BASED on Geert Hofstede (1980) Culture Is the “Collective Programming of the Mind”

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BASED on Geert Hofstede (1980) Culture Is the “Collective Programming of the Mind” BASED ON Geert Hofstede (1980) Culture is the “Collective Programming of the Mind” THE CULTURAL FOUNDATIONS OF Notes TOGETHERNESS AND DISTINCTIVENESS What do we know about culture and the ways it varies across the globe? To Dutch anthropologist Geert Hofstede (1980) culture is the "collective programming of the mind" that differentiates the motivation and behavior of members of one social group from those of other groups. It is through culture that societies give meaning to their environments, organizing their life around particular symbols and myths. Culture shapes perceptions and behavior by directing that selective attention be paid to some details of reality, permitting some actions and forbidding others. Central to this programming of the mind is the transmission of values, broad preferences for one state of affairs over others. People face moral dilemmas, ambiguous circumstances where several choices of proper behavior are possible. Values are priorities for sorting out and implementing one code of behavior rather than others. The act of prioritizing involves emotional commitment. The commitment arises because values are learned during the process of childhood socialization, when individuals come to accept that a particular form of life is meaningful. What people are socialized to is a particular paradigm, a dominant set of beliefs that organizes the way they and other members of their group perceive and interpret the world around them: A social paradigm contains the survival information needed for the maintenance of a culture. It results from generations of learning whereby dysfunctional beliefs and values are discarded in favor of those most suited to collective survival. An individual element of a social paradigm is difficult to dislodge once it becomes firmly entrenched because shared definitions of reality are anchored in it. The values, norms, beliefs, and institutions of paradigms are not only beliefs about what the world is like. They are guides to action, and they serve the function of legitimating and justifying courses of action, that is, they function as ideologies, and ideologies drive politics. Is each culture idiosyncratic or are there systematic variations? This was the question asked by Geert Hofstede as he worked for a large multinational corporation that was seeking to understand why the same facts and instructions sent from headquarters to corporate officers based in different cultures produced different results. After completing attitudinal surveys in 40 different countries and analyzing the results, Hofstede concluded that differences among cultures were far greater than differences within them, lending strong support to the idea that most nation-states were characterized by a dominant cultural mainstream (social paradigm), although they might also have subgroups with cultures valuing alternative or opposing ideals. He also concluded that cultures divide along four separate dimensions. He called the first three individualism-collectivism, power-( Page 1 of 10 distance, and uncertainty avoidance, and the fourth, masculinity. A better term for the last would be sex-role differentiation. Let us look at each of these and then see how they combine to differentiate the world's cultures. Individualism versus Collectivism The first important dimension of variation was between cultures in which the individual is the locus of responsibility and action, and cultures in which it is the collectivity that matters. In individualist cultures Hofstede7s respondents said that individuals should look after their own interests and the interests of their immediate family (husband, wife, and children). On the other hand, in collectivist cultures it was said that any person through birth and later events belongs to one or more cohesive collectives ("ingroups"), from which he or she cannot detach himself or herself. The in-group (e.g., the extended family with grandparents and either paternal or maternal uncles, aunts, and cousins-or on a larger scale, the nation and its governmental institutions) should protect the interests of its members but in exchange can expect their permanent loyalty. Study Table 2.1. Individualist cultures tend to share the following traits: o Worship of the independent actor o Protestant (modernist) ethic o Market economies o Balanced-power political systems o Policies and practices that allow for initiative and o apply to all (universalism) o Promotion from both inside and outside organizations, based on market value (cosmopolitanism) Collectivist cultures, on the other hand, are most typically characterized by the following: o Stress on identity and roots o Traditionalist ethic o Nonmarket economies o Unbalanced-power political systems o Policies and practices that are based on loyalty and individual sense of duty and vary according to specific social relations (particularism) o Promotion from inside, based on family and friendship networks (localism) , Hofstede showed that the degree of individualism correlates highly with contemporary levels