to last through the winter. availability of defensive fo~ces. Critical items, however, can be flown in as There is a remarkable resemblance be needed. The military logistician is faced tween 'the interior of Alaska and our with the problem of. long-range planning western states just after the Civil War. to anticipate needs far in advance, and he The few existing railroads are similar to must utilize the summer months for most those operating during the "gay nineties" of his shipping. era-day coaches replete with pot-bellied The Territory presently has very few stoves, overnight stops at Harvey Houses good roads and this is a fact that the mili for meals and sleeping accommodations. tary planner must consider. Ten years ago, Village streets resemble western movie the only road of any significant length sets, and winter travel off the few graveled was the 370-mile Richardson Highway; a roads is by skis, snowshoes, dog team, or gravel road connecting Valdez with Fair air. It is not unusual for a bush pilot to banks. In 1940, Alaska had a road net fly a trapper or miner with dog team and work of 10,171 miles. Of this, only 2,212 supplies to some remote spot and then miles were suitable for automobile and rendezvous with hiin after the ice melts truck traffic. Trails and winter sled roads in the summer. were the only other overland routes. This limited road net served an area of more Geographically, Alaska is a peninsula. than 600,000 square miles. Although the !logistically, it is an island. The local condition and amount of usable roads in people speak of "going outside" when they creased during the last war, the Territory leave Alaska to travel to the United States. is still critically short of good roads. This This phrase is more than a colloquialism, is an important factor in view of the it is extremely descriptive of actual con United States Army's dependence on ditions. Communications between Alaska motor transport. and the United States are limited to air and water, w!th only a small amount of River Transport traffic over the Alaska Highway. How ever, traffic by air and the Alaska High For many years, the river systems of way' is small compared with the water fered the simplest and least expensive traffic required to fill Alaska's needs. Even mode of transportation into the interior, if the Alaska Highway could deliver the with feeder sled roads and trails radiating total requirements of the Territory to the from the rivers. River transport was not Fairbanks terminal, transshipment to fi entirely satisfactory for civilian traffic nal destinations would require water, rail, and it was completely inadequate from a or air travel. mpitary standpoint. The rivers are free of ice for approximately 105 days out of Water Transport the year, and even then they are treacher Water transportation remains the vital ous because of the constantly shifting sand link in the Alaskan logistical picture, yet bars and channels. it has serious limitations imposed by the rugge.d 'weather and terrain. The Alaskan Tractor-Train Transport coast line is more than 26,000 miles long. To supplement the river traffic, tractor Many ports are icebound from September train freighting became an important ad to May, and ships can get into Point junct to movement of civilian and military Barro'w only about 3 weeks of the year. supplies. This type of freighting origi, As a consequence, only the summer months nated in the early 1930s to haul hea'·y . THE SECPRITY OF ALASKA AND THE TUNDRA ARMY
Water transportation remains the most important link in the Alaskan logistical pictUre in spite of the fact that shipping is limited to the few available ports and, to a short summer season. Above. a typical stretch of rugged Alaskan coast liue. Below. a Navy ice breaker and transports in a "northern resupply operation.-Department of Defense photos. MILITARY REVIEW SEPTEMBER .1952
machinerY to isolated mines. Improve supporting distance decreases, the size ments in tractor design led to widespread, of the support force increases. Granted adoption of this means of transport, with that air supply i:;; faster and more flexible, the D'l and DB caterpillar tractors sup it is doubtful that it can match the trac plying the motive power. During World tor-train in dollar cost per ton-mile, and War II, the Army had to resort to tractor poor flying conditions do not prevent trac train freighting over sled roads and fro tor-train travel. zen rivers in the winter months in order' The Bush Pilot to supply bases in the north. The trains Man's ingenuity has done much to over were composed of tractor, cargo sleds, and come the difficulties imposed by weather a wannigan (a skid mounted shelter used and terrain. An important contribution by the crew for eating and sleeping). This to the opening of the northland was made type of freighting experienced consid by a hardy group of men known as bush erable success and should be seriously pilots. These men, flying various types of considered for the supply of future op aircraft under nearly all weather condi erations in the Arctic. For example, a tions, pioneered the extensive airway 350-mile trip was made by Morrison and systems that serve Alaska today. The Knudsen in 16 days which brought vital bush lines have gained a wealth of ex construction material to McGrath for Civil perience and knowledge over the years Aeronautics Authority projects. The which can assist in the defense of the Army later made a .l.QO-mile trip from Territory. Bush pilots could be used as Nome to Teller bringing in 34 tons of ail' scouts and information-gathering frozen reindeer meat which prevented a agents in their daily flights to remote 6-month meat shortage. A total of 436 parts of the Territory. If told what to tons of steel landing mats werc trans look for and to whom to make reports, the ported from Fairbanks to Galena, a dis bush pilots could contribute valuable in tance of about 250 miles, in a period of formation to the intelligence concerning about 80 days. All of these moves were Alaska. accomplished by tractor-train. The Dog Team The tactical value of tractor-tmin The military use of dog teams in Alaska freighting is important since it not only is questionable. Prior to the develop bridges the frozen periWorld War I vintage: En world that might seriously affect their fields and SPTingfields. Some 150 Eskimos very existence. All of the missionaries were given the oath as charter members of anq teachers exeept one had left the island the Alaskan Territorial Guard-approxi and the one who had remained was mately 100 at Gambell and 50 at Sa threatening to leave. The natives reported voonga. This was the beginning of the or that a Japanese surveying party had ganization of several thousand native visited the island only the year before. people into the ATG. T'he American officer told the natives to remairi on their island and that he Composition ,woUld return to the mainland and bring The Tundra Army was .organized in an THE SECURITY OF ALASKA AND THE TUNDRA ARMY 9 area populated by some 20,000 Eskimos, Discipline and morale were not a prob Aleuts, and Indians. This figure includes lem with the Eskimo, nor was there ever the men, women, and children, so the a question of his basic loyalty to the number of able-bodied men available for United States. When the natives were the task was considerably less than the first contacted they were frightened, total 20,000. The total number actually afraid that the Japanese would come. involved as active members was about After they were armed and organized, 2,700-a lack of accurate records prevents they hoped that the Japanese would come. a thorough tabulation. Nearly every ma One instructor warned: "If Jap come, he ture native man from Egegik to Point steal wife, steal igloo, steal furs, steal Barrow joined the ATG. kayak, steal walrus." "We shoot Jap right The Eskimos outnumber the Aleuts and in middle of forehead," was the reply of Indians about 3 to 1 on population basis. Chief John Alona at King Island and The Eskimos live along the shores of the his attitude was typical. The natives were Bering Sea and the Arctic Ocean, on the inspired and charged with the responsi islands of these seas, and along the rivers bility of serving their country and mak that drain into the sea from about 300 ing a record for themselves. "From Bris miles inland. From this point inland, the tol Bay to Point Barrow," they were Indian predominates while the Aleuts live told, "all are united in carving out for along the Alaskan peninsula and on the all Americans a great destiny for free islands that bear their name. Thus, the dom." Tundra Army was comprised of people The organization of the ATG was ham living along the fan-like periphery of the pered by a lack of instructors, by the in northern Territory; an ideal location for frequency of their visits, by the great a screening force with the mission of distances to be covered, and by the ele giving early warning of hostile attack. ments. However, their organization into some semblance of a military force had A Beginning a profound effect on them. They had Two Army officers were detailed as in great pride in their unit, their shoulder structors for the ATG, but only one was patches, guns, helmets, and the parkas really active and several enlisted instruc which were issued to them. It is amazing tors were later detailed to assist in train how much morale was built around the ing. The instructors traveled from village wearing of a simple shoulder/patch. They to village, from island to island, by any were childishly happy with the shoulder and all means of transportation available. patch of blue with its gold northern stars. Much of the travel was by air, but some This became their symbol of the force-in was by dog team. Hardships which are being-it was their "uniform" and was inevitable during a northern winter were worn on their parkas. When a boy reached encountered by instructors. One instruc the age of 16, he joined the ATG and thus became a man. tor staggered into a village just ahead of a blizzard which froze three of his dogs, The Mission and on' another trip he ran so short of The Alaskan Territorial Guard was food that he had to share the frozen fish organized as a home defense unit. No usually fed to his dogs. The arrival of an unit of the ATG was to be used ex instructor was the social event of the cept for the local defense of the com village. This arrival called for a feast munity from which it was organized. As a and a formal drill period to show the new home guard, it was not subject to call into accomplishments of the unit. Federal service. However, individual mem MILITARY REVIEW: ,SEPTEMBER 1962 bers were 'not exempted by their mem Eskimo, Indian, and Aleut could provide bership from induction into any of the reg intelligence coverage over a vast area. ular armed services of the United States. They could provide excellent scouting serv On the contrary, many Guardsmen were ice while on hunting and fishing expedi called:and served with honor. Assuming tions that comprise their daily lives. Rapid that most of these veterans are still alive reporting and transmission of the infor and still live in the far north, their use in ma;tion they gather was a difficulty that training today or as, a part of a new could have been overcome. "Ham" stations native security force would be valuable. are located in the isolated communities Although membership in the ATG was vol from which the natives hunt and fish. untary, their period of service was for the The operators could be relied upon to pass duration of the emergency. The ranks ~nformation rapidly and accurately, es were open to any male citizen over 16 years pecially when such information affected of age, with the usual stipulation that he the security of their community. The must be capable of bearing arms, of screening and evaluation of the informa temperate habits, and 'that he have no tion would be left to military commanders. incapacitating physical or mental traits. The units of the Alaskan Territorial Commissions, warrants, and promotions to Guard were so widely separated as to pre noncommissioned ranks were to be made clude mutual support. Therefore, the idea by the Governor. All mnks served 1vith of having these people actually fight other Qut pay. than as guerrillas is considered imprac The ATG was given the general mis tical. A company of from 20 to 60 Eskimos sion of co-operating with the regular arm could not fight an effective defensive ac tion against even a small organized invad ed services to assist in repelling attacks ing force with its supporting weapons and on the territory. In addition, the ATG WaS to resist actively raids on the local com to attempt such an action would be sui munity, and thus provide a means of se cide. However, their ability to harass and kill under the hit-and-run tactics of guer curity for the isolated villages. Actually, rilla warfare could be of military value. the organization provided the Governor Since the rifle is the Eskimo's most im with a force that could have been used in portant means of obtaining his livelihood, many ways; to control domestic disturb he is, of necessity, an expert shot. ances, to aid in disasters, and to guard vital areas where local police were not The Native Potential available. One ~ery valuable use of the ! We must revise our accepted techniques ATG was not listed in its mission. It seems ;of basic training before they can be ap obvious that the most important use of plied to the native Alaskan. Otherwise, these people was the one job their daily we cannot realize the maximum from the activities placed them in the best' pos native potential. It seems that the earlier sible position to perform. Their very ex trai~ing of the ATG was amazingly in istence is based on their ability as hunters flexible. -t\ttempts to apply Army regula and fishermen. Daily, they employ stealth, tions and stylized training methods paid natural camouflage, and the ability to a small return for the effort expended. move quickly and shoot accurately"' to se In the first place, most of our basic field cure food. This is learned and applied manuals are not suited to the needs of the from early childhood. This skill natural native nor to the job he is best fitted to ly f~lls into the requirements for scout-' perform. ing and patrolling. With training in mil It is difficult to understand why so much itaryobservation and reporting, the of the limited training time was spent on THE SECURITY' OF ALASKA' AND THE TUNDRA ARMY 11 '«:lose order drill and the manual ~f arms, or retard our progress in Alaska. T~e anq still more difficult to imagine an security of Alaska demands an :effective , Eskimo unit marching in cadence over the reconnaissance screen. The Eskimos are snow. However, there is nothing ridic on the ground willing and capable of ulous about a group of Eskimos engaged performing this mission: in realistic scouting and guerrilla exer cises. Organization and Training The natural, inherent qualities of the Let us consider some of the problems Eskimo should have served as a founda of organizing the native Alaskans. We tion for further tra:ining in patrolling and want to obtain the maximum benefit on the tactics of guerrilla fighting. This from their services witholit interfering, was a mistake and one which should not unduly, with their normal way,of life. The be repeated. ,maximum benefit which we "can obtain involves their employment as an outpost " The Eskimo should become an impor or reconnaissance force which projects our tant part of a military ground reconnais present frontier thousands of miles in the sance screen to our north and west. His direction of a possible enemy. A force nomadic travels cover an area far beyond which would not' only warn us of an in-' his own village. During his normal rounds, vasion, but one which could give a good he travels as much as 100 miles between account of itself as guerrillas by harass his village and hunting or fishing sites. ing the enemy in the event of an actual in Since these people are practically the vasion. These men can be counted upon to only inhabitants along the 5,000-mile fron protect their homeland. tier that faces the Soviet Union, they must compose the major portion of our lo This does not call for a formal terri cal screening force.. The only 'other al torial guard organization; that would de feat our purpose and would not take ad ternative is the employment of American vantage of the most valuable assets these soldiers for this job. men offer. They should be organized in It is militarily unsound to be on short such a way as to utilize the normal daily intelligence concerning a possible enemy. routine which they perform in pursuit of The northern part of Alaska undoubtedly their livelihood: their periodic hunting, has few secrets from. the Soviets. Dur fishing, and trapping trips. This mobile ing World War II, they flew thousands screen woul<~ ,preclude hostile forces being of lend-lease airplanes from Fairbanks, landed which! might otherwise go undis Galena, and Nome into Siberia. covered for, ~any months. The first instructor assigned to the Their training should stress the type Alaskan Territorial Guard stated in his • of, information' we desire and the method report that migrations between Siberia in, which that information can best be re and Alaska were going on as late as 1944. ported promptly. Every attempt' should He reported that he had seen'parties of as be made to utilize "ham" radio stations many as 40 arrive from Siberia on hunt in, reporting information, at least until ing, fishing, or trading trips. He further more efficient and secure military chan stated that, American Eskimos visit Si nels have been established. Obsolete mili beria on similar missions. The accuracy tary equipment would be a valuable, con Ql' his obllervations cannot be determined, tribution to their way of life and would but such travels were and are possible. assist them in extending and comple The mili.tary man should consider how menting existing comm.unication systems. these trips can be- used either to assist !Difficulties in training and equipping the 12 , . . MILITARY REVIEW natives for the task of guerrillas and can greatly add to the protection of Oil scouts are not insurmountable. It can be country without seriously depleting Oil done with reasonable expense and effort. military commitments elsewhere. The native people have already proved themsNves to be both enthusiastic and Summary capable. They have first-hand knowledge of The problems of logistics, tJ'ansportl the terrain and elements: They can shoot tion, communication, and security impose or move with astonishing speed in summer by rugged terrain, great distance, an and winter. They are courageous, inher temperature extremes are not insUl ently disciplined, and loyal. If we train mountable either. Much has been accon and equip them in military observing, re plished in this respect duril1g the past ye8 porting, and guerrilla tactics; if we es ~nd the future is even brighter. Tn tablish channels for passing information; frozen and forbidden northland is no lon~ if we tell the Eskimos what to look for, er a frightening military problem. As ~ t{) whom to report, and what we want gain knowledge and experience, the prol them to do under certain circumstances; lems appear less difficult. Given time 'W thcn their contribution will be great. We can bcat these problems.
NEXT MONTH Main Articles Who Dictates Destl'llction? by Lieutenant Colonel Harold J. St. Clair; aT Artillery-Arbitcr of the Battlefield by Lieutenant Colonel Leonard G. Robinson, JI are included among the main articles.
Foreign Military Digests The fOl'eign digests include "Swiss Partisans?" from Allgemeine SehwcizC1'isd Militar Zeit*chrift (Switzerland); and "Oil Power and National Policy" from it Indian Ail' FOl'ce Quarterly.
Books of Interest to the Military Reader Reviews of The State of Latin America by German Arciniegas; and The Militm Genius of Abl'Uham Lincoln by Brigadier General Colin R. Ballard are included. The Air Invasion o'f Holland I Major James; A. Huston, In/antl'Y Office of the Chief of Mi!ita~y History,' Department of the Army (Copyright 1952-0rlando Ward)
The views expressed in this artielf they had been massed and control was es are the author's and are not neceSr tablished quickly. sarily those 0/ the Depal·tmerlt 0/ tM ArmY'or the Command and' General GERMAN REACTION Staff College. ! Initial German reaction had been feeble I in most pla~es. Although German com This article was taken from a chap. manders had considered the possibility of fer of Major Huston's study on th1 allied airborne landings in Holland, they airborne team prepared for the f01·th~ had regarded such an effort more likely coming volume of air-ground studies against the German homeland. Increasing in the ~el'ies, the UNITED'STATES aerial activity had suggested the possi ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. Req1lest~ bility of an attack in the Netherlands. for permission for reproduction shou14 Nevertheless, the timing and the magni be addressed to the Chief of Military tude of the operation did catch the enemy History, Department of the Army. by surprise. The allied ail' preparation, Washington, 25, D.C. ; beginning about 3 hours before the land This is the second in a series of twb ings, might have disclosed the intentions, articles on this subject. 'The firs!t but the Germans thought the air activity article of this series appeared in thE? not greatly above normal, and they August 1,952 issue.-The Editor. . thought that the attacks against their antiairCl:aft positions were attempts to de THE greatest airborne operation of the stroy the bridges. German Army Group war, Operation lIlal'ket, was launched B had it~ command post, at the beginning when 1,544 airplanes and 478 gliders car of the operation, in a hotel at Oosterbeek ried approximately 0l'!e-half the strength within view of a British landing zone; but of three airborne divisions to three widely the 2 to 3 hours which it took for the Brit Slparated areas and delivered them simul ish to assemble allowed the German head taneously. No German aircraft had in~er- • quariers enough time to move to Terborg. cepted the column, and the supporting German Army Group B had a conglom air ,action against antiaircraft positions eration of troops with which to face' the had been highly successful for the m!ost allied assaults. Its strongest units prob part. • ably were those assigned to the German All the units had not hit their designat Fifteenth Army, but they were committed \'d dr~p zones precisely, but, in most cafes, to holding the ScheIdt estuary and the
A well-planned airborne operation, like a surprise beach landing, is . likeiy 'to meet only light res;skrnce but fo hcwe its hardest fighting qffer the enemy has recovered' from its ;nitia' shock and reorg~n;zed 14. MILITARY REVIEW . SEPTEMBER ·1952 islands in order to deny to the allies the row corridor which would threaten the use of '. Antwerp as a supply port, and, German position in Holland. An air fleet therefore, were not available to strength almost as great' as that of D-day brouglit en appreciably the defenses to the east. additional troops and equipment on D A weakened German First Parachute plus 1, and later the same day 252 jJ-24 Army defended the line against the thrust 'bombers of the Eighth Air Force dropped of the British Second Army; no reserves· 782 tons of supplies. were immedi.ately availahle to it. Disposed When the meteorological staff predicted to protect various key points in Holland (accurately) that rain and low cloud were numbers of "combined" units-for spreading across Belgium would affect'the tress troops, SS reserves, depleted units ~outhern but not the northern route, the from the Eastern front, and naval land First Allied Airborne Army G3 recom units for coastal defense-of the Military mended that all troop carriers follow the District of the Netherlands. The first 48 northern route on the second lift. Neces prisoners taken by the British at Arnhem sary orders were issued within the hour, yielded 27 different unit identifications. but fog delayed the take-offs until be This, of course, was the great advantage tween 1000 and l100-the time when the of airborne operations: that a drop deep planes and gliders were supposed to be behind enemy lines would encounter only over their drop zones and landing zones. weak, disorganized rear area units with out an organized defense or sufficient Second Lift strength for rapid counterattacks. One Most of the 327th Glider Infantry Regi circumstance, however, spoiled this con ment, and 1i6 more jeeps and 109 trailers, dition for the British. It just happened arrived on the 428 (of 450 which took off) that, unknown to the allies, the German gliders which reached the 101st Airborne • II SS Panzer Corps, with its two rather Division safely. depleted panzer divisions, was in the area The 82d Airborne Division used the 454 north and northeast of Arnhem for reha gliders assigned to its second lift to bring bilitation. By 1640, orders were going out in the remaining three artillery battalion~. for the employment of elements of the They arrived at the landing zones in the II SS Panzer Corps as well as for small midst of a fire fight; and quickly went units of the Military District of the into action. Germans had attacked from Netherlands. the Reichswald and seized a part of the A well-planned and executed airborne landing zone. A midmorning attack had operation, like a surprise river crossing driven them off the landing zone, but they or beach landing, is likely to meet light still had much of it under fire. General resistance at first, but to have its most Gavin had sent a message to rear base in difficult fighting l!iter, after the enemy an effort to have glider pilots notified to has had a chance to recover from the land on the west side of the landing zone. initial shock and to organize his forces The message arrived too late for new for counterattacks. The critical time for briefings, however, and a number of glid Operation Market would come after ers . which landed near the Reichswald D-day. came under 4ntense and damaging fire. In SUCCESS AND FAILURE the midst of the landings of several hun During the next 9 days, troop carrier dred gliders on the correct landing zon(', aircraft flew resupply and reinforcing 25 gliders of the 319th Glider Field Artil missioris while the troops on the ground lery Battalion contill;ued over the landing THE AIR INVASION OF HOLLAND . 15 about 5 miles inside Germany; about half ers had flown' the' second lift. Then bad" the men got back to the division within weather. shlllrpiy curtailed air operations a few days. ' for four successive days. Reinforcements for the British 1st 4ir borne Division on D plus 1, included the 101st Ground Action 4th Parachute Brigade in 127 Ameriean The force of the 101st Airborne Divi planes, and other troops in 296 British g~id sion which had crossed the Wilhelmina
ers. Another 33 British aircraft dropped Canal at Zon the previous evening-the supplies. 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment-ad The Eighth Air Force bombers went in vanced toward Eindhoven early on the at low altitudes to drop their 782 tons morning of. 18 September. Held up by of supplies to the 101st and 82d Air enemy fire about a mile north of the city, borne Divisions, but variations in thl/ir. it outflanked the defenses to the east and l'please points scattered the bundles cdn won control of most of the city by 1300. siderably. Since neither enemy action n~r British reconnaissance patrols had.by pDor visibility had hampered the drop, and passed the city to contact the airborne iltasmuch as the bombers flew at the cor troops to the north shortly after noon, and rect altitude, the number of bundles ~e the main body made firm contact just south ported to have dropped anywhere from 1 of the city at 1900. Tanks of the Guards to 8 miles' from the drop zone suggesttd Armoured Division passed through Eind the need for a quick-release mechanism to hoven quickly and reached the Wilhelmina make uniform the time required to get the Canal at 2100. There, engineers immedi .panniers out of the ball turret openints ately began building a bridge. That task .vl1d bomb bays. compieted during the night, the British A total of 1,360 airplanes and 1,200 glia armored division began crossing at 0615 MILITARY REVIEW: SEPTEMBER 1952
(19 September). Racing on through St. with the assistance of members of the Oedenrode and Veghel, by 0645 it was ap Dutch Resistance, again got to within 400 proaching the sector of the 82d Airborne yards of the objective. But then, after Divisiqn. While other.. troops of the 101 st fighting until 1500 without any further ad Airborne Division fought to strengthen vance, it was withdrawn. their hold on the corridor, the main axis The arrival of the Guards Armoured Di became a mass of vehicles streaming north vision tj1e next day (19 September), by ward. After an attack on the preceding way of Grave (it contacted the 504th Para day, and another on this, to regain the chute Infantry Regiment there at 0820) bridg'e near Best had failed, and now in and Heumen, added new.strength for an creasing commitments of the 502d Para other assault on the Nijmegen bridges, chute Infantry there threatened to weaken tbough strong enemy attacks from the dangerously the defenses of St. Oedenrode, Reichswald still kept other units there de a· final assault at 1800 won that objective fending' to the south and east. -and more than a thousand German pris The 2d Battalion of the 505th Parachute oners. Infantry Regiment was attached to the A third glider lift that afternoon British division for a new attempt. Near brought in more troops of the 327th Glider the center of the city, one company of the Infantry Regiment, antitank guns, and ar 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, with tillery. The antitank guns arrived just in seven tanks, turned northwest to attack t'ime to help drive off a German tank at the railroad bridge, while the rest of the tack against the bridge at Zon that eve battalion and the remaining tanks of the ning. That night, German planes bombed 2d Battalion, Grenadier Guards, together Eindhoven heavily. When the threat to with a Britisp armored infantry company. Zon continued to grow during the night attacked directly for the highway bridge. and the next day (20 September), two Once more the attackers got to within 400 battalions of the 506th Parachute Infan yards of the objective, and then they were try Regiment, with British tanks, returned stopped. Violent combat continued through northward from Eindhoven to join with a the evening and the night, but the German battalion of the 327th Glider Infantry Reg defenses held. The whole success of the iment in repelling the attacks. operation might depend upon getting that bridge intact. 82d Ground Action The corps and division commanders Meanwhile, the 82d Airborne Division agreed upon a bold maneuver: a river was being extended in defending itself crossing by boat. While infantry and tanks against attacks coming from the Reichs continued to attack the south end of the wald in the southeast, and continuing at bridge, the 504th Parachut~ Infantry Reg tacks of its own to the north. While other iment, with the 2d Irish Guards att!lched, units attacked to clear the landing zones moved up on the west and cleared an area on D plus 1, platoons from the 504th and to the river. After instruction in the use 508th Parachute Infantry Regiments con of British assault boats, at 1500 the para verged.on the canal bridge of the main chute regiment started across about a Grave-Nijmegen highway near Neerbosch mile downstream from the railroad bridge. and captured it. This bridge was damaged, It had only enough boats to take one bat but would carry light traffic. One company falion at a time, but they got across and of the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment then moved over several hundred yards of returned at 0900 for another try at the fiat ground under fire from an old fort. main highway bridge at Nijme~en, and, After some hard fighting, the paratroops I .' T~E AIR INV~SION OF ~OLLAND
r~ached the north ·end of' the raiJro~d tank fire. No shelter remained for the: , oridge at 1800. When they reached tne wounded, and 300 of them had to· be sur north end of the highway bridge, the troo~s rendered. Out of ammunition, the band of on the opposite side stormed the south e11id 140 survivors early on 21 September split of the bridge. Shortly thereafter the firSt up iI)to small parties to try to filt~r back tank of the Grenadier Guards rolle(j to the main body. None made it. A force, across. At dawn they would go for ArI) numbering 500 at its maximum, had held hem. out at the key Arnhem bridge for more British Ground Action than 3 days, without resupply, against de The delays which had slowed the advancb termined enemy tanks. Now, at almost the of the British XXX Corps-the defense hour that tanks of the Guards Armoured south of Eindhovcn, thc building of Ii Division were starting north f1-om the Nij bridge at Zon, German attacks against thb megen bridgehead, their last remnants l'oad near Zon, and the fight for the Nij~ were being eliJninated. Other elements of megen bridge-were having serious conse the division continued to hold a steadily quences for the British 1st Airborne Divt contracting area to the west of Arnhem. sion at Arnhem. There, enemy reaction wax Holding to the terminus of the Heaveadorp l'elatively stronger and swifter than else Ferry, they hoped that the Polish brigade where. By the time the 4th Parachute Bri might be able to drop there. The bad gade had arrived on D plus I, several hourt weather on D plus 3, however, prevented late because of the weather, the German~ that. had had time to build up effective counter'" Although the spearheads of the ground attacking forces. By evening, the German~ forces now had moved northward toward had cut the route between the landin/t Arnhem, fighting in the south continued zones and the troops at the bridge, and had as vigorously as ever: Troops of the 101st the British forces cut into three parts-r Airborne Division in turn warded off en one between the landing areas and Oostert emy attacks against St. Oedenrode and 1:;('ck, one in the western outskirts of Arne themselves attacked and seized Schijndel. h0m, and one at the north end of the That had to be given up, however, when bridge. Moreover, the division had been stronger German attacks against Veghel unable to maintain effective communica~ (22 September) cut the main highway and tions. Attempts of the battalions in the held it until the next day. ontgldrts of Arnhem to break through tQ As the 82d Airborne Division fought t1w bridge the next day failed. Glider eler 11ll'llts of the Polish 1st Parachute Brigade back against strong counterattacks in its arrived in the midst of a fire fight (D plus sector, all the way from 1VI00K in the south • east to Beek and Ubbergen (east of Nij 2). The Polish paratroops could not go il} meg-en) in the northeast, the fact that the a, planned on D plus' 2, or on D plus 3~ ul'c'ause of the bad weather. Resupply mis. 325th Glider Infantry Regiment had not sions failed on both. days when nearly all been able to join the division became a till' bundles fell into enemy hands. i serious matter. Without supplies, and facing increas~ Polish Brigade i,,:~!y stronger German infantry and heavy' In spite of the unfavorable weather on tank attacks, the troops at the bridge wer(> D plus 4 (21 September), the plight of the in a perilous position. The houses which British 1st Airborne Division made it al they occupied were burned out, one by on~. most mandatory to try to get the Polish ann when they tried to get into alternat~ 1st Parachute Brigade in anyway. Amer po~itions outside they came under direct ican troop carriers took off at 1400 with MILITARY 'REVIEW' SEP.TEMBER 1952.
about h3:lf of the brigade in 110 planes. D Plus 6 The loss of the Arnhem bridge now made No troop carrier 'operations had been use of the drop zone originally selected for . possible on D plus 5, but with improved the Polish paratroops, south of the bridge, weather the next day, the largest lift since impractical. Therefore, they should be D plus 1 took off. (It also was the day of dropped near Dreil, on the south bank of greatest reaction from the German Air the river opposite the area still held by the Force.) Gliders took in more artillery and British. They then could cross the river jeeps for the 101st Airborne Division, and on the Heaveadorp Ferry. Unfortunately,. the 325th Glider Infantry Regiment was the weather was so bad that 41 aircraft re at last able to join the' 82d Airborne Di turned without dropping their paratroops, v\ision (their gliders landed on what had 3 landed at Brussels, and 13 were missing; been DZ "0" near Overasselt). More Pol only 53 reached the area of the drop zone, ish parachutists flew to the area of the 82d and they dropped about 750 men. By the Airborne Division in 41 American aircraft, time these troops assembled and reached and British Stirlings and Dakotas-115 of the river bank, however, they found that 123 reached the drop zone-and planes the ferry had been sunk, and the Germans dropped supplies for the 1st Airborne Di controlled the north bank at that point. vision, but again nearly all of them fell into enemy hands. That night 150 to 250 British Armor more Polish troops ferried across the river The attack of the Guards Armoured Di to try to reinforce the 1st Airborne Di vision, meanwhile, was bl?gged down be vision. However, the British Second Army fore an effective antitank screen near already had given permission to withdraw Ressen. Tanks were unable to operate off all the forces then north of the Lower roads in this country during the rainy Rhine should it become necessary. weather, and on 23 September the British. 43d Infantry Division passed through the German Pressure Guards Armoured Division to make an in German forces in the south still had fantry attack toward Arnhem. Armored not given up their attacks against the cars of the Household Cavalry Regiment 101st Airborne Division nellr Veghel. In moved northward from the Nijmegen fact, on 23 September, an enemy force bridge at dawn, bypassed enemy resistance probed between the regiments holding St. at Elst, and drove to Dreil to link up with Oedenrode and Veghel, and once more cut the Polish 1st Parachute Brigade at 0800 the corridor. The 506th Parachute Infan (22 September). The main attack was un try Regiment, with British tanks, raced able to get beyond Elst on the road to back southward from Uden and the British Arnhem, but another battalion, mounted 50th Infantry Division attacked from the on tanks, followed the route of the armored south. The combined forces were unable to reconnaissance corps and reached the Dreil reopen the road until 26 September, but area before nightfall. More troops, bring this time it was permanent. ing amphibious trucks (DUKWs) loaded Strong pressure continued against the with, ammunition and supplies for the 1st 82d Airborne Division, and, on 25 Septem Airborne Division, arrived in the area be ber, about 40 German planes bombed the fore midnight. But the DUKWs could not Nijmegen bridge; one hit damaged it. How get through the mud along the river bank, ever, by 25 and 26 September, its troops and could not be launched. A few impro again were attacking to b~oaden its area vised rafts did carry about 50 Poles across along the Waal. . the river during the night. Attempts to reinforce the. shrinking THE AIR INVASION OF HOLLAND 19 ..
