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Introduction: The Phenomenology of Emotions—Beyond "What it is like to Feel"

Szanto, Thomas; Landweer, Hilge

Published in: The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotions

DOI: 10.4324/9781315180786

Publication date: 2020

Document version Early version, also known as pre-print

Citation for published version (APA): Szanto, T., & Landweer, H. (2020). Introduction: The Phenomenology of Emotions—Beyond "What it is like to Feel". In The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotions (pp. 1-37). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315180786

Download date: 28. sep.. 2021

Forthcoming in: T. Szanto, and H. Landweer (Eds.). The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotions. London, New York: Routledge 2020.

Introduction:

The Phenomenology of Emotions—Above and Beyond ‘What it is Like to Feel’

Thomas Szanto and Hilge Landweer

The Rediscoveries of the (Phenomenology of) Emotions: A Historical Vignette

Following a brief period of marginalization, emotions are firmly back in the philosophical arena. This is certainly not news. Indeed, just stating that there has been a ‘rediscovery of the emotions in philosophy’ almost amounts to a platitude by now. What is a fairly new development, however, is the recent surge of interest in phenomenological perspectives on emotions. The decades-long jettisoning of the phenomenology of emotions, not just within the still largely analytic orientated philosophy of emotions but also within the phenomenological movement itself, is rather surprising. Over a century ago, early and classical phenomenologists such as Scheler, Stein, Husserl, Heidegger, Kolnai and Sartre were already engaged in intensive discussions about the nature and function of emotions. Moreover, they offered detailed, sometimes book-length, analyses of specific emotions such as anxiety, fear or boredom (Heidegger), shame (Sartre, Scheler), disgust, hatred (Kolnai), or Ressentiment (Scheler). How did this rediscovery of the phenomenology of emotions come about, why (only) now, and what exactly is ‘rediscovered’ in the first place? To address these ques- tions, we have to take a glance at the recent history of the philosophy of emotions in general, and the short but rich history of phenomenological work on emotions in particular.1 Before doing so, a caveat regarding the very notions of ‘emotions’ and ‘rediscovery’ is in order. First, our use of ‘emotions’ in the title, throughout this introduction, but also in many of the chapters, should be taken as an umbrella-term, encompassing a vast range of diverse affective phenomena and, in particular, affects such as short-lived fear

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or disgust, distinct episodic emotions such as indignation or anger, sentiments, affective dispositions or affective attitudes such as Ressentiment or hatred, and affective character traits such as being disposed to humility or jealously. Emotions, in the sense em- ployed here, further include varieties of what is sometimes subsumed under the concept of moods, and which phenomenologists in the wake of Heidegger tend to further divide into moods and fundamental moods (Stimmungen, Grundstimmungen) such as pro- found boredom, and other forms of affective disposedness or attunement (Befindlichkeit) such as anxiety or so-called existential feelings (see Ratcliffe’s and Drummond’s chapters for details). Second, talking of a ‘rediscovery’ of emotions in philosophy is, in fact, highly misleading. After all, emotions have never been completely ignored in the history of philosophy. Quite the contrary: the nature of affectivity and the role of emotions in human existence and social reality as well as the notorious relation of emotions and rationality always been at issue in philosophy—even where explicit discussion of the emotions is missing or is deliberately relegated to the conceptual background. Moreover, the relation of philosophical reasoning to emotions, and the role that emotions (ought to) play therein, has never been philosophically neutral. ‘What’s your take on emotion’ seems, then, to be the sixty-four thousand dollar question for philosophers, ever since emotions entered philosophical thinking (see Landweer and Renz 2012).2 Affects and emotions have played a central role in Western3 philosophy ever since they were introduced by Plato, Aristotle and the Greek and Roman (Neo-)Stoics (cf. Nussbaum 2001). They were extensively discussed as key factors in rhetoric, political life, moral psychology and social interaction. Most classical authors, such as Aquinas, Montaigne, Pascal, Descartes, Malebranche or Spinoza, up until the Scottish moralists explored a panoply of particular affects, sentiments and emotions, taxonomizing so- called ‘passions of the soul’ (Descartes); many of these authors also offered general theories of emotions. It is, however, also true that after Kant and Rousseau, starting roughly with the dominance of German Idealism, emotions ceased to play any systematic role in philosophy.4 In this period of relative marginalization, we find only a few isolated discussions of specific emotions, such as compassion in Schopenhauer5 or anxiety and fear in Kierkegaard. After this period of marginalization, the emotions found their way back to philosophy, albeit through the side-door of the social and natural sciences and, in particular, the so-called ‘empirical’ or ‘experimental’ psychology of the time.6 The initial step towards a new systematic exploration of the nature and function of emotions set in with Darwin’s evolutionary theory (esp. Darwin 1872) and James’ and Lange’s philosophical psychology (James and Lange 1885–1893). In the German-speaking world, specifically, it was the philosophically trained psychologists Brentano, Stumpf and Lipps and their students from the Munich Circle of Phenomenology, Pfänder and Geiger7, and the Leipzig School of Gestalt psychologists, such as Krueger or Stern8, who again developed general theories of our affective life. Eventually, it was the successors, col-

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leagues or students of the Brentano School and of the Munich Circle phenomenologists, such as Husserl, Scheler, Voigtländer, Haas, Stein, and Walther, who put discussions about the nature of emotions on a broader philosophical basis at the beginning of the 20th century.9 The detachment of psychology from philosophy and psychology’s eventual academic institutionalization in the latter half of 19th century was not without friction. What philosophers took issue with and which led to philosophy’s break was not so much psychology as an empirical science as psychologizing assumptions. Various critiques of psychologism between the 1880s and 1920s initially, and rather unexpectedly, united such philosophers as Frege, leading Neo-Kantians such as Cohen,10 Husserl and Wittgenstein, before their successors parted ways in the so-called analytic-continental divide. They were allied in their rejection of psychologistic reductions of meaning, truth and epistemic rationality to the genesis and psychological laws of reasoning. In the foundational text of classical phenomenology, the Logical Investigations, Husserl directed his sweeping criticism against the view that logic is founded upon some psychological basis (Husserl 1900). The controversy around psychologism is particularly noteworthy in the present context if we consider the Janus-faced impact it had on the (phenomenological) rediscovery of emotions: on the one hand, it was psychologists avant-la-lettre or philosophers-turned-psychologists who, after the post-Kantian century of relative silence, first systematically explored human affectivity; on the other hand, it was in reaction to the reductionist conception of psychology—viz. psychologism—that the philosophical engagement with emotions was placed on new grounds. The catalyst of this latter development was arguably classical phenomenology. Husserl’s establishment of intentionality as the defining mark of conscious mental acts—including, notably, emotions—in the wake of Brentano, thus cannot be underes- timated with regard to the general philosophical rediscovery of the emotions in the 20th century. Clearly influenced by Husserl, Scheler made the first systematic attempt since Hume’s tableau of affects in the Treatise to present a metaphysically grounded and a priori order of emotions and values. From the work of Scheler through Sartre to Gold- ie’s (2000) influential notion of emotions as “feeling towards”, Husserl’s theory of intentionality has left its mark. Even in the tradition of Heidegger, which is skeptical of the concept of the intentionality of emotions and reformulates it in terms of spatiality, Husserl’s conception is alive as a matter of critique (Schmitz 1969; cf. Landweer 2011). Certainly, what might be called the ‘first wave’ of the phenomenological rediscovery of the emotions in the 20th century was not uninterrupted. The golden age of phenomenological research on emotions lasted from the early 1910s to the late 1930s, end- ing rather abruptly with Sartre’s Sketch of a Theory of Emotions (1939). In the following decades, any systematic engagement with emotions seems to have been banned from philosophers’, and even most psychologists’, agenda. The few notable exceptions include the following work: Bollnow’s neo-Heideggerian account of ‘moods’ in Das Wesen

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der Stimmungen (The Nature of Moods) (1956/2017) (see Thonhauser’s chapter); Strasser’s Das Gemüt: Grundgedanken zu einer phänomenologischen Philosophie und Theorie des menschlichen Gefühlslebens (1956) (Phenomenology of Feeling: An Essay on the Phenomena of Heart, 1977) from the same year (see more below); and, finally, Schmitz’s project of establishing the so-called ‘New Phenomenology’ in his multi-volume System der Philosophie (1964–1980), whose core elements are a new conceptualization of the felt body (Leib), of emotions and moods as atmospheres, and a sweeping attack on any form of internalization of affectivity (see Nörenberg’s chapter). All three works, however, represent solitary and internationally still hardly-known work, and were almost completely ignored by their more prominent phenomenological peers,11 not to speak of mainstream analytic philosophy. In this, they share the fate of Sartre’s Sketch12 but also Kenny’s Action, Emotion and Will (1963; see below). The second break in systematically thematizing emotions in philosophy, marked by World War II, seems to be due to a general suspicion of the role of emotions in society, politics and ideology after the two Great Wars and the Schoah. Indeed, around 1914, even otherwise clear-sighted public intellectuals from France to the crumbling Austrian Empire and Prussia were caught up in the general nationalist pro-war ideology, and phenomenologists certainly were no exception.13 This is best exemplified by Scheler’s fervent Anti-English war-propaganda essay Der Genius des Krieges und der Deutsche Krieg (“The Genius of War and the German War”; 1915), but also permeates his more philosophically toned, but no less ideological, essay Der Krieg als Gesamterlebnis (“The War as Communal Experience”; 1916). On the surface, the latter essay offers an analysis of the collective intentionality of shared emotions and their role in facilitating the unification of nations; in fact, it’s not much more than a piece of political ideology (see Schmid 2015). Though Scheler’s further systematic work on shared emotions is far more sober and analytically sound, it is certainly not immune to the political ideologies of the time. The same goes for Scheler’s contemporaries, Stein, Walther, and Schmalenbach, whose work on communal experiences is also partly rooted either in Marxism (as for Walther) or ideas of the Conservative Revolution of the Weimar Re- public.14 Hence, especially in Germany, it is no wonder that work on collective emotions was banished from the curriculum, which was soon dominated by Adorno and Critical Theory.15 If we add to this that key figures in the phenomenology of emotions were either forced to emigrate from Nazi Germany or Austria, as Geiger and Kolnai, or murdered in Auschwitz, as Stein, we can better understand the lapse of phenomenological engagement with emotions after the Second World War. That some of the surviv- ing authors who have focused on emotions in postwar Germany, such as Bollnow and most prominently Heidegger, were in ideological complicity with Nazism sadly com- pletes this picture. It is, then, no wonder that in this poisonous atmosphere no unbiased reception of the traditional or phenomenological philosophy of emotions could flour- ish. In short, both the anti-Enlightenment doctrines of the “Conservative Revolution”

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and of National Socialism seemed to justify the intellectual distrust of emotion research after the Second World War, even beyond the borders of the German-speaking world. Viewed from this perspective, this second break in philosophical emotion research from the 1940s to the 1980s and 1990s mirrors the first one between the late 18th and the latter half of the 19th century: in both, what is more or less explicitly at issue is the relationship of rationality and emotions. Thus, the first interruption is largely due to Kant’s authoritative condemnation in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals of actions arising from desires and inclinations. Kant famously excludes such actions, which arise from sensuality and are merely in the pursuit of individual happiness, from playing a role in grounding morality, and allows only the morality of “actions from du- ty”. Eventually, in the wake of war and totalitarianism and under the guise of sociopo- litical criticism, the second rupture in emotion research seems to reestablish this allegedly Enlightenment-based dichotomy, as if reason can only rule and lead to morality if freed from affectivity.16 Looking back on the history of philosophy from a birds-eye perspective, then, emotions have been sidelined only for brief periods. This alone makes the use of the notion of a ‘rediscovery’ somewhat arbitrary. But there is another reason why we should be careful when talking of a ‘rediscovery of emotions’—one that is probably more relevant in the context of the present volume. It has to do with the fact that, as should have become already clear, there is no one single rediscovery. Rather, we can only speak, if at all, of rediscoveries in the plural. The rediscovery of the emotions in the analytic tradition in the latter quarter of the 20th century took a very different shape and had different motivations than its phenomenological counterpart. Moreover, these rediscoveries didn’t even happen simultaneously: for the analytic tradition, we can trace it around 1980; in phenomenology, the rediscovery of its own heydays (i.e., 1910s to 1930s), is only a very recent development and started on a broader international scale just a few years ago.

