AND WE’LL ALL BE FREE: THE ROLE OF THE PRESS IN THE INTEGRATION OF THE— ARMY ( 1947 1950 )

By

ALAN FRIED

A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

1994

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LIBRARIES ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

the of I came to this enterprise with a great desire to leam more about development race relations in the United States, U.S. military policies, the growth of government /press

relations and the processes and methods of historical research. I have learned much

all illuminated for about all these topics and I owe a great debt of thanks to those the way

Dr. David Ostroff, me. I would first like to thank the members of my dissertation committee,

Dr. William McKeen, Dr. Richard Scher, Dr. David Colburn and Dr. Robert Kendall. Each

contributed mightily to my understanding of the process of history and political science. I would especially like to thank those librarians who taught me where and how to look for information: Dolores Jenkins of the University of Florida, who obtained a microfilm set of of the Fahy Committee documents, and Will Mahoney of the Military History of the

National Archives in Washington, DC, and Dennis Bilger of the Harry S. Library,

Independence, , who were unstinting in their kindness and patience. I thank authors Richard Dalfiume, Morris MacGregor and Lee Nichols who first developed this

topic, I also thank the staffs of the Military History division of the Army War College in

Carlisle Barracks, the Wisconsin State Historical Society and the

Personal Manuscripts Division. I appreciate all those who put me up while I was doing research including Matthew and Sue Dodd of Marysville, Pennsylvania: Larry Ekin of

Mrs. of Independence Missouri; and my uncle and aunt, Washington, DC; Armand Helm ,

Adrian and Barbara Pelzner of Reston, Virginia. Finally, I thank my brother Arthur who taught me to revere history and who has always given my life an ethical balance and my parents Bernard and Anita Fried for virtually everything else. The good in this study comes from them; the errors are my own. 8

TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ii

ABSTRACT v CHAPTERS

1 THE ROLE OF PUBLICITY IN GOVERNMENT 1

Publicity and the Political Elite 4 A Brief Review of Military Desegregation 12 Notes 15

2 CIVIL RIGHTS, MILITARY REFORM AND THE TRUMAN PRESIDENCY 1

Civil Rights and the Truman Presidency 22 Military Reform and the Truman Presidency 45 Military Democratization through Unification 55 Truman and the Press 62 Notes 69

3 MILITARY POLICIES 80

Gillem Board 82 85 Kenneth Royall 94 108 J. Lawton Colins 121 Louis Johnson 127 Gordon Gray 133 Conclusions 137 Notes 138

4 A. PHILIP RANDOLPH AND THE COMMITTEE AGAINST JIM CROW IN THE ARMY 155

Randolph's Early Military Desegration Crusade ... 156 Desegregation of Umt 1 62 League for Non-Violent Civil Disobedience 170

Randolph's Influence in Military Desegregation ... 176 Notes 178

iii oagfl

5 THE FAHY COMMITTEE 183

Charles Fahy — 186 : ; Sengstacke and the Defender Tradition 188 First meeting 194 E. W. Kenworthy 201 Situation Analysis 203 Reaction to Johnson's April 6 Directive 207 Roy Davenport 210 Johnson's Second Directive 210 Johnson’s Usurpation 218 The Threat of Publicity 226 Notes 235

6 CONCLUSIONS 248

Why the Bureaucrats Substituted the Press for Public Opinion 252 How the Bureaucrats Viewed the Black Press 256 Acceptance of Truman's Mandate 257 Why Study the History of Press Access? 260 Notes 262 BIBLIOGRAPHY 263 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 277

IV Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University Of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

AND WE’LL ALL BE FREE: THE ROLE OF THE PRESS IN THE INTEGRATION OF THE (1947—1950)

by

Alan Fried

April 1994

Chairman, Dr. David Ostroff Major Department: Mass Communications

When President Harry S. Truman convened the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services in 1949, he directed their work be done with a minimum of publicity. Consistently, however, the committee and their counterparts in the United States Army used press exposure and, more importantly, the threat of press exposure to gain political advantage. Surprisingly, a number of the key players in this incident, including the Executive Secretary of the committee and a committee member, were journalists; thus, members of the press were responsible for management of

government—press relations. By examining the history of the presidential

directive to racially integrate the United States Army, we can g£ n a fresh

understanding of how publicity shapes and influences policy-making.

v CHAPTER 1

THE ROLE OF PUBLICITY IN GOVERNMENT

of the In 1959, Douglass Cater identified a trend that might be one hallmarks of American political life in the last half of the twentieth century. “We have today what might be called government by publicity,” Cater wrote. He saw the influence of publicity growing as mass communications and public opinion

polling expanded into every phase of American life. Cater identified this trend as

a force uniquely indispensable to the American system in which 'public opinion' is called on daily to arbitrate between the two competing branches of government supposedly separate and coordinate what called the 'literary theory' of our Constitution. 1

Communication scholars tend to agree with Cater and with Dan

Nimmo who said that information-dispensing by government usually serves some

political purpose. Governmental bodies craft promotional messages to explain and

to justify their policies; they then transmit them to individual citizens and interest

groups. 2 Within the environment of separate powers, a marketplace of ideas

operates to allow competitive public explanations of policy to vie with other

explanations. As the first recipient of public information, the press has become a

kind of citizen's procurator discriminating among the many messages. In doing this

work, the press has become more than a countervailing fourth estate of

noted, the government; it has become a separate public unto itself. As Cater has

1 2

creative power of government publicity lies in its facility for using the press to short-cut the classic ways of democracy. Cater wrote,

In an age of complex and fast-breaking events, the measurement of publicity comes to be taken as a cheap and convenient substitute for public opinion. For the politician and the bureaucrat the headline inch frequently serves as the day-to-day measure of public opinion on a great number of issues. By their responses to this synthetic public opinion, they stimulate further publicity and so commence a reflexive cycle that has been known to move news stories from the inside to the front page and to reshape policies as surely as if 3 public opinion had exerted its sovereign will.

To test eater's thesis that the expediency of publicity drives (and perhaps, obstructs) policymaking, we have decided to examine the extent to which these processes are peculiar to the “age of complex and fast-breaking events." For this analysis, we need to wrest the process from its contemporary connotations. We are still defining the policymaking process in a very traditional way, but we are suggesting that the disposition of that process has changed.

That is, operationally, we would accept any view of the process that includes (a) problem identification, (b) the formulation, legitimation and appropriation that comprise program development, (c) program implementation, (d) program

4 evaluation and (e) program termination. The distinction that we are making is that this process has run differently since the television-age.

Much of the academic literature about the effects of publicity on policy- making has naturally focused on events that occurred after 1960. President John

Kennedy’s abilities as a telegenic communicator and the graphic, public quality of his assassination have forever transformed the media. Relatively recent events such as the 1960s Civil Rights crusades, the Viet Nam War and the Watergate affair, and the events that have occurred in their aftermath were also powerful natural lodestones attracting the eye of the video camera and the attention of most 3

have, to political scientists and communication scholars. Yet these dramatic events some extent, obscured our understanding of the govemment/publicity process.

Robert Entman argues that federal policymakers were better able to

glaring resolve difficult matters internally, within the Washington system, before the concentration of intrusive and judgmental news coverage imposed an extra layer of strategic complexity on their decisions:

Presidents and legislators could concentrate more on selling the party elite and local activists, who understood the complexity of policy choice and resisted the demagogic manipulation by the opposing party. Public opinion

(perceived or actual) would tag along or not . . . Because of the media, elites may be more attentive than ever to what they perceive as public opinion. Before the television age, back when political parties held more power, a president's image beyond the Potomac could be less favorable than his professional reputation in Washington and he could still dominate the Washington power game. Now, maintaining that situation is more

difficult. Now, even if the public is not always tuned in, politicians behave and actual as if they are. Managing media impressions to bolster perceived public support has become one of the central tasks of presidents and other 5 politicians .

Entman’s conception helps to narrow the focus of this inquiry both in time

and in effect. To understand the consequences of publicity on policy-making, we

need to examine incidents that occurred before television poked its disruptive eye

into the political process. If Entman is right, the publicity machine has most affected

the activities of the elite. Whether for good or for ill, this new sensitivity by the

elites to publicity may have changed the spirit of decision-making in our pluralistic

society. To see if this true, we need to examine how elite policymakers functioned

without publicity, or better yet, how they functioned when publicity was not as

problematic. 4

Publicity and the Political Elite

Ever since Katz and Lazarsfeld theorized the existence of a two-step flow

6 the political elite have usually been seen as an intermediary in communication , between the information generated by the mass media and the public at large.

Although researchers have clearly articulated and proven empirically that a two- step flow of communications occurs in many situations, they have been less clear in how they define elite. We would adopt V.O. Key’s definition, “That thin stratum of persons referred to variously as the political elite, the political activists, the leadership echelons or the influentials .” 7 Although economic status may be a determinant of who is, and is not, a member of the elite, Bernard Hennessy said

on most matters of public concern, the relations between the economic and the political are much too subtle to be captured by any determinist prescription, and much interwoven by other social and psychological forces. 8

Perhaps Hennesy describes it best when he suggests that political elites

are those whose opinions matter. Thus, opinion leaders care more intensely about

the ends and means of public policy and hold their opinions with greater

9 articulateness, self-consciousness and with greater persistence. Where Entman

differs from these scholars is in his perspective; he sees the media as an

impediment to the good works of these elites.

The notion that elites depend upon the media to mirror popular opinion has been

widely accepted. 10 The structure and function of this feedback phase of the two-step

flow between the media and the elite has been well analyzed. For example, Doris Graber

has investigated how the media affects decision-making:

Publicity may narrow the policy choices available to public officials. It may engender action when no action may have taken place otherwise. 5

Alternatively by mobilizing hostile public or interest opinions, it may 11 force a halt to ongoing or projected policies.

We contend that much of the current analysis may be based on

misapprehensions and symbolic projection. If the political elite do rely on the media as the voice of the people, they probably have false notions of its representativeness. J. David

Kennemar notes that elites often use the news media as a surrogate for public opinion

although there is no scientific evidence that the news reflects anything more than one

measure of the popular agenda. In deriving this insight, these elites use no systematic

means to shape these perceptions. In holding these unwarranted assumptions, they

12 exhibit a high degree of pluralistic ignorance.

Samuel Kemell blames the intrusion of the press into the affairs of policymakers for

creating a sea-change in our notions of pluralism. He argues that modem politicians are

caught between the structure of institutionalized and individualized pluralism, where the

former is characterized by stable bargaining of allocated resources by a network of

coalitions based on long-term loyalties and where the latter is characterized by

independent new traders more interested in short term successes. The second political

milieu is also distinguished by greater communication from Washington to the rest of the

country. Public opinion counts for more today because Washington elites are necessarily

13 more sensitive to public and press opinion.

Walter Lippmann saw the dangers of this division in the early 1950s. He wrote,

The press is no substitute for institutions. It is like the beam of a searchlight that moves restlessly about, bringing one episode then another out of the darkness into vision. Men cannot do the work of the world by this light alone. They cannot govern society by episodes, incidents and eruptions. It is only when they work by a steady light of their own, that the press, when turned upon them, reveals a situation intelligible enough for a popular decision. It lies in social organization based on a system of analysis and record, and in all the corollaries of that principle; in the abandonment of the theory in the decentralization of decision, in of the omnicompetent citizen , 14 the coordination of decision by comparable record and analysis .

Thus, we see how the introduction of publicity has been seen as an

or obstruction to some policymaking activities of the elite. Indeed, whether for good

of pluralism in the democratic ill, the media may have altered the very essence process. We have also seen that the elite have become ever more sensitive to the media as a surrogate for public opinion.

in the Our intention in this paper is to examine the role publicity played policy-making process before the media glare had so thoroughly irradiated government. We have chosen to study a time when media scrutiny was a bit less

intense, but a time when the relationship between elite policymakers and the

press was just as adversarial as it is today. Using a particular event as a

useful guidepost, we will examine how the process works when publicity is not a

expedient for decision-makers.

Publicity and Policy-Making in the Truman Era

To provide a new perspective on the origins of the relationship between

the press and government, we have chosen to examine the significance of press

coverage in an issue that transpired during the administration of President Harry

Truman. We will examine the relationship between the press and government in

the racial desegregation of the United States Army. In this study, we explain how

Truman's efforts to enlarge public support for desegregation fit within the context of

his campaign to reform the post-war defense establishment.

for It is important to remember that Truman was trying to build a mandate

civil rights legislation when the ground was not particularly fertile for this

development. For this reason, he did not shine the brightest light on his civil rights

reforms. He tried to take the focus from the controversy rather than making a 7

players in the political football of it. As will be seen, Truman, and the other incident, often tried to manage the press and government to their own best advantage. As part of this effort, the President’s Committee, the Army and the

recognize and to leading civil rights organizations all appointed former journalists to

control publicity-sensitive issues. In respect to the management of publicity and to

the ethical issues involved when journalists join government, and in the interplay

between these two issues, the achievements of President Harry Truman’s

Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the United States Armed

Services provide an interesting window of analysis.

There has been precious little written about the role of the press in

policymaking during the Truman era. Indeed as late as the 1970s, the history of the

Truman administration went largely unmined. 15 Through the next two decades,

some rich veins of study have been excavated. Most of Truman's biographers,

including McCullough, Ross, Phillips and Steinberg regard the role that civil rights

played in the 1 948 presidential campaign and in his dealings with Southern

Democrats in Congress as crucial to his presidency; they count his vocal

commitment to racial progress as one of his primary achievements. Although

scholars such as Berman, McCoy and Ruetten, Hamby, Sitkoff, Longaker and

Leuchtenberg have lavished attention on Truman's influence in propelling racial

reform, they each have treated military desegregation as a relatively minor

component within the broad sweep of the movement for political enfranchisement

and social integration.

While these civil rights historians analyzed the efforts of black leaders and

white liberals to influence Truman, they did not focus on changes in the military.

Conversely, those few historians who have examined Truman’s role in reforming

the American military such as Borklund, Hammond and Haynes have spent more 8

time examining the creation of the National Security Act than military desegregation.

Finally, those few scholars who have concentrated directly upon military desegregation have, to some extent, reduced Truman’s role to that of a catalyst.

Scholars such as Dalfiume, Nalty and MacGregor have not considered methods that Truman employed to create a positive climate for change.

In this study, we will also look beyond the to focus on how segregationists in the United States Army used information control techniques to delay and derail the Truman Administration effort to desegregate that institution.

Then we will show how civil rights proponents built support for reform among

certain select constituencies, notably and white liberals and

moderates. We will show how the President’s Committee and their allies in the

Truman White House served as intermediaries between these groups.

Elites and the Military Command Structure

By selecting the military command structure as one focal point of our

inquiry, we eliminate one serious definitional uncertainty; elites are easily identified

in the U.S. Armed Services hierarchy. Truman knew that he had to win over the

political elites in his own party, the industrialists and others whose labor policies

would change with military desegregation, and most important, the liberals whose

support he desired to help energize reform. But first, he needed to convince the

military leaders. As Juergen A. Heise has noted, even among military public

information officers, the commanding officer remains the focal point because the

authority structure emphasizes hierarchy to ensure uniform, central direction in

combat situations. Heise says the commander or other head of the organizational

16 unit is a significant factor, particularly in the way bad news is handled . When

the Defense Department was first being formed by Truman, there were few unified 9

policy-coordinating and disseminating mechanisms. Congress mandated that the

Secretary’s staff be small. Individual Service Secretaries often took it upon themselves to articulate administration policy themselves instead of relying on the

Defense Secretary staff. Often, these secretaries took a different line than the one promulgated by the Secretary of Defense. This confusion led to individual politicking and publicizing by the individual Secretaries and their subordinates.

Thus, disunity became a critical factor in the formulation of the military’s racial policies.

With less top-down direction, the personal opinions of individual public information officers, who presented specific policy-messages and provide publicity for the Armed Services, became more visible than they might have been

of in a more formal operation. Steven Chaffee and Michael Petrick have written the

17 special problems of military public information officers . The military values secrecy above disclosure, Chaffee and Petrick found, while the press has reversed values. The military PIO is somewhat marginalized and distrusted by

18 desegregation as one both worlds . In this paper, we will examine Army instance in which the expansion of the public and the isolation of the press and professional public information officer corps proved worthwhile.

How Public Information Officers Exercise Their Authority

Ostensibly, official Washington is primarily composed of public officials

who tell the citizen what government is doing. These people, who serve in

publicity offices of administrative agencies, make up one set of pivotal political

communicators—the communicators of messages that have consequences in the

19 activation, shaping and articulation of public opinion. In reality, the information officer is often less a servant to the public or the press than to his or her own organization. The information officer is an administrative specialist, skilled in the

employment and manipulation of symbols. Their expertise lies in mastery of the

means of distribution which will make the audience aware of the agency's

information policies and which will give a rationale for binding the citizen to the

20 program in the spirit of loyalty.

To govern a populace that is often inattentive, skeptical, fickle and

contradictory in its desires, governments have used a wide range of methods to

gamer positive support. From these, George Edwards has labeled two streams of

effort, information control and traditional public relations techniques. Edwards

identifies information control as (a) withholding information, (b) deemphasis, (c)

collection, i.e., controlling publication of statistical reports, (d) timing announcements

to hide bad news, (e) obfuscating and prevarication. Edwards contrasts these

methods with proactive techniques of (a) public information, (b) media events, (c)

21 interpretation and (d) the discrediting and (e) drowning out of the opposition.

Our aim in this paper is to merely recognize these practices as they occurred in the

desegregation of the military; it is not our intention to individually evaluate the

effectiveness nor the moral legitimacy of these forms of manipulation.

Nimmo cites three concurrent causes for the growth of informational

agencies in government. From these causes, he derives a functional set of

behaviors that circumscribe PIO responsibilities:

in for explanations to fill the gulf between policy (1. ) an increase the necessity

application by the administrator and policy acceptance by the citizen. interests. (2.) an increase in the need for promotion of departmental or agency

Governmental officials recognizing the phenomenon of publicity must choose informational messages that promote an effective framework for truth and need specialized separate organizational arrangements to effectively conduct them.

(3.) Communications through mass media are complex and require specialists who have mastered the techniques necessary to formulate messages and win prominent news space. Agencies need technocrats who speak the language both

22 of the government and of the news media.

One advocate for the division the politics and civil service was J. A. R.

Pimlott who saw it, more broadly, as an essentially positive protection for

democracy. The want of clear demarcation between the politician and the civil

servant in the organization of the executive branch thus explains much of the

public relations of the federal government,” Pimlott wrote. Pimlott established a

simple code of conduct: The first objective should be to facilitate the dissemination

of information by the mass media, and the information services should directly

inform the public only when the mass media fail to do so adequately.

Consequences of the Role of the Public Information Officer

Throughout the entire Federal bureaucracy, the growth of a professional

public information staff has resulted in a subtle shift in the power to define and the

power to legitimize the privatization of conflict within the purview of good

governance. By conjuring up a wall between public administration and the political

process, the creation of the public information officer did more than legitimize the

power of the office-holder. This invention removed the process of administration

from general public discourse and spread accountability for the product of

administration (number of roads built, taxes collected, etc.) to the several users 12

and other interested parties. The creation of the public information service created a separate corporate culture of insiders who would create, administer, and/or influence the creation and administration of policy; this policy elite would adopt a unique relationship with the press. Power has been redistributed in this

relationship so that the press, elite policymakers and the public information officer sometimes see each other as adversaries and sometimes seek to engage each

other as allies.

Some conservative analysts, such as Spiro Agnew and Patrick Buchanan,

have said that the press and government relationship has become more corrosive

since the early days of the . They discount the positive effect that the

expansion (and contraction) of the public has had on leadership. They argue that

to view governance as anything other than an adversarial process is to create a

23 it both dangerous illusion . Others, notably Graber, Nimmo and Rivers, see as

24 symbiotic and adversarial at the same time . In this paper, we will offer up a

situation in which public disclosure was seen by liberals as an impediment to

social progress.

A Brief Review of Military Desegregation

Events that led to the desegregation of the military were complex. To better

understand the extent to which the press influenced these events, the reader may

need to become familiar with some important historical milestones. During World

War I, African Americans accepted civil rights leader W.E.B. DuBois’s dictum to

“close ranks " and delay their demands for equality and justice until after the war;

they were not as tractable when the Second World War broke out. Though the

Roosevelt administration half-heartedly tried to muzzle the Black press, some

vocal protests by Black leaders in the military and in the nascent civil rights community resulted in some small experiments with integration of troops toward the war’s conclusion. In the immediate postwar period, A. Philip Randolph, the

Congress of Racial Equality and other desegregationists tried to build on these reforms but were thwarted by a clique of influential officers and civilians in the defense establishment who upheld the racial status quo on the grounds that most white servicemen would violently resist integration and that the military should not lead social reform. These officers tried to reimpose rigid segregation policies through the use of enlistment quotas while they promised reform and improvement; ultimately, this constituted a retreat from gains made at the end of the war.

At virtually the same time that these regressive policies were being

imposed in the military, white Southern segregationists began a reign of terror

against returning Black veterans. Also, at this time, Democratic party strategists

began to recognize the importance of the African American electorate to their

coalition. In 1947, Truman appointed a President’s Committee on Civil Rights.

Their final report found military segregation “particularly repugnant”; immediate

action to end it was recommended.

This combination of events elevated civil rights to a major political issue in

the 1948 presidential election campaign. Truman focused on military segregation as

an important symbol of his independence in a special message to Congress on

Civil Rights in February 1 948. But still the services resisted and civil rights activist

A. Phillip Randolph threatened to lead civil disobedience resistance against the

new draft law unless segregation was ended. To strengthen his political support

from black voters, Truman issued which established the

President’s Committee on Equality of T reatment and Opportunity in the Armed

Services. On the day of that announcement, Army Chief of Staff Omar Bradley

told a press conference, in effect, that the Army would never desegregate before 14

the rest of the nation did. In the wake of Bradley’s statement, Bradley’s staff and an Army Public Relations consultant tried to articulate a policy separate from that of the Commander in Chief; after their effort proved unworkable, this act of resistance was quickly abandoned.

The Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity first met in

publicity to January 1 949. President Truman exhorted the members to avoid and seek true compliance from the service secretaries. The committee was chaired by former solicitor general Charles H. Fahy and its active members included John

Sengstacke, Publisher of . The Executive Secretary, E.W.

(Ned) Kenworthy was also a journalist and his inside knowledge of the press

proved a critical factor in the Committee’s success. Within two months, Secretary

of Defense James Forrestal, a gradualist on racial matters, quit his post for health

reasons and was replaced by Louis Johnson. Johnson eventually was

overwhelmed by interservice rivalries over scandals and other matters and

weakened on the race issue as the Army bitterly resisted change.

During the next year, a series of acrimonious negotiations transpired

between the Committee and the Army, with the Army’s leadership intent upon

wearing down or outmaneuvering the committee and forcing the administration to

accept less than full integration. The committee countered with documented

arguments demonstrating that segregated military units inevitably wasted

resources and prevented equal opportunity. Finally, the Secretary of the Army

issued a new policy stipulating that blacks would be utilized according to their

skills. A cabal of top Army officers attempted to rescind the Secretary’s order but

their plan was exposed by Kenworthy who, in subtle defiance of Truman’s

appeal to avoid publicity, brought evidence of the rescission attempt tc the

Washington Post. This imbroglio and the Committee’s steadfast resolve brought the Army Secretary to the Committee’s side. After some final negotiations, Truman was able to persuade the Secretary of the Army to eliminate a 1 0 percent quota on black enlistments and to facilitate desegregation.

From even this brief description, it is clear that we believe that the press and publicity were important factors for the President’s Committee, the military and

President Truman. Keeping in mind the larger question of the role publicity plays in a policy-making process, we will investigate the core question: How, if at all, did the press inform the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and

Opportunity in the Armed Services? Chapter two will contrast how Truman used

his Presidential power to create committees to enlarge public support for

desegregation and to institute that change he required. Chapter three describes

how the same American military leaders who helped craft or obstruct military

desegregation often implemented their policy by empowering their officers to

control publicity. Chapter four describes how some civil rights leaders used the

expansion of the public through publicity to shape policy. Chapter five explains

why Truman felt compelled to institute press curbs to facilitate desegregation and

why the President’s Committee on Equality felt equally compelled to openly defy

Truman's press curbs as well and surreptitiously challenge the President's press

rejoins. In the concluding chapter, we will discuss the degree to which this incident

may help explain the role of the press in the governance of presidential

commissions. Through the example, we will also examine what may occur when

journalists become policy-makers and, specifically, how they may affect the

management of publicity and news coverage.

Notes 1 Douglass Cater (1959) The Fourth Branch of Government . Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, p. 10.

2 Dan Nimmo, (1964) News gathering In Washington. New York: Atherton, p. 7.

3 Cater pp. 12-13.

4 See for instance Charles O. Jones (1977) An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy. Nova Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press; Charles E. Lindblom, (1968) The Policy-Making Process. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, David Easton (1965) A Framework for Political Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

5 Robert M. Entman, (1989) Democracy without Citizens: Media and the Decay of

American Politics . New York: Oxford University Press.

6 Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld, (1955) Personal Influence: The Part Plaved bv People in the Flow of Mass Communication. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press of Glencoe.

7 V.O.Key, Jr. (1967) Public Opinion and American Democracy. New York: Knopf, p.537.

8 Bernard C. Hennessy (1975) Public Opinion . Nova Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press, p.221.

9 Hennessy, p.314.

As early as 1937, the idea was a matter of controversy . Cf. Floyd Allport, (1937) “Toward a Science of Public Opinion,” The Public Opinion Quarterly, pp. 7-23; Benjamin I. Page, Robert Y. Shapiro and Glenn Dempsey, (1990) “What

Moves Public Opinion,” in Media Power in Politics . Washington. D.C.:

Congressional Quarterly, p. 1 14 ; Elisabeth Noelle Neumann, (1980) “Mass Media and Social Change in Developed Societies,” in Mass Communication Review

Yearbook Vol. 1 ed. G. Cleveland Wilhoit and Harold de Bock Beverly Hills Sage : Daniel Hallin (1984) “The Media, The War in Viet Nam and Political Support: A

Critique of the Thesis of an Oppositional Media” Journal of Politics 46:2-24 ; Herbert McCloskey and John Zaller (1984)“The Public Ethos: American attitudes toward Capitalism and Democracy” Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard

University Press .

11 Doris Graber, 1990) Media Power in Politics Washington, D.C. : Congressional

Quarterly ,p. 287.

12 J. David Kennamer (1992) Public Opinion, the Press and Public Policy .

Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, p. 11. 13 Kernell, p.197-199.

1 4 Walter Lippmann, “Newspapers” from Public Opinion. New York: MacMillan Publishing Company 1950.

15 Richard Kirkendall, ed.(1974) The Truman Period As a Research Field: A Reappraisal. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press.

16 Although Heise was unable to quantify the extent to which material is censored because it would tarnish the reputation of and its members, he notes that maintaining the best interests of the Defense Department has long been a cultural value of the department.

Juergen Arthur Heise, (1979) Minimum Disclosure: How the Pentagon

Manipulates the News . New York: W. W. Norton.

17 Steven H. Chaffee and Michael Petrick, (1975) “The military and its public” in Using the Mass Media. New York: MacMillan & Company, p. 92.

^Chaffee and Petrick, (1975) p. 96.

19 Nimmo, p. 6.

70 Nimmo, p. 20.

21 George C. Edwards (1983) The Public Presidency: The Pursuit of Popular Support. New York: St. Martin's Press.

22 Nimmo, p. 10-11.

23 John B. Donovan (1975) “Mass Communications and the Adversary Establishment,” Intellect May- June 1975 Volume 11: p. 525.

24 Graber , p. 288; Nimmo, p.2 11; William Rivers, (1970) The Adversaries Boston: Beacon Press pp. 101-102. CHAPTER 2

CIVIL RIGHTS, MILITARY REFORM AND THE TRUMAN PRESIDENCY

Harry Truman's penchant for reform, be it civil rights reform or military reform, was engendered by very personal impulses. He was also motivated by traditional political needs. Before we examine how racial desegregation became identified with his campaign to reform the post-war defense establishment, we need to examine Truman’s personal perceptions of the racial issue and the role that the African American electorate played in Truman's early political career and in his campaign for re-election to the presidency in 1948.

