Agenda Setting in Europe a Case Study on a European Aviation Fuel Tax

Agenda setting in Europe A case study on a European aviation fuel tax

Luuk Jansen 01/08/2020 MsC Public Governance

Personal data Author: Luuk Jansen Student ANR: u744744 Student SNR: 2028700 Study: MsC Public Governance Institution: Tilburg University

Thesis tutors First reader: prof. dr. Martijn Groenleer Second reader: MsC. Arlette van den Berg

Acknowledgements During the process of writing this thesis I have received support and assistance from a great number of people. I would first like to thank my supervisor, prof. dr. M. Groenleer, whose expertise, knowledge, and feedback were valuable for finding a research topic, creating a sufficient methodology and analyzing the gathered data. Your guidance also provided me with the tools to choose the right direction for my thesis. I also want to thank the other tutors of the track group for their input and feedback.

Furthermore, I would like to thank my fellow students Jovana Djurdevic, Michelle Sülter, Luuk Spruijt, and Lars Jansen for their support throughout the writing of this thesis. Lastly, I would like to thank my family and friends, for always listening when I had something to discuss and always providing me with feedback and motivation.

Abstract Combatting climate change is important in European policymaking, with for example the presentation of the Green Deal in 2019. Aviation is exempted from a kerosene taxes in Europe, while taxing kerosene would lead to a decrease in aviation emissions. Currently, the European Commission is preparing a proposal to tackle the exemption of taxes in the aviation sector. How and why this topic reached the European political agenda is not known. Research has shown that the European political agenda is influenced by timing, the framing of an issue, and the policy venue that is involved with the issue and has decision-making power on the issue. This study aims to explain under which conditions the issue of a kerosene tax ended up on the European agenda, and why specifically now. This study expands on existing literature by examining the process of this unique case. Its contribution to the literature lies in the development of an operational framework, which has not been done before, and investigating if a climate related differs in its agenda setting process from other issues. Building on theories of agenda setting, this study asks: ‘Why has the issue of an aviation fuel tax made it onto the European agenda now?’

It has been concluded that a kerosene tax has reached the European political agenda because the issue was framed as an issue of a European level playing field by European Member State governments. Furthermore, the European policy venue became more receptive for climate related issues because of an increased awareness and priority for policy aimed at combatting climate change. The European Commission presented the Green Deal, which further underlines the priority of climate change in European policymaking. The current focusing event, the COVID-19 pandemic has altered the debate on taxing kerosene, because airlines are experiencing great financial setbacks and are requesting state aids in several countries. Lastly, it has been found that a kerosene tax has reached the European political agenda because similar policies failed in reaching the goal of decreasing emissions of aviation. The Kyoto Protocol, EU ETS, and national kerosene tax were not able to reduce

CO2 emissions, which led to a kerosene tax reaching a higher position on the European agenda.

Contents Chapter 1: Introduction ...... 6 1.1 Background ...... 6 1.2 Research problem ...... 6 1.3 Research question ...... 8 1.4 Scientific relevance ...... 8 1.5 Societal relevance ...... 9 1.6 Reading guide ...... 9 Chapter 2: Theoretical discussion ...... 10 2.1 Politics of attention ...... 10 2.2 Types of agendas ...... 10 2.3 Issue framing ...... 11 2.4 Policy venue ...... 12 2.5 Window of opportunity ...... 13 2.6 Theoretical model ...... 14 Chapter 3: Methodological framework ...... 15 3.1 Research strategy: Case study ...... 15 3.2 Data collection ...... 15 3.3 Validity and reliability ...... 17 3.4 Operationalization ...... 17 Chapter 4: Case description ...... 21 4.1 International and European measures on pricing aviation ...... 21 4.2 Taxing aviation in European Member States ...... 22 4.4 Moving the debate on kerosene taxation to a European level ...... 25 4.5 COVID-19 ...... 27 Chapter 5: Analysis ...... 29 5.1 Framing kerosene tax over the years ...... 29 5.2 Shifting policy venues ...... 31 5.3 A window of opportunity for setting a kerosene tax on the European agenda ...... 33 Conclusion ...... 36 Discussion...... 38 References ...... 40 Appendices ...... I Appendix I: Aviation tax in European Member States ...... I Appendix II: Timeline aviation pricing ...... II Appendix III: Interview questions ...... III

Interview questions interview one ...... III Interview questions interview two ...... V Interview questions interview three ...... VII Interview questions interview four ...... IX Appendix IV: Interview transcripts ...... X Interview one ...... X Interview two ...... XIII Interview three ...... XV Written interview professor Sebastiaan Princen ...... XVIII Interview four ...... XXII Appendix V: Coding interviews ...... XXIV

Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1 Background The aviation sector is responsible for two percent of the global greenhouse gas emissions every year (EPA, 2017). Yet, there is no taxation of kerosene (the fuel used in aviation) at the European level. The environment and combatting climate change are often central topics of political discussions. For example, the UN set up Sustainable Development Goals, and there are national tax reductions for electric vehicles in most European countries (United Nations, 2020) (European Parliament, 2019) (Rijksoverheid, 2020). Kerosene is not taxed in Europe because a tax will lower demand of aviation, which results in lower connectivity and economic growth. However, more aviation leads to more congestion for EU citizens, higher environmental damage and more noise disturbance (Mahashabde, Wolfe, & Ashok, 2011) (European Commission, 2019).

Humans emit 300 percent more carbon dioxide (CO2) than in 1970 (Ritchie & Roser, 2019). The European Union has the goal to be emission neutral in 2050 (Green Deal, 2019). Therefore, combatting climate change became a high priority for policy makers relatively recently. The CO2 emissions of the aviation sector are part of a collective action problem, that cannot be solved by national initiatives, but require a collective (European) approach (Benzie, Carter, Carlsen, & Taylor, 2019). It is widely accepted that combatting climate change is a cross-border issue (Biesbroek, Swart, & Carter, 2010; Carina & Keskitalo, 2010). Therefore, the subsidiarity principle of the European Union is applicable to issues related to combatting climate change (European Commission, 2008). In other parts of the world, aviation fuel taxes do exist. The United States for example, taxes kerosene for 0.243 dollars per gallon (OECD, 2019).

European Member States are calling upon the European Union to address the tax exemption of kerosene. On November seventh, 2019, a coalition of nine European countries called on Ursula von der Leyen (president of the European Commission) to ’’bring the debate on aviation pricing, in the form of aviation tax or similar policies, a step further’’ (Joint Statement, 2019). The Industry Group Airlines for Europe responded that taxing aviation is not an effective way to pursue environmental objectives (Morgan, 2019). From this moment on, the debate was opened and a kerosene tax was on the European political agenda. This is the first time a tax is discussed in Europe since 2010, when Janusz Lewandowski, former EU budget commissioner, opted for a direct European tax system, to incorporate carbon taxes in the EU tax system. This plan was voted away by several Member States in favor of the EU ETS, which, according to a press release of the European Commission, leads to more impact for the environment at a lower cost for society (Begg, 2011; European Commission, 2012).

Because of the cross-border aspects, the goals of combatting climate change, and the fact that kerosene is taxed in other parts of the world, it is peculiar that kerosene is not yet taxed at the European level. The debate on taxing kerosene has risen on the European Union level in 2019, with the aim of fair pricing of kerosene as part of the European Green Deal (Green Deal, 2019). This thesis intends to determine to which extent the theory of agenda setting can explain how, and why at this moment, the issue of an aviation fuel tax ended on the European political agenda. ‘A political agenda is a set of issues that policy makers give serious attention to. Agendas can be the result of a deliberate choice or as the response to an outside event.’ (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2015).

1.2 Research problem This study uses a case study as the research strategy. The selection of a case must be either random, to minimize bias, or must be based on an information oriented selection (Flyvberg, 2006). The case of

a kerosene tax is an information selection case because it is a deviant and extreme case. In this subchapter, the reasons why this case is worthy of research will be discussed. This will ultimately lead to the research problem that this research is addressing.

With the publication of the European Green Deal, the European Union committed itself to a new challenge, namely being emission neutral by 2050. More policies aimed at combatting climate change are necessary to reach this goal. Therefore, climate change policies will become more important in European decision making. These policies can lead to heavy resistance and can be controversial to implement (Hulme, 2009). A recent example of this controversy is the Dutch farmers protest against a reduction of greenhouse emissions in the agricultural sector (Schaart, 2019). Raising (positive) attention and support for these policies can therefore be complicated. Economies are built upon the idea that more consumption leads to financial success (Newell, 2010). Introducing measures at combatting climate change often goes at the cost of consumption and can therefore harm the financial position of people and businesses. In the case of a kerosene tax, higher (tax) prices may lead to less passengers, which may reduce the revenue of airlines. This means that goals of the European Union can conflict with the goals of companies in the aviation sector. Price fighters like Ryanair have become billion-dollar companies by providing flights for the lowest prices possible (Pitfield, 2007). An aviation fuel tax would hinder this strategy. How these conflicted goals are used in the agenda setting process is currently unknown and will be investigated in this research.

The agenda setting of a kerosene tax will be the subject of this case study because investigating the process of agenda setting for a kerosene tax on a European level can contribute to a better understanding on the agenda setting of other policies aimed at combatting climate change. Climate related issues will become more important in European policy making to reach the 2050 goals of being emission neutral. By understanding the process of agenda setting for an environmental issue like a kerosene tax, the process of agenda setting of other European policies aimed at combatting climate change can be better understood and explained.

Moreover, the issue of a European kerosene tax is a unique case worth investigating because of its tax rate compared to other types of fuel (like petrol, diesel, and LPG). For example, the tax rate for petrol in Europe ranges from 33 cents per liter in Bulgaria to 80 cents per liter in the Netherlands (European Commission, 2020). The tax rate on kerosene is 0 cents in all of Europe. This raises questions related to why kerosene is exempted from taxes in the European Union, while other types of fuel are taxed. This research is, however, not a comparative study between the extraordinary tax position of kerosene compared to other fuel types. The peculiar position of the aviation sector is a reason that this case is unique and worthy of further investigation. Studying the process of agenda setting of a European kerosene tax can provide insights in reasons for the exemption of taxes on kerosene.

Finally, the case of a kerosene tax is especially suited for a case study on agenda setting, because it is discussed for a long period of time already. Taxing kerosene has been a topic of discussion for almost eighty years. Taxing kerosene was forbidden by the United Nations in 1944. Gradually over time, the political and public opinion on taxing kerosene has changed, until a European kerosene tax reached the European political agenda in 2019. From existing literature, it does not become clear how the content of the European agenda has developed over time. Princen (2015) states there are indications in the literature that the European Union has become more open to certain issues over time, but no empirical evidence for this hypothesis has been found. The European Union has gained more authoritative power over issues related to national institutions and regulating free movement (Grabbe, 2006). This makes studying the case of an aviation kerosene tax interesting because it can

contribute to a better understanding on how the European agenda has developed over time and explain why issues end up on the European agenda at a certain time.

The lack of understanding of these issues leads to the following research goal: ‘’Explaining under which conditions the issue of an aviation fuel tax ends up at the European political agenda, and how theories of agenda setting can explain this occurrence.’’

1.3 Research question A kerosene tax is now on the political agenda of the European Union. However, it is unknown how this issue ended up at the agenda, and why specifically at this moment. The political agenda consists of issues that policymakers give serious attention to. For the kerosene tax, this means that the European Commission has the right to initiate a proposal, and that concrete policy plans exist (Princen, 2015). It is for these reasons that the following research question has been formulated:

‘Why has the issue of an aviation fuel tax made it onto the European agenda now?’

1.4 Scientific relevance Studies on the politics of agenda setting have provided an extensive theoretical explanation of the politics and content of the (European) political agenda. However, with the goals of the Green Deal, the European Union is committed to a new type of goal, namely a sustainable transition. Existing case studies on agenda setting mainly focus on issues related to public health such as smoking or alcohol consumption (Conway, Kenski, & Wang, 2015; Princen, 2006) or policies that are a response to unexpected and impactful events, such as the Watergate scandal or the Chernobyl disaster (Weaver, 1975). Issues related to a sustainable transition differ from other issues of agenda setting because the benefits of sustainable issues are long term, by preserving the environment. How issues related to climate change should be solved is a topic of discussion. Different solutions are proposed by different actors. Solutions range from technological developments, taxing kerosene or prohibiting domestic aviation.

The literature is not extensive on the politics of climate change policies on the European political agenda. Pralle (2009) investigates how climate change is addressed on national agendas in the European Union, and how these issues can reach and maintain a high position on the agenda of that country. Pralle does not address how environmental issues reach the European agenda, and why at specific moments in time. Other research related to climate change and agenda setting is aimed at explaining what role Member States have in influencing the European strategy for climate change (Schreurs & Tiberghien, 2007). They find that a small number of Member States, such as Germany and Sweden have a large role in determining the climate change strategy of the European Union.

An existing gap in the literature is how the content of the European agenda has developed over time. There are indications in the literature that the European Union has become more open to certain issues over time, but no empirical evidence for this hypothesis has been found (Princen, 2015). Thus, more research on the development of the European agenda over time is required to better understand the politics of the European agenda, and how issues on the agenda have changed over time.

Existing studies lack in providing answers how issues that are important for the sustainability transition, can be explained by the theoretical approaches of agenda setting. More specifically, in

existing literature, it is unknown how issues related to climate change have changed position on the European agenda over time. While exploring the process of agenda setting of the European kerosene tax will unlikely give conclusive answers to how and why issues related to sustainability end up on the European agenda, it will provide more insight in the applicability of existing theories on agenda setting in this specific field of issues. By conducting a document analysis, it is investigated how the issue of a kerosene tax has developed on the European agenda over time, how the issue ended up on the European agenda, and why specifically now.

1.5 Societal relevance Nine European countries (Germany, France, Sweden, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Bulgaria, and The Netherlands) are calling upon the European Commission for action. These countries assert that CO2 emissions are not reflected in the cost of flight tickets (Hoekstra et al., 2019). The political and public opinion about flying is shifting. Terms like ‘flight shaming’ are rising in popularity (Hancock M. , 2020). This addresses the societal need for more research on the topic of a kerosene tax. Sustainability is the reason behind numerous debates and discussions. Sustainability dictates the public debate and flying plays a big role in this debate. There are numerous European policies for environmental taxes or tax reductions (Zimmer, 2017). Therefore, there is public questioning why there is no taxation of aviation. In a survey conducted in the United Kingdom, 43 percent of the respondents stated that the government should do more to reduce the environmental damage of aviation, while 29 percent was not aware of what the government was doing to reduce this environmental damage (Murray, 2019).

Sustainability becomes more important in the life of European citizens. Climate dictates news outlets, the public debate and everyday conversation (Buizer, Arts, & Kok, 2011). People become more aware of the environment and question why an environmentally damaging form of transport is not taxed. This study will contribute to a better understanding on the pricing of aviation and what politics drive the taxation of kerosene on a European level. Furthermore, the influence of the current COVID-19 pandemic on the pricing of kerosene will be investigated. COVID-19 is influencing the entire world, and the aviation sector is hit severely. Analyzing the role of the pandemic on kerosene taxation will contribute to a better understanding of the tax on kerosene amongst EU citizens.

1.6 Reading guide The topic, relevance and research question of this research have been discussed in chapter one. Chapter two will function as a theoretical framework for the analysis. Theories of Princen, Kingdon and Baumgartner and Jones will be used to investigate and operationalize concepts of agenda setting on a European level. The methodology for this research, a case study, will be discussed in chapter three. Furthermore, choices for data collection, reliability and validity will be discussed. Chapter four will describe the studied case. Facts will be presented, and historical events will be described. In chapter five, an analysis of the case description will be executed, using the theories from the theoretical framework and the operationalization of the abstract concepts of agenda setting. Ultimately, the analysis will lead to a conclusion, where the main question is answered, and further directions and topics for research will be discussed.

Chapter 2: Theoretical discussion In the theoretical discussion, theories on agenda setting will be discussed. The literature on agenda setting asks why some issues emerge on the agenda, while others do not reach the agenda (Kingdon, 1995). Scientists such as Kingdon (1995), Baumgartner and Jones (1993) and Downs (1972) state that issues may rise and decline on the agenda, independently of the objective state of an issue. When there are no feasible solutions, issues may fail to receive attention from decision makers (Kingdon, 1995). Theories on agenda setting attempt to explain patterns of attention from governmental decision makers.

2.1 Politics of attention In 1984, Kingdon published Agendas, Alternatives and Public policies. Up to this date, this research has been leading in the research on the development of agendas. Kingdon (1984) created his theory to analyze and understand agenda setting in the United States. The model from Kingdon is an interpretation of the Garbage Can Model (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972). The Garbage Can Model sees an organization as a group of choices that seek problems, issues, and feelings, which look for solutions and people willing to solve them. Kingdon applies this model to agenda setting in the public sphere. Kingdon states that government agendas are created when problems are recognized that have politically correct solutions available that are correct to make at the time of decision making. This is described as ‘policy window’ by Kingdon. During a policy window, there is an opportunity for policy making.

Kingdon (1984) found three streams that determine the policy making process. Participants and elite forces fight for a position within the streams of problems, policies, and politics. In the first stream, problems, an issue is defined based on individual values and how much these values will be impacted through a change of policies. The problems stream also takes the solvability of an issue into account, and if an issue is getting better or worse over time. The second stream, policies, formulates solutions to an issue, developed by specialists. The more support these solutions have, the greater the chance of the solution being implemented. The final stream, politics, focuses on the state of politics and public opinion. Elements like the public opinion, the effort of people to engage in campaigns for a change of policies and the legislative turnover are addressed in the politics stream.

Baumgartner and Jones (2005) build on the theory of Kingdon and discuss how information is used and allocated by (American) policymakers and institutions. They present the punctuated equilibrium theory, which states that policymaking is characterized by long periods of stability and incremental change but are disrupted by short periods of instability and change. Baumgartner and Jones argue that policymakers are confined by bounded rationality, policymakers cannot consider all problems possible solutions. This leads to disproportionate attention, which means that policymakers either have a lack or a large amount of attention to a certain issue. Baumgartner and Jones (2005) state that issues are framed by groups to gain the attention of policymakers, to mobilize the policymakers to come up with policies that address the framed issue.