of economic development across the globe, as measured by per capita gross national product (R = 0.82; see Figure 2.1). His “individualism" scores are charted in Figure 2.2. Power-Distance Power-distance is the characteristic of a culture that defines the extent to which the less-powerful persons in society accept inequality in power and consider large social distances to be normal. Inequality exists within all cultures, but its extent and the degree of it that is accepted vary from one culture to another. The belief patterns of "high P-D" and "low P-D" cultures are contrasted in Table 2.2. High-inequality cultures have the following typical traits: Page 2 of 10 o -Autocratic or oligarchic governments o -Sudden changes in form of government (revolution and/or instability) o -Polarization between left and right with a weak center if political parties exist o -Tax system protects the wealthy o -Success of religions stressing stratification o -Ideologies of power polarization o -Elitist theories about society o -Greater centralization and tall organization pyramids with a large proportion of supervisory personnel o -Large wage differentials An analogous list of traits for low-inequality cultures is as follows: o -Pluralist governments based on outcome of majority votes o -No sudden changes in form of government (evolution and stability) o -Political parties that exist tend to be in the center, with relatively weak left and right wings o -Tax system aimed at redistributing wealth o -Success of religions stressing equality o -Ideologies of power equalization o -Pluralist theories about society o -Less centralization and flatter organization pyramids with small proportion of supervisory personnel o -Smaller wage differentials A useful indicator of power-distance is the degree of income inequality within countries. For a map showing the global variations, see Figure 2.3. Hofstede's P-D scores are charted in Figure 2.4. If countries are cross-classified using their individualism and P-D scores, insights are provided about the principal types of political economies to be found in the world today. Refer to Box.2.1. Uncertainty Avoidance The third of Hofstede's axes of cultural variation is that of "uncertainty avoidancev-the characteristic of a culture that defines the extent to which people within the culture are made nervous by situations they consider to be unstructured, unclear, or unpredictable, and the extent to which they try to avoid such situations by adopting strict codes of behavior and a belief in absolute truths. Table 2.3 contrasts the belief patterns of "high U-A" and "low U-A" cultures. The traits of high uncertainty-avoidance cultures are: o -Greater dependence of citizens on authorities and less tolerance for citizen protest o -More elaborate legal system o -More intolerant activist state religions o -Popularity of ideological thinking o -More structuring of activities o -More written rules o -More ritual behavior On the other hand, the traits of more tolerant cultures are: o -"Looser" societies o -Stronger feelings of citizen competence and more tolerance for citizen protest o -More casuistic approach to legal issues Page 3 of 10 o -De facto religious tolerance o -Popularity of pragmatic thinking o -Less structuring of activities o -Fewer written rules o -Less ritual behavior Hofstede's U-A scores are charted in Figure 2.5. One indicator of the extent to which economic uncertainty prevails is the inflation rate mapped in Figure 2.6. If countries are cross-classified on the basis of their P-D and U-A scores, fascinating contrasts in social organization are revealed. Refer to Box 2.2. Sex-Role Differentiation The final dimension identified by Hofstede arises because cultures use the biological difference between men and women to define vastly different social roles for the sexes. Highly "masculine" cultures expect men to be assertive, ambitious, and competitive, to strive for material success, and to respect whatever is big, strong, and fast. They expect women to nurture, to care for the quality of life, for children, and for the weak. Less-masculine cultures define overlapping social roles for the sexes, in which men need not be ambitious or competitive but may put the quality of life over material success and may respect whatever is small, weak, and slow. In both masculine and nonmasculine cultures, the dominant values within political and work organizations are those of men. In masculine cultures, these organizational values stress material success and assertiveness; in nonmasculine cultures, they stress quality of life and welfare for the weak. The belief patterns of more- and less-masculine cultures are contrasted in Table 2.4. Highly masculine cultures share the following traits: o -The emphasis is on aggressive pursuit of success. o -Men and women follow different types of higher-level education. o -Men are breadwinners, and women are cakewinners. o -Some occupations are considered male type others, female. o -There are fewer women in more-qua1ity better-paid jobs. o -Fertility is based on male income. In cultures with less sex-role differentiation, the dominant traits are as follows: o -Emphasis is on caring and sharing.
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