After that, we will review how racial desegregation fit into Truman's broader vision of military democratization.

Those who knew Truman as a boy would certainly have been surprised that he would become the first twentieth century president to aggressively advocate civil rights. All four of his grandparents were Kentucky slave owners who brought their slaves with them when they migrated to Missouri. He grew up

detesting abolitionists and Reconstruction. Throughout his entire life, even after

he established his credentials as an advocate of civil rights, he casually used

the word “Nigger” to describe African Americans. 1

Before becoming President, Truman had few dealings with African

Americans, although he received support from black voters as a state judge and

U.S. Senator. Truman’s first notion of the need to desegregate the military may

have started during World War I when he gained first-hand knowledge of the

battle-worthiness of African American troops. He found that the integrated and

18 19

French-led 93rd Negro Division served with distinction, but the 92nd, led by

Americans and segregated, did not measure up in combat. Truman told reporter Lee Nichols that he studied the record after the war and concluded that non-segregation was the only way in which ability and training were the sole basis for selecting leaders. 2

When Truman ran for local office in 1924, the Kansas City Chapter for the

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) refused to endorse him, because he had briefly been affiliated with the Ku Klux Klan

(KKK). 3 Nonetheless, Truman received strong support from African Americans who lived in Jackson County for his 1926 campaign for judge as a result of his

alliance with the Tom Pendergast machine. 4 He also received crucial support from the black electorate for his 1934 Senate campaign. 5 Yet, during his first

6 term in the Senate, Truman's civil rights record was meager.

Truman's chances for reelection in 1940 were diminished because he

lost the support of Pendergast and Franklin Roosevelt (who refused to endorse

him because he privately preferred Governor Lloyd Stark for the seat). 7 In the

1940 campaign, Truman made moderately progressive speeches when he told

voters and members of the National Colored Democratic Club that while he was

not appealing for social equality, Negroes could not be denied their inalienable

constitutional rights. He closed that speech by noting that African Americans

had served their nation in the Spanish-American War at Guasimas, El Caney

and San Juan Hill. Speaking of the (first) World War, Truman noted that

General John J. Pershing had said, “I cannot commend too highly the spirit

shown among the colored combat troops who exhibit fine capacity for the most

dangerous work.” For this effort, Truman received strong organized support

among blacks in St. Louis and Kansas City and the local black newspaper, the 20

Kansas City Call. 8 Though many of the state’s leading newspapers opposed him, Truman won the three-way primary race on the basis of that support. 9

In terms of civil rights, Truman’s second Senate term was a bit more distinguished. He gave unqualified support to the Roosevelt Administration’s

Fair Employment Practices Commission; he recommended a combat command for General Benjamin Davis; he supported filibuster cloture on the poll tax. Most important, he supported a resolution that would have provided for an investigation of segregation in the armed services. Yet, he also opposed an anti-poll tax amendment to the soldier’s vote bill for national elections. This bill effectively enfranchised thousands of African American soldiers who were

10 denied the vote in their home state.

Perhaps the most noteworthy achievement of Truman’s second term in the Senate was his chairmanship of the Special Senate Committee to

Investigate the National Defense Program. While not directly related to civil rights, per se, this committee brought Truman national prestige. Because of his good stewardship of this committee, Franklin Roosevelt decided to nominate

Truman as his vice-president in 1944. The threat of American involvement in war was an important issue in Truman’s 1940 reelection campaign. After winning back his Senate seat, Truman responded to numerous rumors of military waste by conducting his own investigation of many defense plants, military camps and related military projects. He traveled more than thirty- thousand miles, in his own car, from to Florida, across the Gulf Coast to Texas, northward to Oklahoma and to Wisconsin and Michigan and then back to Washington.

In February 1941, he addressed the Senate denouncing methods for awarding defense contracts, condemning the concentration of these awards among a few large manufacturers and citing several abuses by corporations, 21

especially cost-plus contracts. Truman proposed that a five-member committee investigate the national defense program. 11

Franklin Roosevelt, upon the counsel of Senator James F. Byrnes (D-

South Carolina), decided to support the committee with Truman as its chairman.

After some infighting, Truman was named to head a bipartisan, seven-member

Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program. Truman

showed surprising independence and political skill in the committee. During its four years of existence, Truman’s Committee saved the nation $1 5-billion while

spending about $400,000 for expenses. 12

Not only did this ad hoc committee provide Truman with national

prominence, but it would later provide a strong rationale for his military

modernization program. As will be seen, Truman’s desegregation committee

also based its ultimate argument for racial desegregation of the military upon

efficiency and not the justness of the cause. 13

During the Special Defense Investigation, a minor flap erupted involving

racial discrimination in defense industries. NAACP president Walter White

accused Truman of calling for premature hearings before the civil rights groups

could share their evidence. In seeming deference to the complaint, but really to

avoid the issue, Truman agreed to table the issue. In effect, they agreed to hear

the issue but refused to act. 14

When Roosevelt nominated Truman as his vice-president, the

Missourian’s Senate record disturbed liberals and the African American

community. In part, they denounced the removal of Henry Wallace from the

post. Traditionally black newspapers were especially disapproving.

The Norfolk Journal and Guide wrote, “Senator Truman ij a conservative

Democrat, who, it appears, was given the nomination for Vice Presidency for

reasons of political expediency.” The Pittsburgh Courier said that “Truman is a 22 long way from being a Henry Wallace whose nomination was an ‘appeasement of the South’ which must rank in cowardice and shortsightedness with the ineptitude shown by Chamberlin at Munich .” 15

To reassure the African American community, Truman consented to an interview with the largest circulation black daily. Interestingly, his thoughts revolved around the issue of military desegregation:

I have always been for equality of opportunity in work,

working conditions and political rights. I think the Negro in the armed forces ought to have the same treatment and opportunities as

every other member of the armed forces. I think this should be true

of Negro women in the armed forces ... I have a record for fair play 16 toward my Negro fellow citizens that will stand examination.

Although the nomination of Truman cost the Democratic ticket the endorsement of W. E. B. DuBois, Dr. Channing Tobias, William Hastie and

Charles Johnson, the vote from the black community in eight non-southern

17 states helped guarantee their victory .

Civil Rights and the Truman Presidency

When Truman became President less than a year later, he found black reporters were prominent among his press entourage. At his first Presidential press conference, the Washington bureau chief of the Chicago Defender, Harry

McAlpin asked 18 ,

Mr. President, probably as much as any group, the passing of President Roosevelt is very keenly felt by the Negroes in America, as they looked upon him as sort of a symbol of justice and equal

opportunity. I wonder if you would comment on the things that they were so specifically interested in and felt they knew where the President stood: on the fair employment practice, the right to vote without being hampered by poll taxes, and all that? .

23

Truman replied, “I will give you some advice. All you need to do is read the Senate record of one Harry S. Truman.”19

The black press and black people in general afforded Truman some allowance during his first year in office, much as the Caucasian community did.

Truman’s first year as President was, nonetheless, an unfulfilled one regarding civil rights. Although he had made some efforts for continuing the Fair

20 Employment Practices Commission, little else occurred.

The most crucial turning point in Truman’s racial policies occurred in

1946 when Southern whites attacked black veterans. Similar incidents occurred in 1940 when African Americans from the North were bivouacked in

Southern Army camps. Yet, where Roosevelt equivocated, Truman acted. 21

The most dramatic incident occurred on 13 February 1946, when a newly discharged black veteran, Isaac Woodward, was removed from a bus and blinded by the chief of police of Batesburg, South Carolina. Significantly,

Woodward was still wearing his uniform. The police chief escaped federal prosecution in a Columbia, South Carolina, federal court on grounds of self- defense. Barely a week later, in Columbia, Tennessee, the Ku Klux Klan, the local police and the National Guard conducted a reign of terror against that town’s black community. On 25 July 1946, a Klan-inspired Caucasian mob shot two black couples to death. These presumed killers were also later acquitted of the charge. 22

When he learned how much hate literature, minor acts of mob violence and other turmoil was occurring throughout the nation, Truman exclaimed, “My

God! I had no idea that it was as terrible as that! We have to do something . .

Everybody seems to believe that the President by himself can do anything he wishes on such matters as this, but the President is helpless unless he is backed by public opinion.”23 Truman reacted by ordering the President’s 24

Committee on Civil Rights to preserve and implement new civil rights

legislation. A more extensive analysis of this committee appears later in this

chapter. 24

Truman’s Civil Rights Speeches

Along with the Committee on Civil Rights, Truman won the respect of

much of the African American community for some of the most impassioned civil

rights speeches ever made by a United States President. Truman’s economic

message to Congress, in which he called for enactment of FEPC legislation,

stirred concern among Southern Democrats. Calling discrimination “repugnant

to the principles of our democracy,” Truman asked for an end to inequities in

25 employment and wages .

Six months later, Truman was the first President to address the NAACP.

He made the speech following his , in which he made the case

for broader American involvement in international affairs. Truman’s advisors

recommended that he devote less than a minute to the civil rights issue.

Instead, he eloquently committed the federal government to the cause.

Speaking in front of the Lincoln Memorial with Eleanor Roosevelt, Senator

Wayne Morse and Walter White at his side, Truman said,

We must keep moving forward with new concepts of civil rights to safeguard our heritage. The extension of civil rights today means, not protection of the people against the government, but protection of the people by the government. We must make the Federal Government a friendly, vigilant defender of the rights and

equalities of all Americans . . . There is much that state and local governments can do in providing positive safeguards for civil rights. But we cannot, any longer await the growth of a will to action in the slowest state or the most backward community. Our national government must show the way. This is a difficult and complex undertaking. Federal laws and administrative machinery must be improved and expanded. Our immediate task is to remove the last remnants of the barriers which stands between millions of our citizens and their .

25

birthright ... We cannot wait another decade or another generation to remedy these evils. We must work as never before to cure them now. The aftermath of the war and the desire to keep faith with our Nation’s historic principles makes the need of a

pressing one . . Every man should be free to live his life as he wishes. He should be limited only by his responsibility to his fellow

countrymen. If this freedom is to be more than a dream, each man must be guaranteed equality of opportunity. The only limit to an American’s achievement should be his ability, his industry and his character. 26

The reaction to this speech in the black community was electrifying.

While the Afro-American wanted good words backed up by good deeds, Truman received strong support from the Kansas City Call which declared Truman had “left behind him Missouri’s tradition of second-class citizenship for Negroes.” The Pittsburgh Courier, traditionally reticent to support a Democrat, wrote that Truman, “where colored Americans are concerned, is

looming, on the record, to greater stature than his predecessor.” The speech naturally also won strong support from Walter White and the NAACP. They called the speech, “the most comprehensive and forthright statement on the

rights of minorities of a democracy . . . ever made by a President of the United

States.”27

Civil Rights and the 1948 Presidential Campaign

The Republicans capitalized on mounting and labor unrest to

become the majority in the 1946 congressional election. To prevent a defeat in

1948 and to revitalize the Democratic party, a group of liberals devised a coherent political program appealing to labor and the urban minorities. 28 In mid-November 1947, Clark Clifford, the group’s White House liaison, delivered to Truman a forty-page memorandum dealing expressly with the issues and personalities of the 1948 campaign. They predicted: (1) Governor Thomas 26

Dewey of New York would probably be the Republican presidential candidate;

(2) Henry Wallace would run as a third-party candidate and would draw five to

ten percent of the vote in a few "key states which could throw the election to the

Republicans"; and (3) the South, as always, could be "considered safely

Democratic." They urged Truman to “go as far as he feels he possibly could in

recommending measures to protect the rights of minority groups,” adding that

even if we had “difficulty with our Southern friends, that is the lesser of two

evils.” The Clifford memorandum predicted that a liberal domestic program

could revitalize the Roosevelt political coalition while minimizing the defection

of voters to Henry Wallace on a third-party ticket. They warned Truman that he

should make farmers their first priority, that labor and African Americans would

be especially vulnerable to Wallace’s appeals, and that the New York vote

depended upon Jewish voters concerned with Palestine. 29 On this basis,

Truman decided to submit a presidential message on civil rights to Congress

after the State of the Union address he delivered on 7 January 1948. 30

While Clark Clifford wrote the President’s speech, other White House

staff members and Justice Department officials fashioned an omnibus civil

rights bill to complement the presidential message. 31 Even before the

administration sent its civil rights message and legislative recommendations to

Congress, Henry Wallace published his own seventy-four-point program,

including demands for anti-poll tax, anti-lynching, and FEPC legislation 32

Two days later, Mississippi Governor Fielding J. Wright announced his

opposition to federal action “aimed to wreck” the South and its institutions.

“Vital principles and eternal truths transcend party lines,” Wright said, “and the day is now at hand when determined action must be taken." The Mississippi state legislature passed a resolution supporting Wright’s threat to bolt the

Democratic Party if the White House pressed for civil rights legislation. 33 27

Aware of Wallace's potential strength among black voters and dismissive of Governor Wright's rhetoric, President Truman sent a powerful, but dispassionate message to Congress on 2 February 1948. He warned that if the states and local governments would not rectify civil inequities, "the federal government has a clear duty to see that constitutional guarantees of individual liberties and of equal protection under the law are not denied or abridged anywhere in America." The President sought a comprehensive restatement of the federal non-discrimination policy, together with appropriate measures to insure compliance, and he instructed the secretary of defense to have "the remaining instances of discrimination in the armed services eliminated as rapidly as possible." In concluding his message, Truman reiterated the idea that these measures strengthened American moral authority against communism. 34

Truman’s civil rights message immediately became a source of major political controversy. Most liberals or moderates were pleased with his stand.

The black press also responded positively. A White House administrative assistant, indicated as much in a 16 February memo he sent to the President:

Strong favorable language was the rule in the editorials. The President was described as the new champion of human freedom. The program as a whole was hailed as the strongest civil rights program ever put forth by any President. The message was referred to as the greatest freedom document since the Emancipation Proclamation. The language of the message was described as Lincolnesque. 35

White Southerners, on the other hand, disapproved of the message.

Among them, Virginius Dabney, editor of the Richmond Times-Dispatch, who, though opposed to lynching, called Truman “unfit to be nominated and re- elected to the Presidency." To avoid a firestorm among Southerners in 28

Congress, Senate minority leader Alben Barkley of Kentucky shelved the bill by

refusing to sponsor it when it came down from the White House.

While the President withstood the anger of Southern Democrats,

Congressional Republicans — fearing that Truman had outflanked them —

moved their own civil rights legislation through House and Senate committees.

Republicans on the House Judiciary Subcommittee pressed for anti-lynching

legislation. In the Senate, the Labor Committee brought an FEPC bill to the

Senate Floor, even though the committee chair, Robert Taft, voted with

Southerners to block passage. However, most Dixiecrat resistance occurred on

the local and state level. 36

In this charged climate, nine Southern governors met on the weekend of

6-8 February in Wakulla Springs, Florida. Ostensibly, they met to unify their

reaction to a Supreme Court decision which ordered the University of

Oklahoma Law School to provide separate but equal educational facilities for “a

37 Negro girl” who had applied for admission. To comply with the law, the

governors would be forced either to open new public educational facilities to

blacks or to integrate the existing ones.

Fielding Wright wanted to use the occasion to officially recommend a bolt

from the Democratic Party. Although the Democratic Governors resisted this

action, they unanimously warned Truman to cease his attacks on white

38 supremacy or face full-fledged revolt in the South.

Meanwhile, Wallace's campaign began to take on serious dimensions

when a Progressive Party candidate beat a Democrat for Congress in New York

and Wallace’s popularity improved in Michigan, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and

California. Wallace discussed civil rights at a black rally in Har,em. After noting

that the President's 2 February message had generally ignored the issue of

segregation in American life, Wallace said, 29

Southern Governors and Senators have no more reason

to fear action on Mr. Truman's . . . message than we have

to expect it. They are angry that the President has paid lip 39 service to the fundamental democratic principles.

To fend off Wallace, Truman began his 1948 election drive at the traditional Jefferson-Jackson Day banquet in February. For the first time since

before the 1946 election, Truman invoked the magical name of Franklin

Roosevelt, intimating, of course, that his administration was the true heir of the

New Deal tradition. He further declared that the Democratic party was the party

of "progressive liberalism," the Republican, the party of "reactionary

conservatism." 40 Having attracted the liberal vote, Truman next began to mollify

Southern Democrats by quietly shelving his omnibus civil rights bill. Also,

Democratic Party Chairman Senator J. Howard McGrath met with an ad hoc

committee from the Southern Governors' Conference. 41

On 5 February 1948, A. Philip Randolph of the Committee against Jim

Crow asked the administration to publicly repudiate any legislation

perpetuating military segregation. A Democratic National Committee

representative promised Randolph that "careful consideration" would be given

his request. On 22 March 1948, Randolph and other concerned citizens met

with Truman and requested his support for anti-segregation amendments to the

proposed draft bill. During this meeting, Randolph informed Truman that his

(Randolph's) recent travels around the country convinced him that "Negroes

are in no mood to shoulder guns for democracy abroad, while they are denied

democracy here at home;” he then announced that unless the government took

decisive action to change the current racial policies of the armed forces, a civil

disobedience campaign would be launched. Truman made it clear that he was

not happy with those remarks. The conference ended with nothing settled. 42 30

For three weeks in March, the Senate Armed Services Committee held extensive hearings on UMT and selective service. The 1948 Senate Hearings on Universal Military Training provided a particularly opportune moment for advocates of racial desegregation of the military. As will be discussed in later chapters, a short-lived, but powerful political constituency was born during these hearings when A. Philip Randolph and Grant Reynolds declared that they would counsel young African Americans to avoid a segregated draft into a segregated military. 43

On 17 March 1948, the president warned a joint session of Congress of the threat to world peace caused by Soviet expansionism. Truman

recommended to Congress three measures needed to improve the nation's strength and to maintain the free, democratic character of the nations of Europe: passage of the program for economic assistance for Europe, enactment of

universal training legislation, and temporary reenactment of selective service

legislation. (The had just advised him that voluntary enlistment had failed and that restoration of the draft was essential. The administration's draft of a bill that would have provided both renewal of

selective service (Title I) and establishment of UMT (Title II) was submitted to the

House by Secretary Forrestal early in April. After much struggle, Congress passed the Selective Service Act in June, providing for its termination in two years. However, the universal training proposal failed again. 44

The call for racial reform of the armed forces was soon repeated by twenty

Negro organizations which had gathered in New York on 27 March 1948, at the

request of the NAACP. They released a public statement pointing out that

Negro votes could play a "balance of power" role in at least seventeen states in a presidential election, and that their support required the elimination of segregation and discrimination from the armed forces. 45 31

Anti-Truman elements among the Southern Democrats began planning for a bold walkout at the Democratic Convention. The chairmen of the

Mississippi and Arkansas state Democratic committees arranged a states' rights conference in Jackson, Mississippi, on 10 May. Before the conference opened,

Alabama primary election voters decided that the state electors would be pledged to vote against Truman or any other so-called civil rights candidate.

Half of the elected Alabama delegation to the Democratic National Convention

civil rights plank. was committed to a bolt if the national convention adopted a

Despite these results, "the administration," according to Arthur Krock, "was not worried about the Southern uprising." 46

The Jackson, Mississippi, conference showed that the rebellion had its deepest roots in Mississippi and South Carolina. Plans were made for a states' rights nominating convention to meet if the Democratic National Convention

47 adopted Truman's civil rights program.

Throughout the spring of 1948, Truman refused to publicly discuss the

bolt issue; at a press conference on 13 May, he denied that the administration was preparing an executive order to end the practice of discrimination in the federal executive branch. 48 By taking this position Truman hoped to placate as

much of the South as possible before the start of the Democratic National

Convention. Arthur Krock, writing in of 8 June, confirmed

that the Truman administration "was feverishly working to prevent a walkout by

some Southern delegations." 49

What the administration offered Southerners was a 1948 civil rights plank

comparable to the one included in the party's 1944 platform. The 1944 plank,

which Walter White four years earlier had called a splinter, was a rather

innocent statement: 32

We believe racial and religious minorities have the right to live, develop and vote equally with all citizens and share the rights that are guaranteed by our Constitution. Congress should exert its full constitutional powers to protect those rights. 50

The administration did not know if this tactic would satisfy die-hard Dixiecrats and still prove acceptable to party liberals. While Truman tried to unify the

Democratic Party behind his candidacy, the Republican Party convened in

Philadelphia and nominated New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey for

President. Dewey's civil rights record exceeded that of his Republican rivals for the Presidency. In 1945, Dewey helped create a State Commission against

Discrimination (a state FEPC law); throughout his years as governor, Dewy

51 appointed Negroes to state positions that they had never before held.

Dewey’s 1948 Republican Party’s platform called lynching or any other form of mob violence “a disgrace to any civilized state," and endorsed

legislation to end it. They also opposed racial segregation in the armed forces of the United States. They favored enactment and enforcement of federal legislation to maintain equal rights at all times in every part of this Republic.

They also endorsed the abolition of the poll tax as a requisite to voting. 52

Although this plank was not as inclusive or as far-reaching as Truman’s 2

February message, it placed the Republican Party on record in opposition to segregation in the armed forces.

However, the plank put Dewey in a quandary. To compete for a share of the Negro vote, he had to publicize his commitment to the civil rights plank and to discuss his New York State achievements. But such publicity would draw attention on the failure of the Republican Eightieth Congress to pass any civil rights legislation. 53 33

After the Republicans left Philadelphia, the Democrats prepared to hold their convention there. In the weeks before the opening of that convention,

Truman continued to pacify the Southerners. On 22 June, he met with

Congressman John Rankin of Mississippi and may have offered to write the

1944 civil rights plank into the 1948 platform. Following the publication of

Rankin's comments, Henry Wallace, speaking in Washington, charged the president with hypocrisy on the civil rights issue:

If we ever had any hesitancy before, Mr. Rankin has dispelled our doubts. We can now say of President Truman's civil rights message that the views in the message are not necessarily those of the sponsor. We can go further. We can say positively that they are not the views of Mr. Truman. 54

Nevertheless, the NAACP, holding its annual convention in St. Louis,

Missouri, during the last week of June, refused to condemn the President.

Truman was praised for his civil rights stand, while Wallace was attacked, particularly by Walter White, for his failure to fight discrimination or segregation during the years he had served as vice-president and secretary of agriculture

55 and commerce. It was evident that the NAACP leadership preferred Truman to Dewey or Wallace. 56

Before Truman was able to capitalize on the NAACP support another revolt erupted. This time, Democrats of various political persuasions were organizing a "Draft Eisenhower" movement. But their hopes of capturing the convention with Dwight Eisenhower were dashed on 10 July 1948, when the

57 General declared that he would not "accept even if nominated."

By 7 July, when the Democratic National Convention drafting committee met in Philadelphia to write the party platform, a fight on civil rights seemed imminent. Many historians would point to this fight as the progenitor of the 34

modern American civil rights movement. Before they began work, the drafters heard from a diverse group of organization representatives including the

NAACP and Americans for Democratic Action. 58 At Truman’s instruction, Clark

Clifford brought to Philadelphia a virtual rewrite of the 1944 plank, containing none of the specific recommendations demanded by these liberal groups. The

moderate plank still failed to placate the most intransigent Southerners, who

wanted not only the restoration of the two-thirds rule but a resolution in favor of

"states' rights" as well. Liberals were offended by the plank's equivocal

language; they wanted specific civil rights propositions, not bland generalities.

59 A floor fight loomed.

On 14 July, Congressman Andrew J. Biemiller of Wisconsin, speaking for

Hubert Humphrey, 60 Esther Murray, and himself, submitted a liberal civil rights

plank to the convention for consideration. Humphrey eloquently defended this

substitute plank. 61

After floor votes on a series of resolutions, it was time for the civil rights

resolution plank. As Sam Rayburn, the permanent chairman of the 1948

Democratic National Convention, was about to put it to a voice vote, an alert

California delegate requested a roll call vote. The roll call forced big city bosses

in New York, Illinois, and Pennsylvania to endorse the plank for fear that their

62 local and state tickets would be defeated without the black vote. Thus,

Truman's compromise failed. Immediately after the final civil rights vote was

taken, half the Alabama delegation and the entire Mississippi delegation

walked out of the convention. Most Southerners refused to bolt, but they

overwhelmingly chose Senator Richard Russell of over Truman as the

63 party's candidate to protest the civil rights vote.

Conventional wisdom expected a Truman defeat in November. Few

delegates anticipated the President's acceptance speech. But Truman quickly 35

dispelled the convention's gloom with a barn-burning speech, attacking the

record of the "do-nothing" Eightieth Congress. He demanded a special session of Congress that would enact into legislation the lofty resolutions of the

64 Republican Party platform. Of civil rights, the President commented:

Everybody knows that I recommended to the Congress the civil

rights program. I did so because I believe it to be my duty under the Constitution. Some members of my own party disagreed with

me violently on this matter, but they stand up and do it openly. People can tell where they stand. But the Republicans all professed to be for those measures, but the Eightieth Congress

did not act. They had enough men to do it and they could have had cloture. They didn't have to have a filibuster. There are enough people in that Congress that would vote for cloture.

Truman neglected to mention that he had not offered to cooperate with them in

any attempt to secure cloture. While Truman lambasted the Republicans, he

himself was under attack by former Democrats.

On 17 July, a states' rights conference in Birmingham, Alabama, selected

South Carolina's Governor Strom Thurmond and Governor Fielding Wright of

Mississippi to head a third party ticket. 65 The conferees hoped this ticket would

attract enough political support to force the House of Representatives to pick the

next president. 66 To throw the election into the House, where the South could then bargain with the various candidates on the civil rights issue, the Dixiecrats

needed strong backing not only in the deep South but in border states where

white supremacy was no longer quite as fashionable. Hence, Thurmond, in the

course of the conference, attacked lynching and advocated state abolition of the

poll tax in an attempt to persuade Southern moderates that his political

organization was in reality defending the noble heritage of Jeffersonian

Democracy. 67 Yet, lurking behind the scenes where they were exerting real

influence, were true segregationists like Senator James Eastland of Mississippi 36 and former Alabama governor Frank Dixon, whose presence revealed the party's true character. 68

The fourth political convention of 1948 began as the third was ending.

On 20 July, the Progressive Party also held its convention in Philadelphia; it was the only one in which blacks played a prominent role. Lankin Marshall

Howard, a black attorney from Des Moines, was the convention's keynote speaker. Approximately 150 other African Americans, including W. E. B. DuBois and Paul Robeson attended the convention as delegates or alternates.

(Robeson was later designated co-chairman of the party.) Black delegates were among those who approved the party platform, which "was more detailed in proposals affecting Negroes than were those of the major Parties, reflecting the Progressives' efforts to capitalize on Negro discontent." Evidently, the

Progressive Party's militant espousal of civil rights partly reflected the quasi-

Communist control of the party machinery. By working through the Progressive

Party, American Communists hoped to incorporate Negroes into a coalition of

"labor and the people against war and fascism." 69

Henry Wallace and Idaho's Senator Glenn Taylor, the Progressive Party nominees, had been longtime critics of segregation. For this reason, many

African Americans trusted them. But this was beginning to change.

Truman Issues Executive Order 9981

The day before Congress reconvened in special session, on 26 July,

70 Truman issued two civil rights-related executive orders. Executive Order 9980 created a review board in each department and agency of the federal executive

branch to whom government employees could appeal if they felt victimized by discriminatory employment practices. Executive Order 9981 provided for 37

equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin.

The orders were timed perfectly to focus attention on Congress and to undercut Wallace’s standing with many African Americans. Executive Order

9981 was also designed to avoid an immediate confrontation between the administration and A. Philip Randolph. 71

Professor Milton Konvitz characterized Executive Order 9981 “among the

72 most important steps taken to end racial discrimination." Yet, many found its language vague:

It is hereby declared to be the policy of the President that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin. This policy shall be put into effect as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to effectuate any necessary changes without impairing efficiency or morale. 73

The order did not clearly outlaw segregation. Instead, it authorized creation of a President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces to study and resolve the problem of discrimination and segregation in the armed forces. Besides being criticized for vagueness,

Truman's action prompted criticism from other sources for a variety of reasons.