2.2 Types of agendas Before a theoretical analysis on how an agenda comes about, a distinction between different types of agendas must be made. Denham (2010) and Baumgartner and Jones (1993) define three types of agendas: the political agenda, the media agenda, and the public agenda. The political agenda consists of issues that policymakers give serious attention to. The public agenda consists of issues that citizens give serious attention to and the media agenda consists of issues that the media reports on. Cobb

(1976) defines three possible ways for an issue to end on the political agenda. First, the outside initiative model consists of issues that arise outside of decisionmaking venues, and are then moved onto the the political agenda. With the mobilization model, the initiation of an issue lies with decisionmakeres, who then expands the issue to a broader (non-political) public. The inside initiative model consists of issues that are initiated by decisionmakers, and are kept within the sphere of decisionmakers. Princen states that a distinction between the public/media and political agendas are less likely to be relevant in a European setting (Princen, 2006). Public engagement in European decisionmaking is low. Public interest plays a greater role at agenda setting on a domestic level (Imig & Tarrow, 2001). Therefore, this study will focus on the political agenda of Europe. When exploring domestic initiatives related to the pricing of aviation, the media and public opinion will be investigated, as well as national political agendas.

The European political agenda is investigated by Princen (2015). Princen explores what factors can explain how an issue ends or does not end up at the European political agenda. Princen builds on the theories of Kingdon, Baumgartner and Jones and other scholars whose theories are based on an American setting, and applies these theories of agenda setting on a European setting. Princen argues that issue framing, policy venues and a window of opportunity influence the agenda of the European Union.

2.3 Issue framing The first factor that can explain how and why certain issues make it to the European agenda is described as issue framing. Princen defines issue framing as: ‘’the activity of redefining an issue in such a way that it fits a particular frame’’ (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2015, p.222). The way an issue is phrased, which remarks are highlighted and the details that the attention is drawn to, determines if and in what way an issue ends up at the European agenda. Framing an issue can not only determine if an issue ends up at the agenda, but can also determine how policymakers interpret the issue and which solution(s) they prefer. The frame determines how the issue is defined. (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2015).

The goal of issue framing is to increase the number of participants, to reach more potential proponents of a solution to a problem. Issue framing is used to mobilize a public, or to create a public. With a greater mobilized public, the attention for an issue increases. The goal is to address the public at large, instead of the circle of experts involved with the issue (Baumgartner & Mahony, 2008). Mobilizing a public is done by linking the issue to values that are taken for granted by the public and/or policy makers to highlight the importance of an issue (Kingdon, 1984). Being persuasive that an issue endangers other important values will increase the chance for an issue to rise on the European political agenda (Baumgartner & Mahony, 2008). Moreover, issues are often simplified to make the discussion regarding an issue more approachable. It invites a larger public to be part of the discussion. When a large number of people and institutions discuss an issue, its position on the political agenda will likely rise (Jaspaert, Velde, & Feyaerts, 1990). Lastly, creating conflict makes the discussion about a certain issue more vocal and visible for a larger public. To get an issue high on the European political agenda, the conflict must be expanded to wider the circle of participants, from a small circle of experts, to the public at large.

Contrary, people or groups that want to defend the status quo, use framing in an opposite way. Agenda setting is often driven by political actors that want to change existing policies (Princen, 2012, p. 31). By raising an issue, a debate may be opened that leads to policy change. Hence, an actor defending the status quo will try to depoliticize an issue and limit its which will keep the issue from the political agenda. Defending the status quo therefore happens by linking existing policies to values

it contributes to, stressing the technical complexity of issues and avoiding conflict (Baumgartner & Mahony, 2008; Princen, 2015).

To reach the European political agenda, an issue does not only have to be framed in terms of problems and solutions, but also as issues that should be addressed by the European Union. Political actors use multiple reasons to bring issues on the European agenda. Issues may have cross-border effects (such as CO2 emissions), and therefore require European coordination to resolve the issue. The most important requirement for an issue to be ‘suited’ for European decisionmaking, is that is has to align with the European subsidarity principle (Inman & Rubinfield, 1998). Article five of the Treaty of the European Union states the following:

“Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.’’

This means that an issue must be framed as an issue that is impossible to solve at the domestic level, by reasons of scale or effect, but can be better solved at the European level.

2.4 Policy venue Getting an issue on the agenda depends on the venue someone turns to, to get support for their ideas. Shifting the debate to certain venues increases the chance for issues to end up at the agenda. Princen (2015) argues that which issues are discussed, and by whom they are discussed, depends on the policy venue. If the institution that has decision-making power has interest in the issue being dealt with, chances are higher that the issue will end up at the agenda. A policy venue is an institutional location where decisions are made concerning a given issue (Baumgarnter & Jones, 2005).

Institutional systems and procedures are rules that explain how decisions are made, such as the voting system (majority/unanimity etc.) or bureaucratic processes and procedures. These rules can therefore lower or raise the bar for the policymaking process. This influences the political agenda because it influences the effort that actors want to invest in certain issues. Actors are less likely to invest effort when chances are smaller for a positive outcome. Therefore, agenda setting is less likely to occur for issues that have complicated institutional requirements.

Shifting an issue to the European level is used to change the actors involved in the discussion regarding an issue. A greater number of participants from other European Member States become involved in an issue. It can also lead to a decrease of public and media participants, because public and media interest in European politics is lower than interest in domestic politics (Leston-Bandeira, 2014). Shifting towards a European venue can be done to address a specific and specialized institution. An environment related issue for example, can be discussed by environmental ministers at the European level, thereby excluding competing minsters from for example economic affairs on a domestic level (Princen, 2007).

Venue shopping is part of the agenda setting process and takes place when policy makers are actively looking for issues to place on their agenda. Actors that want to address an issue on a agenda can use this to bypass national governments and address issues on a European level when European policymakers are actively venue shopping. Guiraudon (2000) calls this a form of vertical policymaking and argues that the rules and players of agenda setting differ at different levels of policymaking. In

the end, the venue determines who has decision-making power on an issue (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2015).

2.5 Window of opportunity Timing is also an essential factor for shaping the political agenda. When there is wide public attention for an issue, there is a greater chance that there is political willingness to look for a solution to the problem (Princen, 2007). Lelieveldt and Princen (2015) describe three factors that enhance the chance for an issue to end up at the agenda. These factors are: • Wide recognition of the importance of the problem • A viable and acceptable solution • Favorable circumstances for the adoption of the solution (Princen, 2015)

Kingdon (1997, 1998) argues that a window of opportunity can be created by the appearance of compelling problems or by happenings in the political system. “The opening of a window of opportunity will encourage policy entrepreneurs to link existing ideas with new problems or understanding of problems” (Birkland, 2004). Focusing events can quickly shift the possibility for policymakers to influence the political agenda. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) investigate this phenomenon and conclude that political processes are often characterized by incremental change. Focusing events can distort this equilibrium, and lead to drastic and sudden change.

Birkland (1998) defines a focusing event as:

‘’An event that is sudden; relatively uncommon; can be reasonably defined as harmful or revealing the possibility of potentially greater future harms; has harms that are concentrated in a particular geographical area or community of interest; and that is known to policy makers and the public simultaneously.”

Birkland provides the disaster of 9/11 as an example, and states security issues at airports were long known, but were just not prioritized by policymakers. The 9/11 disaster created a window of opportunity for policymakers to address the issue of security on airports and led to an increase of surveillance and security measures on airports worldwide (Birkland, 2004).

A window of opportunity can thus be described as a (short) timeframe when important policymakers draw attention to an issue, either by the alignment of a solution, political circumstances and the recognition of the issue, or by a focusing event that suddenly draws attention to the issue. Thereby, the window of opportunity answers the question: ‘why is a certain issue now on the European political agenda?’

2.6 Theoretical model To provide a visual representation of how the theory on agenda setting will influence the upcoming research, the following theoretical model is developed:

The theoretical model shows how the three factors posed by Lelieveldt and Princen are used to influence the political agenda in Europe. Issue framing, policy venue and window of opportunity also influence each other. How an issue is framed, depends on which policy venue it is addressed to, and at which time this happens. There are both proponents and opponents taxing kerosene. They both use the issue framing, policy venues and windows of opportunity to influence the political agenda. How these factors are used by proponents and opponents over time, will be investigated during this research.

Chapter 3: Methodological framework 3.1 Research strategy: Case study For this research, a case study has been conducted. A case study is the selected method of research because the variables of agenda setting, framing policy venue and window of opportunity are not binary (it is not either there or not) and therefore difficult to measure is a quantitative way. The goal of this research is explaining how these variables interact and can lead to the agenda setting of an issue on the European political agenda. A case study will be used to gather concrete and profound knowledge on one specific case. Yin (2002) defines a case as:

“a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between a phenomenon and context are not clear and the researcher has little control over the phenomenon and context.” (p. 5)

A case study is suited for explaining how or why a certain social phenomenon works (Yin, 2002). Because of this, the generalizability of a case study is low. The purpose of a case study is to expand and generalize existing theories (Stake, 1994).

The case of an aviation kerosene tax is chosen for its peculiar characteristics. When considering the tax position of the aviation sector, almost everyone immediately remarks: ’it is strange that kerosene is not taxed, why is that?’. This makes the case of a European kerosene tax a deviant case that is worth investigating. Other forms of transportation are taxed, the European Union is committed to become CO2 neutral by 2050, but there is still no taxation of kerosene. The case of kerosene taxation raises several ‘why’ questions, that cannot be answered without an in-depth investigation on the one specific case of a European kerosene tax.

Ultimately, even more interesting than this case study would be understanding a large group of cases related to the agenda setting of policies regarding combatting climate change. However, because of the limitations of recourses and time, this study focuses on understanding the complexities of the one case of agenda setting of a European kerosene tax. The case of a kerosene tax is part of larger group of cases related to issues regarding the goals of the European Union to become CO2 neutral by 2050, but also relates to cases of kerosene taxation in other parts of the world. It also relates to other forms of taxation in the aviation sector, for example ticket taxes, green taxes etc.

3.2 Data collection 3.2.1 Document analysis The main source of information for this research originates from documents. Van Thiel (2015) describes three different methods of document analysis (content analysis, meta- analysis, and secondary analysis). For this research, a content analysis will be executed. There will be an analysis of the message that the producer of the documents tries to communicate to the receiver. A document analysis has two main strengths for studying agenda setting. The first strength of a document analysis is the extensive and systematical description of issues by stakeholders. This means that a document analysis can be used for an in-depth research of agenda setting processes and strategies. Another main strength of a document analysis is documented material dates back many years. Therefore, it can be used to describe the historical evolution of an issue and its position on the political agenda (Princen, 2015).

Documents used are official documents from the European Commission, European Council and European Parliament. For more general and contextual information, papers from interest groups, press releases and media reports are consulted. Information from governmental websites and

international bodies will be used to research how countries set issues on the European agenda. The written documents will be complemented by semi-structured interviews, video material (conferences, interviews), and other digital material. The goal of analyzing official EU documents is finding patterns in agenda setting, which details are highlighted, and which details are left out of these documents. This can uncover biases in decision making and reveal how issues are framed, at which policy venues the agenda setting is aimed at and what kind of influence timing has had on the agenda setting process of a European kerosene tax.

If taxing kerosene is the main topic of an official European document, this can imply that the issue is discussed, and is therefore present of the political agenda. Furthermore, documents are used to analyze how the debate on a kerosene tax takes place. This is done by analyzing in which terms the kerosene tax is described, analyzing the arguments given and investigating to which other values the kerosene tax is linked (Princen, 2015).

Yin (2002) describes a risk of using a case study as the research strategy. It is, unlike with other methods, unclear when the collection of data is complete. Yin states that a minimum of two different sources with confirmatory evidence is necessary for the main topics of the investigation. Yin declares that documents may not always be accurate and free of bias. Documents can be used to corroborate information from other documents or other sources of information.

3.2.2 Interviews Because agenda setting is a highly political process, and some information is not available via documented sources, the document analysis is complemented with several semi-structured interviews. Interviewees have been commissioners, lobbyists, NGOs, and employees from national ministries. These interviewees have been contacted because they were directly involved with the agenda setting process of a European kerosene tax on the European political agenda, have many years of experience with agenda setting of environment related issues, or work at the European Commission that has power on how the European Political agenda is shaped. Interviews with these professionals can validate or disprove findings from the document analysis. Furthermore, it can contribute to filling knowledge gaps that studying documents cannot provide, either because they do not exist or because there is no possible access to these documents (Thiel, 2015).

Interviews have provided information that was not available from documented sources. For example, an international conference on the pricing of aviation in Europe was organized by the Dutch ministry of Finance, and because of interviews information was discovered on why certain ministers did or did not attend this conference. Opponents of a kerosene tax were also contacted but declined the request of an interview. Contacted people were employees of AirFrance-KLM, IATA and Airlines4Europe. Therefore, some information on how these opponents have engaged in agenda setting why there should not be a kerosene tax, might not have been found.

The strategy for coding the interviews will be as follows: the interviews will first be recorded and transcribed. Afterwards, the phase of open coding starts, then axial coding and finally selective coding. These steps will not follow each other, but are part of a back-and-forth process, to generate codes that can ultimately complement the theory building. Interviews will be held via online conference call tools like Skype, Zoom etc. (because of the corona virus). This can create complications, because very confidential information will be discussed, that people are less likely to share via unpersonal ways of communicating.

3.3 Validity and reliability The quality of data from desk research is warranted by doing a literature review. By a deep understanding of the theories of agenda setting, framing, policy venues and a window of opportunity can be recognized. Because multiple methods of data collection are used (document analysis and interviews), information is triangulated. Multiple sources will be used to prove the trustworthiness of a source.

Data is gathered directly from sources of the European Commission or other European institutions. These sources will be double-checked by third party sources where possible (using for example: media reports, reports from national governments etc.). The data gathered from desk research is also a critical foundation for the interviews. The desk research will be used to expand the knowledge on the topic, to ensure in-depth interviews. The corona virus has led to complications in arranging interviews. Therefore, the importance of document analysis has increased, while the role of interviews has become a method of confirming or disproving findings from the document analysis.

3.3.1 Reliability The repeatability of the literature study is high, there is consensus in the academic field on the process of agenda setting. The repeatability of interviews will be lower because developments in the ongoing process of agenda setting of a kerosene tax can influence the interviewees. Furthermore, agenda setting is a highly political and even controversial topic to discuss. The interviews will therefore serve a supporting role in this research, where the focus lies on document analysis. Preparing a topics list limits personal bias from the interviewer and safeguards that similar topics will be discussed in different interviews. Besides that, value driven questions will be eliminated from the questionnaire (Thiel, 2015)

3.3.2 Validity Dr. Sebastiaan Princen provided answers to personal questions regarding agenda setting. Because Dr. Princen is the author of state-of-the-art literature on agenda setting in Europe, he has been been of aid, especially for the data collection. He made sure that exactly that information has been found that was necessary for this research.

Semi structured interviews will give the interviewees a lot of room to give complete answers. The findings of this research can be compared to the extensive literature. However, because information is specific, confidential and information that will be provided can be biased, the results are difficult to generalize to the rest of the population.

3.4 Operationalization To analyze how the theory of agenda setting is applied in practice for a kerosene tax in Europe, it is necessary to operationalize the abstract concepts of: ‘agenda setting’, ‘issue framing’, ‘policy venue’ and ‘window of opportunity’.

3.4.1 Agenda setting A political agenda is defined by numerous scholars. “The political agenda explains how political actors determine their priorities, give attention to or ignore issues and do, or do not, take decisions or a stance regarding these topics” (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Cobb & Elder, 1971; Kingdon, 1984; Walgraeve & Aelst, 2006). Agenda setting can thus be seen as the process of obtaining a particular place on the hierarchy of issues and events. Measuring the political agenda can prove difficult, because all political actors have their own agenda and sometimes even have multiple agendas at the same time.

Protess & McCombs (1991) discern three indicators when an issue has reached the political agenda of a political actor: deliberative, individual and substantial attention. Deliberative attention occurs when debates or hearings are held on a topic, individual attention occurs when there is sanctioning or promoting of a topic and substantial attention takes place with policy changes.

Variable Dimension Indicator Agenda setting Deliberative attention Debates regarding a topic Hearings regarding a topic

Individual attention Sanctioning of a topic Promoting of a topic

Substantial attention Policy making

3.4.2 Issue Framing Defining what an issue is can prove difficult because issues facing modern society contain multiple attributes. The complexity of issues means that issues can be defined and understood in different ways (Nowlin, 2016). Baumgartner and Mahony (2008) and Nowlin make a distinction between individual level issue definitions and collective issue definitions. Individual issue definitions highlight certain parts of an issue to the advantage of the individual. A collective issue definition is the aggregation of individual issue definitions. An issue definition is therefore: “An aggregation of the various issue dimensions weighted by the salience of each dimension” (Nowlin, 2016, p. 311).

Baumgartner and Jones (2008, p. 23) state that defining an issue is a purposive process. Because an actor wants governments to do something, or refrain from doing something, the definition of an issue is inherently related to the process of agenda setting. The definition of ‘framing’ that will be used during this research is: “framing manages which dimensions dominate the collective policy debate at any given time (Baumgartner & Jones, 2008, p. 155).”

Existing literature lacks in an operationalization of the term issue framing. Therefore, the operationalization is based on how state of the art scholars of agenda setting have researched ‘issue framing’. Baumgartner and Mahony (2008) conducted interviews about advocates active in the EU about the most recent issues they worked on. They were asked if their argumentations were adjusted for different targets. If this was the case, Baumgartner and Mahony described this as ‘issue framing’. Kingdon (1984) refers to issue framing as ‘coupling’. Issues are linked to solutions that are in the interest of a certain public.

The goal of issue framing is mobilizing a public (Kingdon, 1995). Recognizing how defining an issue leads to the mobilization of a public ultimately leads to an understanding of when ‘issue framing’ takes place. The frame creates a causality between the issue that a person or group wants to get on the agenda and values that a certain public finds important.