British 1st Airborne Division continued landed the Airborne Forward DeliverY throu·gh 24 September. Another 300 to 400 Airfield Group and most of the' person men of the 43d Infantry Division ferried nel; but not their Bofors guns because poor. across the river that night, but the next weather ruled out the use of gliders, of the day the XXX Corps made the decision to 2d Light Antiaircraft Battery. Au the withdraw the 1st Airborne Division. At planes landed, unloaded, picked up Ameri first, it was hoped that the 43d Infantry can glide~ pilots to be evacuated, a~d took Division might be able to establish a new off in just 3 hours and 50 minutes. Guid bridgehead east of Renkum, but finally ing on a pathfinder team flown in the pre even that had to be given up. That night, ceding day, all aircraft arrived safely. The .25-26 September, the survivors of the Brit next day, a column of 125 trucks of the ish 1st Airborne Division, together with Royal Air Force 83d Group (Tactical Air Poles and British infantrymen who had . Force) drove up to the field. Apparently, only recently joined them, withdrew to the the 83d Group seemed to be under the im south bank of the Lower Rhine (a few re pression that'they had marked and pre turned the next night). pared it for their own use. Just as AFDAG The air phase of Operation Market had prepared to receive much-needed ammuni about ended. Some plans had been made to tion and supplies, higher headquarters de use fighter bombers to resupply the Brit cided to use the airfield as a fighter base ish 1st Airborne Division. Believing that because of the noticeable strengthening of the speed, maneuverability, and fire power the Luftwaffe in the area. Now, without of the fighter bombers, together with their any visit or communication with the Brit ability to drop accurately o~ a small dr?p ish I (Airborne) Corps, the 83d Group zone, would make an effective means for suddenly arrived to take over the field. emergency supply, air officers arranged to Under the circumstances, the 878th Air have Typhoons and Mosquitos drop s~p borne Engineer Battalion (Aviation) and plies in belly tanks released from bomb the guns of the 2d Light Antiaircraft Bat racks on D plus 8 and 9. However, suip tery were not brought in; AFDAG was re plies could not be packed in available con moved from the field and dispersed within tainers before the division had been wi~h the Second Army to. pt::rform ordinary drawn. ground duties. I On D plus 4, intelligence reported I a Extrication German airfield, not previously noted, ,in On conclusion of tlie airborne phase of a big bend of the old Maas River bed wfst the operation, the inevitable struggle to of Grave. It was found to be an excellent extricate the airborne divisions from con grass field, but with no markings and p()or tinuing ground action developed. What re road access (the Germans had not used it mained of the British 1st Airborne Divi as an operational field). ' , sion left Nijmegen for England on 28 Sep Immediately, the British I (Airborne) tember, and those of Polish 1st Parachute Corps asked permission of Second Arlny Brigade returned on 7 October. Some 2 to use the airfield to bring in the Uni~ed. days later, Headquarters, British I (Air States 878th Airborne Engineer Battallion borne) Corps moved back to England. (/1.viation)·, the British Airborne Forw~rd However, the 101st and 82d Airborne Di Delivery Airfield Group (AFDAG), and visions-whose early evacuation had been the British 2d Light Antiaircraft Battery, anticipated in plans and orders-were left to be followed by supplies and possibly ~he behind for several weeks more of inten 5~d (Lowland) Division (Airportabie). sive combat. Ou D plus 9 (26 September), 209 C.;t.78 It had become an accepted principle 20 MILITARY REVIEW' SEPTEMBER 19&2 '
,that airqorne troops, because of their spe CONCLUSIONS , cIal training and equipment and the diffi In many ways, Operation Market was a culty of replacing casualties, should be re remarkable and spectacular success. The lieved irom ordinary ground operations nearness which it, came to complete and as quickly as possible. Furthermore, such unqualified success made all the more dis continued employment prevented the prep appointing the failure of the.,ground forces aration of further airborne operations in to'link up with the British 1st Airborne the immediate future in which they might Division at Arnhem. The appraisal of the be needed. At the same time, it could not operation by the First Allied Airborne be expected that a ground commander Army was as follows: would release airborne divisions until the ~The airborne troops accomplished what was ex tactical situation permitted it, or until they pected of them. It was the breakdown of the Sec. could be replaced. Repeatedly, General ond A rroy's timetable on the first day-their failure Brereton asked that the American air to reach Eindhoven in 6 to 8 hours as planned-that caused the delay in the taking of the Nijmegen borne divisions be relieved. SHAEF bridge and the failure at Arnhem. agreed 'that it should be done as soon as The airborne operations proceeded not only ac possible; Montgomery held that the sit cording to plan but with much ]ess loss than ex uation would not yet permit it. The divi pected. Daylight airborne operations over enemy territory heavily defended by flak have been con sions were not relieved until November. sidered €}.cessiveIy hazardous. "Market" has proved On relief by the II Canadian Corps, 11-13 this view erron('ou~. The great dividends in accu November, the 82d Airborne Division ra{'y of dl·op and landing and in quick assembly of moved to Sissone, near Reims. Relieved troop:-:, which may be had from daylight operations were enjoyed to the full. Three factors are chiefly by the British 51st Division on 25-27 No responsible: (1) Strong supporting air forces were vember, the 101st Airborne Division available and were skillfully employed to knock out moved to Mourmelon-Ie-Grand, also in the fiak. positions in advance. to beat flak dow~ during' the airborne operation8 themselves, and to protect Reims area. the troop carriers from hostile aircraft; (2) Excel. STATISTICS lent staff work so organizeu the movement of troop carriers, their protection by the supporting air Operation 1I1m'ket was an airborne op forces. and the drop and landing of troops as to 'eration ,of unprecedented magnitude. A achieve the maximum of s.urprise; and (3) Thorough total of 34,876 troops had gone into the training of both troop carrier and airborne p£>f battle by air-20,1!)0 by parachute, 13,781 sonnel produced almo5t perfect accuracy in the drops and landings. Weapons were rapidly retrie\'eu by glider, and 905 by airplane on a pre and units Quickly formed up for the accomplishment pared landing strip. In addition, airplanes of their initial missions. and gliders had carried more than 5,200 From D plus 2 until D plus 6. weather seriously tons of supplies, including 568 artillery hampered res.upply and reinforcement Etfforts. yet ~ on the who'le they too were accurately effected. It is pieces and 1,927 vehicles. true that highel" rates of loss were suffered in the:-.e Total casualties among the airborne succeeding days, but this must be, and was, expected troops through D plus 30 (including in view of increasing enemy resistance. killed, wounded, and missing) were re Actually, to what extent the "break ported as follows: British 1st Airborne down of the Second Army's timetable on Division, 6,986'; Polish 1st Parachute the first day-their failure to reach Eind Brigade, 383; United States 82d Airborne hoven in 6 to 8 hours as planned" was re Division, 2,909; and United States 101st sponsible for the failure to reach Arn Airborne Division, 2,938. In addition, air hem, and to what extent it was due to men of the IX Troop Carrier Command conditions which the airborne divisions _suffe~ed 454 casualties and those of the might have altered, is problematical. If Royal Air Force 38th and 46th Groups, the Second Army would have reached Eind 294, hoven in 6 to 8 hours, that is by 2200 21 on D-day, troops of the lOlst Airborne rival of the 4th Parachute Brigade from Division would not yet have arrived there morning till 'afternoon on D plus 1; (3) to Ij'Ieet them. At that hour, the 506th the German II SS Panzer Corps had not Parachute Infantry Regiment still 'fas happened to 'be refitting near Amhem. or crossing the Wilhelmina Canal at Zon.1 It at least if allied intelligence had been also had been anticipated (in General Tay aware of its location; (4) communica 100:'S letter to General Dempsey) that tions had been adequate with the British troops of the lOlst Airborne Division 1st Airborne Division so that the British would reac-h Eindhoven within about 5 I (Airborne) Corps and First Allied Air hours after landing. Moreover, all the borne Army might have been aware sooner bridges at Zon had been blown before of the seriousness of the situation at Arn paratroopers could seize them, and the hem; (5) it had been possible to deliver wait for engineers to build a bridge wopld the entire airborne strength of the three have occurred anyway. divisions in n'bt more'than two lifts in When the Guards Armoured Division stead of over such a long period of time; did reach Nijmegen, on D plus 2, the ~2d and (6) American glider pilots had been Airborne Division had not completed :its organized and trained to make a more ef assigned task of seizing the bridge. Not fective contribution to the ground combat. until late the next day wel·e tanks able to cross the bddge. Weather Therefore, while it is conceivable that The arrival of the Polish 1st Parachute the operation might have been a complete Brigade on D plus 2 at the drop zone orig success if the British Second Army copld inally intended near the south end of have moved more quickly, it is also con the Arnhem bridge, at the time when Brit ceivable that the ground army could have ish troops still were firmly entrenched at moved rapidly enough to complete the the north end, could have been decisive. jUllction at Arnhem in time if the airborne The 325th Glider Infantry Regiment divisions had been able to capture Eind might have provided just the extra hoven more quickly, had seized the bridge strength which the 82d Airborne Division at Zon intact, and had seized the bridge needed to seize the Nijmegen bridge while at Nijmegen before the armored spear defending itself against attacks from the heads approached. south and east. Had the British XXX Corps been able to speed across that Contributing Factors bridge as soon as it arrived, it might yet :lIany factors contributed to the out have reached the Lower Rhine in time to come of Operation Mal·ket-Garden. i A relieve the 1st Airborne Division. Or even change in anyone of them might h*ve the arrival of the 4th Parachute Brigade brought a quite different result. The 9P a few hours earlier, as scheduled, ori D eration might have been completely SUc plus 1 might have been enough for the cessful if good fortune or insight could 1st Airborne Division to consolidate in have changed anyone of a series of c9n a strong position before the German troops ditions whjch happened to prevail. The had had time to build up such strong O(ltcome might have been completely s/lc counterattacks. All these things depended cpqsful if: (1) The weather had permitted upon the weather, and good weather failed the Polish· 1st Parachute Brigade and the to continue. Yet, an airborne operation 325th Glider Infantry Regiment to Ibe hardly could be -planned on, the assump dropped and landed on D plus 2 as plannfd; tion that the weather-a condition far (2) the weather had not delayed the p.r more critical for airborne than for ordi ·22 MILITARY REVIEW SEPTEMBER 1952 nary ground operations-would be more Airborne Division to move westward to favorable than us.ual for that region at the area of Renkum when such a move that time of year. Weather was poor, but ment was yet possible; in that area a good it was no worse than could have been ex bridgehead might have been held until the pected: While the v:reather encountered XXX Corps could cross relatively unop . could not be termed ideal, it would be posed. After the operation the First Allied termed "above average" in favor of the Airborne Army gave a great .deal of at operation for this time of year. tention to the correction of communica tion inadequacies. German Armor That the German II SS Panzer Corps Piecemeal Commitment was refitting near Arnhem was a fortui I From the moment that the airborne tous circumstance. It was the kind of con forces landed, they faced three conflicting dition which might be encountered in any tasks: the accomplishment of their as airborne operation. Actually, intelligence signed missions-a task which became pro had noted that armored divisions might be gressively more difficult as the enemy re refitting in the area of the Reichswald, but covered from his initial surprise; the that seemed to have little direct influence continued protection of drop and landing on planning. It is doubtful that a similar zones as long as additional air lifts were notation for the Arnhem area would have to come; and the blocking or fending off lp.ade a great deal of difference either, of enemy reserves moving up to interfere although precise information might have with the mission. All this suggests that brought some effective tactical air strikes. airborne troops should be used in mass and The possibility of armored counterattack the rate of their build-up must be rapid. always was of the greatest concern for If all the allied airborne troops used in ~ an airborne division. the invasion of Holland could have been Communications committed on the first 2 days, the final outcome might have been different. A One of the greatest failings in the op much greater initial force, or very rapid eration was that of communications. The reinforcement, might have made possible British I (Airborne) Corps was not aware of the seriousness of the situation of the complete and permanent control of the 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem until Arnhem bridge as well as earlier seizure 48 hours too late. In response to an offer of the Nijmegen bridge. by the commander of the 52d (Lowland) A German analysis concluded that the Division (Airportable) to send a force in allies' chief mistake was in failing to gliders to aid the 1st Airborne Division, land the entire 1st Airborne Division at General Browning had sent (on D plus 5) once rather than over an extended .period, the following message: "Thanks for your and in not landing another airborne divi message, but offer not-repeat not-re sion (perhaps the United States 17th Air quired as situation better than you think. borne Division, known to be in the United We want lifts as already planned includ Kingdom) in' the area west of Arnhem. ing P,Qles. Second Army definitely re Given the dispositions of troops, the First quires your party and intend to fly you 1 Allied Airborne Army did not have at in to Deelen airfield as soon as situation its disposal enough aircraft to carry the allows." If communications had been ade-' airborne divisions in greater mass than it quate, the British I (Airborne) Corps did. Aside from acquiring more aircraft, might have arranged to accept that offer, another possibility might have saved the or it might have issued orders to the 1st situation: the basing of at least a siza THE AIR INVASION OF HOLLA:tW 23' blepart of the troop carrier and airborne the Reichswald front. This might have re-' forces on the Continent. If the operation, leased parachute troops there for an at at least in good part, could have been tack on the Nijmegen bridge. Such an at mounted from airfields in Belgium and tack conceivably could have resulted in the northern France, it might have been possi earlier capture of the bridge and the re ble to fly two lifts on a single day instead lief of the British 1st Airborne Division of one, double glider tows might have been at Arnhem. The British I (Airborne) used for the shorter distance, and much of Corps considered the British system the bad weather-that which interfered under which glider pilots were assigned to with operations over England but not over the Army rather than the Air Force, and the Continent-might have been avoided. were organized into the equivalent of bat Tactical air forces, however, occupied all talions, companies, and platoon, and the suitable airfields. The question of pro trained to fight as infantry-was far su viding adequate troop carrier bases on the perior to the ,American. It reported that Continent was one which would have had the stand made by the 1st Airborne Divi to be anticipated in strategic planning sion, and its subsequent withdrawal across long in advance of operations. (The state the Lower Rhine, would have been impos ment of policy which the Combined Chiefs sible without the assistance given by the of Staff had issued in February 1944 had organization and training of the 1,200 emphasized that airborne troops should be glider pilots. The commanders of both the kept well forward.) It was another case 82d and the 101st Airborne Divisions.ex when tactical air forces took priority over pressed a need for better organization and troop carriers to the exclusion of the lat control of glider pilots after landing. It ter, when closer planning might have pro was a problem which had been anticipated vided adequately for both. in maneuver, it had appeared in operations in Sicily, Italy, and Normandy, and, after Other Problems repeated recommendations for improving Another closely related consideration the situation, the problem was as evident was that if the British airborne troops as ,ever in Holland. General Gavin de had dropped on zones much closer to 'their scribed it in this way: objective, they might have seized the ••• One thing in most urgent need of <"Qrt"ection bridges and prepared to hold it before the is the method of handling our glider pilots. I do not Germans had a chance to move against believe there is anyone in the combat area more them. eager and anxious to do the correct thing and yet so completely, individually and col1ectivelYI inca.. Another German studyVsuggested that pable of doing it than our glider pilots. if the airborne operation had been timed , Despite their individual willingness to help, I to take place well after the armored at feel that they were definitely a liability to me. Many of them arrived without blankets, some without ra!.. tack on the ground had gained momentum, tions and water, and a few improperly armed and the results might have been decisive, for equipped. They lacked organization of their· own then no German reserves would have been because of, they stated, frequent transfer from one left to turn against the airborne troops. Troop Carrier Command unit to another. Despite the instructions that were issued to them to move via The Glider Pilot Problem command channels to division headquarters. they frequently became involved in small unit actions to If tqe gIlder pilots available to the 82d the extent that satisfied their passing curiosity, or Airborne Division on D plus 1 had been simply left to visit nearby towns. In an airborne 0; ganized and trained to participate ef operation, where, if properly planDed, the first few fectively in -ground combat, those pilots hours are the quietest" this ean be very harmful, since all units tend to los~ control because ot t1)e might have been assigned a def€lnsive sec many people wandering about aimlessly. impropeP'itJ. tvr for the time being on D plus '1 along equipped, out of unifol'Dl, and without individual or. 24 MILITARY REVIEW SEPTEMBER 195Z.
~'unit responsIbilities. When the enemy reaction the bridges before allied paratroops could builds up} and his attack increases in violence and. reach them; (5) the weather had been inteIjsity, the necessity for every man to be on the job at the right place, doing his assigned task. is even worse; (6) more reserves, especially imperative. At this time glider pilots without unit in armor, had been available to the enemy; assignment and improperly· trained, aimlessly wan and (7) the British XXX Corps had failed dering about. cause confusion and generally get in to link up as soon as it did. The airborne the way and have· to be taken care of. In this division. glider pilots were used to control commanders pointed out that this had been traffic, to recover supplies from the landing zones, a "marginal performance," and they ex guard prisoners. and finally were assigned a defen pressed the fear that their very success sive role with one of the regiments at a time when might lead in the future to commitment in they were badly needed. I feel very keenly that the glider pilot problem at less favorable circumstances and the sacri the moment is one of our greatest unsolved prob flce of their divisions in an effort beyond lems. 1 believe now that they should be assigned to their capabilities. airborne units~ take training with the units. and have a certain number of hours allocated periodieal1y Resupply for flight training. The problem of resupplying the troops General Ridgway, commander of the by air had not yet been solved satisfac XVIII (Airborne) Corps did not go along torily in Operation Market. The airborne with the proposal to place glider pilots commanders were agreed that resupply by under the command of division command parachute should be regarded only as an e.rs for full-time ground training. British emergency expedient. The scattered dl'ops practice to the contrary notwithstanding, meant that the fighting strength of the glider pilots, General Ridgway thought, division had to be weakened to provide were where they belonged: in the troop recovery details, and many bundles were carrier squadrons. They could receive lost. Gliders, when they could get in, were, whatever ground training they needed of course, much more reliable, but the use with their associated airborne division. of one-way gliders, each requiring a pilot, This apparently was no change from the was an expensive means. policy which had created the problems Supposedly, the "approved solution" was which were of so much concern to the air to prepare a forward delivery airfield borne division commanders. whe,"e supplies could be landed by air plane. However; that procedure would de Circumstances pend upon the situation-how long it was While it may be true that a change in expected that airborne troops would need only one of a number of unfortunate con resupply by air, and whether enough troops ditions might have resulted in success for were at hand to clear and defend a for the entire operation. doubtless it is also ward airfield. In this operation, one field true that less fortunate circumstances had been put to use briefly, but then a anyone of several-might have spelled conflict had developed with the tactical air complete disaste~. Success might have forces. The British I (Airborne) Corps been much less if: (1) the enemy, instead presented the airborne point of view: of being disorganized as the result of long "There is no doubt that this conflict is and rapid retreats, had been in well-or inevitable and changing conditions during ganized positions with command and con the battle (in this case the strengthening trol completely re-established; (2) the en of the Luftwaffe in the area) may upset emy air force had been able to come out prearranged priorities. Lt is not agreed, in greater force; (3) the civilian popula however, that priority for all airfields tion had been hostile instead of actively everywhere must go to the tactical air . helpful; (4) German troops had blown all forces on all occasions." ~::<-. TBE AIR INV4SION OF HOLLA}fD 25
ln his report, the engineer officer con~ that ground forces must make contact eluded that one or more airfields should with airborne troops within 3 days. From:. be among the primary objectives in any this the German Army Group B drew the airborne operation, and that an airfield conclusion that far-reaching airborne land 'should not be given a secondary priority ings in the future were unlikely. It.was after: bridges or towns, because the ai~ expected that the next airborne attacks field might be indispensable to the hold would be in conjunction with ground at ing of other objectives. Co-ordination, tacks or sea-borne landings. The German then, should be 'made effective on a high view was that the next airborne operation level. This generally had been the assump would not likely take place behind sections , tum in airborne maneuvers, though state of the West Wall remaining intact, be ments of doctrine had not made that pro cause the allies probably woul,d not think cedure mandatory. General Ridgway it possible for a ground attack to break thought that the generalization that land through there within 3 days. General ing strips should always be constructed Brereton wrote as follows: "[The enemy] was not justified. Better communication has the ability to reinforce any threatened might have improved the supply situation. area quickly. Therefore, it is vital that A troop carrier air control party with each the airborne thrust be joined with the division, equipped to communicate with ground thrust in a minimum of time to troop carrier headquarters and with the avoid undue losses. The armament of air planes, could have prevented some of the borne troops does not permit sustained drops into enemy territory. operations against a prolonged attack by heavy weapons and armored forces." Airborne Doctrine Operation Market unquestionably was The airborne commanders, after Opera the best-planned and the most skillfully tion Market, generally were agreed as to executed large-scale airborne operation the soundness of airborne doctrine as laid thus far. The experience of earlier opera down in War Department Training Circu tions played an important part in that lar No. 113. General Ridgway wrote: "I achievement, but it is not unlikely that cannot too strongly urge the study; the the existence of an over-all co-ordinating mastery, and the application, by all upon agency in the First Allied Airborne Army whom devolves any degree of responsibil helped in large measure to make it possi ity for the employment of airborne fotces, ble. This centralized control of all air of the principles enunciated in War iDe borne and troop carrier forces, together partment Training Circular No. 11$, 9 with the direction of all associated air October: 1943." I forces, was the culmination of a trend Probably the operation's greatest con • which had been developing since the Sicily operation. tribution was its demonstration of I the feasibility, and advantages, of a m~jor Faulty Organization airborne operation in daylight under the Faulty organization still seemed to be c0nditions then prevailing. However,! the evident in the airborne division. Both the l'1'sults seemed to cool some of the senti 82d and the 101st Airborne Divisions had ment which had been expressed from ~ime continued to depart from the published to time for a long-range strategic: en tables of organization and equipment in
vo;lopment and prolonged action from an < effecting a more practicable organization. il1
Colonel George C. Reinhardt, Corps of Engineers The Engineer Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia
The views expressed in this article ~euvers, not theory, should determine the are the author's and are not necessa1'nature and extent of all challges. ily those of the Department of the Success in atomic warfare calls for a Army or the Command and General careful analysis of the weapons' effects Staff College.-The Editor. upon armies operating in the field, and upon the installations and services sup A S LONG as fissionable material re porting them. It demands thorough indoc mained scarce, the ability of the strategic trination and training of our own forces, air force to deliver atomic bombs on key from general to private, so ·that these targets in the enemy heartland was the troops will be prepared to exploit to the central core of American war planning. maximum our use of the weapons, and, 'Now that this basic shortage is being over at the same time, to minimize the effects come, additional concepts for the employ of hostile atomic weapons used against ment of atomic weapons must be examined. them. The United States Army must learn to Before we attempt in the space of a handle these new weapons in both attack single article to outline the immense task and defense as well as to prepare to re involved in these simple statements, let us ceive hostile atomic blows. This prospect first consider the more general questions poses many new problems to commanders -What is the place, if any, of atomic and to troops. The swift technological weapons in tactical warfare? progress in new types of atomic weapons and missile delivery must not outpace the The Tale of Two Cities development of tactical doctrine and pro The destruction of two Japanese cities cedures for their employment. by the only,· two atom bombs delivered While we accept as fact that the advent, against an enemy has inevitably overem of atomic missiles to the battlefield phasized that particular method of em changes no principles of war nor funda ploying the world's most powerful weapon. mentals of tactics, we may reasonably ex A future major war may again witness pect that many applications of these prin the devastation of industrial centers by ciples and fundamentals will be subjected atom bombs, but it is highly improbable to different degrees of variation. Organi that such a war will be decided solely by zatidn, equipment, staff procedures, and similar attacks or that city bombing will the handling of units on the atomic battle comprise the predominant wartime use of field will differ from those of World War the new weapon. II just as the machine gun in World War A parallel exists in the history of ar , I profoundly affected the land warfare of tillery, long used in siege warfare to bat· that period. Thorough testing in field rna tel' down castle walls, before it developed NOTES ON THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF 'ATOMIC WEAPONS 29,
into an antipersonnel weapon. Even in the bombardier when "ground ze.ro" was I World" War II, artillery shattered cities the center of a populous city., ,which fanatic Nazis refused to surrender Since that [day, the family of atomic 'despite encirclement. Manifestly, it was weapons has progressed.. Commanders of sound to rely upon fire power to reduce the near future will have a choice of bombs the casualties that direct assault would and delivery means to reach varied types. have cost us. of targets with even greater destructive Broadly considered, that was the use power available in one package. The ac made of the atom'bomb in 1945. Japan curacy of the original means of delivery, was hopelessly encircled, with all chance the high-altitude heavy bomber, exceeds of victory gone. Yet, fanatic resistance the possibilities of 1945. In additio~, de to the scheduled invasion was certain. livery by fighter planes, by artillery shells, Hence, the bombing of Hiroshima and free rockets, and guided missiles is in cer Nagasaki. A beaten foe was jolted into tain prospect, although dates and detail, realizing the futility of further resistance. are guarded b1 security provisions. In both instances, if the means were No longer is the Strategic Air Command bloody, the actual loss of life was less than the sole military agency concerned with assault would have ehtailed. the olfensive use of atomic weapons. Past These considerations, sound as they are, is the time when only cities, industrial do' not constitute the complete case for the 'complexes, or large military installations selection of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as comprised the entire list of "suitable" initial targets. Had the first bombs been targets. It is now time to consider the ready a few short months earlier, might potentialities of atomic warfare upon ar not their targets have been Iwo Jima or mies, and their subordinate units, in the Okinawa? Would not the destruction of field. a concentrated defensive position with its Fire and Movement powerful garrison, determined to inflict The classic concept of "fire and move severe casualties upon our troops, have ment" for seeking the tactical decision on been preferable to wiping out two cities the battlefield began with the revolution which were of limited military importance ary armies of the French Republic and has in themselves? gone unchallenged since its exposition by Von Clausewitz. The effect obtainable by Atomic Fire Power maneuver dictated all battle plans for the Probably the strongest arguments fa decisive conflicts in a century of warfare. voring a metropolitan target lay in the The "fire plan" was devised to support the The Army's chief concern should be,the employment of, not merely de fense pgainst, atomic missiles, for this powerful weapon can become the bulwark of an active defense against numerically superior forces
ex isting technical difficulties of assuring movement to which it was suborJinated. a hit on any target smaller and less surely Hence, the common phrases, "base of fire," ddined' than a city. Bomb delivery from "support fires," and the like. Even those hdghts above 30,000 feet had grave limi terrific concentrations of fire that pre Ltions 7 years ago. There was little chance ceded the Normandy landings were essen of designation errors by intellfgence or of tially aids to, not instigators of, the ma mistaken identification of aiming point by neuver scheme. - .30 MILITARY REVIEW 'SEPTEMBER 1~52 The ,tremendo'us concentration of fire with atomic weapons involves all the 'dif power in a single package brought about ficulties connected with predicting results by atomic weapons suggests possible al of new and untried instruments of war terati9ns in this accepted idea. Cases may fare. For one thing, much essential fac arise in which the unusual potency of that 'tual data are still incomplete and in some "fire: power" itself governs the adoption of instances actually contradictory. For an a particular maneuver. A frontal assault, other, psychological reactions to the shock tempting as the most direct route to the effect of atomic weapons are unpredicta ble, but could, conceivably, be more cata strophic than the physical damage. Panic Ftnd mental confusion have won as many battles as bullets. New Units It should be reasonably assumed that all military forces will, in the near future, be adequately instructed in the capabilities of their atomic weapons. In addition, it is to be hoped that our troops will have ac quired a sound, unexaggerated knowledge of those weapons' threats to themselves, a knowledge which reduces radiation haz ards to their actual minor role. Yet, even with military education in atomic war fare, specially trained and equipped units DOUBLE ENVElOPMENT will be necessary. ('Pincer', 1-----, CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS New Staff Specialists New units will be required for assign enemy's vitals, but cast aside as a bloody ments connected with safeguarding and insanity with conventional weapons, may transporting atomic missiles as well as now become the cheapest route after their actual delivery against the enemy. atomic weapons open the way. The for Atomic staff specialists of two types, dif bidding concentration of men and guns ferentiated by both education and mis that bar our way may conceivably comprise sion, also will be needed. One staff group the most remune~ative atomic targets in will be technicians, scientifically trained, the'enemy's entire position. Instead of to advise the commander in the selection searching out the opponent's weakest of fuze settings, height of burst, bomb point to assault, the atomic missile power, and delivery methods with a view equipped army may deliberately shatter to accomplishillg the maximum effect upon his strongest element with their blasts and the target, or targets, of the commander's exploit that destruction by swift columns choice. The second type will be general of armor and following infantry. Weaker staff officers, specially trained in the tac elements of the hostile force then will fall tics of atomic warfare, to recognize and easy prey. select priorities among targets. Their task will be to advise the commander, as the ar Offense-Atomic Style tillery commander now advises regarding De~ising plans and procedures and mak conventional fire power, concerning the i.ng, preparations for attacking the enemy manner in which his atomic weapon8 NOTl!1S ON THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT .oF ATOMIC WEAPONS :h shouid be integrated into an operation to convent~onal means. "Ec~nomy of force," . ensure their maximum contribution to "surprise," and "the objective" (this last ward the over-all mission. properly the ·"destruction of the enemy's The tasks allocated to atomic weapons will to fight" instead of the often heard in the scheme of maneuver primarily will "destruction of the enemy") have all been be those which, either by their nature or served, and ably so. magnitude, cannot be performed effectively Divisional participation in long-range by conventional weapons. The limited target selection is unlikely. Still less prob numbers of atomic missiles, as well as the fact that each missile might influence the course of a battle as much as an entire division, mark target selection as a prob lem of vital importance. It is probable, therefore, that such authority will not be delegated lower than the level of the corps commander if, in fact, such discretion is not retained by the army commander. ~ '" ~- What Is a Target? -. -. • •• Before commanders are able to render a decision concerning a specific target, many preliminary steps must be completed by numerous agencies and staff echelons. However, no selection can be better than PENETRATION TO EXPLOIT the intelligence provided the staff per TACTICAL ATOMIC MISSILES sonnel charged with this vital assessment. With the enemy's picture at hand, the FIGURE 2. process of choice" begins. In a particular situation, the staff adviser must .ask: able would be divisional authority to ex Should the atomic plan (as well as plans pend atomic missiles. Permanent (fixed) for other supporting weapons such as tac targets such" as defiles, fortified localities, tical aviation and naval gunfire) be guided communications junctions, and distant ones by the commander's existing scheme of such as reserve bivouacs and supply depots maneuver in order to afford the maximum will be selected or rejected by higher assistance to that plan? Or, might it be echelons before they become of tactical in better to hit the enemy at his strongest . terest to a division. Yet, there may be occa point, that is, where his troops were most sions when targets of the utmost impor heavily concentrated, rather than at a tance, which, because of their transitpry "weak" spot covered by fewer troops? nature, have escaped detection at higher Should the enemy risk a large number level, are discovered by division intelli of men and equipment in a relatively small gence agencies. It is, therefore, vital that a.ca, the casualties and destruction that all reconnaissance and intelligence ele ~ tomic. attack might wreak upon them ments of the division be educated to recog c..uld be sufficient to demoralize the sur nize potential atomic targets. No less im \ ivors, making them easy victims to swift, portant are prescribed rules, usually ~·,ploiting armored columns following up termed standing operating procedures tne atomic blasts. The lesser enemy con (SOPs), for the swift evaluation and re-' (','ntrations could then be dealt with by porting to next higher level of all infor 32 MILITARY REVIEW SEPTEMBER 1952 mation, (intelligence) which indicates tar dollars worth of A-bombs will kill more gets worthy of atomic attention. foes than 10, 20, or 100 times that sum invested in artillery shells or ordinary Terrain and Weather bombs." Or, in another form, "A-bombs Terrain and weath~r must be considered costing X millions can destroy many times in target selection. The major influence that value in supplies." Whether or not of weather on the effect of atomic missiles either of these is accurate remains an aca enhances the military value of reliable demic question to the combat commander. weather reports and forecasts. Fog, haze, He will use tactical atomic weapons be and rain redu£e the burn effect (ordinarily of their availability and effective the most powerful of the weapon's threats caus~ against personnel in the open). Rugged pess, not because of the dollar value of terrain, on the other hand, can limit all material destroyed compared with the cost of the missile. Perhaps our enemies have three of the atom bomb's lethal effects; blast, burn, and instantaneous radiation. an entirely different scale of costs from However, the hills or ridges must be high ours. The "value" of an ammunition de enough to "shadow" a locality against the pot to an army varies immeasurably ac slant line from the point of burst (nor cording to how many similar depots that mally considered as approximately 2,000 army may possess. And, finally, what is feet. above the ground). the "value" of human life on the battle field? No, we cannot use a doUar sign Blast effect of a bomb exploded over, or in, a terrain compartment is actually yardstick in selecting targets for atomic increased by "echoes" from the compart weapons! ment walls. This is not true of the burn The tendency to regard the tactical em effects. Radiation is "diffused" by colli ployment of atomic weapons in the same sion with the ground but not to an extent light as artillery preparation or counter, requiring consideration for field opera battery fire also is misleading, although tions. in a broad sense both functions may be Consideration of the S~tuation performed by the new weapons. Atomic Atomic mIssile targets must be selected stock piles are likely to be too limited, the after considering the existing tactical sit missiles too powerful for expenditure on uation, particularly the comparative "area targets." Except in instance of dire strengths of opposing forces; the avail emergency, authorized by proper author ability of atomic weapons to both forces; ity, atomic missiles will be delivered only and the missions of these forces. The low against accurately located targets, the im est order weapon available which will ac portance of which, in the specific situation, complish desired destruction always must have been carefully weighed. be used. Consequently, it is impossible to Therefore, the atomic missile will be ex state categorically, in advance, that a cer tremely difficult to deliver against targets tain number of troops, a concentration of of opportunity. The rapid pace of many so many tons of supplies, or a command of the campaigns in the last war caused post of a specified echelon are "profitable" numerous instances where front-line com targ~ts. manders located "opportunity" targets for No Dollar Economy long-range artillery or tactical aviation. Statements have appeared in the public Yet, because they failed to get both this press emphasizing the relative "dollar information and support requests through econqmy" of atomic weapons compared fast enough and with sufficient clarity, with conventional means of inflicting cas they failed to receive the assistance in ualties upon the enemy. "So many million time. The seesaw campaigns in Korea NOTES ON THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF ATOMIC WEAPONS. , 33, have doubtless developed comparable e~- ( not likely, eVen for preplanned missions, ,amples. that thil:\ can pe eut to the pare minimum Concentration customary w~th ordinary gunfire. Long The delivery of atomic missiles against range guided missiles may turn out to be ,an entrenched enemy prior to our assault Air Force weapons, complementing that is well within present staff capabilities. service's strategic bombbg mission, and as The principal risks involved will be hos such would be exceptions. In general, how tile atomic capabilities to make a shamble ever" guns, guided missiles, and rockets out of our assembly areas, if they are too appear to be Army weapons. Their tre concentrated, and if, again, the enemy can mendous power will require close control discover them in time. We will know with by senior commanders. Their complicated, reasonable accuracy enemy locations. Our highly technological logistic problems will front-line units, precisely ,plotted in opera necessitate special measures. Safeguard tions maps, can dig. in for protection, and ing the stock ,pile of missiles, guarding occupy their deep foxholes at the exact such missiles and maintaining secrecy dur moment. (We hope to time our blasts to ing transit from depots to firing positions, catch as many of the enemy in the open as and the safety precautions in handling possible.) them to prevent a premature explosion on On the defense, staff planning looms friendly territory all represent major new much more complicated, particularly in requirements in ground warfare. Battal case of a hostile penetration. Positions ions organized to fire these weapons will of friend and fo'e alike will be vaguely need both security and logistic support defined. Obviously, the atomic strikes can greatly in excess of that furnished today's not fall in such close proximity to our own artillery from the headquarters to which troops as artillery shells do. "Oppor they are assigned. tunity" targets will predominate although Such units will seldom be assigned to localities where hostile concentrations divisions or even receive fire missions might logically be anticipated should be from division commanders. Limi.tations of "zeroed-in" ahead of time. Our defensive range, however, may result in their oc maneuvers should particularly seek to com cupying positions within the rear limits of pact the enemy within those small areas. the divisional area. In order to be pre A third, and most unpleasant, prospect pared for this last possibility, division for atomic age staffs is the task of rede commanders and their staffs must be con ploying our reserves, rallying stricken versant with general procedures and tech ullits, fast enough to counter the assault niques of security, including deception almost certain to follow an enemy's atomic measures to conceal firing positions, as strikes. Logically, current maneuvers are . well as the logistic problems of weapons fi0id testing such problems and gaining and missiles. Obviously, they also must be PI actical experience in their solution. . completely informed as to the time and AI omic weapons, like every new tool of nature of all fire missions ordered by W:1r, must be thoroughly understood and higher authority, for these may affect the mastered before they are used in battle. security of their divisional area. 'Radirttion Hazard' Debunked Friendly troo.ps in deep foxholes, trained Presumably, Army possession of atomic to look away from the direction of the ex artillery, guided missiles, or free rockets plosion, will be safe a mile from ground will speed up the period between decision zero, for the "nominal" (20 KT)' bomb. a, to targets and the moment the missile This "safe" distance may be reduced by is actually "on the way." However, it is additional data being collected from tests