The Rediscovery of the Emotions in Analytic Philosophy

Let’s first look in more detail at the analytic discussions, as it gives us a contrast-foil to better understand the story of the ‘phenomenological rediscovery’. From its very incep- tion with Frege and Russell to Quine and Putnam, analytic philosophy has, broadly speaking, focused on issues in philosophy of language, epistemology, philosophy of science and metaphysics; domains that seem to be, more or less, ‘purified’ of affectivity. There were only few prominent exceptions to this general trend, most notably Wittgen- stein (cf. Mulligan 2017), and they haven’t had much influence on the mainstream debates. If affective states have figured at all in mainstream analytic discussions, with rare exceptions, such as Bedford (1956/1957), they were reduced to either erratic impulses, agitations, or dispositions to act, as in Ryle (1949), or conceived of as nothing more

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than propositional states capable of entering rational and causal mental connections as in Davidson (e.g., 1982). But the disregard of the emotions is probably most telling in analytic work on practical philosophy and moral psychology up until the last two decades or so of the 20th century. The change starts in the wake of early virtue-ethical approaches, with feminist inspired critiques of utilitarian or deontological moral and contractualist political theory, as well as of rationalist trends in moral psychology.17 But the omission of emotions in these areas is particularly curious. After all, emotions were at the forefront not just in Ancient Greek and Roman moral and political philosophy and psychology,18 but in neo-Aristotelian (especially Aquinas) and in early modern political and moral psychology (especially Spinoza); moreover, emotions played a central role for the British and Scottish moralists, including Hume, Shaftesbury, Smith and Reid, but also political philosophers such as Hobbes—that is, for authors who represent standard historical points of reference for analytic philosophy. The reason for the disregard of emotions besides the general mistrust of emotions after World War II is probably to do with the influential ‘emotive theories of ethics’, proposed by such dominant figures of the time (viz. around the 1940s) as A. J. Ayer and C. L. Stevenson. Ironically, the discounting of emotions in this period resulted from the emotive theorists’ claim that the entire do- main of practical and aesthetic theory cannot be subject to rational assessment or veri- fication, but only to a subjective, affective-evaluative one, and hence cannot sensibly be a part of philosophical discussions. Incidentally, it was some decades later, in meta- ethical work on moral sentimentalism and projectivism, that emotions, sentiments and passions were discussed from fairly early on in this tradition, roughly coinciding with the otherwise unrelated feminist critiques.19 Now, it has become customary to point to Kenny’s Action, Emotion and Will (1963) as the start of the resurgence of interest in emotions in analytically oriented theoretical philosophy.20 But this is misleading. The book appeared in the Routledge and Kegan Paul series “Studies in Philosophical Psychology”, which has become famous for its groundbreaking short monographs, but initially represented a niche outpost of a nas- cent post-behaviorist philosophy of mind. The work was prominent but arguably not influential in the dominant strands of analytic philosophy of its time. In fact, it was not until the late 1970s with the appearance of Solomon’s The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life (1976), Neu’s Emotions, Thought, and Therapy (1977), Lyons’ Emotion (1980) and Oksenberg Rorty’s seminal edition Explaining Emotion (1980) that research on emotions was placed on a broader philosophical footing. The dominant thread within these earlier theories was a broadly cognitivist account of emotions,21 challenging the traditional dichotomy between reason and passion, and highlighting emotions’ intrinsic rationality. These ideas culminated in de Sousa’s The Rationality of Emotions (1987), Elster’s Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions (1999) and Nussbaum’s comprehensive treatment in The Upheaval of Thought: The Intelli- gence of Emotions (2001). Nussbaum was also among the first within the analytic tradition

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to systematically engage with literary and historical, especially ancient and early modern resources (Nussbaum 1990).22 Around the shift away from the cognitivist paradigm, Wollheim published On the Emotions (1999), drawing heavily on Freudian psychoanalysis. Wollheim suggests that emotions originate in desires and are, roughly, sedimented mental dispositions. It is worth noting that, for Wollheim, emotions are more often than not unconscious. Somewhat paradoxically, even though Wollheim’s work can be seen as one of the most sustained projects of ‘re-psychologizing’ the mind and of refurbishing it with affective states within the analytic tradition, he sidelines the experiential character of occurrent emotions, and indeed holds that occurrently experienced emotions are the exception. This, to be sure, stands in direct opposition with most of the otherwise more or less congenial phenomenological accounts (see more below). One such account from the broadly analytic tradition deserves special attention, since it has had an enormous influence both on the still-ongoing ‘second wave’ phenomenological rediscovery of emotions and on philosophy of emotions in general. This is Goldie’s (2000) conception of emotions as “feelings towards”, or a “thinking of with feeling”. According to Goldie, emotions have—above and beyond a number of other components, such as bodily, motivational, expressive or regulative—a sui generis kind of intentionality, which has also become known as “affective intentionality”.23 The ‘intentionality of emotions’ and, what Goldie calls, the “phenomenology of emotions”, or their experiential and felt quality, are inextricably interlinked, as Goldie argues against the so-called “add-on” theory. More specifically, the affective phenomenology of emotions is not just a matter of their intentional content but also “infuses” the very attitu- dinal aspect of emotions (Goldie 2002, 242). Moreover, affective intentionality also “infuses” the very “bodily feeling”, and “in turn, the feeling towards is infused with a bodily characterization“ (Goldie 2000, 57). Goldie’s account at the turn of the millennium can be seen as the herald of the post-cognitivist era in the philosophy of emotions. And today—as typically in any ‘post’ era—we have a variety of alternative models on offer: multi-componential theories (Ben Ze’ev 2000), concern- or value-based construals of emotions,24 neo-Jamesian perceptual and embodied (Prinz 2004) and cognate perceptual accounts,25 narrative accounts (Goldie 2012), and most recently so-called ‘4E’-conceptions (embodied, enactive, embedded and extended).26 These predominantly Anglo-Saxon discussions were eventually received in Germany (Döring 2009; Berninger 2017) and enriched with an interest in historical and phenomenological contextualization.27 Above and beyond their contribution to a general theory of emotions, some have also offered refined classifications of different types of affective states, such as dispositional emotions, moods and sentiments.28 Some have also contributed to the analysis of a rich roster of particular emotions (esp. Ben-Ze’ev 2000; Roberts 2003), and especially social and moral emotions, such as sympathy or compassion, jealousy, shame, envy, forgiveness, pride or self-esteem.29 Others have focused on specific key dimensions or

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functions of emotions, such as their epistemology (Brady 2013; Candiotto 2019), or their moral and normative,30 and bodily dimensions (Prinz 2004; Maise 2011; Co- lombetti 2014) or their relation to law.31 In recent years, philosophers have also increas- ingly focused on the relation of emotions and aesthetics, and in particular the issue of fictional emotions,32 as well as on discussions about the truth, appropriateness, authenticity or integrity of emotions,33 or the nature of shared and political emotions.34

The Second Wave Phenomenological Rediscovery of Emotions

To complete this historical vignette, let us now briefly turn back again to phenomenologists’ rediscovery of their own tradition, or what we have baptized the ‘second wave phenomenological rediscovery’.35 As we have seen, even among phenomenologists, with few exceptions, systematic work on affectivity and emotions was buried for a number of decades. So why this ‘phenomenological affective turn’ now (again)?36 Obvious- ly the reasons are manifold, concerning socio-historical and institutional shifts, as well as systematic conceptual changes, and we list here only the most salient ones. In the first place, in the past two-to-three decades, we see an increasing interest in various issues relating to bodily dimensions of our being-in-the-world, from the role of kinesthesia or motor-intentionality in perception to so-called “drive-intentionality” (Husserl 1929–1935; cf. 1908–1937) to the role of embodiment in empathy and affectivity.37 Embodiment is, of course, a core issue of phenomenology ever since Husserl, and was elaborated in further detail in the work of such post-Husserlian phenomenologists as Stein, Merleau-Ponty, Henry and Schmitz (see more below). In the wake of the establishment of gender and cultural studies and their affective turn, as well as the so- called embodied and enactive approaches to cognition, action, and emotion (see Steph- an’s and Walther’s chapter), the connection between embodiment and affectivity, which was always part and parcel of the phenomenological theorizing, found its way back to the frontline of more mainstream philosophical discourse.38 Similarly, we can witness a veritable explosion on work on empathy in recent years, which again always figured as a core concept of classical phenomenology. And even though no phenomenologist holds that empathy is an emotion as such, or that it should be construed as some form of emotional sharing,39 empathy and its related ‘forms of sympathy’ (Scheler) do have important affective elements. Phenomenologists also long recognized that empathy affords us with a more or less direct access to affective states of others, and hence plays a crucial epistemic role not just regarding knowledge of other minds but also regarding emotions. This brings us to the third key systematic factor, namely the abundance of work in the last two decades on sociality and collectivity, in general, and social and collective emotions, in particular. Classical phenomenologists from Husserl, Stein and Walther, through phenomenological sociologists such as Scheler, Schütz and Gurwitsch, to existential phenomenologists such as Heidegger and Sartre first systematically addressed

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not only interpersonal forms of empathic engagement and intersubjectivity but also various forms of collective intentionality, including collective affective intentionality (see Szanto 2020). Thus, it should come as no surprise that they too were the ones to turn to for the analysis of the sociality and collectivity of emotions.40 Moreover, the growing interest in affective atmospheres (see Griffero’s chapter), also readily resonates with Heidegger’s or Bollnow’s conceptualization of moods (Stimmungen), and in particular Schmitz’s (1969, 2014) radical conception of emotions as atmospheres (cf. Krebs 2017). Two further points of convergence between classical phenomenology and contemporary philosophy of emotions should be noted: First, there has been a surge of interest in psychopathological disturbances in empathizing, emotional experience and expression, for example in patients with depression, autism spectrum disorders, Möbius syndrome, schizophrenia or Parkinson’s disease.41 Given their emphasis on the complex connections between emotional experience, expression or regulation and embodiment, as well as the intrinsic link between the lived body (Leib), affectivity and the social environment,42 phenomenological accounts have been particularly adept at accounting for these affective disturbances. Finally, the themes found in the above-mentioned contemporary discussions concerning the normativity of emotions—i.e., on how, when, why and which emotions can be appropriate or not, authentically or inauthentically felt, etc.—were foreshadowed in classic phenomenological discussions almost a century earlier, in particular in the work of Voigtländer, Haas, Scheler, Stein, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.43 Above and beyond these systematic reasons, to a non-negligible degree, the phenomenological affective turn is also due to certain new meta-theoretical developments of intra- and interdisciplinary reception. Thus, the resurging interest in early phenomenological accounts is partly to do with developments within analytic philosophy and its turn to emotions, and especially the emergence of congenial affective-intentional accounts. Phenomenology has opened itself more to concepts and debates in analytic philosophy and also to neighbouring disciplines discussing emotions, above all psychology, psychiatry, sociology and the cognitive sciences.44 A natural corollary of this methodological opening in phenomenology is more focus on systematic issues and less historical-exegetic work on past ‘grandmasters’. And much of this systematic work is now focusing on emotions. Moreover, phenomenologists have lately become more integrative with regards to sociocultural and political issues and social criticism (cf. Bedorf and Herrmann 2020). They have also shown a renewed interest in post- structuralist thinkers such as Foucault (Oksala 2016), and especially in recent discussions in cultural and gender studies, feminist philosophy and critical race theory.45 This has led to the emergence of so-called ‘feminist phenomenology’ (Fielding and Olkowski 2017), ‘queer phenomenology’ (Ahmed 2006) and ‘critical phenomenology’ (Salamon et al. 2019). And, again, in all these new directions of phenomenology, the study of affectivity, and in particular of social emotions, and their normatively and culturally shaped forms of corporeal sedimentation take center-stage.