Variable Dimension Indicator Issue framing Individual issue definition Adjustment of argumentation to certain public Coupling issue to solutions

Collective issue definition Aggregation of issue dimensions

3.4.3 Policy Venue Baumgartner and Jones (1993) define a policy venue as ‘’the institutional locations where authoritative decisions are made concerning a given issue” (p. 32). A policy venue can therefore be recognized as a location of decisionmaking power on a certain issue. Indicators for authoritative power are the possibility to initiate legislation, the right to make laws, and the power to determine priorities. In the European Union, the European parliament, the Council and the European Commission occupy these rights.

Manheim (1986) found that the institutional ownership of an issue can be relevant for its position on the political agenda. When the responsibility regarding an issue is more clearly related to an institution, more urgency exists for that insitution to act. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) further find that the reframing of issues has most impact when it coincides with a shift of institutional venues.

Examples of European policy venues are the European Parliament, Council and the Commisison. Within those venues, there are more specific institutions aimed at a certain field of issues. The European Commission has various Directorates General and the Council has shifting configurations. Recognizing a policy venue can be done by determining if and what decisionmaking power an institution has. A policy venue and its interests can change overtime. Other institutions get interested in the issue, because of timing, focusing events and/or new issue frames (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993).

For example: the issue of fishery policy in Europe is discussed by Princen (2010). How issues regarding fishery are handled depends on the department that is investigating it. An economic-centered department will investigate the issue from an economic point of view. An ecological policy venue will investigate the environmental issues related to fishing.

Variable Dimension Indicator Policy venue Loci where decisions are made European Commission by an institutional body with Directorates General authoritative power European parliament Parliament formations Council of Europe Council configurations

3.4.5 Window of opportunity Kingdon (1995) describes a window of opportunity as a limited time frame that has an increased chance for successfully addressing an issue on the political agenda. A window of opportunity can be fleeting, and attention can decline when there are no successful attempts at policymaking to combat the issue (Kingdon, 1995). Birkland (2004) states that the opening of a window of opportunity can result from a change in understanding of the issue, a change in the political setting that is favorable to policy change, or a change in the tractability of the issue given a certain solution. Kingdon (1995), Baumgartner and Jones (1993), Birkland (2004) and Princen (2015) also emphasize the possibility of the opening of a window of opportunity resulting from a ‘focusing event’. Birkland (1997) defines a focusing event as:

Historical examples of focusing events are the nuclear disasters of Chernobyl and Fukushima, the Watergate scandal, or the attacks of 9/11. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) argue that a focusing event

can dramatically highlight failures in policymaking and provide opportunities to create new policies based on these highlighted failures.

Variable Dimension Indicator Window of opportunity Change in understanding of Developments in science related an issue to issue Breakthrough papers, articles, documentaries on a certain issue

Favorable change in Changes in (EU) government political setting for a formations solution

Focusing event Disruptive occurrences that highlight failure of existing policy

Operationalizing and defining the concepts of issue framing, policy venues and window of opportunity is difficult because these concepts also influence each other and are influenced by each other. How an issue is framed depends on which venue is interested in the issue. Furthermore, the presence of focusing events can explain how an issue is framed. Therefore, the operationalization is aimed at explaining how these three concepts are measured separately. This will make it possible to analyze how these three factors can explain agenda setting independently, but also how they are used in combination with each other to explain agenda setting.

Chapter 4: Case description The case description is presented to gain insight in how the taxation and pricing measures for aviation have evolved over the last eighty years. This historical approach is taken to understand patterns of attention on a kerosene tax and how these patterns of attention have changed over time. European measures, international conventions and national initiatives will be discussed to provide more insight in the process of agenda setting of a European kerosene tax.

4.1 International and European measures on pricing aviation 4.1.1 Chicago convention In 1944, the first legislation regarding civil aviation was introduced. During the second World War, the technological advancements in the aviation sector developed rapidly. Aviation is a cross-boundary form of transport and therefore requires international rules. Hence, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was established by the United Nations in 1944 (ICAO, 2006). On December seventh, 1944, the Chicago Convention was signed by 52 states. Article 24 of the Chicago Convention states:

‘’Aircraft on a flight to, from, or across the territory of another contracting State shall be admitted temporarily free of duty, subject to the customs regulations of the State. Fuel, lubricating oils, spare parts, regular equipment and aircraft stores on board an aircraft of a contracting State, on arrival in the territory of another contracting State and retained on board on leaving the territory of that State shall be exempt from customs duty.’’ (ICAO, 2006)

This means that the Chicago Convention does not allow the taxation of fuel that is present in an airplane when it lands in another country (ICAO, 2006). As of 2019, all Member States of the United Nations have signed the Chicago Convention. The Chicago Convention was created to stimulate the growth and safety of the aviation sector (Interviewee two, 2020). In 1944, industrial growth and financial results were more important than environmentally conscious behavior (Tol, 2006). Prohibiting the taxation of jet fuel was done to reduce the chance of conflict between countries. In 1944, the fear of more conflict was great (Interviewee two, 2020). Over the years, European Member States began to implement aviation taxes in several forms, without directly taxing kerosene (Mickwitz, 2003).

4.1.2 Kyoto Protocol Aviation was included in the Kyoto protocol. The goal was to limit the emissions of the aviation sector at the 1995 level (United Nations, 2020). The aviation sector itself was held responsible for taking appropriate action to reach this goal. This goal was never reached, and measures were not taken in the form of taxes or trading schemes (Dings, 2010; Interviewee two, 2020).

4.1.4 European measures for reducing emissions of aviation Not only the United Nations acted to reduce emissions of aviation, the European Union also acted by implementing aviation in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) in 2012. All airlines are required to monitor, report and verify their CO2 emissions (European Commission, 2020). Furthermore, airlines must pay allowances for their emissions. Airlines receive tradable allowances that can be sold when the airline emits less CO2 than they are permitted to do with their current amount of allowances, or purchased when the airline wants to emit more than they are allowed to with the allowances they acquired. The legislation concerning including aviation in the EU ETS is adopted in 2008 (European parliament, 2008). Reasons for including aviation in the EU ETS are the increase of aviation emissions by 70% percent in the last fifteen years. The United Nations forecasts a further increase of 300% by 2050 if no additional measures are taken (European Commission, 2020) (ICAO, 2019).

4.2 Taxing aviation in European Member States There are international measures for reducing the emissions of the aviation sector, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the UN Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) and the European Union implemented aviation in the EU ETS system. Besides that, there are several national taxes in European Member States with the goal to address the CO2 emissions of aviation.

Even though the Chicago Convention forbids the taxation of aviation fuel in some situations, European Member States found ways to tax aviation with compliance to the Convention. There are no direct taxes on kerosene in European Member States, but other forms of tax, such as a ticket tax, airport tax or green tax do exist in European Member States. Because there is no European policy, several distinct types of aviation taxes can be found in European Member States. In this paragraph, a number of these countries will be investigated. To understand how the European political agenda is influenced, it is necessary to investigate national incentives of taxation. Member States exert influence over European policy (Börzel, 2002). As of June 2020, six European member states levy some form of tax for intra- European flights (CE Delft, 2019). A list with aviation taxes in Europe can be found in appendix I: Aviation tax in European Member States.

4.3.1 German, Italian, French and Swedish aviation tax Germany introduced a national aviation tax of €7,46 for intra-European flights in 2011. The effects of the tax were investigated by Borbely (2018). He concluded that a national aviation tax led to a significant reduction in passengers for airports near the border in Germany, and a significant increase in passengers for foreign airports near the German border. This behavior leads to a reduction in tax income and a negative effect on the emission of aviation, because people travel further to fly for a lower price (Borbely, 2018). In 2019, Germany increased the tax rate from €7,46 to €13,03. The German minister of Finance states that the reason for increasing the tax is: ‘’It puts us at the forefront of the air transport tax, together with the United Kingdom’’ (Scholz, 2019). Minister Scholz is part of the Social Democratic party (SPD) in Germany. The measure is part of Germany’s ’Klimaschutz’ plan that accounts for climate protection (Die Bundesregierung, 2020). The German Aviation Association (BDL) is opposed to the aviation tax, stating that it will reduce the financial resources from German airlines to invest in green technologies. Furthermore, BDL is cautious of the leaking effect, where passengers travel to foreign airports for their departures to escape the higher prices due to taxes (Buyck, 2019).

Italy levies two different kinds of aviation tax, namely an embarkation tax of €12,69 for intra-European flights and a City Council tax of €7,07. Italy levies the second highest tax on aviation of Europe, only to be surpassed by the United Kingdom. Therefore, it is in Italy’s interest to increase the tax in other countries. Italy is an expensive country to fly from compared to other European countries, and a European tax would reduce the gap between countries, and therefore create a more levelled playing field (CE Delft, 2019). The International Air Transport Association states that the revenue from the tax is not invested in the aviation sector, that the tax is harming the economy and is causing unemployment. IATA states that Italy should remove the aviation tax whatsoever, just like the Netherlands, where the discontinuation of an aviation tax increased aviation travel (IATA, 2016) (Janzen, 2018).

France levies two different kinds of aviation tax, comparable to the Italian system. The French system levies a higher tax on first class travel. The French aviation tax was introduced in 1999. This makes France the first European country to levy tax on intra-European flights (Gouvernment France, 2020). France introduced more aviation taxes in 2005 and 2020, to compensate for environmental and noise damage caused by aviation. The 2020 ‘green’ tax is a response to the protests of the ‘Yellow Vest’

movement in France. In 2018, protests in France began when the tax on fuel was increased by the government. Taxing fuel became highly controversial in France because of this occurrence. However, with coalition plans to reduce pollution, the revenue from the tax is invested in greener forms of transport, such as transport by train (Gouvernment France, 2020) (BBC, 2019).

Sweden adopted a similar bill for aviation taxation as Germany in 2018. For European flights, passengers departing from a Swedish airport pay the equivalent of €5,91. For longer flights, the tax rate is €24,78. Sweden’s cabinet consisted of the Social Democratic party and the Green party when the bill was introduced (Government offices of Sweden, 2017). Sweden has no national airline carrier (like Lufthansa for Germany). There were little to no objections against the aviation tax.

4.3.2 Countries without aviation tax Belgium, Bulgaria, and Denmark all signed a Joint Statement in 2019 (together with six other European Member States) requesting European measures for fairer pricing of kerosene. However, these countries currently do not levy any form of tax on aviation domestically. This means, no excise duty, no VAT, no kerosene tax, and no tax on domestic flights. Luxembourg levies a VAT of 3% on domestic flights, but since Luxembourg is a small country, the tax is negligible. Because these countries request a higher pricing on aviation, but do not tax aviation themselves, their lack of a tax is examined and the political situation in these countries is investigated to understand why these countries have signed the Joint Statement but never introduced a national tax on aviation.

The Belgian government responded to a Belgian protest with 70.000 attendees, where demands were made that the government should address climate change more seriously. Minister of environment Schauvliege argues for a European solution, but the Belgian member of the European parliament Staes states that this is an unrealistic goal. ‘’All 28 countries have to approve the legislation, that will not happen’’ (Staes, 2019). Staes refers to the German national flight tax, and to the Netherlands, that are planning to introduce a kerosene tax in 2021. During a parliamentary hearing in 2020, the Flemish social-economic council stated that a national tax would only move aviation activities to other countries that do not levy a tax (Flemish parliamentary hearing, 2020).

Bulgaria, Denmark, and Luxembourg follow a similar reasoning. The governments of these countries emphasize the importance of the environment and the fair pricing of aviation, but fear that national policies will create an unequal level playing field (Wammen, Goranov, & Gramegna, 2019; interviewee three, 2020).

4.3.3 Greece’s aviation tax Greece does not have a tax on kerosene or a ticket tax for passengers. Greece only levies a Value Added Tax (VAT) of 24% for all domestic flights. Greece is a country that is dependent on international tourism. Tourism accounts for 18% of Greece’s total GDP (Ministry of Tourism, 2018). Other southern European countries levy similar taxes. Because tourism is so crucial for the economy of Greece, it is unlikely that Greece is a proponent of increasing the cost of flying. Therefore, the problem of unanimity becomes apparent. The Council of Europe must vote in favor of a tax policy unanimously, while tourism dependent countries are opposed to aviation taxes. Greece, Cyprus, and Malta were opposed to ending the exemption of taxing aviation during a meeting of Europe’s ministers of Finance in 2019 (Bannon, 2019).

4.3.4 Dutch kerosene tax The Dutch national kerosene tax deserves extra attention because the tax was abolished after exactly one year. The Netherlands had a kerosene tax from June 2008 until June 2009.

At 22 February 2007, cabinet Balkenende IV presented their coalition agreement. The agreement stated that ‘’environmental damage must be represented more fairly in market prices’’ (Coalition Agreement CDA, PvdA, CU, 2007). Environmental policy became more important because of international agreements (like the Kyoto Protocol and the UNFCCC) and advising reports from the Dutch ministries (interviewee one, 2020). The unique position of the aviation sector was immediately addressed because they do not pay tax on kerosene or excise duty. Therefore, the ministries of finance, infrastructure and water management and environmental management commissioned an investigation on the effects of a flying tax on the Dutch aviation sector. On 15 August 2007, the investigation was published (Significance, SEO economic research, 2007). The research provided a prognosis on the effects of a tax on emissions and passenger numbers.

As a response to the investigation, parliamentary questions were asked. The liberal party (VVD) objected to the tax plans and refers to an investigation by the Board of Airline Representatives of the Netherlands (Kamerstuk First Chamber Dutch parliament, 2007) (BARIN, 2007). The research by BARIN stated that flying will become more expensive, less passengers will come to the Netherlands, 12.000 jobs will be lost, 1 billion euros of damage will occur annually and that a kerosene tax is in violation with the Chicago Convention. The Dutch Council of State judged that the plans for a kerosene tax were not in conflict with the Chicago Convention (Council of State, 2007). Other research shows that the growth of airports will only be slowed, and that the number of jobs lost are lower than BARIN estimated (Faber, Schroten, Wijngaarden, & Tol, 2018).

At July first, 2008, a Dutch kerosene tax was introduced. A tax of 11,25 euros for air travel withing Europe or up to 2500 kilometers was imposed. For flights more than 2500 kilometers, the tax was set at 45 euros. This tax only accounted flights that departed from a Dutch airport (Kamerstuk First Chamber Dutch parliament, 2007).

The world was hit by a financial recession shortly after the enactment of the Dutch tax. The Dutch Organization for Travel Organizations (ANVR) commissioned a research that was executed by the same research bureau that executed the investigation commissioned by the Dutch state in 2007 (SEO). The SEO publication stated that the kerosene tax costs 1.2 billion euros every year, the tax incomes are lower than the Dutch government predicted and that the resulting unemployment because of the tax increased the costs for the Dutch government (SEO economic research, 2009). The research also states that a ‘leaking effect’ existed, where passengers moved to foreign airports to escape the higher aviation prices from Dutch airports. There were demonstrations against the kerosene tax by employees of airlines like KLM, Martinair and Transavia (Trouw, 2008). The number of passengers dropped ten percent at Schiphol Airport, this meant that flying from Dutch airports was not financially attractive for airlines like RyanAir and MartinAir (Gordijn & Kolkman, 2011). Eventually, multiple airlines stopped flying from Dutch airfields, because of the kerosene tax (Cawley, 2008).

After exactly one year, at the first of July 2009, the tax rate of the kerosene tax was set to 0,00 euros. This led to positive responses from Schiphol, KLM, ANVR and other parties (ANVR, 2009) (IATA, 2009). At the first of January 2010, the bill was officially abolished (Second Chamber Dutch Parliament, 2009). Currently, there is no tax on aviation in the Netherlands, except for a 21% VAT on domestic flights. Since domestic flights in a small country like the Netherlands do not occur regularly, the VAT tax for aviation is negligible (CE Delft, 2019).

In the period of 2010 to 2016, only the Party for Animals (Partij voor de Dieren) stated in their party positions that they are advocates of re-introducing a kerosene tax, because of the harmful impact of aviation on the environment. In the period from 2010-2012, the Liberal party (VVD) governed with the Christian Democrats (CDA). This government was right winged and liberal. The cabinet of 2012-2017 (VVD-labour party) did not advocate a national kerosene tax. The cabinet focused on international

measures like EU ETS and CORSIA from the UN (Dutch Emissions authority, 2015). In the period of 2012 to 2017, no parliamentary question on a kerosene tax were held.

4.4 Moving the debate on kerosene taxation to a European level 4.4.1 Dutch coalition agreement In 2017, a Dutch coalition was formed between four parties (VVD, D66, CDA and ChristenUnie). In their coalition agreement, it was stated that the government will aim at European agreements on the taxation of aviation to comply with the goals of the Paris climate agreement (VVD, D66, CDA, ChristenUnie, 2017). If a European tax is not a possibility, the Dutch government wants to introduce a national tax, effective from 2021. Plans for taxation ended up in the coalition agreement based on independent research by the ministries of finance and infrastructure and water management (Interviewee one, 2020). An example of such a problem is the leaking effect of a Dutch tax, where passengers of airplanes resort to foreign airports for their departure to escape the higher prices that a kerosene tax brings on Dutch airfields. A European approach will take this problem away because the tax rate will be the same for the whole European union. Hence, the Dutch government had a European kerosene tax on their national political agenda since 2017.

4.4.2 Conference aviation tax On June twentieth, 2019, the Dutch ministry of Finance organized an international conference to discuss the possibilities and importance of a European kerosene tax. CE Delft published a report on the effects of a kerosene tax (Faber & Wijngaarden, 2019). The Dutch ministry of finance also organized an internet consultation, that led to 1460 responses from politicians, NGOs and aviation sector representatives. The Dutch ministry of Finance wanted to gather information about the opinion of other European Member States on a European kerosene tax. These three factors have led to the Ministry of Finance organizing the international conference (interviewee one, 2020).

Representatives from 29 different countries and international organizations were present at the conference. Speakers on this conference were the ministers of Finance of Sweden, the state secretary of Finance of the Netherlands, the European Commissioner for economic and finanical affairs, taxation and customs and several others. There were a total of eleven key speakers during the two day conference (Ministry of Finance, 2019). The goal of the conference was stated as follows: ‘’Make a new European Commission develop proposals for a European kerosene tax, a charge on kerosene and CO2 pricing’’ (Ministry of Finance, 2019).