-"-'-'~ 34 MILITARY REVIEW such aS,the recent maneuvers in Nevada. Division plans for exploitation should em Tank crews protected by their armor ean. phasize the urgency of passing all obsta be closer. Equipment and supplies will be cles while the enemy is still shaken and in undamaged at distances permissable for capable of laying down effective fires. personnel. Defense Plus A-Bombs Fortunately for the quick follow-up, no radiation dangers exist for our troops General 'Omar Bradley recently said, who advance swiftly in the wake of an concerning the defense of Western Europe: atomic air-burst explosion. (After-explo "The atomic bomb will make a formidable sion conditions within several hun'dred defensive weapon" if the aggressor is com yards of ground zero for ground and under ~elIed by terrain and the efforts of ground ground bursts are not definitely known. troops to "channel his attack along the Even in these explosions, however, resid natural routes of march." ual radiation should be of brief duration By causing an aggressor army to change outside of the radius of the clearly dis its steam-roller tactics, the Western ar cernable crater lip.) mies' superiority in mobility and control can be made to payoff. In short, the atom Handicaps to prompt exploitation will bomb makes it possible to resist aggres be more frequent because of fires and sion with a relatively smaller number of debris from an explosion. Roads may be land forces. However, these units must blocked and thick, dry brush may be ablaze, consist of alert, highly trained fighting but ,in country open enough to normally men, equipped with the most effective permit troop movement, no serious obsta means of modern warfare. Such hard cles are foreseen. Plans should be made for hitting land forces, backed up by adequate rapid movement in complete disregard of naval and air support, can defeat in de the hitherto exaggerated "radiation haz tail what remains of the atomic-crippled ard." Contingency plans should' assure enemy. cross-country mobility in case roads are blocked or for engineer assistance to clear However, the tactical use of atomic weapons is not a cheap and easy solution blocks. of our immense security task. The United A possibility of atomic warfare is the States and its allies still need m~ny divi hostile use of mines, atomic or conven sions backed by strong tactical air power. tional, to bar an area where our advance The atom bomb in land campaigns can is anticipated. The effect of atomic explo make it unhealthy for an aggressor to' sions on buried mines, atomic or conven mass his forces, but it will not eliminate tional, is not definitely known. EVen if his armies. atomic explosions fail Ito destroy enemy Atomic missiles, like their comparatively mines, their delaying: effect upon our miniature counterparts conventional ar advance will be minimized by cutting chan tillery, are primarily offensive weapons in nels through mine fields while hostile cover contrast to mines, which are entirely de ing fire is absent because of our atomic at fensive. Yet, despite a given weapon's tac tack. tical dassification, it can often possess a This consideration applies with equal different strategic potential. Certainly force to an forms of obstacles which may . long-range bombers are strictly an offen be encountered in the advance, either nat sive striking force. Nevertheless, since the ural" or artificial. The adage that "an ob United States strategic air force will be . stacIe not covered by fire becomes only e~ployed only in retaliation against ag-. a n1isance" is truer than most aphorisms. gression, it at once becomes a prime NOTES ON THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF ATOMIC WEAPONS 35· weapon of American defense. The same is flank its deadly menace a:nd dispose of·its equally true of tactical atomic weapons crew with a .hand grenade or a sharp which now open startlingly new vistas for shooter's rifle. In brief, the ll}achine gun outnumbered defensive forces. must be guarded by enough tr~ops to pre The use of this weapon by defending vent flank or rear attack from infiltrating· armies might seem to involve .contradic individual foes against which it is helpless. tions. Concentrations, either of men or Thorough guarding raised the concentra material, are prerequisites to justifying tion of defenders to a point where attaek the dispatch of atomic missiles. Appar ers' artillery could take its toll and again ently, we must remain dispersed while open the path for flanking skirmishers. hitting a concentrated foe. Is that possi Even the "solid" front, from Switzer )
COUNTERATTACK WITH TACTICAL ATOMIC MISSILES FIGURE 3. AGAINST A MAJOR PENETRATION hIe? The immense striking power of the land to the Alps, was not impenetrable atomic weapons appears neutralized on to determined, infiltrating storm troops a battlefield where both contestants pos and yielded to the German new style as se,s it. The massing of force to achieve ,sault in March 1918. Months later, when d.,eisive victory exposes that force to the American armies plunged into the forests dp.,tructive effects of its opponents' atomic of the Meuse-Argoime, maneuver broke the missiles. Yet, dispersed troops cannot ap machine gun's absolute supremacy and ~ pj~, enough force to defeat the enemy. stored to skillful leadership the possibility The apparent contradiction is explained of wresting decisive victory. Advances by recalling the belated success of World could no longer be estimated mathemati Wal' I generalship in dealing with the ma cally beforehand; so wany hundreds of chine gun. :Against frontal attack by in casualties for so many yards forward. fantry, the machine gun had been almost War's principles, which were merely over~ impregnable. Dug into field fortifications, looked, not invalidated, were again ac it was hard to destroy by artillery. Yet, knowledged. Speed and skill of maneuver a Sergeant York could, single handed, combined with a superior intelligence serv SEPTEMBER 1952 ice would'seem the key to success in tacti those- imponderables adequately met, the cal atomic warfare. defending general has barely begun the estimate which leads him to his decision . . Renaissance of Generalship They will aid him in the succ~ssful dis Many writers concluded in the after position of his own troops: They will not math of World War II that, because of inform him as to the means by which the the increased mechanization of armies and enemy's superior strength can be reduced the immense logistic effort to support them, to a point at which a counterattack can be generals were only planners, not leaders. launched with hope of decisive victory. The general's role-so we were told-had This latter "uncertainty of battle," as Von become that of a corporation board chair (\:lausewitz expounded more than a century man. Had that conclusion even been true, ago, has not changed in nature. It has the advent of the tactical A-bomb on the only become more complicated when the battlefield would kill it. traps into which he would beguile his at Atomic warfare will tax generalship as tacker are no longer sunken roads, enfilad never before, by vastly enhancing the ing canister, or concealed cavalry to charge price paid for each faill!le or, conversely, an exposed flank. The traps are now sit holding out hitherto unbelievable rewards uations under which the defender may for "outgeneraling" the .enemy. The atomic loose atomic missiles with disastrous re age commander, whose army faces superior sults upon the unwary, if superior, num foes and must assume the defensive, has bers and equipment of his enemy. The the difficult task of disposing his troops classic example whereby Hannibal de so that their strength is great enough to stroyed a superior Roman army at Cannae force the attacker to mass if he would ad still typifil's the ultimate in tactical art. vance, yet held sufficiently dispersed to Only the nature of the enticement and the preclude fatal damage by the enemy's method of the kill will take on new forms, atomic missiles which will probably pre since the weapons with which the soldier cede his assault. fights have been altered beyond all com Maneuver is not apt to be again ignored prehension of Hannibal's swordmen. as it was in World War I or in medieval Calculated risks must be taken. That sieges. Were the establishment of "un term cannot be permitted to cloak igno broken fronts" possible with available rance of the real nature and extent of those manpower and material, modern conflict risks but should emulate the careful reck still offers the possibility of airborne or oning of a Lee at Culpepper detaching his sea-borne envelopments. And it will be "right arm" Jackson to Manassas Junction in the maneuver-normally on the most while he faced Pope's Yankee host with a extensive scale-accomplished by the gen fraction of the Confederate Army. ius of leadership which conceives it and Some portions of the atomic age battle the mobility (including discipline and commander's defending force must inevi training) which executes it that combat tably be more concentrated than would be ' between two atomically armed hosts may "safe" should atomic blows befall them. well ·find victory or defeat. Those portions must either be concealed, The next war's commanders will desper too mobile to be dangerously hit, or so ately need swift, accurate intelligencEl; deeply dug in that their concentration is from reliable estimates of enemy atomic reduced, in terms of atomic attack. The capabilities and intentions to spot recon "dispersion" cure-all for protection against naissance of hostile weapons which might the new weapons is meaningless until an deliver the missiles. However, even with alyzed and applied to a specific set of eon " " NOTJ':S ON THE TACTICAL" EMPLOYMENT OF ATOMIC WEApONS 37 I ,ditions. For example, direct a replace. seas if atomic bombing turns ports into " ment depot commander to "disperse" his death traps. , , ' . camp so that a nominal (20 J(T) bomb Conclusions cannot cause more than 2,000 casualties New, often startling,' aspects can be out of his 16,000 men. With World War discovered in every phase of operations 'II type construction, that requires a camp in atomic warfare. Yet, a few conclusions of 64 square miles minimum, 'a square 2 must already have become obvious. Atomic miles on a side for each 2,000 men. Such weapons are,now suited to battlefield use. an installation would be prohibitive to Commanders up front, as well as those "build, impractical to operate. Yet, if per far back, must deal with them, recognize sonnel were required to live in tent cov their potential power to help us snatch ered, deep foxholes, it could be safely re victory from superior numbers or to en duced to less than half size. Camouflage, compass our ruin. We must respect, but concealment, and "calculated risk" could not fear, the maw weapon. Possessing the permit further concentration. headstart in numbers and technological Engineers can build very few atomic development, we need only ensure that we bomb-proof installations. The next war's use them wisely, and protect ourselves logistics as well as its tactics must make against them soundly, not hysterically. adjustments to new weapons. To site an Atomic warfare is a challenge to both extreme example, overseas forces may American leadership and science, which, leave the Zone of Interior from beaches boldly met, will neutralize an aggressor's in addition to having to land outside of reliance upon reckless expenditure of lives established ports upon their arrival ,over to pound out victory in land warfare.
Let me emphasize that the major air arm of today is composed of tw~ elements-the atomic bomb and the airplanes to carry these atomic bombs. This atomic bomb is the greatest and most powerful weapon that man has ever had in his hands and th'e Soviets are quite alert to that fact. They have built up'their atomic c!lpability impressiVely, and this for all the prognostications of a few years ago that they lacked the scientific and engineering ability to do so. I believe that any complacent assump,tion that the Soviets are not capable of developing' atomic weapons-excelldnt in quality and in substantial num~ers-is a very dangerous assumptiqn indeed.
Secretary of the Air force Thomas K. Finl~tter r . . W.hat's the Score?
Colonel Buel T. Rose, Adjutant General's Corps Instructor, Command and General Staff College
. IT IS a basic characteristic of Americans the unit visited, in the final analysis, these to want to know the score. Newspapers visits were primarily for the purpose of play up the score in large black headlines getting news. The staff officer wanted the whether the contest be a baseball game or score, insofar as his particular staff activ an election. Radio and television sports ities were concerned, at the level of the announcers, recognizing the importance of unit visited. informing their audiences, repeat the score We make a mistake if we assume that over and over again during their broad the hunger for news is limited to en casts. In no segment of American life listed personnel. While it is true that does this hunger to know the facts reach our formal information program in the greater heights than in the armed forces. Army is aimed primarily at giving troops One has only to observe troops at mail information, the successful leader never call to get the full impact of the hunger of loses sight of the fact that it is of even troops for news from home. The hunger greater importance that he ensure that for information about the civilization in his staff and subordinate commanders are which we live, and the events which are kept informed. Unless this is done, the shaping our lives; a hunger which is not chances of the troops getting the word are born of military directives. remote. The hunger for news is just as great among the individuals at all levels of During World War II, the question most command and staff as it is among the in asked during the visit of staff officers and dividual members of a squad. commanders to either subordinate or higher headquarters was "What's the Historical Background score?" Of course the question was not The idea of a troop information program always phrased in this way, but it might is not new, although the formal program well have been, because the information we know today came into being dUring desired was actually, "What's the situa World War II. Great military leaders, tion in this war as you people know it at since the beginning of recorded time, have your level of command?" recognized the need to give their troops Personnel at the subordinate headquar the word. A part of their greatness may ters ,felt that the visitor should have in be attributed directly to the fact that they formation that they did not have access appealed to the minds and hearts of their to and personnel in higher headquarters men. Caesar deemed it wise, before cross wanted the news which had not as yet ing the Rubicon, to explain to his troops filtered up to them. While officially staff why ~e was defying the Senate's orders. visits' were usually for the purpose of su There are many instances recorded in hi!'-· ,nervision. co-ordination. or assistance to torY where soldiers who were well' in WHAT'S, THE SCORE? 39 'formed of the cause for which they were issues of the day. It is recorded that at fighting were able to defeat better trained, one such meeting he causedc the Declara more experienced, and numerically supe tion of Iz.tdepehdence to. 'be read ~o th~m. , rior forces. , The readmg was foIIO\¥~d by a dIScussIon Another First period during which all joined in talking Among the numerous firsts attributed over the grounds and reasons for the war. to George Washington must be included We also know that on Christmas Eve, the information program in the Am~rican 1776, he called his tattered, hungry army Army. Just as he is recorded in history together to hear a reading of the Crisis as the Father of His Country so, too, prior to crossing the Delaware and de must he be considered the father of the feating the well-fed, better-equipped Hes information program in the Army. Wash "ians at Trenton. General Eisel)hower fol ington realized the importance of keeping lowed Washington's example 168 years his army informed and he wrote many ar later when he talked to his troops and ticles for this purpose. In the trying winter gave them the ~core to date just prior to of 1776, he commissioned Thomas Paine, their undertaking the greatest amphibi author of Common Sense, to write a pam ous assault of all history, the landings in phlet which would "arouse the people." Normandy. As a result of this commission, Paine In July 1776, Washington prepared a wrote the Crisis which stirred our fore statement which was ordered read to the fathers with an honest zeal of patriotism soldiers of his entire army. One paragraph much as the series of films "Why We of this statement read: Fight" inspired American soldiers during The time is now near at hand which must pos World War II. Regardless of the impli sibly detennine whether Americans are to be fr-ee men or slaves; whether they are to have any cation raised by historians regarding property to caU their own; whether their houses Thomas Paine's political beliefs, there is and farms are to be pillaged and destroyed, and 'little doubt regarding the contributions they are consigned to a state of wretchedness from til the revolutionary cause by his writings which no human efforts will probably deliver them. for the information of the soldiers of ~ur A Recent Example Revolution Army. Indeed, he may be called On 15 January 1951, General Matthew the first troop information officer of the Ridgway. soon after taking command in American Army. The credit for realizing Korea, prepared a similar statement for the imperative need for informing his his troops. General Ridgway prepared his troops on subjects vital to our struggling statement ,because" J he had heard from In spite of the fad that facilities and top-/e"'t' support have been provided for the information program, the success of the program will be determined by the support given by operating level commanders
y,nng Nation must, however, be given to several sources, chiefly from members of G,'neral Washington. His information pro combat units, the questions, "Why are we gl',lm played an important part in building here?" "What are we fighting for!", thl' ,kind of morale in his ragged army "What is the score?" General Ridgway Which enabled it to win against great odds. gave his troops the score in the following IVe know that Washington often called message: his men together to discuss the important The real issues are whether or not the power 40 MILITARY REVIEW $EPTEMBER 1952
of Westep' civilization, as God has pennitted it to General Andrew Jackson < initiated a flower in our own beloved lands,' shall defy and series of "Division Orders" just prior t; defeat communism; whether rule of men who shoot their prisoners, enslave their citizen8~ and deride the War of 1812. The purpose of these the dignity of man shall displace the rule of those orders was, just as in Washington's day to whom the individual and his individual rights and later in General Ridgway's d,1ty, to ~re sacred; whether we are to survive with God's inform his soldiers why they, as individ hand to guide and lead us, or perish in the dead existence of a Godless world. uals, had been called upon to fight and to If these be true, and to me they are, beyond any explain what they were fighting for. Jack possibility of challenge. then this has long since son's astounding victory at New Orleans ceased to be a fight for freedom for our Korean was proof of the importance of giving allies alone, and for their national survival. It has become. and it continues to be, a fight for our' pghting men the basic issues of the con own freedom, for our own survival, in an honora,ble. flict in which they were engaged. independent, national existence. • • • • • During the Civil War great leaders on In the final analysis. the issne now joined right Doth the Union and Confederate sides used here in Korea is whether communism or individual troop information to raise morale and to freedom shall prevail, and make no mistake. whether inspire their troops to fight for their cause. the next flight of fear-driven people we have just witnessed across the Han River and continue to From the foregoing, it is readily ap witness in other areas, shall be checked and de parent that, although procedures, methods, feated overseas, or permitted, step by step. to close and techniques of troop information have in on our own homelands, and at some future changed, it is today, as yesterday, a basic time, however distant, to engulf our own loved ones in all its misery and despair. tool which a commander uses to give his * * * troops the score. I would like each commander to whom this is addressed, in his own chosen ways of leadership. A Formal Program to convey the substance of the message to every single member of his command and at the earliest Although the general concepts of troop practicable moment. information are as old as the Army it General Ridgway was saying exactly the self, it was not until World War II that same thing to his troops that General troop information came into its own and a Washington had said to his troops in 1776. formal Army-wide troop information pro I cite this example to show that men's gram was instituted. As we have pointed desire to know the score has not changed out before, great commanders through since the beginning of our Nation and the ages have informed their troops re that successful leaders, now as then, give garding the cause for which they were their troops the score. fighting. Many of our commanders in In General Ridgway's phrase "in his World War II had their own troop infor own chosen ways of leadership" two things mation program long before they were are important; first is the recognition ordered to establish one. They recognized that giving the troops the score is a mat the importance of that bond between a ter of leadership at all echelons of com commander and his men which is created mand, and, second, that the how the mes through a mutual understanding of the sage was to reach each soldier was left why behind their actions. to subordinate commanders. It will be The formal program was initiated be pointed out later that tHe near failure cause some commanders had failed to of our Army information program during orient.their troops properly and their fai1~ the post-World War II period which re ure had resulted in low morale. The much sulted, in part at least, from our failure to publicized OHIO (Over the Hill in Octo leave the how of troop information to ber) episodes of the 1940 maneuvers were
< < subordinate.commanders. excellent examples of the results of failure WHAT'S THE SCOREZ
,,'to inform troops properly of the why. Our ward centralization in Washington, much top commanders rea,lized that if high of the initiative concerning the informa-' , morale on the part of the Army as a whole tion 'Program 'was taken from local com was to be attained and maintained, neces manders. Armed Forces Talks prepared sary action must be taken to ensure that at Department of Def!lnse level were re Army personnel were well informed. The quired topics for discussion during three formal information program was inaugu of the four troop information hours re rated to ensure Army-wide application of quired each month. Many of these re the knowledge that the morale of troops quired discussion topics were duIl, dry, who know the score is always higher than and uninteresting to the soldier. Gener that of troops who lack proper orienta ally, they were written in language far tion. General J. Lawton Collins, after he above the educational level of the soldiers became Chief of Staff of the Army, stated for whom they were intended'. In their the reason for an Army-wide informa zeal to create a utopia in which each sol tion program in these words: dier would be well versed in national and Discipline in the Army today cannot be founded international affairs, government, history, on the ancient shibboleth of "Their's not to reason economics, and geopolitics, the planners why. their's but to do and die." American soldiers particularly must know the reason why a.nd must lost sight of the basic purpose of troop be convinced of the importance of their individual information. The purpose remained that t{tsks in the operation of a. unit. Hence. the im of giving the troops the score; the score portance of the' individual is paramount, and re of the game of which they were a part. spect for the rights of the individual is the keynote of American discipline and American leadership. Elaborate materials were prepared and reams of directives were written, explain A Beginning ing in detail just exactly what was to be Much credit for the formal information done and how it was to be accomplished, program, however, should go to Mr. Ar however, nothing happened at the· troop thur H. Sulzberger, publisher of The New level. York Times. Mr. Sulzberger, as a result The Problem of a survey made of soldier morale in the The overworked company commander summer of 1941, recommended to President was inclined to throw up his hands in dis Roosevelt that an information service for gust at the volume of material and direc military personnel be instituted at once. tives which he was expected to use or im This recommendation was instrumental in plement. As a result, the whole matter was the initiation of the troop orientation pro usually turned over to a sergeant. Com gram which became the information pro pany commanders did not feel that this gram in 1943. From 1943 until the post was their troop information program. WitI' reorganization of the Army in 1946, ,They felt rather that it was a Depart the information program was under the ment of Defense program. jl,l'isdiction of the Director of Personnel In 1947, a lieutenant colonel compl,et of the Army Service Forces. With the ing a tour of duty in European Command pf,,~twar reorganization, Troop Informa headquarters, as a staff officer in the Of tivl1 and Education was made a separate fice of the Theater Chief of Information 'division under the Chief of Information and Education, had this to say in his final at the Department of the Army level report. \, ),ere it has remained. In general. the program gets little command Centralization support. and the majority of the soldiers dislike or .are bored with it. . . . The mandatory l ..hour.. With the establishment of the Depart per..week requirement is a source of harassment , l1i"nt of Defense and the postwar trend to to units concerned. I have found most regular " --~
MILITARY REVIEW
officers. though agreeing in theory that the pro~ All Evaluatioll gram is IQ good idea, do not consider the Pfogram " practical, and in many eases necessary. . . . I In September 1950, G.eneral Collins, the have found that in most troop information pro~ Army Chief of Staff, requested Lieutenant . grams I have witnessed ~t would have been better General Clarence R. Huebner to undertake had it' not heen held. one final mission prior to his retirement Our postwar information program was from the Army; a survey of the informa characterized in general by great plans, tion and education program. high ideals, much material, many direc General Collins, in his directive to Gen tives, and highly centralized control at the eral Huebner, stated his concept of what higher echelons of command which were the information and education program met by complete indifference and, in some :should be. He·said: cases, downright antagonism at the lower With respeet to the information and education echelons. program, out" goal should be to assure an officer Tile Need Restated and enlisted corps interested in." and reasonably well informed on, current world affairs including The report to the President on "Infor the ideals and aims of our country. Furthermore, mation and Education in the Armed I feel that we must offer the younger men in the Forces" by the President's Committee on serviee an opportunity to complete and broaden Religion and Welfare in the Armed Forces, their education. Such programs, however. should not become an undue burden to our various com.. better known as the Weil Committee Re mandel'S. port, dated 1 December 1949, threw the General Huebner was ideal for this as 'spotlight on the Army information pro signment as he had done much to remedy gram. The committee stated the need for the chaotic condition of information and an information program simply and effec education program in the European Com tively as follows: mand which we have pointed out earlier. We are convinced that an information and edu~ cation program for membprs of the armE'd forces In attacking this problem, General Hueb i.. e.ss<:>ntiaJ to the welfare of our arllled forces and ner was not content to sit in Washington to the national security. It is clear that such a and examine staff studies and staff reports program is vital to the development of civilian from the field. He went to the field. He confidence in, and support of, the armed forces. In addition, the preponderance of testimony from asked commanders at the operating level our great combat leaders holds that an information the old, old question-"What's the score?" and e'ducation program is essential to the develop Commanders gave him the score as he ment of proper battle discipline. visited all armies in the Zone of Interior. The report. in substance, endorsed and He also" visited and held numerous con commended the Army's information pro ferences with officers at Headquarters, gram. It did point out specifically. how Army Field Forces; Office, Inspector Gen ever, that the main handicap was lack of eral of the Army; and Office of the Army command support, particularly at the op Chief of Information. The following perti erating levels. nent extracts of General Huebner's find Of the 24 recommendations made by the ings concerning troop information and ed committee, 3 dealt with the problem of ucation, as contained in his report to Gen ensuring command support at operating eral Collins, highlight the defects of the levels for the information program. Army's postwar program: Whil~ the Wei! Committee Report caused Present directives issued by the Department of the Army to examine and evaluate its in the Army are clear and complete. However. they formation program critically, it was al are very restrictive as to subject matter and schl?d most a year later that the Army informa uling of the troop information hour. The two programs have 'been seriously handicapped by lack tion' program received a thorough investi of funds, qualified personnel and failure of com gation by one of its own generals. manders to assume responsibility. Only recently WHAT'S 'rUE SCORE? haV'!! adequate staffs been organized in the six th~ Army. At the present' time,' tht 'prb armies in the United States. • • • Material issued gram is more flexible, and the responsi by the Armed Forces Information and Education Division is written at B level tOo high for the aver· bility fQr troop infor'mation rests squarely age enli$ted man, is inappropriate in many cases, on the shoulders of commanders at all lacks -training aids, and has a poor f~rm.at. Too echelons. No longer is the responsibility much material is supplied by that diviBion~ thus leaving insufficient time for presentation of essen-' centralized at the Department of the Army tia! information by the Department of the Army level. and local commanders. . . . There is a failure on The old troop information hour is now the part of many officers, both senior and junior, to more accurately referred to as a command understand the objectives of the programs and the benefits to be derived from them. There is, in 'many conference. Normally 'one command con instances, animosity toward the programs, and a ference period will be held each week on ieeling has grown up tbat lumped with special duty time. Such conference periods consti services. the chaplain's hour, character guidance, tute a part of military trainillg and are career management, they are obstacles to training. Recent attacks on the program may indicate sub included in the training schedules. Com versive elements, as in 1945, are trying to destroy manders now are required to use only one our armed forces, and that some officers unwittingly Armed Forces Talk each month as discus assist in the objectives of those elements.... There is a failure on the part of commanders to recognize sion material for a command conference. that the troop information hour can be used ad.. This leaves three periods each month for vantageously to disseminate local . infonnation on the presentation of essential Army infor policies to the troops.... mation as well as information of local General Huebner's report contained interest to commanders and troops. The many more findings that indicated our materials prepared for the troop informa failure to achieve greater success in our tion program are now adjusted to the edu information program. However, those men cational level of the troops for which they tioned point out the greatest weaknesses of are intended. Now, adequate, appropriate, our postwar program. His findings were and timely materials are prepared to give not news to a great many officers in the the troops the information they desire. A rmy, but somehow very little had been Any animosity on the part of officers done to correct the weaknesses. Too many toward- the program which exists today officers who could have done something undoubtedly results from the inflexibility about it apparently thought someone' else of the directives for the old postwar pro should take the necessary corrective ac gram. It is difficult to understand how any officer would object to a program' which tion. Others who tried became enmeshed in provides his men with the facts necessary the red tape and inertia so often prevalent for a better understanding of their respon in high echelons. sibilities as soldiers and citizens. The greatly increased flexibility of the present Corrective Action • program should do much to eliminate hon Fortunately for the Army's information est, sincere objections to the program. III ogram, General Huebner's report, be ill"; made directly to the Chief of Staff, A Comparison \\ as not met with the resistance previously Activities in troop information today nHmtioned. Soon after his report was would startle the professional soldier of Bende, new Army Regulations on the sub an earlier day. But we must bear in mind j·,.:t of troop information and education that today we are dealing, for the most v,ere published. These regUlations imple pa:rt, with young drafted soldiers and that lHented most of the recommendations of the old professional soldier of the twenties Cpneral Huebner and provided a basis for and thirties has all but disappeared. a vitalized troop information program for An information program is not unique MILITARY REVIEW SEPTEMBER, 1952 to the United 'States Army. The British only if every commander recognizes it 8S a function Army has, for many years, had a highly of command" and shows continuing interest in it. successful information program in which Last year, Senator Lyndon Johnson, Chairman of the Senate Preparedness Sub discussion periods are led by officers. committee of the Armed Services, rendered The' French Army is now doing an ex a report on the results of his committee's cellent job of indoctrinating its recruits investigation of the troop informatioJ.l pro with patriotism and democratic principles. gram in the Army. This report clearly in As a result of this program a large num dicated that while some commanders were ber of former French Communists have still dragging their feet, the new, vitalized become loyal citizens of France after 6 program in the Army is, in general, ef months of basic training'. fectively giving the troops the score. The The. information program in the Soviet following are extracts from his report: Army is also effective. Some 4 hours or Good troop information programs contribute to more each week are devoted to Party line good morale. The American soldier, if indoctrinated indoctrination. Political officers are as with the uwhyH of his service. accepts his military signed to units including the battalion. responsibility with jnterest. courage. and devotion. Morale is generally good. Good troop informa~ These officers. serve not only as troop in tion programs have generally been effective in fQrmation and education officers, but also maintaining good morale; however, information as welfare and counterintelligence officers. programs could be improved at some installations. There appears to be little doubt from General of the Army Omar Bradley had our experiences in Korea that the Com this to say: For in this acid test between conflicting ideologies munist forces there have an efficient sys it is going to take a better citizen, and a stronger tem of orienting and indoctrinating their American. to meet the constant and continuing at troops. When soldiers will hold their po tacks on democratic ideals and institutions ... Dur sitions and fight to the last man rather ing the war it was apparent that men fought best than surrender or retreat, there can be when they understood why they were fighting. little doubt of the effectiveness of their Former Secretary of the Army Gordon indoctrination methods. Gray summed up the need for an informa tion program in the following statement: Many Latin American armies have also It is axiomatic by now that the American soIdlf'r. adopted information programs using much if y!u want to get the best results from him. mu~t of our material as the framework, for their kno why a thing needs to be done. Then he will own programs. do t better, faster, and more willingly than any soldier in the world. Baron von Steuben learnpd A Permanent Feature this when he came to this country to help our Revolutionary forces, and he described this unique Troop information is here to stay. It quality in a letter borne in which he wrote: "In the has proved its value. We have pointed out first place, the genius of this nation is not in the the indorsement of the program by the Wei! least to be compared with that of the Prussians, Austrians. or French. You say to your soldier, 'Do Committee and, later, by General Hueb this' and he doeth it; but I am obliged to say. 'Thi$ ner's report. General Collins has reiterated is the reason why you ought to do this,' and thC'n many times his belief that the program he does it. We try to tell our soldiers 'why' as WI"a is essential. In 11 recent personal let as what, when. where and how." ter to his army commander~, he stated: General Mark Clark expressed his feel I am particularly concerned that individual com ing concerning the importance of an in manders. from the highest levels to the squad leaders. formation program in this way: are thoroughly aware of the necessity of explaining I cannot emphasize too strongly the importan(e to their men the reasons for actions taken. The of keeping our soldiers fully informed concerning philosophy of "tell them why" is even more valid the necessity for their services in the Army, wh'll today·than in times past. We can succeed in having they fight, and why they must be sent to overseas a top-notch information and education program garrisons to perform essential occupation duties. A , I WHAT'S THE SCORE? sound troop information program will. of .course, of enlightened oplUlon, around which 1a-.: answer these inevitable questions before they are vorable attitudes toward the Army may' a.sked by the individual soldier. In addition, the program must instill in our soldiers a full apprecia be expe'cted to develop. Their influence tion of the blessings they enjoy by living under our upon public opinion, both while. they are democratic system, and of their responsibilities of in the Army and after they return to ci- citizenship to preserve these blessings tor this and future generations. . . . I am most anxious that I vilian life, can form the basis of a mutual you give the troop information and education pro , respect between the Army and the public grams your most careful attention to ensure that it serves. commanders at all echelons present these pro grams to their men with the maximum effectivenes::;. If the Army can return the drl!ofted cit izen-soldier of today to his civilian com We of the military must never lose munity tomorrow, not merely as a trained sight of the fact that individual members soldier, gut as a self-respecqng, mature of the Army have a great influence on pub citizen with a sincere appreciation of his lic opinion concerning the Army. If our obligations to preserve a democratic Amer soldiers believe in the Army, the public ica, the Army'most certainly will be sup will. ported by that civilian community and uni Summary versal military training or any other The .public is comprised of mothers, legislation necessary for the Army Ito ac fathers, and relatives of Army personnel, complish its ·mission as a member of the and the welfare of these soldiers is an I unified armed forces team will be forth important factor in determining the de coming witho'ut having the Army placed gree of support the Army will receive in a position of literally begging for the from their families. Clergymen, educators, means with which to do its job. and others who have a great deal to do We have the organization, material, and with molding public opinion will give their the ,!olid support of higher commanders' ~upport to the Army only if there are necessary for a successful information moral, ethical, and educational safeguards program, however, the success or failure in the training programs. The Army of our troop information program will be "graduates" many. thousands of men into determined by the amount of command eivilian life each year. The attitudes of , support which commanders at operating tilese ex-servicemen thus become a nucleus levels give the program.