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The Phenomenology of Emotions—Above and Beyond ‘What it is Like to Feel’

As we have seen, phenomenological theories of emotions were simultaneously developed with the establishment of phenomenology as a distinct philosophical tradition. Indeed, virtually all phenomenologists up until 1940 systematically worked on some version of a phenomenology of emotions. So why is it that many phenomenologists, who otherwise dealt with such theoretical issues as consciousness, intentionality, imagination, perception, time-consciousness, or metaphysical and epistemological discussions on idealism versus realism, were not only interested in emotions but thought that affectivity ought to play a central role in phenomenology? This is far from obvious, and was certainly not the case in the broader philosophical landscape. The reasons for early and classical phenomenologists’ keen interest in emotions largely overlap with those that motivated the second-wave phenomenological discovery just listed; notably, phenomenology’s focus on the affective dimension of perception, of personhood, on the felt body, on empathy and other forms of sympathetic stances, on social interaction and shared experiences, as well as the normativity of emotions. Above and beyond these, one crucial factor is also phenomenologists’ conviction that there is an intrinsic link between emotions and evaluations or values. This conviction is shared by most early phenomenologists from Pfänder, Geiger through Husserl to so-called ‘realist’ phenomenologists such as Scheler, Reinach, Stein and Hildebrand, while New Phenomenologists such as Schmitz focus on the evaluative aspects of atmospheres. Though phenomenologists certainly do not agree on all details (see more below), they all emphasize the role of emotions in disclosing values or the affective aspects of evaluations, and stress the intrinsic normativity of emotions like shame or resentment. Accordingly, phenomenologists conceptualize emotions as what today would be called “felt evaluations” or “evaluative feelings” (Helm 2001). Viewed generally, the fact that affectivity plays a pivotal role in phenomenology reflects the most fundamental ontological and epistemological tenets of phenomenology about human cognition, volition and (inter)action, indeed about human nature and (social) existence. Thus, almost all phenomenologists agree that any form of conscious experience has a core affective dimension, even on the most basic level of a simple perceptual experience. As Husserl first pointed out, before subjects take any active cognitive, epistemic or evaluative stance, their perceptual environment exerts a certain “affective allure”, which makes objects salient and motivate subjects’ attentional modifica- tions (Husserl 1918–1926 and 1938; Heidegger 1927, see also Merleau-Ponty 1945). Famously, Heidegger, and subsequent German and French phenomenologists, such as Bollnow, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Schmitz, ontologically generalized this picture, ar- guing that our very being in the world is always and already a way of being affectively attuned to oneself, others and the world (cf. Vendrell Ferran 2019). According to phenomenology, then, our very experiential fabric or being-in-the-world is affective

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through and through, long before subjects take more complex evaluative or social stances. Now, on the face of it, and especially if one is not already familiar with the core tenets of phenomenology, it might seem that the reason for the co-emergence of phenomenology and the phenomenology of emotions has something important to do with phenomenologists’ focus on the first-personal, qualitative contents of experience, or, roughly what has become known as ‘qualia’. This impression could also be vindicated by the fact that work on emotions found their way into traditional publishing outlets of analytic philosophy around the same time as work on philosophy of mind and phenomenal consciousness. Curiously, but certainly not coincidentally, books with titles such as The Rediscovery of the Mind (Searle 1992) appeared just few years before their philosophy of emotion equivalents, such as Rediscovering Emotion (Pugmire 1998). But the impression that classical or contemporary phenomenology of emotions has anything relevant to do with phenomenology in the notorious sense of ‘what is it like’ to have conscious mental states, or qualia, or even just with ‘what it is like to feel’,46 is simply false. The primacy of the first-person perspective in phenomenology in no way limits the scope of analysis to the qualitative ‘feeling’ aspect of emotions—be it their bodily, sensory, or any other subjective ‘what is it like to undergo them’ aspect. One is prone to such reduction only if one undercuts the intrinsic connection between affective, sensory or bodily, on the one hand, and intentional or evaluative components in emotions’ affective intentionality, on the other (see again Goldie 2000, also de Mon- ticelli’s chapter). We find a correlative pseudo-problem in recent discussions on cognitive phenomenology in recent philosophy of mind, where the issue of whether thoughts have a certain qualitative aspect, or ‘phenomenology’, predominantly arises by falsely dichotomizing the qualitative, conscious, on the one hand, and the cognitive, propositional and intentional dimension of mental states, on the other.47 Taking the subjective standpoint seriously when addressing emotions, for phenomenologists, means thematizing emotions in light of a whole series of relevant experiences and evaluations of the affected subjects. From a phenomenological standpoint, emotions are only meaningful in light of the conduct of subjects’ personal life and in the context of their lifeworld. Importantly, this is not a private, inner-mental realm but essentially involves subjects’ interpersonal and sociocultural environment as well as their collective strivings and engagements. This by no means implies that a phenomenological analysis of the nature of affectivity or of particular emotions has to stop short at the level of everyday emotional experience; nor will descriptions suffice that only take into account folk-psychological or scientific preconceptions about the sedimentation of emotions in ordinary experience. However, an adequate phenomenological analysis must take these dimensions into account—along with their bodily feeling, intentional-evaluative, etc. aspects—since they articulate a conceptual background that is relevant for a proper understanding of emotions—or, of what they mean for the subjects undergoing them (cf. also Steinbock 2014).

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Main Points of Convergence within the Phenomenology of Emotion

So far we have spoken of ‘the phenomenology of emotion’ as if it is a more or less uni- vocal account, and only alluded to differentiations regarding different topical foci among phenomenologists. This, of course, is a massive oversimplification and needs to be qualified. First of all, just as there is no ‘analytic’, or ‘cognitivist’ philosophy of emotion simpliciter, there is no single account that could be taken as a paradigm of a phenomenological conception. To claim otherwise would only be applying strategic considerations, as it is, alas, too often the case in academic turf-wars. So what are the major points of convergence and what are the major fault lines among phenomenologists of emotions? As we have already seen, most phenomenologists are in basic agreement with regards the following points: (i) the irreducibility of emotions to other mental or cognitive but also to other bodily states; (ii) the fundamental role of the first-person (singular or plural) perspective in the study and description of emotional experiences, without ignoring the embeddedness of emotions in the life-world of individuals and social groups, which is shared and hence can be accessed intersubjectively; (iii) the importance of taking the sociality of emotions seriously; but also (iv) distinguishing empathy from sympathetic emotional stances towards others, such as sympathy or compassion, as well as from various forms of affective sharing. (v) Most, and in particular early and ‘realist’ phenomenologists, believe that emotions bear important, broadly epistemic, relations to different types of values, and hence that axiological considerations must be part of a systematic philosophy of emotions. (vi) Relatedly, many hold that emotions can be appropriate/authentic or not, and hence normative considerations play a fundamental role in a proper phenomenology of emotions. There are further important points of agreement, some of which are already im- plied in what we have said so far, but which are worth making explicit: (vii) To begin with, phenomenologists not only stress the role of embodiment in emotional experience in a general sense; ever since Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, they pay careful attention to the distinction between the subjectively felt body (Leib) and the objective body, or the body under some third-personal, physical description (Körper). This distinction, in turn, must always be taken into account when thematizing emotions in phenomenology as bodily feelings.48 (viii) Relatedly, virtually all phenomenologists take an anti-Jamesian stance regarding the identification of bodily feelings and emotions. In contrast, they markedly distinguish bodily sensations (such as itches, pains, etc.), purely bodily feelings and sensations of bodily changes (i.e., roughly Jamesian emotions), on the one hand, from emotions, moods or sentiments, on the other. Moreover, some, and in particular Scheler, Stein and Schmitz, also emphasize the difference between the bodily feeling aspect of emotions and the more complex experience of emotions, especially regarding their differing affective intentionality. Building on and further developing these differentiations, some

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phenomenologists introduce complex stratifications within our affective life and taxon- omize affective states above and beyond the standard classification of episodic emotions, moods, sentiments, etc. For example, Scheler, Stein or Kolnai discuss such affective states as vital feelings (Vitalgefühle) or life-feelings (Lebensgefühle), while Schmitz distinguishes between stirrings of the felt body (leibliche Regungen), bodily being-affected (leiblich-affektive Betroffenheit), and emotions as atmospheres (see more in the respective chapters). (ix) According to most phenomenologists, emotions are not passive states that subjects simply undergo and cannot control or regulate—emotions are not passions in this sense. Rather, in contemporary terminology, they are ‘enactive’, acting upon their environment, or, as Sartre would put it ‘spontaneous’. Indeed, as we have seen, many hold that the very experiential receptivity of subjects is always and already affective, or is a “being affected” (Affiziertsein; Husserl 1908–1937). Arguably, many phenomenological analyses of emotions can be viewed as undermining altogether any neat active/passive distinction regarding emotions, and in particular Husserl’s, Sartre’s, Mer- leau-Ponty’s or, more recently Waldenfels.49 Some, and in particular New Phenomenol- ogists, such as Schmitz or Griffero, go even further in this regard. They hold that any distinction between internal and external aspects of subjects’ “bodily being-affected” (leiblich-affektives Betroffensein) in experiencing emotions is altogether inappropriate. Ra- ther, their conceptions of being affected, of emotions as having “bodily orientations” (leibliche Richtungen) or of emotions as socially “extended atmospheres” aim to capture the sense in which even bodily feelings and atmospheres can interact in a shared “emotional space” (Gefühlsraum).50 Put more generally, according to most phenomenologists, emotions are not simply ‘felt responses’, registering purportedly ‘internal’ (bodily) or ‘external’ (worldly, social, etc.) events; rather, they are responsive to and disclosive of the world and others, as well as disclosive of oneself. (x) In this latter feature, the self-disclosive nature of emotions, lies a further central contention of phenomenological accounts, most prominently defended today by authors such as Pugmire (2005) and Goldie (2000, 2012). Emotions stand in an essential relation to what it is to be a person. According to some, such as Scheler or Stein, emotions indeed are constitutive of personhood. Numerous phenomenologists, and notably Pfänder, Husserl, Scheler, Voigtländer, Stein, Walther, Merleau-Ponty, or Schmitz, further hold that emotions have certain depths, which correspond, roughly, to how they affect the core personal evaluations of the emoters (see more in the respective chapters). An interesting, yet, in the English-speaking world fairly little known, alternative account is provided by Henry, who stresses the essentially bodily and affective dimension of one’s basic, pre-intentional and pre-reflexive, relation to oneself, or what he calls “self-affection” (auto-affection) or “self-feeling” (Henry 1963 and 2003).51 (xi) Unsurprisingly, all phenomenologists in the tradition of Husserl and early phenomenology hold that emotions are intentional states, or states that are directed upon and present their objects in certain ways (which is, to be sure, a view shared by

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virtually all philosophers of emotion since Aquinas). Moreover, in the wake of Brenta- no’s original conception (see Montague’s chapter), many, and most explicitly Pfänder, Husserl and Stein, also hold that emotions as intentional acts are dependent upon, though not reducible to, some kind of intentional ‘presentation’ (Vorstellung) of the tar- get object. The claim is sometimes expressed in terms of a foundational relation between emotional and non-emotional acts. The idea is that emotional experiences are founded upon certain cognitive acts, or, better, acts of intentional acquaintance with the object that bears the value-properties that the emotion discloses. The founding act is sometimes construed as an “objectifying act” (Husserl), such as a perception or some other “intuitive” act, such as remembering or imagination.52 Furthermore, according to this view, emotions derive their intentionality from those objectifying acts that they are founded upon. Call this the ‘foundational thesis’ regarding the intentionality of emotions (Drummond 2018). Phenomenologists in the tradition of Heidegger also accept a version of the foundational thesis, but reverse the order of foundation. They argue, that any representational, propositional or properly speaking epistemic act, and in particular understanding and discourse, is founded in one’s original attunement (Befindlichkeit). However, many of the details of this foundational thesis are unclear or contested (see below); though what is clear is that the phenomenological intentionality thesis does not entail any form of emotional cognitivism, according to which emotions would be reducible to the cognitive content of intentional representations, let alone to mere evaluative judgments. Nor does any phenomenologist believe that the foundational thesis entails propositionalism regarding emotional states, i.e., the claim that they necessarily have a propositional structure (of the sort: ‘S fears that p’), or that they must at least be translatable to propositional attitudes. In contrast, many, if not most, phenomenologists would arguably subscribe to the view that paradigmatic emotions such as fear, anger, envy or jealousy are more complex and more fine-grained than propositional attitudes and judgments, but, somewhat paradoxically, also more ‘primitive’ in terms of their conceptual contents. Consequently, also pre-linguistic humans, and presumably some non-human animals, are capable of experiencing emotions. The fact that the intentionality of emotions is more fine-grained than the cognitive content of propositional attitudes partly explains why emotions, in Goldie’s (2000) terms, are “cognitively impenetrable”: that is to say, they are more or less unaffected by relevant beliefs about their intentional objects, without necessarily being really irrational or unwarranted. For example, I can be deadly afraid of the mere sight of a bee as an adult if I had a traumatic experience as a child, having fallen into a bee nest and being repeatedly stung, even if the memory of the pain is actually not bodily felt or eludes my occurrent consciousness (see Drummond 2004).53 (xii) This links to a further point stressed by phenomenologists, namely that emotions are structured and holistically embedded both in subjective, or personal, and objective, intersubjective or life-worldly contexts. The evaluative properties that emotions disclose are not discrete instances but, due to the structure and experiential nature of

