A Multiform Desire A Multiform Desire A Study of Appetite in Plato’s Timaeus, Republic and Phaedrus Olof Pettersson Dissertation presented at Uppsala University to be publicly examined in Universitetshuset, Sal IV, Biskopsgatan 3, Uppsala, Wednesday, January 23, 2013 at 13:15 for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The examination will be conducted in English. Abstract Pettersson, O. 2013. A Multiform Desire: A Study of Appetite in Plato’s Timaeus, Republic and Phaedrus. Filosofiska institutionen. 242 pp. Uppsala. ISBN 978-91-506-2325-3. This dissertation is a study of appetite in Plato’s Timaeus, Republic and Phaedrus. In recent research is it often suggested that Plato considers appetite (i) to pertain to the essential needs of the body, (ii) to relate to a distinct set of objects, e.g. food or drink, and (iii) to cause be- haviour aiming at sensory pleasure. Exploring how the notion of appetite, directly and indi- rectly, connects with Plato’s other purposes in these dialogues, this dissertation sets out to evaluate these ideas. By asking, and answering, three philosophically and interpretatively crucial questions, individually linked to the arguments of the dialogues, this thesis aims to show (i) that the relationship between appetite and the body is not a matter of survival, and that appetite is better understood in terms of excess; (ii) that appetite is multiform and cannot be defined in terms of a distinct set of objects; and (iii) that appetite, in Plato, can also pertain to non-sensory objects, such as articulated discourse. Chapter one asks what the universe can teach us about embodied life. It argues that Plato, in the Timaeus, works with an important link between the universe and the soul, and that the account of disorder, irrationality and multiformity identifying a pre-cosmic condition of the universe provides a key to understanding the excessive behaviour and condition of a soul dominated by appetite. Chapter two asks why the philosophers of the Republic’s Kallipolis return to the cave, and suggests that Plato’s notion of the noble lie provides a reasonable account of this. By explor- ing the Republic’s ideas of education, poetry and tradition, it argues that appetite – a multi- form and appearance oriented source of motivation – is an essential part of this account. Chapter three asks why Socrates characterizes the speeches of the Phaedrus as deceptive games. It proposes that this question should be understood in the light of two distinctions: one between playful and serious discourse and one between simple and multiform. It argues that the speeches of the Phaedrus are multiform games, and suggests that appetite is the primary source of motivation of the soul addressed, personified by Phaedrus. Keywords: Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Plato, Appetite, Desire, Epithymia, Soul, Tripartition, Multiform, Poikilos, Timaeus, Republic, Phaedrus, Embodiment, Incarnation, Necessity, Philosopher-kings, Allegory of the Cave, Noble Lie, Poetry, Multi-headed Beast, Game, Play, Rhetoric, Dialectic, Deception. Olof Pettersson, Uppsala University, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Metaphysics, Box 627, SE-751 26 Uppsala, Sweden. Photo cover picture: Mathilda Vinkka Haarla © Olof Pettersson 2013 ISBN 978-91-506-2325-3 urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-186130 (http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-186130) Printed by Elanders Sverige AB, 2012 Acknowledgements A book has neither object nor subject; it is made of variously formed matters, and very different dates and speeds. To attribute the book to a subject is to overlook this working of matters, and the exteriority of their relations.1 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari In writing this book I have been helped by many people. I am in great debt to my supervisor Pauliina Remes whose devotion to my cause has been invalu- able. Without the initial support from Lilli Alanen it would not have been written at all. The feedback I have received from the participants in the his- tory of philosophy seminar at Uppsala University – in particular, Peter Myrdal, Tomas Ekenberg, Lorenzo Casini, Frans Svensson, Alexander Stöpfgeshoff, Annika Wennersten, Marcel Quarfood, Erik Åkerlund and Tor Freyr – has been crucial. The moral support from Per Algander, the proof- reading by David McVicker, and all the practical aid from Sandra Olsson and Ryszard Sliwinski have been indispensable as well. I am also in great debt to Tony Long for comments on an early draft of what eventually became chapter three, for welcoming me into his seminar on the Phaedrus, and for taking great care of me during my stay at the Universi- ty of California at Berkeley; where, in various forms, I also received im- portant reactions from John Ferrari, Dorothea Frede, David Crane, Wei Liu, Derin McLeod and Alexandre Roberts. In addition, I am also sure that the letter of recommendation Hans Ruin wrote for me was essential in the pro- cess of getting there. Nicholas Smith’s comments on parts of the manuscript have been im- portant, just as the inspiring discussions I have had with Mats Persson. The positive reactions and the critical remarks from Vasilis Politis, on the whole manuscript, have also been decisive in the final stages of writing. On top of this, I have received much appreciated financial support from Gästrike-Hälsinge Nation, in the form of Göransson-Sandviken’s forskar- utbildningsstipendium, and from Sverige-Amerika Stiftelsen, that made it possible for me to spend a year abroad. Last but not least, besides the support from my friends and my family, nothing would have been possible without the love of my life, Tuva Widén. 1 Deleuze and Guattari (2002, 3). Contents Introduction ..................................................................................................... 9 1. Cosmic and Mortal Necessity ................................................................... 15 1.1. Introduction .............................................................................. 15 1.2. Cosmic Necessity ..................................................................... 18 1.3. Mortal Necessity ...................................................................... 47 1.4. Conclusion ............................................................................... 80 2. The Power of Lies ..................................................................................... 85 2.1. Introduction .............................................................................. 85 2.2. The Return to the Cave ............................................................ 88 2.3. The Function of the Noble Lie ............................................... 107 2.4. The Psychological Background of the Noble Lie .................. 119 2.5. Conclusion ............................................................................. 140 3. A Multiform Game ................................................................................. 147 3.1. Introduction ............................................................................ 147 3.2. A Serious Line of Interpretation ............................................ 152 3.3. Serious and Playful Discourse ............................................... 163 3.4. Multiform and Simple Discourse ........................................... 182 3.5. The Deception of the Multiform Soul .................................... 210 3.6. Conclusion ............................................................................. 217 Conclusion .................................................................................................. 223 Bibliography ............................................................................................... 231 Index ........................................................................................................... 241 Introduction Plato has a good claim to have invented the idea of rationality; and with rationality the idea of the philosopher.2 A philosopher is supposed to have rational motivations and he is supposed to be ruled by reason. But just like philosophers, rational motivations are rare (e.g., Rep., 494a or 496a). The motivating forces of most people come in different forms. In the three dia- logues where Plato develops the famous idea of the soul’s tripartite nature, i.e. in the Timaeus, in the Republic and in the Phaedrus, Plato also singles out two forms of non-rational motivation that are particularly important: motivations spelled out in terms of victory and honour, and motivations per- taining to irrational appetite and desire.3 This book is a study of the latter. As recent research on appetite (ἐπιθυμία) in Plato has shown, appetite may in general be understood along the following lines. (1) Appetite is a source of motivation pertaining to the body. (2) Appetite is essentially linked to the world as it appears, and (3) appetite gives rise to behaviour that aims at sensory pleasure and satisfaction.4 In a comprehensive account of Plato’s theory of appetite, these ideas would be central, not only because they are often highlighted in the litera- ture, but also because they, to some extent, have intuitive appeal. It seems reasonable to think about appetite in terms of food, drink and sex. And inso- far as we understand appearance as a matter of how the world presents itself before (or unless) it is submitted to rational scrutiny, it is sensible to say that our appetites drag us towards what appears to be worthwhile, in the same way as it is reasonable to say that appetite is a source of motivation that ori- ents us towards the sensory