4.4.3 Support for European kerosene tax It was important for the Dutch ministry of finance to get big economies like France and Germany to sign the Joint Statement (interviewee three, 2020). With their signature, the Joint Statement gained a lot of importance and influence over the European agenda. Germany was hesitant in signing the Joint Statement, because they want to execute their own national flight ticket tax. The Joint Statement is therefore rewritten and terms are rephrased, in order to get the support of Germany. For example, the Joint Statement contained the request for the European Commission to look into proposals for the ‘taxation’ of aviation, but this was later changed to the ‘pricing’ of aviation. This was changed at the request of Germany (Interviewee three, 2020).

Sweden was enthusiastic about the Dutch plans and sent the minister of finance, Magdalena Andersson, to the conference in 2019. Sweden introduced their national aviation tax recently and was in favor of European measures for the taxation of aviation (Andersson, 2019). In her speech at the conference Andersson referred to Greta Thunberg and the term ‘flightshaming’. Andersson further spoke about the essence of timely action in combatting climate change. A tax would serve multiple

goals, according to Andersson. First, it would raise revenues for climate investments and second, it would change behavior by pricing market externalities better (Andersson, 2019).

The French were also supporting the plan, because the French government has a focus on environmental policies and advocates the reduction of emissions. The French embassy released a press release on the content of the Joint Statement. The French minister of Finance states that more European coordination of on pricing of negative externalities could ensure that the polluter pays a fairer price. To ensure a level playing field, European coordination is a necessity (Ministère de l'Europe et des affaires étrangères, 2019).

Most eastern European countries are hesitant or opposed to the Joint Statement and did not sign it. This is because of their poor road network compared to Western European countries. In several press releases from sector representative IATA, the organization urges eastern European governments from Poland, Hungary, Croatia, and Romania to increase the competitiveness of the aviation sector (IATA, 2018, 2019). IATA emphasizes the importance of aviation for the economies of these countries and highlights the number of jobs the sector supports. IATA urges these governments to invest in capacity of airports, and to reduce costs for airlines.

In a behind closed doors session of European environment ministers, Cyprus and Portugal raised concerns on plans for taxing aviation. Cyprus and Portugal argued that raising the price of aviation impacts the competitive position of the European aviation sector worldwide. They also state that the aviation sector is only capable of investing in green airplanes and biofuels, when there are enough financial resources to invest in these technological advancements. A tax would hinder this revenue stream (Morgan, 2020; Interviewee three, 2020).

4.4.4 Joint Statement The result of the conference in June 2019 was a Joint Statement for Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission. At November seventh, 2019, the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, France, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark, and Bulgaria presented the Joint statement. It states that aviation causes 2.5% of global CO2 emissions. The Statement calls upon the European Commission for better coordination on the pricing of aviation, as this would lead to more fair pricing of aviation and a level playing field. In the Joint Statement, the issue of aviation pricing is presented as follows:

“Compared to other forms of transportation, aviation is not sufficiently priced. Aviation transport is exempt from exercise duty, VAT, there is no coordinated ticket tax and instruments to curb greenhouse gas emissions can be strengthened in the aviation sector” (Joint Statement, 2019).

The issue of insufficient pricing of aviation needs to be addressed by the European Union, according to the signing countries of the Joint Statement. The importance of European coordination is addressed as follows:

“We believe that more coordination on pricing of negative externalities of aviation could ensure that the polluter pays a fairer price for the use of aviation transport. To be effective and create a level playing field, we are convinced that EU coordination on this matter is the most effective for all member states” (Joint Statement, 2019).

19 countries did not sign the Joint Statement. As discussed before, Eastern European countries have a worse road network and are therefore more dependent on cheap aviation. The environment is also less represented on the political agenda of Eastern European countries (Turnock, 2001; Jordan, 2010).

Frans Timmermans accepted the Joint Statement sent by nine European countries. Up to this day, there has been no official response from the European Commission on the Joint Statement. However, Frans Timmermans, who also ran for presidency of the European Commission, and is now executive vice-president of the European Commission argued in favor of a European kerosene tax before the Joint Statement was handed over. Timmermans stated that taxing aviation is necessary to create a level playing field (Parliamentary questions Timmermans, 2019). In December 2019, the European Commission presented the Green Deal. It presents plans for Europe to grow in a sustainable and environmentally friendly way, with the goal of being emission neutral in 2050 (European Commission, 2019). The Green Deal refers to the Joint Statement and states that the Commission must investigate and address the tax exemptions that the aviation and maritime sector have at the moment. The European Commission is aware of the institutional barriers of unanumous voting for European tax policies, and aims at CORSIA and EU ETS for reducing aviation emissions, while also addressing the issue of the taxation exemption of aviation (CE Delft, 2019). In appendix II, a timeline of all aviation pricing related pricing policies is incorporated for an overview of the process of introducing several aviation pricing policies.

4.5 COVID-19 The COVID-19 pandemic has had great influence on the aviation sector. In April of 2020, there were 67.7% less flights compared to a year prior. The revenue loss for airlines due to COVID-19 is estimated at 314 billion US dollars (Statista, 2020). At the moment this research is written, the pandemic has not ended yet. However, the pandemic already has a large impact on how the aviation sector and policymakers view the plans for a kerosene tax.

4.5.1 Aviation Sector responses to COVID-19 The aviation sector responded to the COVID-19 crisis with the request to stop or postpone plans for a kerosene tax. Chief Executive of Airfrance-KLM Benjamin Smith stated the following at a conference of the sector advocacy organization Airlines for Europe: “In view of the coronavirus outbreak, we are asking governments to suspend the introduction of new flight taxes” (Smith, 2020). A spokesman of Airlines for Europe says that plans for an environmental tax is absolutely what the industry does not need at that moment. ‘’It will only make this bad situation worse’’ (Janzen, 2020). In a press release, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) discusses the financial damage that airlines are experiencing due to the COVID-19 virus. IATA stresses that the sector will experience losses in the billions because of this outbreak, and airlines will need reliefs from taxes, charges and slot allocations (IATA, 2020).

In an interview with IATA employee George (no last name), the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the aviation sector in Cyprus and Greece is discussed. COVID-19 led to a complete shutdown of the largest airport of Cyprus and to a 95% reduction of flights in Greece. George (no last name) states that the governments of both countries keep an open dialogue with the aviation sector because they understand the vital role of aviation in these countries, because air connectivity is crucial for the economies of both Greece and Cyprus (George, 2020).

4.5.2 Policymakers responses to COVID-19 Governments are planning to or are already providing financial aid to airlines (Morgan, 2020). Environmental organizations are advocating that governments should attach ‘green’ strings to providing financial aid. Adina Vălean, European commissioner for transport, states that it is the wrong time to talk about attaching such strings. It is unrealistic because it is unknown what the industry will look like after the COVID-19 crisis (Vălean, 2020). COVID-19 caused the plans from the European Commission to present plans for a kerosene tax to be postponed (interviewee three, 2020). It was

planned to make the plans public in June or July of 2020, but the new publishing date is set sometime in 2021.

Chapter 5: Analysis In this chapter, the theory on agenda setting will be used to analyze the factors that can explain how and why the dependent variable, a European kerosene tax, ended up at the political agenda of the European Union. This is done systematically by investigating how the independent variables of issue framing, policy venues and a window of opportunity can explain the process of agenda setting.

5.1 Framing kerosene tax over the years Issue framing investigates how an issue is formulated in such a way that it fits a specific frame. Issues must be linked to other values in Europe, in order to create a frame that draws the attention of policymakers. It will be analyzed how a kerosene tax was framed and which frames dominated the political debate and how this developed over time.

5.1.1 Framing kerosene taxation as a risk for economic development and global peace The first frame that was ever created regarding the taxation of kerosene happened in 1944, with the introduction of the Chicago Convention. The issue of a tax on kerosene was coupled to the values of safety and economic development. Important values in society were to rebuild economies during and after a period of global war. Because of the political tension in the world, a tax on kerosene was seen as a risk for global peace. Discussions on who had the right to tax kerosene (the departing country, the country of destination) could lead to tension and conflict between countries. Environmental issues were (almost) not present on the agenda of any political actor. Environmental consequences therefore did not contribute to a strong frame. Kerosene tax got substantive attention from policymakers because ICAO developed policies regarding aviation safety, including legislation regarding the taxation of kerosene. Hence, the first time a kerosene tax was found on a political agenda was 1944, on the agenda of United Nations agency ICAO. The ban on a kerosene tax is relevant to a European kerosene tax nowadays because the convention is signed by all European Member States and influences the institutional barriers that affect the policymaking process of a European kerosene tax.

5.1.2 Domestic taxing of aviation because of shifting frames The ministry of environment in France was the first ministry in a European Member State to introduce plans for a tax aimed at increasing the price of aviation in 1999. The ministry framed the tax as a measure to increase safety and security measures at airports. The environmental frame was not strong enough to be convincing as an answer to issues in society at that time. What the ministry did not publicly address, was that a tax is often aimed at reducing passengers’ numbers, therefore lowering the amount of flights and CO2 emissions (Ministère de la transition écologique et solidaire, 2020).

The same form of framing was used by the ministry of environment in 2005. A solidarity tax was introduced for each airplane passenger. The revenues of the tax were (and still are) meant to be used for health projects in developing countries. Hence, the solidarity tax is framed as an instrument of helping people in countries of need, instead of a tax to lower demands and reduce environmental impact of the aviation sector (République Francaise, 2005). In a press release, the sector representative IATA responded to the 2005 Solidarity tax, stating that it is fundamentally wrong to let passengers pay tax for a States’ social programs (IATA, 2006). IATA calls the tax ‘discriminatory’ and argues that it conflicts with the Chicago Convention. IATA wants to depoliticize the discussion by using complicated legislation that only a selected group of experts has knowledge about. By stressing technical specifics of existing legislation, the participation from a public is limited. Although sector representatives were objected against the aviation taxes, they remain in force to this date. The French aviation tax was the first aviation tax in Europe and paved the way for other national aviation taxes.

5.1.3 The first kerosene tax in the European Union The Dutch aviation ticket tax was adopted in 2008, but already abolished one year later. The reason that the tax was abolished is that the economic damage for airlines was too great. Furthermore, researchers from the institute of mobility policy (KiM) found a ‘leaking effect’, where passengers depart from foreign airports to avoid higher prices at Dutch airports (Gordijn & Kolkman, 2011). This leaking effect was a reason for the Dutch government to frame the issue of a kerosene tax, not as a domestic issue, but as a European issue. People did not fly less, they flew from foreign airfields, which led to a decrease in revenues for Dutch airports and airlines. When all European Member States have a similar kerosene tax, this leaking effect would not occur. The Dutch tax did also prove that taxing kerosene is possible, even though it is contentious as a result of the Chicago Convention. Because of these reasons, the goal of a European kerosene tax was part of the Dutch coalition agreement of 2017. Why this was present in the coalition agreement of 2017, and not earlier, will be discussed in chapter 5.3: A window of opportunity for setting a kerosene tax on the agenda.

5.1.4 Mobilizing support To frame the issue of a kerosene tax as a European issue, the Netherlands had to mobilize supporters for the issue. The number of participating actors had to be increased to combat the status quo. The Netherlands wanted to mobilize support of other European Member States. The Netherlands first approached other European Member States that had some form of aviation tax in force, such as France, Germany, and Sweden. These countries were likely to support the Dutch initiative to urge a European approach to taxing kerosene. From other Member States such as Belgium and Luxembourg it was known that they were supportive of a European kerosene tax but did not implement a domestic tax out of fear of a leaking effect similar to the Netherlands.

The Netherlands was aware of potential support for a European kerosene tax in other European

Member States and therefore organized an international conference on the pricing of CO2 and taxation of aviation. The Netherlands deliberately framed the issue of a kerosene tax as an issue of a level playing field, while focusing less on the environmental frame, because a level playing field is an issue that the European Union is highly concerned with (Dutch Coalition agreement, 2017; interviewee three, 2020). The Netherlands also coupled the tax exemption of kerosene to the fairness principle. Petrol and diesel are both taxed in every European Member State, while kerosene is not taxed anywhere. The Netherlands therefore state that the cost of kerosene does not represent the ecological damage it causes and that this should be addressed.

5.1.5 International conference on aviation pricing The international conference had several speakers. The speakers were ministers, state secretaries and the European commissioner for economic and financial affairs, taxation, and customs. All speakers were already in favor of a European kerosene tax and spoke to strengthen the frame that the Netherlands was trying to create. The goal of the conference was to mobilize more countries to urge European coordination of kerosene taxation. The minister of finance of Sweden, Magdalena Andersson, was one of the key speakers. Sweden introduced their national aviation tax recently and was in favor of European measures for the taxation of aviation (Andersson, 2019). Andersson used the same reasoning as the Netherlands by referring to a level playing field, unequal tax position of kerosene and the necessity of taxation to combat climate change. To strengthen her frame, Andersson referred to the Swedish Greta Thunberg and the term ‘flightshaming’ in her speech at the conference and acknowledging that climate change affects her everyday life (Andersson, 2020). The state secretary of ecological and solidary transition of France, Brune Poirson, was another one of the key speakers and confirmed that France was supporting the Dutch plan for more European coordination

kerosene pricing (Poirson, 2019). The Netherlands mobilized countries who had a national aviation tax and/or were proponents of European agreements on the taxation of aviation. During the conference, the issue of a lack of kerosene taxation was coupled with the values of a European level playing field, the fairness of an exemption on kerosene tax compared to other fuel types that are taxed, and the

CO2 impact of kerosene.

5.1.6 Joint Statement The international conference led to a Joint Statement from nine European countries. The Joint Statement frames the taxing of kerosene as an issue that should be addressed by the European Union by linking a European coordination to effectively creating a level playing field in Europe, whilst also addressing the ‘unfair’ pricing of negative externalities of aviation. The Joint Statement phrases a kerosene taxation as ‘aviation fuel pricing’ because taxes are national matters where the European Union has no competence. Framing the issue as a matter of taxation would reduce the strength of the frame, because the European Commission would be hesitant to commit to legislation where it has no competence.

While nine countries signed the Joint Statement, there were also 19 countries that did not sign. Instead of a frame of creating a level playing field, reducing environmental damage and fairness of a kerosene tax, opposing countries frame the issue of aviation pricing differently. Eastern European countries have a worse road network and are therefore more dependent on cheap aviation. The environment is also less represented on the political agenda of Eastern European countries (Turnock, 2001; Jordan, 2010). Countries like Croatia, Cyprus and Malta have a multitude of islands, and are therefore more dependent on aviation. These countries also welcome large amounts of tourists that travel by airplane. The risk of losing that income means that these countries were/are opposed to a kerosene tax (Ministry for tourism Malta, 2019; interviewee three).

The ministry for tourism of Malta states that there should be other methods to make the aviation sector more sustainable. There should be technological advancements and better European coordination to make flying more efficient. Instead of linking the emissions of aviation to the low prices, the minister for tourism of Malta links emissions of aviation to a lack of biofuel innovations and bad European coordination of the airspace (Single European Sky project) (ministry for tourism Malta, 2019). Reducing the emissions from the sector is therefore not an issue of taxation, but an issue of technological innovation. The introduction of a kerosene tax is coupled with economic damage, risks for the infrastructure of countries with poor road networks and a reduction in revenues from tourism.

The framing of the issue of a kerosene can partly explain why a kerosene tax is currently on the agenda of the European Commission. The frame shifted from a kerosene tax as a risk for global peace and economic developments, towards an issue related to climate change and a European playing field. This frame shifted because of changing values in society and politics, and the introduction of national forms of aviation taxation. However, questions still remain why the issue was framed towards the European Commission and why this issue rose specifically now on the agenda. Therefore, the influence of policy venues and a window of opportunity on the agenda setting of a European kerosene tax will be explained in the following paragraphs.

5.2 Shifting policy venues Shifting the debate to other policy venues may increase the chance for agenda setting of certain issues. How approaching certain policy venues has contributed to the agenda setting of a kerosene tax on the European agenda will be explained in this paragraph.

5.2.1 A lack of European interest For a long time, European venues were not interested in plans for a European kerosene tax, as the plan for a kerosene tax only reached the European agenda in 2019. This has two main reasons. The first reason is the existence of competing or alternative policies such as the EU ETS and the Kyoto Protocol. Because aviation was already incorporated in the EU ETS, the European Commission had no interest in introducing more legislation but focused on refining the EU ETS to combat emissions from aviation. Furthermore, the presentation of CORSIA from the United Nations agency ICAO has led to more, global legislation regarding the emissions of aviation. This has led the European Union to reduce the effects of the EU ETS, to give ICAO the time to develop a global market-based measure aimed at reducing aviation emissions.

It was only when it became apparent that the EU ETS did not lead to a reduction of emissions from aviation, and when the CORSIA plans got postponed multiple times, that the European Commission became more open towards ideas of the taxation of kerosene. The lack of effect of the EU ETS is combatting aviation emissions became clear in 2018, when a briefing to the European parliament was made public. The briefing states that the EU ETS is currently failing in reaching the Paris Climate Agreement goal of limiting global warming to below two degrees Celsius (European Parliament, 2018). Thus, it was only when it became clear that alternative policies were insufficiently reaching their environmental goals, that the European Commission became more open towards ideas for taxing kerosene to combat the emissions of aviation.

The second reason that the European Union was not interested in taxing kerosene on a European level results from existing institutional barriers. There are two institutional barriers regarding the taxation of kerosene on a European level. The first barrier is the Chicago Convention. The European Commission itself stated that taxing kerosene is contentious because of the Chicago Convention (European Commission, 2012). The second barrier is the requirement of unanimous voting in favor of a European kerosene tax. As stated before, various Mediterranean countries are opposed against the plans of taxing kerosene because of their economic dependency on cheap aviation. This does not only make the European policy venue less interested in taxing kerosene, this also makes the European venue less interesting for actors who want to address the exemption of a tax on kerosene. The chance for success influences the effort actors want to invest in the agenda setting of a certain issue (Princen, 2015).

5.2.2 Creating European interest Then the question remains why the European Commission became interested in a European kerosene tax, and why nine countries found the European venue interesting for agenda setting. First, the Dutch national kerosene tax from 2008-2009 showed that it is possible to tax kerosene while being compliant with the Chicago Convention, as was confirmed by the Dutch High Council (High Council, 2009). Unanimity remains an issue. However, getting a kerosene tax on the European agenda is already success according to interviewee three. The EU Commission itself can then deliberate on the form of taxing or pricing kerosene. The European venue was also interesting to the Netherlands because of the negative consequences experienced from a national kerosene tax, as discussed in the previous paragraph.