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emotions, embedded in situations of certain types. Emotions are part of the personal situation of those who have them—they have a history. This prehistory—or what El- ster (1999) calls “antecedents” and de Sousa (1987) “key scenarios”—is always idiosyn- cratic. Now, especially, though not uniquely, in the case of traumatization, this can re- sult in intersubjective conflicts of appropriateness: the involved emotions may seem inappropriate in their felt evaluation or ‘disproportionate’ in their felt intensity (cf. Goldie 2000 and Pugmire 2005) vis-à-vis a given situation or, at worst, as irrational. This does not mean, however, that their motivation or personal genesis cannot be, at least in principle, rationally reconstructed and understood by others; the given emotion is then meaningfully fitted into the respective set of experiences of the emoter. To con- clude, according to most phenomenologists, emotions are subject to norms of rationality, at least in the sense of a broad concept of rationality according to which there must be some concordance between the motivational and personal background, the intentional structure and the experiential quality of emotions, on the one hand, and evaluative features of situational context they disclose, on the other. (xiii) As mentioned, some, if only a few, philosophers of emotion from the analytic tradition hold that emotions are not necessarily felt or consciously experienced. There are various possible readings of this claim. One can construe unfelt emotions as unconscious dispositions to feel something (e.g., Wollheim 1999) or as “emotions that pass unfelt, or are felt only on the periphery of consciousness” (Roberts 2003, 80). Some suggest that on closer inspection there is no outright inconsistency in claiming that there are unconscious emotions in a Freudian, dispositional or other sense, and that emotions are essentially felt (Deonna and Teroni 2012; cf. Hatzimoysis 2007). In contrast, it seems that there is no phenomenological sense in which emotions can be unfelt, where ‘unfelt’ is understood as not experientially given. However, as we will see in the next section, it is true that according to some interpretations of the distinction of so-called ‘value-feelings’ and emotions proposed by early phenomenologists, one can say that an emotion that corresponds to a given value-feeling is not (adequately) felt. Obviously, there is another reading of the claim that most phenomenologists could readily endorse, namely one that builds upon the distinction between grasping an emotion and being bodily or else affected by it. Thus, it seems perfectly possible, and quite ubiquitous, to empathically grasp emotions of others or to simply perceive their expres- sions, without feeling those emotions in any relevant sense of the term (cf. Landweer’s chapter). Finally, some phenomenologists, as Stein (1922), recognize cases in which a group of individuals shares an emotion without each member experiencing or feeling it.54

Main Fault Lines

So much, then, for the broad agreements between phenomenological accounts of emotions; what about the divergences? Some of the disagreements are systematic or meta-

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physical in nature, relating, for instance, to: the role of emotions vis-à-vis values and the ontological status of evaluative properties; the role and nature of affective intentionality; possible taxonomies and the stratification of affective phenomena; the possibility of unfelt or not consciously experienced emotions; or the issue of whether emotions should primarily be construed as conscious mental or psychological states at all, or, for example, as spatial atmospheres. There are also some meta-theoretical divergences: Whereas some phenomenologists are more interested in general theories of the nature and structure of emotions (like Husserl or the early Sartre); others focus on specific types of emotions, such as social, collective (Scheler, Stein, and Walther), moral (Scheler; cf. Steinbock 2014) or hostile emotions (Kolnai, Scheler); or on emotions in specific socio-normative or political contexts (e.g., Arendt, Fanon or Beauvoir). Yet others analyze particular emotions, such as love (Scheler), shame (Scheler, Sartre), anxiety (Heidegger), hatred or disgust (Kolnai) or Ressentiment (Scheler); or, as notably Scheler and Schmitz, they provide comprehensive accounts on all of the above. Lastly, some study emotions and moods more in terms of their specific existential-ontological and world-disclosing function (Heidegger and Bollnow; cf. also Ratcliffe 2014; Saarinen 2014, 2018). Certainly, almost none of the thirteen converging points sketched above are wholly uncontested among phenomenologists (save, perhaps, the possibility of unfelt emotions). Without being able to go through each in detail, we will only highlight the most significant controversies. Let us start with the intentionality thesis. However broad the agreement regarding its general contours—namely regarding the fact that emotions have a sui generis affective intentionality—there are a number of moot points. For one, it is contested whether specific types of affective phenomena are intentional phenomena at all, or at least in the standard sense of object-directedness or mental ‘aboutness’; this concerns, first, sensory or bodily feelings, such as pain or bodily pleasures (are they, for example, directed upon felt locations in the body?) but, above all, it concerns Dasein’s affective attunement (Befindlichkeit), moods, and in particular fundamental moods (Grundstimmungen), existential or so-called “oceanic feelings” (Saarinen 2018) and affective atmospheres. Some, like Stein, argue that even paradigmatic moods are intentional and have an “objective correlate” (as, e.g., the rosy shimmer that the world is submerged in when someone is cheerful; see Stein 1917, 108–109; 1922, 181).55 According to other radical proposals, and based on a general criticism of the concept of intentionality, not even allegedly ‘ordinary’ emotions such as basic fear can, without qualifications, be properly conceived of as intentional phenomena (e.g., Schmitz 1969 and 2011). Moreover, as we have seen, phenomenologists in the Heideggerian tradition reverse the foundational relation concerning emotions and objectifying acts. In contrast to the Brentanian-Husserlian line of thought, they argue that telling (Rede) and understanding (Verstehen) are founded in attunement (Befindlichkeit), and Schmitz traces self-consciousness back to one’s being bodily affected (leiblich-affektive Betroffenheit). Indeed, New Phenomenologists defend the view

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that emotions cannot be reduced to conscious mental or psychological states, but should rather be conceived as spatially extended atmospheric phenomena, which are subjectively incorporated in one’s being bodily affected by them.56 In the broadest brush-strokes, in this respect, we can register a fault line between two broad paradigms in the phenomenology of emotions: the affective-intentionalist paradigm, on the one hand, and the affective-bodily-impact or the bodily being-affected paradigm of New Phenomenology, on the other.57 There is another aspect of this fault line which concerns the issue of embodiment. Specifically, it concerns the claim that all affective phenomena are bodily felt, or in some sense body-bound. Thus, key figures of the early phenomenology of emotions, and notably Scheler and Stein, hold that not all affective phenomena are “body-bound”. The reason for this striking claim is that certain types of affective experiences, and in particular what Scheler and Stein call “spiritual feelings” (geistige Gefühle), or “emotions in the pregnant sense”, do not always co-vary with changes in bodily feelings or with any bodily feelings at all. For example, one can be anxious about one’s hostile neigh- bors without any sensible heart beating or trembling of one’s hand, or one can remain fearful after all visceral or other bodily felt sensations have ceased to manifest themselves. New Phenomenologists would say in these cases that bodily contraction, which characterizes anxiety, must be felt to speak of fear or anxiety at all. Notice, however, that neither Scheler nor Stein, nor any other phenomenologist for that matter, would therefore simply give up on the distinction between Leib and Körper, nor would they no longer emphasize the role of the felt body for affectivity. Quite the contrary: Both Stein and Scheler, for example, clearly accommodate the Leib/Körper-distinction, and further distinguish—within the sphere of the lived body (Leib)—between purely “sensory feelings” (Gefühlsempfindungen) and so-called “vital” or “common feelings” (Vitalgefühle, Ge- meingefühle). The former include sensations such as itching, bodily pain, the pleasure of tastes or of the touch of a soft texture, which are interoceptively perceived but concern specific sensations in specific bodily locations, whereas the latter concern the overall “attunement of the lived body” (leibliche Befindlichkeit; Stein 1917, 87), such as weariness, freshness or irritability. In unprecedented detail, these authors provide descriptions of the complex stratifications of bodily feelings and their psycho-dynamic interaction (e.g., the affect of bodily weariness on the experience of spiritual joy, etc.). They, thus, pre- figure later conceptions of bodily attunement by Heidegger and Schmitz.58 Moreover, in concordance with the affective intentionality paradigm, all early phenomenologists still hold fast to the idea that—for all affective phenomena which in fact have bodily components—their bodily feeling and their intentional-evaluative dimension are inextricable and can only analytically, if at all, be distinguished.59 Coming back to the intentionality thesis, even among those who wholeheartedly subscribe to the affective-intentionalist paradigm (in contrast to the affective-bodily- impact paradigm), it is far from clear how exactly to spell out the affective or “emotional intentionality” at stake (cf. Ratcliffe 2019). Is it a sui generis kind of intentionality,

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like the intentionality of empathy according to Husserl or Stein60, as Goldie (2000) argues? Relatedly, the construction of the above-mentioned foundational thesis regarding the intentionality of emotions is far from clear-cut: What does it mean to say that the intentionality of emotions is ‘derived’ from the intentionality of acts of perception or imagination upon which emotive acts are founded, as Husserl, for example, claims in some of his writings? Specifically, it is unclear in what sense emotions are intentional presentations of values, i.e., so-called ‘value-ceptions’ (Wertnehmen), as Husserl, Scheler, Stein and others construe emotive acts; and in what sense do value-ceptions involve originary presentations of values, analogous to perception (Wahrnehmen).61 In other words, it is a matter of dispute whether the emotive acts of value-ception really constitute, in the Husserlian sense, the evaluative properties of their intentional objects, or the ‘value-objects’ as such, or if it is the case that emotions are only directed upon those objects and disclose their evaluative properties. If the latter, what, then, does ‘disclosing’ here exactly mean?62 With this, we touch upon one of the central discussions of early phenomenology of emotions, namely on the nature of values and the intricate relation between emotions and values.63 This issue bears important connections to the above-mentioned appropriateness of emotions. All early phenomenologists, including not only the so-called ‘realist’ phenomenologists, such as Scheler, Reinach, Stein or Hildebrand, but also the transcendental-idealist Husserl, hold, explicity or implicity, a form of value realism. (In the following, we will discuss only this strand of the debate and leave aside the more general critism of the concept of values by the bodily-being-affected-paradigm.)64 However, it is far from clear what value realism exactly entails, or how to conceive of the ontological and phenomenological status of values. To recap, the most important alternative conceptions on offer are these: Either values and value-objects are first constituted by emotive acts, or values are independent objects or properties of things, persons or events. There is an admittadely problematic middle-way that we can uncover implicitly in some phenomenological accounts, such as Stein’s (1922).65 According to this view, though values are intentional correlates of emotions qua acts of value-feeling (Wertfühlen), value-feelings still can appropriately or inappropriately track those values and are thus sensitive to reasons ‘of the heart’. 66 Values, thus, retain a certain ontological independency vis-à-vis the emotive acts that at the same time constitute and disclose them. According to one interpreter, Scheler would also conceive of values as both felt qualia and intentional objects (Theodorou 2018, 152f.). Values are not particular properties of concrete, existing objects, like the color of a concrete patch, hence do not depend on the existence of concrete objects as their bearer; they are rather like “eidetic essences” or “species” (cf., critically, Vendrell Ferran 2008a, 198f.). If this were so, we are at a “dead-end” (Theodorou 2018, 153), since one could never directly access the values that one’s emotions are supposed to disclose, at least not in ordinary affective experiences. Rather, value-feelings would be some affective analogue of Husserl’s categorical intuitions, and values some sort of higher-order categorical object or, even