Through our troop information and education programs, we have made our soldiers the best informed in the world. We feel that this is necessary since as citizens of our democracy, often in remote parts of the ,yor}d, they must have access to information to continue intelligently to discharge their resPQnsibilities as citizens. General J. Lawton Collins Future of Y·ugoslouio·· Under lito·
Colonel Sam J. Rasor, Infantry Instructor, Command and General Staff College
The views expressrd in this artigllther with those who wish to follow me." cle are the author's and are not necThus, the Chetnik movement was started. essarily those of the Department of Mihajlovic represented the Royal Gov the Army or the Command and Generernment inside Yugoslavia and wanted to al Staff Collegc.-The Editor. m~intain the authority and strength of that government. He was violently op THE first crack in the Iron Curtain was posed to communism. revealed by the open break between Tito Tito's Rise to Power and the Soviet Union. Pravda, an offi cial Soviet news organ, stated that Tito In 1941, following the German attack had joined the Imperialist camp. The on .Russia, an active Communist Party Soviets played upon the theme that Tito member, Josip Broz, better known as Tito. had become a tool in the hands of the made his way into Serbia and there began United States and England, who were to organize a partisan army to fight the struggling against the mighty democratic Germans who had invaded Yugoslavia. group and its guiding forces-the Soviet Tito established himself as head of this Union. The Soviet Government official partisan force, with Communist members forming the nucleus of the force. ly designated this camp as "the enemy of J'osip Broz adopted the Party name of . the Soviet Union." Tito, and, by his own admission, the nick When Mr. Edvard Kardelj, Yugoslavia's name gJes back to 1924 when he was doing Minister for Foreign Affairs, was asked illegal *ork in Yugoslavia after the Com if Yugoslavia's break with the Soviet munist .Party had been outlawed there. Union was not a little like David fighting Tito was born on 25 May 1892, the son of Goliath, he replied, "In history the a blacksmith, and was christened in the Davids have always won." Catholic Church. In 1915, Tito was drafted into the Austro-Hungarian Army and sent The Chetnik Way to the Russian front, where he deserted Immediately after the German attack on or was captured. The Czarist Govern Yugoslavia in April I 1941, a resistance ment sent him to Siberia ail a prisoner of movement started. This resistance move war. . Following the October Revolution. ment was led by Draza Mihajlovic, a staff he fought in the Red Army during the colon~l in the Yugoslav Army, who refused Civil War. to obey General Kalafat~vich's order to Tito returned to Yugoslavia with a surrender. He (Mihajlovic) told his com Russian wife in 1924, as a labor organizer. manding general, "You may lay down your He continued these activities until he was arms and surrender, but I am going to con arrested in 1929, and was sentenced to 5 tinue the struggle in the Chetnik way, to years in jail. FUTURE OF YUGOSLAVIA UNDER TITO
In late 1941, the Chetniks (Mihajlovic) ginning of the end so far as support for ··and the Partisans (Tito) began to quar- . the Chetniks, was concerned. Early' in reI. Attempts. at reconciliation failed, 1944, Mr. Churchill and President Roose and by 1942 their differences broke into velt agreed to support the Pal·tisans. an open "fight. The Germans regarded Tito as a Russian agent and Mihajlovic as Soviet Endorsement an agent of the allies. In fact, in July 1943, In March 1944, a Soviet military mis the German authorities simultaneously an sion· was sent to Tito which greatly nounced a reward of 100,000 gold marks strengthened his hand, and, on 28 Septem each for the heads of Tito and Mihajlovic. ber 1944, the'Soviet Army reached the Since Tito was a trained Party member, Yugoslav border. They asked Tito for the Soviet Union was to endorse him at permission to enter Yugoslavia, promis the first opportunity as the true repre . ing to leave civilian administration entire sentative of the Yugoslav people. This ly in Partisan hands. Tito, to no ones sur occasion was not long in coming for, in prise, granted their request. The purpose July 1943, the Soviet Government of the mission's strategy was political charged that Mihajlovic was collaborating rather than military and their goal was with the Germans and fighting the Par the capture of Belgrade and the establish tisans. The Communist Parties all over the ment of Tito in power as chief of state world immediately launched a press pro by the Soviet Army. gra!U against Mihajlovic and the Chetnik Tito entered Belgrade in the wake of movement claiming to the world that the Russian tanks, and Mr. Churchill, the Chetniks were monarchists, and were, British Prime Minister, stated in the therefore, reactionaries; the Partisans House of Commons that "Tito's govern were antimonarchists, and were, therefore, ment has now installed itself in Belgrade progressives. " with Russian assistance." Russia and Yu Originally, Mihajlovic had at least the goslavia signed a mutual assistance agree 1110ral support of the United States and ment soon thereafter. Bdtain. The United States furnished the Chetniks, among other supplies, four Russo-Yugoslav ·Postwar Relations Ubemtol' bombers early in 1943, and, on Mihajlovic was captured by Tito's forces '; May 1943, the British Government in in March 1946, and was tried by a Com formed Mihajlovic that they hoped soon munist court and executed on 16 July 1946. to be able to furnish material on a greater Thus, Tito eliminated his chief rival and ~<,alc than in the past. However, on 8 one who was beloved by many Yugoslavs.
Marshal fito and the Yugoslav people have demonstrated tha~ they will actively resist any aggressive politi,al and military move of the Soviet Union and her satellites directed against their homeland
Uecember 1943, the Right Honorable World War II gave the Soviets the op J~ichard Kidston Law, then the British portunity to attain their long-awaited :'iinister of State, informed the House of control of Yugoslavia. Tito and the Com •·ommons that henceforth Tito was to be munist Party had been prepared long be f.wored "for the simple reason that the forehand as an instrument for that con j'artisans' resistance to the Germans is trol. Once Tito was installed in Belgrade, ' .,,'ry much greater." This was the be- he openly adopted a hos.tile attitude to· bat '48 MILITARY REVIEW . SEPTEMBER 1952
ward America and Britain. Two days after Tito's prospects were bright: with a re VE-day, Tito asked the military missions cent trade agreement and.friendship pact of the two countries to leave Yugoslavia. with the USSR; and a government and The deliberate shooting' down of unarmed parliament which appeared legitimate in American airmen while flying over Yu- the new Communist world. Yugoslavia was an independent member of the Communist family of nations. Tito was head of a powerful Yugoslav Army and was ac cepted as seeundus inter pares. In the United Nations and on the diplomatic frlmt, the Soviets supported Tito's claim for Trieste even though they had de manded Yugoslav evacuation of that ter ritory in 1945 as the use of force in this instance would have disrupted their pro grams for Eastern Europe as a whole. After the claim for Trieste was denied and Trieste was declared a free territory, Tito placed an iron curtain around that portion of the free territory borderi~g on Yugo slavia and under its administration. The Blast Heard Around the World On 28 June 1948, the Soviets' victriolic condemnation of Tito and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia revealed the first im portant breach in the USSR's leadership A group of soldiers of the Yugoslav Army in Central Europe. The open break be returning from drill singing as they march. tween the Kremlin and her principal satel Pite emphasized the importance of Yugo goslavia, in August 1946, was also a part slavia in European affairs. of a determined policy to strengthen the The conflict between Yugoslavia and the tie between Tito and Stalin. Soviet Union was to provoke much com After Tito's installation at Belgrade, the ment in editorials and over the radio, as Tito-Stalin horizon seemed cloudless. The well as in high government offices through Soviets flattered the boundless ambition out the world. Overnight, "experts" ex of the Yugoslav dictator and encouraged pounded their theories as to why the break his well-known desire for luxury. had occurred and forecast its impact upon Tito forced communism on Yugoslavia. the world. There were many who doubted The methods used later in the communi seriously that Tito had many more days to zation of satellite countries were first live. tested in Yugoslavia. Suppression of po Tile Cause litical·parties, curtailment of freedom of What was the cause of this break in the press, elections from a single hand the relations of these two Communist picked list of candidates, and the merciless countries? This question is difficult to an liquidation of the middle classes were swer because of the many people involved. methods first practiced in Yugoslavia be the petty jealousies among leaders in the fore being applied in other satellite coun Communist Party who were attempting tries. to gain favor with Stalin, and because of FUTURE OF YUGoSLAVIA UNDER TITO
:the re,Strictions imposed by the Iron Cur sistance and heavy equipment from the " tain that inclosed the .commUnistic states Soviet Union I to accomplish these things. from the rest of the world. It may be of in Tito was coming to realize that Yugo terest, however, to examine 'Some of the slavia's place in the over-aU Soviet eco theories, or possible causes, of the split. nomic plan was to remain what she had One popular theory was that success had always been-poor, backward, and weak. gone to Tito's head, and that he had be Raw materials which would have supplied gun to see himself as the rival or potential native industry would be shipped instead successor to Stalin as the leader of the to the Soviet Union or to other satellite Communist cause. One must remember that Tito had come a long way in a short time-from a very obscure person in 1940 to the absolute dictator of Yugoslavia by 1945. Another theory was that Tito had been entrusted with certain tasks by Moscow and had not been willing to undertake them. A third theory suggested that Tito had visualized ambitious plans for a Bal kan federation, with Yugoslavia as the controlling state. There were those who considered it such a fantastic situation that they thought it had been created in tentionally. Although the Tito-Stalin split broke sud denly upon the world, it had been develop ing for some time. Tito was determined to nm his own show despite Stalin's plan to make Yugoslavia another pillar of the Soviet empire. Unlike other rulers which Jfoscow had placed over other satellite !'tates, Tito and his associates were not Hlel'e puppets; they had successfully Yugoslav Army personnel being used as la fought the Axis armies and their political borers on a Federal constrnction project. l'llemies inside Yugoslavia. \ states. The Soviet Union set prices on The Problem Tito's exports, according to a ratio that • would cost the Yugoslavs $28,000 for every Tito was determined to bring industri Soviet tractor. By this Soviet arrange alization and its many blessings to Yugo "'lIvia. He had promised the Yugoslav ment, Yugoslavia's labor and natural re l,t'ople after the war that, und\!r his pro sources were to be exploited for the benefit i:' am of industrialization, nationalization, of the Soviet Union. Tito, of course, would .. nd collectivization, factories and hydiro have none of this. . Jectric plants would be developed, irriga The Kremlin was not satisfied with the ',un systems would be constructed to bring progress Tito was making in the collective , . ater to arid regions. oil resources wOjlld ownership of the land and it complained 1." tapped, and modern highways would be bitterly that the land was still in private "'lilt throughout the country. ownership, that it was bought and sold, Tito .had hoped to obtain financial ~s- that considerable portions of land Were ,50 MILITARY REVIiw' SEPTEMBER 1952 concentrftted in the hands of rich peasants, gence was recruiting Yugoslav citizens.' and that hired labor was used. The peas Stalin, at this point, seemed to realize ants still hold a key position in the Yugo that the time was ripe to bring Tito, the slav system; they still .constitute almost 70 "realist," into line with the thinking of the percent of the entire' population of the Cominform. The final goal was complete country, and more than 90 percent of the "Sovietization." The collectivization of the land they hold is still privately owned. land was to be complete, since the most Tito realized that critical decisions con dangerous seeds of capitalism still lived on cerning the successive steps and tempo of in the peasantry. the class struggle in Yugoslavia might Tito tried to convince Moscow that a soon pass out of his hands if methods used crrtain autonomy of action must be per in the collectivization of the land in the niitted if he were to bring communism into Soviet Union were transferred integrally a non-Soviet country; however, to the So to the Yugoslav scene. He also realized viet leaders, Tito's attitude of temporiza that pitched battles between the peasants tion seemed careless, and they insisted and the government agents and police upon complete communization without were certain if this policy were established. compromise. Tito having failed to meet Tito, confronted with realities, soon real the Soviets' expectations, the Cominform ized that he could not overcome the op was set in motion to demote the man who position of the peasants, especially of the had lost the confidence of the Kremlin and Serbs. As Mr. Sumner Wells said, "In his to replace him with someone who would dual role as head of the Yugoslav Com carry out the policies it dictated. munist Party and as Moscow's procon Tile Split sul, Tito found himself up against one of On 18 March 1948, formal notification the toughest specimens of t11.e human reached Belgrade that the Soviet Govern race-the Serbs." ment had decided to withdraw all military The Soviets had made an offer to Tito advisers on the ground that they were to rearm and reorganize the Yugoslav "surrounded by hostility"; the next day Army. Tito did not relish the idea since he Tito was informed by the Soviets that all felt that under the plan the Army would civilian missions would be withdrawn be lose its national character and become, in cause of "lack of hospitality and lack of effect, an auxiliary of the Red Army. He confidence" shown them. was unwilling to permit Soviet intelligence Tito and Yugoslavia'S fate had been agencies to operate in the Yugoslav Army. decided. After several exchanges of com In the Soviet plan, Yugoslavia was to muniques between Belgrade and Mpscow, train conscripts in yearly batches but not the Information Bureau (Soviet-Com maintain any considerable standing army munist controlled) made the following and neither was she to build a national statement on 28 June 1948: "The Central armament industry. Tito felt the Soviets Committee of the Communist Party of Yu wished to obliterate their characteristic goslavia has placed itself and the' Yugo nationalism and self-reliance. slavia Party outside the family of the Tito was beginning to grow restless, and fraternal Communist Parties, outside rumors of his discontent reached Moscow. the United Communist front and conse Further, the Kremlin heard that unkind quently outside the ranks of the Informa things were said in Belgrade about the tion Bureau." demands of the Soviet trade delegates, the Thus came the open break between Tit<~ salaries and behavior of the Red Army and Stalin on 28 June 1948. ,officers, and the way the Soviet intelli The Kremlin unsuccessfully attempted I FUTURE OF YUGOSLAVIA UNDER TITO I to incite the Yugoslav Communist Pa~ty gram that is 'bdgging down fqr lack of \ against Tito for the obvious purpose' of capital and materials. . , , replacing him with a Moscow-controlled 2. The economic dislocation inherent in puppet. Tito reacted vigorously and jailed the reorientation of Yugoslavia's trade two leading members of his party and toward the West. cracked down on everybody suspected, of 3. The results of a disastrous drought plotting against his regime. during 1950. In considering the seriousness of the, Economic Situation Yugoslavia began her 5-year plan early in 1947. The plan envisioned the trans formation of Yugoslavia from a backward, war-destroyed Balkan country into a highly developed, modern country with an economy balanced between agriculture and newly developed modernized industries. The plan, however, was dependent upon a network of bilateral' trade treaties with the Soviet Union and other satellite states and, to a lesser extent, on some Western countries. Yugoslavia could not succeed in her ambitious plans if she were to become a single unit isolated from the West and ostracized by the East (the Soviet Union and her satellites). When the Soviet leaders realized that their hegemony had met with resistance on the part of Yugoslavia's people, the USSR and her satellites .applied economic block acle tactics against Yugoslavia. Hungary ca~celJed treaties. Czechoslovakia withheld Marshal Josip Broz Tito is the Chris deliveries of goods already completed and tian-born son of a Yugoslav blacksmith. for which Yugoslavia had already paid in materials and credits. Rumania carried economic problems, one must bear in mind the blockade so far as to refuse payment that Yugoslavia is dependent_upon imports of a debt of honor resulting from a l(>an for about 75 percent of the raw materials of Yugoslav wheat during the Rumanian . for her manufactured goods. famine. Bulgaria refused to carry out her l' eaty obligations to Yugoslavia. ' Tito Faces West The economic blockade imposed by Ithe Let us consider the steps Yugoslavia ,.'wiet Union caused Yugoslavia to lose has taken to overcome some of her eco· ""ernight more than 45 percent of !her nomic problems. Tito realized his dilemma, ",arkets. The Soviet Union's aim was to caused by the break with Stalin,. and he 'uin Y,ugoslavia's 5-year plan and tpus further recogniz~d the necessity for find ,·,use a great upheavel among the people ing trade elsewhere after the Soviet Union "I' Yugoslavia against Tito, and his party. and her satellites applied the economic Yugoslavia's economic problems tollay blockade against his country. Tito, being ,'em from three sources: the realist that he is, began to put out 1. A grandiose industrialization' ~ro- feelers to the West for assistance. His t{ .52 ~. . ' · MILITARY REVIEW SEPTEMBER 1952 main political preoccupation, of course, the Yugoslav Government that all assist was that regardless of whatever credits ance furnished by the United States or loans he might get from the West the would be given full and continuous pub indepefldence and integrity of his country licity, that the aid would be distributed should not be jeopardized. He had already equitably and fairly among the Yugoslav risked I;!verything to preserve these against people, and that the distribution would be Soviet encroachment. . under the ohservation of persons desig The policy of the Western powers was nated by the United States, the United to help Tito without making heavy de States Government, in December 1950, mands in return. made available to Yugoslavia. nearly 28 Early in 1949, the National Security l1\lillion dollars in stop-gap aid from the Council broadened American commercial Economic Co-operation Administration policy so as to permit American concerns stock pile in Europe. Then, later the same to sell Yugoslavia materials required in mon~h, the United States Congress voted order to maintain a "peacetime economy." an additional 38 million dollars for Yugo slavia in emergency food shipments. The In the closing days of 1949, Great Brit Yugoslav Government informed the United ain signed a trade agreement providing States and British Governments in the Yugoslavia with a credit of 8 million spring of 1951 that because of the drought pounds sterling (repayable in 5 years) to Yugoslavia was unable to exchange food facilitate purchases in Great Britain. The stuffs for raw materials Qn the world mar British also granted commercial credit of ket, that her stocks of essential industrial 5 million pounds sterling to the Yugoslavs. raw materials were almost depleted, and Tito negotiated additional loans from the that many of her factories might have to Export-Import Bank. The total amount of be closed in the near future, which would loans and credit made available to Tito by cause widespread unemployment and the Western democracies by mid-1950 was would further lower Yugoslavia's living 89 million dollars with no strings attached standard. At the present time, the Yu to the loans or trade agreements that goslav Government's principal shortages could be considered as interfering with the include cotton, wool, gasoline, and lubri independence of the Yugoslav Government. cating oils. The continuing shortages of As a result of the severe drought in the raw materials for light industries are 'summer of 1950, Yugoslavia was threat acute, and it is in these industries that ened with famine. The food shortage, to shutdowns may cause serious unemploy gether with the shortage of consumer ment. goods, added to Tito's problem and pro vided fertile ground for the subversive ac The possibility of national economic tivities of the Kremlin and seriously re stagnation in Yugoslavia is as potentially duced the capacity of the Yugoslav people dangerous today as is external military to resist aggression, either internally or aggression. The Yugoslav economy must externally. be reprimed with outside aid or it will On 20 October 1950, the Yugoslav Gov gradually come apart at the seams. ernment formally requested United States Washington and the Western powers assistance in averting the- worst effects of have let it be known that they are willing the disastrous crop failure. This request to continue aid to Yugoslavia, and Tito i~ came. only after the Yugoslav Government sure that he can keep his country on an had exhausted all means of'meeting the even keel as long as there is aid to east' situation through its own efforts. the food problem and assistance in secur After having received assurances from ing raw materials. FUTURE OF YUGOSLAVIA UNDER TITO 53
Tito has almost a half million physically fit, highly trained men under arms; an army rated by many as one of the finest in Europe today. Above, a Yugoslav Army unit mounted in American-made vehicles. Below, a Yugoslav tank unit parading through the st.reets of Belgrade in Soviet-built tanks mounting guns which 'were made in the USSR. \ . MILITARY REVIEW SEPTEMBER 195Z
Political and Military Pressure principles as determined followers' of Since the break between Stalin and Tito, Marxist-Leninism or from our own road the Soviet pressure against Yugoslavia, to socialism." And he added defiantly that like the development of Soviet foreign Yugoslavia would trade with the West on policy as a whole, has evolved through a quid pro quo basis, Yugoslav goods for various stages. In ·the first period, Soviet Western machines and money. Anything propaganda against Yugoslavia utilized else would be "a crime against ~ur So the medium of radio to call openly on Yu cialist country." goslav citizens to resist and overthrow the Another line that the Soviets have taken legal government of Yugoslavia, while the against Yugoslavia is that they are doing Cominform apparatus tried to inveigle a l thorough job of war-of-nerve propa Yugoslav citizens into working against ganda. The Cominform radio constantly their own country. This, without question, charges Tito with the persecution of her was gross interference in the internal af bordering states' minority groups within fairs- of a sovereign state. ) Yugoslavia. Frontier incidents of all kinds The rules of diplomatic i~munity were are provoked constantly. Cominform prop violated. Diplomatic mail bags were aganda accuses Yugoslavia of preparing opened and the personal freedom of diplo to attack her Cominform neighbors, and matic personnel was violated; Yugoslav ,f mounting espionage and sabotage op diplomatic representation was severely erations for the Americans. harassed by all Soviet bloc countries. An intelligence network of foreigners was or The 'White Paper' ganized within Yugoslavia, and the Soviet On 9 March 1951, Tito's government Union and her satellite states saw to it officially protested against the movement that subversive leaflets were distributed of Soviet arms and troops around Yugo throughout the country. The Cominform, slavia's borders. The protest came in the through broadcasts from satellite states, form of a 481-page "white paper" on the encouraged its followers in Yugoslavia to aggressive activitie'l of the Soviet Union engage in sabotage activities. "Incidents and her satellites against Yugoslavia. Cop are being organized and provoked," ac ies were delivered to the Western nations cuses Foreign Minister Kardelj of Yugo and to United Nations Secretary General slavia, "almost every day along our froif Trygve Lie. tiers." In 2 years, he charged, 896 frontier The "white paper" accused the Soviet incidents have been staged by the Kremlin Union of applying forceful means in an against Yugoslavia. Yugoslav citizens have attempt to overthrow Tito's independent been murdered in, their homeland by Communist regime. It further charged Cominform agents. that Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria are carrying on a "permanent little war" along Soviet Propaganda Yugoslavia's borders; they are erecting At every opportunity, the Soviet Union barbed-wire fences, planting mine fields, and her satellite states would tell the digging trenches, constructing machine world; and especially the people of Yugo gun nests and emplacements for mortars slavia, that Tito had sold out to the West and artillery, and building observation and that he was a mere pawn in the hands posts along the frontier. of the "Imperialists." On 9 April 1949, Tito further accuses the bordering satel Tito announced to the Third Peoples' lite states of getting bombers and tanks . Front .Congress that "no intimidation from from Moscow in direct violation of peace the West or East can divert us from our treaties; shifting civilian populations FUTURE OF YUGOSLAVIA UNDER TITO .55
YugoshlVia's S-year plan envisaged the tr~nsformation of a backward, war.torn country into a highly developed, industrial nation with an economic balance between agriculture and newly developed industries. Above, workers using primitive methods of road con struction. Below, Western machinery imp~rtations speed up Yugoslav rqad construction. -. ' ":5,6 MILITARY REVIEW: SEPTEMBER 1952' from border regions and sheltering Soviet ing business does not .include giving a troops. ' dissenter a seco;n~ chance. 'Thus; one can readily see that the USSR Tito lmd the West and her satellite states have used every possibie course of acti~n short of open war Since it is highly improbable that Tito fare against Tito and his party. The aim could or would return to the Soviet orbit, of the Soviet Union has been clear since what is next for Tito? As has been pointed out, for Tito to remain solvent at home he the open break with Yugoslavia occurred must carryon trade with the outside -to dispose of Tito and his party and to world. Stalin has made trading with the "replace him with a Soviet-sponsored "pup Soviet Union and her satellite states im pet." \possible. Theref{)re, Tito must seek aid Will Tito Return to the Soviet Orbit? from the United States and the West, for without outside aid Yugoslavia might de In the foregoing discussion we have cay from within and Tito might be forced shown that Tito is an individualist and a out by Soviet pressure through her agents realist. Further, it has been pointed out inside Yugoslavia. Under present circum that Tito came to power by his cunning stances, Yugoslavia can remain independ ability; that he has taken advantage of ent only under Tito, and since Tito can war supplies furnished him by the United retain his position as chief of state only States and Britain, and by the Soviets. by the maintenance of Yugoslavia's eco Then, when he felt he could benefit more 'nomic health, the future of Yugoslavia as by aligning himself with the Soviet Union, he lost no time in doing so. an independent state depends upon Tito's obtaining that aid. After a few years of Soviet sponsor ship, Tito realized that Yugoslavia was Yugoslavia's Future playing second fiddle to the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia's future" then, depends upon Stalin attempted to tell Tito how to run his our answer to the question "Should the country-politically, militarily, and eco United States and the West continue to nomically-but Tito, would not permit this. aid Tito?" From a practical point of view, Finally, when the break came between Tito considering the world situation today, the and the Soviet Union, the USSR used only answer is "Yes!" The argument'for every trick known to Stalin and his hench aiding Tito is not based on our love for men, short of war, to destroy Tito and his communism. Tito is a Communist. He is party. The objective of the Soviet Union the dictator of a police state. However, now is to eliminate Tito and his govern Tito knows the source of danger to himself ment and replace them with a regime sub and his party, and, by aiding Tito, Yugo servient to Moscow. slavia will at least remain an independent Recently, when Tito was asked whether, state. looking back, he would act differently if Of what advantage is it to the Western he had it all to do again, he paused as if democracies to have Tito and Yugoslavia recounting in his mind the steps by which remain an independent state outside the he had earned Stalin's hostility. "No," he Iron Curtain? Some of the advantages arc: said' deliberately, "no compromise was pos 1. It is a crack in the Iron Curtain ard sible, and none is now." shows the world that Stalin and his fol Tito has burned his bridges behind him; lowers are not invincible. there can be no turning back. The only 2. If the Soviets regain control Ov(-r way' he could return to the Soviet family Yugoslavia, it is expected that they will would be.in chains. Stalin's method of,do not stop with the elimination of Tito. The FUTURE OF YUGOSLAVIA UNDER TITO
Soviet bloc would 'be in a position to take "An attack against Yugoslavia might well over Trieste and pose an immediate threat strain to the breaking point the' fabric to Italy and Greece. of world peace;" gives the implication that 3. Tito has under arms today almost a the United States would support any half million soldiers. These men are physi United Nations action to assist Yugo-' cally fit, highly trained fighters whose mo slavia in maintaining her independence. rale is good. Some observers rate Tito's Military assistance for Tito was further army one of the best in Europe-with the implied when Aneurin Bevan, then British exception of- the Soviet Army. Recently. in Minister of Labor, told the House of Com a speech in Belgrade, Tito warned the So mons, on 15 February 1951, that "any viet Union and her satellites of the conse threat to Yugoslavia is naturally of con quences ~hould they attack Yugoslavia. cern to His Majesty's Govern~ent." Tito said. "Every inch of our land has been soaked in blood in the p~st. and, if neces Conclusions sary, it will be soaked in ,blood again, but it Four conclus,ions may be drawn from will remain ours." He f1.)rther stated, "We this discussion: are always ready to defend ourselves from 1. Tito is a realist and will take ad anyone who wishes tp deprive us of our vantage of any situation to improve his freedom and independence." position within his country. He is a dicta 4. If a conflict is forded upon the West tor and will remain so, allowing no outside by the Soviet bloc, Yug~slavia would con influence in the conduct of his state's in stitute a military facto~ which the Soviet ternal affairs. Union could not overlook, and Tito's army 2. Under present circumstances, it is in could provide flank protection for a coun the interest of the West to keep Yugo terblow launched from another area. slavia an independent state and out of the We have listed some of the advantages Soviet orbit, and the United States and that the Western democracies would enjoy Western democracies will probably con if Tito and Yugoslavia remain outside the tinue assistance to Tito and his regime. Soviet orbit. What are the advantages for 3. Barring some drastic changes in the Tito in his leaning toward the West? situation, Tito will be able to maintain his 1. Economic aid from the West, without position as supreme ruler of his country. which Tito would not be able to survive. Further, Tito and his people will cOlJ.tinue This aid has been furnished Tito and his to resist any aggressive move, either po government without any interference from litical or military, by the Soviet Union or the donor as to how Tito conducts his in her satellites against their homeland. t," rnal policies. 4. If the Soviet Union should decide to 2. Military aid from the West, as well go to war with the West, though not neces a, the implied promise of United Nations . sarily closely allied with the West, Tito, h.·lp for Tito if his country is invaded by with his large army, would stand like a tlle Soviets or her satellites. The statement dagger pointing directly at the heart of the by President Truman, in which he said, Soviet homeland and her satellites.
, I --1 THREE YEARS Of NATO
WITH the admission 'of Greece and In addition to the European program, Turkey, the North Atlantic Treaty Or service personnel from abroad are receiv ganization (NATO) is now represented ing specialized training at various armed by 14 freedom loving nations of Europe fprces installations in the United States. and North America. In 3 years, most of These men in turn apply this training to these countries have developed military their own military programs. potentials which were beJieved impossible prior to the creation of NATO. Joint Majority Are European Nations training exercises, many of which have Aside from the United States, Canada, taken place in the Western zone of Ger and Iceland, NATO nations are concen many, have not only brought most of trated on the European Continent proper these countries closer together, but have and the Scandinavian Peninsula. Because also done much to improve their combat of its proximity to the United States, the effectiveness. The United States has pro military alliance between this country and vided weapons and various types of tech Canada was strong even before the crea nical military equipment under the Mu tion of NATO. The United States provides tual Defense Assistance Program. forces to safeguard the security of Iceland.