Now that it is known why the European Union was an interesting venue for agenda setting, it is possible to explain how the interest of the European Union was peaked. An important moment of agenda setting during the process was the international conference on aviation pricing. The European commissioner for economic and financial affairs, taxation and customs was invited to the conference. The commissioner emphasized the European goals of reducing emissions and acknowledged the unfair taxation of aviation fuel compared to other forms of transport. The Dutch ministry of Finance (that

organized the conference) deliberately did not invite other European commissioners, for example from transport, because they would not be interested in raising the tax on kerosene. The commissioner of transport would likely emphasize the importance of a strong aviation sector for the European economy.

The Joint Statement that followed from the conference was sent to the president of the European Commission because the president of the European Commission gains a lot of attention, which increases the public that is aware of the Joint Statement, further increasing the participation on the issue. Furthermore, the Joint Statement was addressed to executive vice president of the European Commission, Frans Timmermans. It was known that Timmermans was working on the Green Deal and was therefore more receptive to issues related to combatting climate change. The choice for policy venue was used by signing countries of the Joint Statement to increase chances for agenda setting of the issue of kerosene taxation.

It has now become apparent that the receptiveness of European policy venues regarding climate issues changed over time and how European Member States used this to get a kerosene tax on the European agenda.

5.3 A window of opportunity for setting a kerosene tax on the European agenda The third factor that can explain why a kerosene tax has ended on the agenda of the European Union is the window of opportunity. The window of opportunity explains the role of timing in the process of agenda setting. It can explain the agenda setting of a kerosene tax by investigating the changing understanding of climate change over the years, the role of government coalitions and the impact of focusing events.

5.3.1 Changing understanding of environment and aviation over time When the first legislation regarding the taxation of aviation was adopted in 1944, the environment had no priority in society or policymaking. Over time however, the targets of society started shifting. The environment became more important in policy making due to research publications and documentaries (Watson & Moss, 1995). Climate Change 1995 by Houghton (1996) is cited over 4000 times, and is just one of multiple influential research publications on climate change. Documentaries raised public awareness on the topic of climate change (Warming Warning, 1981). This created new possible frames, and led to the immersion of institutions, NGOs, and companies aimed at combatting climate change. For example, the NGO Environmental Defense Fund was founded in 1967, Greenpeace in 1969 and the European Environment Agency was founded in 1993 (EDF, 2016; Greenpeace, 2020; EEA, 2019). With the increased attention from scientists and the public on environmental issues, national and European politics gained increased attention in environmental policies. Green parties in Europe were formed in the period of 1970-1990. The French Greens was founded in 1984, the Dutch Green Left party was founded in 1990 and the Swedish Green party exists since 1981 (Miljöpartiet de Gröna, 2020; Groenlinks, 2020; Les verts, 2020). France founded the ministry of environment in 1971, the first in Europe (Gouvernment France, 2019). In 1990, the European Commission gained its first Environment Commissioner (di Meana) (European Commission, 2020). These are all signs that climate became more important in society, as well as policymaking.

The rise of publications and reports on climate change and its effects led to the adaptation of the Kyoto protocol in 2005. Up to this year, there were no international measures for combatting CO2 emissions. The United Nations state that the Kyoto Protocol is based on scientific consensus that global warming is occurring and that human CO2 emissions have caused it (Kyoto Protocol, 2020). The Kyoto protocol is a reason that a kerosene tax did not reach the agenda of the European Union earlier. The importance of an international solution to climate change is often emphasized by the European

Commission, the United Nations and European Member States (European Commission, 2020; United Nations, 2020; Joint Statement, 2019). Because the emissions of aviation would have been addressed in the Kyoto protocol, the European Commission saw no necessity to introduce more legislation to combat aviation emissions. As discussed before, aviation was never incorporated in the Kyoto protocol. When this became apparent, the European Commission incorporated aviation in the market- based instrument EU ETS in 2012,with the goal to reduce emissions from aviation. In a press release, the European Commission stated that aviation was incorporated in the EU ETS and that kerosene was not taxed, because incorporating aviation in the EU ETS has a lower economic cost to society than a kerosene tax (European Commission, 2005). The ‘failure’ of other policy instruments led to the rising position of aviation pricing at the European agenda. The quality and success of (inter)national policies can therefore determine the content of the European political agenda.

The CO2 emissions from airlines rose by 32% from 2013 to 2018 (Topham, 2019). The public and political understanding and interest in climate also increased further in the period from 2012 to 2020. Publication on the human impact on climate change from 2012 to 2017 are cited thousands of times, for example Stocker (2013) is cited 4519 times for his research on climate change, the long-term effects of climate change by Collins (2013) is cited nearly 3000 times. Media outlets also report on climate change almost daily. It was during this time that terms like ‘flightshaming’ were popularized by climate activists. This raised awareness regarding the impact of aviation on the climate. Furthermore The Council of Europe states that climate change is the most serious environmental problem the world faces today (Council of Europe, 2020). The increased awareness and focus on combatting climate change from science, the public and politics, combined with the lack of effect of the EU ETS in combatting emissions from aviation, led to the opening of a window of opportunity for the agenda setting of a kerosene tax on a European level.

5.3.2 Changing political actors A window of opportunity can also be created by favorable political circumstances. The Dutch government was the initiator of the issue as of kerosene taxation as a European issue. The initiation originates from the 2017 coalition agreement. The pro-Europe Democratic party and the climate oriented Christian party (D66 and ChristenUnie) pushed the issue of kerosene taxation on the agenda of the government. It is specifically mentioned that the cabinet pursues European measures. A kerosene tax reached the coalition agreement in 2017 and not earlier because prior government formations were not as supportive of a flight tax. The 2010 coalition consisted of the people’s party for freedom and democracy VVD, the Christian Democrats, and support from anti-Europe party for freedom PVV. These parties were against European measures and had less interest in combatting climate change than the 2017 coalition. The following cabinet was formed in 2012 and consists of the VVD and the Labour Party PvdA. This coalition did presumably not prioritize a European kerosene taxation because of the financial setbacks of the 2008 financial crisis (Coalition agreement VVD & PvdA, 2012). It was for these reasons that these government formations did not address a European kerosene tax.

Not only the Dutch government formation created more political support for a European kerosene tax. In other Member States, government formations also led to an increased support for a European kerosene tax. The government formations of the nine countries that signed the Joint Statement in 2019 almost all had a Green or Socialist party governing. In Sweden, the Green Party was part of the government coalition, in France the president is from the socialist party, and the German government consists of the CDU, Social democrats and Christian Social Union (Government of Sweden, 2019; Gouvernment France, 2020; The Times, 2013). The number of political actors in favor of addressing the status quo (the exemption of kerosene tax) were at an all time high. The high number of participants and the large European public involved in the debate regarding the taxation of kerosene

led to a greater chance of agenda setting on a European level. The mobilization of support led to a window of opportunity for setting a kerosene tax on the European agenda.

The timing of sending the Joint Statement to the European Commission was also not incidental. The Joint Statement was sent to a newly elected European Commission that still had a term of five years. The chance for successful policy change is greater when the European Commission still has time to construct initiatives. Therefore, the Joint Statement that calls for European coordination on the pricing of aviation and kerosene was sent at this specific moment in time to the European Commission.

5.3.3 Focusing event of the COVID-19 pandemic Besides the gradual and incremental change of policy that often characterizes agenda setting, focusing events can lead to a quick rise of certain issues on the political agenda. A focusing event influencing the debate regarding the taxation of kerosene is the COVID-19 pandemic. A focusing event highlights the failure of existing policies and influences the position of a kerosene tax on the European agenda.

Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the aviation sector came to a complete stop. This has led to great financial losses in the aviation sector. This has led to airlines and aviation sector representatives arguing that a kerosene tax is not suitable to implement during the pandemic. Airfrance-KLM called on the European Commission to postpone or change policies aimed at reducing emissions (Plumer & Tabuchi, 2020). Proponents of a kerosene tax state that it might be challenging for airlines, but COVID- 19 should not be a reason for airlines to stop addressing climate change. Prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, the debate at a European level was mainly dominated by environmental consequences and creating a level playing field. The European Commission planned on presenting plans to price kerosene more accordingly to its environmental impact in the summer of 2020, but due to the COVID-19 crisis, the presentation of these plans has been postponed to at least 2021 (Interviewee three, 2020).

COVID-19 has also created a new discussion regarding aviation and its emissions. Numerous airlines (Arirfrance, KLM, Lufthansa, Alitalia) have requested state aid of billions of euros to survive the pandemic. NGOs are advocating to attach ‘green strings’ to state aid. If an airline like Lufthansa or AirFrance-KLM wants to receive state support, they must invest this money in green and sustainable aircrafts and biofuel (Bannon, 2020). The European Commission has adopted new guidelines on state aid to airports, especially created because of the COVID-19 crisis (European Commission, 2020). This shows that policymaking can be drastically sped up by the occurrence of a focusing event such as COVID-19. The European Commission adopted these guidelines this to ensure a single market and prevent unfair competition. The debate has shifted from taxing kerosene to regulating the single market in case of unfair competition because of state aid (European Commission, 2020).

Conclusion In this research an answer to the following question was sought: ‘Why has the issue of an aviation fuel tax made it onto the European agenda now?’. This question has been answered by applying theories of agenda setting on the case of aviation fuel taxation. The results show that several factors led to an aviation fuel tax ending on the European political agenda.

The first factor explaining agenda setting is the use of issue framing. Over the years, a kerosene tax has been framed in several distinct ways. At first, taxing kerosene was framed as a risk for economic growth and global peace. This issue was framed this way in the Chicago Convention of 1944, when the first legislation regarding kerosene taxation was created. The results from this issue frame are still noticeable today because the convention that prohibits taxing kerosene is signed by all European Member States. The first and only major attempt of framing kerosene taxation as a necessity that must be addressed by the European Union occurred in 2019. This frame was created by the Dutch government, and the Dutch ministry of Finance in particular. Because a national kerosene tax failed in the Netherlands, they tried framing a kerosene tax as a European responsibility. The Dutch government needed to mobilize support to create a stronger frame and gain European attention. To do so, the Netherlands organized an international conference on aviation pricing for other European Member States and European Commissioners. The issue of taxing kerosene was framed as an issue of a lack of a European level playing field, the exemption of tax was compared to the tax rate of other forms of fuels, and the CO2 impact of kerosene. The convention that prohibits the taxation of kerosene is not mentioned in the Joint Statement, because this will decrease the strength of the frame that a kerosene tax is an achievable European goal. These frames were written down in a Joint Statement that was handed over to the president of the European Commission. By framing the issue as a problem of a level playing field, the European Commission got interested in the issue.

The second factor that explains why a kerosene tax has reached the European agenda are policy venues. European venues had no interest in a kerosene tax for a long time. The two reasons for this are the existence of comparable policies that tried to achieve the same goal and institutional barriers.

Policies like the Kyoto Protocol and the EU ETS had goals of reducing the CO2 emissions of aviation. Therefore, the European Union did not see urgency in introducing more legislation regarding the same issue. It was only when it became apparent that the Kyoto Protocol and EU ETS were unsuccessful in reducing aviation emissions that the European Union gained interest in a kerosene tax. Furthermore, the existence of the ban on taxing kerosene and a requirement for unanimous voting for introducing European tax measures led to high institutional barriers that decreased how appealing the European venue was for agenda-setting. Unanimity is highly improbable, because several Mediterranean countries are opposed against increasing the price of aviation, because of their dependency on air travel for the economy and tourism.

The European venue was still interesting to the Dutch government because its national kerosene tax had issues that could be solved by European measures. Because the Dutch national kerosene tax led to leaking effects of passengers flying from foreign airports, the Dutch government found that European measures could mitigate this problem. The European venue was addressed by inviting certain commissioners to the international conference on aviation pricing, and deliberately not inviting others. kThe Joint Statement was also sent during a time that the European Commission was preparing to present the Green Deal. With the Green Deal, the Commission is committed to goals that combat climate change, of which a kerosene tax is one. This makes a kerosene tax harder to ignore (or more appealing) for a European venue.

Lastly, a window of opportunity can explain why taxing kerosene is on the European agenda specifically now. Over the years, climate became more important in (European) policy making. Research publications, documentaries, and media reports increased the awareness on how humans are changing the climate, and what role transport has in climate change. The increasing awareness on climate led to the rise of Green political parties, NGOs like Greenpeace, and the introduction of a European Commissioner for environment. This increased awareness first led to the introduction of the Kyoto Protocol. After its failure to incorporate aviation, the EU incorporated aviation in the EU ETS.

When it became apparent that the CO2 emissions of aviation kept rising in 2012-2017, and prominent figures like Greta Thunberg openly spoke against the emissions of aviation, a window of opportunity was opened for setting plans regarding taxing kerosene on the European agenda. Furthermore, in the period of 2018-2019, the political circumstances in Europe were favorable for mobilizing support for policies regarding climate change. Many governments in European Member States had a Green or Social party governing that openly spoke in favor of a fairer pricing of aviation, or recently implemented a different form of aviation tax (e.g. ticket tax, solidarity tax, green tax). Therefore, mobilizing support for a European kerosene tax was easier than in other periods with lower support for environmental policies.

A window of opportunity can also quickly open or close because of focusing events. The COVID-19 pandemic struck when a kerosene tax was only on the European political agenda for some months. Aviation came to a complete stop and revenue in the sector dropped. This created a window of opportunity for the sector to put a hold to the plans of taxing kerosene. They state that the financial consequences of COVID-19 are already so severe, that a kerosene tax would be too impactful. Proponents of a kerosene on the other hand, argue that aviation enjoyed an unfair exemption for too long already, and that the pandemic is no reason to alter existing plans for fairer pricing of aviation. COVID-19 has suddenly reopened a debate by changing the economic position of the aviation sector. New arguments have risen regarding the financial position of the aviation sector. Airlines are also requesting billions of euros of state aid, which opens a whole new debate on if they should receive aid and under what circumstances.

Ultimately, agenda setting of a kerosene tax on the European political agenda happened because of a combination of issue framing, the interest of policy venues, and the opening of a window of opportunity. A kerosene tax was framed as an issue related to creating a level playing field, the European Union took great interest in climate related issues with plans to publish the Green Deal in the near future, and there was an increased awareness and support for policy aimed at combatting climate change, resulting from research publications regarding the issue. These factors combined led to the commitment of the European Commission to find ways to end the exemption of taxation of kerosene in the European Union.

Discussion In the discussion, theoretical and practical implications of this research are discussed, limitations of this study are investigated and recommendations for follow-up research are provided.

The results of this research built on the literature on agenda setting by Kingdon (1984), Baumgartner and Jones (1993) and Princen (2007; 2015). An important role for issue framing, policy venues and a window of opportunity have been found to address the issue of kerosene taxation on the European agenda. It was not possible do determine if one factor was more important than the other, because they are heavily influenced by each other. How an issue is framed depends on whom it is framed for and at which moment in time.

This study finds that European agenda setting depends on the success or failure of other similar policies. In this study it has been found that the failure of combatting aviation emissions with the Kyoto Protocol and EU ETS has led to agenda setting of a kerosene tax on the European agenda. Furthermore, the failure of the Dutch national kerosene tax has led the Dutch government to attempt to set a kerosene tax on the European agenda instead of the domestic agenda. Agenda setting has therefore been a response to failing existing policies. Existing literature on agenda setting is not extensive on the role of existing policies and their effectiveness on the agenda setting of similar issues. This study provides reason to believe that the influence of failing policies with similar goals (reducing emissions from aviation) on agenda setting has been great. This would mean that the theory on agenda setting could be further developed by investigating the influence of the lack of effective policies on the agenda setting of related issues. This study also attempted to operationalize the abstract concepts of agenda setting, which is not done before in existing literature. By operationalizing agenda setting, it becomes possible to investigate the concept more structured, and make it more measurable. This can create more consensus amongst scholars of agenda setting whilst researching agenda setting.

Aviation is becoming a more contentious form of transport because of its CO2 impact on global climate. On Twitter, the hashtag ‘#stayontheground’ was trending in 2018 in Sweden. This coincided with the rise of the term ‘flightshaming’. In a recent survey, 21% of participants stated that they avoided flying because of its impact on climate. The German Green Party, that aims at making domestic flights obsolete, doubled its seats during the last elections (Hancock, 2020). These are all signs that the public opinion on flying is changing. Therefore, it is peculiar that kerosene is not accordingly priced. This study was aimed at explaining the politics behind the exemption on a tax on kerosene. It explains how and why a kerosene tax ended on the European agenda specifically now. The increased knowledge on the process of agenda setting might provide European residents with more information to assert influence over the process of agenda setting. However, agenda setting on a European level remains a technocratic process that is dominated by political actors and characterized by low public involvement.

This study also had its limitations. For one, the choice to use a document analysis as the main instrument for data collection has possibly led to the exclusion of information that has been discussed behind closed doors. Because of the intransparent nature of agenda setting, it is possible that not all relevant data has been gathered. This can create issues regarding validity. Therefore, the findings from the document analysis have been validated by a small number of interviews, four in total. More ‘behind doors’ information could have been gathered by conducting a greater number of interviews with sector representatives, European commissioners, and employees of national ministries.

However, because of the political sensitivity of the topic, and the COVID-19 crisis, it was impossible to arrange more beneficial interviews.

Another issue closely related to a document analysis is the operationalization of data. Existing information is created with another purpose in mind than this research. Therefore, the possibility exists that the available information is not directly connected to the research question. To combat this limitation, a search for information as closely related to the research question will be sought, and existing information will be analyzed in such a way that it will connect to the research question.

Another limitation of this research is the fact that the agenda setting of a kerosene tax is still an ongoing process. This complicates giving a final verdict on the process of agenda setting of a kerosene tax, because it is still subjected to change. Therefore, this study aimed at a historical approach on the process of agenda setting of a European kerosene tax.