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more confusingly, some “species of a felt quality” (ibid.). But this would amount to an arch-cognitivist view of emotions, which doesn’t seem to be true to the phenomenology of emotional experience and doesn’t square with Scheler’s overall account of emotions either.67 What, then, are values? As none of this seems quite right nor does it help illuminate the phenomenological nature of felt evaluations. Probably the closest one can get to an answer is by considering the early phenomenologists’ view on how emotions disclose values in the acts of value-ceptions or value-feelings (Wertfühlen)—a view that is, in turn, unfortunately rather ambigous.68 Without going into too much detail, let us just highlight one contentious issue, namely whether or not emotions should be conceived of as identical to acts of value-feeling. Some classical phenomenologists, and in particular Scheler, Stein or Kolnai, hold a non- identity view: value-feelings belong to a distinct type of intentional act and should be contrasted with feelings or emotions properly speaking (Mulligan 2008, 2010a, 2010b, 2017; Vendrell Ferran 2008a and 2015). According to this view, it’s not feelings that present or disclose values, but precisely value-feelings. Thus, I am not ashamed because my feeling of shame discloses the shamefulness of my behaviour, but rather because, in having a corresponding value-feeling, I become acquainted with its shamefulness. And the feeling, viz. the emotional experience of shame, is a response to the disvalue of shamefulness that the value-feeling is disclosing. Value-feelings do not represent a distinctive type of feeling or emotional experience. However, it is not unanimous whether they are just an aspect of a properly speaking emotional experience, or instead some affective ‘knowledge by acquaintance’, or as Mulligan puts it, “acknowledgements” or “responses to acquaintance with values” (Mulligan 2010a, 2010b). For example, Stein does not contrast value-feelings with the feeling or the emotional reaction that is motivated by those values; for Stein, they are precisely just two aspects of the affective intentionality of emotions.69 In any case, the most promising way to approach a resolution to this issue seems conceive of the phenomenological relation between emotions and values in terms of a double-aspect evaluative intentionality of emotions. Emotions, then, are disclosing not only values but also something about the appropriateness and the depth of the felt evaluation, or the emotional experience as such (see, again, for a similar account de Monticelli’s chapter). Thus, when I have a feeling (e.g., joy over x), what is disclosed to me is not only the evaluative prop- erty (joyfulness) of x but that and how x matters to me or impacts me in a certain way (as meriting a joyful response from me). Yet, importantly, realist phenomenologists do not simply identify the act of value- feeling and the experiential dimension or felt quality of an emotion. The reason for distinguishing the two has to do with their claim that emotions can appropriately or inappropriately track values, and, moreover, be appropriately and inappropriately felt. Only by distinguishing these two aspects of emotions—their value-disclosing and their function of ‘affecting’ subjects—can phenomenologists take into account cases in which a value is indeed appropriately disclosed but precisely doesn’t affectively (fully) impact

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the emoter (‘leaves one cold’) or is not accompanied by a corresponding emotion at all (cf. Stein 1922, 133–136). In other words, realist phenomenologists aim to accommodate the intuition that we can clearly—and also emotionally—grasp values without necessarily being affected by them in a way, in which others or we ourselves think we ought to. For example, we may grasp the appalling nature of an injustice but instead of being outraged by it (even if only in the sense of a moral outrage) we remain in a state of slight indignation. According to this picture, the perceptual and the moral world is more complex and more fine-grained than our emotional repertoire (cf. Vendrell Ferran 2015).70 Others would claim that divergences between (alleged) values and those actually felt are an indication that something is wrong not necessarily with the feelings but, rather, with the moral norms and values to which one considers oneself to be committed. According to this perspective, it is not an independent moral world which is too complex to be grasped by emotions, it is the moral self-concept and self-image which are susceptible to self-deception concerning one’s own commitments. Here, one would need to differentiate between (i) a wider concept of value and (ii) the narrower concept of norms which are dependent on emotions with strict normative demands like shame, guilt and moral anger, which are emotions of conscience and have moral authority for us (cf. Landweer 2007 and 2013). How to resolve this problem of a divergence, or even a conflict, between emotions and values—whether emotions can ever be considered inadequate, inappropriate or inauthentic in some sense, or whether, in some cases, it is our moral ideas or normative framework that are too wooden or prone to self- deception—is an open question that begs further phenomenological research.

Rationale and Synoptic Overview

Against the historical and meta-theoretical background just sketched, let us now say a few words about the rationale of this volume, about our reasons for selecting the given authors and topics and give a synoptic overview of the parts and chapters. The volume consists of five interlinked parts which center around three focal aims: a.) a more historical focus (Part I), b.) a systematic focus on the most important classical and contemporary issues and debates (Part II), and c.) a focus on the analyses of specific types and forms of emotions, notably self- and other-directed, collective and political emotions (Parts III and IV), as well as of affective phenomena that we call ‘borderline cases of emotions’ (Part V). Thus, first, the handbook critically, and in contemporary terms, re-evaluates the rich historical resources that we can find in the phenomenology of emotions. Accord- ingly, in Part I: Historical Perspective, the chapters offer state-of-the-art assessments of central pre- and postwar, and also little-known phenomenologists of emotions. Some of the accounts are systematically introduced to an English-speaking audience for the first time (e.g., Bollnow71 or Voigtländer). In presenting the views of classical as well as yet

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only marginally considered authors, we certainly aim beyond a mere cultivation of the tradition; rather, we contend that a historically informed gaze is better suited to detect and also to challenge conceptual and methodological background assumptions and their implications for current philosophical theorizing. Yet, anybody who seriously engages with the (pre-)history of the phenomenology of emotions will realize that there is no one-dimensional, and much less teleological, narrative. One will of course also discover that the conceptual repertoires, methods and claims of classical phenomenological accounts are not neatly reflected in current discussions in the philosophy of emotions. Rather, we hope that what comes into relief are both the continuities and divergences across these accounts, and hence an overall more balanced view on the present state of emotion research. In terms of the selection of authors, we aim to provide the most exhaustive treatment of all those phenomenological thinkers who have significantly contributed to the philosophy of emotions. Thus, nineteen chapters give overviews of the theory of emotions of authors from the pre-history or the very beginning of the phenomenological movement (see the chapters on Brentano, Pfänder, Geiger, Husserl, Voigtländer, Scheler, Scheler, Walther, Schmalenbach, Hildebrand and Kolnai) to the most important Inter- or Post-war French (Sartre, Beauvoir, Merleau-Ponty, Fanon, and Levinas) and German-speaking phenomenologists (Heidegger, Bollnow, Gurwitsch, Arendt and Schmitz). Given their distinctive contribution to a systematic phenomenology of emotions, a special emphasis in this part is on the so-called early or realist phenomenologists. Many of these authors are next to unknown within analytic philosophy of emotions, and some even within phenomenological scholarship; yet, they were not only highly influential for the establishment of the phenomenological movement (see Spiegelberg 1994) but also offer numerous valuable insights for contemporary debates on social, collective and moral emotions (notably Voigtländer, Stein, Walther, Schmalenbach, von Hildebrand, and Kolnai). Some of the contributions in this part not only present authors individually, but, wherever it makes systematic sense, the respective work is considered in light of mutual influences or criticism (see the chapters on Walther and Schmalenbach and Heidegger and Bollnow). Now, some might wonder whether all these authors can sensibly be listed among phenomenologists. To be sure, in terms of traditional fault-lines, we have endorsed a fairly liberal notion of phenomenology. Thus, we have included authors who might, on first glance, not immediately be recognized as belonging to the phenomenological tradition, such as Fanon, Arendt, Beauvoir, or the forefathers of phenomenology Pfänder, Geiger or Brentano. The same goes for unquestionably phenomenological authors who, however, might not be readily counted as phenomenologists of emotions (such as Schmalenbach, Gurwitsch, Merleau-Ponty or Levinas). Above and beyond our generally inclusive notion of what phenomenology was, is, and should be in future research, our choice is motivated by more specific considerations. In some cases, it is motivated by considering certain ‘conceptual constellations’ (Begriffskonstellationen, as Adorno or Ger-

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man historians of philosophy would put it) or influences that need to be taken into account to understand central authors and concepts. For example, Husserl’s, Scheler’s, Stein’s or Walther’s phenomenology, and their phenomenology of emotions, cannot be fully appreciated without considering the theories of Brentano, Pfänder, or Geiger. The same can be said of Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, who had a key impact on both traditional and contemporary discussion on affectivity, even though they have not provided systematic phenomenologies of emotions, or Arendt, Fanon or Beauvoir, who proved to be eminently influential on contemporary critical phenomenology. Similarly, Schmalenbach or Gurwitsch were among the important voices for the development of a phenomenology of collective emotions, which was fully developed only in the work of Scheler, Stein or Walther. In terms of topical discussions, we were not only guided by what phenomenologists have traditionally regarded as the central issues in the theory of emotions, such as intentionality, values, appropriateness, the morality of emotions, or a taxonomy of different affective phenomena; we were also guided by what we take to be equally essential for a comprehensive phenomenology of emotions with a view to contemporary discussions (analytic or not), and for the future phenomenological research generally speaking. This brings us to the second aim of the volume, represented by Part II: Systematic Issues and Contemporary Debates. Here, the chapters provide comprehensive overviews of both the central traditional and the recently discussed issues in the philosophy of emotions from a phenomenological perspective. These ten chapters offer lines of arguments that partly complement, partly challenge, current discussions on the ontology, epistemology or morality of emotions and contextualize classical phenomenological accounts of emotions with a view to current discussions on affective stratification and taxonomies of affective states (Drummond), existential feelings (see Ratcliffe’s chapter), trends in moral psychology and moral phenomenology (Helm, De Monticelli, and Drummond and Rinofner-Kreidl), situated and 4E-approaches to emotions (Stephan and Walter), the growing literature on emotional atmospheres (Griffero), the philosophy of embodiment and the relevant discussions in feminist thought (Dolezal), psychopathology (Fuchs), as well as the philosophy of art (Carroll). In the remaining parts of the volume, nineteen chapters provide detailed analyses of the central, but also often sidelined or non-standard categories, types and forms of particular emotions. In these three parts, contributors investigate self-directed, other- directed and collective emotions, as well as discussions of particular ‘borderline cases’ of emotions. With these analyses, we aim to close a gap in emotion research that still exists, despite many dozens of texts published in recent years on particular emotions. Most philosophical approaches were and still are devoted to formulating general theories of emotions, or have the tendency to paradigmatically generalize certain features of particular emotions, from which they then distill some general insights about the nature of certain types of emotions (e.g., moral or aversive ones) or emotions in general.72 Cases in

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point, for example, are grief for narrative theories (Goldie 2012; cf. Ryberg Ingerslev’s, and also Bortolan’s chapters), or resentment and forgiveness for the morality of hostile emotions.73 Phenomenologists were certainly not immune to this strategy. Just think of Sartre’s analysis of shame (cf. Zahavi’s chapter), or Heidegger’s conceptualization of anxiety and boredom (cf. Thonhauser’s, and Freeman’s and Elpidorou chapters). Obvi- ously, this strategy has some shortcomings for a phenomenologically adequate description of many emotions, as they do not readily fit the paradigm cases. Consider, for instance, the problem of conceiving of the morality of Ressentiment (in contrast to resentment) or of hatred (cf. Schmid’s, Landweer’s and Szanto’s and Slaby’s chapter) or the arguably doomed attempt to construe a narrative theory of episodic forms of anger or joy. In this volume, we pursue a multi-dimensional strategy, discussing general conceptions of emotions and their role in our experiential, cognitive, moral and social life, as well as more than thirty particular emotions. Moreover, in a number of chapters throughout the last three parts, particular emotions are further differentiated, such as hate and hate of evil (see the chapters of Landweer and Schmid), or shame, hetero- induced shame and survivor shame (see Zahavi, and Montes Sánchez), and various transformations and interlinked dynamics between distinct but cognate emotions are elaborated upon (see Summa, Freeman and Elpidorou, Landweer, Bortolan, Steinbock, Breyer, and Bernhardt). This also explains why some emotions or types of emotions are discussed in more than one chapter, as they are considered from different perspectives or in the context of different affective phenomena, or in the work of different phenomenologists. This applies to forms of shame (see Zahavi, Montes Sánchez, and Dolezal), and to various, distinctively social, antagonistic and/or collective emotions, such as Ressentiment or hatred (see Vendrell Ferran’s two chapters, as well as Land- weer, Schmid, and Szanto and Slaby), and forms of emotional sharing (see Calcagno, Schloßberger, Tranas and Caminada, Fuchs, J. Müller, Sánchez Guerrero, Szanto and Slaby, and Krebs). Part III deals with Self-Directed and Individual Emotions. The chapters, here, display discussions of central instances of emotions and affectively charged attitudes whose subjects are typically—though not necessarily—single individuals and/or whose affective focus essentially has a self-reference to the respective emoters, such as joy and happiness (Summa), disgust (Heinämaa), fear, anxiety and boredom (Freeman and Elpidorou), pride and self-esteem and its related contrast-phenomena embarrassment and shyness (Bortolan), and shame (Zahavi). The emotions covered in this part also include often neglected but highly pertinent feelings such as the affective reaction to humiliation or the feeling of humility and affliction (Steinbock). Part IV is dedicated to what we call Other-Directed and Collective Emotions. Under this title, we subsume three different types of emotions: (i.) moral, antagositic and (pro- )social emotions, which all have an intrisic social focus, or are intentionally directed at others, such as grief (Ryberg Ingerslev), including: ‘pro-social’ sentiments, and in par-