Progress Has Been Made A Powerful Military Barrier Since the inception of the North At Recently, the Defense Department sent lantic Treaty Organization on 4 April additional forces to Europe to implement" 1949, the member nations have provided those of other nations taking part in the their best trained officers and men, and are mutual defense effort. This is in addition taking steps to standardize their weapons to the occupation forces in Germany, Aus and equipment wherever possible. As a re tria, and Trieste. From a network of mili sult, the organization is working toward tary units with little training and little an estimated strength of 50 divisions, a or no equipment, NATO has molded the force of approximately 4,000 aircraft, and armed forces of most of the North At substantial naval power for the present lantic Treaty countries into a powerful year. In addition to building up NATO's military barrier against the threat of po land, sea, and air strength, most of the tential aggressors. In the face of the tre member nations will participate in some mendous military build-up in Eastern 45 training exercises and maneuvers, Europe, these nations are taking every several of which have already been com precaution to insure their peace and se pleted. This is in marked contrast to 1951, curity through a highly intensified pro when' oply 10, such exercises took place. gram of military preparedness and unity.
In the face of a tremendous military build-up in Eastern Europe, the Norih Atlantic Treaty nations are taking every precaution to insure ",e;r security through an intensified program of military preparedness THREE YEARS OF NATO 59
\ "
Service personnel from abroad are receiving specialized training at various United States armed forces installations which they in turn apply to their own military programs. Above. two Turkish sailors study torpedo opetation aboard the USS Blower. Below. Norw~g.ian airmen study radar operation in Mississippi.-Department of Defense photos. '·60 MILITARY REVII;:W SE;P'iEMBER
The United States has provided weapons and technical military equipment under the ,Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Above, crewmen of the Royal Netherlands Air Force study the American T-G trainers shipped to the Netherlands. Below, tanks awaiting shipment to the NATO countries of Europe.-Department of Defense photos. THREE YEARS OF NA'l'O . 61
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.~•• ' The Department of Defense recently sent additional troops to Europe to bolster NATO forces taking part in the mutual defense effort. Above, the American 116th Fighter Interceptor Squadron being welcomed to Europe. Below, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower inspecting a newly arrived armored unit.-Department of Defense photos. 62 MILITARY REVIEW SEPTEMBER Ht52
North Atlantic Treaty nations are taking steps to standardize their weapons and equip ment wherever possible. Above, members of a French armored unit training with Amer ican-made Sherman tanks. Below, Greek Army personnel studying the nomenclature and identification of an American-made MU light tank.-Department of Defense photos. 1M¥~ II a I'ItA,.1 I{' F Ho'ItES AROUND THE VlORLD
UNITED STATES Army Aircraft XH-17 Helicopter Seven branches of the Army now have The world's largest helicopter-the jet aircraft as part of their basic equipment. powered XH-17-moved out of its hanger They are Infantry, Armor, Artillery, Ord recently for a series of ground tests prior nance Corps, Transportation Corps, Sig to a fi rst flight. nal Corps, and Corps of Engineers. An The XH-17 is powered by two turbojets additional technical service, the Medical supplying gas pressure through ducts lead- Corps, soon will have aviation as part of I its organic structure.-News release. I. Weather Data Equipment recently developed by the Army Signal Corps and described as a "rawin" (radio wind) system will help gather more accurate facts about wind direction and wind speed. The' "rawin" system consists of a mobile automatic tracking radio direction finder and a new type of radiosonde, or radio set, canied aloft into the atmosphere by weath er balloons. The jet-powered XH-l'1 helicopter. The "rawin" set permits, for the first tim~, continuous automatic tracking of ing up the rotor shaft and out to the tips balloon flights and recording of atmos of the long rotor blades. phr:l'ic conditions aloft. It can be oper The huge helicopter is designed for short at"d remotely, if necessary. The set it range moving of heavy military equip repJaces had to be manually operated on ment, including artillery pieces, tanks, the spot. The radiosonde transmits weath bridge sectiQIls, and trucks. In opera er llata back to earth automatically, in tion, it -will straddle its cargo in a manner clu,ling information on wind speeds, wind similar to that of a lumber lift, picking dil·\'ctions, pressure, temperature, and up loads by attachments to the landing hUl!iidity.-News release. gear and body.-News release. MILiTARY REVIElW 'SEP~EMBER "1952
Traveloader Stratojet Bomber The' amazing diversity of loading plat The world's fastest bomber-the B-47B form levels-equaling in number the many Stratojet-has been fitted with external' mod~ls of cargo transport aircraft in op fuel tanks to' give it greater range. The eration-brings with it a host of p~oblems 600-mile-an-hour, six-jet bomber also has ,to personnel in the air transport field. been given more powerful engines. The chief problem is how best to push, Presumably, it now has the long-dis tance ability to deliver atom bombs-if it ever is called upon to do so-deep within any Iron Curtain country, and to return \ to a friendly base.-News release.
Adjustable Locomotive The latest Army wrinkle is an adjust able diesel locomotive. This engine can run on tracks varying in width from the United States standard up to the widest gauges in use. A simple adjustment of the wheels on their axles does the trick. Locomotive statistics show a 16-cylin del', 2-cycle diesel engine rated at 1,600 The Traveloader r!!ady to load a %-ton horsepower; a top speed of 77 miles an truck into an Air Force transport plane. hour; satisfactory performance in tem shove, lift, and squeeze boxes, cars, ma peratures from minus 40 degrees Fahren chinery, livestock, clothing, and the myriad heit to 125 degrees; and consumption of other items carried by commercial and 40-octane fuel oil or lower. military services into the holds of the The adjustable locomotive-the MRS-1-' short, squat, low-slung, or long, narrow, was built to Army Transportation Corps high fuselages of transports with level or specifications. Thirteen of the units are sloping floors, and with large or small scheduled for delivery.-News release. doors? To meet this! challenge to human in Bore-Hole Camera genuity, the Army Transportation Corps A bore-hole camera to photograph rock has come up with a piece of equipment strata is being tested by the Army Corps which promises to be all things to all of Engineers. In its present stage, it can planes with all kinds of cargo. Called the take 360-degree pictures of a 3-inch-diam Traveloader, it is being tested on differ eter bore hole. Further tests are expected ent cargo transports in loading a variety to improve not only the camera's perform of the supplies and equipment which the ance, but also its accompanying projec Army must ship to its units overseas or tion equipment. in the Zone of Interior. It is equipped with The .camera, cylindrical in form, can IJe a hoist that raises and lowers the vehicu lowered into a bore hole and operated lar' pl~tform some 6 to 7 feet, extreme 'electrically by means of a cable. Either range. The eable and pulley hoist is cen dry or' water holes can be photograplwd tered in the chassis with the platform off with equally good results. By use of ,a set- to one side. Heavy equipment and specially designed projector, the pictures %,-ton trucks can be handled by the can be viewed in undistorted form on a Traveloader.-Aviation ,Age. cylindrical screen.-Ordnance. MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE .WORLD . 65'
:Staieside Tours Cut New Combat Camera The Army has announced that personnel The Army Si911al .corps has announced returning from the Far East now will be the development of a greatly advanced come eligible for new overseas duty after combat camera that is capable of taking 9 instead of 12 months of duty in this 10 pictures in as little as 5 seconds. country. Personnel returning from other The new camera, which can withstand overseas areas will be eligible for new dust, light, fungus, moisture, or driving foreign service again after 6 instead of rain, makes an exposure every time the 9 months.-News release. shutter clicks, and the film automatically
Ration Heater I A flameless fuel unit to heat soldiers'· combat rations in the field without prp dueing tell-tale smoke that might give the soldiers' positions away has been ~ ve]oped by the Army Quartermaster Corps. The flexible unit is wrapped around eafh can of field rations and is lighted with a match. It burns evenly without flame and heats the contents of the can to the proper temperature. Ration heaters now being used burn with a flame that must be shielded frOm the wind. They also generate smoke hazards that might disclose the soldiers' whereabouts to the enemy. When rations are frozen, sometimes present-day heaters will not warm the food satisfactoriIY'T- Sciellce News Letter.
Export Curbs Eased The Army's new 70-mm combat camera. The Government has dropped expor·t ad\'ances one frame while the shutter is quota controls on synthetic rubber. I cocked for the next shot. Double expo This removes restrictions on the quah sures are impossible. tity which may be sent abroad, but ship ments still wiII require export licenses Although the camera uses 70-mm film, aimed to see that none is sent to unfriend it·has alI the advantages found in 35-mm ly llations.-News release. miniature cameras, and can take 50 indi vidual pictures-2Y! x 3Y!-on each roll.. Test New Landing Cralt If only a few pictures are desired, the I T le Marine Corps is trying out a new photographer can slice off as many expo tYPl of landing' craft that unloads fro\1l sures as he wants with a built-in knife. the ,tern instead of over a ramp in the The camera automatically counts expo sures, and when the film runs out a red bon' like 'World War II boats.. I T:te idea is that troops will be ,better flag pops up into the view finder. proJected from enemy fire if they cah Fully loaded, with 4-inch lens attached, WOl k along the sides of the boat.-NeWis the camera weighes only 5 IAl pounds. rek..lse. I News release. ..,':.' I 66 MILITARY REVIEW SEPTEMBER 1952 Construction Prediction. Steam Catapult The Government predicted recently that A new British steam-powered aircraft .a record 32 billion dollars would be spent catapult, regarded as one of the impor for new construction this year. This would tant developments for naval aviation since top outlays in 1951 by about a billion World War II, will be adapted for use dollars.-News release. on United States carriers (MILITARY RE VIEW~' Apr 1952, p 68). Salvage Program In recent tests, the catapult proved The salvage and sale of wastepaper by that it can hurl Navy jet fighters into the United States armed forces in Germany air even when the carrier is headed down saved American taxpayers almost $250, (wind or alongside a dock.-News release, OO~ last year. The paper, more than 2,500 long tons, Jet Presses was recovered at Army and Air Force in The United States is seeking European stallations.-News release. help in building 17 mammoth superpresses for improving and speeding up jet plane Motor Vehicles output. A record 52 million cars, trucks, and The Defense Production Administration busses traveled the highways last year, said a government-industry team left fOI' burning' up a record of more than 38 billion Europe to see whether steel for some of gallons of gasoline and diesel oil, accord the giant forging and extrusion presses ing to a report by the Public Roads can be cast there. Bureau.-News release. Presses of this new type were developed and put into use in Germany during World Combat Contact Lenses War II. One such press can stamp out an The Army Medical Research Laboratory entire plane wing or other section in one at Fort Knox, Kentucky, is conducting operation. The conventional method is to tests to determine whether contact lenses fabricate the section out of many small will enable riflemen, tank drivers, gunners, pieces. and other soldiers to lay aside hazardous, The presses thus cut hours on the pro old-style spectacles while in combat. duction line down to minutes, save on cost, Experience during World War II and and give the finished plane greater in Korea has shown that glasses are easily strength.-News release. broken or lost under field conditions. Moreover, reflection sometimes makes the Power Plant wearer an attractive target for small The Navy is converting a 7,000-ton arms fire.-OrriJlance. vessel into a floating power plant, capable of providing 75 percent of the power needs Communist Air Force for the largest Navy shipyard in event of It would cost the United States 250 emergency. Work has begun on the lIfS million dollars a year to support a 1,700~ Coastal Racer, and completion is expected plaI;le ail' force such as the Soviet Union in about 2 years. ' is furnishing to the Communists in Korea, When completed, the steam-operated according to the Air Force Chief of Staff. power plant will have a capacity of 3,,). Moreover, it would take "something on the 500 kilowatts. At present, the largl,:;t order of 1,900 tank cars of fuel and 100 Navy floating power plant is. the 20,000 freight. cars of other supplies per month." kilowatt USS Jacona, now based in Korean -Aviation Age. waters.-Armed Force .. "MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD,
DENMARK ITALY Defense Directive Ship Construction The -Danish Ministry of Defense recent Italy recently laid the keel of her first" ly issued a directive covering the actions destroyer since I World War II,. and an.. to be taken in the event that the country nounced plans for the construction of five is invaded. In the event of attack upon more.-News release. Danish territory, or a Danish military unit outside Danish territory, the forces at BULGARIA tacked are unhesitatingly to fight with· Mone;ary Reform out awaiting-or seeking to ascertain A drastic monetary reform tying Bul orders, even though any declaration of garian money to the Soviet ruble and vir war or state" of war be unknown to the tually wiping out currency holdings was respective command. Any attack upon Den announced recently by the Sofia, radio. mark or its constituted authorities is 'to be All Bulgarian lev notes outstanding in considered an order of mobilization. Home the hands of the population were ordered Defense forces are to meet immediately, exchanged for new notes at the ratio of a captive government is not to be obeyed, 100 old leva for 1 new lev. More favor and threats of reprisals are to be disre able rates of up to 25 old leva for 1 new ~ev garded.-Danish Information Office. were inaugurated for savings deposits. Simultaneously with the revaluation, the NORWAY rationing system was abolished and prices Salvage Project for foodstuffs were lowered. About 15,000 tons of steel plates and The new exchange rate makes the lev scrap iron and some technical equipment worth 1.7 rubles. The previous rate of ex have been salvaged from the German change was 100 leva for 1.4 rubles. The battleship Tirpitz, which was sunk in ruble has the nominal official value of 25 Tromso Fiord, Norway, during the last war cents, but it is a purely domestic Soviet by Royal Air Force bombers. curren~y.-News release. It is hoped eventually to raise 40,000 tons of scrap iron and steel from the YUGOSLAVIA sunken hulk.-News release. Population Increase New census figures recently released fix Walkie-Talkies Yugoslavia'S population at 16,338,504, an The United States Mutual Security increase of 566,397 over 3 years ago. Agency has allocated $15,000 for the pro Belgrade's population is 390,733.-News curement of American radio tubes to be ' release. used in manufacturing 5,000 lightweight : walkie-talkies for the Nor';"'egian armed ! EGYPT for(·es. : Mineral Deposits Scarcely larger than a soda pop bottle, ! Rich deposits of iron ore and other min the Norwegian walkie-talkie is ideally erals have been discovered by four geolog-. suited for use in rugged mountains and ical expeditions in the eastern desert of wo",{s.· Weighing only 6 pounds, it has Egypt: a Il'Jrmal operating range of from 1 to 6 Encouraged by these discoveries, the miJps, but under favorable conditions it Egyptian Government is contemplating calTies' as fa~ as 60 miles. Earphones the use of airplanes 'to make an aerial ex are worn like a cap, and the niicrophone ploration of the entire desert region, only ma~' be hidden in a mitten.-Norwegian , a small part.of which has been surveyed. Inf.,rmation Service. News relei\se • • :68 MILITARY REVIEW NEW ZEALAND TURKEY Fighter Squadron Women in the Armed Forces The Prime Minister has announced that The Turkish General Staff is giving con New.Zealand is planning to send an Air sideration to the employment of women in Force fighter squadron to the Middle East the armed forces. for garrison duty.-News release. According to tentative plans, women will be engaged in service work, but will not CZECHOSLOVAKIA be assigned to combat duty. They will Jet Planes have their own distinctive uniforms and The Defense Minister has announced carry their own insignia of rank.-Turk that Czechoslovakia is producing jet planes \ ish Information Office. with the assistance of the Soviet Union. -News release. BRAZIL Development Project Air Service Brazil is engaged in a vast project for The Prague radio announced recently the development of the Sao Francisco that a Czech air line is establishing regu River, which is believed -to be the largest lar service between Prague and Commu enterprise of its kind ever undertaken in nist China. South America. When completed, the proj The broadcast stated that an agreement ect will help to develop an area consider between Czechoslovakia and the USSR ably larger than any country in Western permits the air line to fly passengers, Europe. freight, and mail over the USSR to China, Almost 85,000 square mile's with nearl~; thereby establishing "the only direct serv 7112 million inhabitants will be affected ice connecting Europe and -all other by it. It will have an eventual output of countries with China."-News release. more than a million horsepower of electric energy that will go out to more than 200 JAPAN municipalities in the states of Bahia, Ala United States Bases goas, Sergipe, Pernambuco, and Paraiba. The United States-Japan Joint Com This new source of electric power is ex mittee repol·ted recently that 13 naval and pected to have a tremendous effect on the 12 air training areas had been created for economic growth of the region.-The New use by the United States forces in Japan. }'ork Times. All of the areas are on or near Honshu, the main Japanese island, or Kyushu, the GREENLAND southernmost island.-News release. Building Program Shipyards, quays, schools, hospitals, Sunken Submarines water supply installations, and fishermen's Japanese salvage men are hunting for houses are to be built in Greenland this 45 lost submarines, once the pride of the year under an extensive Danish Govel'll Imperial Navy. ment investment program. The submarines, most modern in the Greenlanders also may be offered.a fleet, were secretly scuttled somewhere in scheme for buying new houses throug:h the landlocked "inland sea" of central their local stores. Under a proposed Gov southern Japan. ernment scheme, the islanders w01,lld he When they are found, they will be raised able to get a state loan through the shops and· broken up for scrap ·to relieve the to help buy prefabricated houses built in critical shortage of steel.-News release. Denmark.-News release. MILITARY NOTES' AROUND THE WO'RLD 69. AUSTRALIA GREAT BRITAIN Rear-facing Seats Radio Telescope Australia's Civil Aviation Department A giant radio telescope weighing 1,270 has a'nnounced that an new types' of civil' tons is to be built in Britain to map un aircraft flying in Australia soon will be explored regions of the universe. It will required to have the passenger seats fac enable scientists to pick up signals from ing the rear (MILITARY REVIEW, Aug 1951, invisible stars sent out hundreds of mil p 70). lions of years ago from outer space. These Tests have shown that this type of seat high pitched messages may be the birth ing arrangement should cut fatalities in air accidents by at least 25 percent. Australia will be the first country to make the rear-facing seats compulsory.-: News release. Antiexposure Suits The Royal Australian Air Force has' ordered more than 1,000 new-model anti exposure suits from Great Britain. The suits are a combination antiexposure out fit and dinghy for use in subzero temper An artist's sketch of the radio telescope. atul'es.-Austl'alian News and Informa tion Bureau. cries or death gasps Of stars which have either ceased to exist or are not yet ca Electric Power pable of emitting light. Electric power stations at present under Shaped like a huge electric fan with a construction in Australia will more than diameter of 250 feet, the "steerable double the present generating capacity of paraboloid aerial" will rotate on a plat 2 ~2 million kilowatts. form mounted on two l85-foot elevating Stations now in the planning and con racks. Completely adjustable, it will be struction stages are estimated to cost 430 free to scan any desired region of the sky. million dollars. It is expected that they The instrument will not be affected by will be progressively completed in the next clouds or fog and research will be possible 5 years, the speed of construction being during the hours of daylight and in all dependent on availability of labor, mate kinds of weather. The total cost is expect rials, and equipment.-Australian News ed to be approximately $940,800. and Information Bureau. It is expected that the new equipment Timber Program will put Britain far ahead in the new The Australian Government will contrib s~ience of radio astronomy which reaches ute half of the capital of a 4%-million out into space beyond the limits of th~ dolhr company to cut 10 million feet of most powerful optical telescopes. timber a year in New Guinea. In addition to studying radio emissions The cutting will be done in a 40,000-acre from invisible stars, it will be used to plot fon 8t in the Bulolo Valley, which is esti the intensity of radiation from important mated to contain 500 million feet of timber. regions of the Milky Way which are ob Hy cutting 10 million feet a. year and scured from normal vision by layers of rep:aQting new trees, the company will en cosmic dust and to obtain data on the sun, sup, that the timber never runs out. the IDllon, visible stars, and meteors. Th, Christian Science Monitor. British Information Services. a--" 2 <""'"'\"l1lI MILITARY ,REVIEW SEPTEMBER 1952 : -THE NETHERLANDS WESTERN GERMANY New Ca'nal Link Steel Production The largest inland navigation lock in West German steel makers announced the wQrld and a new stretch of canal recently that they expect to increase pro linKing the heavy river traffic of inland duction to 16% million tons a -year next year-a million tons more than Great Britain. This would make Western Ger many Europe's biggest steel producer, preceded in the world only by the United States and the Soviet Union.-News re lease. T~aching Program Some 25 secondary school teachers from Western Germany and Berlin will go to the United States this month, and the same number of American high school teachers will come to Germ'any, to teach in each others' schools for a year. Under this new program, German teach ers of English and American teachers of Europe with the North Sea were opened German will be mutually exchanged be recently in the Netherlands. tween communities of, comparable size and type for a school year. The German The 45-mile-Iong Amsterdam-Rhine Ca school will continue to pay the salary of nal, including the new 20-mile segment, its teachel' while in the United States, will take ships up to 4,000 tons and halve and the American school will also pay its the shipping time between Amsterdam and teacher while in Germany. The United the Rhine.-News release. States Department of State will provide Jet Fighters transportation for both groups of teachers, as well as a cost of living allowance to the The Dutch Government is negotiating to German teachers.-InfoTmation Bulletin: build under license two of Britain's lat (Office of the US High Commissioner for est jet fighters-the Vickers Supermarine Germany). Swift and the Hawker Hunter. The Dutch intend to build and assemble the planes Security Controls with Belgian-made engines.-News re The Allied-German "peace contract" lease. unclamps all but two controls over We5t ern Germany's industrial machine. PAKISTAN That means that the big Ruhr steel Recognize Vietnam mills again can produce such items as ar Pakistan has decided to recognize the tillery weapons, shells, tanks, and similar Bao Dai Government of Vietnam, one of military items. the associated states of French Indochina. Security controls, however, stipulate By her move, Pakistan became the sec that arms production must be uncleI' ond Asian nation to recognize the French authority of the European army. The other spon~ored Government of Vietnam, Thai bans production of atomic weapons, guid land already having done so.-The New ed missiles, bacteriological weapons, and York Times. poison gas.-News release. MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD
CAN~DA COMMUNIST CHINA Radar Installations Rail Construction The Royal Canadia:n Air Force has The construction of new railroads has an announced that United States Air Force important place in Communist China's personnel will man a, number of radar preparations for industrialization. installations being built in Canada. Most important of the number of con News release. struction projects already in process or in the planning stage is the extension of Planes Replace Tugs the Lunghai Railroad to Lan~how, ~apital The Canadian aircraft carrier Magnifi of Kansu Province, and possibly beyond. cent towed itself out to sea recently-by Another major rail project is the .con air power. Eleven A venger torpedo bombers were lined up, moored securely to the flight deck, and cranked. Pilots gunned the planes' engines, and the pull generated by the propellers towed the 18,000-ton war ship smoothly out of Halifax harbol'. The planes were so placed that by regu lating the speed of their various engines, the carrier was able to turn and maneuver a~ if tugs were prodding her along. Naval officers said this pull-yourself br-your-bootstrap method was speedier than the conventional tugboat tow.-News release. Immigrants Canada's Immigration Minister has an nounced that that country probably wiH admit 100,000 to 150,000 immigrants this struction of a line lipking Chungking and year, compared with last year's ne:h rec Chengtu, two major cities of southwestern o} d total of 194,000.-News release. S'zechwan Province. Railroad engineers also are surveying Sabre Production the mountainous terrain between Chengtu The Minister of Production recently and Lanchow so that the isolated Chung told the House of Commons that Canada kipg-Chengtu line may be tied in to rail is producing F-86 Sabre jets twice as fast roads leading to tlie prl!wipal cities and as originally planned, and that production ports in eastern China. is ,'xpected to be doubled again by the end The Communists also are busy in south of (he year.-News release. east China. Their new railroad from Laip ing sduth to the Indochina coast has been Naval Planes hi operation since last November, and sur~ ('anada is going to send 60 to 70 surplus V(\ys are being made for a line connect na';"l planes to the Netherlands as part in~ Nanning with .the Gulf of Tonkin. of her contribution to the integrated Mbreover, additional surveys are under North Atlantic Treaty Organization de wky in other parts of China.-The Chris fel1ses.-The New York Times. tiiIn Science Monitor. iir"-' 72 MILITARY REVIEW SEPTEMBER, 1952'
USSR UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA . Don-Volga Canal Air Navigational Aids The' Don and the' Volga 'Rivers were South Africa's Department of Transport linked recently through a newly completed is speeding plans for developing a network canal that forms a part of an immense of air navigational aids in the Union. Or waterway that eventually will extend from ders for radio beacons and other vital ap the Baltic to the Black Sea (MILITARY RE paratus have been placed with overseas VIEW, Feb 1951, p 72). manufacturers, and the equipment will be The Don-Volga Canal is the first to be set up as soon as it is received.-The Aero completed of five postwal' construction tplane, Great Britain. EASTERN GERMANY Rearmament Program The Communist East German Govern ment has disclosed plans for a vast re armament program, to include the 2 mil lion members of the Communist Free GeJ;man Youth and workers in all key' indpstries. 'the aim is an army of 25 divisions with 375,000 men, backed up by millions of East Germans organized as Communist militia. High schools are giving courses in fire arms, military communications, and aero dynamics; and "armed defense corps" are being organized in major factories. The Don-Volga Canal (1) is part of a sys Under the rearmament program, every tem making possible navigation from the East German-regardless of age or sex Baltic Sea to the Caspian by means also of is ordered by the Commun.ists to "do your the Moscow-Volga (2), Mariinsk or Lenin part in defending our homeland."-News grad (3), and Baltic-White Sea (4) Canals. release. projects described as "the great edifices Qf communism." HUNGARY Construction of the Don-Volga Canal Aluminum Production began' before World War II, was inter Communist Hungary is engaged in a de rupted by the German invasion, and was termined effort to raise her output of resumed in 1947. aluminum and of bauxite, the raw material The first link in the system, a 91-mile from which aluminum is made, according canal across the steppes from Stalingrad to the Budapest radio. to Kalach, will enable small sea-going ves Last year Hungary produced about sels to ply between the Baltic, the White, 33,000 short tons of aluminum, 20 times the Caspian, the Azov, and the Black Seas. the prewar output, and a further sub According to the plans, the Aral Sea stantial increase is sought this year. Hun will become a part of this waterways sys garian bauxite production, more than half tem by 1957 when the world's longest ca of which is exported to the Soviet Union, nal; the Turkmen Canal, will bring the is scheduled to be raised 53 percent this Aral waters 900 miles to the Caspian. year as against the 1951 output.-The·' News release. N ew York Times; . FOR"EIGN Ml LITARY IJI(;IlS')'S
A Criticism of Air Power Strategy
Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article in "The Hawk," ';- The Journal of the Royal Air Force Staff Colleges (Great Britain) De.ember 1951,
THE publication of Major de Seversky's the President's power to send United book Air Power: Key to Survival has States divisions to Europe is a measure of drawn attention, both in the United States American public opinion which favors the and 'in this country, to how the military strategy, and of the powerful support it forces of the North Atlantic Treaty" Or has in the United States Congress. ganization (NATO) countries should be Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord built up. The lowering of living standards, Trenchard has recently stated that the and the setback to economic: recovery re book represents more nearly his own views sulting from the vast sums of money de than anything he has heard or read before. voted to provide armaments, makes the This alone would be sufficient to warrant subject of vital importance to the peoples a study of the strategy and its implica of these countries. They will want to know tions. That neither the United States nor that the money they are providing will Great Britain appear to have accepted the build the forces needed for their security. strategy but are actually building the bal The author says the acceptance of air anced land, air, and sea forces, which Ma power strategy is a matter for the Ameri jor de Seversky strongly criticizes as being can people to decide, because on:ly the made obsolete by air warfare, may well Fnited States has the industrial capacity cause some concern among those peoples tu produce the air force that would be re who are sacrificing so much to provide quired. This is no doubt true, but, as the forces to meet the danger which threatens NA TO countries are bound together by them. the treaty, whatever strategy the people of the United States decide will directly Air Strategy Theory a~fect the security and independence of the The strategy which the advocates of' 01 hel' countries concerned. air power propose is based on the primary It may be thought in this <:ountry that assumption that total war between the So~ the case for air power strategy presented viet Union and the West is inevitable, and by Major de SeverSky represents the ex the vast resources of the Soviet Union in treme view in the United States, but the manpower and surface weapons would recent almost successful 'attempt to curb place the Western powers at a d~sadvan- iiioo...... 74 MILITARY REVIEW SEPTEMBER 1952 tage. If the United States economic and tainly. There would be little danger to military effort is directed at an attempt cities and peoples in Soviet-occupied coun to stem the tide of Soviet hordes, the re tries because air bombing would be di sult would be the swallowing up of the rected at vital targets in the Soviet Union. American forces piecemeal and a subse The theory, at least from the United States quent withdrawal, from all bases on the point of view, is attractive; it eliminates Eurasian Continent, with enormous losses the need for conscripting vast numbers of in manpower and equipment. At this stage, men in ground armies and relegates naval the battle would have to be carried out forces to an auxiliary role with the conse from the Americas. Such a battle would quent reduction of expenditure on those develop into an interhemisphere war which arms. It postulates victory through air could only come to a successful conclusion power alone, which is now widely accepted by the building of a mighty force of long as being proved. To support the view, les range strategic bombers. These aircraft sons of World War II are drawn upon. would first obtain air supremacy over the The defeat of Japan is cited as the main Soviet Union, and finally reduce her to a precedent, for here was a nation defeated state of collapse by disrupting her eco by air bombing of the homeland while the nomic system and, thereby, eliminate her ground forces in the field were largely in ability to continue the conflict, although tact. Whether this is true, and whether the Soviet Union, occupying all of Asia and her armies in the field would be undefeated. Europe, could be similarly bombed into The logical strategy evolved from this submission, does not form the basis of this assumption is to accept that the EurasIan criticism. If the postulation is accepted, bases cannot be defended, to withdraw all the question is whether the strategy would United States forces to the American Con meet the threat with which the Western tinent before a war started, and to con nations are faced. centrate, immediately, on building a stra tegic air force capable of striking at the Soviet Intentions Soviet Union from the American Conti To determine to what extent the strate nent. In this way, the argument continues, gic air power policy would be successful, the war, if it starts, could be brought to a it is necessary first to assess the danger speedy conclusion, since the forces of vic which threatens the free countries. The tory would be already at hand and the Soviet Union's broad international policy national effort would not be wasted in at is well known; it has been stated briefly tempting to hold overseas bases that are by W. Bedell Smith, American Ambassa indefensible. By accepting this strategy, dor to Moscow from 1946 to 1949, as: advantage would be taken of America's "Soviet policy has always been directed great industrial capacity and technological toward the ultimate goal of world revolu superiority over the Soviet Union to forge tion and Communist world domination ... an air force with which she could not and will continue to be, so far as can be hope to compete. The occupation, by the foreseen, in the future." Soviet Union, of the whole of Europe (with To achieve this aim, the Soviet Union the possible exception of the British Isles) , has two principal methods. She can either the Middle East, India, and Southeast embark on total war or prosecute her Asia is accepted as inevitable and unfor policy by all means short of total war. tunate. However, if the peoples of these countries understand air power strategy The Possibility of Total War they will realize that only by this means To embark on total war with any chance can their liberation come speedily and cer of success, she would require an industrial FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 75 capacity at least equivalent to that of the is not yet prepared for total war. Take United States together with the technologi- . for example her unwillingness to use force cal ability to back it up. These are vital during the Berlin blockade and the faUuTe requirements and there is little doubt that to intervene with her armed forces in the Soviet Union is so far behind in both Greece, Iran, and Korea. Had she decided that any geographical. and manpower ad to act, there would have been the moral vantage which she may have would not backing of Communists and supporters make up the deficiency. That the Soviet throughout the world, and armed conflict Union is fully aware of her de£.ciency in with the Western powers would have been industrial capacity and technological provoked at a time when her military su ability can be seen in many of her actions. periority in the field was absolute. Also the vigorous political campaign with which Industrial Capacity the Soviet Union is opposing the rearma Stalin, in his much quoted speech in ment policy of the NATO countries would 1946, gave figures which indicated that be of little point if she is bent on total the Soviet Union, together with her satel war. The 40 or' so divisions which are lites, had an industrial productivity 4% plann.ed for European defense under NA times less than the United States at that TO could hardly hope to prevent the 150 time. To reach the United States level Soviet divisions, which could be deployed would take four or five Five-Year Plans, against them, from occupying Western say by 1963 at the earliest. Attainment of Europe. The probability is, therefore, that the required parity earlier could be the rearmament policy adopted by the achieved only by industrial control of all Western powers is likely to frustrate some Germany, France, and Italy. There is some other Soviet plan which does not involve evidence to show that the Five-Year Plans total war. Thus, the Soviet Union is not are not as successful as was hoped, so that Iil{ely to embark on a third world war, be even with the industrial capacity of West cause she is aware that the chance of ern Europe added to her own, the Soviet ultimate success is small.· There is evi Union has little hope of bringing the date dence to show that she is sensitive con forward by an appreciable period. cerning her inferiority in the industrial and technological fields, superiority in Technological Ability ~hich is a basic requirement of victory, The Soviet Union's backwardness in and that her position in relation to the technological ability is probably more im United States cannot be greatly improved portant than her industrial capacity, for for at least 10 years. without it her industry cannot develop and become efficient. The highly organized in The Other Alternative ternational spy system maintained by the • The alternative method of achieving Soviet Union provides ample evidence of world domination is by all means short of her inferiority in this respect. Her fantas total war. This would be a continuation tic claims for inventions in every field of of the present process of maintaining science also is an indication of this weak world tension, threatening total war, "war nE ss. They may be explained by her desire by proxy" on the Korean pattern, and ex to impress on the satellite countries that, tension of communism through Commu by being members of the Soviet system, nist-front organizations. At the same time, th~y will benefit from the best technologi full advantage would be taken of discon cal advice in the world. tent in Western countries, caused by the Apart from these two factors, there are need for rearmament, to initiate strikes . otl~er 'indications that the Soviet Union and foster international instability both po 76 MILITARY REVIEW SEPTEMBER 1952
litically and econ~mically.)n this cold war, Soviet Union is not likely to cause concern Stalin holds the initiative and it is not in the Kremlin, because the Soviet Union easy to'see how it can be reco:"ered by the would not be directly involved. The bomb Western powers. By postponing their eco ing . of Soviet targets by the United nomic recovery, and by reducing the stand States would be branded as aggression, ard of living to rearm, the Western pow and would be unlikely to have the moral . ers are creating the internal conditions on backing of the American people or those which communism thrives. If they fail to of allied countries. Certainly in the eyes rearm, they will be vulnerable to "war by of some 500 million people in the world proxy." ,ho have signed the Stockholm Peace Ap It would seem tha.t the Soviet intention peal, such an act would be regarded as is not to embark on a third world war, outright aggression. Stategic bombing of Dut to .continue her present policy by all the satellites responsible would be no more means short of total war, for by this successful than the "strategic" bombing method she has a better chance of achiev of North Korea. The only solution in this ing her aim of world communism. Military case appears to be balanced land and sea operations by this method would be con forces, supported by a strong tactical air fined to satellite wars on the Korean pat force, with the maximum aid from the tern. Therefore, the danger is not from the Soviet Union's 150 divisions, but United States in these arms. rather from the considerably lesser force A 'Preventive' War? which the satellite countries could put It has been suggested that the United in the field. States might wage a "preventive" war Application of the Strategy against the Soviet Union. In such a war, If the Soviet Union then is unlikely full use would be made of America's ad to initiate a third world war during The vantage in atomic weapons. However, now next 10 years, the concentration on strate that the Soviet Union is building her own gic air power alone by the United States stock pile of atom bombs, the chance of would not provide the force to meet the a quick decision without retaliation in kind danger with which we are faced. On the is rapidly receeding. A "preventlve" war, contrary, by withdrawing military aid if it is to be fought, would have to start from the Eurasian Continent, which the very soon. The opportunity may have al strategy requires, the Soviet Union would ready passed. The only means of under be encouraged to launch her satellite states taking such a war would be by strategic on new adventures on the "war by proxy" air power, because, as recent events in the model. Without military aid from the Far East have shown, neither Britain nor .. United States, in the form of balanced France would support America, and she armed forces, the free democracies would would, consequently, be denied the most have little chance of defending themselves, suitaIDle bases and facilities for launching because the inevitable strain on their econ an attack. The interhemispheric strategic omy· to produce the armed forces needed air force, however, is not available and for their defense, together with Soviet could not be ready for some years. A "pre intimidation, would almost certainly lead ventive" war to be undertaken by the to u.nstable government and possible in United States must, therefore, be ruled ternal revolution. This is particularly true out, for, although it may be the best way of Fr!l.nce and Italy, who have strong and of removing the Soviet menace, the weap . active Communist Parties. The threat of ons required for victory could not be pro retaliation by the strategic bombing of the vided in time for its success to be assured. FOREIGN MILI').'ARY DIGESTS 77 A Soviet Miscalculation ons is not easy, as even' many present There is a possibility that the Soviets day weapons are closely guarded in a ,might make a miscalculation which would shroud of secrecy. If what Major de Se lead to total war. This is most likely to versky calls the "curve of expectancy" can happen in one of the more dangerous be applied, it may, however, be possible to areas where there is direct contact between predict the general trend. Soviet and Western armed forces, or in In World War II, air power came to be places of vital importance to Western econ recognized as an essential part'of warfare, omy-Germany, Austria, and Iran are ex and as important, if not more so, than land amples. The best way of avoiding such a and sea power. In past wars, the success catastrophe would be for the treaty coun of the offensive by land and sea lessened tries to make quite clE)Qr which areas they according to developments in defensive are prepared to defend, and to provide the weapons, It is probable that in the future, necessary balanced forces for the purpose. the success of the air offensive will be sub Soviet prudence might then prevail and ject to the same limitations. There are in~ she would take steps to ensure that no mis dications that within the next 10 years or takes are made. so, the defense against the piloted strate The adoption of the strategic air power gic bomber will be in the ascendant. Such policy by the United States would, there a development would lead to a stalemate in fore, encourage the Soviet Union to take air warfare to be ended only by the intro the very step which it is in the best in duction of a new weapon. This new weapon terest of the United States to prevent may be the long-range intercontinental the occupation of Western Europe-and guided missile. Similarly, the development hasten the time when the Soviet Union of new defense weapons on land may once could undertake a third world war under again reduce land warfare to a stalemate the most favorable circumstances. By pro as in World War I. Much has been said of viding full military assistance for the the offensive aspect of atomic weapons, but treaty countries, the United States has it may be that the defensive possibilities the best chance of containing the advance are even greater. In the Smyth Report of of communism in the foreseeable future. 1945, it is concluded that "the fission prod In this way, the Soviet Union may even ucts produced in 1 day's run of a 100,000 tually be forced to modify her aim of world kilowatt chain-reacting pile might be domination and seek a co-operative under- , sufficient to make a large area uninhabita standing with the Western powers. ble." The sealing off of a frontier, or at least those parts which are not easily The 'Curve of Expectancy' defended by conventional weapons, with If, after a period of some years, the radioactive substances with a half-life of Soviet Union continues to maintain a state up to 2 years may be a feasible proposition of world tension, during which her in within the next 10 years. At sea, the main dustrial capacity and technological ability threat is from the submarine, but recently are brought to an equivalent or higher ]"vel than the United States, the real dan there have been official announcemen~s ger of another war may develop. It may that this problem too may be satisfactorily b,~ fought on the interhemispheric pattern solved within the next few years. as visualized by Major de Seversky, but It is possible, therefore, that with the the strategy is more likely to .be modified development of new weapons, the ad to suit the effectiveness of new welilPons vantage will once again be with the de that will certainly be developed. Trying fense and military strategy will have to ttl forecast the development of new weap be mod~fied accordingly. The. strategy 78 MILITARY REVIEW . SEPTEMBER 1952 based on the mobile offensive in ground It is more probable that, in the foree warfareand strategic bombing in air war seeable future, the Soviet Union will limit fare, which was the predominant feature her expansion by military means to "war of Wotld War II, could well become the by proxy') on the Korean pattern. The "Maginot mentality" of World War III. best way of meeting this thre~t is for the Conclusion United States to provide aid in the form The inadequacy of the air power strat of balanced military forces to those CQun egy, as proposed by Major de Seversky, tries which are prepared to contain com lies mainly in its failure to assess the munism within its present confines. That means by which the Soviet Union can tris policy is the best method of frustrat achieve her aim of world communism. ing Soviet plans is supported by the vig There is evidence to show that the Soviet orous political measures she is taking to Union has no desire to initiate a third oppose the rearmament now being under world war, and that she is fully aware taken by the North Atlantic Treaty coun of her inability to bring such a war to a tries. If the United States continues to successful conclusion. The adoption of air power strategy, and the withdrawal of support this policy of containment, a third United States military aid from the Eur world war may be averted until the de asian Continent, might hasten the time velopment of new weapons makes the pi when the Soviet Union would feel justified loted strategic bomber as obsolete as the in taking the risk. Maginot Line was in World War II.