Building on this research, several questions for follow-up research can be distinguished. While this research attempted to operationalize the concepts of agenda setting, much more research must be done to create a complete operational framework that represents the vast amount of research conducted on agenda setting. A large-scale meta-analysis on how theories on agenda setting measure agenda setting and how case studies are methodologically structured can lead to an operational framework that can contribute to an improved measurability of the concept of agenda-setting. This in turn makes it possible to execute more structured and comparable case studies in the future.

Another question relates to the impact of the success or failure of comparable policies on the process of agenda setting. In this research, the impact of the failure of the Kyoto Protocol, EU ETS, and the Dutch kerosene tax, on the agenda setting process of a European kerosene tax, were elucidated. More research must be conducted to discover if this influence is an anomaly in the process of agenda setting, or this is fundamental part of it. More research must be done to find out if failing policies can lead to more incentive for agenda setting. While this study supports this hypothesis, more research is necessary to make conclusions on this issue.

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Appendices Appendix I: Aviation tax in European Member States

Countries with some form of aviation tax Countries without any form of aviation tax or only tax on domestic flights Austria, since 2011 (Bundesministrum Belgium Finanzen, 2011) France, since 1999 (Ministère de la Transition Bulgaria écologique, 1999)

Germany, since 2011 (Die Bundesregierung, Croatia 2020)

Italy, since 2011 (EBAA, 2011) Cyprus

Sweden, since 2018 (Government offices of Czech Republic Sweden, 2017) United Kingdom, since 2007 (Government UK, Denmark 2018) Estonia Finland Greece Hungary Ireland Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta The Netherlands Portugal Romania Slovakia Slovenia Spain

Source: (CE Delft, 2019)

Appendix II: Timeline aviation pricing

Appendix III: Interview questions Interview questions interview one 2007 – 2009 Issue framing - Was u ten tijde van de invoering van de vliegbelasting in 2008 al betrokken bij het ministerie van financiën? o Zo ja, wat was uw rol bij de totstandkoming van de vliegbelasting? - Is het ministerie van financiën actief bezig met de formulering van issues om te zorgen dat er aandacht voor ontstaat vanuit de politiek, en dat deze aandacht de vorm krijgt die het ministerie wil? - Kunt u een voorbeeld noemen van bepaalde formuleringen die de aandacht op bepaalde details van het issue ‘vliegbelasting’ hebben gericht zodat het met een bepaalde insteek op de politieke agenda terechtkwam?

- Hoe is de invoering van een vliegbelasting in uw ogen ter sprake gekomen in de politiek?

Onderzoeksbureau SEO heeft in opdracht van de ministeries van financiën, infrastructuur en leefomgeving een onderzoek uitgevoerd naar de effecten van een vliegbelasting. - Bent u bekend met dit onderzoeksbureau?

SEO heeft in 2018 ook een onderzoek naar de effecten van een vliegbelasting uitgevoerd in opdracht van KLM. De resultaten van deze onderzoeken zijn totaal verschillend. - In hoeverre denkt u dat framing, de opdrachtgever en de timing van het onderzoek invloed hebben gehad op hoe het issue gepresenteerd is?

Policy venue Getting an issue on the agenda depends on the venue someone turns to, to get support for their ideas. Camiel Eurlings, destijds minister van infrastructuur, was fel tegen de vliegbelasting. Een jaar na de afschaffing van de vliegbelasting werd meneer Eurlings directeur vracht van KLM, twee jaar later was hij CEO. - Is hier een verband aanwezig met de vliegbelasting?

Timing: - Heeft de financiële crisis in 2008 invloed gehad op de afschaffing van de vliegbelasting?

2010 – 2018 - Waarom is er in deze 10 jaar geen concrete voorstel meer gedaan of politiek debat gevoerd over een vliegbelasting? (In andere woorden, waarom verdween de vliegbelasting naar de achtergrond?)

2018 – nu 2017 Regeerakkoord, hervorming belastingstelsel ‘Ingezet wordt op Europese afspraken over belastingen op luchtvaart in het kader van de voor 2019 geplande onderhandelingen over de klimaatdoelen van ‘Parijs’.’

III

- Hoe is het gekomen dat de intentie voor een Europese vliegbelasting is opgenomen in het regeerakkoord 2017-2021?

Kabinetsplannen vliegbelasting - Wat was het effect van de internetconsultatie met 1460 openbare reacties op het verloop van de plannen voor de vliegbelasting? o Welke verschillen waren merkbaar in de reacties van voor- en tegenstanders van de vliegbelasting

De ANVR noemt de vliegbelasting een ‘vakantiebelasting voor de consument’. Dit is, in mijn ogen, een geval van issue framing. - Zijn er meer voorbeelden van terminologie die doet denken van het framen van het issue? - Gebruikt het ministerie van Financiën zelf ook bepaalde ‘krachtige’ termen om hun standpunten kracht bij te zetten?

Joint Statement - Hoe is de joint statement aan de Europese Commissie tot stand gekomen? o Waarom nu? o Waarom hebben deze landen zich aangesloten (NL, Zweden, Frankrijk, België, Duitsland, Italië, Luxemburg, Denemarken, Bulgarije)? o Waarom andere EU landen niet? o Waarom aan de Europese Commissie, waarom bijvoorbeeld niet aan de ICAO (VN internationale burgerluchtvaartorganisatie)? o (Doorvragen over internationale conferentie juni 2019)

- Werkt het ministerie van Financiën samen met NGO’s zoals Natuur & Milieu om de vliegbelasting onder de aandacht te brengen?

Corona ‘’Coronavirus Could Slow Efforts to Cut Airlines’ Greenhouse Gas Emissions’’ → statement van KLM en IATA (New York Times, maart 2020) - Wordt de coronacrisis gebruikt door tegenstanders van vliegbelasting om belastingmaatregelen tegen te gaan? o Hoe doen ze dit? - Wordt de coronacrisis gebruikt door voorstanders van een vliegbelasting om voor een belasting te pleiten? o Hoe doen ze dit?

Interview questions interview two - What is your function at Environmental Defense Fund?

EU ETS - Is Environmental Defense Fund deliberately focused on framing the issue of the emissions of aviation? How does EDF present the problems with the current policy/ plans for a kerosene tax? (issue framing question) o If yes, what is your role in drawing attention to the right issues? o How do you do that? o Why in this particular way?

- Is the venue where an issue is discussed important for if it ends up at the European agenda and how it ends up at the agenda? o How do you try to influence which policymakers address the problem of aviation emissions? o If you do not, why is this not done? Not possible or something else?

- Why is the ETS point of debate specifically now? o Why is CORISA not something that was addressed 5 or 10 years ago? o Why specifically now? Are there factors that have led to the possibility of a place for aviation taxation specifically now? - Have there been focusing events regarding ETS, aviation taxation etcetera? o How did you use them to your benefit? o How did other parties use this, for example IATA

Corona - Does corona lead to opportunities or threats regarding setting aviation taxation on the EU agenda? o Do you see this an opportunity or a threat to frame the issue in a particular way that the height of CORISA / tax will become what EDF desires?

‘’Coronavirus Could Slow Efforts to Cut Airlines’ Greenhouse Gas Emissions’’ → statement van KLM en IATA (New York Times, maart 2020) - What do you think about this statement? - Is this, in your opinion, a form of issue framing?

- Same for 2008 financial crisis o How did this crisis influence the debate regarding the pricing of aviation in Europe?

Aviation tax and Joint statement In 2019, 9 countries handed over a Joint statement for the European commission, they ask for more fair pricing of aviation in Europe. They suggest that the European Commission explores ideas for a kerosene tax. Taxing kerosene is complicated because of the Chicago Convention and because of the minimum of unanimous voting in order to introduce taxation bills.

- What are your thoughts on this Joint Statement? o Why are they advocating an almost impossible kerosene tax?

o Why is this presented specifically now? o Why is it send to the European Commission, why not ICAO or Member States on their own? - Why do 9 countries sign, and 19 not?

Interview questions interview three Issue Framing

- Kunt u een voorbeeld noemen van probleemdefinitie die het ministerie van financiën (heeft) gebruikt, zodat het issue ‘’uitstoot door luchtvaart’’ binnen een bepaald frame past?

Policy venue

- Waarom is de joint statement gericht aan de Europese Commissie, en niet bijvoorbeeld aan ICAO dat bezig is en was met CORSIA?

Chicago Convention

- Chicago Convention stelt: geen belasting van kerosine. Dit stamt ui 1944 toen de wereld er totaal anders uitzag. Hoe kan het dat dit na al die tijd nog steeds niet aangepast is?

Joint Statement

Door Chicago Convention en door de vereiste van unanieme stemming lijkt een vliegbelasting hoogst onwaarschijnlijk.

- Waarom is hier dan toch op ingezet door de ministeries? - Houdt de timing van het Joint Statement verband met de ideeën voor CORSIA? - Houdt de timing van het Joint Statement verband met de nieuwe Europese Commissie?

Conferentie

- Wat was de aanleiding van deze conferentie? - Waarom is deze juist nu georganiseerd (2019) - Wie zijn er uitgenodigd en waarom deze personen, groepen of organisaties?

- Er waren veel sprekers, uit veel landen en internationale instellingen. Uiteindelijk hebben ‘maar’ 9 landen getekend. - Waarom zoveel landen niet? - Waarom juist die andere 8 landen wel?

Europese Commissie Ik heb geen officiële reactie kunnen vinden van de Europese Commissie - Waarom is er geen officiële reactie?

- Met welke partijen spreekt de Europese Commissie allemaal voordat het gebruik maakt van het recht tot initiatie en met een voorstel komt? o Zijn dit voornamelijk vertegenwoordigers van de industrie, of NGOs, of lidstaten etc?

Focusing events - Wat voor invloed heeft corona op hoe vliegbelasting wordt geägendeerd?

VII

o Gebruikt bijvoorbeeld de vliegsector dit als reden om een belasting te voorkomen?

VIII

Interview questions interview four Vraag 1: Hoe bent u betrokken bij de beprijzing van de luchtvaart?

Vraag 2: Wat zijn de grootste struikelblokken om iets op de Europese agenda te zetten?

Vraag 2: Kunt u een voorbeeld noemen van belangengroepen die het issue ‘belasten van de luchtvaart’ in bepaalde termen uitlegt, waardoor een bepaald frame ontstaat? En waarom is dit op deze specifieke manier gebeurd? - Voorbeeld: ANVR die de luchtvaartbelasting een vakantiebelasting noemt - Ministerie van Financiën die luchtvaartbeprijzing een kwestie van level playing field noemt, en daarmee als een Europees probleem framet

Vraag 3: Er zijn meerdere nationale vliegbelastingen in Europea, waarom wil Nederland zo graag de ‘venue’ verschuiven naar Europees niveau?

Vraag 4: Waarom wordt er specifiek nu ingezet op een vliegbelasting? Het is in 2008 ook mislukt, en bij het Joint Statement sloten 9 van de 28 landen zich aan.

Vraag 5:Chicago Convention stelt: geen belasting van kerosine. Dit stamt ui 1944 toen de wereld er totaal anders uitzag. Hoe kan het dat dit na al die tijd nog steeds niet aangepast is?

Vraag 6: Annie Interviewee two vertelde mij dat in het Kyoto Protocol, de luchtvaart een bijzondere positie had, en gereguleerd werd door de luchtvaartsector, en dat daardoor eigenlijk luchtvaart niet belast werd. - Waarom greep de Europese Commissie toen niet in?

- Heeft CORSIA hetzelfde effect? - Staan Kyoto protocol en CORSIA een vliegbelasting in de weg op de Europese agenda?

Vraag 7: Invoering van Europese belastingwetten vereist unanieme stemming voor een voorstel. Wat voor invloed heeft dit op de mate van inzet die partijen willen leveren om een probleem op de agenda te krijgen?

Vraag 8: Wat is het effect van een economische recessie op duurzaamheidsbeleid? Je zag dat de financiële crisis in 2008 gebruikt werd als reden om de vliegbelasting af te schaffen. Met corona zie je hetzelfde gebeuren. Corona → economie → CORSIA / vliegbelasting

Appendix IV: Interview transcripts Interview one Transcript interview one, May 15th, 2020 L= Luuk Jansen (interviewer) K= interviewee, policy officer ministry of Finance

L: Was u al betrokken bij het ministerie van financiën ten tijde van de vliegbelasting in Nederland in 2008? K: Nee, maar ik weet er wel het een en ander vanaf. Menno Snel was toen directeur generaal fiscale zaken. Hij heeft de eerste vliegbelasting geboren en ten grave gedragen. Menno Snel was in 2018- 2019 staatssecrateris van financiën en had dus al affiniteit en interesse in een vliegbelasting.

L: Is het ministerie van Financiën bezig met het definiëren van problemen in zo’n mate dat het binnen een bepaald frame past? K: Wij als ministerie proberen neutraal te zijn, maar de minister en van welke partij hij is, maakt wel uit voor hoe een probleem wordt geframed ja. Wij onderzoeken ook met welke terminologie iets de grootste slagingskans heeft in de politiek. Voor het precieze frame heeft een minister wel politiek adviseurs.

L: Bent u bekend met SEO onderzoek, die hebben een onderzoek uitgevoerd in opdracht van het ministerie van financiën en later eenzelfde soort onderzoek uitgevoerd in opdracht van KLM. Is de onafhankelijkheid van een onderzoek nog te waarborgen als bureaus voor voor- en tegenstanders onderzoek uitvoert? K: In principe moeten die bureaus onafhankelijk zijn. Het is heel gebruikelijk dat deze bureaus voor beide partijen een onderzoek kunnen uitvoeren. De onderzoeksvraag zal anders zijn en de uitkomsten daarom ook. Daarom moet je bij onderzoeken altijd goed opletten naar de context, opdrachtgever en de vraagstelling.

L: Is er een verband tussen Camiel Eurlings, zijn aanstelling bij KLM als directeur en de afschaffing van de vliegbelasting? K: Ministerie van verkeer en waterstaat behartigt meer de belangen van de luchtvaartsector. Dat er gesprekken plaatsvinden tussen de minister van IenW is redelijk zeker, maar of er banden zijn tussen de afschaffing en een lobby vanuit KLM/Schiphol durf ik niet te zeggen.

L: Waarom zijn er na 2009 geen voorstellen meer gedaan voor een introductie van een vliegbelasting in de periode 2009-2017? K: De politieke setting moet daarvoor juist zijn, alsmede de economische positie. De tijd moet ervoor rijp zijn. Daarnaast waren de gevolgen van de economische crisis groot en hebben brancheorganisaties lang gebruik kunnen maken van de crisis als argument om de luchtvaart te ontzien van belasting.

L: Waarom is de tijd nu rijp voor een vliegbelasting? K: Europa is veel meer bezig met milieu, kijk naar de Green Deal bijvoorbeeld. En in de tussentijd zijn er veel andere nationale vliegbelastingen, wat laat zien dat het toch mogelijk is. In Duitsland is bijvoorbeeld bewezen dat een luchtvaartbelasting wel kan werken. Wij gaan in principe mee in de flow. We kijken wat er op mondiaal niveau gebeurt, ook met betrekking tot bijvoorbeeld het Parijs klimaatakkoord. We kijken ook waar de maatschappij aan toe is. Het thema duurzaamheid is een stuk

sterker geworden in de laatste jaren, het leeft. Je wilt ook de mensen meekrijgen, je wil beleid voeren waar de mensen achter staan.

L: Hoe komt een Europese vliegbelasting terecht in een Nederlands regeerakkoord? K: Hier spelen ministeries een grote rol. Wij verzamelen mogelijke initiatieven, we noemen die fiches. Hierop werken we kort en bondig mogelijke beleidsvoorstellen uit waar politieke partijen als het ware uit kunnen kiezen. Dan kijken zij wat interessant is. Bij de vliegbelasting is zoiets ook gebeurd. Partijen als D66 en CU willen ook meer de groene kant op, en zijn ook Europeagezind. Deze partijen zijn verantwoordelijk in de eerste plaats dat deze fiches gekozen zijn en zo op de nationale politieke agenda terechtgekomen zijn.

L: De ANVR noemt de vliegbelasting een vakantiebelasting, een typisch geval van framing. Kent u meer voorbeelden van framing, waarin krachtige termen gebruikt worden om een bepaald frame wordt geschetst? K: Ja, dit gebeurt dagelijks. Met name over de effecten worden grote uitspraken gedaan. Meestal is dit negatief, maar dit gebeurt ook vanuit NGOs. Iedereen probeert zijn belangen zo luid mogelijk te verspreiden.

L: Hoe is het Joint Statement tot stand gekomen? K: Dit begon ook in het regeerakkoord. Door de slechte ervaring met een nationale belasting, door met name de weglekeffecten, werd er nu ingezet op Europese maatregelen. Menno Snel heeft zich er sterk voor gemaakt, hij wilde echt acties ondernemen. Eén van die acties was een internationale conferentie, waar gekeken wat de mogelijkheden waren met een Europese vliegbelasting. Het was een soort inventarisatie hoe andere landen erin stonden. Voormalig eurocommisaris voor belasting en financiën Pierre Mozcovici stelde dat zijn termijn afliep en dat het daarom verstandig was om het Joint Statement aan de volgende Europese Commissie te presenteren. Het initiatiefrecht blijft bij de Commissie, wij als landen kunnen alleen ideeën aandragen.

L: Dus waarom nu? Omdat er een nieuwe Europese Commissie is? K: Ja onder andere, er is nu meer tijd om echt iets voor elkaar te krijgen. Daarnaast is het politieke klimaat er nu geschikt voor. Er zijn veel landen positief over een vliegbelasting, maar alleen als alle landen meedoen. We moeten een level playing field houden. Als je momentum hebt gecreëerd tijdens zo’n conferentie moet je iets blijven doen, anders verloopt je momentum snel weer.

L: Zet Nederland Europa onder druk door te zeggen dat ze het nationaal gaan regelen (vliegbelasting) als het Europees niet gebeurt? K: Ik denk niet dat Nederland niet zoveel druk kan uitoefenen op Europa, daar is Nederland een te klein land voor. Luchtvaart is echter wel bij uitstek een internationale sector. Als je het echt goed wilt doen, moet het globaal. Globaal is te moeilijk, dus daarom is het Europees regelen het streven. Europa is ook het niveau waarop we als Nederland mee kunnen praten. Nationale belasting is meer een plan B, ook omdat het in andere landen ook werkt.