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ticular sympathy and compassion (Breyer); hostile or ‘aggressive’ emotions, such as indignation, envy, anger, jealousy, contempt and hatred (Landweer); and the little- explored variants of shame, namely survivor shame and shame felt in the face of something shameful being committed by another with whom one socially identifies (Montez Sánchez); (ii.) collective and/or political emotions (Guerrero Sanchéz; Szanto and Slaby); (iii.) in one case, namely empathy, a sui generis intentional state that is, according to most phenomenologists, though not an affective state as such (see above), is indispensable for the grasp of emotions of others and lies at the basis of ‘pro-social’ emotions (Breyer). It is also in light of our multi-dimensional approach that we have included contentious cases of affective phenomena, so-called Borderline Cases of Emotions, in Part V— counting on raised eye-brows and, indeed, welcoming skepticism as to whether these actually are fully-fledged emotions. We believe that only phenomenologically detailed analyses and ongoing conceptual refinements regarding any psychologically, morally, socially or politically relevant phenomena that potentially bear an affective dimension can determine—ever-inconclusively—the scope of the class of phenomena that we can rightly call ‘emotions’. Accordingly, this concluding part is devoted to dispositional states, attitudes or other phenomena that may not be properly speaking emotions but have either important functions for generating affective states or are themselves affectively ‘charged’ in one way or another. Moreover, a number of contributions in this section return to issues and discussions from previous parts; in particular on bodily felt aspects of emotions, the morality of emotions, emotions of aggression and destruction, or emotional sharing. Specifically, these chapters discuss morally or socio-politically relevant attitudes, such as forgiveness and revenge (Bernhardt), gratitude (Rinofner-Kreidl), feelings of solidarity (J. Müller), trust (de Warren), or the hate that is specifically directed at allegedly ‘evil’ agents, or its opposite, the complex dispositional sentiment love (Krebs). But we find here also discussions of a central affective bodily affliction, such as pain (Svenaeus), or the affliction that befalls one in the loss of the sense of the world as a locus of familiarity, as in experiences of the uncanny (Trigg).

Desiderata for Future Research

There probably exists no handbook in which something is not missing, no matter how comprehensive the collection may be. This is, of course, no different in the present case. So, who or what is missing? We have aimed for maximal comprehensiveness regarding the treatment of phenomenologists, presenting twenty authors from the phenomenological tradition. However, some little discussed or almost unknown but still important figures and their work could not be included. The list comprises almost a dozen German-speaking, Spanish, French and Hungarian authors from the beginning to the late 20th century,

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notably: the Munich phenomenologists and Pfänder-students Willy Haas, Karl Kon- stantin Löwenstein-Freudenberg and Paul Kananow, but also figures such as Nicolai Hartmann, Hans Reiner, José Ortega y Gasset, Helmuth Plessner, the already mentioned Stephan Strasser and Michel Henry, or Paul Ricoeur and Agnes Heller. Let us say a few words on these authors, thus outlining potential avenues for future research (for Henry, see above). Haas published his essay Über Echtheit und Unechtheit von Gefühlen (“On the Au- thenticity and Inauthenticity of Emotions”) in 1910, in which he develops an original framework for the appropriateness of emotions. Roughly, the idea is this: There are no authentic or inauthentic emotions as such, rather, the authenticity of emotions is correlative to the strata of the ego or self in which they are realized. Authentic emotions are those which are integrated into the “unity of the proper personality” (Einheit der eigent- lichen Persönlichkeit) or the “dominant affective orientations” (Grundrichtungen der Gefühle) of the relevant instance of the self, i.e., the “ego that actually bears the given emotion” (das Ich, welches Träger des Gefühls ist). For example, joyfulness is authentic if it is integrated into the actually dominant background orientation of relaxation and blissfulness of the emoter and not into that of her irritability or disgruntlement (Haas 1910, 352–356). Haas not only argues against correlating the (in)authenticity of emotions with the dia- chronically fluctuating “phenomenal ego”, but also warns us not to misidentify the relevant layer of the self with some personal character or characteristics (see a brief discussion of Haas in Vendrell Ferran’s chapter on Voigtländer). Overall, Haas seems to echo Stein’s similar considerations, but also partly prefigures recent accounts of emotional “soundness”.74 Other work that has almost been completely forgotten are two dissertations from the Munich school of phenomenology: the Pfänder-student Löwenstein- Freudenberg’s thesis Über das Gefallen (“On Pleasing”) (1913), which aims at a detailed “phenomenology of the act of pleasure” (“Phänomenologie des Gefallensaktes”), distinguishing it from love and partly drawing on Freud; and the Russian student Kananow’s dissertation Über das Gefühl der Tätigkeit (“On the Feeling of Agency”) (1910), written under the direction of Pfänder and Lipps, which elaborates a taxonomy of feelings of intentional agency, such as feelings of excitement (Erregungsgefühle), of power (Kraftgefühle), or feelings accompanying intentional decision (Entscheidungsgefühle). Both treatises deserve more attention, especially given their focus on still wholly underexplored affective states.75 Nicolai Hartmann, in the second volume of his three-volume Ethics (1926), puts forth an a priori axiology or a so-called ‘material ethics of value’, in which he details different types of emotional and moral evaluations and their relation to different types of values (see Poli 2017). Despite strong links between Hartmann’s axiology and Schel- er’s (see Kelly 2011) and Hartmann’s occasional references to other realist phenomenologists, such as von Hildebrand or Reinach, he doesn’t endorse a phenomenological methodology, even broadly conceived. Nevertheless, the Ethics contains many phenom-

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enologically detailed descriptions of a range of emotions, or what he calls ‘special moral values’ (e.g., happiness, courage, love, humility, trust, modesty or aloofness). Phenome- nological re-assessments of these or further comparative research elaborating Hart- mann’s and other phenomenologists’ take on particular emotions could thus be fruitful (e.g., Kolnai’s ‘haughtiness’ (Hochmut) and Hartmann’s ‘aloofness’ (Wahrung der Dis- tanz)). In this regard, we should also mention Reiner’s alternative phenomenological account of values (Reiner 1959; see also 1932). In a somewhat deflationary move, Reiner correlates values with the valence of emotions (as do many classical accounts, such as Spinoza’s or Aquinas’). Values and disvalues are simply what is either agreea- ble/pleasant or disagreeable/unpleasant. He also explicitly cuts across the traditional divide between realist and idealist conceptions of values (Reiner 1959) and provides a succinct critical discussion of Heidegger’s Nietzsche-inspired rejection of the notion of value altogether (e.g., in Heidegger 1938).76 Ortega y Gasset is a better known, though today little read, author, who was educated in the context of the Neo-Kantianism of Cohen and Natorp. However, in his earlier years, he also intensively engaged with the broader phenomenological movement, in particular with Pfänder, Husserl and Scheler, and later, critically, with Heidegger (Pintor Ramos 1994; Holmes 2017). Although Ortega y Gasset did not present any systematic work on phenomenology of emotions, his essays On Love (1941) are noteworthy. Here, he follows Pfänder’s theory of sentiments. He also agrees with Scheler that love and hate are dispositional acts, insofar as they incline an “inner doing”, an active intention towards their objects (see Vendrell Ferran 2008). Stephan Strasser’s work Phenomenology of Feeling: An Essay on the Phenomena of Heart (1956) deserves special attention. In this systematic work, Strasser (a previous Husserl- assistant) critically discusses Scheler and, probably for the first time in the German- speaking world, also Sartre’s theory of emotions at length. Moreover, he deals with the first and second generation Leipzig School Gestalt psychologists’ accounts of emotions. But Strasser is certainly of more than mere scholarly interest as he attempts to develop an original and comprehensive phenomenological “typology of feeling”. He also offers the most systematic phenomenological account of happiness to date (see Summa’s chapter). Fortunately, Strasser’s work has been translated into English decades ago, and Ricoeur’s foreword and the translator Robert Wood’s comprehensive introduction provide a good starting point for a long-overdue rediscovery. The rich work of Paul Ricoeur also contains interesting material for future work on affectivity. For example, in The Fallible Man (a part of his monumental Philosophy of the Will) (1960), he, too, discusses happiness in some detail. More importantly, he intro- duces the notion of “affective fragility”, which refers to the phenomenon that humans are capable of what one would today call ‘mixed feelings’77, or, in Ricoeur’s Freudian terms, a “disproportion between the principle of pleasure and the principle of happiness,” as when one experiences “Joy in and through anguish” (ibid., 106). Relatedly,

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Ricoeur discusses the alleged “paradox” of affective intentionality, the phenomenon that the intentionality of emotions grasps felt qualities pertaining to intentional objects and, at the same time, “manifest[t] and revea[l] the way in which the self is inwardly affected“ (ibid., 84). As we have seen, this latter point regarding emotions’ self-related and self-revelatory character is a central issue in both phenomenological and the analytic philosophy of emotions; it has also been discussed in terms of the radically ‘passive’ intentionality of self-affection by Henry. Another notion of the paradox nature of human existence and its relation to affectivity was proposed earlier by one of the most eminent German-speaking philosophical anthropologists, Helmuth Plessner. Plessner was a student of Husserl, Neo- Kantians and the sociologist Max Weber, but also influenced by Scheler. Plessner’s core idea is that the defining feature of humans, which distinguishes them from non-human animals and inorganic matter alike, lies in their so-called “eccentric positionality”. Plessner means by this a form of perspectival distance towards one’s organic and inorganic environment, as well as to one’s own body. Importantly, for Plessner, this distance or transcendence vis-à-vis oneself manifests itself not only in human’s linguistic capability but also, and indeed distinctively so, their emotional expressivity. Specifically, eccentric positionality manifests itself in the uniquely human expression of smiling (Lächeln), laughing and crying (Plessner 1941/61 and 1950). Plessner conceives of laughing and crying as “limit-cases of human behavior”, as they express “the broken- ness of man’s relation to his body“, which is “the basis of his existence, the source, but also the limit, of his power.” (1941/61, 32) Plessner has had a considerable influence on German postwar philosophy, but has not yet been sufficiently recognized in the Eng- lish-speaking world. Both his original existential-anthropological theory of laughter and crying and his analysis of shame and vanity (Plessner 1924) await a broader discussion in the philosophy of emotions (see, however, Berger 1997).78 Finally, let us mention the unduly little-known work A Theory of Feelings (1979) by the Hungarian philosopher Heller, who later became the successor of Arendt’s chair at the New School for Social Research. In this book, Heller provides an intriguing, explicitly phenomenologically founded, critical sociology of emotions. Heller was arguably among the first to discuss the idea of culturally sedimented and internalized “emotional regimes” (Reddy 2001) or normative sets of affective practices. This is well reflected in her Marx-inspired, historical and conceptual elaborations on the “housekeeping of feelings”. For Heller, such an affective “economy” is not just a matter of individual emotional “regulation” but, rather, functions by means of internalized, socially stratified norms. Hel- ler, thus, also prefigures the influential conceptions of feminist sociologists of emotion such as Hochschild’s (1979 and 1983) “emotion management” and “emotion norms” or Illouz’s (2007) notions of “emotional capital” and “emotional habitus”. As we have seen, the range of affectively relevant phenomena in our bodily felt, moral and social world is probably more complex than our (folk-)psychological, philosophical and phenomenological conceptual frameworks can capture. But some affective

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phenomena that have in fact been conceptualized still lack their own treatment or are only partly covered in the following chapters for reasons of space. Several are treated by the authors just mentioned, such as feelings of agency (Kanonow), courage (Hartmann), or laughing and crying (Plessner); some are discussed across the chapters in the context of other affective phenomena or dynamics, such as Ressentiment and feelings of powerless- ness, frustration or malicious joy (see the chapters of Vendrell Ferran on Voigtländer, and Schloßberger, Landweer, and Szanto and Slaby), regret (Bernhardt), feelings or a sense of justice (Rinofner-Kreidl, and Landweer) or feelings of belonging and exclusion (Szanto and Slaby); some affective phenomena, such as surprise or curiosity, that certainly deserve more attention from phenomenologists, are altogether missing.79 We hope, though, that the material in this handbook will inspire future research on these and further emotions.