The Baltimore Sun suggested that "the timing of President Truman's executive orders against racial discrimination in civilian government employment and in the armed forces strongly suggests that they were politically inspired." The

Montgomery Advertiser stated that "Truman's army program is of more raw and repugnant character than that urged for the civilian provinces." The Shreveport

Times accused the President of "grandstanding to try to get back some of the

Roosevelt Negro vote which seems to be swinging to the Wallace-Communist

74 Progressive banner in some areas." 38

Henry Wallace generally criticized Truman's efforts to fight discrimination in the military, “The President's order on equality of treatment in the armed forces says nothing, promises nothing, does nothing — and leaves segregation intact.” 75

Senator Richard Russell, a powerful member of the Senate Armed

Services Committee, charged that Truman's executive orders were "articles of unconditional surrender to the Wallace convention, and to the treasonable civil disobedience campaign organized by the Negroes, by A. Philip Randolph and

Grant Reynolds." Russell further asserted that Truman was unwilling to prosecute those men who were defying the Selective Service Act because

"such action would alienate the few Negroes who remain loyal to him in the present political campaign." 76

On the same day that Truman delivered the Executive Orders at Fort

Knox, Kentucky, Army Chief of Staff Omar Bradley declared that "the Army is not out to make any social reforms. The Army will put men of different races in

different companies. It will change that policy when the Nation as a whole

77 changes it." Bradley’s statement forced the President to clarify the language of his executive order; at a 29 July press conference, Truman admitted that the order eventually would require the armed forces to abolish segregation. 78

When A. Philip Randolph and Grant Reynolds complained that Truman’s statements were vague and confusing, Democratic Party Chairman McGrath was charged to explain to them that the seven-man presidential committee would "initiate its activities and functions on the basis of non segregation." 79

They were apparently satisfied that Truman sincerely wanted a desegregated military. On 18 August, Randolph and Reynolds terminated their civil disobedience campaign. 80 39

The Republican leadership responded to Truman's speech by bringing to the floor of the Senate an anti-poll tax bill, which had cleared the House. This

bill immediately ran into a Southern filibuster, and it forced debate on the cloture rule that authorized procedural limitations on debate. 81

Congressional inactivity gave Truman a ready-made issue: the lackluster domestic record of the Eightieth Congress. Truman reiterated that theme while he solicited support from the coalition of labor, farmers, consumers, and African Americans. 82 By early September, Truman was solidifying his support among black voters. The Southern walkout at the

Democratic National Convention had distinguished him from the Dixiecrats; the imbroglio convinced many African Americans that Truman’s advocacy of civil rights legislation was sincere. Executive Order 9981 enhanced this support in the African American community.

White House aide Donald Dawson wrote the President on 9 September:

1) Since your executive order was issued all important opposition to the draft on the basis of the Army's race policy has disappeared. Philip Randolph and Grant Reynolds have withdrawn from their Committee Against Jim Crow, and only a few C.O.'s and other war resisters remain in the movement. 2) Negro leaders and their white friends have been universal in the praise of the order and in their support of the proposed committee. 3) The Committee will have complete minority press support. The Negro press, which had been conducting a vigorous campaign 83 against the Army's racial policy has now abandoned it.

To enhance his position with blacks, the President on 18 September named the seven men who were to become members of the President's

Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services.

This committee, subsequently known as the Fahy Committee, would begin its work in January 1949, assuming that Truman was still in the White House. 84 40

While Truman benefited from the release of his executive orders, Henry

Wallace toured the South and spoke before racially integrated audiences, wherever possible, to convince blacks of the sincerity of his egalitarian

85 convictions. It was a courageous effort which Truman did not match.

Instead, Truman ignored the civil rights issue during his late September campaign swing through Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, and Missouri at the behest of Democratic leaders in these states. They felt that civil rights was "too hot"; such talk would only drive Southern Democrats into the "states' rights party," and endanger their own local candidates’ election. Finally, on 30 September, in

Carbondale, Illinois, Truman briefly mentioned that his administration had

86 fought "to expand our civil liberties by new measures against discrimination."

By doing well in the South, Truman made up for the advances Wallace was making in the North. The Dixiecrat rebellion gained favor in only four

Southern states: South Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana.

Elsewhere in the South, Truman had no real opposition. Even Senator Richard

Russell of Georgia, Dixie's candidate at the Philadelphia convention, endorsed the Democratic standard-bearer a few days before the election because he felt the South was safe with Truman. 87

The Democratic state committee chairman of North Carolina complained:

What can we accomplish? . . . The Republicans are committed to a more determined civil rights program than our party is and Governor Dewey has already put into effect in the New York government many of the proposals to which we in the South most vigorously object. 88

During the last few weeks of the campaign, Truman focused on the key

industrial states in the North and East. On that final swing, Truman toured the slums of Philadelphia, spoke on behalf of civil rights in Chicago, in South Bend,

Indiana, and Cleveland. In one key speech, Truman reminded his audience 41

that the Republican Party, which had been paying lip service to this kind of

89 legislation for years, never acted upon it.

Truman climaxed his drive to win the vote of African Americans with a speech in Harlem on 29 October (though he decided to speak there at the last minute). He was warmly welcomed by some 65,000 people who heard his remarks and saw him receive the first Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorial

Brotherhood Medal from the Reverend Dr. C. A. Johnson. Truman told the crowd of the significance of To Secure These Rights on the first anniversary of the day he had been presented with the report of his civil rights committee. After praising the work and committee recommendations, Truman outlined his administration's civil rights record:

After the Civil Rights Committee submitted its report, I asked Congress to do ten of the things recommended by

the committee. You know what they did about that. So I went ahead and did what the President can do unaided by

Congress. I issued two executive orders. One of them established the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services. The other covered regulations governing fair employment practices within the federal establishment. In addition to that, the Department of Justice went into the Supreme Court and aided in getting a decision outlawing restrictive covenants. Several states and municipalities have taken action on the recommendations

of the Civil Rights Committee, and I hope more will follow after them. 90

Ironically, Truman failed to receive editorial endorsement from any major black newspaper except the Chicago Defender; the rest supported Dewey. For example, the Pittsburgh Courier, the most widely circulated Negro newspaper, declared on 30 October: “Put Governor Thomas E. Dewey in the White House where he can do for all Negroes of the nation what he has done for the Negroes of New York state." 91 42

The results of that election staggered millions of Americans, including most Republicans, many Democrats, and practically all political pollsters.

Truman achieved a certain political immortality because of his spectacular victory, which on the basis of hindsight was not quite so remarkable. 92 Although

Truman had been harassed on both flanks by political defectors and challenged in the center by the leader of a formidable political organization, he successfully routed his enemies by holding on to Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal coalition, which was still a potent political force in 1948. Widespread prosperity also contributed to Truman's 1948 success. Many voters felt that a depression would follow a Dewey victory. 93 As Clark Clifford, architect of the 1948

campaign, put it:

We had to be bold. If we had kept on plugging away in moderate terms, we might have reached mid-field when the gun went off, so we had to throw long passes, anything to stir up labor, and to get the mass votes of the great cities of the Middle West, New England and the East. 94

Many black Americans saw Truman as a spokesman for both their political and economic interests; almost two-thirds of the African Americans who voted in 1948 cast their ballots for him. According to a post-election survey conducted by the NAACP, sixty-nine percent of all Negro voters in twenty-seven major cities and communities voted for Truman. In some of these Negro districts, Truman received more votes than Franklin Roosevelt had ever polled.

Had Dewey or Wallace won a larger share of black voters in any two of the three key states of California, Illinois, and Ohio, Dewey would have won the

White House. 95

Dewey generally ignored black voters, a policy decision which did not help him on election day. In short, while Truman made capital of his civil rights promises, Dewey kept silent about his civil rights accomplishments. Dewey 43

further damaged his standing with most African Americans by actively soliciting

Southern votes. The latter maneuver was especially self-defeating because

few Southern Democrats voted for him, and most northern Negroes, offended

by his ostensible disregard of their interests especially economic — sided with

Truman. On the other hand, it seems clear that Dewey carried Delaware,

Indiana, and Maryland with the help of Negro voters. But in no state did Dewey

and the Republican Party receive a majority of the black vote in the 1948

election. 96

Henry Wallace’s apparent surge of the spring and the early summer

faded completely by 2 November 1948. The existence of widespread

prosperity, the total lack of support in the farm belt, the inability to rebut the

"Communist front" charge, the partial preemption of the Progressive Party's

domestic program by Truman, the Stalinist coup d'etat in Prague — all these

97 factors help to account for the rapid decline in Wallace's fortunes.

Wallace contributed to Truman's ultimate success by forcing Truman and

his advisers to devise a strategy to undercut the independent’s appeal with

liberal and other vital voting blocs. Not the least among them was the African

American bloc.

The Dixiecrats had been convinced of the sincerity of Truman's

commitment, so much so that they organized a political party for the purpose of

depriving him of the electoral votes he needed to win, thus allowing the House

of Representatives to decide the outcome. Their hopes were frustrated by the

fact that they carried only four Southern states: South Carolina, Alabama,

Mississippi and Louisiana. The relatively poor showing of the Thurmond-Wright

ticket (which received just 12,000 more votes than the Wallace-Taylor

combination) can be attributed to several factors: (I) a reasonably good

Democratic Party discipline that reinforced the ingrained voting habits of a 44

substantial number of Southerners; (2) fear on the part of Southern Democrats

that if Truman won, he would punish the bolters in and out of Congress by denying them their party position and patronage privileges; (3) distrust of

Dixiecrat motives; that is, a suspicion that the States' Rights Party was really a vehicle for economic conservatism, which (at least in 1948), many Southern whites, the beneficiaries of the New Deal, rejected; (4) a growing Southern liberalism as evidenced in newspapers, magazines, and the lessening of hard- core racism, especially in the border states and the upper South, where blacks

98 were beginning to vote in increasing numbers.

The results of the 1948 election demonstrated that the politics of civil rights had become institutionalized on the national level. Blacks had at last

crossed the threshold of influence, making it possible for them to win a place at the table. Thus, black political strength in states with the largest electoral votes was now sufficient to determine the outcome of a close national election. As

Henry Moon, voting analyst for the NAACP, suggested even before the 1948 election, blacks, because of their strategic position, were in a position to become a "balance of power" force in national politics. 99 Ideally, African

Americans might maximize their political leverage by alternating between the parties. In 1948, however, many blacks remained loyal to the Democratic Party after having been won over by Roosevelt.

After the election, civil rights remained a major domestic political issue.

On 16 November, Truman told a post-election press conference that another civil rights message would be in the Message on the State of the Union and it would include proposals agreed on in the Democratic platform." On 25

November, administration leaders hinted that the forthcoming Congress would try to modify the cloture rule to expedite passage of civil rights legislation. 45

Following a 28 November meeting with Truman at the White House, Walter

White reported this legislation would receive the President's active support. 100

On 24 December 1948, the New York Times disclosed that the

Republicans were hoping to embarrass the Democrats by pushing for civil

rights legislation at the beginning of the new session of Congress.

Specifically, Senate Republicans planned to modify the Senate rules so as to

curb the Southern filibuster. 101

Military Reform And The Truman Presidency

Now that we understand the motivational context of Truman's desire for

racial reform, we can examine how he was able to effectuate change through

the restructuring of the armed services. The civil rights reforms that Truman

instituted have rarely been discussed within the context of the journalistic

process or in terms of military reform. In this second part of the chapter, an

attempt will be made to merge these lines of inquiry. To better discern the role

that publicity played in policymaking, we interpret Truman’s efforts to enlarge

public support for desegregation within the context of his campaign to reform

the post-war defense establishment. Although he was not successful on all

fronts, Truman crusaded for military unification, postwar reorganization and

universal military training. To help sell this program of controversial military

reforms, Truman needed the support many of the same military officers who

would oversee military desegregation.

To place desegregation in the military reform setting, we will first evaluate

Truman’s use of the presidential power to create special commissions and

committees. More specifically, we will see how he used the symbolic,

representational aspect of these commissions to broaden the coalition for

reform and to create a climate for change. We will look at the Special Senate 46

Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, which Truman chaired

during World War II and compare it with the 1947 President’s Committee on

Civil Rights and the President’s Committee for Equality of Treatment and

Opportunity in the Armed Services. We will provide evidence that these committees broke with traditional practices in the way that they handled publicity and press coverage. We will examine how these special interest groups coalesced and broadened the public desire for racial reform.

After comparing the committees, we will explain how racial

desegregation fit into Truman’s broader vision of military democratization. We

will more carefully discuss how Truman’s reforms left the American military

more efficient, less biased, and more powerful than it had been before World

War II. We will analyze these three major military reforms: (1) a massive

restructuring of organizational and command relationships to achieve

unification of the armed forces: (2) the elimination of racial segregation in the

military services: and (3) the establishment of a system of universal military

training (UMT).

Finally, we will suggest how Truman’s mistrust of the American

publishing elite would help shape the instructions that he gave his military

desegregation committee. Truman encouraged that committee to avoid the

press and publicity. In so doing, he followed practices that he had used before

as chairman of the Special Senate Committee to Investigate the National

Defense Program. We will show how Senator Truman navigated between the

sometimes-adversarial and sometimes-collaborative relationship of the press

and government to win concessions from the military. 47

Presidential and Senate Commissions

Studying Truman’s actions on Senate Committee to Investigate the

National Defense Program, particularly the relations between the press and the committee, enables us to better understand both the 1947 President’s

Committee on Civil Rights and the President’s Committee for Equality of

Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services. Studying Truman’s Senate

Committee also helps to place desegregation in the military reform setting.

Through it, we will see how he used the symbolic, representational aspect of these commissions to broaden the coalition for reform and to create a climate for change. We will provide evidence that these committees broke with traditional practices in the way that they handled publicity and press coverage.

We examine how these special interest groups coalesced and broadened the public desire for racial reform.

Since Truman’s time, congressional and presidential commissions have become a popular way to identify societal goals and to secure and delay reform.

David Flitner, Jr., identifies these primary goals of commissions: (1) they put issues on the national agenda; (2) they help create policy; (3) they enable governments to surmount bureaucratic obstacles inherent in the separation of powers; (4) they provide a cooling off period during which tensions ease; (5) they educate society, even as they create a repository of wisdom and knowledge about vital issues, and (6) they influence American attitudes about these issues. They have demythologized conspiracies, lowered the heat on controversial issues and changed the language, i.e., altered the terms of national debate. 102

As Flitner notes, George Washington created the first presidential commission to mediate the Whiskey Rebellion. Many of Washington’s successors used commissions to handle local issues, but Theodore Roosevelt 48

was the first to appoint commissions whose purview was national in scope and

significance. In forming the Public Lands Commission and the Inland

Waterways Commission, and through his enthusiastic sponsorship, Teddy

Roosevelt “lent a legitimacy to his commissions which increased their stature as

a presidential tool and which maximized their potential for stimulating public

103 awareness in a pre-television age.”

Truman followed Teddy Roosevelt in the way he used the Bully Pulpit of

the presidency to enlarge the public pressure for reform. Where Teddy

Roosevelt was concerned with the institution of conservation measures, Truman

concentrated his attention on special interest groups within the electorate,

including the civil rights constituency and the military. He acted, in no small

measure, through his appointment of public information spokespersons and

through public commissions.

Truman perfected his skills in the use of public commissions as a

Senator in charge of a World War II defense oversight committee. Except for his

achievements during World War I and his experiences as Commander in Chief,

Truman encountered more military leaders as chairman of this committee than

in any other situation; his Senate experience is worth extensive examination

because it influenced his later actions. Before heading up this committee,

Truman had been an undistinguished member of the Interstate Commerce

Committee and the Appropriations Committee. He had been virtually unknown

outside of Washington, DC, and the state of Missouri during his first term.

Truman clearly learned much about the opportunities for military reform as

chairman of the Special Senate Committee to Investigate the National Defense

Program. 49

Comparison of the Senate and Presidential Committees

There is no demonstrable evidence that Truman directly influenced the

military desegregation committee by relating his experiences in the defense

efficiency program. Yet, there are strong procedural parallels between

Truman’s Special Senate Committee and the President’s Committee on

Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services. These similarities

help explain why each group was effective. Yet, before comparing these

committees with each other, it is important to recognize how each committee

diverged from other similar groups that had come before.

These committees were noteworthy (1) in the way they both criticized

military planning, (2) in their issuance of reports, (3) in the way they handled

relations with the press, and (4) in the way they refused to attribute blame. By

its very formation, the Senate Committee was trying to assure civilian control

over the military. Distrust of a “man on horseback” (i.e., a charismatic military

104 dictator) has a long tradition in American history. Although the Senate

generously praised cooperative military personnel, they insisted upon a need for some constraints in military spending. Testifying before them, Secretary of

War Robert Patterson and Lieutenant General Brehon Somervell questioned the Committee’s authority and argued that money should be no object for a

nation at war. In effect, the military saw every attempt to obtain value as unwise frugality. By demanding greater efficiency, and not accepting Patterson’s argument, the Senate Committee became a “domestic high command” criticizing the Army for having failed to plan adequately, for refusing to coordinate with other services and other powers, and for weaknesses in

personnel planning, intelligence efforts and quality of oversight. 105

The Army was consistently unwilling to allow reform to play a part in the war effort; this attitude would continue through the Cold War with the Soviet 50

Union. Just as the Senate Committee often heard that “money was no object for a nation at war,” the President’s Equality Committee often heard that, “the Army

.” 106 can not afford to be a social laboratory In each case, the military accused their critics of being unpatriotic and putting external issues above the life of the soldier. However, both the budgeting effort and desegregation would ultimately improve military efficiency.

Other Senate and Presidential investigations of war readiness attempted to ascribe blame for combat failures. There were at least eight contemporaneous investigations on Pearl Harbor and military operations; each of these inquiries devoted particular attention to such imputations. In contrast, the Special Senate Committee, which maintained its focus on industrial mobilization, gained credibility because Truman refused to denounce its witnesses, even those who may have been guilty of malfeasance. Instead, it did not try its witnesses in the court of public opinion and left those responsibilities

107 to the Justice Department . Similarly, the President’s Equality Committee carefully avoided accusations of wrongdoing. The Senate Committee refrained from inquiring into personnel matters in which there was not a clear and

legitimate public interest. It made a sincere effort to keep its investigations of fraud and corruption directed at conditions rather than individuals, and achieved a considerable measure of success. Similarly, the President’s

Equality Committee did not attempt to ascribe personal blame, even when officers attempted to evade orders that they received from the Secretary of the

Army and the Secretary of Defense.

The Senate Committee only issued unanimous reports. The Committee based its reports on solid factual investigations, kept all members informed of its findings and distributed duties among the Democratic majority and Republican minority on the Committee. Before any report was issued, galley proofs were 51

sent to each government agency, corporation and individual affected by the report with a request for comment. This gave affected parties an opportunity to offer rebuttal and assure accuracy. As will be seen, the President’s Equality committee often delayed publication to assure agreement from all members.

According to Donald Riddle, Truman’s Senate Committee enjoyed

excellent relations with the press, and it received exceptionally favorable press

treatment. It released information promptly and in large measure avoided leaks.

It resolved complex questions by permitting the press advance copies of reports. Through these practices, the committee put pressure on defense

108 agencies, particularly the military, to release information to the public.

He insisted that all reports be unanimous and thus retained bipartisan support.

He also assured that small manufacturers and suppliers received an equitable share of government contracts.

President’s Committee on Civil Rights

Truman’s commission to study the status of Afro-Americans was also not the first committee of its kind. Racially-motivated violence has been a source of anxiety for whites and established authorities since the earliest days of

European migration and colonization. However, the riot commission or other commission designed to investigate and explain specific outbursts of illegal collective violence involving blacks and whites is a twentieth century phenomenon. Commissions were created to study violence perpetrated by

109 blacks in 1917, 1919, 1935, 1943, 1965, 1968, 1969, 1970 and 1992. In

1947, in the wake of a series of savage attacks directed upon black soldiers by whites, Truman created a special Committee on Civil Rights. These attacks prompted picketing by the NAACP, some 20,000 letters of protest and the formation of the National Emergency Committee against Mob Violence.

Eleanor Roosevelt, Dr. Channing Tobias and Walter White, the executive 52

secretary of the NAACP, formed the Emergency Committee as a national protest group. 110

David K. Niles, a holdover from the Roosevelt administration who otherwise lacked great White House influence, suggested that Truman create the broad-based civil rights commission. (Importantly, this was the first generalized presidential commission to primarily study violence perpetrated by whites on blacks. Although William Hastie, as civilian aide to the Secretary of

War, studied violence committed by whites on black military recruits in 1940,

Truman’s generalized commission was the first formal body to study racially-

motivated violence from this perspective.) When Niles presented the commission idea to the delegation against mob violence, they readily accepted

it; Walter White approved potential delegation members. On 11 October 1946,

Attorney General Tom Clark suggested Truman issue an Executive Order, entitled “Establishing the President’s Committee on Civil Rights” to preserve

111 and implement civil rights.

The black press expressed ambivalence toward Truman’s Executive

Order. The Republican Pittsburgh Courier was very suspicious of it. The

Baltimore Afro-American and the Kansas City Call gave good play to the story.

The Chicago Defender ran a somewhat favorable editorial saying,

If the committee is not hampered in its inquiry and if its recommendations are not circumvented by a welter of administrative procedures, the results should be far more consequential to us than anything that has happened in the United States since slavery. 112

In October 1947, the President’s Committee on Civil Rights issued its report. The report was extraordinarily comprehensive and considered methods of legal enforcement, the personal safety and security of individuals, a broadening and guarantee of voting rights, and the elimination of segregation in 53

employment, education, housing, health services, public services and the

District of Columbia.

More than that, the committee examined and exploded the mythology that formed the foundation for racism. Foreshadowing the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka Supreme Court decision, the committee argued that a

“separate but equal” policy was inherently discriminatory. Moreover, the committee spoke out strongly against segregation in the armed forces. It said,

“Prejudice in any form is an ugly, undemocratic phenomenon and in the armed forces, where all men run the risk of death is particularly repugnant.”

The Committee applauded the services’ newly-stated commitment to try

to eliminate discrimination, but it called for more substantive action. Then the committee focused on one of the traditional obstacles to this action.

Segregationists and those who favored racial gradualism worked to delay military desegregation until after national policy was set. They argued that turning the armed services into a "laboratory for social change" would jeopardize military preparedness. To counter this casuistry, the President’s

Committee on Civil Rights said,

During the last war we . . . found that the military services can be used to educate citizens on a broad range of social and political jobs. The war experience brought to our attention a laboratory in which we may prove that the majority and minorities of our population can train and work and fight side by side in cooperation and harmony. 113

To those who argued military desegregation could cause internal unrest among the troops, and impair efficiency, the Committee retorted,

The injustice of calling men to fight for freedom while subjecting them to humiliating discrimination within the fighting forces is at once apparent. Furthermore, by preventing entire groups from making their maximum contribution to the national 54

defense, we weaken our defense to the extent and impose heavier burdens on the remainder of the population. 114

Recognizing the highly controversial nature of these remarks, Truman eliminated the service recommendations when he transmitted his recommendations to the Congress in early 1948. Truman had two pieces of military legislation to get through: a new draft law and provision for universal

115 military training. He considered these more vital than his pitch for civil rights.

While Truman may have subtly muted his support for portions of the Civil

Rights Committee report, he authorized the committee to send 25,000 copies of

To Secure These Rights to government officials, public libraries, civic, fraternal, farm, business, social-welfare, women’s and veteran’s organizations.

It was the subject of radio talk shows such as CBS’s “Peoples Platform,” ABC’s

‘Town Meeting of the Air” and Mutual’s “American Forum of the Air." The

Advertising Council issued one-minute spots on radio emphasizing tolerance and understanding.

Press and public commentary was vigorous. Most Southern newspapers

116 condemned the report, but Northern newspapers generally endorsed it. For

instance, noted that it had broad backing, the Chicago

Sun Times called it “the book of the year,” and the more conservative

Washington Star admitted it was a “fine statement” but noted that it required too much government interference. The black press was very enthusiastic.

The Afro-American, which had been suspicious of Truman’s sincerity, called the report “one of the most significant documents of all time.” The Norfolk

Journal and Guide reprinted commentary from other newspapers. In their own right, they praised Truman for his moral courage in issuing the report. The New

York People's Voice said the government had finally admitted, “segregation 55

and discrimination were cancerous sores sapping the strength of democracy

.” 117 and making it a mockery before the world

Military Democratization through Unification

Remarkably, Truman was able to begin military desegregation even as he was reshaping the services into a modern defense establishment. The struggle to unify the services and to improve inter-service coordination became one of the most divisive issues in modern American military history. In fact, the

reorganization issue was so visible and so divisive that it largely overshadowed the racial desegregation of the military. Reorganization and unification were, among military people at least, far more contentious issues than either desegregation or universal military training.

With respect to racial desegregation, unification did more than just make headlines and preoccupy the minds of the major governmental decision makers. It set the tone for the administration because there was no single policy-making or policy-coordinating mechanism. The services ostentatiously vied for favor or demonstrated their independence through their reconciliation with White House unification policies; they also contested through their accommodation with White House racial policies. The secretaries and their staffs used the details of unification to try to win their way on desegregation, just as they tried to use the details of personnel readiness and the efficacy of racially-separate, segregated facilities to frame the unification argument. The politics of unification also determined, to some extent, the appointment of

leaders in the defense establishment. For these reasons, it is important to review the origins of the unification controversy.

Discussion of unification of the services and reform of the defense establishment intensified during the Second World War. Truman’s Special 56

Senate Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program generally

avoided any evaluation of military strategy or tactics. Yet, they did criticize the

lack of unity of command. The committee argued, “As disclosed by the report of

the Roberts committee, lack of unity of command was one of the most important

circumstances contributing to the disaster at Pearl Harbor.” 118

In April 1944, a House subcommittee discussed War Department

unification. The Army proposed establishment of a single Armed Forces

Department administered by a secretary, who would be the principal adviser to

the Congress and the President on all defense subjects relevant to politics and

administration. The joint chiefs would advise the President on financial

allocations and other budgetary matters. 119 The Navy Department, represented

by Secretary James Forrestal, opposed the Army plan for fear that it might lose

control of its air force and the Marine Corps. Forrestal argued that a unified

system might be too cumbersome for efficient management. The secretary also

told a Senate committee that administering such an organization would be too

much for any one man. 120

In 1944, Truman voiced support for unification as a vice-presidential

candidate. In an influential article for ’s, Truman argued that the Pearl

Harbor disaster and subsequent early defeats demonstrated the danger of

dividing military responsibilities between the services. He proposed military

coordination under a single civilian secretary, administratively assisted by three

undersecretaries for the ground, sea, and air forces. 121

During the first two years of his presidency, Truman was often immersed

in the politics of military unification. While the President prepared for the

Potsdam Conference, the Navy and Army each prepared very different

unification plans. In October 1945, the Senate Military Affairs Committee heard the plans presented by Navy Secretary James Forrestal and Army General J. 57

Lawton Collins. These divergent proposals divided the services and provoked

a “Battle of the Potomac." 122

Until mid-December 1945, Truman remained aloof from the bitter inter-

service bickering, but he continued to delay his unification message. As the

struggle between the services grew more heated, it drew unfavorable press

commentary which tainted the universal military training proposal. In mid-

December, the Military Affairs Committee adjourned with the Army and Navy no

closer to agreement. Finally, Truman felt compelled to intervene. 123

Despite vocal objections from Forrestal, Truman sent his military

reorganization message to Congress on 19 December 1945. In it, the President

laid down broad guidelines that he wanted followed; he detailed nine reasons

why unification was necessary, stressing greater efficiency and economy and a

more effective civilian control over the military. 124

The President's message to Congress helped focus the debate. Truman

permitted the service secretaries and their staffs to discuss their own personal

feelings on unification before Congress, but he discouraged inter-service

125 quarreling in the press. Yet the public interservice wrangling continued, with

much of it directed by the Navy to the Thomas-Hill-Austin unification bill

(S.2044). Despite the fact that Truman had sent his clarification in June,

Congress adjourned early in August 1946, without taking action. 126

On 10 September, Truman invited the top military leaders to express their

views candidly on a new draft of the bill prepared by his assistant, Clark Clifford,

and Leahy. No one changed their opinions regarding the powers of the secretary of defense. 127 The meeting adjourned and there the matter

rested, unresolved, until early in 1947.