Men, Mass, and Technique
Translated and digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Major Bror von Vegesack in "Ny Militiir Tidskrift" (Sweden) No. 12, 1951.
MEN, mass, and technique are three in the competence of one's· own leaders, factors that have always exercised a de and in the thoroughness and effectiveness cisive influence on the outcome of a war. of one's own training. This enlightenment At different times, one of these three fac must be imparted before a war stands at tors has stood out as the most important, the door. Time is required for grasping but never has anyone of the three failed and assimilating the situation. With the to play a vital role. arrival of hostilities, so many new im pressions and practical problems come Psychological Defense crowding in upon the individual that no Psychological defense, particularly, com piace is found for anything more. prises many fields. It is based not only on enlightenment with regard to what the ob The Human Factor jective of the combat really is, the moral The human factor must still be accorded obligation to defend freedom and inde the same great weight it has always had, pendence, and the wrong in bowing to for the character of modern war is still force, but also on acquaintance with one's the same in this respect. Moreover, the Qwn factual possibilities of standing up frightful weapons of modern war have under· attack, and comprises, therefore, increased the need of the individual's ca .the feeling of self-confidence, which has pacity for resistance. its roots in the faith in one's own weapons, Since the days of antiquity, the problem FOREIGN MILI'IARY DIGESTS 79 :of the few against the many has existed. Engineering science was fostered by th~ Mass, however,. by no means, has always armed forces. It· was a very long time been the conqueror. No less in Swedish (the 1800s) before the military engineer war history has the numerically inferior got his civil comrade, the civil engineer. now and then triumphed over mass. The Time was then ripe for a mighty evolution human fa<;tor, in combination with tech in technique. nique, has showed its superiority over num The great discoveries which £ollowed bers; however, to underestimate the role one after the other, at this time-the of mass is to court disaster. It is, indeed, steam engine, the propeller, the telegraph, an important factor in war's complex equa the telephone, and the internal combustion tion. engine-made possible motorization's £or Mass versus Technique ward march, and, at last, the conquest o£ In our days, the question of mass versus the air revolutionized the very) mode o£ technique is discussed with special livIi human existence. ness, but the question is not formulated in Industrializati~n began its victorious a completely objective manner. Thought march over the earth, mass production be is channeled in the direction of colonial came possible, means o£ communication warfare where small,. well-armed, elite were £urther developed, and technique be formations have conquered primitively came international. The art o£ war also armed hordes with no interior strength. derived benefit from this extensive civil However, today's mass armies are well technique. Through mass production, it equipped and scorn no technical aids. Atom became possible to arm mass armies; bombs are found today in the East as well through the extension of the communica as in the West, even though they vary in tion network, it became possible to move numbers and, perhaps, effectiveness. The mass armies to distant areas and concen armies of the Eastern powers also possess trate them in the masses seen in the two interior strength which is supported by world wars; through the use of the tele an ideology instilled from early youth. graph, telephone, and radio, they could be From the West's point of view, the ques led; and through the employment of the tion is posed how we, with better tech airplane, war 'could be waged against the nique, may overcome the combination of areas back of the fighting forces. Civii mass and technique. technique was just as applicable to mili It may be of interest, in this connection, tary ends as the purely military engineer to touch briefly on the intimate relation ing art. Today, we are not able to differen ship between mass and technique. tiate between civil and military technique; they are meshed together to an immeasur Scientific Contributions able degree-they are identical. War has always been given a technical turn, if one measures its technique by Use of Technical Aid contemporaneous'standards. Even in the Although technique is international and d:-.ys of antiquity, the scientists arid tech its application in military fields has de nicians of that time contributed in making termined the pattern £or modern military the apparatus of war more effective. For procedures, including the mass employ men like Archimedes, Aristotle, Euclid, ment o£ men and materiel, there exist, GaliIeo, Leonardo da Vinci, and others, naturally, considerable differences between . lI1ilitary technique was an important field the various countries in the manner in of activity. Their contributio,ns, however, which they mak,e use of technical help. W'lre only of local importance; science was This was obvious during World War II. . not, as yet, international. To begin with, the Soviet Union was not 80 MILITARY REVIEW SEPTEMBER 1952 organized for a technical war, but was the veil was lifted from this enormous col forced, by pressure of circumstances, to laboration between the scientists and the draw on all her scientific capabilities. military. The newspapers vied with one Despite this fact, a 'crude but effective another in publicizing this new and amaz Ipilitary technique emerged. The finer ing field. Technique and science were again points came from the West, but they were in the limelight. Future war was depicted often copied with great skill. The Hitlerian as a scientists' war. dictatorship was not able to gather to gether the scientific talent in an all-out Future Possibilities collaboration in the war. Many scientists It is obvious that the knowledge of the fled to the United States where they con s~ientists has been turned only in part tributed effectively, among other 'things, to military uses. Portions of the knowledge to the creation of the atom bomb. Germany, painstakingly accumulated through the the technical country "par excellence," centuries are still unused and untested. lost in the scientific race, time after time, However, there is now, in time of peace, a during the war, in spite of the fact that thorough inventory of these untested por the initial situation was in Germany's tions in progress, and we have reason to favor. look for many innovations in the future. EspeciaJly serious is the fact that the To a large extent, this situation must prerequisites exist for bacteriological war b'e attributed to Germany's more limited fare, where, by means of the spreading of resources and to Hitler's strategic mis take in staking all on a short war, but it sickness and toxins, there appears to be great possibilities of obtaining very con may also be attributed to the lack of free siderable effects against an enemy who is dom and security under the dictatorship less well prepared in this respect. In the which stifled personal initiative. matter of chemical warfare, there are also In the West, on the other hand, the many innovations to be noted. The tactical scientists co-operated voluntarily and with atom bombs are a new branch on the enthusiasm in the development of military atomic weapons tree, and research in the technique. For centuries, the scientists field of the hydrogen bomb points to en had been collecting a reservoir of knowl tirely new possibilities. We certainly have edge, which was now suddenly made avail reason for giving attention to science and able t6 the art of war. In it was found a technique! great mass of unexploited data that could Science has striven to become interna be used. The atom bomb and the perfection tional. One of the causes of the great scope of radar were the most widely known prod of its expansion has been this extension ucts of this new collaboration. However, over international boundaries. in countless other fields, the scientists also contributed in making the war machine East versus West effective. By means of electrical computing The greater part of scientific knowledge machines, many years of long and tedious is, therefore, available to the scientists of labor were saved, new materials such as both the East and West, and even so small plastics' began to be used, new and more a country as our own does not have such efficient manufacturing methods were tried poor possibilities of following along in out, and scientific methods of analysis scientific developments. In the face of the were" employed with astonishing success day's uncertain political situation, the .in the problem of military strategy. After Iron Curtain hides many of the new scien .the war came to an end, with the two tific and technical advances, and the in atomic explosions over the Japanese cities, ternational character of science has be FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 81 come obscured. Let us hope, however, that great difference in important details. Per this is only a temporary situation. The haps the West's tanks have slightly better race in the laboratories goes on on both armor, travel faster, and are more ac sides of the Ir@n Curtain. curate in their fire, as well as being alone It can thus be seen that extensive scien in the matter of effective night combat tific material exists on both sides of the means. Possibly the West's planes and Iron Curtain, a sufficiency to promise many instruments are a shade better than the advances. It seems, however, as though East's corresponding types. Tactical atom the Western countries possess the greater bombs are not, as yet, found in the East. possibilities of availing themselves of the These are details, but important ones. It new materiel and achieving results more could be upon them that the entire balance rapidly than the dictatorship in the East of power hangs. Therefore, it.}s so im with its (for scientists) more oppressive portant that all the possibilities of tech atmosphere. Likewise, in the matter of nique must be developed to the greatest industrial development of the new weapon possible extent. 1m time of war, one bene and its mass production, the West has fits thereby in the form of smaller losses; better resources. In the West, technique in time of peace, additional knowledge and has a greater scope. The East has mass technical ability are won ~hich can be of and technique, but the question is, How use to science in many fields. well have they worked out and perfected them? That one is wise in taking the Summary Eastern powers technical knowledge seri Men, mass, and technique will constitute ously is attested to by the Soviet atom tomorrow, as today and yesterday, impor bomb. tant military factors. It is not their sum or Analyzing the Situation product, but a synthesis of them, that The present question of technique ver forms military strength. As for our own sus mass has many aspects, whose mu part, it is necessary that we concentrate on tual connections are comprehended only the two factors, men and technique, that with difficulty. Today, no mass army is we ourselves, with our resources, are able able to appear on the field of battle with to develop. Our defense technique also out the support of a comprehensive home must be guided in its efforts, by the pos industry. Mass does not consist of men sibilities of our having to face the com alone, but of men with arms, tanks, guns, bination of mass and technique. We have and planes. However, there can exist a resources, and we should use them.
. American industry has shown its fitness for the enormous task involved in making this Nation the arsenal of democracy. These tasks are being re peated almost daily as we look into the realm of the wonder weapons. We must continue our scientific programs aimed at equipping eur forces with the most advanced and superior weapons which can be developed in order that they may overcome the overwhelming numerical advantage of our potential enemies. Brigadier General Henry M. Black MILITARY :REVIEW SEPTEMBER 195Z- It Limited and Unlimited War
Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by J. M. Spaight in "The Royal Air Force Quarterly" (Great Britain) January 1952.
ABOUT 150 years ago, CIausewitz pro great powers. The necessity of survival pounded his theory of "limited and has been the main plank in the platform unlimited wars." It is more or less a com of advocates in the United States of unin monplace now, but it wa~ new then. Clause hibited strategic bombing. The morality of witz saw that there was one class of war such a manner of warfare depends, it is where the political objective was so im argued, on "whether a blitz application of portant to both belligerents that they t~tal force is essential to security" and would tend to fight to the utmost limit of "whether our code of morals is more en their endurance to secure it. However, titled to survive than that of the enemy." there was another class of war where the One cannot conceive that the question of objective was of less importance, that is the survival of the American way of life to say, where its value to one or both of could arise in any war less than a major the belligerents was not so great as to be one. The issue in a limited war will be of worth unlimited sacrifices of blood and less gravity for any great power that may treasure. It was these two kinds of war be engaged in it. which he designated provisionally un The limited war, it must be emphasized, limited and limited. is not a war from which all but the at Unlimited wars tend to be fought to the tacking nation and the attacked stand bitter end. Limited wars do not; they cul aside and leave it to the immediate parties minate usually in some kind of bargain or to fight out. In an article in Foreign Af compromise. As we know from experience, fairs, Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong a call for unconditional surrender is not stated that Greece, Turkey, and Yugo unheard of in the one kind of war; in the slavia had little or no belief in "the pos other, in all normal circumstances, it is sibility of a localized war." They believed, inconceivable. Moreover, there are other he said, that the Western po.wers would differences. The limited wars of the fu be forced to intervene if any of the thrce ture are likely to be localized, cordoned countries were attacked. That is probably off, contained wars; the unlimited wars of true, but it could still be a limited war. the future are likely to be more or less A limited war is something entirely dif global wars. However, the most important ferent from a "piecemeal" war in which difference for the present purpose is that each country is left to shift for itself and in the one kind of war the means of de is overwhelmed in turn. struction will probably be (voluntarily) limited, in the other they will not. The The Korean Con1lict belligerents will pull their punches in the The conflict in-Korea is an example of a limited wars; in the unlimited wars they limited war, in the sense of being not only will probably throw everything they have a localized war, but one of which the issue, at the enemy. The unlimited wars are though a great principle was at stake on fairly certain to be wars in which there thl) United Nations' side, was never a mat is a first-class power engaged on each side, ter of life or death for any major power. and, <;onsequently, a trial of strength, the It was, therefore, never likely to be fought issue of which will be nothing less than to the last ditch. The Times stated, in a the survival of one or the other of the leading article of 18 August 1951, re FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 83 ferring to the cease-fire talks at Kaesong: that they should not be allowed to spread. "Both sides, the United Nations explicitly, An unlimited war is an unrelieved disaster the Chinese tacitly, have expressed the for mankind. A limited war is bad enough, opinion that this is not a war which could but it is not nearly so catastrophic in its profitably be fought to a finish." .It might impact and consequences. That is due, in easily have become, however, an unlimited part, to the fact that it is likely to be war. The United States decision to abstain fought with weapons whose capacity for from any action against the real bases of mass destruction is far less than those the Communist forces in Manchuria prob which probabiy would be used in a major ably prevented that country from getting conflict. involved in the wrong war at the wrong In Korea, as we know, the atom bomb place at the wrong time with the wrong was not used. According to a spokesman enemy. In other words, the United States of the American Air Force, there was no was reserving its strength for the big objective worthy of it there; but would affair that might be coming. it have been used if there had been? There It has been asked, "Why were the Com were worthy ob)ectives in China, but, munists granted the right of sanctuary?" actually, Chinese territory has not been An American senator made a practical re i bombed at all to date. Had the war been ply to this question during a speech in : a major one, in all probability there would Washington when he stated that "there I have been a very different tale to tell. are still other sanctuaries ... Washington Peiping could hardly have escaped in that and New York and Detroit and" Denver event. There is in the city, right in its and San Francisco. If American planes Icenter, an important military objective, fly over the Chinese mainland, if Ameri .the so-called East Station, the main rail can-assisted troops try to invade that way terminus. It adjoins the great gate mainland, if American ships attempt to way of Chien Men, where the Tatar and squeeze it in a total blockade, how much I the Chinese cities meet and which is the time will elapse • . . before you and I channel of an unceasing flow of traffic be- listen day and night for the air raid sirens I tween the north and south parts of Pei • here in Washington?" ping, a moVing mass of pedestrians, cy clists, motor vehicles; donkey carts, and The Lesser Evil rickshaws. One can imagine what the ef There was implicit reason in the sena fect would be if a massive bombing attack tor's words for hoping that limited war, "were made on the station and the piles of the old pattern, may become the fashion of dead and dying that would be heaped again and that the world wars of which in the streets. \Y we had such terrible examples in 1914-18 and in 1939-45 may be avoided. It is in Moderation in Small Wars the interests of the big powers, but not That, at any rate, did not happen, of them alone, that this should happen. It though voices were heard demanding tha~ is not a matter of the big powers saving something no less calamitous should. There their own skins. The United States and is bitter fighting in Korea, and the death otbers are very definitely not doing that : roll is piteously long, but the destruction " in KorEla. It is only an acknowledgment of Iland the slaughter that has occurred is the truth that" limited war is the lesser of 'probably inconspicuous, compared with two evils. The task of the future will be I what it would have been if a major war to stifle the small wars before they blaze I had started. There is definite evidence of out into big wars. Wars are conflagra-" a desire on the allies' side to conduct the tions, and it" is in the interest of all nations military operations without resort to the MILITARY REVIEW SEPTEMBER· 1952 extremjties of violence that had marked fortresses have been taking a hand in the the fina~ stages of World War II. Similar work of co-operation' with the ground restraint may not be shown in an all-out forces. Ground forces are likely to con conflict of major powers. Peace, it used tinue to be primary for some years to .to be affirm,ed in the days of the League 'come in all kinds of wars, ·but more es of Nations, is indivisible. The dogma was pecially in wars of the Korean type. In always challengable. Still more question global wars, the long-range bombers, the able would be an assertion that war is successors of the B-36, will come into their indivisible. Obviously, it is not.·It can be own. In minor wars, there will be a tend split up into major and minor wars. The ency to revert to the pattern, brought up minor war is a kind of safety valve which to date in some respects, of the wars can serve to prevent the major explo 'f.hich had been waged before instruments sion. In all probability, it is only in of mass destruction had been developed great wars that use would be made of to their present proportions and of which the fearsome instruments about which the repercussions and consequences, bad the prophets of evil warn us. They would as they were, were far less serious than not be used in minor wars for various rea would be those of a major, all-out conflict sons-because the wars are minor and do today. not call for an all-out effort, because the A famous Frenchman, asked for his belligerent who has the new weapons in views on hell, replied that no doubt it his armory would not wish to disclose the existed, but he believed it to ·be uninhab existence of them prematurely, because ited. One might misappropriate that idea they will probably be very costly to pro for the present purpose and say that there duce and may be limited in supply, so that is, doubtless, a kind of war which would the tendency will be to reserve them for a be hell with the lid off, because the weap really great occasion. ons employed in it would be so murderous. Air Operations in Limited Wars However, the odds are that none of us The part which the strategic air offen shall see that hell. The fact that these sive will play in, a limited war will prob appalling instruments of destruction may ably be less prominent than that which be used in a great war will gq far to pre would be allotted to it in an unlimited vent its coming. They are less likely to be one. In Korea, there is more tactical than used in small wars for the reasons al-' strategic action in the air. Even the Super- ready given.
We do not have a choice between fighting in Korea or not fighting at all. Our choice lies between fighting in Korea or fighting somewhere else-some where more difficult-and probably somewhere closer to home.
President Harry S. Truman FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS Combat in Cities
Translated and digested' by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article in "Militaert Tidsskrift" (Denmark) I April ,19;;2.
IT HAS always been a difficult task to irreparable harm to the troops' morale and attack a city, and, for this reason, forces discipline. Therefore, combat in cities, engaged in offensive operations have at whether offensive or defensive in character, tempted to, avoid such undertakings. Nev requires that all personnel are well trained, ertheless, during World War II, time and well disciplined, and eager for combat. time again, cities became the focal points It is wrong to beliele that the defense of the fighting. of a city can be left exclusively to its home guard or civil population, ~spite the Reasons for the Change fact that such ideas have been, and are Two of the major reasons for this re being, expressed rather freely. It is true cent change in warfare can be listed as that the workerS' in Stalingrad succeeded follows: in such an undertaking, bcit it is also true 1. The modern motorized army is that the average Soviet industrial worker strongly bound to the roads and is obliged ;had generally received military training to conquer the cities which dominate the ;that surpassedthe training of the average road junctions in its zone of advance, in member of a Western European home order to ensure the movements of supplies guard. and reserves. Soviet Experience 2. Many cities possess tactical or stra The Soviet Union probably gained more tegic significance for the attacking force. experience in combat in cities than any For ·example, a city may control a river other country during the last war, for the passage, as at Arnhem, a valley, as at Soviets fought for and lost some of their Monte Cassino, or possess an important own cities, later won them back, and, port, as at Cherbourg-or it may have toward the end of the war, captured many psychological value and be attacked for enemy cities. reasons of presti~e. Although the Soviets have been some what reluctant to share their tactical Combat Characteristics experiences with the Western powers, Combat in cities differs from combat many Swedish military publications have, in open terrain in many ways, namely: through the medium of Soviet articles 1. It is difficult to locate the enemy be and studies of operational methods used cause visibility is poor (buildings, smoke, during the war, formed for themselves a and dust) and the noise of his weapons is picture of the Soviet tactics in an attack reflected and reinforced. on a city. .2. Co-ordination and control are difficult The Soviet Pattern because the field of combat cannot be sur Before the attack is launched, pains veyed, and the usual means of communica taking preparations are made, including tion and liaison are unreliable or impracti thorough reconnaissance and the use' of cal. Moreove.r, the plundering carried intelligence studies, special training for 011 by otherwise well-disciplined troops the troops which are to be engaged, and is a frequently occurring phenomenon dur a rehearsal of the anticipated action stress ing combat in cities, and can cause an at ing the teamwork required between the ta~k' to come to a standstill, resulting in infantry, artillery, and tank units. MILITARY REVIEW SEPTEMBER 1952 <
Launching the Attack to building by way of the attics and roofs, The attack is begun by the tanks and or through the basements, clearing each< reconnaissance forces who surround the building in turn. In the buildings where city and attempt to cut off all routes to resistance is encountered, an effort is and frem the city. An advance force, sup ma"de to get above the defender and force' ported by strong artillery, launches an at him into the open or down into the base tack after the initial encirclement has ments. In the latter case, he can be been completed, in order to tie down and smoked out by setting the buildings on fire, immobilize the defense forces. After this or drowned by breaking the water pipes. action has begun, the main body of the at Vigorously defended strong points are tacking forces< moves around the city and held down and blinded by fire and smoke attacks it from the rear and the flanks in "'{hile the first wave passes, and then are an effort to decentralize and paralyze the ahacked by the second wave. defense effort. A Major Question Organization of Assault Units At this point, it might be weU" to ask: During the fighting in the city, the at "Would a Western European city have any tacking forces are divided into a number chance of holding out or defending itself of assault units, each consisting of the against an attack as described above?" following four sub-units: The answer is yes, for the defender has 1. An attacking unit, composed of light many advantages in such a situation, as infantry (armed with machine pistols, compared with the attacking enemy. hand grenades, and knives), flame-thrower units, and forces equipped with smoke Defensive Advantages generating apparatus. Not only does the defender know the 2. A supporting unit, armed with ma routes within the city and the location of chine guns, antitank guns, assault ar underground passages and sewer lines, tillery, and tanks. but he has the advantage of cover and 3. A reinforcing unit. previously prepared strong points. If he 4. A reserve unit. has had time to prepare barricades, dem Action Against Weak Resistance olitions, and mine fields, .the defender If the resistance is relatively weak, the is in a much better position than the at attacking unit moves forward along both tacker, who, until he has obtained a foot sides of the street, firing at windows, doors, hold in the city, is obliged to maintain balconies, and roofs on the opposite sides himself on a glacis created by scorched of the street. The supporting unit follows earth tactics. closely behind and lays down fire on barri Strong Defense Forces cades ahd buildings from which resistance If the defense has adequate strength is offered. A few tanks travel on each side to offer strong resistance, defense posi of the street and lay d9wn cross fire in tions are established along the entire outer the same manner that the infantry does, edge of the city so located as to afford while other tanks travel farther behind good fields of fire and adequate cover and and fire down the streets. protection for the weapons and their crewI'.. Action Against Strong Resistance Inside the city, additional positions are If the resistance is strong, the attacking established and reserves located so that unit attempts to enter buildings through the defense can maintain aU-round pro holes 'shot in the walls by the supporting tection and co-ordinate the launching o.f unit ~nd then works its wa from buildin . counterattacks. FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS
Weak Defense Forces themselves on all sides and provide mutual On the other hand, if the' defense forces support for 'one another. are relatively' weak, the defense generally The defense is conducted in such a way is concentrated,ar.Qimd the most important that the enemy will be hjndered as long as penetration rout~s and the vital sections possible from getting a foothold 'in the of the city, while the unmanned portions city, and, when he has finally pushed into of the city are defended by prepared ar the city, his attack is channelized as much tillery fires, snipers, and patrols. as possible so that the defender can bring In either.case, outposts are established down concentrated fires to destroy him.
Allied infantrymen moving down a rubble-littered street in Waldenburg, Germany; a scene typical of much of the fighting in World War H.-Department of Defense photo. about 6 miles or more beyond the outer Every officer and man must be imbued edges of the city, and, in addition, tlie area with a will to fight, and must not let any a)'l)und the outer edge of the city is mined possibility for a surprise burst of fire or to whatever extent time, forces, and ma cDunterattack go unexploited. teriel permit. Exploiting the Advantages If the enemy forces his way into a builde The Defensive Organization ing, the defender must take advantage of Normally, each defense position con the fact that he is the one who prepared sists of resistance areas composed of a the building for defense and is, therefore, number of strong points. Generally, a able to exploit its advantages. He must strong point' is organized in a large continually inflict losses on the enemy; building or a designated area of the city, expose him to ceaseless surprise; and make and defended by a reinforced platoon. him fight for every room, every hallway, Sileh strong points must be able to defend and every stairway. MILITARY REVIEW SEPTEMBER 1952 88 , . The Arming of Our Maritime Reconnaissance 'Squ~drons
Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Wing Commander K. R. C. Slater in the "Journal of the Royal United Serviee Institution" (Great Britain) November 1951.