A Final Note

A final, general note on what—and what not—to expect from reading the contributions is in order. Given the nature of a handbook, and the fact that there are as yet hardly any introductory sources or overview material available on the phenomenology of emotions, these being especially scarce in English, all the chapters are devised so as to give a comprehensive and accessible overview of the authors, topics and discussions at issue. However, we believe that it is illusory to think that philosophical analysis could ever be entirely neutral. Indeed, we contend that while philosophy should be charitable and sensitive to opposing views and interpretations, it is also, to some degree, always partial. Accordingly, throughout the volume, the contributors’ own voices, conceptual preferences and own research foci will be present, but that, we trust, will be perceived as a benefit.

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Further Reading

Ben-Ze’ev, Aaron, and Krebs, Angelika (Eds.) (2019). Philosophy of Emotion. 4 Volumes. London, New York: Routledge. Goldie, Peter (Ed.) (2010). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford: Oxford Uni- versity Press.

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Griffiths, Paul E. (2013). Current Emotion Research in Philosophy. Emotion Review 5(2) (2013), 215–222. Hatzimoysis, Anthony (Ed.) (2003). Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mickunas, Algis (1997). Emotion. In: L. Embree (Ed.). Encyclopedia of Phenomenology. Dordrecht: Springer, 171–176. Mulligan, Kevin, and Klaus R. Scherer. (2012). Toward a Working Definition of Emotion. Emotion Review 4(4), 345–357. Solomon, Robert C. (Ed.) (2004). Thinking about Feeling. Contemporary Philosophers of Emotion. Ox- ford: Oxford University Press. Scarantino, Andrea (Ed.) (2019). The Routledge Handbook of Emotion Theory. London, New York: Routledge.

1 That emotions are prominent on the agenda of various disciplines is also reflected by the fact that there are numerous works on the history of thinking about emotions: see, especially,. Reddy 2001, who provides a general conceptual framework; Perler (2011/2018), who concentrates on the Middle Ages and early modern philosophical theories of emotions from Aquinas through Montaigne to Spinoza, and their metaphysical underpinnings; Plamper (2012/2015), who focuses mostly on the history of emotions in cultural studies, the social sciences, and on the meta-historical aspects of studying the history of emotions; for the history of emotions from a psychological angle, see Oatley 2004; see also the collected volumes on classical philosophical theories of emotions, Landweer and Renz 2012 and Cohen and Stern 2017. 2 This has been repeatedly emphasized in recent scholarship, but keeps being forgotten by philosophers and non-philosophers alike. 3 For a recent study that explores the history of emotions in early Chinese philosophy, see Virág 2017. 4 This is not to say that German Idealists were explicitly or altogether hostile towards emotions’ role in the life of the mind or moral life. On the contrary, Hegel, for example, famously states in the Encyclopedia: “Nothing great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion. It is only a dead, too often, indeed, a hypocritical morality which inveighs against the very form of passion.” (He- gel 1830, § 474). 5 For a recent Husserlian reassesment of Schopenhauer’s ethics of compassion, see Streubel 2015. 6 Curiously, the circumstances prompting the rediscovery of affects and emotions and the ‘affective turn’ in the cultural and social sciences in the late 1990s were similar. Influential strands of the so-called ‘affect studies’ were (and still are) inspired more by empirical, and in particular socio-biological and neuroscientific, emotion research than philosophical research. Here, psychological work on “affect theory” (Tomkins 1962/1963) or “basic emotions” (Ekman 1992), and eventually Damasio’s popularization of neuroscientific emotion research (e.g., Damasio 2003), or more recently Barrett Feldman’s social neuro- constructivist account (e.g., Barrett Feldman 2017) proved to be key discussion points. Even some feminist literature in affect studies is influenced more strongly by research at the intersection of sociobiolo- gy, neuropsychology, classical psychoanalysis or media, communication or film studies than any of the grand philosophical theories (e.g., Kosofsky Sedgwick 2003; Angerer 2007). For orientation in the complex web of this field, see the introductions in the volumes of Greco and Stenner 2008, Harding and Pribram 2009 and Gregg and Seigworth 2010, the concise monograph of Wetherell 2012, or consult the handbooks by Sander and Scherer 2009, Stets and Turner 2006 and 2011, and Slaby and von Scheve 2019; see also references in Szanto’s and Slaby’s chapter. To be sure, a specific Deleuzian reading of Spinoza’s theory of affects played an equally important role in the affective turn in cultural studies, and indeed many authors in this paradigm precisely aim to combine this reading with a neuroscientific account of affect, a strategy also followed by the neuroscientist Damasio (2003).

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7 Lipps’ (esp. 1889 and 1902) theory of emotions, however, had considerably less impact on subsequent phenomenologists than his—much-criticized—theory of empathy. For Stumpf’s work on emotions, see esp. Stumpf 1928, on Pfänder and Geiger, see the respective chapters in this volume. 8 See Strasser 1956, ch. 3. 9 For a concise discussion, see Vendrell Ferran 2015; cf. also Salice 2016. 10 In this context, it is worth mentioning that even an eminent figure of the allegedly ‘emotion-proof’ Neo-Kantianism such as Cohen dedicated a comprehensive work to the theory of emotions, see his Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls (1913) (“Aesthetic of Pure Feeling”). 11 An exception among these exceptions seems to be Strasser’s book Das Gemüt, whose English transla- tion, more than 20 years after its German publication, was introduced by Ricoeur; but even this transla- tion has not had any real effect on its reception, which—unduly—remains almost nonexistent to this very date. 12 Straddling analytic and continental work on emotions, Solomon is the only notable exception who, from early on in his work, repeatedly refers to Sartre’s work on emotions (see, e.g., Solomon 1976). 13 See Rutkevič 2014; de Warren and Vongehr 2018; cf. also Stein 1985. A noteworthy and almost wholly unknown critical essay, albeit from the interwar period, is Voigtländer’s “Zur Psychologie der politischen Stellungnahme. Eine massenpsychologische Studie” (1920). It is a sad irony of history that Voigtländer, an early proponent of Freud in Germany, became a member of the NSDAP in 1937, though her sympathies with Nazism remain unclear; see also Vendrell Ferran’s chapter. 14 Cf. also Plessner 1935. On Stein, Scheler, Walther and Schmalenbach, see the respective chapters. In this context, it should be noted that there were some interesting and exceptional conservative, catholic phenomenologists who were staunch critics of Nazism, such as Scheler, the Jewish convert to Catholi- cism, Kolnai, and von Hildebrand; see also Gubser 2014 and 2019. 15 Although, see Heller’s (1979) neo-Marxist reassessment of emotions in the last section. 16 Against a one-sided reading of Kant as somebody who altogether expels emotions and affectivity from moral life, see, however, Mohrmann 2015. For general post-liberal rejections of this picture, see the references in Szanto’s and Slaby’s chapter. Note also that this dichotomy between emotions and morality, supposedly originating in Enlightenment thought is not as clear-cut as often thought; just think of what Nussbaum (2013, 54) calls “Rousseau’s civic emotion culture”. See also the powerful counter- narrative in Mishra 2017. 17 See, e.g., Oksenberg Rorty 1980; Baier 1986; Nussbaum 1990; Jones 1996. 18 Oksenberg Rorty and Nussbaum were among the first to remind the Anglo-Saxon world of this. 19 See, e.g., Gibbard 1990; McDowell 1998; Blackburn 2001. 20 Solomon (1984) also highlights the importance of Bedford’s paper “Emotions” (1956/1957), which critically draws on Ryle (1949), though the impact of this paper seems quite marginal compared to the monographs appearing only decades later. 21 Let us stress the qualifier ‘broadly’ given the diversity and indeed ambiguity of the concept of ‘cognitivism’ in relation to emotions. Caution should be applied even in relation to those philosophers typically listed as ‘arch-cognitivists’; for a good discussion of this see Solomon 2002. 22 Other influential work from this earlier cognitivist period includes Marks 1982; Deigh 1994; Gordon 1990; Greenspan 1988; cf. also Stocker 1983. Also, the use of literary examples and their phenomenological analysis has become more customary within analytic work on the emotions, most notably in the work of Wollheim and Goldie. 23 See also Slaby 2008a, 2008b; Slaby et al. 2011; cf. also Helm’s congenial account in his chapter. 24 Note that ‘concern or value-based construal of emotions’ is a fairly broad umbrella-term that houses some still divergent accounts such as Helm 2001, 2017; Roberts 2003; Deonna and Teroni 2012, or Tappolet 2016. 25 Mapping perceptual accounts is almost impossible by now, however young the field, as the label has been used, more or less appropriately, to characterize (or self-applied to) such widely diverging authors as de Sousa, Roberts, Goldie, Helm, Tappolet, Prinz, or Döring among many others; for a useful, brief orientation in this conceptual minefield, see Döring and Lutz 2015; and for the most sustained criticism to date, see Brady 2013. For a discussion of classical phenomenological (esp. regarding Scheler and Sar- tre) and recent perceptual accounts, see Poellner 2016. 26 See Griffiths and Scarantino 2009; Colombetti 2014; de Jaegher 2015; Krueger and Szanto 2016, and more references in Stephan’s and Walter’s chapter.

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27 See Demmerling and Landweer 2007; Landweer and Renz 2012; and, Müller 2019. 28 See, e.g., Deonna and Teroni 2012 and further references in Drummond’s chapter. 29 See the respective chapters on some of these emotions in this volume. 30 See, e.g., Murphy and Hampton 1988; Prinz 2007; Bagnoli 2011; Murphy 2012; Brudholm 2008; Mihai 2014; Steinbock 2014; and, further references in De Monticelli’s and Szanto’s and Slaby’s chapters. 31 See Landweer and Koppelberg 2016; Landweer and Bernhardt 2017; Brudholm and Schepelern Jo- hansen 2018. 32 See Carroll 1990 and Carroll’s chapter in this volume; Walton 1990; Gendler and Kovakovich 2006. 33 See d’Arms and Jacobson 2000; Helm 2001; Pugmire 2005; Salmela 2005, 2006; Solomon 2007; de Sousa 2011; Szanto 2017; Furtak 2018; and, Welpinghus 2018. 34 See, e.g., Gilbert 2002; Ahmed 2004; Schmid 2009; Nussbaum 2013; von Scheve and Salmela 2014; Sánchez Guerrero 2016; Helm 2017; and, for more references the chapters of Sánchez Guerrero and Szanto and Slaby. 35 The authors who should be listed in this second-wave rediscovery largely correspond to the contributors in the present volume, but see also: the work of Mulligan (2008, 2010a, 2010b, 2017); Vongehr 2011; Poellner 2016; the contributions in Mertens and Müller 2014, Ubiali and Wehrle 2015, Krebs and Ben-Ze’ev 2017, and Drummond and Rinofner-Kreidl 2018, as well as these four special issues dedicated to the phenomenology of emotions: Heiner 2008; Elpidorou and Freeman 2014; French et al. 2017, and, most recently, Parker and Quepons 2018. The first general second-wave discussion of the phenomenology of emotions is Vendrell Ferran’s monograph Die Emotionen: Gefühle in der realistischen Phänomenolo- gie (2008a); for other recent monographs with a systematic scope, see Švec 2013; Colombetti 2014; Steinbock 2014; Sánchez Guerrero 2016, and Müller 2019. See also occasional systematic references to phenomenologists in Furtak 2018. 36 The first to coin the notion of a “phenomenological turn in the philosophy of emotions” was Schmid (2009, 64), but he uses this phrase more broadly to refer to the shift from cognitivist and internalist paradigm to the affective intentionality paradigm. 37 On the role of emotions in kineasthetic experience, and dance in particular, from a Husserlian perspective, see Sheets-Johnstone 1999; on Husserl’s conceptualization of affectivity on the pre- intentional level or cognitively low-level forms of intentionality, see Al-Saji 2000 and Waldenfels 2006. 38 Discourse on emotions began earlier in other disciplines. Since the 1990s, especially in film studies, sociology and literary theory, there has been a strong interest in phenomenological accounts of the felt body and emotions. The renewed reception of phenomenoogy in philosophy was, in part, an effect of this interdisciplinary appreciation; see also endnote 6 above. 39 See Szanto and Krueger 2019, and Breyer’s chapter in this volume. 40 See Schmid 2009; Sánchez Guerrero 2016; Szanto and Moran 2015, 2016; Szanto 2015, 2018; Zahavi 2015; Krueger 2016; Salice and Schmid 2016; León et al. forthcoming; and, Krebs’, Jan Müller’s, Schloßberger’s and Sánchez Guerrero’s chapters. 41 See, e.g., Maise 2011; Summa and Fuchs 2015; Bortolan and Salice 2018; Krueger and Colombetti 2018; Varga 2019, and Stanghellini et al. 2019. 42 See, e.g., Fuchs 2005 and 2013; Ratcliffe 2014, 2017; and more in Fuchs’ chapter. 43 Related intriguing debates on “feeling rules” and “emotions norms” have also occupied center-stage in the sociology of emotions since Hochschild’s (1983) seminal work; see more in Szanto 2017 and in Szanto’s and Slaby’s chapter. 44 This is evidenced, for example, in the work of such phenomenologists as Fuchs, Gallagher, Ratcliffe, Schmid, and Zahavi, as well as most of the contributors in the present volume. 45 See Heinämaa 2003; Ahmed 2004; Al-Saji 2010a, 2010b; Bernasconi 2010, 2020; Oksala 2016; Ortega 2016; Landweer and Marcinski 2016; Slaby 2020; and, Wehrle 2020. Indeed, as Vendrell Ferran (2008b) noted, German women phenomenologists, such as Voigtländer, Stein, Walther, were among the first to have systematically thematized emotions and, in particular, their relation to sociality and collectivity over a hundred years ago in the first phase of women’s academic institutionalization in philosophy. 46 The only classically phenomenologically grounded account tackling precisely the ‘what-it-is-like’ aspect of the ‘phenomenology’ of emotions, to our knowledge, is Dewalque 2017; see also Goldie 2000 for a comparable understanding. On the other hand, Gunther 2004 represents a typical analytic example of discussing the ‘phenomenology’ of emotions in this deflationary sense and without mentioning any authors of the tradition.