With the White House pressuring them to agree, Patterson and Forrestal finally relented. They sent their mutually acceptable ideas to Truman on 16 58

January 1947. Truman accepted their effort as a "thoroughly practical and

workable plan of unification." The New York Times headlined the White House

announcement as, "A Truman Victory—Patterson and Forrestal Compromise at

Last on Unification Ideas." 128 Yet the military leadership, having taken almost a

year and a half to agree on the principles of unification, still found it difficult to

agree on the text of the unification bill. Truman, tired of the dissension over

details of the bill, ordered Forrestal and Patterson to initial it. The Senate

129 Armed Services Committee debated it from 18 March to 8 May 1947.

After some small modifications, Congress passed the National Security

Act of 1947 on 25 July and Truman signed it into law the next day. Truman also

issued Executive Order 9877, which defined the roles and missions of each

branch of the armed forces. As finally passed, the act established the Army,

Navy, and Air Force as equal departments, each with its own civilian

administrator, under the supervision and control of a single civilian secretary of

defense. The act revamped military organization, while it strengthened

coordination among all the agencies and departments of the federal

government—both civilian and military—that affected national security. 130

New Appointments Affected Desegregation

The changes made in the military departments prompted Truman to make several new appointments. He asked Robert Patterson, then Secretary of

War, to become Secretary of Defense. Patterson, explaining that his strained financial condition would not permit his staying in government, refused the post and insisted upon resigning as Secretary of War (Army). The president asked

Forrestal to take the post and he accepted. Thus the man who had consistently believed that the job was too much of a burden for any man to bear, became

Secretary of Defense, and his suicide two years later marked an ironic fulfillment of his own prophecy. With Forrestal's concurrence, Truman .

59

appointed Undersecretary of War Kenneth C. Royall secretary of the Army;

Assistant Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan Secretary of the Navy; and

Assistant Secretary of War for Air became the first Secretary of the Air Force. Forrestal was sworn in as Secretary of Defense on 17

September 1947, and the new military establishment became operational the following day. 131

These appointments represent one of the most significant factors affecting racial desegregation of the military. As will be seen in the next chapter, Kenneth Royall was a particularly vocal advocate for racial segregation in the United States Armed Services. Though Forrestal believed in gradual change, that is a virtual maintenance of the status quo, he did provide an

influential outlet for voices for reform within the Pentagon. The interplay between these two actors, and their respective staffs, as well as the actions of the newly-named Navy Secretary and Air Force Secretary, shaped both service

unification and racial desegregation of the military.

In fact, in a National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs that Forrestal called on 26 April 1948, he admitted the degree to which unification was affecting the desegregation effort. One delegate asked why the Defense

Department could not just issue a desegregation order and expect immediate compliance. Forrestal replied:

I would ask you to keep in mind that we (the newly-formed Department of Defense) are a child of six months of age. We began business last September, and there was a larger number of basic questions of organization, administration and policy that had to be settled. You can’t get those (racial) questions settled,

because if you settle them without thought, then they won’t be

settled. That takes work. .

I just want to revert to what I was trying to say. I would be

glad to clarify it. It would look as if you solved it. In my opinion,

that would not solve it. But, as I say, it was my own experience in

unification, all during the arguments of unification measure. I always maintain that by law, by fiat, you cannot force people into 60

the kind of cooperation and mutual respect and coordination that we hope to get out of unification. It has to come out of gradual experience and out of the kind of learning that each service has

its own contribution to make; and as each service learns more 132 about the other, there grows up a common effort.

Universal Military Training (UMT)

At a time when the American military was otherwise beset by factional bickering, the UMT experiment provided a common goal to unite the services.

Although the notion of continued military obligation would not gain favor among war-weary American civilians, UMT did represent a symbolic democratic ideal for the military. The services capitalized on UMT for positive publicity on recruitment and training. However, UMT further complicated the discussion of military unification. As will be seen, the services used both desegregation and, to a lesser extent, UMT as political footballs. They used their acceptance of UMT as a way to curry favor with Truman. Finally, UMT provided an ideal forum for civil rights leaders to discuss further democratization of the American military.

In his Memoirs, Harry Truman traced his preference for a trained soldier- citizenry over a large standing army to his military experience during World War

I. He once explained that a military program that emphasized physical and educational improvement would democratize the army and "overthrow the West

Point and Annapolis cliques" of the services by "recruiting commissioned

133 officers from the rank and file." At another juncture, Truman told a reporter that he had been for UMT since 1905, the year he joined the National Guard.

Truman often based his judgment of military affairs on his combat experiences. 134

Later, during his years in the Senate, Truman vainly supported a bill to

make the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) a permanent institution. He wanted the CCC converted into a universal training program. Truman's first chief of staff of the Army was General George C. Marshall, the leading military 61

advocate of UMT and a man for whom the president had a profound respect.

training Given these factors, it was natural for Truman to publicly back such a program from the very outset of his presidency. 135

Truman's first presidential statement on UMT occurred in a press conference in June 1945. At that time, he hinted about his unique vision when he told reporters: "I have got a few views on universal military training of my own, which don't agree with the Army, and don't agree with the Navy, and don't agree with the House or Senate.” 136

Many military planners considered Truman's idea of a citizen-army an ideal antidote to Soviet expansionism. Truman acknowledged that the fundamental reason for universal training was to provide full military preparedness for any potential aggression against the United States. But he also believed that individual training would lower the national illiteracy rate, improve the general physical condition, and remove minor medical disabilities.

Trainees would receive ample opportunity for self-improvement instruction in useful civilian skills, and proper care for their moral and spiritual well-being.

In explaining the plan to Congress, Truman distinguished this type of training from conscription which he defined as compulsory membership in a branch of the armed forces; UMT would simply be civilians receiving training. It would not replace selective service, which would continue to furnish troop

replacements. However, the plan met great resistance in the Republican-

137 controlled Congress and in the press.

Part of the public resistance grew because the military never understood

Truman’s goals. While Truman consistently held that there was no relationship

between UMT and the draft, the War Department did not agree. When queried for reaction to a new Presidential commission on Universal Training, a War

Department spokesman said that the Army would not request further 62

continuation of selective service, which was due to expire in March 1947, until congressional intentions on universal training were clear. The spokesman

138 added that if UMT was not forthcoming, then the draft would be inevitable.

The expectation was that enough volunteers would emerge from the UMT

program. On March 3, Truman decided to gamble on an all-volunteer force and

asked Congress to allow selective service to lapse on March 31. While Navy

Secretary James Forrestal and Secretary of War Robert Patterson agreed,

Selective Service Director Lewis Hershey and the Army's Chief of Personnel,

General W. S. Paul adamantly opposed the decision. Congress did allow the

draft to expire, and the nation was without peacetime conscription for fifteen

months. 139

Truman and the Press

Truman’s attitudes about the press also strongly shaped his strategy for

desegregating the military. For two reasons, he directed that the work of his

military desegregation committee, the President’s Committee for Equality of

Opportunity and Treatment, be accomplished with a minimum of news

coverage. First, Truman was determined to achieve “concrete results ... not

publicity on it.” He wanted the job done “so that everybody will be happy to

cooperate to get it done.” The Committee was not to impose integration of the

services from the top down. To achieve lasting success, the Committee had to

win over the opponents of desegregation in the Army and elsewhere. Truman

thought that mollifying sensitive feelings and coalition-building would succeed

best outside the public spotlight.

Second, in so doing, Truman made clear that he did not see the

Committee’s role as a publicity stunt. He would “knock somebody’s ears down,"

140 if he had to, but he wanted true compliance and real results. Why did 63

Truman lay down this edict in this way? Primarily, he believed that this was the surest way to win military compliance. The military aspects of this belief will be discussed in the next chapter.

We contend that Truman believed the spotlight of publicity would inhibit true compliance because he feared political opposition from conservative publishers and because he did not want a public discussion of U.S. military preparedness. Truman’s views can be studied from at least three aspects: (1)

The relationship between the nation’s newspaper publishers and Democratic candidates was traditionally adversarial. Truman was a particularly vocal critic of the nation’s publishing elite; (2) Although he came into the Presidency on a wave of popular opinion and press support, Truman suffered from press comparison to his predecessor, Franklin Roosevelt; (3) Although he often proclaimed support for freedom of the press, Truman would institute such

Constitutional abrogations as loyalty oaths and Executive Order 10290, which

broadened and extended government control of dissemination of government

information.

Editorial support for Truman was no different than editorial support for the next Democratic standard bearer, Adlai Stevenson. In 1948, Harry Truman

received support from only 17 per cent of the nation’s newspapers. Stevenson

141 won support from 16 per cent . Yet, there can be little doubt that Truman

cared about his relations with the press. Herbert Lee Williams combed

Truman’s press conferences, public speeches and personal letters. He found

that Truman made 206 significant references to the press in 324 press conferences, 118 significant references to the press in 1,101 speeches and 320

142 significant references to the press in 31,650 letters. As President, Truman received press synopses, and he read from half a dozen to a dozen 64

newspapers a day. He reported that he read everything from cartoons to letters

to the editor. 143

As did other Democrats, Truman often spoke approvingly of average

working reporters, and his relations with the working press were generally

144 good, but he strongly mistrusted the concentration of power and influence

among publishers. On 1 December 1948, he wrote a letter to the United States

ambassador to Chile in which he said: “I’ve never cared a great deal about what

the editorial writers and columnists say about me on the editorial page if I can

145 get a fair break on the front page in the news columns.” In a speech at

William Jewell College, Truman said,

There is not a single great newspaper in the United States that

could operate if it did not have these workmen down here in front of me today to do this work. They can’t all be managing editors. They can’t all be top-notch columnists to tell the President what to do. Somebody has to sit in the front row and do the work. 146

Although he respected the efforts of the working press, Truman often

railed against the concentration of power in the publisher’s office and the

concentration of money that corrupted the political process. As Truman saw it,

the communication facilities of the country represented another issue in the 1948 campaign . . . The segments of the press and radio which were not directly controlled by anti-administration interests depended to a great extent upon the advertising revenue which came from the wealthy, and often selfish, private groups. The power companies for instance, purchased millions of dollars’ worth of newspaper and magazine space in which to attack the public utility program of the federal government. Other lobbies and pressure groups, like the National Association of Manufacturers and the United States Chamber of Commerce, were constant contributors to press and radio in the guise of sponsors and advertisers.

Truman said that he did not mind Republican advertisements, because

Democrats had the same access. But he did resent 65

the commonplace practice of distorted editorials and slanted headlines in the press and of outright misrepresentations in the daily offerings of the columnists and commentators. The worst offense of all was the editing and distorting of the facts in the news.

Truman argued that the mere fact that a statement appeared in print

made it appear credible to many people. He said that newspaper owners,

publishers and columnists of the press and radio were deliberately

irresponsible and that they were not living up to the responsibilities attached to

their constitutional privileges. He wrote,

Too many candidates have lived in fear of the press and radio and

have courted their good will as if the outcome of the election

depended upon it. But I have learned the error of this idea in my

own political life. In my own state I always faced the overwhelming

majority of press opposition. I overcame it at every turn and never 147 had any respect for the so-called political influence of the press .

Truman’s predecessor, Franklin Roosevelt maintained an even warmer,

more intimate relationship with the working reporters. In press conferences, he

discouraged written questions, as had been the custom, and, instead,

encouraged informal questioning. He often provided off-the-record news

through a pattern of requiring reporters not attribute the information to him. This

intimacy allowed reporters to appreciate the flexibility of the President’s

position, while it permitted reporters to hear the President “thinking out loud .” 148

Truman, by contrast, was less discreet, more caustic and less willing to confer

with reporters. This is especially evident in the frequency with which the two

Presidents held press conferences. While Truman averaged about five press conferences every six weeks, Roosevelt averaged nine press conferences

149 every six weeks .

During the first thirty-three months of Truman’s administration, questions about security information and 150 press responsibility rarely came up . In the 66

beginning of his second term, he directed the President’s Committee on

Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services to sedulously

avoid press coverage. This action presaged a stricter move to control the press

near the end of his second term.

Truman responded to Soviet expansionism by becoming more conscious

of the need for safeguarding information of a strategic or military value. Some

scholars have argued that Truman’s reaction to a potential communist threat

exceeded the scope and nature of the threat itself. David Caute compares U.S.

reaction under Truman with the British reaction. He notes that Britain also

committed itself to a political and military alliance against the “but

without the corollary of domestic red-baiting and witch-hunting” that occurred in

the United States during Truman’s time in office. Caute concludes that “The

style— tactical and rhetorical— of Truman’s immersion in the Cold War

therefore emerges as crucial; it was here that the seeds of McCarthyism were

151 sown.” Caute blames Truman for creating the double standard that

obscured the motives of American foreign policy in the post-war era. Theoharis

agrees that Truman shaped the debate by acceding to McCarthyite arguments

rather than opposing them on a libertarian basis. For instance, Truman authorized his Attorney General, J. Howard McGrath, to warn how communists were intent on using the protection of the Bill of Rights to destroy the nation.

Through this interpretation, civil liberties such as the First Amendment could be seen as a threat to the national interest. 152

On 24 September 1951, Truman issued Executive Order 10290. The order empowered the administrator of any federal department — civilian or military — to embargo any item of news that he considered to be security- sensitive. Although the order did not impose any penalties, Truman expected 67

reporters to voluntarily cooperate with it. By framing the Order in this way,

Truman argued that there was no element of censorship, direct or implied.

A firestorm of protest resulted. The American Society of Newspaper

Editors protested the order before Truman proclaimed it, and reporters publicly

questioned it as soon as he announced it. Afterward, the professional

journalistic fraternity, Sigma Delta Chi, the Associated Press Managing Editors

Association, and the American Society of Newspaper Editors all worked

153 together to try to overturn it.

It appears that Harry Truman became quite disenchanted with the press

during his time in the White House. In the midst of the Executive Order conflict,

Editor & Publisher Columnist Robert Brown compared a tribute to the press that

Truman made to the Associated Press in April 1947 with his 1951 press attacks.

Brown noted,

It was more than a year after that (1947) speech when in the heat of the 1948 campaign he started accusing newspapers of serving special interests. And since then he has frequently lashed out at the press either individually or collectively. 154

James Pollard, whom Truman himself regarded as an expert on the

press and the presidency, characterized Truman’s press relationships before

he issued Executive Order 10290:

Time and the responsibilities of office work changes in a man and Harry Truman is no exception. It would be inaccurate to say that his six years in the White House made a new man of him, but the events of the years from 1945 to 1951 clearly made a different man of him. The early doubts and unsureness were replaced by confidence and self-assurance.

Later in the article, Pollard quotes an unnamed “‘longtime Washington reporter,”

Rather recently it seems to me that I have detected in Mr. Truman the beginning of a feeling of persecution. Newspaper criticism, for 68

example, he often considers unfair. I think perhaps this grows out

of the rise of what I call cockiness. He feels pretty sure of himself, and anyone who criticizes him does so, he thinks, out of evil

motives. I have seen the same thing in two other Presidents,

Roosevelt and Hoover. I think it is an occupational malady which comes upon any man after he has had several years of adulation. 155

In 1964, Pollard republished his Journalism Quarterly article as “Truman:

First Phase” in the second edition of Presidents and the Press. He followed this with ‘Truman: Second Phase,” a far more generous appraisal of the latter part of Truman’s second term. In this article, he concluded,

To the very end of his term and beyond, Mr. Truman excited

interest and controversy. It was greatly to his credit that he steadily maintained good relations with the working press. As with Franklin Roosevelt, his quarrels with the newspapers for the most part were with the publishers and with the press in general. Through eight difficult years he maintained the working relationship which he saw was essential in the public interest. It is for the soundness of this basic political philosophy for which he should be remembered and appraised rather than for occasional outbursts, indignant letters or public castigation of the press. Much of the latter could be charged off to his Missouri temper or simply to politics. Of significance also was the confidence he showed in (William) Hillman and the six (reporters) who were favored with the special interviews near the end of his administration. These things were a better measure of the man than the risibilities to which he sometimes yielded. 156

Pollard’s opinions of Truman’s press relations appear too charitable.

Truman was all too willing to discount the value of the press to a free society.

As will be seen, the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and

Opportunity in the Armed Services often had to work around Truman’s anti- press edict. In some ways, this injunction worked to the benefit of those who sought to preserve segregation. Ultimately, however, the journalists who worked on the President’s Committee were able to work around the rules and goad the Army into accepting desegregation. 69

We have seen how Truman's personal vision of a unified, efficient, democratic American military came to encompass a racially-desegregated armed force. Truman changed his racial beliefs on the basis of military justice.

Although his political position in 1948 appeared feeble, Truman implemented these ideas to craft a vigorous political stance. Ultimately, he revitalized the

New Deal coalition. We have surveyed press reaction to Truman’s military reforms and civil rights innovations. We examined Truman’s underlying attitudes about the press and focused on his second-term reaction to hostile publicity. In the next few chapters, we will examine how the military and the civil rights community reacted to Truman’s reform agenda, Through this analysis, we will continue to show that Truman’s personal commitment to racial reform in the military and his mistrust of the press, were central to his creation of a President’s

Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services.

Finally we will examine the communication processes of the Equality

Committee and see how they were able to create and preserve the goals of

Truman’s reforms.

Notes

1 W. Leuchtenberg, (November 1991) ‘The Conversion of Harry Truman” American Heritage, pp. 62-66.

2 L. Nicholls (1954) Breakthrough on the Color Front . New York: Random House, p. 85

According to Alfred Steinberg, Truman’s primary opponents were both members of the Klan. Two Truman supporters convinced him to join and he gave them ten dollars to sign him up. One of the supporters, Spencer Salisbury became one of Truman’s most formidable enemies. Salisbury claimed that Truman was not allowed to participate in KKK activities because they suspected his maternal grandfather, Solomon Young, was a Jew. (There was apparently no mention of the fact that Truman’s business partner for the past five years was also Jewish.) Truman and the other supporter, Edgar Hinde, claimed that the KKK returned his application fee when he refused to accept their discriminatory edicts and that Truman ran the group out of the county. Alfred Steinberg, (1962) The Man From Missouri,: The Life and Times of Harry S. Truman. New York: G.

P. Putnam, p. 64; F. Mitchell, (1968) Embattled Democracy: Missouri Politics. 1919-1932 . Columbia: University of Missouri Press, p.182 cites Kansas City Call, 31 October 1924.

4 Richard Dalfiume (1969) Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts.

1939-1953 . Columbia: University of Missouri Press, p.135. 8

70

5 Truman won a three-way Democratic primary for the seat on the basis of his votes in Jackson County and Kansas City. Truman wound up winning the state with a plurality of some 40,000 votes. Much of Truman’s victory came from the 130,000 votes cast by Missouri’s African Americans. Mitchell, p.124-139; Steinberg, pp. 110-119; William Berman (1970) The Politics of

Civil Rights in the Truman Administration . Columbus, Ohio:The Ohio State University Press, p.11.

6 He joined a move by Northern liberals to close debate on an anti-lynching bill and in 1 940, he supported an amendment to the Selective Service Act to prevent discrimination against minority groups in the Armed Services. Congressional Record, 75th Cong. 1st Session. 1938, LXXXIII, 1166, 2007 and 6th Cong. 2d Session, 1940, LXXXVI, 10895.

7 Stark fired the Board of Curators at Lincoln university and other black office holders. The Governor also had refused to receive black citizens at the state capital and he supported the John

D. Taylor bill, which appeared to discriminate against black law students. All in E. F.Schmidtlein, the Dissertation University of Missouri, reproduced by Arbor, (1962 ) Truman Senator from Ann Michigan: University Microfilms, p. 223.

8 Congressional Record, 76th Cong. 3d Session., 1940. Appendix, p. 4546 and pp. 53-67-5369.

9 He was opposed by the Kansas City Star and the Kansas City Times, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, as well as the Springfield Leader and Press, the St. Joseph Gazette, the Cape Missourian, the Dexter Statesman, and the Vandalia Leader. Cabel Phillips (1966) The Truman Presidency: The History of a Triumphant Succession New York: MacMillan & Co. p.30. ,

10 Berman, p. 15 and Dalfiume, p.136.

11 Donald Riddle, (19641 The : A Study in Congressional Responsibility . New Brunswick: Rutgers University, pp. 11-14.

12 Riddle, p. 154; Wesley McCune and John R. Beal, (June 1945) "The Job that Made Truman President." Harper's. Vol. 190, pp. 616-621.

13 Riddle, p.156.

14 Berman, pp. 15-17.

15 ‘Truman may cost Democrats the election” (editorial) Norfolk Journal and Guide, 5 August

1944, p.6; William Nunn, , “Democrats sell race, Wallace to buy South” and “Views vary on Truman candidacy,” Pittsburgh Courier, 29 July 1944, p.1.

16 Note that Truman’s language foreshadows the name of his presidential committee. Davis,

John, “I am for equality, Senator declares,” Pittsburgh Courier, 5 August 1944, p.1.

17 H.L. Moon (1948) Balance of Power: The Neoro Vote Garden City, N.Y. Doubleday 34- , pp. 35.

1 The Black press had been admitted to the White House Press Corps in 1 943 when McAlpin, was admitted to their ranks. Also in that year, the Negro Publishers’ Bureau organized a pool of reporters to visit the war theaters. By the end of the war, every major theater had been visited by at least one black war correspondent. Ulysses Lee, (1 966) United States Army in World War II:

Special Studies: The Employment of Negro Troops. Vol. 8, no. 8. Washington, D.C. : Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army p. 470, p.387, Chicago Defender, 4 March 1944. , . . ;

71

19 Item no. 7, Public Papers of the Presidents of The United States, Harry S. Truman: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, 1945, pp. 10-11.

20Donald R. McCoy, & Richard T. Ruetten, (1973) Quest and Response: Minority Rights and the of 29. Truman Administration . Lawrence, Kansas: University Press Kansas, p.

21 Lee, in passim.; Chicago Defender, 6 September 6 and 14 September 1941; Dalfiume, p. , 129-130.

22 York: MacMillan & Co., p. 102-103; L. F. Murray, . ed.,(1949) The Nearo Handbook. 1949. New Hughes, (1962) Fiaht for Freedom New York: WW. Norton, pp. 102-106; “Confer with Governor on Tennessee riot” and “Asks U.S. action on Tennessee riot,” Norfolk Journal and Guide, 16

1 total $1 ,500; GA lynch victims total 5; Nation deplores mob act, March 946, p.1 ; “Rewards 1 leaders call for action,” Norfolk Journal and Guide, 3 August 1 946, p.1

23 New York Times, 14 November 1946p. 33;‘Truman orders lynchers found; voices horror at Georgia crime,” New York Times, ( July 31, 1946), p.1; “Bomb rips home in open attack,” Pittsburgh Courier, 8 November 1946, p.1; Minutes of Executive Committee Against Mob Violence, 21 August 1946, Box 332, NAACP Papers; Walter White, (1948) A Man Called White, New York: Viking Press, pp. 330-331

24 Pittsburgh Courier 31 1947 Tom C. Clark to HST, 1 1 October McCoy, & Ruetten, p. 48; May ; 1946, Truman Papers, OF 596A HSTL.

25 of Garden City, N Y. :Doubleday, Harry Truman, (1955) Years of Trial and Hope. Vol.2 Memoirs , pp. 213;ltem no. 4, Public Papers of the Presidents of The United States, Harry S. Truman: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, 1947, pp.31-32.

26 Truman (1955) Vol.2 of Memoirs pp. 212.

27 White, p. 249.

28 Berman, p.80; also see Phillips, pp. 162-65; and Irwin Ross, f19681 Loneliest Campaign: The Truman Victory of 1948 New York: New American Library, pp. 18-27.

29 Phillips, pp. 197-98; Clark Clifford, (1990) Counsel to the President New York: Random House.

Black voters constituted at least 4 percent of all potential voters in such critical states as New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Illinois. Truman’s political needs dictated a renewed commitment to civil rights.J.B. Shannon, (1 951 )“Political Obstacles to Civil Rights”

Legislative Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences . 53-60.

30 Item No, 2, Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1948, Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1964, p. 3. Also see Ross, pp. 60-61.

31 Berman, p. 82.

32 Knowes, C. “PCA (Progressive Citizens of America) votes 74—point platform embracing Wallace policies,” New York Times, 19 January 1948, p. 1

33 V. O.Key, (1949) Southern Politics in State & Nation. New York: A. A. Knopf, p. 330; “Southern Democrats threaten secession,” Norfolk Journal and Guide, 31 January 1948, p. 1. . ,

72

34 Item No. 20, Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1948, p. 122.

35 Memorandum to the President from David K. Niles, 16 February 1948, Philleo Nash Files, HSTL. See Norfolk Journal and Guide editorial, “We need only the will,” 14 February 1948, p. 8, for the following: "Mr. Truman received the report of his Civil Rights Committee on 29 October 1947. That he so promptly acted on some of its recommendations, and during an election year at that, demonstrates that he has honest and deeds, convictions and the courage to give official voice to them."

36 Trussell, C.P.," Committee Forces Senate to act on Ives FEPC bill," New York Times, 6 called for,” (editorial) Norfolk Journal & Guide, 2 March February 1 948, p.1 ; “Action on Rights 1948, p. 2

37 The “Negro girl” was 23-year old Ada Sipeul and her case was argued by NAACP attorney . “Negro gets review of education plan,” New York Times, 1 1 November 1947, p.25.

38 Because of its political significance, the meeting was heavily covered by the press; some 54 reporters were in attendance including reporters from the major Florida dailies according to the Tallahassee Democrat, 8 February 1948, p.4 For another view, see R.A. Garson (1 974) The Democratic Party and the Politics of Press ‘Thompson fights bolt from Sectionalism . Baton Rouge Louisiana: Louisiana University ; party,” Pensacola Journal, 8 February 1948, p.1.

39 Times W. Moscow, ., “Wallace man wins; Sweeping victory in Bronx election,” New York 18 February 1948, p. 1 and p.16; Ross, p. 65-66; ‘Wallace rejects bid to rejoin party,” New York Times, 16 February 1948, pp. 1, 5.

40 Item No. 32 Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1948, pp. 147-151.

41 Key, p. 331 ; Phillips, p.207; Truman was asked (At his press conference on March 11):

Q: Mr. President, do you plan to send Congress bills to carry out your civil rights message ?A:

Congress never feels very happy when the Executive sends them bills and says "this is it." When I was in Congress it was customary for Congress to write its own bill. If they request suggestions from me, I will be glad to make them; Item no, 49, Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1948, p. 179.

42 Crisis, 45, (1948) p. 140; R. M. Moore to Senator Howard McGrath, Chairman of the Democratic Committee, February C.P. Trussell, “Report Senators favor draft, UMT,” New National 5, 1948; , York Times, 23 March 1948, p.21

43 Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, Universal Military Training, 80th Cong., 2d Session., 1948, p. 688.

Millis 393-398; Paul Hammond, (1963) “Super-Carriers and B-36 Bombers: Appropriations, , pp.

Strategy and Politics” in H. Stein, (ed ), American Civilian-Military Decisions: A Book of Case

Studies . Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, pp. 473-476; Item no. 52, Public Papers of the Presidents of The United States, Harry S. Truman: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, 1948, pp. 1 82-186.

45 Declaration of Negro Voters Folder, Box 376, NAACP Papers. . ,

73

46 On March 1 3, in Washington, seven of fifteen southern governors, upon receiving Strom Thurmond's report of his committee's fruitless negotiations with Chairman McGrath, repudiated Truman and his civil rights program, called for the restoration of the two-thirds rule in the convention, and urged Southerners to cast their electoral college votes for those candidates who did not support civil rights legislation.

Key, p.333-335. “Anti-Truman bloc leads in Alabama," New York Times, 6 May 1948 p.3; Krock, A. “In the Nation,” New York Times, 7 May 1948, p. 22..

47 Key, p. 181 and p. 334-335.

48 Item No. 97, Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1948, pp. 253-254;

49 A. Krock, New York Times 8 June 1948, p.24,

50 K. Porter, and D. Johnson. (19661 National Party Platforms: 1840-1964 Urbana: University of

Illinois Press, p. 404.