IN CONJUNCTION with the Royal Navy, midget units in an attempt to plant atomic the role of the Coastal Command is to safe .mines inside our major ports. If success guard our sea communications. At the fully delivered, attacks of this nature could present time, the Soviet Union and her disrupt our maritime communications far satellites are the most dangerous potential more effectively than the sinking of ships enemies with whom we must reckon, and at sea. intelligence regarding Soviet naval forces , However, the mining of inshore waters indicates that we must be prepared to con l)y submarine calls for extremely accurate tend with two main threats to our shipping navigation, if mine fields are to be correctly in the event of war. First and foremost, located and the operations carried through there is the Soviet underwater fleet, esti without undue hazard. This means that mated to consist of between 300 and 500 submarines must carry out the final stages submarines of all types, as compared with of their approach at periscope depth in the 60 possessed by Germany in 1939. Sec order to obtain the observations required ond, the Soviet Navy is believed to have to fix their position, and in doing so they under construction a number of fast cruis are obliged to expose themselves to the ers, specifically designed to operate as risk of detection from the air. Hence, the commerce raiders. first step in countering minelaying opera Should hostilities break out, therefore, tions by a submarine lies in the provision one of the primary tasks of the Royal of standing air reconnaissance patrols Navy and our maritime air forces will be over threatened areas. to secure the safe and timely arrival of Once located, it is important that sub shipping against underwater attack and marines should be attacked immediately, against attacks by surface raiders. Ac since they represent fleeting targets of cordingly, the purpose of this article is to opportunity which must not be allowed to review the role of our Coastal Command escape. On the other hand, the equipment . and naval reconnaissance squadrons in required to track and kill a submerged countering these threats, and to consider submarine can only be carried in fairly how they should be armed to meet the pos large and expensive aircraft, so that when sibility of war in the immediate future. surface craft are available to strike swiftly upon receipt of sighting reports from the Functions of Reconnaissance Aircraft air, as would normally be the case in the Defense Against Mining vicinity of main ports, then it is usually more economical to rely on surface craft to Mining the approaches to ports and har kill, using aircraft primarily as a means bors is a type of operation for which sub of detection. Thus, the first function of marines are particularly. suited and, in our maritime reconnaissance forces is to view of the known emphasis placed by the provide standing antisubmarine spotting Soviet Navy on mine warfare, we must patrols over the inshore approaches to. expe~t this form of attack to be developed ports and harbors. against us on a large scale, either 'just prior to, or immediately following, the Antisubmarine Defense in Focal Areas outbreak of war. It is likewise conceivable In mid-ocean, evasion is probably the that enemy submarines may also operate most effective method of safeguarding FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS shipping against underwater attack. How times' the task will have to ,be under ever, all sea communications converge on taken by aircraft operating independently. ' focal areas, such as the western ap Hence, the two main functions to be per proaches, where a large concentration of formed by recolmaissance aircraft in the targets is unavoidably presented'to the submarine defense of focal areas are, first, enemy and evasion can no longer be ex to act as the eyes of convoy escort ships ploited as a means of defense. Hence, it is and, second, to carry out antisubmarine against the focal areas that the enemy offensive sweeps either with or without the must be expected to concentrate his maxi support of surface forces. mum underwater effort and, unless forced to retreat by the effectiveness of our coun Alltisubmarine Defense in Mid-Ocean termeasures, his initial offensive may be We have previously noted that the un disastrously successful. Accordingly, it is derwater threat to our convoy!'; in mid essential that sufficient antisubmarine ocean is unlikely to become serious until forces be deployed in these areas to 'de the build-up of our counteroffensive has prive U-boats of all freedom of action and succeeded in dri\,ing U-boats away from to ensure their destruction whenever and the focal areas. Therefore, on reaching wherever located. this stage, it is imperative that we should Because of their abi1ity to search vast continue to wrest the initiative from the stretches of ocean at high speed, the use of enemy by forcing him to remain on the de aircraft is clearly the most economical fensive. To do this, we need to provide for means of denying the enemy freedom of the close tactical defense of our convoys action, provided that once submarines have as economically as possible, so that our been located means are available to neu maximum effort can be devoted to operat tralize them effectively. At the present ing offensive patrols in enemy transit time, since ships equipped with asdic are areas with the threefold object of: still able to hunt and kill submerged sub 1. Locating and killing submarines be marines with greater precision and re fore they are in a position to threaten our liability than is possible using airborne shipping. equipment, it seems likely that the close 2. Forcing enemy submarines to remain protection of shipping will continue to 'be submerged, thereby mlllllll1z111g their carried out by fast escort frigates for chances of intercepting convoys, first, by some years to come. Thus, aircJ;aft operat reducing their radius of action and, sec in!!: in the immediate vicinity of convoys ond, by restricting opportunities for visual should be able to call upon ships to attack and radar search. submarines as soon as they are sighted. 3. Gaining intelligence regarding the However, with the advent of long-rllllge, disposition of enemy submarines so that pattern-running torpedoes, our best chance convoys can be diverted away from threat of protecting convoys against underwater ened areas. attack is to kill submarines before they As was mentioned previously, the close can position themselves to strike. To this tactical defense of convoys is best un end, antisubmarine offensive sweeps must dertaken by surface ships operating with 'be operated continuously throughout each the assistance of spotter aircraft. On the fQ~al area, and although the ideal method' other hand, owing to the vast distances of carrying out suC;h sweeps is to employ which must be continuously patrolled, pri hunter-killer combinations of ships and mary responsibility for carrying the of~ ail'craft, it often happens that ships can fensive into enemy transit areas is best not be spared for the purpose, at which undertaken by long-range reconnaissance f
90 MILITARY REVIEW SEPTEMBER 1952 aircraft, capable of operating effectively time reconnaissance aircraft should be against enemy submarines with or without capable of detecting them by day or by the support of surface forces. night in all conditions of visibility. This means that aircraft must be able to carry Defense Against Surface Raiders all the necessary search equipment, to From the enemy point of view, the main gether with the crew needed to operate it, advantages to be gained from the use of and to maintain an efficient visual look surface raiders lies not in the number of out for the maximum period the aircraft ships sunk (though this may well be con is likely to be on patrol. siderable) but in the loss of shipping ca pacity imposed upon us indirectly, by the Cost of All-Weather Facilities need to reorganize our convoy escort sys It is important to bear in mind that tem, once the presence of a surface raider quality is no substitute for quantity in is suspected, and also in the vast naval and maritime reconnaissance operations, which air effort which must be deployed in order frequently involve the maintenance of to hunt even one cruiser class raider. standing patrols over large areas. Indeed, Therefore, in order to minimize the dis where antisubmarine operations are con ruptive effect of an enemy surface raiding cerned, the mere threat of aircraft over campaign, it is imperative that raiders head is usually sufficient to deprive U-boat should be cornered and destroyed as soon commanders of their freedom of action, as possible after they have put to sea. To almost regardless of the type of aircraft this end, our maritime reconnaissance employed. Therefore, in these circum squadrons have a vitally important part stances, quantity is even more vitally im to play, their task being to locate raiders portant than quality. Hence, it is impor immediately after their presence has been tant that aircraft intended for maritime disclosed and to shadow them until they reconnaissance duties should be cheap to can be engaged by an adequate force. produce and operate in large numbers, so far as this can be achieved without sacri Summary of Functions ficing other essential requirements. Having reviewed the principal functions Ship-Borne or Shore Based? of maritime reconnaissance squadrons, in relation to each of the major threats, these In deciding when it is preferable for functions can now be summarized as fol maritime reconnaissance aircraft to be ship-borne and when they should be shore lows: based, it is necessary to consider the na 1. Continuous antisubmarine reconnais ture of the task, the availability of air sance of inshore waters. craft carriers, and the size of aircraft in 2. Antisubmarine spotting in support of volved. If the task is one involving tactical convoy escort frigates. reconnaissance, in conjunction with convoy 3. Continuous antisubmarine sweeps of escort forces or a naval task force, then it focal and transit areas with or without is plainly an advantage if the aircraft can the support of surface forces. be operated from a ship. Not only are ship 4. Search and shadow patrols against borne aircraft on the spot whenever re enemy surface raiders. quired, but their use eliminates a prodi gious waste of effort which would oth~rwise Influencing Factors be involved in transit flying from shore Since ships and submarines can remain bases. at sea for weeks at a time, regardless of On the other hand, the use of ship-borne weather, it is clearly essential that mari aircraft to carry out tasks such as anti FOREIGN MILITARY DIGES!.l'S 91
submarine sweeps in enemy transit areas in thi~ way is it possible to reap the ,,at present involves committing a valuable , maximum ~ividend from tlw capital re aircraft carrier, together with its atten sources invested, in the carrier and its es~ dant escort. In such circumstances, the use cort. Considerations such as these may of shore based aircraft may frequently be therefore justify the use of carrier-borne more economical. Indeed, the availability aircraft for reconnaissance purposes which and huge cost of operating fleet carriers could otherwise be fulfilled more econ'omi is likely to restrict severely the use of air cally by shore based aircraft. craft which can only be operated from In some cases, of course, the size of air ships of this size. craft required for particular tasks vir In this connection, it must be appre tually precludes the possibility of operat ciated that the construction of even one ing them from ships. For example, all the fleet carrier absorbs a significant propor crew, together with the search equipment tion of our national resources in highly and armament, required to track and kill skilled manpower and material-quite submerged submarines entirely without apart from the large crew and elaborate the support of surface forces, can only be docking facilities required to keep her in carried satisfactorily in very large air commission. Moreover, giant aircraft car craft which must inevitably be shore based. riers are exceptionally vulnerable to air Generally speaking, however, in the ab and surface attack, and need the protec sence of special considerations, it seems tion of a surface antisubmarine screen reasonable to conclude that aircraft in in fact they may even have to be escorted tended primarily for tactical reconnais by cruisers, or a battleship, if there is any sance in the vicinity of convoys or naval risk of encountering heavily armed enemy task forces should normally be ship-borne, units. Thus, the deployment of these great while aircraft required to carry out stra ships automatically gives rise to a de tegic reconnaissance and independent an fensive commitment for which it may not tisubmarine sweeps should be shore based. always be possible to provide the necessary Landplanes or Flying Boats? forces. From the military aspect, the choice be During the last war, small escort car tween landplanes and flying boats for riers and dual purpose merchant aircraft maritime. reconnaissance duties is governed carriers were produced quicklY and at a primarily by strategic factors which vary comparatively low cost, but the restricted according to the theater in which the force size and speed of this type of carrier im is to be disposed. Flying boat designers poses severe limitations on the payload generally' agree that in speed and load and performance of any conventional air carrying capacity, the landplane is in craft with which they can be armed. In evitably superior to the flying boat until this connection, it is important to note an all-up weight of about 300,000 pounds that the latest fleet reconnaissance air is reached, after which, because of the craft, the Fairey G.R. 17, cannot readily massive weight of the undercarriage as~ , be operated from anything smaller than a sembly in giant landplan~s, the advantage light fleet carrier. switches to the flying boat. It is also in :>fevertheless, where, for example, the disputable that the maintenance, refuel requirements of air defense make the pres ing, and rearmament of flying boats at ence of a fleet carrier essential, then the moorings involves difficulties and delays potential value of these larger units as not suffered by landplanes, with the result baBes for antisubmarine reconnaissance that a far higher utilization rate is pos ail'craft must be fully exploited, since only sible with the latter type of aircraft. 92 - , MILITARY REVIEW, SEPTE!llBER 1952·
On the other hand, there is no doubt however, should comprise part of a shore that, sttategically, the ability of flying based force consisting mostly of landplanes boats to operate in all types of weather in the Atlantic and Mediterranean and of from primitive and indestructible bases flying boats elsewhere. can be" extremely val~able. The cost and delay involved in· building airfields is com Types of Aircraft Required pletely eliminated, enabling this type of The general requirements for maritime aircraft to be switched rapidly from one reconnaissance aircraft having been es area of operations to another in a matter tablished, it is now appropriate to consider of hours. Such an advantage is tremendous types of aircraft for use in particular in maritime warfare where threats may roles. In doing so, reconnaissance tasks develop anywhere within a vast thea may be divided into three broad categories. ter of operations, necessitating frequent namely those which are ,primarily con adjustment to the deployment of maritime cerned with spotting the enemy; those reconnaissance forces. On balance, then, which involve striking him at the same where there is a .deficiency of strategi time; and those concerned with locating cally well-placed airfields, the greater mo and shadowing surface raiders. bility of the flying boat far outweighs its technical shortcomings in comparison with Spotting Aircraft landplanes. Antisubmarine patrols over inshore wa . Examining the availability of landplane ters, and in the vicinity of convoys and and flying boat bases in British or friendly naval task forces, are mainly concerned territory, in relation to the defense of our with locating the enemy so that he can sea communications, it is evident that be attacked by surface ships. For this pur there. are enough airfields flanking the pose, therefore, we need an aircraft hav North Atlantic and Mediterranean sea ing the following characteristics: routes to provide for their complete cover 1. Capable of being operated in all age by landplanes. In the Indian Ocean types of weather from either shore bases and elsewhere, however, airfields are few or small, dual-purpose carriers such as the and far between, whereas there is an merchant ship carriers of the last war. abundance of suitable flying boat bases 2. Good endurance. from which all important routes can be 3. Adequate radio and search equipment. adequately patrolled. Hence, it appears 4. A large enough crew to maintain an that the greater part of our shore based efficient visual search; that is, at least a. maritime reconnaissance force should con crew of three. sist of landplanes, with ~dditional flying Striking power to kill a surfaced or boat squadrons for use mainly in the In 5: snorkeling submarine (this is desirable dian and Pacific Oceans. but not absolutely essential). Summary of Requirements 6. Cheap to produce and operate in To summarize, therefore, we see that large numbers. maritime reconnaissance aircraft should Of the requirements listed above, the be inexpensive and capable of detecting first is undoubtedly the most difficult to the enemy in all types of weather; also fulfill, and, within the immediate future, it that tactical reconnaiss~nce aircraft should virtually restricts our selection to a choice be of a type which can be operated equally between conventional aircraft, of a size well either from ships or shore bases. Air and performance comparable with the ,craft 'intended primarily for strategic re venerable Swordfish, blimps, or helicopters. connaissance and antisubmarine sweeps, Conventional aircraft in the Swordfish FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS
'category have the advantage of being undulY' expensive, if produced in large reasonably cheap to. produce while e~pe enough quantities; second, they can be rience in the last war shows that they can flown "On and off ,a small deck-space and it be operated fairly successfully at night should, therefore, be relatively simple and and in bad weather conditions. Neverthe inexpensive to modify suitable types' of less, the extent of deck space required for merchant ships, in considerable numbers, take-off and landing necessitates the pro to serve as dual-purpose carriers; and, vision of an elaborate and expensive modi third, it should be quite feasible to design fication to the superstructure of a mer a helicopter having an endurance of be chant ship. Moreover, the need to head tween 3 and 5 hours, to carry a crew of the carrier into the wind w"hen flying on three and the radio and search equipment and off is a serious handicap when ships for an.tisubmarine reconnaissance. have to be sailed in convoy. The most serious drawback to' helicop The United States Navy has made exten ters, in their present'stage of evolution, is sive use of blimps for inshore patrols and the severe strain oimposed upon the pilot convoy escort duties, and there is no doubt during prolonged flights and the extreme that, given suitable weather conditions, difficulty of flying them on instruments they can be employed most effectively in and at night. However, an automatic pilot this role. Not only is the endurance of this is now under development, and when this type of aircraft measured in days rather is available it should minimize pilot strain, than hours, but it should be quite feasible and, at the same time, greatly improve to devise Iheans of replenishing and refuel the all-weather and night flying character ing them from merchant ships when nec istics of this type of aircraft, essary. Moreover, since there is no inherent Thus, reviewing the comparative suita limitation to the size of these aircraft, bility of conventional aircraft, blimps, and they can readily be adapted to carryall the helicopters for antisubmarine spotting crew, equipment, and armament required purposes, it is evident that although con to track and kill submerged submarines. ventional aircraft are capable of meeting On the other hand, blimps are exceedingly most requirements, their use demands the expensive to build and operate and are also provision of carriers which are expensive very vulnerable to antiaircraft fire, added to improvise and which have to be headed to which they cannot be used in regions into the wind when flying on and off. In where there is any risk of encountering the case of the blimps, while they can be severe icing conditions. This latter dis most effective, given suitable weather con advantage' inevitably rules out the pos ditions, they are very costly to build 'and sibility of utilizing them in the North are unsuitable for use in the North At Atlanti<; during the winter. lantic route in winter. Helicopters, on the Trials to evaluate the usefulness of other hand, are free from the disad helicopters for maritime reconnaissance vantages associated with the other two, 'purposes are now being carried out on types of aircraft, but, at the present time, both sides of the Atlantic. Recent experi are unsuitable for carrying out pr910nged ence in Korea has demonstrated the ability flights or for use at night or in bad of helicopters to operate reliably either weather. On balance, however, given the from ships or shore bases under excep .necessary priority in development, it is tionally difficult conditions and the use of evident that helicopters should be capable these aircraft for antisubmarine spotting of satisfying our requirement for a large patrols 'would appear to offer many ad number of ship-borne spotting aircraft . vanta!5es. In the first place, they are not more nearly, and more economically, than 94 MILITA,RY REVIEW
is possible by using either blimps or con carry a somewhat smaller crew' (7 instead ventional aircraft. of 10) "and much· the same equipment as Offensive Reconnaissance Aircraft in the case of the gi~nts, although, with this load, its radius of action is only about Offensive reconnaissance patrols are half that of the larger types. Of course, mainly concerned with locating and killing the introduction of two categories of shore. enemy submarines, and for this purpose based aircraft for offensive reconnaissance an aircraft is needed which incorporates inevitably reduces the over-all flexibility the following characteristics: ' and efficiency of our force, but this disad 1. Range and endurance. vantage is outweighed by the vital need 2. Adequate radio, all-weather search to deploy aircraft in the numbers required equipment, and a large enough crew to to saturate focal areas. maintain an efficient visual search through In discussing the role of carrier-borne out the patrol. aircraft, we observed that when fleet car 3. The equipment required to track a riers are required in an area for purposes submerged submarine for a prolonged of air defense, they should also be used period. as bases for antisubmarine reconnaissance 4. Striking power to kill a submarine, aircraft. Therefore, a carrier-borne anti whether surfaced or submerged. submarine aircraft is required, incorporat 5. Capable of defending itself against ing substantially the same characteristics fighter attack. as those specified for similar shore based '6. Cheap enough to produce and operate aircraft, with the exception that a much in large numbers. shorter range is acceptable. In practice, Previously, we concluded that, in the however, it is virtually impossible to op absence of special considerations, it is erate, from a carrier, aircraft large preferable for aircraft engaged on offe~ enough to lift the crew, equipment, and sive reconnaissance to be shore based, III armament needed to track and kill sub which case a radius of action of 1,000 merged submarines entirely without the miles, with 4 hours on patrol, would seem support of surface forces. Therefore, in to be a reasonable interpretation of our considering the type of aircraft needed, first requirement. Unfort1Jnately, however, we are forced to choose between three pos this requirement directly conflicts with sibilities, namely: our need for an inexpensive aircraft, and, 1. To operate aircraft in pairs; for ex in practice, an aircraft designed to inco~ ample, one aircraft carrying search equip porate the characteristics we have speCI ment and the other tracking equipment, fied will have an all-up weight of around together with the killing weapon. 100,000 pounds; the Shackleton and the United States Convair PBY being typical 2. To operate aircraft as spotters, re examples. lying on surface ships to deliver attacks. The cost of building giant aircraft of 3. To compromise by operating aircraft this kind is prodigious. Hence, in order primarily as spotters, while providing to increase the total number of aircraft them with the means to cripple a subma obtainable within the limit of our re rine pending attack by surface ships. sources, it is desirable to equip a propor The system of operating aircraft in tion of our squadrons with smaller types, pairs is unacceptably extravagant, since such as the United States Navy Neptune, it virtually halves the effort available for which has an all-up weight of 67,000 reconnaissance purposes. On the other pounds, or the Short Solent at 78,000 hand, since submarines represent .fleeting . pounds.. The former aircraft is able to targets of opportunity, they s~ould be at FOREIGN MILITAll.Y DIGESTS 95 : tacked on sight whether or not surface Parliamentary announcements have stat; for(!es are available for the purpose. Hence, ed that the present intention is to arm the the best answer, seems to lie in adopting Coastal Command with Shackle tons, ,Nep the compromise represented in the design tunes, and Solents, while naval reconnais of the Fairey G.R. 17 which, although sance squadrons are to be equipped with primarily intended as a search aircraft, is the G.R. 17. It is reassuring to note that also armed with a striking weapon. the equipment of squadrons with these air- . craft is now going ahead. But what of the' Bunting Aircraft helicopters needed for tactical reconnais As long as they have the means to pro sance? tect themselves against fighter attacks, Without helicopters, the Coastal Com aircraft equipped to carry out long-range mand and carrier-borne aircraft, intended antisubmarine reconnaissance are emi for offensive reconnaissance, muS't be di nently suited for use on search and shadow verted from their primary role in order to patrols against enemy surface raiders. carry out defensi"ve inshore and convoy Special aircraft are not, therefore, re escort patrols. To dissipate our striking quired for thi.s role, which can be coupled force in this way is to invite defeat by conveniently with that of antisubmarine surrendering the initiative to the enemy offensive reconnaissance in all squadrons and allowing him freedom of action to whether carrier-borne or shore based. concent!ate against us at will. Summary of Types Required Conclusion The various types of aircraft for which Twice, since 1914, aggressors have we have established a requirement may sought to conquer us by submarine block now be summarized as follows: ade and twice they have brought us to the 1. Helicopters for antisubmarine spot verge of defeat. The success or failure of ting in support of surface forces; for ex a third attempt may well be decided by ample, patrol of inshore waters and con our ability to utilize helicopters for mari voy escort duties. time defense. 2. Long-range landplanes and flying boats (around 100,000 pounds all-up It is true that, at present, the capacity weight) for long-range antisubmarine of for the development and manufacture of fensive reconnaissance and for search and helicopters is extremely limited in this shadow patrols; for example, antisubma country. Nevertheless, given the necessary rine reconnaissance' in transit areas. priority, this capacity could be rapidly ex 3. Medium-range landplanes and fly panded and, if necessary, it should be pos ing boats (around 70,000 pounds all-up sible to purchase licenses from the United w!'ight) for medium-range antisubmarine States to produce suitable American types offensive reconnaissance and for seal1ch pending development of our own designs. and shadow patrols; for example, antislllb The task of equipping and training an ma rine sweeps in focal areas supported adequate force of helicopter squadrons for' by surface forces. I the Royal Navy will take years' to com 4. G.R. 17 type aircraft for antisub plete, and it is imperative that it should marine offensive reconnaissance from light be started without further delay. The fleet carriers supported by surface forqes. force is needed now! 96 MILITARY.ttEVIEW SEPTEMBER 1952 ' ,Employment of Commonwealth and . United States Field Artillery Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Captain G. A. Wood in the "Canadian Army Journal" .January 1952.
UPON emerging victorious from a major mm howitzers, and one battalion of me war, one is inclined to feel that his own diums, consisting of eighteen 155-mm how army corps or service is the most efficient itzers. This adds up to a total of 72 how and brilliant of them all, irrespective of the itzers in the divisional artillery, a fourth performance of his comrades and allies. of them being mediums. This is a healthy attitude, provided it is ~ The Canadian organi?ation, on the other not carried to a ridiculous extreme. Being hand, provides three field regiments for a gunner of the Canadian Army, I was af the infantry division, each consisting of flicted with a similar feeling about my own three batteries of eight guns. This gives arm to the partial exclusion of the merits a total of 24 guns in the regi~ent and 72 of the artillery of other armies, and more in the division, all being ligHt artillery especially of those outside the Common equipment. Therefore, it is apparent that wealth. the American division has slightly more Having been assigned to the United fire power in its divisional artillery than States for a tour of duty, and, in the course we, by virtue of having the heavier caliber of this tour, having met a number of very equipment. Whether 01' not this is the fine United States artillery officers, I have right balance of fire power is a matter for been obliged, being a reasonably fair man, conjecture and, no doubt, opinions will to admit that perhaps gunners other than vary greatly in both services." British and Canadian are able to em ploy artillery, and quite effectively, too. Battery Organization 'In this article, which I hope will assist us One of the principal differences between ,in understanding the United States artil the two services lies in the battery organ 'leryman and his ways, I am attempting to ization. In the Canadian battery, we have 'compare the methods of employing field ar two troops each of four guns and a bat tillery at the battalion-regimental level tery headquarters troop. The latter is re used by the field gunners of the United sponsible for administering the gun troops, States and Commonwealth forces by point co-ordinating the battery survey, and pro ing out the more prominent similarities viding the battery command post. Each and differences between the two systems. gun troop is able to fire independently of the other and without assistance or direc ~ do not intend to compare the tech nical capabilities of ourselves as opposed tio') from the battery command post. It to the United States artillel'yman except has its own troop command post which is to state that, from what little I have ob responsible for controlling the fire of the served of United States gunnery meth guns, carrying out the troop survey, and ods, the, American artilleryman need take determining the data to be passed to the off'his hat to no one. guns as fire ol'ders. The battery command post, on the other hand, is responsible for The' United States divisional artillery battalion is organized on a three-battery * Although no medium artillery is organic to basis,there being six guns in each battery. the Canadian division. it is normal for a medium regiment from an AGRA (Army Group Royal Ar There' are three light artillery battalions tillery) tot be allotted to the divisional artillery in the infantry 'division, armed with 105 when committed.-The Editor. ' J FOREIGNiMILITARY DIGESTS 97
'. ca-ordinating the fire of the battery: on address their requests for fire to 'the fire' all regimental and higher targets and on direction center, which, in turn, allots a certain battery targets. For this purpbse, battery, or whatever amount of support it is organized to duplicate the technical it feels is requir~d for a mission. The for work performed by the two troop com ward observer then passes his fire orders mand posts in order to p~rmit control ~nd to the fire direction center which converts provide a final check on all technical work them into commands and passes them to done by the troop command posts. If jthe the battery or batteries concerned. There proper checks are carried out. each item is no delay in relaying these orders to the in the sequence of fire orders is confirred .' guns, the fire direction center performing by independent check at least twice and much the same task as a Canadian battery usually three times. No technical work is command post might under certain cir performed at the regimental headquartl:!rs. cumstances. Although the Uniteu States but, rather, the fire of the batteries is eon- teaching requires battel:y command posts trolled and co-ordinated through the bat~ to perform technical work at all times, tery command posts by telephone and from what I can iearn this is not always radio. In the Canadian battery, the am done and varies from one unit to another. munition and POL (petroleum, oil. and In any event, this is desirable, but, in most lubricants) are carried in battery trans cases, not essential for the functioning of port, re-supply being co-ordinated by the the unit. The main function of the battery regiment, while in the United States bat command post, once the battery 'is de talion there is a service battery provided ployed, is general supervision of the po to perform these duties and others. This sition.' is merely a difference in the allocation of From the foregoing, it would appear transport which has no real effect on the that the Canadian battery is more self working of the two types of units, as con contained than its United States counter trol is centralized in both cases, the United part and perhaps can conduct independ States service battery having the ability ent operations more readily, This does not to break down into gun battery portions mean, however. that it can function more if necessary for independent operatio~~. efficiently in this role. The United States battery,can be better The outstanding difference between the compared with our troop. It is organized. two batteries lies in the location of the deployed. and fought as a single unit. Its command group. The command of the fire is directly controlled from a. battery United States battery is found at battal command post. but the technical work is ion headquarters and the battery com done by the fire direction center at the bat mand post, while the command of the talion headquarters. The battery officers Ca·nadian sub-unit is found at the obsel'va are responsible for deploying the battery. tion post and with the headquarters of the commanding the gun position, and control unit being supported. The relative merits, ling the fire as directed by the battalion 'fire direction center. of these 'two systems will be discussed in later paragraphs. The United States artillery battalion is lIlore rigidly controlled than its counter The centralized system of fire control part, the Canaaian regiment. The fire of as found in the United States battalion all batteries on any type of target is con has its advantages and disadl1antages, 'trolled from the battalion fire direction W,ith this system, fewer numbers of sPe center which does all the technical work cialists are provided for command post for the batteries. All forward observers and fire direction center work. Surveyors MILITARY REVIEW
"and o~her personnel at battalion head ket," the fire direction center. There, is quarters are trained in fire direction cen not the degree of flexibility that there is ter duties in order to provide the required in the other system. Unless the United relief for the specialists. With this reduc States battery command post is able to ti~n in highly trained specialists comes take over and undertake aU· its own tech fewer problems in the initial training of nical work and effect the necessary liaison the unit. This is a most important con with the other batteries and the forward
CANADIAN FIELD REGIMENT ORGANIZATION
ARTILLERY TO DIVISION ARTILLERY .1______+ REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS ~""'~~'!I!",
I " ,
I " , I , , I " , I " a:{~ATTERY £h BATTERY ~ BATTERY 'W'.COMMANO- -- -m-COMMAND- -- -m COMMAND , ~ POST , ~ POST , ~ POST , ~ , ~ , \ I \ I >.... ,..( ~ ~---.~ E9---~ ~---ffi TROOP TROOP COMMAND COMMAND POST POST CONTROl. CENTER WHERE NO + TECHNICAl. WORK 'S PERFORMED. FORWARD FORWARD OBSERVATION OBSERVATION OFFICER OFFICER AT COMPANY AT COMPANY -- - GUN POSITION COMMUNICATIONS. HEADQUARTERS HEADQUARTERS -FORWARD CONTROL COMMUNICATION5 This gives in diagrammatic form the layout of the Canadian field regiment in support of an infantry brigade. For the sake of simplicity, the forward control communications for one battery only is given. The basic communications are such as show'n in the diagram.. The complete system is much more complex, employing radio and telephone. sideration, especially during the early observers, it is completely dependent upon stages of mobilization when training time the battalion fire direction center for the is so vital, school resources are greatly firing of the guns and the co-ordination of overtaxed, and units must be trained the battalion's fire. Under the Canadian quickly. system of control, the neutralization of Under the United States system, a small anyone of the control agencies would number of trained specialists can carry have no effect upon the fire of any of the on for a limited period until the full com guns for even a very short period, because plement is brought up to a satisfactory all levels of control are duplicated. Under sta~da~d by on-the-job training. This the centralized system, according to the also is true of the Canadian unit, except teaching, but apparently not always in tliat a few more specialists will be required actual practice, all senior commanders i~iUaIlY. As I see it, one of the principal locate themselves at or near the fire di d sadvantages of the .centralized system rection center. Should this area become is. that "most of the eggs are in one bas neutralized, the action to assume tempo ·"i FOREtGNjMILITARY DIGESTS 99 .
tary control of the battalion fire nlust at the same time, our infantry is heavily come from an officer of comparati,\ely attacked, our artillery must, as in the junior rank. While this is feasible, it is past, play a major role in defeating the . not the most desirable situation. attack. By decentralizing. our technical work to the batteries, duplicating it at Possibilities of the Future troop level, and performing it right on It is readily agreed that past exp~ri- the gun position, we are minimizing the
UNITED STATES FIELD ARTILLERY BAnALlON ORGANIZATION
TO DIV1SION ARTILLERY
LIAISON OFFICER AT REGIMENT
LIAISON FORWARD FORWARD FORWARD FORWARD LIAISON OFRCER AT OBSERVER OBSERVER OBSERVER OBSERVER OFFICER AT BATTALION AT COMPANY ATCQMPANY AT COMPANY AT COMPANY BATTALION
CONTROL CENTER WHERE 1fCHNICAl WORK IS PERfORMED. _ _ _ _ GUN POsmON COMMUNICATIONS.