L: Waarom hebben specifiek deze 9 landen het Joint Statement ondertekend en andere niet? K: Wij gaan landen benaderen, dan gaan zij met hun bewindspersonen aan de slag of zij willen meewerken of niet. Landen waarvan je vermoedt dat zij positief staan tegenover het statement benader je dan eerst. Dit zijn bijvoorbeeld België en Frankrijk, die ook een groen regeerakkoord hebben. Vooral Frankrijk zet in op klimaat.

L: Is 9 landen veel en genoeg voor een impactful Joint Statement? K: Er zijn ook landen waarvoor een belasting desastreus kan zijn, denk aan Malta of Cyprus. Met name dit soort eilandstaten. Er zijn ook veel Europese landen waar het thema duurzaamheid nog niet zo speelt. Dit statement is ondertekend door de toch wat rijkere Europese landen, die al iets verder zijn met duurzaamheid. Het statement wordt ook krachtiger door grote landen als Duitsland aan je zijde te hebben.

L: Waarom is het Joint Statement gericht op Europees niveau, en niet op bijvoorbeeld Verenigde Naties level? K: ICAO (VN) staat verder van ons af, die hebben meer contact met het het ministerie van Infrastructuur en Waterstaat. ICAO is ook meer betrokken bij de sector zelf.

L: Wordt corona gebruikt door voor- en tegenstanders om de vliegbelasting te beïnvloeden? K: Jazeker, van beide kanten. Je hoort geluiden als: moet je nu wel een vliegbelasting introduceren als een sector al zo zwaar heeft. Je hoort daarentegen ook, dit is het moment, een keerpunt om de luchtvaartsector op een duurzame manier terug op te bouwen. Het is uiteindelijk een politieke keuze hoe je hiermee omgaat.

L: Waarom wordt er ingezet op een belasting, en niet op verdere raffinering van bijvoorbeeld van ETS? K: De luchtvaartsector krijgt momenteel veel gratis rechten toegewezen. De Europese Commissie zegt in de Green Deal dit al te willen adresseren. Dit is dus zeker ook een instrument. Hier zit echter wel een nadeel achter, alleen intra Europese vluchten vallen dan binnen de ETS. Intercontinentale vluchten zijn uitgesloten van ETS, dit is bij een belasting niet het geval.

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Interview two Transcript Interview two, 3 June 2020 L= Luuk Jansen (interviewer) A= Interviewee, International Council Environmental Defense Fund

L: First, a short question about yourself, Do you want to share your function at EDF? A: Absolutely, I am council seat SPL international lawyer, I do not represent court practice for EDF. I use international instruments so as to communicate incentives for companies and countries. ETS is the next great debate among economists. I have done research on issue framing regarding ETS with David hardesty, Professor Rainer, a professor at the University of British Columbia.

L: You have vast experience with ETS, can you explain me bit more about ETS? A: I wrote a paper in 1997 about the minimum requirements of market based policies. It would be required to implement this on environmental policy. In 1987, EDF lawyers held a strategy session. Their research found that global warming and acid rain were a big problem. Jan Dudak said that we need a global system of tradable permits. Joseph Goffman said that the idea was crazy, no one cared about global warming. They did however care about acid rain. EDF presented information about acid rain to the US president election candidates. When Bush was elected, he contacted EDF because he embraced the idea. This led to legislation, the enactment of Clean Air enactments of 1990. This was our first implementation of ETS on a large scale.

Let me tell you about the Kyoto protocol. EDF was involved in the creation of this protocol. It advocates an ETS system, based on historical emission data. There were several political tradeoffs. EDF is the pioneer of ETS systems around the globe, led by Delbeke, Vis and Meadows. We set up an experiment with BP (oil company). The experiment of an ETS was a success. They saved 600 million euros.

Aviation was included in the Kyoto protocol. The goal was to limit the emissions of aviation at the 1995 level. No one actually took action to make sure this would happen. Therefore, the industry took advantage of this situation and said that they would include aviation in the Kyoto protocol. This never happened and aviation grew in size and emissions.

L: The industry seems very divided. You speak about BP and that they are positive about ETS, but companies like AirFrance/KLM are advocating against CORSIA (form of ETS), together with IATA. A: They were opposed? Where did you find this?

L: A statement from Airfrance KLM in March in the New York Times and a publication by IATA. You should look into this blog. → CORSIA: Industry-sought rule change threatens aviation climate program (Petsonk, 2020)

The industry chose their own baseline for CORSIA. Normally, this is done with historical emission data. For example: Kyoto protocol was based on emission levels of 1990. CORSIA was based on emissions from 2019-2020. Under normal conditions, this meant that almost nothing would change for the aviation sector. But because of the corona virus, the emission levels are a lot lower than they predicted. Therefore, the industry is now saying that they don’t have money, they should not get taxed etcetera. They chose a year in the future knowing the risks (they cannot see into the future). CORSIA was set up in 2016. Changing the rules of the CORSIA will decrease the trustworthiness of the legislation.

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You can see airlines are taking advantage of the situation. A group of European parliamentariars contacted the EU transport commissioner that the commission should not support changing the change of rules in CORSIA.

You can see airlines are taking advantage of the moment. They say, we are bankrupt, we don’t have any money for emission reduction. Our emissions are low anyway now. But our (EDF) vision is: if you change the rules now, there is no pressure on them to make their economic recovery in an environmentally friendly way.

This is what I call an ‘’inflection point’’, the aviation sector is facing flightshame, because of corona people get accustomed with video conferences instead of flying.

The venue is shifted, by the people from European parliament requesting the European commissioner to keep a tight stance.

L: We talked a lot about historical events. I do have a question then about the Chicago convention. It mentions that it is forbidden to levy tax on kerosene. How is it possible that this still exists in such a way, with completely different values then in 1944? A: When the Chicago was signed, in 1944, the world looked different. Aviation was a tool of destruction. The people that founded the Chicago convention saw that the Chicago convention could be an instrument of peace. It was founded to lift the world out of the damage that the war caused.

That is the frame that the Chicago convention was created in. They put together technological rules. Uniform standards for the bolts that keep together an airplane.

A change in the convention has to be amended. Which means that you have to go through a formal process mentioned in the convention. It is then only applied to the countries that have rectified it. To change the taxation requires amendment, this is very difficult.

L: I have a final question about the Joint Statement sent to the European Commission in 2019. Taxing kerosene is complicated because of the Chicago Convention and because of the minimum of unanimous voting in order to introduce taxation bills. Why do you think they try to go for a tax anyway? A: To pressure the European Commission to take action and to get more voters. Unanimous voting also complicates the process. Our institutional rules complicate the change of legislation. The EU ETS is not a tax, therefore it is not subject to the rule of unanimity.

Back in 1992, when they went to adopt rules of proceduring, I know because I was there, they tried to apply a rule of procedure that uses a majority vote. Saudi Arabia stopped this completely, and still does that until this day.

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Interview three Transcript interview 3, 4 June 2020 L= Luuk Jansen (interviewer) M= Policy officer European Commission/ policy officer ministry of Finance, the Netherlands (interviewee)

L: Ik onderzoek het belasten van de luchtvaart. Voornamelijk vanwege de Joint Statement van 2019. Ik onderzoek dit door het bestuderen van theorieën over agenda setting, die onderzoekt waarom sommige issues wel, en sommige issues niet op de Europese politieke agenda eindigen. Dit wordt onderzocht aan de hand van 3 factoren: - Issue framing - Policy venue - Window of opportunity

L: Kunt u een voorbeeld noemen van probleemdefinitie die het ministerie van financiën (heeft) gebruikt, zodat het issue ‘’uitstoot door luchtvaart’’ binnen een bepaald frame past?

M: Dat er geen level playing field was op de belasting van deze vorm van transport.

L: Dus niet zozeer de milieuschade die luchtvaart veroorzaak? M: Nee, dat lag erg politiek gevoelig. Andere landen doen dat duidelijker. Er zijn veel verschillende meningen in Den Haag. Je hebt misschien de krantenkoppen wel gezien, je moet dit op Europees niveau doen en op wereldniveau doen via de ETS, en niet via belastingen. Natuurlijk noemen we het wel. Maar heel bewust zijn we in de persberichten gericht op een level playing field creëren. Met een laag belastingtarief is het effect op het milieu ook laag, blijkt uit onderzoek.

L: Waarom is de joint statement gericht aan de Europese Commissie, en niet bijvoorbeeld aan ICAO dat bezig is en was met CORSIA? M: Wij zagen dat het onhaalbaar is op mondiaal niveau, dat is te lange termijn. In een ideale wereld zouden we dat willen. Zodoende dat we ons beter op Europees niveau kunnen richten.

L: Waarom wordt er dan ingezet op een vliegbelasting, belasten van kerosine is moeilijk, en unaniem voor stemmen is noodzakelijk voor een Europese belasting? M: Kerosine belasten is wel mogelijk. Dit is niet in strijd met het Chicago verdrag. Er zitten wel bilaterale verdragen in de weg. Dat het moeilijk is betekent niet dat we het niet moeten doen. Een ticketbelasting is ook nog mogelijk voor intercontinentale vluchten. Er is inderdaad een moeilijke besluitvorming bij Europese belastingen. Misschien is het mogelijk om het in stappen te introduceren. In de Green Deal is het idee van belasting omarmd, dus de Commissie gaat hier ook voor. De Joint Statement heeft hier ook aan bijgedragen.

L: Was het Joint Statement dan ook verstuurd met het doel om de EU Commissie onder druk te zetten om met voorstellen te komen? M: Ja dat helpt. Er wordt veel naar verwezen.

L: Ik kan geen officiële reactie vinden van de commissie op het statement, hoe komt dit? M: Er wordt naar verwezen in onderzoeken, en het wordt genoemd in de Green Deal. Er lagen ook voorstellen klaar, maar vanwege de coronacrisis zijn die uitgesteld. In juni 2021 komt een nieuwe

richtlijn energiebelasting, waar ook de luchtvaart in opgenomen zal zijn. In welke vorm is op dit moment nog niet duidelijk, daar worden nog onderzoeken naar gedaan.

L: Is er nagedacht over de timing van het overhandigen van het Joint Statement? M: Er is bericht gestuurd 2 jaar geleden naar de Europese Commissie. Die zou het doorgeven aan de volgende commissie. De timing is daarom goed. We hebben het meegegeven aan de nieuwe commissie, daarom is ook de conferentie georganiseerd in 2019. Wij weten ook niet hoelang het duurt voordat er een nieuwe commissie is. Het statement duurde ook langer dan verwacht. Het duurde langer voordat de lidstaten het eens waren over het statement.

L: Kunt u dat toelichten? M: Wij wilden dat Frankrijk en Duitsland aan boord waren en daar waren we op aan het wachten. Duitsland wil de ticket tax die zij voeren in gebruik houden en dus die macht niet overdragen aan Europa. Daarom is het statement meermaals herschreven. Bijvoorbeeld waar we eerst spraken over een eerlijk vliegbelasting, spreken we nu in het statement over eerlijke vliegbeprijzing.

L: Waarom is niet ingezet op ETS of CORSIA? M: Dat is het wel. Door ruime termen te gebruiken hebben we de mogelijkheden opengehouden. CORSIA is niet op ingezet omdat dat niet Europees is geregeld.

L: Waarom is de conferentie juist in 2019 georganiseerd? M: Vliegbelasting is deel van het regeerakkoord. Dit is heel belangrijk. Hier wordt gezegd dat ingezet wordt op een Europees traject. Het moest vanuit het regeerakkoord in 2021 in werking treden (nationaal of internationaal), dus er zat ook druk achter vanuit ons.

De Tweede Kamer heeft dus ook druk uitgeoefend om de conferentie te houden. De Tweede Kamer heeft toegezegd dat er een conferentie georganiseerd moest worden, omdat dit ook in het regeerakkoord ook vermeld werd.

L: Hoe kwam de ambitie voor Europees beleid in het regeerakkoord? M: Dit komt door lobbyen en voornamelijk vanuit de coalitiepartijen D66 en CU (ChristenUnie). Vanwege deze partijen moest er een groen tintje in het regeerakkoord komen en werd er ook ingezet op Europees beleid.

L: Waarom zijn juist bepaalde ministers, staatssecretarissen en commissarissen uitgenodigd? M: we hebben breed uitgenodigd. Zweden was al heel actief, die krijgen wij sowieso mee. Die zijn al bezig met een vliegbelasting.We hebben de commissarissen uitgenodigd die over dit thema gaan uitgenodigd. We hebben gekeken welke landen hierin actief wilden zijn. Dan sprong Frankrijk eruit, zij zetten met hun regeerakkoord ook sterk in op milieu. De contacten waren ook goed. Die grote landen zijn ook belangrijk voor de kracht van je verhaal. Er waren ook veel landen die geïnteresseerd waren, maar waar het economisch te instabiel was, bijvoorbeeld Spanje. Spanje is nu bezig met een vliegtaks.

L: is bewust gekozen om NGOs en brancheorganisaties niet uit te nodigen? M: Je hebt niet allerlei brancheorganisaties nodig. Je weet precies wat die denken. Van NGOs ken je ook de standpunten. Wij waren met agenda setting bezig, we hoefden niet van KLM te horen dat het een heel slecht idee is. Dat hebben we al vaak genoeg gehoord.

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L: Uiteindelijk hebben 9 landen getekend, dat betekent dat ook 19 landen niet getekend hebben. Welke redenen gaven zij om niet te tekenen? M: Er waren een aantal landen waar het politiek of economisch instabiel was. Het was zwaar weer. België kon niet tekenen omdat ze bezig waren met een regering construeren. Kroatië heeft de angst dat het ook de maritieme sector zal raken. Daarmee worden eilanden te hard geraakt. Denemarken heeft problemen in het parlement. Oost Europese landen zijn tegen een belasting omdat hun wegennet van een lagere kwaliteit is. Het milieu heeft daar ook minder prioriteit. Malta, Cyprus en Griekenland zijn tegen vanwege hun grote aantal eilanden en hoge aantal vluchten.

L: Met welke partijen heeft de Commissie contact bij het maken van een voorstel voor de Raad en het parleement? M: Er wordt een onderzoek of een impact assessment gedaan, die wordt gepubliceerd en aan de hand daarvan wordt een publieke consultatie gehouden. Er zijn organisaties die afzonderlijk aankloppen. De brancheorganisaties hebben niet veel invloed op het voorstel van de Commissie, dat is voornamelijk de impact assessment. De brancheorganisaties gaan voornamelijk bij de Raad of in het Europees parlement lobbyen. Lobbyen gaat ook gebeuren bij nationale overheden, bij ministers en staatssecretarissen.

Voor agenda setting is het erg belangrijk dat een Europese vliegbelasting in het regeerakkoord van Nederland stond. Dit geeft lobbyisten minder kans om bijvoorbeeld iemand van de VVD te benaderen om ze om te praten tegen de vliegbelasting. Het regeerakkoord maakt het een gemaakte belofte.

L: Is CORSIA een kans of een bedreiging voor een vliegbelasting? M: Je krijgt de discussie van een dubbele belasting. De commissie is zelf bij de CORSIA onderhandelingen en zij zien niet dat het één het ander tegenhoudt. Het hoeft elkaar niet in de weg te staan. De brancheorganisaties zullen dit wel gaan gebruiken om een frame te schetsen waarin zij erin staan alsof ze het al zwaar genoeg hebben door CORSIA, corona etcetera.

L: Wat voor invloed heeft COVID-19 op hoe de vliegbelasting wordt geägendeerd? M: Dat is uitstel, de vorm of het idee worden niet veranderd. Officieel was het zelfs nog niet aangekondigd. Corona heeft het zeker niet versneld. Ik kan het nog niet precies overzien. Onderzoek is veel moeilijker, naar de impact.

De Green Deal en corona worden gebruikt om te stellen: ‘’we gaan Europa groen opbouwen’’. De Europese Commissie houdt voet bij stuk en wil de vliegbelasting niet afzwakken naar aanleiding van corona.

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Written interview professor Sebastiaan Princen Written interview Sebastiaan Princen, 6 June 2020

Vraag over toepassing theorie

Eurlings was in 2009 minister van verkeer en waterstaat, tijdens een gesprek met iemand van het ministerie van financiën werd al aangegeven dat contact tussen deze twee partijen aannemelijk is. Hij heeft daarnaast een onderzoek laten uitvoeren naar de schade van de vliegbelasting voor Schiphol en KLM

- Kan aangenomen worden dat er bij de aanstelling van Camiel Eurlings als CEO van KLM, 3 jaar na de afschaffing van de vliegbelasting in Nederland, gebruik is gemaakt van hem als ‘policy venue’ door KLM/Schiphol voor het afschaffen van de vliegbelasting?

Antwoord: Ik kan niet precies uit je vraag halen over welke situatie je vraag gaat: • Dat KLM bij Eurlings lobbyde toen hij nog minister was. Als het hierom gaat, kun je het Ministerie van V&W zien als venue. Eurlings was, als toenmalig minister, een (het) aanspreekpunt van dat ministerie, maar dat betekent alleen dat hij het ministerie naar buiten toe vertegenwoordigde. Eurlings was niet zelf/persoonlijk een venue. Een venue wordt opgevat als een institutionele arena waarbinnen besluiten over beleid worden genomen; een ministerie is daar een voorbeeld van. • Dat Eurlings als CEO van KLM lobbyde bij het ministerie. In dat geval is Eurlings geen venue (en KLM ook niet) omdat Eurlings noch KLM beslissingen over overheidsbeleid konden nemen. Zijn rol was dan die van lobbyist, die van KLM als belangengroep in het beleidsvormingsproces. Als algemene achtergrond is het misschien nuttig om te bedenken dat het begrip “venue” onderdeel is van een theorie die in de VS is ontwikkeld. De invulling daarvan sluit aan bij een sterke traditie in het Amerikaanse politicologische denken die de staat/overheid opvat als een arena waarbinnen belangengroepen hun strijd uitvechten. In deze opvatting hebben politici en staatsinstellingen geen eigen inhoudelijke beleidsvoorkeuren, maar fungeren ze als min of meer passief doorgeefluik van externe belangen. Deze visie is aanvechtbaar, maar je komt hem in grote delen van de Amerikaanse literatuur tegen. In de toepassing van het venue-concept brengt dit soms problemen met zich mee, omdat een en dezelfde instantie zowel als venue als als actor (met eigen voorkeuren) gezien kan worden. Dit is een conceptuele beperking die inherent is aan de theoretische benadering, maar die je in het achterhoofd moet houden wanneer je hem toepast.