51 S. Lubell, (1956) The Future of American Politics. New York: Harper & Company, p. 100.

52 Porter and Johnson, pp.452-453.

53 Republican National Committee File, Box 1951, NAACP Papers, Library of Congress

54 Wood, L. “Wallace charges sham on rights,” New York Times, 26 June 1948, p. 4.

55 Walter White Folder, Box 376, NAACP Papers, Library of Congress

56 “Senate uncertain over draft, UMT,” New York Times, 21 March 1948, p.1 and p.8.

57 Included in this broad movement were liberals such as Senator Claude Pepper of Florida, Walter Reuther, president of the United Automobile Workers Union, Chester Bowles and Wilson Wyatt of Americans for Democratic Action, a recently formed private liberal organization, and southern conservatives such as Senator Richard Russell of Georgia and South Carolina's

Governor Strom Thurmond. C.MacDougal, (1965) Gideon's Army . New York: Marzani & Munsell pp. 473-75; also see Ross, pp. 72-75, and pp. 112-14.

58 Box 367, NAACP Papers, Library of Congress

59 Trussell, C.P., “Sharp floor tests due on platform,” New York Times, 12 July 1948, p. 31

60 Minneapolis Mayor Hubert Humphrey was a member of the drafting committee. He announced that he intended to fight for the inclusion of such specific civil rights recommendations as an anti- lynching law, abolition of the poll tax, an FEPC, and the abolition of segregation in the armed forces. Brock, C. (I 962 ), Americans for Democratic Action Washington: Public Affairs Press, p. 97; Also see Lautier, L. “Rights issue splits Democrats; Platform makers stynrred,” and” Platform makers warned of dilly-dallying,” Norfolk Journal and Guide, 17 July 1948, p 2; Ross, pp. 123-24

61 C. E. Brown, ed.,(1948) at Philadelphia: Democracy Work , Local Democratic Committee, p. 167., p. 178, p. 181 and p. 189.

62 Brown, p. 202;Trussell, , “South beaten on race issue as plank is widened,” New York Times, 15 July 1948, p. 8;. "Rout of the Bourbons," Nation CLXVII (1948), pp. 1-3. 74

63 Key, p. 335; New York Times, 15 July 1948, p. 9.

64 M. Ernst, and D.Loth, (1948) The People Know Best, Washington Public Affairs Press; Ross, pp. 133-35.

65 Key, p. 335.

66 J. Abels, (1959) Out of the Jaws of Victory . New York: Henry Holt & Co,p.147.

67 York Times 1 8 July 1 p. 3. New , 948,

68 Key, p.335.

69 Wilson Record, (19511 The Neoro and the Communist Party Chapel Hill: University of

North Carolina Press, pp. 280-81. Also see MacDougal. Gideon's Army II. 506-83.

70 , for example, Walter White Executive Orders 9980, 9981 , in F.R. 431 1 4314. Also see, to Harry Truman, 23 July 1948, Box 367, NAACP Papers, Library of Congress

71 As will be discussed, Randolph had announced that if the president permitted a segregated draft, then his organization would stage a campaign of civil disobedience. Pittsburgh Courier, 3 July 1 948, p. 1

72 M. Konvitz, (1966) Expanding Liberties: Freedom's Gains in Postwar America New York: Viking, p. 260.

73 Washington: Government Printing Office xi-xii. Freedom. To Serve , pp. , (1950)

74 27 Baltimore Sun, 27 1948; Montgomery Advertiser, 29 July 29,1948; Shreveport Times. 1 August 1948.

75 “Wallace scorns Truman,” New York Times, 28 July 1948, p.4.

76 w.White, “21 Southern Senators map a filibuster on civil rights," New York Times, 28 July 1948, p.6.

77 A more complex examination of the General’s statement follows in a subsequent chapter. “NAACP hits Bradley speech,” Washington Post, 29 July 1948, p.3.

78 Item No. 29, Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1948, pp. 422-23.

79 R. Reynolds, (1948) "Triumph for Disobedience," Nation CLXVIL228.

80 A more complex examination of the end of disobedience campaign follows in a subsequent chapter. “Civil disobedience program abandoned,” Norfolk Journal and Guide, 21 August 1948, p. 1 (Home edition) and “Civil disobedience drive abandoned, "(National edition) 28 August 1948, p. 2.

81 Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2d Session., 1948, XCIII 9651-52.

82 Abels, p. 82 .

75

83 Memorandum to the President from Donald Dawson, 9 September 1948, Philleo Nash Files, Box 6, HSTL.

84 Committee Members were Charles Fahy, former solicitor general of the United States; Lester Granger, executive secretary of the Urban League; John H. Sengstacke, editor of the Chicago Defender; Dwight Palmer and Charles Luckman, industrialists; William Stevenson, educator; and Alphonsus J. Donahue, a prominent Catholic layman. A comprehensive discussion of the Fahy Committee and its staff follows in a subsequent chapter. Philleo Nash Files, Box 28, HSTL. Luckman and Donahue contributed no work to the committee.

85 “Wallace opens Southern campaign with meeting," Norfolk Journal and Guide, 4 September

1948, p. 1; MacDougal, vol. Ill, 707-44

86 Pittsburgh Courier, 2 October 1948, pp. 4.;. Item no, 219, Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1948, p. 650.

87 Key, pp. 337-44; Cited in Abels, p. 219.

88 Abels, p. 219, p. 220.

89 Aronson and Spiegler, (December 1949) "Does the Republican Party Want the Negro Vote?", Crisis, p. 365.

90 Anthony Leveiro, “President receives civil rights plan,” New York Times, October. 30,1948, P-1-

91 C. Van Auken, "The Negro Press in the 1948 Presidential Election," Journalism Quarterly XXVI (1949), 431-35.

92 Lubell,p. 190; Ross, pp. 163-271.

93 For an analysis of the urban vote, see R. A.Lee, (1 966) Truman and Taft-Hartlev. Lexington: University of Kentucky Presspp. 143-52; for an analysis of the farm vote, see A. Matusow, (1967) Farm Policies and Politics in the Truman Years. Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, pp. 185-89. A reexamination of the farm vote is undertaken by Ross, pp. 256-60.

94 Clifford, p. 231

95 H.L. Moon, (1949)“What Chance for Civil Rights," Crisis LVI 42-45. ,

96 Aronson, A. and Spiegler, S. "Does the Republican Party Want the Negro Vote?", Chsis, LXVIII (1949), 365.

97 K. Schmidt, (1960) Henrv Wallace: Quixotic Crusade. Syracuse. N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, pp. 232-51

98 Reston, James, ‘Truman victory is found to contain four elements,” New York Times, Nov. 4,1948, p. 8; Ader, E. "Why the Dixiecrats Failed," Journal of Politics, XV (1953), 356-69.

99 Berman, W.C. "The Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Policies of the Truman Administration," in The Truman Era As a Research Period, ed. Richard Kirkendall, Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1967, p. 193.; Moon, in passim 76

100 Helen Gahagan Douglas to Walter White, December 3, 1948, Douglas File, Box 419, NAACP Papers, Library of Congress. Item No, 274, Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1948, p. 947.; W.White, ‘Truman forces convinced filibuster on rights will fail, New York Times., 27 November 1948, pp. 1, 63; 181. NAACP press release, 2 December 1948, NAACP Papers, Library Of Congress

101 “Republicans push rights challenge,” New York Times, 24 December 1948, p. 18.

102 David Flitner, Jr., (1986) The Politics of Presidential Commissions . Dobbs Ferry, New York: Transnational Publishers, pp. 10-12.

103 Flitner, p.12.

104 Samuel P. Huntington, (19611 The Common Defense. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 384-388; Adam Yarmolinsky, (19711 The Military Establishment. New York: Harper & Row, pp. 194-210.

105 Riddle, p. 144, p. 154 and p. 156. Also “Billion Dollar Watchdog,” Time, March 8, 1943.

106 Yet, as will be seen in Chapter Five, the President’s Committee would also fashion its case on the need for efficiency and better coordination in manpower planning, intelligence and oversight.

107 Riddle, in passim.

108 As will be shown in chapter four, the President’s Equality Committee also enjoyed excellent press relations because the Executive Secretary of the Committee and its most active Committee members were journalists. Riddle, p. 49.

109 Anthony Platt, (19711 The Politics of Riot Commissions. New York: Collier Books p. 3.

110 “Limited in lynching case,” New York Times, (14 November 1946) p. 33; ‘Truman orders lynchers found, voices horror at Georgia crime,” New York Times, (31 July 1946), p. 48; Minutes of Executive Committee Against Mob Violence, (21 August 1946) Box 332, NAACP Papers; White, pp. 330-331.

111 McCoy, & Ruetten “U.S. lynch probe felt not enough,” Pittsburgh , p. 48; Courier, (8 November 1946) p. 3; “American Justice? (editorial),” Pittsburgh Courier ,31 May 1947, p. 6 ; Tom C. Clark to HST, (1 1 October 1946) Truman Papers, OF 596A in HSTL.

112 ‘Truman may name lynch committee," Pittsburgh Courier, 5 October 1946, p.1 “Truman creates group to probe civil rights,” Pittsburgh Courier, 14 December 1946, p. 1; “Disappointing for US,” Pittsburgh Courier ,18 January 1 947, p. 6; The Georgia lynch inquiry,” Chicago Defender, 5 October 1946 p. 1; December 14, 21, 1946; ‘Truman hits hate groups,” , Baltimore Afro-American ,14 December 1946, p.1; Kansas City Call, 20 December 1946, p. 9.

113 To Secure These Rights, (1947) Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, in passim. Quotes from pages 41 and 47, respectively.

114 To Secure These Rights, p. 162.

115 Morris MacGregor, (1981) Defense Studies: Integration of the Armed Forces. 1940-1965. Washington: Center of Military History, pp. 296-297. 6 .

77

1 1 Sample of news articles reported in Norfolk Journal and Guide, 8 November 1 947, p. 8.

117 Chicago Sun-Times, 2 November 1947; Washington Post, 30 October 1947, Washington Star, 30 October 1947; New York Herald Tribune, 9 November 1947; Louis Lautier, “Segregation's end urged,” and “To secure these Rights,” Norfolk Journal and Guide, 8 November 1947, New York People’s Voice, 30 October 1947.

118 U.S. Congress, Senate. Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program. Hearings. 11 March 1943, p. 220 in Riddle, p. 28.

119 Arnold Rogow, (1 966) A Victim of Duty; A Study of James Forrestal. London: Rupert Hart- Davis, pp. 187-188; U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 15 April 1944, National Defense Establishment: Unification of the Armed Services, Hearings on S.758, 80th Cong., 1st

Session, Part 1 pp. 7-8.

120 |_ater, Truman appointed Forrestal the first Secretary of Defense; the pressures of the job eventually brought on a general breakdown in Forrestal’s mental health, forcing his resignation and suicide.

1 21 Harry S. Truman, (26 August 1944) “Our Armed Forces MUST Be Unified," Collier’s, pp. 16, 63-64; E. F. Raines, & D. R. Campbell, (1986) The Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Evolution of Army Ideas on the Command. Control and Coordination of the U.S. Armed Forces. 1942-1985. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, p. 37.

122 Walter Millis (ed.) (1951) Forrestal Diaries. New York: Viking Press, pp. 62-63; Rogow, p. 191;

C. Joseph Bernardo and Eugene H. Bacon, (19611 American Military Policy: Its Development

Since 1775 . 2nd ed. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, p. 456; Newsweek, 19 November 1945.

123 Richard Haynes, (1973) The Awesome Power: Hartv S. Truman as Commander in Chie f.

Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, p. 99.

124 Item no. 52, Public Papers of the Presidents of The United States, Harry S. Truman: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, 1945, pp. 546- 560; Millis, pp. 119-120.

125 Millis pp. 148-149; Hearings, National Defense Establishment, Pt. 1, pp. 6-10, Truman to Patterson and Forrestal, 15 June 1946, Records Group 330, Office Secretary of Defense, Hoover Commission Report, Unification of the Armed Forces, National Archives.

126 Haynes, p. 102.

127 Millis, pp. 203-205.

1 28 House Documents, 80th Cong., 1st Session. “Patterson and Forrestal compromise at last on unification,” New York Times, 17 January 1947, p.1

129 Anthony Leveiro, “(Fleet Admiral) King fights Army-Navy bill on unification,” New York Times, 7 May 1947, p. 1.

130 pu b|jc Law 253, 80th Cong., 1st Session. 78

131 Forrestal to Truman, 28 July 1947, Official File 1285 in Truman Papers; Item no. 182, Public Papers of the Presidents of The United States, Harry S. Truman: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, 1947, pp. 420; Millis, pp. 295-299.

132Testimony in front of National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs, (26 April 1948). Copies in James Evans Files, US Army Military History Research Collection, Carlisle Barracks, PA. and in OSD 291.2 National Archives, pp. 72-74 and 78.

133 in Truman Library and Millis, ed. (1951) The Forrestal Diaries. Harold D. Smith Diary Harry S. , New York: Viking Press.

134 He enlisted in Battery B of the National Guard at Kansas City in the year it was organized. into a full regiment. As was When World War I broke out, the Kansas City batteries were extended customary at the time, the men elected their officers. Truman was elected a first lieutenant of light artillery in Battery F of the Second Missouri Field Artillery. After training in Oklahoma, his unit was shipped to Vosges, France in March, 1918. In July, he was given command of Battery D, 129th Field Artillery in the Vosges Mountains. He commanded his unit at St. Mihiel, the Meuse- Argonne, Varennes, Verdun and Metz. Truman, (1955) Vol. 2 of Memoirs, p. 46; Jonathon Vol. Daniels Man of Independence, Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, pp. 89-90; Truman, Memoirs ,

1, pp. 125-128; Steinberg, p. 42.

135 I, Item no. Public Papers of the Presidents of The Truman, Memoirs , Vol. pp. 153, 510; 36, United States, Harry S. Truman: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, 1947\ p. 147; Russell Weigley, (1962) Towards an American Army : Military Thought from Washington to Marshall, New York and London: Columbia University Press, p. 247.

1 36 Item no. 44, Public Papers of the Presidents of The United States, Harry S. Truman: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, 1945, p. 78

137 Item no. 128, Public Papers of the Presidents of The United States, Harry S. Truman: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, 1946, pp. 407- 408

138 Haynes, p. 85 and Item no. 268, Public Papers of the Presidents of The United States, Harry S. Truman: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, 1946, p. 509.

139 Lewis B. Hershey to Truman, 5 December 1946; Patterson to Truman, 4 February 1947, in Subject File, National Military Establishment, Selective Service, Clifford Papers in Harry S. Truman Library.

140 ‘Testimony before the Fahy Committee,” 12 January 1949, Vol. 1, 2-3, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL, Cited hereafter as "Testimony."

141 In a preliminary poll of 723 daily newspapers, Editor & Publisher showed that Tom Dewey led Truman by four to one in the volume of newspaper support given by the nation’s dailies. Specifically, the Republican candidate received support from 69 percent of the newspapers and these papers delivered 70 percent of the daily circulation. By contrast, Truman won support from 17 percent of the newspapers accounting for 14 percent of the circulation. Another 4 percent of the newspapers supported Henry Wallace and Strom Thurmond. The remaining 1 1 percent were independent or uncommitted. In terms of circulation, Dewey garnered eight times the support that Truman had. Four years later, Adlai Stevenson garnered 14 percent to Eisenhower’s 68 percent. Editor & Publisher, 11 September 1948, p. 5; 30 October 1948, p. 11; 1 November 1952, p. 9. 79

142 Herbert L. Williams, (1984) The Newspaperman’s President: Harrv S. Truman. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, pp. 206-210.

143 White House Press and Radio Conference, No. 36, 4 December 1945; Conference No. 124 17 October 1947; Williams, p.3.

144 ‘Truman and Press,” Editor & Publisher, 2 June 1945, p. 38.

145 Personal letter to Clyde C. Bowers, Santiago, Chile, 1 December 1948 cited in Williams, p. 176.

146 Informal remarks, William Jewell College, Liberty, MO quoted in Williams, p. 176.

147 Truman, Vol. 2 of Memoirs pp. 205-207.

148 York: Colin Seymour-Ure, (1982) The American President: Power and Communication. , New St. Martin’s Press, p. 34.

149 James Pollard, (1964) The Presidents and the Press Washington: Public Affairs Press, p. 27.

150 Williams, p. 104; In 1946, Truman appointed a Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty to examine the effectiveness of existing federal employment procedures in protecting both internal security and individual rights. He did this as much to grab the initiative away from Congress as to enact legislation. Athan Theoharis, (1971) Seeds of Repression. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, p. 127.

151 David Caute, (1978) The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge Under Truman and Eisenhower. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 30.

152 Theoharis, pp. 145-146.

153 J. Butler, 29 September 1951, “Voluntary Security Rules Broaden Restricted Area, Editor & October “Protest to Truman Voted on Censorship,” Editor & Publisher, p. 1 1 ; C. Watson, 6 1951 , Publisher, p. 12; G. Brandenburg, 24 November 1951, “Sigma Delta Chi Opposes Secrecy Rule,” Editor & Publisher, p. 12; “Editors Won’t Rewrite Gag, But Truman Sticks to Idea,” 22 December 1951 Editor & Publisher, p. 9. ,

154 R. U. Brown, 22 December 1951, “Shop Talk at Thirty,” Editor & Publisher, p. 68.

155 Item No. 86, Public Papers of the Presidents of The United States, Harry S. Truman: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, 1948, p. 231; James Pollard, (1951) “President Truman and the Press,” Journalism Quarterly,

156 Pollard, p. 59. CHAPTER 3

MILITARY POLICIES

Why did race relations begin to change in the postwar period? How did

the United States Army, an institution that was basically segregationist, become

the leading architect of desegregation? Most important, what role did the press,

publicity, and censorship play in this transformation?

In Truman's revolving-door Defense Department, individual initiative often colored the institutional response. In the interim between the end of World

War II and the start of the , two very different administrators led the department. One Defense Secretary was an implacable gradualist, the other was a flamboyant bull who charged headlong into every situation. These men, and their colleagues in the United States Army, left an indelible stamp of personal authority on their offices. It was not a time for bland organization men.

Given this contentious climate, it is remarkable that a policy as controversial as racial reform managed to survive, and ultimately thrive in the U.

S. military. In this chapter, we will focus upon the contrasting personalities of the men who helped shape this policy. We will begin to show how liberal policymakers capitalized upon the tumult and transition in the Defense

Department to expedite these reforms. We will argue that by airing, or more often, by threatening to expose the contradictions in the military's segregationist policies to public scrutiny, the desegregationists were able to w*n major concessions from the Army.

80 81

The atmosphere of crisis and personal reaction, rather than organizational response, was no less evident in the U. S. Army itself. In fact,

because it was a larger bureaucracy with a longer history, the tradition of

resistance to racial reform was better entrenched in the Army than in the

Defense Department. In this chapter, we will examine a series of incidents in which the Army tried to create a policy separate from that of the Truman White

House. Also, in this chapter, we begin to specifically explore the activities of the

President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed

Services and to meet the people who made that policy. A more comprehensive examination of the committee and its actions will appear in chapter five.

Interestingly enough, the first articulation of modern Army segregationist policy was presented to a group of journalists. In the aftermath of a series of racial incidents in southern Army training camps in 1940, Secretary of War

Henry Stimson ordered William Hastie, his Civilian Aide, to produce a comprehensive study of the violence. Hastie made recommendations concerning the integration of the "Negro Soldier into the Army." Upon receipt of

Hastie's report, Chief of Staff George Marshall formulated an official Army policy that rejected Hastie's recommendations. The policies he substituted would be in effect throughout the War. 1 In December 1941, Marshall argued that

a solution to the issues presented. ..would be tantamount to solving a social problem which has perplexed the American people throughout the history of this nation. The Army cannot be charged with the undertaking. The settlement of vexing racial problems cannot be permitted to complicate the tremendous task of the War Department and thereby jeopardize discipline and morale... 2

Marshall's policies, based on this rational, were first made public to a group of

Negro newspaper editors on December 8, 1941. The editor's opposition to both 82

the spirit and letter of these policies was lost in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor.

Although African Americans creatively expressed displeasure with Army policy

3 in their newspapers throughout the war, the policies continued after the war in the form of Circular 124, informally called the Gillem Board Report, which was designed to create separate-but-equal treatment for black Americans in the

4 Army by establishing parallel battalions of white and black soldiers.

Gillem Board

Although the military did not invite journalists to address its policy-making

sessions, it did depend on a group of black editors to help evaluate the policy as articulated in the Gillem Board Report. For this reason, and because of its centrality in later policy-making, that report is worth extended examination. The idea for the Board was suggested by Assistant Secretary of War John J.

McCloy, who had set up an Advisory Committee on Negro Troop Policies during

5 Would War II. Alvan Gillem, who chaired the committee, did not expect--or

want-the assignment when it was first made. He had expected to be sent to assist General Douglas MacArthur in the containment of postwar Japan. Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower gave Gillem this assignment because he had written a report on blacks in the military when he was a student at the Army War

6 College in the 1920s.

The Gillem Board Report was the most extensive inquiry ever made by the Army into its Negro policy. From October 1945 through January 1946, the three-person Gillem Board heard testimony from sixty-nine military and civilian witnesses. The Board also scanned various studies of Negro manpower made between the two world wars. Although the role of black servicemen in World

War II had been assessed by many different parties in and out of the 83

government, the Army based its decision-making on evaluations made by

McCloy's Advisory Committee on Special Troop Policy. Rather than statistically analyze the performance, the Committee depended on anecdotal evidence gleaned from interviews conducted with personnel from all branches and at all levels of command. Military analysts gave greater attention to the disappointing performance of large black combat units, especially the 92nd Division in Italy.

They ignored successful contributions made by smaller black units in Europe and the Pacific.

While the official service assessments focused on the failures, civil rights groups and other advocates of integration emphasized instances of black heroism and effectiveness, although their overall assessments were not always accurate. Notably, Congresswoman Helen Gahagan Douglas' report was generally balanced and widely circulated. The Gillem Board's recommendations were issued in April 1946 as the Army's "Utilization of Negro

Manpower in the Postwar Army Policy," superseding the official policies announced in October 1940 and reinterpreted by Marshall in December 1941. 7

As citizens, the Gillem Board said, African Americans had a right and obligation to serve in the armed forces. The Army was obliged to make the most

effective use of its manpower, but it had failed to do this during World War II.

They specifically exonerated the black troops themselves from failure. Without a definite combat mission, they said, Negro units were often formed for the sole purpose of absorbing black troops. The Gillem Board found that American blacks were better educated and could have accomplished a wider variety of tasks.

In this regard, the Gillem Board broke with traditional segregationist policy. Without setting a timetable, the Board did assert that the Army's future policy should "eliminate, at the earliest practicable moment, any special 84

consideration based on race." 8 While the Gillem Board recommended that blacks could be integrated into overhead or basic maintenance units, this was to be for duty hours only. Off-duty housing was to remain segregated.

Integration was left for some far-off time, at some “unknown date." In the future, perhaps, manpower would be used "without regard to antecedents of race." The report called for maximum utilization of Negro manpower while it imposed a quota of 10 percent Negro strength. This action by the Gillem Board was clearly contradictory. Maximum utilization could not be achieved with imposed strength limits.

Because the Gillem Board policy was filled with contradictory declarations. Army administrators were able to interpret the new policy as they pleased. The Personnel and Administration Division of the War Department (G-

1), who were charged with instituting the new policy, said that the ultimate goal was to integrate small Negro units into larger white units. 9 Yet, Secretary of War

Patterson told the National Negro Press Association that it meant the end of segregation. 10 Despite Patterson's optimism, most informed blacks saw the new policy as a failure. "This new Army directive indicates that the Army command has undergone no real change of heart..." the Pittsburgh Courier

11 reported. The Norfolk Journal and Guide felt that it was a step in the right

direction, but reserved its judgments until it saw how the policy was implemented. 12 Roy Wilkins of the NAACP and Lester Granger of the National

Urban League each condemned the policy as "inadequate" because it did not end segregation. Further, they said "there is nothing new in his announcement to show how vacillation or weak policy will be prevented.” 13

Although the War Department ordered the new policy "be initiated without delay," the policy mostly went unenforced. 14 This dereliction was attested to by a group of black newspaper publishers, who were invited by the 85

Secretary of War to tour European installations and another tour by Marcus H.

Ray, Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War. 15

Generally, Army staff openly rebelled against the liberal aspects of the

Gillem policy. Deputy Chief of Staff, General Willard S. Paul, formally replied to

Ray's report. Paul argued that segregation was needed to keep possible troublemakers out of combat divisions, to promote efficiency, and to placate regional racial prejudice among influential leaders in Congress and in the

Army. Integration should be postponed until the quality of black troops improved. 16

These views ran counter to both the official policy and the public statements of the Secretary of War. A vague impasse continued, with pragmatic resistance suppressing racial progress until the Korean War. Gradual change began, however, with the elevation of James Forrestal to the post of Secretary of Defense.

James Forrestal

Forrestal served as the nation's first Secretary of Defense. His characteristically grim, taut expression, flat, broken nose, thin lips, and compact body, all gave the impression of a man who was self-possessed, resolute and effective. Although Forrestal served as Secretary of Defense for less than two

years (1947-49), it was an especially stormy period within the defense establishment and among the nations of the world. As Hanson Baldwin wrote in the New York Times, "The disarray on the international scene and the uncertain direction of U.S. foreign and domestic policy immensely complicated the task of establishing new national security machinery." 17 To effectuate these changes, 86

Forrestal chose an evolutionary approach that stressed accommodation to build cooperation. For example, he held informal inter-service conferences in Key

West, Florida, and Newport, Rhode Island, among the service directors.

Forrestal gained wide respect for his leadership, though he had never served in

combat.

Forrestal was a gradualist on racial progress, as he was unification. His

primary contributions to racial progress were to establish a National Defense

Conference on Negro Affairs and to help facilitate issuance of the Executive

Order and formation of the President's committee, rather than a committee

under the office of the Secretary of Defense. On this issue, Forrestal consistently

impeded press coverage. He established the press management techniques

that were taken up by the President's desegregation committee. Forrestal urged

silence to expedite candid discussion and win cooperation. It will be shown that

Forrestal's views were uppermost in Truman's mind when the President spoke

to his Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces.

Forrestal's Career

Early in his life Forrestal was drawn to journalism. After high school and

before college, Forrestal had a brief career as a reporter. While he was a

student at Princeton, he served as editor of the college newspaper. In this

capacity he interviewed many people on and off campus including Franklin D.

Roosevelt, who was then Navy Undersecretary. After college, Forrestal gave up

his journalistic ambitions to pursue a career in business. After a series of jobs,

he became an employee and eventually moved up to the presidency of the

investment house of Dillon, Read and Company. Washington lawyer and later

Roosevelt confidant, Thomas G. Corcoran (Tommy the Cork) recommended the 87

46-year old Forrestal as an administrative assistant in 1940. Soon after, Navy

Secretary Frank Knox convinced Roosevelt to make Forrestal Undersecretary of the Navy. Forrestal performed brilliantly in the position, taking special care to

curry favor with the press and Congress. When Knox died suddenly in 1944,

Forrestal was the natural choice to replace him.

Although he did well as Undersecretary, Forrestal was not Truman's first

choice for Secretary of Defense in September 1947. War Secretary Robert

Patterson, however, turned down Truman's request because he feared that

Congress would not support the military adequately. "It was," he declared, "too

18 hard to put in for money." Forrestal accepted Truman's appointment, and

quickly began to deal with the financial restraints Congress placed on the new

of position. When it authorized the creation of the Office of the Secretary

Defense, Congress did not want "a plethora of assistant secretaries sweeping

into the Pentagon and unrolling large ribbons of red tape;" it therefore

authorized the Secretary to have only three assistants. Forrestal chose three

able men to fill these positions: Marx Leva was Forrestal's principal assistant

and focused chiefly on legal matters; Wilfred McNeil was primarily responsible

for overseeing the military budget; Jack Ohly served as public relations

assistant for the Secretary and functioned as liaison between civilians and the

19 military and between the Secretary and the three service secretaries.