_ FORWARD CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS. This gives in diagrammatic form the laYI'J~t of the United States field artillery battalion in support of an infantry regiment with two battalions up. More forward observers may be allowed if required. The basic communications are shown in this' diagram. Alternate channels, both radio and telephone, are provided and used as the need for them arises. ente has shown that the neutralization chance of control being lost. If'a troop . of the fire direction center even for a short command post is knocked out, the battery period is a very rare occurrence, but with commhntl post takes over as it is equipped the enemy artillery we are likely to face to, do at all times, and if the guns of a in future conflict, especially in the early troop are neutralized or knocked out· the stages when we will probably be on thfJ troop command post is not required, but defensive, such occasions should not be the rest of the regii};ent is able to fire' too remote to receive very serious com. as usual. Under our system, in the worst sidl'ration. If the United States evolve~ case, at least some of the guns will be able. a ,tandard drill for firing the battaliotl to fire, and under centralized control. From wit hout 'the fire direction' ce~ter, and al~ a strictly functional point of view, how batteries religiously performed their own ever, I do not think there can be any ar technical work, this criticism would ~ gument one way or another as regards nullified. If our gun areas are subjecte the technical efficiency of either system. to sudden and heavy bombardment an They both work well, and I do not think - .. , .•.~
'100 MILITARY REVIEW SEPT,EMBER 1952 either can claim more speed or accuracy rests with the artillery even up to and over the other. including divisional artillery level, after which the division commander must de Most Controversial Point cide. I do not intend to imply that there We now come to what is without a doubt is lack of harmony between the United the 'most controversial point of difference States infantry and artillery under this between the two systems. I think it is system, which I am sure is not the case, the crux of the whole matter, for if we but I merely wish to point out the differ-, were agreed on this the rest would take ences in our thinking on this question. care of itself. I refer to the organization for the forward control of the fire of the The Canadian System unit. IW' the Canadian regiment, the reverse In the United States battalion the for procedure is followed. The junior officers ward observers are from the junior of (lieutenants) are responsible for the gun ficer ranks. It is not uncommon for the positions and all survey and technical battalion to 'use enlisted men as forward work. The senior officers live and work observers for short periods until replace with the units being supported. The com ment officers become available or until manding officer bases himself during ac these enlisted men can be commissioned in tion at the headquarters of the brigade the field. The artillery battalion command he is supporting and visits his unit daily er is represented at the infantry battalion to attend to matters requiring his per headquarters and the infantry regimental sonal attention; the battery commanders (brigade) headquarters by a liaison offi (majors) live and work with the infantry cer who is a captain, or possibly a major battalion commanders that their resPective if the situation warrants it. These are batteries are supporting; and the troop true liaison officers in that they have no commanders (captains) are the forward command responsibility, but live with the observers for those battalions, being lo supported unit always, even when out of cated with the forward rifle company com action. The artillery battalion commander manders. It is only when the supported visits regimental headquarters at least battalion or brig'ade is in reserve or out daily, and the infantry battalion head of action that the senior officers rejoin quarters frequently. The liaison officers and live with their respective units and ,', are responsible for acting as artillery ad sub-units. visers to the commanders of the units The troop commanders are the forward being supported and as their own com observation officers and are permitted to manding officers' representatives with the call directly upon their own troops for infantry. They also are responsible for supporting fire. They normally can call directing the forward observers much as for fire from the battery without reference do the Canadian battery commanders. to the battery commander who is at the in The final decision as to what artillery fantry battalion headquarters, but lhey support will be provided for the infantry will usually have to get his consent to fire battillion rests with the senior artillery the regiment or more artillery. This, of commander concerned, usually represented course, varies with the situation, and a by the artillery battalion S3 (a major) in policy is laid down at all times by the unit the fire direction center. The forward commander defining the amount of artil obsei'ver may request fire, but not demand lery a battery commander may use, over it or' order it even from his own battery and above his own battery, on his own re 01' battalion. The final decision, th~refore, sponsibility during the period in question. FQREIGN~tITARYDIGESTS 1'01 , ,Whena forward observati~n officer wishe$ the infantry commander and tlieir influ to fire a battery or larger target, he may ence will be felt. do so through his troop, battery, or th¢ Greatest Point of Difference regimental command post, whichever he This is tlie greatest point of difference chooses. Other batteries and regiment$ in our thinking, and it is most difficult for follow up each. ranging correction as it i$ a gunner to lay aside personal loyalties given out, and by this means all the artil;' and look at the problem completely objec lery allotted for the target is ready to fir~ tively, as each line of reasoning has its at the same time as the ranging gun. i own merits. One may perhaps cite a num I bel' of cases where United States artillery The United States Attitude support has suffered because of differences The United States attitude is that the of opinion between the infantry' and ar command organization should remain in tillery which could have been ayoided if the gun area and that all that it is necl a "more senior arti1leryman had been on essary to have forward is the machiner~ the spot. On the other hand, the United to pass on the requirements to the guns States artilleryman can produce literally and to advise the infantry on artillery thousands of cases where the relationship matters. The complete battle situation is was completely harmonious and could not known at the artillery battalion head have been improved. quarters while the forward observer has There are othcr differences between the only local knowledge. For this reason, units of the two services, but these are the United States artillery officer main vcry minor. Wc have different communica tains, junior personnel are sufficient for tions systems, but we are equally com forward observer duties. At the same time, munications-conscious and follow the same the battalion commander, by at least daily principles to provide the maximum flexi visits to infantry regimental headquarters, bility and the minimum chance of break eifucts the necessary liaison with the in down. We both, in our forward control fantry commander. communicatio~s, provide our armies with The Commonwealth artillery holds that their main channels of battle intelligence. command must be exercised from forward Wc both almost dogmatically practice the positions with the "arms being supported. principle of concentration of fire, and we OUI' stand is that the man on the spot both resist vigorously the tendency of any must be able to turn to his infantry op one to disperse and dissipate the artillery posite number and state with authority, "I effort. We have both produced more than will give you the fire you want," or, "I our fair share of top commanders and we advise against it for the following rea both have succeeded in convincing our sons ..." After stating his reasons, the comrades in the other arms of the service gunner must leave it to the infantryman that in paving the way for the successful to decide the questi
102 MILITARY REVIEW SEPTEMBER 1952 The Battle Group
Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Norman Archer in "The Army Quarterly" (Great Britain) January 1952.
ARMY evolution is notoriously slow. The guns and armor must have food or the Maginot Line mentality was unfortunately army dies. not confined to the French and the old Reason for Success shibboleth of defense held sway in the The success of the German battle group various staff creeds until the Germans, lay in the fact that it was self-contained. previously held as copyists and improvers, The infantry was not expected to combat swept this away in the Battle of France opposing armor, but simply whistled up by introducing mobile warfare. 88-mm guns or tanks in their own group Turning to the title of this article, we and stubbornly held vital positions for have the mobile "battle group" encountered days. If they had been adequately sup by the British and the Americans in the ported from the air, they might have gone close country of Normandy after the suc far in blunting the allied attack and driv cessful landings on D-day. The German ing it back to the hard-won beaches. It Seventh Army, faced with an overwhelm cannot be stressed too much that the al ing gun and air superiority, was at a de most complete elimination of the German cided disadvantage, coupled with a lack Air Force was the paramount factor in of mobility as shown by its widespread the defeat of the Seventh Army in Nor use of horse-drawn transport. Its role, mandy. until the completion of Patton's armored We now know from interviews with Ger "right hook" and the subsequent retreat man commanders that their lack of air to Belgium and Holl'and, was almost en support was crippling. Phrases like "We tirely confined to defense; a defense that lost contact with X division on our left"; was tenaciously fought for months. The "N0 orders came through for 3 days"; German High Command was at fault in "We had to fall back as each position was not reinforcing this army after it became outflanked"; and "Reserves and supplies plain that this was the main event. How failed to arrive" give some idea of the be ever, in the chaos of battle, it evolved wilderment in the enemy camp. It says the battle group. much for the discipline of the German At a strength of one battalion of in system that they were able to put up such fantry, supported by a few self-propelled a stout opposition when one considers the guns and a handful of tanks, these forma personnel of their units composed as they tions would punch a gap in a British di were of a good proportion of Russian, Slo vision and cause a disruption out of all vak, and other eastern and European proportion to its numbers. The forward types. This mixture of foreign elements movement of a corps would grind to a halt in armies is no new thing. Napoleon until the wedge was eliminated. The sol drafted nationals from nearly every coun dier in battle will not fight well with a try in Europe to fill the gaps in the Grande threat to his rear, and with the accent on Armee. supply, the modern army soon is rendered ineffective if gasoline or ammunition fails Composition of a Battle Group to arrive. Armies have got along for con However, let us return to the question siderable periods with little or no food, of the battle group. Depending on the and will do so again in future wars, but situation, the formation could be anything FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS
from battalion to brigade strength with "specialists" were attached, sometimes . the'infantry weapons integrated fully with permanently, but often being withdrawn armor, artillery, and service units. Where to other formations as replacements just possible, a flight or squadron of aircraft as they were settling in and working would train with the ground force. Co harmoniously with the division or brigade. operation between the air and the ground The artillery observation officer lived in or has not always been too happy. One re about the front line and responded to any members occasions in Normandy, Italy, request for support from the infantry, and and Tunis where a deplorable lack of reported targets back to his batteries, but liaison, ground recognition, or faulty brief he nevertheless remained a comparative ing led to severe losses with consequent stranger to the infantry, was removed by bad feeling between the services. wounds, death, or recall, and a new man was laboriously inducted. The batteries Co-operation Difficulties often pulled out, leaving their gubs in the Co-operation between the infantry and pits to be taken over by a new battery armor has presented many difficulties. unacquainted with the terrain and prob The footslogger has come to regard tanks lems of the sector. Meantime, the infantry as something to be called up every time sweated grimly on in the deadly routine the going gets tough. The experienced of that war: a week at a time in the line, tank man knows from bitter experience the support and reserve, while the daily at limitations of his weapon, and, with the trition whittled down their numbers. improved antitank weapons now coming forward, combined with the ever present A Need for Improvisation mine field, these costly and vulnerable ve This rigidity of the British Army in hicles are in a transitory state. Maybe in World War I was noted by the Germans, time they will join the battleship in the and one of their commanders has stated discard unless some form of mobile mine that all British attacks, with the exception sweeper or destroyer is evolved to sally of one or two like Cambrai, followed a out in front of an armored attack. fixed pattern, with no improvisation to mcet previous lessons, and the Germans Again, the actual contact between the made their defensive plans accordingly. infantry and the fa~t-moving tank has It has often been said by various military shown the need for drastic revision of writers that the Germans were no better, communications. Nearly every battalion that once their plans became unstuck they history of the last war has some pungent folded up. However, at least they had criticism of "combined" actions that failed learned something by 1918, and their in to do just that. filtration tactics nearly won the war. Analyzing the British Division •The reader might be pardoned if he If we take the British division of three thought by this time that this article is briKades with ancillary signals, artillery, a eulogy of German military genius. The, supply, and others, we come up against a writer is fully aware of their points and rigid division of the functions of the drawbacks from military angles. It is well separate arms. In World War I, the in never to despise an opponent, but rather fantry's' task .was comparatively simple to learn both from his successes and fail from a technical angle. Somewhere at the ure~, so that he may be the more readily rear of eal!h battalion in the line was,the beaten. field and heavy artillery. The Royal En The battle group then will become a gineers, Royal Army Medical Corps, and reality. The size of a group will be con 104 MILITARY REVIEW SEPTEMBER 1952
ditioned by circumstances of attack or de Hacheim where, completely dug in with fense, but will probably not exceed a bri all-round defense, they withstood the as gade in strength, and will more probably saults of Rommel's armor and dive bomb be limited to the numbers of a battalion. ers until the end. Such actions will swing Commando and airborne operations bear the verdict in future battles. The reduction some resemblance, but these are neces of such formations is a costly and time sarily specialist formations, limited by wasting operation for any attacking com their very nature to lightly armed troops mander, but their employment as a regular whose success and often final existence de feature of modern armies is yet to come. pend on completely integrated forces of The military mind from experience is all arms following up. slow to change. It is only in the crucible The future battle group, whatever its of war that new ideas, born of desperate size, can remain a component of its im situations, are given a trial, often reluc mediate brigade, division, or corps. In tantly. The rapid invention of new weap action, it will be entirely on its own, in ons must inevitably cause a revision of effect an army within an army. One re tactics, if not of strategy, which remains calls the heroic Free French at Bir a fairly constant factor.
New Threat-Soviet Navy
Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article in "U. S. News & World Report" (United States) 11 April 1952. *
THE Soviet Navy is no longer a joking large naval guns. The emphasis is on matter. Almost unnoticed, the Soviet new types of submarines, but surface Union has developed a strange, yet for fleets as well are being built up. Large midable, fighting fleet. It has more active battleships and cruisers of a wholly new ships than the United States, is overtak type, designed primarily to use missiles ing our lead in heavy combat ships, and (guided and free rocket), are the backbone has the world's largest submarine fleet. of the Soviet Navy now under construc Soviet sea power, once ignored, is giv tion. There seems to be no interest in air ing serious concern to Western defense craft carriers, but great interest in fast planners-and that power is still growing. interceptor vessels. Altogether, the Soviet Western officials are just now beginning Union's naval tonnage has risen, within to show serious concern over the fast the last 10 years, from seventh to third growing Soviet Navy, as reliable facts and place among the navies of the world, and figures come to light to show what is it may go to second place when the cur happening. What the reports show is this: rent building program is completed. Then, The Soviet Union seems to be building only the United States Navy will be larg a new type of fleet. Its basic weapons er-and only in tonnage, not in the number are guided missiles and torpedoes, not of combat ships. I * This article was digested from U. S. NEWS & Compared with the United States Navy, WORLD REPORT, an independent weekly news it is a strange sort of fleet. It has virtu magazine published at Washington. Copyright 1952, ally no defensive strength. It cannot es l United States News Publishing Corporation. Per mission for further reprint must be obtained from cort convoys or expect to defeat other l. United States News Publishing Corporation. navies at sea. However, at the present FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 105. time, it probably is unsurpassEld in abili present Soviet battleships are said· to be ty to intercept an enemy's vital life lines equipped with one or two catapult towers overseas, to attack 1m enemy's coastal for firing radio-controlled aerial- torpe- cities, or to break up a large amphibious does, and also rocket-firing apparatus landing operation with missile attacks. and radio-controlled guns. Moreover. those unde~ construction also will carry Aircraft Carriers two batteries of guided missiles·in addi In aircraft carriers, which form the tion to the torpedo and rocket-firing arma backbone of the United States fleet, the ment. new Soviet Navy has no real strength. Cruisers It is reported to have only one carrier, In cruisers, too, the Soviet Union soon
THE SOVIET NAVY: LARGER AND LARGER
TIlE SOVIET NAVY MAY BE IN SECOND THE SOVIET NAVY WAS IN SEVENTH PLACE. THE SOVIET NAVY IS IN THIRD PLACE. PLACE. IT WAS BEHIND BRITAIN, THE UNITED IT IS LARGER THAN ANY OTHER NAVY, A NEW BUILDING PROGRAM, IF COM· STATES, JAPAN, FRANCE, ITALY, EXCEPT THE UNITED STATES' AND PlETEO, WILL MAKE THE SOVIET NAVY AND GERMANY. BRITAIN'S. SECOND ONLlTO THE UNITED STATES NAVY. the captured German Graf Zeppelin, now will far outnumber the United States, at being used as an experimental ship for the present rate of construction. The guided missiles. The United States has Soviets now have from 15 to 20 cruisers, the world's largest carrier fleet, with a all new or remodeled since World War II, total of 27 ships. Carriers are handy for and they plan to add 20 more, inCluding dpfending convoys and naval task forces, 4 "supercruisers." The United States has but they do not fit into the Soviet formula 15 heavy and 3 light cruisers on hand, for an interceptor fleet. with none under construction. The Soviet Union'S large fleet of cruisers appears to Battleships be designed for the fast interception of hi battleships, however, the Soviet Navy enemy convoys and missile bombardment is strQng, and growing stronger. Where of enemy coastal areas. tI,e United States has four conventional large battleships, the Soviet -Union has Destroyers three modified dreadnoughts and. three In destroyers, Soviet strength is well mvre under construction. According to behind that of thE;! United States, but it the authoritative Jane's Fighting Ships, is increasing fast. Where this country has 106 MILITARY REVIEW , SEPTEMBE~ 1952,
244 destroyers, the Soviet Union has 70 longed periods. That is the line-up of the regular' destroyers plus 33 small, high present submarine fleet as reported by the, speed destroyers, and she plans to build well-informed quarterly review, Foreign 120 additional ships of both types. Their AjJ'ai1·s. New construction is expected to missions,however, differ greatly. United be largely of the latest long-range, type. States destroyers are primarily for anti What concerns Western defense offi submarine duty and convoy protection. cials most about the Soviet submarine Soviet types are believed to be largely for fleet, however, is not so much its size as its patrol duty-to locate enemy convoys and quality, Submarines of World War II task forces, to be worked over by Soviet types can be combated, but three new submarines, and to patrol Soviet coastal developments in postwar submarines, if areas. perfected by the Soviets, can make under Torpedo Boats water craft very difficult to find and de stroy, These are: The Soviet Union is well ahead in tor pedo 'boats, which can be useful for pro 1. The snorkel device, tecting inland seas and intercepting an 2. The closed-cycle submarine engine, enemy fleet in areas such as the Baltic or which the Germans developed toward the the Mediterranean. She has several hun end of the' war to provide the engine with dred of these specialized craft, and has its own oxygen, by using hydrogen per hundreds more under construction. oxide, thus making it unnecessary for the submarine to come to the surface period Submarines ically for air, or even to expose its snorkel. In submarines, however, the new Soviet 3. The atomic-powered engine, which fleet has its greatest strength. Jane's could give submarines unlimited range, Fighting Ships lists 375 or more for the high speed, and the ability to stay under Soviets, and adds that they plan to build water indefinitely. 1,900 more. This compares with a German strength of only 67 submarines at the Naval Planes start of World War II, and with an aver In naval planes, finally, the new Soviet age German strength of 132 during war fleet has no carrier based types, but it is time, when submarines nearly cut the strong on coastal patrol models. In fact, United States-to-Europe life lines. near Soviet coasts, naval torpedo bombers could be as much of a threat as the Not all of these Soviet submarines are Soviet submarine and surface fleets, More large, long-range models. Many are old, than 2,000 combat aircraft are known to and not equipped with the snorkel breath be under Soviet Navy command, and near ing device which enables newer types to ly all of these guard Soviet or satellite stay underwater indefinitely, Probably a coastal areas, New types of jet-powered, third of these craft are very small "Mal long~range naval patrol planes are report utka" models, SUItable only for intercep ed, as are hundreds of land-based dive tion jobs near harbors, in inland seas, or bombers. just off a coastal area. Others are sea going submarines of 500 to 800 tons, us Totaling the Score able in the Baltic, Black, and Arctic Seas, That is how the new Soviet Navy ap the Sea of Japan, and, to a lesser degree, pears to stack up at this time. It means in parts of the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. that the Soviets 'now have the world's The largest Soviet submarines are the largest undersea fleet, a formidable naval fleet type of 1,000 tons and up, which can air fleet, and a surface fleet that is sur 'go anywhere and can operate for pro passed in'size only by the United States FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 107 " and British surface fleets. Altogether, of course, is more important than thenum the Soviets are known to have at least ber of ships in her fleet. If war between 536 combat ships, compared with 473 large the United' States and the Soviet Union er combat ships in the United States fleet. should occur, in the opinion of respon In addition, the Soviet Union is reported sible naval officers: to have more motor torpedo boats, sub The greatest danger will be from Soviet marine cha'sers; inshore patrol craft, and submarines cutting American supply lines other small coastal vessels in active use to Europe and from sources of raw ma than the United States and British Navies terial elsewnere. combined. Many vessels of all types are The danger to United States cities on captured models, or are old, poorly or near either coast is less publicized, equipped, and obsolete by United States but it. is just as real, especially with the standards, but a modernization program new Soviet fleet concentrating on missile is bringing even these types into usable weapons. shape. The danger to the United States fleet The expansion of the Soviet fleet, more is less evident, but it also must be con over, will greatly increase the strength sidered because of the new weapons and of underwater and fast surface intercep~ the growing size of the Soviet UnJon's tor types. According to Jane's Fighting surface fleet, and the possible effective Ships, Soviet plans call for at least 1,143 ness of her new-model submarines. Long more ships. That would bring the size of range missiles with atomic >yarheads, for the Soviet Navy up to 1,707 combat ships, example, could conceivably wreck a United plus small craft, as compared with the presently planned expansion of the United States task force before Soviet ships were States Navy to about 1,200 combat ships. even sighted. In the process, the Soviet Navy would All told, the long-ignored Soviet Navy pass the British Navy in size and ap now appears to be moving into the big proach the tonnage of the American fleet. time, becoming a serious menace to de fense plans of the West-and the outlook What Are its Capabilities? is for the Soviet threat to increase great What the Soviet Union's Navy can do, ly in the next few years.
A perusal of available military and civilian publications, during the past 3 months, indicates that material from the l\ULITARY REVIEW was reprinted in the following countries: .\rgentina Denmark Italy Portugal .\ustralia EI Salvador Mexico Spain Belgium France Norway Switzerland Brazil Great Britain Pakistan The Netherlands I'anadll India Peru United States Chile Ireland The Editor 108 MILITARY REVIEW SEPTEMBER 1952 Carrier Development
Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Rear Admiral G. P. Thomson.in "The Navy" (Great Britain) December 1951.
THE conversion of two United States of the escort carrier used during the war. cruisers for guided missile firing may well The escort carrier of the future will re indicate an early change in the main arma quire a vessel to be of approximately the ment of large ships. Aircraft, however, still size, speed, and performance of; the Glory provide the effective striking power of the class. present-day fleet, a striking power vastly The six Glory-class carriers-and the increased by the atom bomb which can be three similar vessels whose construction delivered by carrier-borne aircraft. There has been suspended---ean no longer be re fore, the developments which are now tak garded as having any real value for fleet ing place in carriers are of considerable work, for operating in enemy waters interest. against land based aircraft. Laid down in Two Types of Carriers Required 1942-43, at a time when the urgent need for both repair and new construction of The Soviet Union's geographical sit merchant ships imposed rigid economy in uation and the numbers and types of her naval building, they were regarded' as warships emphasize the lesson of the last makeshift carriers, and intended to meet .:w.ar that we must have two types of car immediate fleet requirements in the Pacif riers-one for antisubmarine warfare and ic theater. the other for attacks on land and sea sur face targets during offensive operations. The Triumph, Theseus, Glory, and the In World War II when we found the Royal Australian Navy's Sydney have U-boats operating in the mid-Atlantic, since done splendid service in Korean we obtained some 45 escort carriers from waters, but they are already stretched to the United States. These vessels, which the limit in being called upon to operate were constructed on merchant ship hulls, aircraft of a weight half as heavy again accompanied the convoys throughout the as those of 6 years ago, and with take voyage and did splendid work in keeping off and landing speeds some 30 knots in ex U-boats submerged and preventing them cess of their predecessors. Moreover, apart from shadowing convoys on the surface from the small number of aircraft car and attacking in packs at night. ried-about 40-their maximum speed of 23 knots is insufficient to operate jet and Changes in Antisubmarine Weapons other modern aircraft. However, concurrent with the increase of the submarine's offensive power be Modernization Required cause of the snorkel and her increased The greatly increased size, weight, and submerged speed, aids to aircraft in anti speed of modern aircraft already have submarine warfare also have made rapid necessitated the modernization of our six strides. The weight and size of both de existing fleet carriers (the Victorious techlng devices and antisubmarine weap is now in hand), and also a delay in the ons now being installed in aircraft have completion of the Ark Royal-sister ship increased to such 'an extent since the war of the Eagle and started only 6 months that modern antisubmarine aircraft will later-to enable still more modern equip be incapable of operatIng from ships with ment to be installed in her. Before the the small dimensions and limited speed last war, the aircraft of both belligerents FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 109 'were restricted by the same conditions in In view of the demands for shipping having to operate from a carrier. It was in time Of war, it will not be easy to :find a comparatively simple problem for our merchant ships suitable for conversion to naval constructors and engineers to de escort carriers of the type which is now sign vessels which, in performance and recognized as a light fleet carrier. Fortu other operational requirements, were at nately, the prospect of being able to fit car least as good as, if not superior to, the riers with a flexible rubber flight deck carriers of a potential enemy. Under should improve matters considerably, modern conditions, however, the offen since landing on a rubber deck eliminates sive function of the carrier has largely the need for the undercarriage which re changed. quires a percentage of the total weight of an aircraft out of all proportion to its Operational Tasks value. If the project proves successful, it In the absence of potential enemy will greatly increase the effectiveness of battle fleets, British fleet carriers in the the naval air arm, both by.reducing the future are likely to be required for general performance requi'rements of escort car reconnaissance duties and for task force riers and enabling fleet carriers to operate operations in enemy waters, including aircraft of increased range, armament, also the provision of air cover for expe and performance. ditionary forces on passage and during the landing until air bases can be estab Greater Tactical Freedom lished ashore for land based aircraft. U ndercarriageless aircraft will, of Moreover, whether or not naval aircraft course, have to be catapulted to become are to assist the Royal Air Force in stra airborne, but this has little disadvantage tegic bombing, there will be many oppor since catapulting is now becoming the tunities for medium-range bombing' from standard method of launching all of our carriers operating off an enemy's coasts. latest aircraft. Catapulting, if it increases All these duties entail opposition from slightly the launching interval, gives a enemy shore based fighters, and it is thus carrier the immense asset of greater tacti essential that our fleet carriers should be cal freedom, because she no longer has to able to operate fighters of the latest type, alter course into the wind prior to flying which it is possible to operate from ,car off. Steaming into the wind for landing riers, in addition to the most powerful will stilI be necessary, but there is nor bombers, offensively and defensively. mally sufficient notice of this for the neces Hence, the need for major alterations, in sary action to be taken to adjust the po volving an increase in the strength of the sition of the carrier. Indeed, this tactical flight deck and the installation of higher freedom given by the use of the catapult performance arrester gear and catapults, mll.Y be regarded as an effective answer and other important modifications, both to those who argue that the large fleet to ~xisting carriers and those now under carrier is far too vulnerable for operations, construction. in enemy waters. BOOKS OF IN')'ERE'S'I' TO THE MILITARY READER
THE RISE OF TOTALITARIAN DEMOC , The detailed study of the views of Ba RACY. By J. L. Talmon. 366 Pages. The beuf and his plot is a well-rounded picture Beacon Press, Boston. $4.00. of the thoughts of one of the principal By LT COL IRVING HEYMONT, In! precursors of Marx and of the mechanics In this book, the first of a series of of a revolutionary effort. Professor Tal three, Professor Talmon examines the mon makes clear the debt owed by Marx and the Bolsheviks of 1917 to the lessons roots of totalitarian democracy in the French Revolution. The following two of the French Revolution and its subse books will trace further developments up quent upheavals. to the present day. While the book is thoroughly docu According to the author, both liberal mented, nothing distracts from smooth and totalitarian democracy agree on the reading. The serious student of history value of liberty. While the liberal form and social ideas is indebted to Professor believes in development by trial and error, Talmon for this lucid coverage of ~ com the totalitarian form assumes an exclusive plex subject. truth in politics. The totalitarian democ LINCOLN AND HIS GENERALS. By T. racy is Messianic in nature in that it Harry Williams. 363 Pages. Alfred A. Knopf, further assumes a preordained p~rfect Inc., N ew York. $4.00. scheme of things which will inevitably be reached. Force, it preaches, may be re By CAPT JAMES S. EDGAR, MPC quired to hasten its progress. This is a fascinating story of Lincoln Modern totalitarian democracy is a dic and his many trials in directing the Civjl tatorship resting on popular enthusiasm. War. It is not a military history but an This dictatorship of the Left has as its exciting, dramatic human story of the starting point man, his reason, and salva part played by the Commander in Chief. tion. As a result, it tends, to' assume the It contains many previously unpublished character of a universal'creed. Because sketches of this great man and of those he the application of force by the dictator placed in command-McClellan, Pope, ships of the Left is theoretic'ally to hasten Buell, and Hooker-and many others end the progress of man's salvation, Profes ing with the appearance of Grant, the one sor Talmon believes it is -legitimate to re trusted and confided in above all the fer ;to it as democratic totalitarianism. others. The dictatorships of the Right have as The author has accomplished an inter their starting points the state, nation, or esting and valuable account of the events race. They assume men to be inherently of this time. Military personnel will find weak and corrupt. Force is used to main this book of great value in their studies of tain order and to train man to act in a the Civil War from a political and military _manner alien to his mediocre nature. standpoint. BOOKS OF INTEREST .TO THE MILITARY R"EJADER
THE COMING DEFEAT OF COMMU the anti-Communist labor organizations NISM. By James Burnham. 278 Pages. The of France, Germany, and Italy. John Day C(lmpany, New York. $3.50. Yet having outraged, to varying degrees, so many influential graups, Burnham goes By COL GEORGE C. REINHARDT,CE on to somewhat smooth ruffled feathers, to The coming defeat of communism is offer elements of hope, however unpalat "inevitable" says Burnham, in the sense able the medicine he prescribes for each. that a brave captain assures his troops He concludes, rightly enough, if one that victory is inevitable, expressing "reso accepts his premise, that communism is lution not to yield, to fight to the end." So actually on the defensive and ripe for at too the defeat of communism depends upon tack by new, nontraditional methods of di the "number of determined men who so plomacy, by treating with people instead resolve." of with governments and govern~ent offi Thus is expressed the same note of con cials. ' servative optimism sounded by Vannevar In conclusion, Burnham claims that his Bush in Modern Arms and Free Men. It recent "20,000-mile slow trip through the is encouraging to note two important United States" convinces him that this thinkers, as distinct in their views as Burn country "in Mackinder's meaning is a go ham and Dr. Bush, who dare lighten the ing concern" not a "mature economy" prevailing gloom of the Western world's ready to quit, cynical and indifferent to forebodings of the struggle between com patriotism. munism and f",eedom. Our Nation's uneasiness, which we all ,In all respects but his conclusion, how feel and see too widely expressed in pes ever, Burnham differs radically from Bush. simistic forecasts, official emphasis upon Both emphasize the value of freedom, the upreserving the peace" to an extent that necessit!'{ of determined defense to pre 'falsely imputes pacifism; these manifes serve it. But Burnham depends little upon tations, concludes Burnham, are not indi science a:nd "normal" governmental proce cations of "awareness of death," but the dures, placing his reliance upon the "tormenting pause before the leap into mental, even the psychological, aspects of maturity." the conflict which, he rightly insists, is cur SOVIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY. By 10 rently 'a fact, not a future possibility. Russian Writers. Translated by Hugh W.· This book will shock diplomats with its Babb. 465 Pages. Harvard University Press. insistence that "traditional diplomacy" is Cambridge, Mass. $7.50. dead and useless in the crisis; disturb the By CAPT JOHN A. NOBLE, JAGC military mind with its emphasis upon re sistnnce (subversive) warfare; and irri This book consists of 12 articles, written tate industrialists with its .attack upon by 10 Russian writers, concerning the po theil' ideas that business "deals" are pos sit~on of the law in the Soviet state, cov sibk with communism (Burnham terms ering the lleriod 1919 to 1945. The book, that concept the "suicidal mania of Ameri is designed to show the initial Soviet phi can business"). Only for labor, American losophy of law and the subsequent changes antt-Communist labor, has he a good word in this philosophy as the state matured. init ~ally; prail?ing the Reuthers, Dubin , The articles are difficult to read as the sky'~, and Lundbergs for their relatively writers are attempting to justify what ap sucressful onslaught against Communist pears to be an untenable position. The influence within labor ranks. He deplores 20.page introduction by John N. Hazard . this country's failure to assist materially ma~s excellent reading. - . I 112 MILITARY REVIE,1" SEPTEMBEIi' 195~
STALIN'S SLAVE CAMPS (An Indictme~t regulations as "laws" and "Ilncoded jus of MOdern Slavery). By Charles Orr. 104 tice" simply because they have gone to the Pages. The Beacon Press, Boston. Cloth, trouble to set them down in writing; as '$1.75. Paper, $.75. ' if to say, what more does the worker need By MAJ ROGER E. LAWLESS, SigC or expect? In "an, appeal to the conscience of the Sta~in's Slave Camps adds to the formi entire world," the author, who is Research dable flrray of similar recent books' which Officer in the Economic and Social Depart seek ~o dissect the Communist mind. Mr. ment of the International Confederation of Orr's: trepanning on slavery is expertly Free Trade Unions, traces the long cam handled. The book is a text on the subject paign by the unions to establish a tribunal of man's inhumanity to man among the where free labor can submit charges and \400 ~illions in the "worker's paradise" evidence of forced labor. This end was and beyond. achieved in March 1951 when the United HISTORY OF MARINE CORPS AVIA Nations set up a Commission on the In TloIli IN WORLD WAR II. By Robert vestigation of Forced Labor. Sherrod. 496 Pages. Combat Forces Press, Stalin's Slave Camps is thus an indict Washington, D. C. $6.50. ment presented to the UN and the world By Lt COL WILLIAM H. SOUDER, JR., USMC and aimed at "the elimination of brutal enslavement of man by man, a barbarous Published on the 40th anniversary of 'practice which thrives today in the Sta its founding, this history of Marine Corps Iinst Empire on a scale rarely known in aviation is truly an excellent portrayal of history." Actual slaves are reported as the part played by that service during 15 million people, or 1 in 10. Every source World War II. is exploited, whole populations uprooted, W~itten primarily for the 1 percent of to provide the mass labor needed for state our armed forces that served in Marine projects. The "slave laws" of the satellite aviation units during World War II, the nations are presented in excerpts and nat history sketches the Corps' growth in the urally parallel those of the USSR itself. field of aviation from its woobly beginning Happily, the author has something con on 22 May 1912, through World War I, structive to offer. He states the program and the "banana" wars of'the twenties, to of free labor will stop the further spread 7 December 1941. Thereafter, Mr. Sherrod of enforced labor. The program is based on relates in detail the exploits of the men an assumption that men with something and squadrons that fought back against really worth defending will not allow them Japan from Wake Island to Tokyo. selves to be enslaved. Hence, free labor Acaurately documented and illustrated, must publicize the barbaric terror of this bbok not only relates the experiences Stalin's slavery, strive to raise the eco of a daring group of pilots and their untir 'nomic standards of peoples exposed to ad ing ground crews, but also covers the de vancing communism, and reaffirm and en velopment of the type of close air support force the basic human and political rights that has made Marine aviation famous. of those peoples. A team of qualified Marine Corps his To the trained lawyer, it is always mor torians collected material for this book bidly interesting to note the pathetic at over a period of 4 years. Mr. Sherrod thtm tempts of Soviet Russia and her satellites transformed their efforts into an action to place their tyrannical practices on a packed, fast-moving narrative which is 11 "legal" basis. The author points out that "must" for all interested in military his .the Communists regard their oppressive tory.