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47 See Szanto 2012. For a discussion of the allegedly productive link between the ‘phenomenology’ of emotions, in the sense of a feeling theory, and cognitive phenomenology from the perspective of analytic philosophy of mind, see Kriegel 2014. 48 See also Henry’s reassessment of the early 19th century’s intriguing philosophy of embodiment by Maine de Biran (esp. in Henry 1963 and 1965); for more on Maine de Biran, affectivity and embodiment see also Colombetti 2014 and Schmitz 1964, 2009. For a critical discussion of the allegedly stark ontological difference between Körper and Leib with regard to affectivity from the perspective of New Phenomenlogy, see Slaby 2008a; cf. also Berninger 2017. 49 For further discussion of the active/passive distinction in emotions, see Waldenfels’ so-called ‘responsive ethical’ conception of what he calls “pathic undergrounds and backgrounds of experience” (Wal- denfels 2006, 46). Levinas’ and Henry’s ontological conceptions of affectivity as a form of radical passivity (see Tengelyi 2009) seem, rather than contradictive of this picture, actually supportive of it. See also Loidolt’s chapter. For a helpful, partly historical, discussion of whether affectivity is active or passive (and the claim that it is neither), see Zaborowski 2018. 50 See Schmitz 1999 and 2009; Schmitz et al. 2011; and, Nörenberg’s and Landweer’s chapters. 51 See again Pugmire 2005; for Stein’s view regarding this, see Szanto and Moran 2020; cf. also Mulligan 1998 and Vendrell Ferran 2008a; regarding Merleau-Ponty, see Vendrell Ferran 2019 and Cataldi 1993. On an enactivist re-assessment of Henry’s related notion of a “pathos-with”, see de Jaegher 2015; see also Colombetti 2014. Note that in developing his notion of ‘affective self-relation’, Henry explicitly refers not only to Heidegger but also to Scheler (Henry 2003, 50, 129). 52 Note that a merely objectifying act, completely deprived of any affective components or “value-free” is, according to the later Husserl—as most phenomenologists would readily concur—“an abstraction”; see, e.g., Husserl (1929–1935, 404–405) or an unpublished manuscript cited and discussed in Drummond (2004, 112). 53 Even though they are typically used synonymously (e.g., Kristjánsson 2010), and Goldie doesn’t discuss the differences or similarities between these terms, not every instance of cognitively impenetrable emotions seem to be an instance of so-called “recalcitrant emotions”; in the latter cases, a recalcitrant fear of spiders, say, is not necessarily motivated or warranted by any previous experience of actual harm emanating from spiders. Given their focus on the personal-biographical, situational or life-worldly embeddedness of emotions in contrast to discrete episodic ones, phenomenologist or narrative accounts of emotions (e.g., Goldie 2012) are particularly well-equipped to differentiate such cases; see also Dolezal’s discussion of “chronic shame” in her chapter. 54 See Szanto 2015; cf. also Gilbert 2014. 55 On Husserl’s conception of the (horizon-)intentionality of moods, see Quepons Ramírez 2015. 56 See Nörenberg’s and Landweer’s chapters, but also what Schloßberger, in his chapter, calls Scheler’s ‘psychic realism’. 57 What complicates matters, or makes any clear-cut paradigmatic distinction here porous, is that, as we have seen above, Goldie’s (2000) original conception of affective intentionality already stresses the inextricable entanglement of bodily and intentional aspects in emotional experiences—bodily feelings being “infused” with intentionality and vice versa. 58 See also Fuchs 2013; Ratcliffe 2014, 2017, and the chapters on Stein and Scheler. 59 See more on some complications regarding the issue of value-feelings below. For details and references on Scheler and Stein in this respect, see Vendrell Ferran 2008a and 2015, and Szanto and Moran 2020. 60 Roughly, empathy is a so-called ‘non-originary presentation’ of an other’s experiences and as such distinct from ordinary presentation of spatio-physical object but also from the so-called ‘presentification’ (Vergegenwärtigung) of one’s own past experiences or from imagination; see, e.g., Szanto and Moran 2020. 61 A somewhat similar discussion can be found in contemporary analytic discussions revolving around the perceptual nature of emotions, see references above. 62 Cf. Drummond 2004, 2018; Vendrell Ferran 2008a; Mulligan 2010a, 2010b; Engelsen 2018; Müller 2019, as well as Jardine’s and de Monticelli’s chapters; for Husserl’s shifting view in the course of his work, in particular, see Gyemant 2018. One of the first analytic philosophers of emotion who explicitly endorses the view that emotions are ‘disclosive’ in this sense is Johnston 2001. 63 For recent analytic discussions on this, see Roeser and Todd 2014 and Tappolet 2016.

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64 For an alternative approach, cutting across the value-realism/idealism issue, see Reiner 1959. We should also stress that the New Phenomenologists’ take on the relation of emotions and values is altogether different from classical phenomenologists. They reject the idea of values as abstract objects or value qualities that would excert normative demands and to which emoters respond. Instead, according to Schmitz, for example, it is our spatial experience of emotions as atmospheres that have felt-body-like qualities which corporeally ‘grip us’ and by our very corporeal-affective involvement make claims upon us. In other words, we do not grasp or respond to values, but are affected by atmospheres that bear normative forces, which push us towards certain actions or omissions. Thus, notwithstanding a rejection of any form of value-realism, New Phenomenomelogists also distinguish between our subjectively being-affected, by means of which we appropriate and literally ‘incorporate’ individual value qualities, and the normative pressure of a given atmosphere (see Schmitz 2009). 65 This alternative approach in Stein comes closest to contemporary neosentimentalism; in particular, so- called “rational sentimentalism” (d’Arms 2005) or what we might call ‘quasi-value-realist’ accounts of the appropriateness of emotions, see esp. d’Arms and Jacobson 2000. Versions of this account have also become known as so-called ‘buck-passing’ accounts (Scanlon 1998); for detailed discussions, see Mulligan 2010a and Tappolet 2016. 66 See also Reiner’s (1959) alternative model of values in the final section. 67 See de Monticelli’s chapter, for a more plausible interpretation of early phenomenologists’ endorsement of what she calls “the intrinsically evaluative, twofold intentionality” of emotions, whereby “every emotion is an experience of [a value] that encompasses both poles of the intentional relation”. For a critical, comparative discussion of Husserl’s and Scheler’s view on the issue of the giveness of values, see Rinofner-Kreidl 2013. 68 The notions ‘value-feelings’ and ‘value-ceptions’ are mostly used synonymously by early phenomenologists such as Scheler, Stein and others. 69 The interpretation of Stein is not straightforward, to be sure. We find a few ambivalent passages that are sometimes refered to to show that she actually does not identify value-feelings and feelings (see Mulligan 2010a, 236; 2017, 235; cf. also Vendrell Ferran 2015). In such passages, Stein claims that “attempts to distinguish ‘feeling’ (‘Fühlen’) and ‘emotion’ (‘Gefühl’)” are futile, since they “don’t denote distinct types of experiences, but only different ‘directions’ (Richtungen) of one and the same experience” (1917, 117; cf. also 121, 116, 119). At one place, Stein explicitly distinguishes between “value-feeling” (Wertfühlen) and “the feeling of the existence of a value” as well as between “value-emotion” (Wertgefühl) and “the depth of a feeling” (1917, 120). However, the whole passage remains somewhat obscure regarding the identity claim. 70 Note that none of this entails an endorsement of the controversial claim that there are unfelt or unconscious emotions (see above). 71 Cf., however, Krebs 2017. 72 Notable exceptions include Solomon 1976; de Sousa 1987; Ben-Ze’ev 2000; and, Roberts 2003. All these writers analyze in some detail rich rosters of emotions, or what Solomon calls the “Who’s Who Among the Passions” (1976), alongside their general theories of emotions. 73 See Murphy and Hampton 1988; Solomon 1995; Brudholm 2008; and, Mihai 2016. 74 See Pugmire 2005 and Brewer 2011; cf. Szanto 2017. Interestingly, Binswanger, one of the foremost classical phenomenological psychiatrists and founder of the psychoanalytic-phenomenological school of Daseinsanalyse, in his early chef d’oeuvre Einführung in die Probleme der Allgemeinen Psychologie (1922), praises Haas (as well as to Scheler and Pfänder) for “having [in the wake of Brentano] energetically stressed the ‘spatial form’ of the psyche (die ‘Raumform’ des Psychischen),” which “attributes ‘psychological entities’ the ‘intuitive’ determination of extendedness, voluminosity or fullness and orders of depths (‚anschaulichen’ Bestimmtheiten der Ausgebreitetheit, der Voluminosität oder Fülle und der Tiefenordnung). This doesn’t concern, of course, a form of physical extension, etc., but are still phenomena that “stem from the form of space” (Binswanger 1922, 119). (Binswanger later on in the book also criticizes Haas’s and Pfänder’s “psychiza- tion” (Psychisierung) of the depth of psychological states as a sort of psycho-affective ‘intensification’ of those states (ibid.,333).) This is particularly interesting in light of the New Phenomenologists’, and especially Schmitz’s, similar conceptions of emotions decades later. However, in Schmitz’s view, what is described as the spatiality of the soul are felt-bodily experiences which do not need an additional ‘inner space’ in any metaphorical sense; see above and Landweer’s chapter.

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75 See brief descriptions of both Löwenstein-Freudenberg and Kananow in Spiegelberg and Avé- Lallemant 1982. 76 See additional references to both Reiner and Hartmann in De Monticelli’s chapter. 77 For a recent overview of thediscussion on mixed feelings, see Zaborowski forthcoming. 78 Prütting has recently published a truly monumental, 2000-page monograph Homo Ridens (2013/2016) dedicated to the phenomenology of laughter, heavily drawing on Plessner, but even more on Schmitz’s New Phenomenology. 79 For the most sustained and phenomenologically grounded treatment of Ressentiment published recently, see Aeschbach 2017.

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