McNeil who had been Navy fiscal director, introduced Leva to Forrestal.

Leva, an Alabama native, was a graduate of Harvard Law School and former

clerk to Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black. During World War II, Leva saw

combat with the Navy in the Mediterranean and in the invasion of Normandy.

After the war in Europe, Leva became General Counsel on Me sleil's staff. Leva

became Forrestal's closest confidant. 88

Leva suggested that Forrestal hire Ohly to balance the Navy-dominated

OSD. Ohly, a graduate of William and Mary and Harvard Law, was a member on the staff of Secretary of War Robert Patterson. Ohly gained renown by

serving as Executive Secretary of the President's Advisory Commission on

Universal Military Training. 20 Leva and Ohly served as de facto assistant under-

secretaries. They shared office space, lunched together almost daily, and

shared decision-making on a wide variety of issues. They were especially

influential in deciding Defense Department press and racial policies.

Forrestal and the Press

During Forrestal's watch as Secretary of Defense, there was public

conflict in virtually everything the Pentagon touched. From custody of the atom

bomb to the budget, every decision seemed marked by press leaks and

anonymous rumor-mongering. Pentagon quarreling, especially over the issue

of unification, became "one of shoddiest spitting contests in U.S. military

history." 21 This in-fighting was often played out publicly in the newspapers.

When Forrestal took office, he did not realize how press relations would

complicate his mission. During World War II, public relations developed as a

centrally-organized activity of the military services. It then acquired unstoppable

momentum in the postwar period; each branch of the military grew to rely on it

as a major weapon to further its budgetary organizational changes. The

publicity surrounding the 1945-1947 unification battle created a press war that

Forrestal feared would destroy the prestige and credibility of the military. 22

Personally, Forrestal enjoyed good relations with the press. He held one

or more press conferences a month and often met with reporters for off-the-

record background talks. His primary press enemies were Drew Pearson and 89

Walter Winchell, who depicted him as a dangerous conservative because of his support for an Arab Palestinian state.

About a month before he was sworn in as Secretary of Defense, Forrestal suggested that he would clamp down on those who leaked sensitive data to the news media. He wrote Vannevar Bush, head of the office of Scientific Research and Development,

With the general international situation as it is, it might be well to review this open publicity policy and start putting the brakes on the flow of information to the American public, which unfortunately, reaches all foreign sources. There comes a time when the worldwide press wire must be excluded from the various experiments and projects carried out by the military of this country. 2 3

Forrestal held his first press conference on 23 September 1947. At that meeting, and on 10 October 1947, Forrestal tried to comprehensively refashion military-press relations. Forrestal told the press there would be separate administration by service of public relations work, designation of a public relations service within his office, and prior clearance by the Office of the

Secretary of Defense (OSD) of all statements concerning OSD personnel and functions, speeches by the War Council, and releases affecting two or more services which had not reached mutual agreement. On that same day, Forrestal confidentially directed the services to redefine and tighten security classifications and access. 24

Barely a month later, a Navy civilian engineer sent an unsolicited letter to the Washington Post accusing the Air Force of security violations. A flood of press leaks ripped through the media. To staunch the flow, in late 1947,

Forrestal suggested that the press should reimpose war-time voluntary censorship regulations. The Pentagon press corps refused to administer 90

controls as long as the military was unable to stop disclosures. Foreshadowing

Truman's 1951 self-censorship directive, Forrestal ordered a study on the press

25 and national security, which he received in January 1948.

In February, Forrestal issued a press policy which stated, "No article which touches on a controversial subject shall be published, nor shall any speech be delivered without prior approval of the Office of the Secretary of

Defense." This gag rule proved to be largely ineffective. A month later, Forrestal asked the publisher of the Arizona Star and a New York Times reporter to develop a new unified press policy for the services. They recommended a single press office run by a single press officer. 26

Whether his mind was on posterity or security, Forrestal established his own set of news-clippers, who collected relevant articles about the Defense

Department. In March 1949, during Forrestal's last month in office, the United

Press published two stories that contained classified information, one that described B-36 performance characteristics and the other quoted from an Air

Force study on of the Soviet Union. Forrestal reacted to these leaks by consolidating the Office of Public Information as the sole agency for dissemination for military information. 27 Defense Department attempts to control press coverage of infighting in the formation of racial policies would prove no more effective than other press curbs.

Forrestal and Racial Integration

In the period immediately preceding Forrestal's promotion, the Army was preoccupied with post-war demobilization. Generally, Caucasians were sent home first. Thus by default, by February 1946, African Americans represented

15 per cent of Army strength. To reduce that share, the Army suspended Negro 91

enlistments in July and discharged so-called "undesirable" troops in October.

However, by July 1947 in response to Soviet expansion, all enlistments were reopened.

As a result of Civilain Aide Marcus Ray's tour and the new Gillem policy, special training centers and personnel training efforts were established in

Europe. These training centers in Grafenwohr, Kaefetel, and Kitzingen were

primary destinations for a group of black publishers who toured post-war

Europe from 18 March through 8 April 1948. (Interestingly, recommendations be

28 this group of publishers figured in planning for the Berlin Airlift.)

The Army leadership saw the post-Gillem period as a success. As Army

historian Margaret Geis wrote,

The general trend of revisions in command procedures for European command was toward integrating small Negro units into composite larger units of the U.S. Army stationed in Germany, eliminating color as a factor in the recruitment and assignment of soldiers, and increasing the opportunities of affected Negro troops for education and advancement. During the entire period, the command devoted much thought and consideration 29 to use of its Negro troops.

One example of U. S. Army thought and planning revolved around the

possiblity of experimenting with integration on the individual unit level. In one of

his first reports on military desegregation, on 29 February 1948, Defense

Secretary Forrestal wrote Truman to discuss the concept of experimentation.

This particular plan may have been the brainchild of Army Secretary Kenneth

Royall. 30

On 12 March 1948, presidential counsel Clark Clifford met with Forrestal

and asked him to take the lead on racial desegregation. According to Clifford,

although he was personally sympathetic, Forrestal would not impose his views 92

on the three services. The next day Clifford wrote Forrestal a memo saying, "I think we are all fully aware of the difficulties and the fact that the world is not

going to be changed overnight, but I also think the time has come when we must make a start." 31

At the end of the 1948 Senate Hearings on Universal Military Training, civil rights leaders A. Philip Randolph and Grant Reynolds declared that they

32 would counsel young African Americans to avoid a segregated draft. The full import of this fiery declaration will be discussed in Chapter Five.

National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs 33

During a Pentagon-sponsored National Defense Conference on Negro

Affairs, Forrestal articulated his philosophy about publicity and the public to a distinguished group of black journalists, educators, and civil rights leaders.

Planning for the National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs began on 13

April 1948, when Marx Leva prepared a list of black leaders to be invited by

Secretary Forrestal to that conference. 34 The Conference was held at the

Pentagon on 26 April 1948. Nine conferees, along with seven other prominent guests, asked questions of Forrestal, Patterson, Leva, the service secretaries, their liaisons and aides. Journalists from eight different black newspapers were

represented at the Conference. These included Ira Lewis, President of the

Pittsburgh Courier, Cliff W. Mackay of the Baltimore Afro-Americarr, Louis Martin

and Charles Browning of the Chicago Defender, 35 Dowdal Davis of the Kansas

City Calf, Dan Burley of the Amsterdam News and P. B. Young, editor and ;

publisher of the Norfolk Journal and Guide.

The meeting was contentious. The conferees were encouraged by the

Navy's previously announced plans for desegregation, unhappy with delays in 93

policy implimentation by the Air Force and downright angry with Secretary of the

Army Kenneth Royall. After the conferees interviewed the service representatives, they held a final session with Forrestal. Together, they discussed points of agreement and conclusions. Forrestal, the former Secretary of the Navy, stressed that the gradualist approach had proven successful for the

Navy because it had been accomplished with a minimum of public discussion and with the aim of announcing success after it had been achieved, rather than

predicting it before it could be guaranteed. He pointed out that Navy changes

had been made with the full approval and support of top service leadership,

implying that such endorsement was absent among the Army General Staff.

Forrestal declared that he would not issue a statement of policy in the form of an official directive until he had more assurance that the directive would

be supported by those who would administer it. Forrestal declared, "the

utterance of a policy that is not followed through is more destructive than not

having one." Forrestal said he preferred to receive "unpleasant criticism" for

slow action, rather than to win plaudits for actions that are "manifestly insincere

and specious." He expressed a willingness to meet with an advisory group to

keep his office “conscious of the problem," but he insisted that the services

cannot be "forced into cooperation, mutual respect and coordination, such as

unification of the services required simply by law, by fiat."

Rather than address the dilemmas inherent in gradualism, the conferees

impressed upon Forrestal their absolute repudiation of Royall's support of

segregation. In sum, they argued that a national predilection for prejudice and

bigotry could not excuse its existence in the military; in fact, official policies of

segregation and military subservience to local discrimination policies

perpetuated and accelerated prejudice in American life. 94

On 12 May, Forrestal met again with Clark Clifford, along with White

House assistants Phileo Nash and David Niles to begin discussion of an executive order to desegregate the Armed Services. At that point, the White

House was, apparently, still considering the creation of a committee within the

Department of Defense to draft the Order. Authorship of the decision to create an Executive Order is less clear than authorship of the orders themselves.

According to Lee Nichols, Nash said he had previously contemplated a committee within the military establishment to push steps toward nonsegregation, similar to the War Department's Troop Policies Committee

(McCloy Committee) in World War II. Action was tabled until after the passage of

36 the selective service bill.

On 1 July, Clifford asked Nash to draft the two executive orders on civil rights. Clifford discussed the second order, which provided equal opportunity and treatment in the armed services, with Forrestal. The Defense Secretary requested that the order eliminate any specific timetable or deadline for compliance. He asked that each service be allowed to work out its own timetable and insisted that the order simply call for progress "as rapidly as possible." Clifford agreed and urged Truman to issue the amended executive order. 37

Kenneth Royall

Kenneth Royall, the Army’s highest ranking advocate for segregation, was blocked from attaining the top job in Truman's reorganized Department of

Defense. Royall worked for Secretary of War Robert Patterson. Patterson was

offered the post of Secretary of Defense by Truman. He declined it and resigned as War Secretary. During a brief interim, Royall took over as Patterson's 95

Royall by successor in the Secretary of War post. However, Truman snubbed offering him the lessor post of Secretary of the Army and offering the Defense

Secretary job to James Forrestal. The issue of military desegregation would,

of Army 38 eventually, cause Kenneth Royall to lose his position as Secretary ; yet, his tenure as one of the few vocal segregationists in the Truman administration was critical for the preservation of the Gillem Board policy. To do this Royall played a crucial role in the National Defense Conference on Negro

National 39 and in his Affairs, on the issue of desegregation of the Guard , support of General Omar Bradley who opposed the Executive Order. Perhaps because he anticipated his departure from the Pentagon, Royall was less active as the Army's point-man in later negotiations with the President's Committee on

Equality of Treatment and Opportunity.

Although General Omar Bradley would generate greater publicity at Fort

fight in Knox, it was Secretary of the Army Royall who led the against change the Army's racial practices. As the debate over these practices expanded in the

press, Royall emerged as the principal spokesman against further integration

and the principal target of civil rights forces. Royall was convinced that the

separate but equal formula of present policies did provide equality. When

questions of efficiency, compounded by fears of Soviet conspiracy, complicated

the debate, the issue seemed irrefutable to segregationists.

Royall was not only an outspoken opponent of desegregation, but he

may have also secretely worked with Omar Bradley and others in the Army and

in the Senate to hinder its implementation. It will be shown that he provided

false and incomplete statistics to prevent the President's desegregation

committee from completing its work. He recognized that early announcement of

desegregation plans could derail cooperation and tried to prematurely 96

announce them. In one of his last acts as Secretary of the Army, he threatened premature public exposure of White House efforts to block them.

Why did Royall feel empowered to take such a contrary stance with the

President and the Secretary of Defense? In part, it was because Forrestal

40 preferred to avoid conflict at any cost. It may also may have been because

Royall had strong support from all manner of segregationists. After virtually every public statement that he made, Royall received letters of support for his segregationist opinions. 41 For instance, after Truman's Executive Order, the

Army and Na vy Journal published an editorial extolling segregation. Royall

42 wrote Editor John Callan O'Laughlin praising him for the editorial

Royall's Career

General Omar Bradley was quoted as describing Royall as "a genial giant," who was 6 feet, 5 inches tall and 250 pounds. The scion of a noted

Southern family from Goldsboro, North Carolina, Royall was a Phi Beta Kappa graduate from the University of North Carolina and Harvard Law School.

Among his teachers at Harvard were Felix Frankfurter. After serving in the field

artillery in France in World War I, Royall returned to a lucrative law practice in

North Carolina, served in the state senate and was elected president of the

State Bar Association. Six months after Pearl Harbor, at the request of

Undersecretary Patterson, he returned to the Army as a reserve in the

Army fiscal and legal branches. Patterson promoted him to brigadier general and put him in charge of the Army's congressional relations. When Patterson replaced Henry L. Stimson in 1945 as Secretary of War, Royall was named

Undersecretary. 43 97

Royall served as War Secretary from 24 July 1947 through 17

September 1947. On 18 September 1947, the day after Forrestal was sworn in as Secretary of Defense, Royall was effectively demoted, and sworn in as

44 Secretary of the Army.

Royall and Racial Integration

As Undersecretary of War at the end of World War II, Kenneth Royall had

in the formation little to do with the military's racial problems. He was not active

of the Gillem Board policy. He first became involved with racial policies as War

Secretary when some congressmen from Northern states and Civilian Aide

Marcus Ray suggested that individual states should be permitted integrated

policy National Guard units, if they so desired. Before these suggestions, Army

dictated the National Guard, as a reserve component of the Army, had to follow

the Gillem policy, which did not allow integration. The Army General Staff,

including Chief of Staff General Dwight Eisenhower agreed that federal

recognition should be withdrawn from those National Guard units which

integrated Negroes into white units. 45 Eisenhower decided, however, that

Negro companies could be included in white battalions. The Army's Operation

and Training Division (G*3) and the Air Force opposed even this concession. In

a policy statement, the division expressed the opinion that if Negroes gained an

opening in the National Guard, "the next step by Negro leaders conceivably will

be to demand the integration of Negroes into Regular Army units as

individuals." 46

The Army appeared to recognize that change was in the air, but it gave

no indication of accepting it willingly. Asked to comment on the Committee on

Civil Rights' report, Secretary of the Army Royall would say only that the Gillem

47 policy was the one the Army followed, and it would be continued. 98

The Gillem Board policy (officially, War Department Circular 124) was

Royall intended to conclude in late October 1947; this was barely a month after became the Secretary of the Army. When Royall urged continuation of the

Gillem policy, Walter White asked for a meeting with Forrestal and Navy

Secretary John L. Sullivan. White was unable to change the Gillem Board policy. 48

officials with In late November, General B. O. Davis urged the Army meet the nation's black newspaper editors to respond to the resurgent political

49 interest in military desegregation. (As one of a very few African-American

relevant officers in the Pentagon, General Davis had problems even receiving

information. General Collins had to request approval from Royall's

Undersecretary, William Draper, Jr., to let General Davis meet with General

Charles Hall, Director of Organization and Training, and with Personnel and

Administration Director Willard Paul on the latest progress in race relations.)

Davis's request led to the tour of European installations by members of the

Negro Newspaper Association.

In November 1947, the first major attempt to form composite units of

whites and Negroes was made public when it was announced that some black

50 units would be included in the Eighty-second Airborne Division. Inquiries to

the Army about how the Committee on Civil Rights' report affected Army policy

prompted a message to be sent to all Continental Army commanders: "Recent

newspaper and magazine accounts have highlighted portions of the President's

Committee on Civil Rights. . . Such accounts taken out of context might be

misunderstood." 51 99

Integration of the National Guard

conflicts In 1948, the President's civil rights message sparked new between the Army and the states over who had the right to regulate the National

Guard. New Jersey passed a new constitution with a clause forbidding

Alfred E. segregation in the militia. On 1 February 1948, New Jersey Governor

to Driscoll announced that the Department of the Army had forbidden his state

52 to the integrate its National Guard. Immediately, Walter White sent a telegram

Secretary of Defense, citing the President's civil rights message instructions to the Secretary to end remaining discrimination in the military. White asked how the Army's action could be consistent with state law and Presidential directive. 53

The Administration immediately recognized the political importance of the Army's action in New Jersey. Marx Leva recommended that Forrestal should talk with Secretary Royall: "This is a serious matter both from the standpoint of

practical considerations and the standpoint of the political implications." After

his talk with Forrestal, Royall wrote Governor Driscoll that "for the present" the

Army would continue to recognize the New Jersey National Guard. Royall

warned that the recognition of an integrated New Jersey militia would not

constitute change of the Regular Army segregation policy, because segregation

"was considered to be in the interest of national defense, and both the staff and I

54 feel that this is still the case."

Charley Cherokee of the Chicago Defender noted the Driscoll statement

put Royall on the spot and suggested, "Well, we scribblers said he (Royall) was

probably excited and forgot to ask advice of his aide, James Evans, on when to

.* 55 open and when to close his big mouth on race matters. . Walter White noted

a paradox and addressed this with Secretary Forrestal. In the past, the Army

had stated that its policy was to conform to local laws and customs when 100

White refusing to violate the Southern etiquette of segregation. "How, then,"

clear- said, “can the imposition of segregation upon northern states having such

56 cut laws and policies in opposition to such practices be justified by the Army?"

Henry Wallace, campaigning for the black vote in Harlem, charged that the

President was insincere on the question of civil rights. If Truman really wanted to end segregation in the armed forces, he would ask Secretary of the Army

Royall to resign. 57

The New Jersey incident prompted repercussions in Connecticut, New

York, and Minnesota. 58 The National Guard issue caused enough concern at the White House that Secretary Royall was ordered not to answer any inquiries

59 without prior approval by Clark Clifford. Royall was caught between the Army

General Staff and the National Guard Bureau on the one hand and intense

White House pressure on the other. In a compromise, he would continue to offer

Army recognition and support to any state that outlawed segregation in the militia by constitutional amendment or legislative act. He refused to accept a

60 governor's executive order to end segregation as sufficient. Against the advice of Forrestal and Clifford, Royall insisted on defending segregation in his

letters to the governors of Minnesota and Connecticut: "It is the opinion of the

policy of 27 Staff--with which I concur-that in the interest of national defense the

April 1946 [segregation], should be uniformly applied throughout the Federal

forces of the Army." 61

Rovall meets National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs

Before the National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs, Royall began

to circulate a plan to test an integrated unit; Charley Cherokee suggested the

idea would be proposed to the Negro Publishers Association who were 101

planning to tour Army bases in Europe. He said Royall planned to use it to win

62 recognition before his run for Governor of North Carolina .

Although the group was not specifically named, a Newsweek article provided one of the few reported descriptions of Forrestal's National Defense

Conference. Army Secretary Royall told them Tm from North Carolina and I know the Negro ." 63 While that statement epitomizes Royall's remarks, it does not begin to suggest their full significance.

Royall told the conferees that when he first became Secretary of War, he directed a restudy of the Gillem Board Report to see if it should be renovated.

Generals Eisenhower and Bradley and the Army staff urged that he retain the policy without changes. Royall declared that he concurred with these decisions.

When asked about his attitude toward experimental or demonstration integrated units, Royall declared that "after very careful study and consideration with those who know a great deal about the military," he concluded that such projects should not be attempted. He said that he fully appreciated the Negro point of view on non-segregation. He dismissed as "political" any notion that the Army's

64 racial policies presented an undemocratic example to the world .

Attorney Charles Houston suggested that continued military segregation

65 might engender civil disturbances . In this connection, Houston noted, Royall had once referred to black units as possibly being vulnerable to subversive propaganda. Royall said he thought that the possibility was unlikely, but would

66 be dealt with .

The Secretary argued that the Army insisted upon racial segregation because of "military expediency" and "experience." But the conferees pointed out that the Army never had even tried integration on a broad scale. This insistence, they explained, expressed an Army attitude, rather than an acquired experience. When the Army did integrate the training of specialists, and when 102

Northern states integrated their National Guards, the conferees noted, the Army dismissed the positive results.

The Army was forcing upon blacks "uniformly and without exception" a pattern of racial segregation which legally prevailed in a minority of the states of the Union. "In so doing,” the conferees concluded, "the Army does severe violence to the Negro as a citizen by deliberately operating below the level of

American experience and purpose."

The next day, Colonel David Ginsburgh met with a few reporters to clarify

Royall's remarks. He explained that Royall meant to say social advances could only be made in the framework of the Gillem Report, not that social advances could only be made within the framework of segregation. The Defense

Conference was largely ignored by the white press, but black newspapers

publicized it and they were far more critical of witnesses.

Newsweek did suggest that the group reacted strongly to Royall's words.

in "Not only did it fail to repudiate [Civil Rights leader A. Philip] Randolph, but

effect [it] adopted his tactic by flatly refusing to form the Advisory committee that

Forrestal had encouraged." 67 In 1948 Randolph had called upon young

African-Americans to refuse to cooperate with the draft.

On 30 April 1948, Royall complained to Forrestal that the other secretaries did not appear at the Defense Conference; Royall argued that their

68 neglect disrupted the spirit of unification. Defense Conference Chair Lewis

Granger's final report rebutted Royall's testimony, which in turn, drew umbrage from Royall. Without first advising his Secretary of the Army, Forrestal released

69 the Conference report to the press and the New York Times. In reply, Royall

complained about the "bad rap" that he was getting from the prt ss. In late

September 1948, Royall sent a confidential memo to Forrestal. He wrote, 103

with the It seems to me that the Army as compared other two Departments is taking an unnecessary rap among the Negro and the liberal press in the matter of race relations.

This is in large part due to the conference of Negro leaders last spring, which now appears to have been

generally unfortunate. At that conference it was of insisted that I be present even at the expense postponing a Congressional hearing. None of the other Secretaries appeared, with the result that the entire burden of the criticism was directed at the Department of the Army and me personally. This criticism has carried over into the press ever since....

In view of the fact that the Army's present policy has not been disapproved by your office (nor by the President), and there has been no suggestion from

either source that a change should be made, I feel that your office should go on record publicly as

approving the Army's position.... I believe this course would be much better than for me to state (in necessary defense of the Army) the facts showing the tacit approval of the Army's position and demonstrating the fact that our own treatment of the Negro is equal to that of the Air Force and superior to 70 that of the Navy .

On Forrestal's behalf, Marx Leva wrote a draft reply which acknowledged that the Army received the burden of criticism. However, the office of the

Secretary of Defense had not disapproved of the Army policy because it had not

the reviewed it. Consideration of these policies would soon be given by

President's Committee. Forrestal chose not to use Leva's letter but instead chose to speak to Royall directly. Using Leva's unsent memo as a talking paper,

71 Forrestal blocked Royall's ultimatum . 104

First Peace-Time Conscription

In late May, weeks after Clark Clifford first approached Forrestal about composing an Executive Order, Forrestal, Bradley, and Royall testified against race-related amendments to the 1948 draft bill. The Republican-controlled

Senate Armed Services Committee rejected all segregationist and integrationist amendments and the Senate concurred by voice vote. After that defeat,

Southern Democrats threatened to filibuster when the draft law reached the

Senate floor. 72

The issue of desegregation continued to be a prominent one throughout the spring. On 21 May, the Army Chief of Staff sent underlined copies of the

President's Committee on Civil Rights and Higher Education reports to the nation's commanding generals. On 25 May, Leva sent Royall a copy of a report by Dennis Nelson, USNR Navy Public Relations Department. The report favorably compared the Navy's integration policy with that of the other services.

On 14 June, Evans sent Royall a note stating that a similar Army study would be sent that day under separate cover. 73 On 21 June, Lieutenant General Willard

Paul prepared a summary of action on the Report of the Negro Publishers and

Editors tour of European installations. In accordance with the editors’ recommendations, Paul recommended that Negro officer strength be increased for the European command, that the Training Center at Kitzingen be continued, and that no interim directive be sent to the theater regarding use of Negroes in overhead installations. In response, Royall reiterated his support for the Gillem

Report but also recommended that a study be instituted to find ways to increase the number of Negro officers. 74 105

National Guard and the Executive Order

Agitation for action to permit integration of the National Guard by a governor's executive order continued through the late spring. 75 Secretary

Royall wanted to answer these letters with another firm reaffirmation of the Army

Staff's opposition to any deviation from the policy of segregation, but would include a statement that constitutional or legislative action would be reluctantly accepted. 76 Chief of Staff Omar Bradley said that "from the military point of

view, I still think that any integration of Negroes.. .in the National Guard will create problems which may have serious consequences in case of national mobilization of those units." 77 However, the White House refused to let Royall mail his letters. 78 Clark Clifford informed Royall that "the President has suggested that this entire matter be studied carefully in the light of recent happenings"; and he wanted to "discuss the subject thoroughly." 79 Secretary

Royall said he knew of nothing in recent events that would change the policy he had announced earlier. "The staff and myself strongly feel that this policy cannot be changed without adversely affecting national defense...." Royall answered. 80

(The "recent happenings" referred to by the President and Clifford concerned the Democratic convention. A liberal plank against segregation in the armed forces had been adopted and the Administration would act upon it.)

As the focus of attention turned to the political conventions, Royall made fewer public statements about racial policies. However, on 19 July 1948, Chief of Staff General Omar Bradley held a 9:40 A.M. telephone call with Major

Kenneth Cramer to set up an appointment with Royall. He intended to speak with Royall on "the question of segregation." They later had lunch with eleven members of the top staff including Alvan Gillem and Dwight Eisenhower, who had appointed Gillem to create the "Negro utilization policy." 81 Executive Order

9981 was released on 26 July 1948. On that same day, Bradley contradicted 106

Truman's order in a comment made to reporters at Fort Knox. In turn, Royall

instructed his staff that they were not to comment on the Order. He reassured

Truman that Bradley meant no disrespect and he advised Bradley to explain the

incident to Truman. 82

When the time came to choose members of the Presidential Committee

in mid-September, Royall recommended that no one serve on it who had made

a statement on military desegregation. It may have been that the appointment of

Georgia-born Solicitor General Charles Fahy as chairman of the President's

Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services was

a bow to Royall. 83

Experimental Unit

Royall was usually an inept politician. But at the end of 1948, after the

election, he hatched a plan that would temporarily torpedo integration and

extend the life of the Gillem Board plan for another year and a half. As Secretary

of War, he had political support in Congress and in the Army. Yet the

integrationists continued to gain ground. In October, Royall seemingly reversed

course, and again suggested the Army should create an experimental

integrated unit. He explained that they had deferred the idea because of the

international situation, the small size of the Army at that time, and the national

elections. This time, in deference to Forrestal, the plan was carefully drawn up

with an absence of publicity. (Meanwhile, on 7 November 1948, ten days after

his surprise reelection, Truman ordered a severe budget cut of the defense

department.) According to some Washington-insiders, Truman was seeking the

resignation of Forrestal, Royall, and Air Force Secretary Stuart Symington. 84

Then, in December, Royall formally proposed a defense-wide experiment in 107

integration involving all the services. The Navy and Air Force refused to go along with the experiment. The plan was cancelled. Through this stratagem, the

Army was able to delay integration until 1950. 85

A Final Ultimatum

During the first few months of 1949, Royall challenged the authority of the

President’s military desegregation committee by withholding and then suddenly releasing necessary enlistment data to them. For months, Royall refused to work with the Air Force on a desegregation plan. Royall's procrastination put Air

Force Public Relations Officer Lieutenant William Savoy in a spot, the Chicago

Defender reported. Black newsmen kept "taking potshots" at Savoy because he would not release news about Negroes. If he released information, he would delay implementation of the Air Force desegregation plan. If he did not, he would be a target of black newsmen. 86 Then, on 21 April 1949, Royall sent the new Secretary of Defense a memorandum which summarized the number of

Negro officers and the reenlistment rate among black soldiers in defense of existing Army racial policy. 87

Royall’s testimony before the President's Committee echoed his statements before the National Defense Conference. Then, in early April, the new Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, simply and unequivocally ignored the President’s Committee and ordered the services to prepare desegregation plans. When segregationists attacked the decision, Johnson ignored them. In his response to Johnson, Royall combined deception and intimidation to create another major obstacle to desegregation. Others in the Army also would try to block racial progress, but none were as highly placed as Royall. First, he argued that the Department of the Army practices and procedures were "in 108

accord with the policies of the National Military Establishment and with

Executive Order 9981." Royall falsely claimed that the Army was making assignments in schooling, placement, and promotion without regard to race.