Vraag over toepassing agenda setting als middel of als doel

In 2019 is er een Joint Statement naar de Europese Commissie verstuurd, waarin het verzoek staat aan de Commissie om de belasting van kerosine te behandelen. Belasting heffen op Europees niveau is alleen mogelijk met unanimiteit van alle lidstaten en dat is hoogst onwaarschijnlijk. Daarom is dit statement waarschijnlijk verstuurd om het imago van de regering te versterken, of om druk te zetten op de Europese Unie

- Kan dit dan ook gezien worden als issue framing? Het doel van de Joint Statement is dan niet het framen van het issue ‘uitstoot van de luchtvaart’, maar de Joint Statement dient dan eerder het doel van politiek gewin behalen.

Antwoord:

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Het maken van een statement om een punt te maken naar een achterban in plaats van daadwerkelijk te proberen beleid te beïnvloeden, is een veelvoorkomend onderdeel van het politieke spel. Zowel politici als belangengroepen moeten aan twee dingen denken: (1) het beïnvloeden van beleid en (2) het aan hun achterban laten zien dat ze voor hen opkomen c.q. niet stil zitten. Om die reden organiseren bijv. Greenpeace en vakbonden wel eens acties: niet omdat ze denken dat het iets zal veranderen aan het beleid, maar omdat ze aan hun leden willen laten zien dat ze opkomen voor hun belangen. Dit is nodig om die leden betrokken te houden. Iets vergelijkbaar geldt ook voor politici: soms is het belangrijkste om te kunnen laten zien dat je iets gedaan hebt, zodat je je kunt verantwoorden naar je achterban toe (of dat nu belangengroepen of kiezers zijn). Ik denk niet dat het zinvol is dit als “framing” te benoemen. Er zijn meerdere definities van framing, maar als ik het moet omschrijven komt framing neer op het formuleren van een vraagstuk in bepaalde termen. Je kunt een kerosinebelasting bijvoorbeeld framen als een noodzakelijk middel in de strijd tegen klimaatverandering. Een ander frame zou bijv. gelijkheid zijn: zonder kerosinebelasting wordt de luchtvaart anders behandeld dan wegtransport en dat is niet eerlijk. Of als je tegen een kerosinebelasting bent: een kerosinebelasting is een manier om mensen met een kleine beurs hun welverdiende vakantie af te pakken. Wat steeds gebeurt, is dat hetzelfde onderwerp (kerosinebelasting) wordt gekoppeld aan (of: omschreven in termen van) een ander onderwerp of een bepaalde waarde (duurzaamheid, gelijkheid tussen lucht- en wegtransport, eerlijke verdeling van kansen tussen groepen burgers). Wat je beschrijft in je vraag, gaat niet over framing (hoewel de brief best een bepaald frame kan bevatten), maar over de redenen om die brief te sturen. Ik zou dat als iets anders zien, dat je het beste los kunt zien van framing: actoren hebben redenen om iets (al dan niet) te doen en ze gebruiken (al dan niet) bepaalde frames.

- Een issue op de agenda krijgen wordt bijna het einddoel in plaats een verandering van beleid naar mijn idee.

Antwoord: Soms kan dat inderdaad zo zijn. Bedenk daarbij wel dat “op de agenda krijgen” nog een veelheid aan dingen omvat. Ten eerste: er zijn meerdere agenda’s, dus de vraag is op welke/wiens agenda men iets wil krijgen. Denk daarbij ook aan Kingdon’s onderscheid tussen brede agenda’s met onderwerpen waarover wordt gedacht (‘governmental agendas’) en agenda’s met onderwerpen waarover concrete beslissingen worden genomen (‘decision agendas’). Ten tweede: het maakt uit hoe duurzaam de aandacht/plaats op de agenda is. Als iets een paar dagen in het nieuws is, is het in zekere zin (even) op de media-agenda geweest, maar dat is dan niet meer dan kortstondig geweest. Dat is iets anders dan pogingen om een onderwerp voor langere tijd op de agenda te houden. Je kunt dus de doelen van agendavormers onderscheiden naar (1) het soort agenda waar men het onderwerp op wil krijgen en (2) wat voor type aandacht men wil. Om een verandering in beleid te krijgen, moet een onderwerp (meestal) gedurende langere tijd serieuze aandacht krijgen en moeten de activiteiten erop gericht zijn het onderwerp (uiteindelijk) op een decision agenda te krijgen. Kingdon definieert agenda’s om die reden in termen ‘serious attention’ (i.p.v. alleen maar ‘attention’): het gaat hem niet om de gevallen van kortstondige, niet-bestendige aandacht.

Vraag over toepassing theorie

De theorieën van Agenda Setting pas ik toe op lidstaten van Europa, omdat lidstaten veel invloed uitoefenen op Europees beleid. Uw theorieën zijn voornamelijk geschreven in Europees verband.

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- Zijn uw theorieën ook toepasbaar op nationaal of internationaal niveau, of zijn er dan zaken waar meer aandacht aan besteed moet worden (ik denk hierbij bijvoorbeeld aan verchillende types agenda’s (media, political, cultural agendas)?

Antwoord: De theorieën waar ik me op baseer, zijn ontwikkeld in de context van binnenlandse politiek en dan meer specifiek de Verenigde Staten. Ik heb geprobeerd ze te herformuleren voor en toe te passen op de EU, maar je zou kunnen zeggen dat ze in eerste instantie bedoeld zijn voor binnenlandse politiek. Als je agendavormingstheorieën gebruikt in een Europese (binnenlandspolitieke) context, zijn er wel een paar aandachtspunten: • In de literatuur uit de VS spelen politieke partijen nauwelijks een rol. Dit heeft te maken met de andere rol die ze hebben in de Amerikaanse politiek. Zie in dat verband ook mijn eerdere opmerking over de rol van belangengroepen en de staat in de Amerikaanse politicologie. In veel Europese landen zijn politieke partijen veel belangrijkere spelers, die duidelijk zijn te onderscheiden van andere typen actoren. De Deense politicoloog Christoffer Green-Pedersen heeft in een aantal artikelen laten zien dat partijcompetitie een belangrijke rol speelt in agendavormingsprocessen in Europese landen. Dat is een element dat geen rol speelt bij Amerikaanse auteurs als Kingdon en Baumgartner & Jones. Je zult dit ook niet in mijn kader vinden, omdat politieke partijen een veel minder belangrijke rol spelen op EU-niveau. • In de binnenlandse politiek spelen publieke opinie en de media een veel belangrijkere rol dan op EU-niveau (tenminste, in het algemeen – bij sommige onderwerpen meer dan bij andere). Daarom zie je die niet (of althans: meer zijdelings) terug in mijn kader over agendavorming in de EU. Als je binnen landen gaat kijken, zijn dit heel belangrijke factoren. Ik denk dat agendavormingstheorieën in principe ook op het internationale (in de zin van: boven- Europese) niveau kunnen worden toegepast, maar dat hangt af van het type vragen. Naarmate een onderwerp meer ‘high politics’ wordt (en dus sterker gedomineerd door ‘klassieke’ diplomatie tussen staten), worden elementen uit mijn theoretische benadering minder toepasselijk. De hele notie van agendavorming wordt dan problematischer, omdat agenda’s en beslissingen moeilijker los van elkaar te zien zijn. Dat is, denk ik, ook de reden dat de notie van “agendavorming” nauwelijks een plaats heeft in de literatuur en theorievorming over internationale betrekkingen. Bij specifiekere vormen van beleid (zoals bijv. internationaal milieubeleid) denk ik dat agendavormingstheorieën wel een rol kunnen spelen. Die vormen van beleid zijn sowieso veel sterker verbonden met wat er binnen staten en binnen de EU gebeurt.

Vraag over factoren theorie agenda setting

Ik heb tijdens interviews besproken waarom er in de ‘Chicago Convention’ is opgenomen dat kerosine niet belast mag worden en waarom voor een Europese belasting unanieme stemming nodig vóór nodig is. Als antwoord kreeg ik dat institutionele systemen die er in Europa en internationale verdragen bestaan hiervoor verantwoordelijk zijn.

- Denkt u dat institutionele systemen en reguleringen ook een factor kunnen zijn die de politieke agenda kunnen beïnvloeden?

Antwoord: Zeker. In het theoretische kader maken zij deel uit de venues; het zijn regels die aangeven hoe venues tot besluiten kunnen komen. Deze regels bepalen wat er nodig is om een bepaald besluit te nemen. Daarmee leggen ze de lat hoger voor sommige (typen) besluiten en lager voor andere. Dit heeft invloed op de agenda, omdat de waarschijnlijkheid dat een bepaald besluit genomen kan worden,

invloed heeft op de moeite die actoren willen besteden aan het op de agenda krijgen van een onderwerp. Dit is een van de achtergronden voor ‘venue shopping’: actoren gaan op zoek naar het venue waar de kans het grootst is dat ze gehoor krijgen. Dat heeft deels te maken met de verhouding tussen voor- en tegenstanders in dat venue, maar ook met de procedurele regels en vereisten om een bepaalde besluit te nemen. Evengoed komt het voor dat een onderwerp hoog op de agenda komt van een venue waarin de procedures het heel moeilijk maken om een bepaald besluit te nemen (denk aan een onderwerp als ‘gun control’ in de VS, dat met enige regelmaat op de agenda komt), maar je ziet ook dat het moeilijk is die aandacht vast te houden als er weinig uitzicht op een positieve uitkomst is. Je kunt dit ook duiden in termen van ‘governmental’ en ‘decision’ agenda: als de procedurele vereisten hoge drempels opwerpen, is het moeilijk een onderwerp van de governmental.

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Interview four Transcript interview four, 8 June 2020 L= Luuk Jansen (interviewer) J= interviewee, Climate Neutral Group, employee ministry of housing, spatial planning and environment, the Netherlands

L: Waarom zet Nederland in op een Europese belasting en niet op nationale beprijzingen? J: Als zoiets in het regeerakkoord staat, dan bindt de regering zich eraan om de Europese weg te volgen. Als dit dan niet werkt kunnen ze zeggen, och wat jammer nou, we hebben het geprobeerd, dus we gaan voor nationale belasting. We gaan in Nederland verder. Europa kan gebruikt worden om ervan af te zijn, Europa kan gebruikt worden omdat het moet, maar soms kan Europa gebruikt worden als venue omdat je iets echt alleen via de Europese weg kan bereiken om succes te behalen, zoals bijvoorbeeld bij het emissiehandelsysteem.

L: De Europese weg is een soort ‘moetje’ dan, omdat het in het regeerakkoord staat. Hoe komt het dan in het regeerakkoord terecht? J: De opties worden opengehouden, je wilt genoeg voorstanders van je idee hebben, om je idee krachtig over te brengen. Hierbij is framing erg belangrijk.

L: Wat zijn de grootste struikelblokken om iets op de Europese agenda te krijgen? J: Lidstaten onderling op één lijn krijgen, sommige onderwerpen spelen in landen totaal niet en ergens anders juist wel. Je moet onderzoeken of het probleem echt in Europa speelt, en hoe de dynamiek over dat onderwerp zit in dat land. Het moet ook in het straatje van de Europese Commissie passen, bijvoorbeeld nu met de Green Deal. Als het daarin staat, weet je dat de Commissie ermee aan de slag gaat.

Het Europese presidentschap beïnvloedt ook welke onderwerpen kans maken en welke niet. Een president uit Malta zal tegen een vliegbelasting zijn.

L: Is tijd een struikelblok? J: Ja, Europa is langzaam. Het Europees parlement kan ermee weg gaan lopen. Het parlement gaat er lang over debatteren, dit kan zorgen dat de besluitvorming tergend langzaam wordt. Je verliest de controle over de agenda als dit proces te lang bij het Europees parlement ligt.

L: Hoe is de uitstoot van de luchtvaart gereguleerd in het Kyoto Protocol? J: Het Kyoto Protocol schrijft een plafond aan emissies voor aan landen. Hoe zij zich hieraan houden is aan de landen zelf. Er moest nog worden besloten hoe er om werd gegaan met internationale emissies, zoals die van de luchtvaart. De allocatie van deze emissies lag ingewikkeld. Het idee was dat als uitgevogeld was hoe dat zou moesten zouden die instrumenten daarvoor worden ontwikkeld. Daar was ook genoeg tijd voor, het Kyoto protocol ging in vanaf 2008.

Er zijn nooit doelen gesteld. Er is gepingpongt door ICAO, IATA. Als de doelen gesteld zijn, dan gaat ICAO de instrumenten verzinnen om die doelen te behalen. Die doelen zijn echter nooit gesteld. Daarom heeft de Europese Commissie na verloop van tijd daarom besloten het heft in eigen hand te nemen en de luchtvaart op te nemen in het EU ETS systeem. Europa wilde dit uitslaan naar een wereldwijd systeem, maar dit is te bot en direct gecommuniceerd. Daarom is er een handelsstrijd ontstaan voor buiten Europese vluchten. Die druk en dat gestengel heeft er wel toe geleid dat CORSIA nu op de agenda staat.

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L: Waarom is het verbod op kerosinebelasting nog steeds opgenomen in het Chicago verdrag? J: Omdat je niet wilt dat bijvoorbeeld Spanje ineens belasting gaat heffen, dat vluchten daar naartoe duurder worden, om de Spaanse staatskas te spekken. Daarnaast dient het geen CO2 doel naar mijn mening. Daarom moet het wel Europees geregeld worden, of mondiaal. De luchtvaartsector heeft wel veel vrijstellingen, en zou meer behandeld moeten worden als een gewone sector. De luchtvaart groeit heel snel, mede door al die vrijstellingen. Accijnzen en belastingen gaan naar de staatskas, dat vindt het ministerie van financiën wel interessant.

L: Waarom zet Nederland in op een Europese belasting, geen nationale? J: Een belasting benadeelt je economische positie ten opzicht van andere landen enorm. Er zijn andere, veel effectievere manieren om de uitstoot van de luchtvaart te beperken die al in Europa besproken worden. Die worden al in Europa behandeld, zoals het EU ETS. Ook ICAO is er al mee bezig, op een mondiaal niveau. Ik vind dus niet dat je een belasting moet invoeren. De prijzen omhoog gooien met het doel verduurzaming klopt niet. Je ziet het nu ook met corona, mensen werken op een andere manier, zijn gaan videobellen, luchtvaartmaatschappijen vliegen minder dus zetten alleen hun schonere vliegtuigen in. Dat leidt tot een echt effect. Met een heffing zet je jezelf als Nederland buitenspel in de Europese economie.

L: Bent u het eens met het statement van KLM dat zij moeten worden ontzien van verdere belastingen, omdat hun investeringen in groene initiatieven in gevaar komen? J: Ja, daar ben ik het wel mee eens. Dat luchtvaartmaatschappijen dan ook echt groen investeren moet dan wel worden vastgelegd. Dit kan niet op goed vertrouwen gedaan worden. Maar je ziet ook dat dit in andere sectoren ook gebeurt. De luchtvaart is ingewikkeld, de techniek achter vliegtuigen is ook enorm ingewikkeld. Het kost daarom ook meer tijd om de luchtvaart energieneutraal te maken. De elektriciteitsector kan misschien al rond 2025 energieneutraal zijn, de industrie rond 2050. Maar geef de luchtvaart iets langer, tot bijvoorbeeld 2070 om energieneutraal te worden. Zij kunnen bijvoorbeeld wel investeren in verduurzaming in andere sectoren, maar de techniek is simpelweg te ingewikkeld om zo snel energieneutraal te worden, en een belasting gaat daar niet bij helpen.

L: Wat is het effect van een economische recessie op beleid gericht op duurzaamheid? J: Dit kan positief en negatief zijn. In 2008 zag je dat de crisis gebruikt werd als argument om een nationale vliegbelasting af te schaffen in Nederland. Nu met corona zie je dat de aanleiding ook anders is. Zoals ik eerder al zei, zijn we op andere manieren gaan werken. Dit kan juist leiden tot een groene heropbouw van de economie. Neem Europa als voorbeeld. Misschien worden vergaderingen in Straatsburg wel online gedaan in het vervolg, om het milieu te sparen. Je moet er wel wat aan doen, je moet duurzaamheid op de agenda houden. Bijvoorbeeld Timmermans zegt, we klimmen uit deze crisis, maar we gaan het niet doen zoals vroeger, dit is een groene transitie. Het moet alleen niet allemaal duurder. Extra heffingen leiden niet tot meer milieuvriendelijk beleid. Zo denkt de DNB ook.

L: Staan CORSIA en EU ETS een vliegtuigbelasting in de weg? J: Ja, dit is dubbel belasten. Vliegen wordt al duurder door CORSIA en EU ETS.

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Appendix V: Coding interviews Agreement among Member States: 2 Chance for success, factor for actor participation: 2 Coalition agreement as the creation of a frame: 2 Competing policies at different institutions: 3 COVID-19, timing: 3 Cross border issue: 6 Double taxation: 2 Economic costs and benefits: 5 Framing as environmental issue: 7 Equality: 2 EU most ambitious and possible: 3 Focusing event: 2 Institutional barriers for not introducing new legislation: 2 Level playing field: 5 Mobilizing proponents: 6 Issue frame double taxation: 2 Political interest and willingness to act: 9

From coding the interviews, the frames of environment, economic costs and benefits and level playing field were mentioned the most. This aligns with the findings from the document analysis. The frequency of the codes is low, but this is largely due to the number of interviews. The interviews were held with experts. Proponents of a kerosene tax mentioned institutional barriers as a risk for the introduction of a kerosene tax, because of unanimous voting. Competing policies in the form of international measures and national taxes were mentioned as both an opportunity and as a threat for a European kerosene tax. Opponents of a European kerosene tax framed the tax as ineffective for reaching environmental goals, and stated that a tax leads to double taxation, due to the introduction of CORSIA and EU ETS.

The influence of COVID-19 on the agenda setting is great, according to experts. It mainly postpones the introduction of legislation, without changing the form.

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