With this action, Royall was defying the President, the Fahy Committee, and the

Secretary of Defense by sticking to his belief that equality could be achieved through segregation. Then, in a separate confidential note sent on the same day, Royall reminded Johnson that during the previous spring he and Forrestal had met with the Senate Armed Services Committee to discuss the draft law.

"Certain Senators stated that they would violently oppose the legislation unless they were convinced that President Truman would in no event issue a peremptory order as Commander-in-Chief completely abolishing segregation in the Army." He noted that Forrestal had promised them as much, and that

Truman gave his approval as well. Then Royall closed his letter by warning

Johnson, "if any action were later taken by you or by other authority to abolish

segregation in the Army, I am confident that these Southern Senators would remember this incident and might possibly call Mr. Forrestal and myself as witnesses on the question." 88 Royall resigned five days later.

Omar Bradley

89 After Bradley's heroic efforts in Europe, President Harry Truman appointed him to restore the Department of Veterans Affairs and to manage the nation's veteran's hospitals, which were in scandalous disrepair. Bradley reluctantly accepted the post. In 1948, Bradley was named Army Chief of Staff.

In this position, he streamlined Army bureaucracy by devising a vice-chief of staff position and consolidating technical services under the director of logistics, administrative services under the director of personnel and administration as 109

well as financial and management under the Army comptroller. Bradley answered to Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and Army Secretary

Kenneth Royall.

During the racially turbulent years of Truman's first term in office, Bradley occasionally spoke out on his belief about racial desegregation in the military.

Although Bradley's early opinions echoed official Army policy, he received more positive press from most black newspapers than Royall. That situation changed

in late July 1948.

On the same day that Truman issued Executive Order 9981 which established the President's Equality Committee, Bradley told a group of military men and reporters that the Army would not desegregate before the nation did.

Bradley's statement earned nation-wide headlines even as Truman was urging a hostile Congress to pass a strong civil rights bill. For this reason, historian

Morris MacGregor described the Bradley incident as "the most celebrated pronouncement on segregation at the moment of the Truman order." 90 This section will provide new light on this critical moment. We will make a case that

Bradley contrived this incident to embarrass Truman and possibly derail his election efforts.

Up until the summer of 1948, Bradley's civil rights beliefs could be characterized as moderately segregationist. In January 1948, he told the

American Jewish Committee that the Army could not induce men to become

soldiers if they were divested of their dignity and human rights. He further stated:

Contributing to this atmosphere of racial discrimination is often the lack of education which has retarded the Negro. This denial of equal education opportunity to a portion of our civilian population tends to drag down the whole economic level of our people by preventing intelligent 110

utilization of our manpower resources and by limiting their purchasing income.

The Pittsburgh Courier, the nation's largest black newspaper, called Bradley the first American general to speak for abolishing discrimination and segregation in the Army. 91

In June 1948, Bradley spoke out again. In addressing Los Angeles Town

Hall, Bradley earned headlines by condemning harsh Army discipline and promised liberal treatment of draftees. In this context, Bradley was asked if liberal treatment might include racial integration. Bradley replied that the

"complete integration" of Negro personnel as distinguished from the maintenance of separate-but-equal all-Negro units within a Caucasian Army

92 was a problem "which is up to the population as a whole."

Bradley's Pre-Fort Knox Action

Bradley's activities from mid-July through mid-August 1948 suggest that he participated in a deliberate plan to embarrass Truman. Although the case is admittedly circumstantial, the evidence is compelling. Bradley's diary shows that on 19 July 1948, he made a 9:40 A.M. telephone call with Major Kenneth

Cramer to set up an appointment with Army Secretary Kenneth Royall. That

record shows that he intended to speak with Royall on "the question of segregation." Later that day, Bradley had lunch with eleven members of the top brass including Alvan Gillem, who created Circular 124, the Army's plan to handle utilization of Negro troops, Dwight Eisenhower, who appointed Gillem to that assignment, and Wade Haislip, Army Deputy Chief of Staff. 93

On 20 July, Bradley met with Washington Post owner Eugene Meyer and publisher Philip Graham. The Post would figure prominently in the ensuing Ill

incident. Bradley attended a Joint Chiefs meeting later in the afternoon. On 21

July, he had dinner at the home of Secretary Forrestal; Lieutenant General

Lucius Clay, who headed the military government in Germany, Royall and Army

Undersecretary William H. Draper, Jr., also attended. Draper had recently taken over responsibility for the Fort Knox Training Center from Brigadier General

John M. Devine. It is quite possible that they may have planned the Fort Knox trip at this dinner. On July 22, Bradley met with the National Security Council,

President Truman, the service secretaries and Forrestal. Afterward, he met again with the Joint Chief's staff. Bradley's diary for Friday, 23 July was blank.

94 However, he was in the office on Saturday.

On Saturday night the Kenneth Royalls threw a "double-barrelled celebration" to honor Bradley's birthday and his one-year anniversary as Chief of Staff of the Army. The gala, held at the Mayflower Hotel, was one of

Washington's social highlights. More than 800 movers and shakers attended.

The Post featured it on its Society pages. It is not improbable to believe that the upcoming special session of Congress (nicknamed the "Turnip" session) and

95 civil rights would have been prominent topics at the party.

On Monday, 26 July, Bradley met with Lawton Collins, his chief of public information and deputy chief of staff; Colonel C. B. Hansen; Thomas Schroth,

Managing Editor of the Brooklyn Eagle, and Diana Mower and Marion Cranston of the CIO. After work, Bradley flew to Fort Knox, Kentucky with Information and

Education Division Director Brigadier General C. R. Lanham; Personnel and

Administration Director Lieutenant General Willard S. Paul; Lieutenant General

H. A. Craig, Chief of Staff for Materials, Colonel Robert S. Moore; Colonel H. T.

Miller; Colonel H. K. Whalen; and Lieutenant Colonel J. B. Matthews, Director of Organization and Training. 96 112

Fort Knox Statement

The next day, Truman announced the new Executive Order promising

"equality of treatment and opportunity in the Armed Forces." In her article on the

Order, Mary Spargo of the Post commented upon liberal political pressures that may have motivated Truman’s action:

The President's unheralded action was taken on the eve of his appearance before the special session of Congress today when he is expected to advocate passage of the poll-tax repeal and the anti-lynching

bill.

It followed by less than 24 hours the adoption in Philadelphia of the platform of Henry Wallace's Progressive Party which called for the end of discrimination and segregation in the armed services 97 and in Federal employment.

Truman’s order delicately skirted phrasing that used the politically- volatile term, “desegregation “ Instead he called for “equality of opportunity and training.” Royall’s distinction between "separate but equal" and desegregation was momentarily preserved. Bradley did not keep up his diary for Tuesday, 27 July. The official files of the Chief of

Staff included a scrap from the Washington Daily News front page of

Tuesday, 27 July. The second news brief, datelined Fort Knox, Kentucky, reported:

The nation's new soldiers may start their Army careers on furlough. Lieut. Gen. Willard Paul, director

of personnel, said the Army might find it necessary to furlough a number of its draftees as soon as they are inducted because facilities for housing and training them are not available.

Gen. Paul spoke at a conference of high-ranking officers. Gen. Omar Bradley, chief of staff, said in 113

reference to the issue of non-segregation of races in the Army that, "the Army is not out to make any social reforms. Gen. Bradley said "the Army will keep men of different races in different companies. It will change 98 that policy when the nation as a whole changes it.’

On Wednesday, 28 July, Bradley returned to his office. Although his statements made nation-wide headlines and would therefore have certainly have been on his mind, there is no evidence from his diary that Bradley was working on the controversy.

On 29 July, James Evans, Civilian Aide to the Secretary of the Army, sent a copy of a resolution for anti-discrimination issued by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People to Army Secretary Royall. It is worth

remembering that Truman spoke at this conference, the first President to address the NAACP. 99

Later that day, Truman held a press conference in which he disclaimed

Bradley's statement. According to the Associated Press news-wire copy,

Truman told the news conference that he envisioned an eventual elimination of

segregation in the Armed Forces. The President told the reporters that his

information from Army Secretary Royall was that General Bradley had NOT said

he favored segregation in the lower echelons of the Army. When asked about

the statement attributed to Bradley, the Chief Executive said that he had not

seen the Bradley remarks but had been informed by Royall that Bradley had

made no such statement. Then a reporter asked whether the President

envisioned an eventual end of segregation. Truman declared that his new

executive order did, in fact, mean the end of segregation in the military. With that

100 statement, the postwar civil rights movement gained its first victory. 114

That evening, a Sergeant Burns delivered a note from Royall to the White

House. Royall apologized noting that "I am sure that General Bradley would not

Furthermore have made the statement if he had known reporters were present. at the time he had not read your Order and did not know of my instructions that

no comment would be made thereon. While the quotation of General Bradley

101 was substantially correct, he tells me that this quotation was incomplete."

Bradley spent 29 July in his office. At 1 1:40 P.M., Bradley met with

columnist Drew Pearson and Colonel C. B. Hansen. On 3 August 1948,

Pearson reported that Bradley could not have known about the President's

declaration because he woke up at 6:30 A.M. and reported to the seminar at

7:30. 102

On 30 July 1948, Bradley wrote Truman an apology at the direction of

Kenneth Royall. Bradley said he attended the Fort Knox conference to instill

commanders with the need for safeguarding the dignity and the individuality of

their men. During the last few minutes of the morning conference, Bradley said

he spoke extemporaneously, without notes, and that no record was made of his

comments. He claimed that he did not know that reporters had been admitted

into the conference. He assumed that he was speaking privately, but he was

prepared to meet the reporters later, at a scheduled 12:45 P.M. press

conference.

Earlier that morning, a commander asked for guidance regarding

establishment of separate service clubs for white and Negro soldiers. Bradley

wrote these commanders deserved some guidance to help them answer

segregation questions. Bradley write that he explained to the men that the

Army's only reason for existence lay in this capacity to provide for the nation's

common defense. Any policy which cut dangerously into voluntary manpower,

any policy which impaired operating efficiency at this time would jeopardize the 115

ability to maintain a minimum security force. He also noted many Southern volunteers felt antagonism and hostility toward progressive integration policies.

In guiding the commanders on segregation issues, Bradley told Truman that he had referred to the statement he had made five weeks earlier in

California. In Los Angeles, Bradley had said, "the question of integration of the

Negro is a vital problem of social reform--to be achieved first by the people of the United States--and thereafter by the United States Army."

Press reports, however, contradict Bradley's recollections. Reporters from the Associated Press, the United Press International, and the International

News Services were in Kentucky on 27 July to report how Fort Knox lessons were being applied to the Third Armored Division. 103 These journalists also on

Bradley’s comments; no newspaper, however, reported that Bradley specifically mentioned either the word segregation or integration.

Press reports do confirm that Bradley reaffirmed his belief that it would be hazardous for the United States to employ the Army deliberately as an instrument of social reform. Likewise, they show he said the Army must be kept fully aware of the substantial civilian progress in race relations.

Bradley assured Truman that he had no intention whatsoever of embarrassing him in any way. He closed his letter of apology by reiterating that had he known the press was present, he would have avoided any mention of the segregation issue. He further claimed that at that time, he had not yet seen the Executive Order published on 27 July. Finally when he returned to

Washington on the evening of 27 July, Bradley said he learned that the

Department had adopted a policy of "no comment" on his Executive Order. 104

As Clark Clifford noted, Bradley did not retract the views ascribed to him.

In fact, Bradley was once quoted as saying that he had done much to discourage instant integration and that, "true integration of the armed forces 116

would not come for another ten years, following the general pattern in the civilian community.” 105

Congressional Reaction.

After the Fort Knox statement, Representative Joseph Bryson of South

Carolina commended Bradley; Representative Ed Gossett of Texas and Overton

Brooks of Louisiana both accused Truman of playing politics with American security. South Carolina Senator Burnett Maybank, an Armed Services

Committee member, hailed the statement and admitted that he and Army generals agreed to retain segregation. Maybank's statement included an

unidentified news report of Bradley's remarks. From this, it appears that the

Chief of Staff made extensive remarks saying the Army was "the favorite whipping boy of the country" and that the caste system would not only remain but that "it's only the just reward for those who work the hardest."

The Post reported on these reactions. Spargo noted the Southern

Democrats, "already alienated from Mr. Truman, grimly noted his statement, and

started figuring what they could do to block his program." Spargo notes that

Senator Tom Stewart of Tennessee wanted a bill that would allow white

soldiers to refuse to serve in integrated units. Others, such as Alabama's Lister

Hill said that Truman's move would impair Army morale when efficiency was

crucial. As has been shown, Spargo says they united in charging the President

was playing politics with the issue. 106

On the other hand, Truman's desegregation statement at his press

conference impressed the African American community. Based on this

pronouncement and later confirming statements, civil rights lea fer A. Philip

Randolph felt obligated to suspend a nation-wide civil disobedience campaign 117

against draft registration. (See chapter four for a fuller discussion of this issue.) 107

Press Reaction.

At this moment in the Presidential campaign, Bradley's comment was hardly regarded as a minor statement. It prompted front-page headlines, debate among commentators, and letters to the editor. While no major news magazines covered the incident, many newspapers used the occasion to voice their opinion on racial separation in the military. The Washington Post and the New

York Times each published two editorials.

The Times, which relied on the Associated Press report, said that Truman termed Bradley's statement as a misquotation "to the effect that segregation would continue in the lower echelons of the Army." They noted that, after the press conference, Army public information officers would make no statement either on the President's extemporaneous press conference remarks or regarding General Bradley's views. Bradley saved a copy of the 29 July Post editorial which said:

... if General Bradley's offhand remarks at Fort Knox Tuesday on racial segregation in the Army are indicative of how the President's anti-discrimination order is to be applied, the program is indeed to be a hollow one.

The Post editorial accepted that "in fairness to General Bradley, it must

be explained that he had not seen the President's order at the time he

delineated Army policy." The Post skeptically characterized Truman's Orders as

"vague in outline and weak in administrative implication." The editorial closed

by arguing that "it would be encouraging to have the great stature and breadth 118

of vision General Bradley has exhibited on so many occasions devoted to meeting this problem squarely."

In a by-lined article, Times chief Pentagon reporter, Hanson Baldwin argued on behalf of General Willard Paul's version of the story:

It was undoubtedly a straight-forward and

courageous statement and it put the problem in the

perspective in which it belonged-as a national

problem, rather than as an Army problem. It required

amplification, however, which it has now received.

His remarks should have been read against the background of the policy the General enunciated with such complete logic at Los Angeles earlier in the year. There he repeated what he said at Fort Knox but in a form somewhat less bald. The complete integration of Negro personnel in the Army was a 108 problem which is up to the population as a whole .

Questions and Contradictions.

Historians Morris MacGregor and Richard Dalfiume concluded that

Bradley was unaware of the President's Order and unaware of the presence of reporters in the Fort Knox training room. As evidence, they cite Bradley's letters

109 of apology and the article by the Posts Mary Spargo .

However, some things do not add up. First, Bradley's statement to

Truman differs substantially from press reports of the Fort Knox statement.

Bradley says that he confused the words "segregation" and "integration" in his talk. Yet in the Associated Press article, Bradley is clearly quoted as saying, "the

Army is not out to make any social reforms." In that account, he goes on to say

that "the Army will put men of different races in different companies. It will

change that policy when the nation as a whole changes it." In the Associated

Press account, Bradley did not utter the words "segregation" or "integration." 119

Clearly, in his Fort Knox statements, Bradley was advocating the same

110 gradualist approach that had been Army policy before the war.

Bradley surely knew that the Kentucky site would be the object of

publicity. It was the experimental model for Universal Military Training (UMT). As

111 such, it had been the focus of much press and Army publicity. On base, thirteen Public Relations Officers were assigned to help visiting journalists get out pro-UMT publicity. 112

Bradley surely also knew that Fort Knox had been the object of controversy regarding segregation. In March, civil rights leader A. Philip

Randolph had written Truman advising that House Armed Services Committee

Chairman Walter G. Andrews told him that an antidiscrimination bill was removed from the original UMT model. According to a witness who testified before the Senate Armed Services subcommittee on UMT, an unnamed clergyman, who was a member of the 1947 Fort Knox Advisory Committee recommended Negro participation in the UMT model. However, Camp

Commander Brigadier General John M. Devine said it would be impractical to create a separate black platoon and, thus, they would be left out. At the April

National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs, Dr. Charles Houston asked

Army Secretary Royall about the Model Battalion at Fort Knox. Royall answered that the UMT experiment had nothing to do with the current Army, and the question of whether or not the Army would try UMT was not being considered. 113

Bradley's ignorance of the presence of reporters at Fort Knox is unlikely.

Reporters from the Associated Press, the United Press International, and the

International News Service were at Fort Knox on 27 July and they had spoken with General Willard Paul. Surely someone on his staff or one of the thirteen 120

reporter might slip Public Relations Officers on staff could have imagined that a into a closed meeting.

Further, he admitted that he had a press conference planned for later in

Pittsburgh the day. In fact, according to Percival Prattis, executive editor of the

Courier, the press conference was held and Bradley repeated his statements

it noted that that he had made earlier that morning. If that is so--and must be only the Courier reported it--why did Bradley not recant or rephrase his

114 statement in the press conference.

about the Executive Order It is also unlikely that Bradley did not know

were filled with articles before he left. The nation's newspapers during the week about the special session, the chances of a Southern filibuster on civil rights

Rights Party and the general and the implications it might have on the States

election. Even the weekly Elizabethtown, (Ky.) News, the largest local

newspaper covering Fort Knox, carried an editorial on the Order. This was rare

115 because the newspaper usually editorialized only about local issues.

According to the Chicago Defender, the Washington press corps learned

on Saturday, 24 July 1948 that Truman planned to issue his Executive Order

9981. Saturday, 24 July was the day of Bradley's Mayflower Hotel Anniversary

116 celebration. This was three days before Bradley left for his trip.

Clark Clifford, James Forrestal, and others had been discussing the

feasilibity of forming a committee to deal with racial discrimination in the military

since 12 May 1948. At the time, they agreed that the committee would be

comprised of both service and civilian personnel and would work under

Defense Department auspices. Clifford proposed the committee idea to

Forrestal who was concerned that they were moving too rapidly. By late June,

the White House had apparently decided to issue the Executive Order and

establish the Presidential Committee. 117 121

To sum up, before his trip to Fort Knox, Bradley had at least three long, casual meetings with Forrestal, and a week before, he specifically spoke to

Royall about segregation. Later in the day, Bradley spoke to Eisenhower and

Gillem, the Army's appointed integration expert. And again, two days before the trip, Royall feted Bradley at a gala. Bradley was not isolated.

Why did the President blithely accept Bradley's errant behavior? Truman,

of the fighting for his political life, was in no position to question the integrity

popular war hero. He did not need any more fights, and he certainly did not

need them with his Army Chief of Staff.

Apparently, Truman did not hold a grudge. In August 1949, he appointed

Bradley to be the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Bradley served

directly under Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson. J. Lawton Collins took over

as Army Chief of Staff. Colonel Chet B. Hansen, Bradley's chief speech writer

and unofficial public relations counsel, went with Bradley to the new post.

However, after the Fort Knox speech, Bradley remained removed from the issue

of military integration.

J. Lawton Collins

Joe Collins was not happy when, on 16 December 1945, Eisenhower

appointed him to be Chief of Information of the War Department. As he told

Eisenhower, "I thought my metier was commanding troops."

In this post, Collins was responsible for three information agencies, each

headed by a communications officer; Public Relations under Major General

Floyd L. Parks; Congressional Relations under Major General Wilton B. "Jerry"

Persons; and Troop Information and Education under Major General Charles T.

Lanham. 118 122

Persons had been the Army's congressional liaison since 1939. In July

1948, Persons was appointed Marx Leva's deputy for legislative liaison. He also served as McNeil's congressional liaison officer on congressional appropriation matters. In early 1949, Lanham was appointed staff director of the

Personnel Policy Board under a civilian, Thomas R. Reid, Vice-President in

119 charge of human relations of McCormick and Company of Baltimore.

When Bradley was promoted to the post of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 16 August 1949, he was replaced as Army Chief of Staff by his Vice-

Chief of Staff, J. Lawton Collins. Collins immediately chose as his Vice Chief

General Wade Hampton "Ham" Haislip, with whom he served in World War

!20 II.

According to Bradley, Collins had grown enormously (more sophisticated) during his stint in post-war Washington. As chief of information, he had met and charmed the Washington press corps. As the War Department's leading planner and spokesman on unification, he became well-known in

Congress. Under Eisenhower, Collins became thoroughly familiar with many internal Army policy problems. Bradley wrote: "Joe was not a deep thinker or strategist. He was a 'doer,' an action man; and on occasion, he was all too apt to live up to his nickname 'Lightning.'" 121

Collins, unlike his immediate predecessors, was more concerned that

Army racial practices guaranteed a more efficient organization and less concerned with whether or not his actions would put the Army at the vanguard of American social practices. He was willing to accept substantive revisions in the Gillem Board Plan, although he believed a numerical quota was needed to restrict the number of blacks that could enlist. 122

Collins admitted, in his autobiography, that he was reluctant for the Army to take the lead in eliminating segregation, which he also distinguished from 123

discrimination in the ranks. He argued that Army life should be in accord with

local state and federal laws. Importantly, Collins credits pressure from black

activists and the liberal press with helping to diminish opposition to integration.

Nonetheless, as Army Chief of Staff, Collins made the historic agreement that

abolished the quota system that limited the percentage of black draftees to 10

per cent, the approximate percentage of blacks in the American population.

Moreover, even after the Fahy Committee submitted its final report, Collins

permitted General Matthew Ridgway to accelerate desegregation during the

123 Korean War and he ordered similar action in Europe.

The Page Letter

In his capacity as Deputy Chief of Staff, Collins began to prepare a new

approach to military desegregation. His efforts were a kind of contingency plan

using public procedures to prepare an independent course for the Armed

Services-independent, that is, from civilian authority.

On 30 July, three days after Bradley made his controversial remarks at

Fort Knox, Collins wrote a short note after telephoning Arthur W. Page, Public

Information Consultant to the Army. In the note, Collins said that he just learned

that Kenneth Royall did not wish the Chief of Staff to make any public utterance

on his subject. Collins then wrote: “this does not, however, preclude our further

consideration of when and how he should correct the mistaken impressions

given in his garbled dispatch." Collins asked Page if Bradley should say

anything further and what would be the most suitable means. 124

On 3 August 1948, Page replied, recommending that the Army write a

defense of its gradualist approach to racial segregation. Although Page did not

specify this policy preference in his letter, Collins and Bradley responded by 124

not been crafting a defense of segregation in the Army. This communication has

125 mentioned in any of the literature on Army desegregation.

Page, a pioneer in public relations philosophy who helped build AT&T into a modern corporation, first became involved with the Army when War

Secretary Henry Stimson asked him personally to supervise the indoctrination

of the Normandy invasion troops. He stayed on to become public relations

consultant to the . After the war, Page retired from American

Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T), and spent his time fighting a socialist

takeover of Kennecott Copper in Chile. After this, he tried to convince other

American industrialists to create a corporation to rebuild Europe; that idea

inspired George Marshall to create the European Recovery Program. In October

1947, Marshall asked Page to become an Assistant Secretary of State. Page

declined but he helped form the Stimson Committee for the along

with former Army Secretary Robert Patterson, , Allen Dulles,

Clark Eichelberger, and Winthrop Aldrich. 126

Page and Collins were friends. In 1945, as an Army Public Relations

consultant, Page recommended to Bradley that Collins should, as Chief of

Information, attend all meetings at the Secretary of Chief of Staff level. From this

position, Collins was promoted to Deputy Chief of Staff and then to Chief of

Staff. 127 In early 1946, Page vigorously lobbied Collins and James Forrestal to

create a post-war version of the Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare

and Recreation. It was at this point, apparently, that Page and Collins cemented

their friendship. 128

The day after Page wrote his letter to Collins about integration, Truman

accepted written apologies from Bradley and Royall for the Fort Knox gaffe.

Truman told Bradley that the newspapers were violently opposed to his election

and would magnify any controversy. In his letter to Royall, Truman accepted 125

he could set Bradley's version of the incident. He also expressed the hope that

worked out in a manner up the sort of Committee which would get the matter

129 that would be satisfactory to the people affected.

Collins Page's letter was routed to various offices of the Pentagon.

noted that the Chief of attached a note and sent it to General Willard Paul. He

last paragraph Staff (Bradley) would like to have a statement as indicated in the

it to contact of Page's letter. He then asked to have whomever would work up

views. Information Officer Colonel Chet Hansen for General Bradley's personal him On 9 August, Hansen wrote Collins that General Joseph J. O'Hare advised

of "putting a of Page's letter. Hansen questioned whether anyone was capable hundred magic words that would explain, justify, or substantiate our position at this time." Hansen recommended that the statement “be a digested study prefaced by a party-line policy which would emphasize our only reason for existence and then interpret the problem in terms of our combat efficiency.”

Major General John Dahlquist, Acting Director of Personnel and

Administration (P&A) sent an undated note to General O'Hare and Colonel

Whalen. (Whalen accompanied Bradley to Fort Knox.) The memo routing slip

reported that General Collins felt the statement was inadequate becauseit did

the gist not contain (1) a resume of what the Army had done on the problem, (2)

of the Gillem Board report, and (3) a comparison of the benefits that Negroes

derived in the Army as compared with the other services and private business.

On 19 August, a Summary Sheet was issued which recommended that a

statement be devised to emphasize the Army's desire to achieve maximum

efficiency through effective utilization of its manpower. Dahlquist recommended

that this statement be approved, for the record, but that it not be published “in

view of the recent order of the President establishing a committee to examine

the procedures and practices regarding equality of treatment and opportunity for 126

this all personnel.” Dahlquist requested that the Chief of Staff approve

action. 130

On 26 August, Royall wrote Clark Clifford that the Army planned to

publish a report called, “The Negro in the Army.” A note attached to this memo

indicates the file was taken by the Secretary of the Army's office and not

returned. On that same day, Dahlquist sent a note to the P&A files noting that

the Deputy Chief of Staff (Collins) told Deputy Director of P&A Haislip that the

proposed statement was inadequate for the purpose intended. Collins later

ordered discontinuation of any action on the proposed statement.

Royall finally sent the "Negro in the Army” report to Clifford along with a

note from James Evans, the Office of the Civilian Aide to the Secretary of the

Army, recommending that Army policies and practices be summarized for

publication. Clifford suggested that all Army policies should conform to the

Executive Order. Effectively, Hansen's statement and Clifford's order stopped

any further action on a independent course. 131

Collins and the Press

Collins spent two years, from fall 1945 through fall 1947, as Chief of

Information of the War Department. In his memoirs, Collins recounts a series of

uncomfortable incidents during this time in which he looked bad. He uses his

memoirs to get in the last word. Yet Collins recalled the period fondly:

In retrospect, much as I had objected to my

assignment as Chief of Information, if I had deliberately chosen a position in which to school

myself to be Army Chief of Staff, I could not possibly

have picked a better one. It gave me insight to the problems of Congressional, public, and Army

information relations that I could not have gotten any other way. 132 127

Collins served as Chief of Information in the War Department before the battle for unification, and well before the subsequent budget war between the

Air Force and the Navy. The services were enjoying unprecedented respect as the war ended in triumph. During most of this period, Truman's popularity was

idyllic still high as well. By comparison with what would soon follow, it was an time. Still Collins had many problems. Most revolved around the slow, sometimes chaotic pace, of demobilization. As Collins put it, a barrage of press and congressional criticism surrounded this effort and, on the other hand, there was no small controversy about which local military installations would close.

Collins began to win support when he addressed a meeting of the

Associated Press managing editors. He asked if he could hold a panel

discussion on "The Responsibility of the Press and the Cold War," but was

turned down by Robert McLean, President of the Associated Press and

publisher of the Philadelphia Bulletin. Instead he explained to the editors the

problems of demobilizing a million men scattered around the globe, while trying

to maintain some deterrent to the Soviets. He noted that billions of dollars worth

of equipment were untended in the fields of Europe and the jungles of the

South Pacific. Apparently, he was successful in winning what he felt was

belated press support. He specifically felt fortunate for his friendly contacts with

the Washington Post, the Washington Star, and the Washington Times Herald.

Louis Johnson

Louis Johnson was a tough, ambitious, back-slapping politician who

lasted in the office of the Secretary of Defense for eighteen months. His

predecessor lasted nineteen months in the same job. In terms of personality 128

opposite of Forrestal. Despite and mode of operation, Johnson was the exact

often victims of negative their differences, both Johnson and Forrestal were

continued to receive publicity over unification; the interservice rivalry issue unwanted news coverage during Johnson's term. In terms of the military

is, where desegregation issue, however, the Secretaries reverted to type. That

far more Forrestal sought quiet cooperation, Johnson tried to use the press

during his assertively to control the issue. Where Forrestal reaped cooperation

silence with stint, the Committee threatened to break their vow of press

Johnson. Why was this so?

Johnson was a Virginia-born lawyer who graduated from the University

highly successful of Virginia in 1912, moved to West Virginia, and established a

law partnership, Steptoe and Johnson. He was elected to the West Virginia

House of Representatives before being drafted into the Army and serving as an

in politics infantry officer in World War I. Johnson's participation national

accelerated in the 1930s. In 1932 he helped create the American Legion.

Between 1936 and 1940 he served as National Chairman of the Democratic

Advisory Committee and in 1937 was named Assistant Secretary of War. In

1939, Johnson fought with the Secretary of War, Harry Woodring, on military

preparedness; they carried their fight to the newspapers. To build a bipartisan

consensus for war, Roosevelt dismissed Woodring, and named Henry Stimson

to the War Secretary post. When Johnson was passed over for the job, he quit.

Johnson returned to White House favor less than two years later and was

a major Democratic power-broker by the end of the war. When Senator Howard

McGrath called a financial meeting of the Democratic Party in 1948, few party

stalwarts showed up, and none of them would take the job of finance chairman.

McGrath was stunned. Then Johnson asked for a brief recess. He met with

Truman, returned to the meeting and took the job. As Senator Harley Kilgore 129

for Roosevelt explained it: "Louie had been hankering for a Cabinet post years." had appointed him Assistant Secretary of War with the understanding that he would succeed Secretary Woodring. Johnson settled for a promise of a Cabinet

133 post from Truman in exchange for raising campaign money.

Without Johnson, the campaign would never have gotten off the ground.

At the outset, he had to pay the Party's initial expenses from his own pocket.

Truman was occasionally cut off the air because he could not afford additional advertising time. Johnson, shrewdly, encouraged these situations to dramatize the meager funds and populist appeal of the Truman campaign. 134

When Forrestal resigned, Truman named Johnson the new Secretary of

Defense; he took over on 28 March 1949. Johnson was not well prepared for the job. Although his staff stayed on, Forrestal left less than a page of instructions. 135 The next day, Johnson held a disastrous press conference in which he promised openness but mostly offered "no-comments" to questions.

When asked about the issue of racial integration of the armed services,

Johnson answered vaguely: “you'll not have much argument on what we decide there, I'm sure." 136

Where Forrestal sought to elicit cooperation, Johnson ruled by fiat. He grabbed the best offices, would brook no opposition, eliminated more than 200 committees and summarily ordered unification. Pentagon insiders compared him with John Wilkes Booth, and suggested that he had pushed Forrestal out of office. 137

Before leaving office, Forrestal asked for amendments to the National

Security Act. The National Military Establishment became the Defense

Department. The Secretary of the Defense Department gained status in State

Department protocol. The three special assistants became Assistant

Secretaries. A new Deputy Secretary of Defense was appointed and a 130

to Eisenhower. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was approved, in a bow

fiscal procedures. And the Secretary gained power over a uniform budget and

construction of Before that legislation went into effect, Johnson cancelled

Secretary John L. the 65,000-ton , the U.S.S. United States. Navy and Johnson Sullivan quit in protest and was replaced by Omaha lawyer

Air Force sycophant, Francis Matthews. In April, Johnson won approval from the Truman and Army to scuttle production of the aircraft carrier. On this basis,

a allowed the program to be killed. However, the Navy's aviators launched press near-mutiny that came to be called "the Revolt of the ." Using

of 75 leaks and character defamation, the Navy aviators attacked production

138 bombers, the ten-engine B-36, for the Air Force.

139 This battle was largely fought in the press. Admiral Arthur W. Radford,

Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, and the Chief of Naval Operations

140 focused their attack on Secretary Johnson. Air Force Secretary Stuart

the Symington made his case in the Saturday Evening Post. And a columnist for

New York Times made the pro-Navy case in a series of articles. Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs, General Omar Bradley demanded a public withdrawal of Navy

charges. Less than three years later, the Air Force replaced the B-36 in its plans

with the jet-powered B-47 and the B-52.

After the , Johnson conducted a severe budget-

cutting and drawdown of military forces. At the time, many Americans thought

the Soviets saw this drawdown as a weakening of American resolve. They

thought this retrenchment enabled the Soviets to support the North Korean

incursion into South Korea. Truman first openly considered replacing Johnson

141 in July 1950. By the time the Korean Conflict was a few mo iths old, in

September 1950, and it became clear that the U. S. had not adequately 131

feuding with prepared for war, Truman discharged Johnson for openly

142 Secretary of State Dean Acheson.

Johnson and the Office of Public Information

control When he took office, Johnson did not break with ForrestaPs press

warned (in efforts. At his first press conference, on 29 March 1949, Johnson

during his vain) that there would be no vying between the services for headlines

watch. The classification procedures would continue as previously adduced.

Johnson inherited ForrestaPs controversial policy that consolidated the Office of

Public Information (OPI) as the sole agency for dissemination for military

information. And he inherited a whirlwind of press condemnation as well.

Johnson reacted by narrowing the range of information under scrutiny to that

143 which is classified for security reasons.

OPI never became the information clearinghouse that some hoped and

materials for release, others feared it might be. In spite of its authority to review

OPI was almost powerless to stop the flow of unauthorized disclosures. Inter-

service feuding continued throughout Johnson's tenure and consolidation of

public affairs offices merely forced the services to find alternative outlets to air

their grievances. Civilian organizations, veterans groups, and retired officers

took up the cudgels on the services' behalf.

OPI failed, in large measure, because Secretary of Defense Johnson

neglected to use it. He held only five press conferences and gave 48 speeches,

usually without advance notification to OPI. Johnson's Deputy Secretary,

Stephen Early, was in charge of OPI and, in 1951, tried to reorganize it by

144 returning public relations responsibility to the individual services. 132

The Fahv Committee

Although Chairman Fahy negotiated directly with the services and

the reported periodically to President Truman, his committee depended upon

active cooperation of the Secretary of Defense. Johnson retained a brief but

At first, the Secretary interest in the committee's development and proceedings.

these of Defense recognized the Committee's right to review and approve

submissions, but in the protracted negotiations that surround the development

group's power by of a successful Army program, Johnson tried to curb the Fahy

going to the newspapers.

On 20 April 1949, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson announced that

he had directed the armed forces to examine equality of treatment and

opportunity in order to determine what changes in policy should be made. The

next day, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall reported on the number of

Negro officers and the reenlistment rate among black soldiers in defense of

current Army racial policy. It was one of Royall's last acts. In early May, Johnson

145 forwarded to Chairman Fahy responses outlining service policies.

policies On 1 1 May, Johnson announced his approval of the racial

proposed by the Air Force. Only after Fahy appealed to the White House was

the committee's right to review the service programs before their approval

reasserted. On 26 May 1949, Royall's successor, Acting Secretary of the Army

Gordon Gray, reviewed Army implementation of the recommendations of the

1946 Gillem Board. 146 On 7 June 1949, as a spur to the Army, Secretary

Johnson approved the Navy's proposed racial policy. 147

The first plan accepted by both the committee and Secretary Johnson

was that offered by the Air Force. Actually, this proposal had been completed

when the Fahy Committee first met. Stuart Symington, the service secretary,

had postponed the implementation so that a joint proposal could be devised 133

with the Army. The Navy shared the Air Force view that racial segregation represented a waste of manpower, but the Navy's good intentions were delayed because the plan was not acceptable to Secretary Johnson.

Then Johnson, reverting to type, tried to finesse the issue by accepting and promulgating an incomplete, but evasively-phrased, new policy. Although

Chairman Fahy met with Truman on the matter, Johnson sided with the Army and, for the first time, against the Fahy Committee. Johnson may have been seeking Army support during the celebrated interservice battle or to avert a

148 difficult situation. Either way, Johnson's press statement created an uproar among the nation's black and liberal newspapers. At Niles' suggestion, Truman told a press conference that the Johnson statement was just "a progress report" and that the work of the Fahy Committee had his full support. With that, Johnson removed himself from all negotiations with the President's Committee. The task

149 fell to Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray.

Gordon Gray

Following Kenneth Royall, Gordon Gray, the Assistant Secretary and a former newspaper publisher and radio station owner, was confirmed as Acting

Secretary on 13 June 1949. In an administration characterized by short-term tenure among military leaders, Gray served as Acting Secretary for only ten months. However, during this time, Gray was a key figure in military desegregation. Compared with Royall, Gray was far more sympathetic to the

Fahy Committee and more available to the press. Among the key players involved in desegregation of the Army, Gordon Gray was perhaps the most pragmatic. Although he would defend the traditional Army policy that blacks 134

could not compete in a desegregated Army, he did very little to challenge or obstruct the Fahy Committee.

A Phi Beta Kappa graduate of the University of North Carolina and editor of Law Journal at , Gray practiced law for years in New York and Winston-Salem. Although Gray was an heir to part of the R. J. Reynolds fortune, he preferred journalism. He bought the Winston-Salem Journal and

Twin-City Sentinel, which were both in lackluster shape. As publisher, he turned them into successes. Then in 1942, he enlisted in the Army. He rose from enlisted private to in the Twelfth Army Group in Europe during World

War II, but did not participate in any battles.

After the war, Gray became the principal Assistant Secretary of the Army.

Gray's only brush with controversy was in 1948, when he headed up a

commission called the Gray Board which recommended that the National Guard

150 should be taken out of state control and put under the federal government.

Johnson inveighed Gray to take the post of Secretary of Army. Gray was

on the verge of leaving the Army to take the post of dean of the University of

North Carolina School of Business. At Truman's request, Gray agreed to stay on

as Undersecretary of the Army for "a decent intervaP--at least until Johnson

could find a replacement for Royall.

Ultimately, Johnson offered Gray the job of Army Secretary. While Gray

was away on a trip, Johnson told Truman that Gray actually wanted the job of

Army Secretary. Without consulting Gray, Truman sent Gray's nomination to the

Senate. When Gray returned to Washington, he was stunned to learn what had

happened. Although Truman offered to "take the rap" and admit that he had

submitted the order by mistake, Gray agreed to accept the job for "a respectable

time," and spare Truman the embarrassment of the error. General Omar Bradley

saw the incident as another example of Louis Johnson's mentally-ill 135

151 bill, which Gray had worked on as Under behavior . An Army reorganization

152 Secretary, came before Congress during Gray's watch as Army Secretary .

Gray and Racial Integration

Perhaps because he was younger, or because he had attended an integrated Officers Candidates School, or simply because he was more open- minded, Gray offered a somewhat more sympathetic ear to advocates of desegregation. This is not to say that Gray was an avowed integrationist. Far

to develop from it. He defended segregation as giving black soldiers the chance

153 leadership without weakening morale and efficiency . But he joined the proceedings when opportunities were greater for change. The Fahy Committee had become far more shrewd at questioning Army objections to reform.

Integration plans of the Army and Navy had already been accepted. In short order, Gray would accept most of the Committee's recommendations, except for those that dealt with quotas.

Throughout the fall, Johnson and the middle level hierarchy of the Army tried to outmaneuver the Committee. Gray may have endorsed, or at least accepted, Johnson’s attempt to finesse the Committee. However, because of its

peremptory nature, the decision seems more attributable to Johnson. (See

above and chapter five.)

Then, Gray became victim of one of the Army's most important, most

elaborate, and least heralded, instances of insubordination. Gray sent out a

directive ordering opening of all military occupational specialties to all men,

abolished racial quotas for the Army's schools, and abolished racially separate

promotion systems and standards. Without Gray's approval, top Army officers

surreptitiously sent out an order that rescinded this directive. The issue forced 136

the Committee to defy their promise to Truman and take the issue to the newspapers. Gray learned of the incident through the newspapers, rescinded the rescission, and returned to his original plan. 154 The Fahy Committee objected to this turn of events and protested that they would be forced to

155 publicize the event, again, if they did not get requisite White House support.

These incidents opened Gray's eyes to the inconsistencies inherent in the traditional segregationist argument. He was ready to learn. In a meeting on

27 December 1949, Charles Fahy, chairman of the President's Committee on

Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, convinced Gray that the removal of discrimination was impossible without integration. Then Gray met with Roy Davenport, a key personnel expert working in the Personnel &

Administration department of the Army, who showed Gray that the Army staff was deceiving him and, using a wealth of personnel data, convinced him that desegregation must be carried out. On 16 January 1950, the Army began

identifying vacancies in white units that blacks could fill. The Gillem Board policy of "integration by unit but not by individual” was abolished.

All that remained to negotiate was the thorny issue of the quota. In later

Affirmative Action issues, corporations and institutions would challenge whether or not governments could require that they hire a minimum or quota of members of minority groups. Conversely, in 1950, the postwar Army tried to establish a maximum or quota of African Americans in their midst; obtaining black enlistments was not a problem. The Army feared that so-called black overstrength would reduce efficiency and jeopardize enlistments by white southerners.

In conference with Chairman Fahy, Truman reasserted his desire to abolish the ceiling-type quota and communicated that desire to Gray. The

Secretary of War was ready to comply. In turn, Gray won a promise from Truman 137

that a racial quota could be reinstituted if the balance of racial strength became

disproportionate. By 13 March 1950, the Army had agreed to abolish the 10 per

cent quota beginning in April 1950. Having accomplished important changes in

Army practices, Gray finally returned to the University of North Carolina as he

had originally desired.

Gray and the Press

During Gray's brief tenure, the Fahy Committee was willing to break its

vow of silence and take its story to the press. Indeed, it did this at least once.

Gray was an active journalist. Yet he apparently did not call upon his fellow

Southern publishers to editorialize and build a mandate for the prevailing

conservative view. It is difficult to speculate why an individual would choose not

to act. But it is possible to speculate that this decision by the Fahy Committee

was motivated by the fact that their adversary was a newspaperman. This point

will be discussed in depth in Chapter Five.

Conclusions

In this chapter, we have seen that the degree to which the individual

personalities of America's post-war military leaders shaped their interpretation

of racial policy. This was most strongly exemplified by the communication

policies of Secretaries of Defense James Forrestal and Louis Johnson. Where

Forrestal, a former newsman, believed cooperation was most possible without

the press spotlight, Johnson acted peremptorily, garnered headlines and did

not anticipate the consequences. In chapter five, it will be show i, that one of

these consequences was a change in press policy by the Fahy Committee. This

change empowered the Committee to win major concessions from the Army. 138

We have also seen how Kenneth Royall acted furtively, and threatened to use press exposure as a political weapon, and how his actions backfired. We have seen how Omar Bradley's apparent inept press action may have, in fact, been contrived, but was equally ineffective. Through his communication with a prominent public relations expert, Arthur Wilson Page, we have seen how J.

Lawton Collins conspired to create a policy separate from that of civilian leadership, but that Colonel Chet Hansen, a former newsman and Bradley speechwriter, quashed this effort. Finally, we have seen how it fell to Gordon

Gray, a pragmatic newspaper publisher, to cooperate with the committee and create a new racial policy for the Army.

Notes

1 Testimony in front of National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs, (26 April 1948). Copies in

James Evans Files, US Army Military History Research Collection, Carlisle Barracks, PA and in OSD

291 .2 National Archives.

2 Survey and Recommendations Concerning the Integration of the Negro Soldier into the Army,

Submitted to the Secretary of War by the Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War, in Memo, Civ Aide

/1 5640-1 for of Staff, to SW through USW, 22 September 1941 , G-1 20; Memo G-1 Chief 6

November 1941.

3 Louis Finkel, (1 975) Forum for Protest: The Black Press During World War II. (Cranbury, N.J.:

Fairieigh Dickinson U P); Patrick Washburn, (1 986) A Question of Sedition: The Federal

Government's Investigation of the Black Press During World War II, (New York: Oxford University

Press).

4 War Department Circular No. 124, "Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Postwar Army Policy,"

27 April 1946; Memorandum, Truman K. Gibson, Jr. for Assistant Secretary of War John J.

McCloy, 13 November 1945; Memorandum, Lt. General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., for Chief of Staff, 17

November 1945, subject; Report of Board of Officers of Utilization of Negro Manpower in the 139

Post-War Army; Memorandum, Assistant Secretary McCloy for Judge Patterson (The Secretary of

War), 24 November 1945; Memorandum, Truman K. Gibson, Jr., for Secretary of War Patterson,

28 November 1945; Supplemental report of Board of Officers (Gillem Board) on Utilization of

Negro Manpower in the Post-War Army, 26 January 1 946; Memorandum, Commanding General,

Army Air Forces for Chief of Staff, April 1946. All in Morris J. MacGregor and Bernard

C. Nalty (eds.), (1981) Blacks in the United States Armed Forces: Basic Documents, Volume VII:

Planning for Postwar Employment of Black Personnel, (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly

Resources Inc.).

5 He sent a memorandum to Robert P. Patterson, who had become Secretary of War on 27

September 1 945. Patterson had been assistant secretary and then under Secretary of War under

Henry Stimson. When Patterson became Stimson's assistant, he had replaced Louis Johnson, who had served as assistant under Secretary of War Harry Woodring. Morris MacGregor (1 985)

Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965, (Washington, D.C.:Center of Military History,

Government Printing Office), p. 153; Memo McCloy for Secretary of War, 17 September 1945,

Secretary of War 291 .2; Memo Secretary of War for Chief of Staff, 7 November 1 945, Secretary of

War 291.2.

6 Alvan Gillem Oral History Interview in Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

7 This was published as War Department Circular No. 1 24 on 27 April 1 946. All references to the

Gillem Report in the following paragraphs, unless otherwise noted, are from this document. NARG.

^ Specifically the Board ordered that African Americans should be integrated in duty assignments

in special and overhead units (post housekeeping and administrative jobs); they should form 10

percent of the Army; a special staff group should be formed within the War Department to see that

Negro policy was implemented; Black officers should be accorded equal opportunities for

advancement and assignment; groupings should be made of smaller Negro units with larger white

units in "composite organizations"; desegregated use of the post recreational facilities should

continue; commanders of Negro troops should be made fully aware of the Army's race policies.

9 Memorandum, G-1 to the Secretary of War, 24 December 1946, OSW 291 .2, NARG.

10 “End of Army Jim Crow Near, Says Army Chief’ Baltimore Afro-American, 9 March 1946.

11 “No Real Change in Army Policy” Pittsburgh Courier, 11 May 1946. 140

12 A Right Step for Army,” Norfolk Journal and Guide, 9 March 1 946.

13 Hanson Baldwin, “An Uncertain Defense Posture,” New York Times, 5 March 1946.

14 The Adjutant General to Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Army Service Forces, 6

May 1946, WDAG 291.2, NARG 319.

15 Frank Stanley, "Report of the Negro Newspaper Publishers Association to the Honorable

Secretary of War on Troops and Conditions in Europe, 18 July 1946, OSW, NARG 330, 291.2;

Marcus Ray, Report to Secretary of War, Robert Patterson, "Tour of European Installations," 17

December 1946.

16 Morris MacGregor, (1981) Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965 (Washington, D.C.:

Center of Military History, Government Printing Office), pp. 213-215.

17 Hanson Baldwin, "Forrestal Faces Trials," New York Times, Sept. 21 , 1947.

18 Steve Rearden, (1 984) History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Volume I: The

Formative Years, (Washington, D.C.: U S. Government Printing Office), p. 538; R. S. Allen and W.

V. Shannon, "Why Johnson Was Fired," New Republic, 123(25 September 1950): 11-12.

Carl Borklund, (1966) Men of the Pentagon. (New York: Praeger), p. 37.

20 Carl W. Borklund, (1966) Men of the Pentagon. (New York: Praeger), p. 39.

21 Rearden, pp. 60-61.

22 Borklund, p. 45.

23 Rearden, p. 78.

24 Rearden, p. 78; “Forrestal Calls for Tightened Security,” Baltimore Sun, 24 September 1947.

25 Washington Evening Post, 16 January 1948; New York Herald-Tribune, Des Moines Register,

24 September 1948.

26 Rearden, p. 78. 141

27 “ Is Press a Threat to National Security?” Chicago Tribune, 28 November 1948; Rearden, p.

81.

2 & Margaret Geis, (1952) Negro Personnel in the European Command: 1 January 1946 to 30

June 1950. Historical Division, European Command. Report of the Secretary of Defense, Center of Military History.

29 Geis, p.26.

30 The original suggestion may have come from Granger. MacGregor, p.326.

31 Clark Clifford, (1 990) Counsel to the President: A Memoir, (New York: Random House), p.

210.

32 Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Sen/ices, Universal Military Training, 80th

Congress, 2nd Session, 1948, p. 688.

33 Most of this section is from the Report of National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs,

Monday, 26 April 1948. Copies available in Fahy Committee Papers HSTL and James C. Evans

Papers, Reports and Papers, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

34 Letter, Secretary of Defense Forrestal to President Harry S. Truman, 29 February 1948;

Memorandum, Special Assistant to Secretary of Defense, Marx Leva, for Secretary of Army et.al.,

13 April 1948.

The conferees included Lester Granger, the Executive Secretary of the National Urban League

and consultant to the Secretary of Defense; Attorney Sadie T. M. Alexander; Dr. John W. Davis,

President of West Virginia State College; Truman K. Gibson, former civilian aide to the Secretary

of War; Rev. Bishop J. W. Gregg; Charles Houston, Dean of the Howard University Law School;

Rev. John H. Johnson, rector of St. Martin's Church; and Dr. Mordecai Johnson, President of

Howard University.

The other attendees included Benjamin Mays, President of Morehouse College; Attorney

Loren Miller; Hoben E. Reynolds of the International Order of Elks; Director Channing Tobias, of 142

the Phelps-Stokes Foundation; George Weaver sitting in for columnist and union president

Willard Townsend; and Roy Wilkins, Assistant Secretary of the NAACP.

35 Browning would later serve as an assistant to the Executive Secretary on the President's

Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services.

36 Truman Papers, HSTL; David K. Niles to Clark Clifford, 12 May 1948; Clifford to Fon-estal, 13

May 1 948; Clifford Papers: Judge George T. Washington of the Federal Court to Clifford, 29 June

1948; Nicholls, L. (1954) Breakthrough on the Color Front, (New York: Random House), p. 86.

37 Clifford, p. 210.

38 Rearden, p.49; Robert Donovan, (1977) Conflict and Crisis: The Presendency of Harry S.

Truman, (New York: W. W. Norton), p. 53.

39 The actions of the Committee on Civilian Components or Gray Board are of tertiary importance

here. (The Committee was named for its chairman, Under Secretary Gordon Gray, who would later

succeed Royall as Secretary of the Army.) As part of the unification issue, the Gray Board was

charged to analyze the feasibility and desirability of federalizing the National Guard. The issue

raised important objections among those states who had otherwise opposed the notion of States

Rights. See “Gray Board Calls for Changes in National Guard,” Armed Forces, 31 July 1948, “Gray

Board Calls for Federalizing Guard,” Washington Post, 8 November 1947.

40 For comparison, see how Forrestal dealt with insubordination from Secretary of the Air Force

Stuart Symington. James Forrestal, (1951) The Forrestal Diaries, ed. by Walter Millis, (New York:

Viking Press), pp. 464-465.

41 Bernard Manning (son-in-law of John Clemson Henry of Durham, N. C.) to Kenneth C. Royall

(5 December 1947) OSA 291.2; Edwin Powell to Royall (2 March 1948); Attorney F. H. Brooks,

Smithfield, N.C., to K. Royall, (18 May 1948) OSA 291.2; J. C. O'Laughlin to Royall (15

September 1948) OSA 291.2 NARG 335.

Royall received notable support from the article “The Negro in the Armed Services" written by

Paul Davis and published in the Virginia Quarterly Review 24(Autumn 1948), pp. 495-523. Davis

argues that black Americans must play a vital role in the military service, but also supports Royall's

segregationists positions. He supports the Army's long-held contention that, while it must be alert

to the latest trends in psychology and sociology, that the Army "must not attempt social reform so 143

advanced as to create interracial friction, to antagonize community attitudes nor to reduce over-all effectiveness.

42 J. O'Laughlin to Royall (15 September 1948) Army and Navy Journal ( 11 September 1948); C.

OSA 291.2.

43 Omar Bradley and Clay Blair, (1983) A General's Life, (New York: Simon & Schuster), p. 47.

44 With this action, the protocol section of the State Department announced that the branch

secretaries sat at a lower status in state dinners. “Changing of the Guard,” Washington Star, 5

October 1947. When Royall took over for Patterson, he also took Patterson's Pentagon office.

When Forrestal became Secretary of Defense, he took that office away from Royall and Royall

returned to the office he used as Under Secretary. Armed Forces, 9 August 1 947.

45 Secretary of War Patterson to Walter White, 14 February 1947; Patterson to Senator Brien

McMahon of Connecticut, memorandum, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff to G-3, 17 May 1947 all

in WDSCA 291.2, NARG 319; “National Grapevine,” Chicago Defender, Charley Cherokee, 28

February 1948.

46 Memorandum, G-3 to Deputy Chief of Staff, 28 May 1947, WDGOT 325, NARG 335.

47 Memorandum, G-3 to Deputy Chief of Staff, 28 May 1947, WDGOT 325, NARG 335.

48 w White to J. Forrestal, 9 October 1947; J. Forrestal to W. White, 21 October 1947 OSA

291 .2 21 October 1 947 and Reel 080 NAACP 21 October 1947; K. C. Royall to White 9 October

1947 OSA 291.2.

49 A similar conference had been hosted by Forrestal's predecessor, Robert Patterson, in March

1946; this conference was part of the Gillem investigation. Memorandum, G-1 to The Adjutant

General, 8 December 1947, G-1 291.2, NARG 319.

50 Memorandum, G-1 to The Adjutant General, 8 December 1 947, G-1 291 .2, NARG 31 9.

51 Memorandum, G-1 to Undersecretary of the Army, 29 April 1948, NARG 319; also referred to

in Menning to Royal and reply, RG 407. 291 .2.

52 “Army Forbids New Jersey Guard to Integrate," New York Times, 5 February 1948 and

“Driscoll Replies to Army” New York Times 28 February 1948. 1

144

53 Telegram to Forrestal from White, 5 February 1948, Office of the Secretary of the Army 291 .2,

NARG 335.

54 New York Times, 5 February 1948; memorandum, Forrestal to Royall, 5 February 1948, OSA

291.2, NARG 335.

55 “National Grapevine,” Chicago Defender, Charley Cherokee, 21 February 1948 and 28

February 1948.

56 White to Forrestal, 17 February 1948, D54-1-1, NARG 330.

57 “Wallace Blasts Truman in Harlem,” New York Times, 16 February 1948.

58 The Governor of Connecticut was told that integrating this state's National Guard would jeopardize federal recognition and support. The Governor requested that Truman direct the Army to change its policy to conform with the Rights Committee report. Governor Thomas E. Dewey of

New York, supported a special legislative committee investigation to end segregation in the New

York National Guard. Governor James L. McConaughy of Minnesota also wrote that he wanted to integrate National Guard units of his state by executive order. Telegram, Governor James L.

McConaughy to the President 9 February 1948, OF 155, HSTL; The New York Times, 10 and 1

February 1948; Governor Luther W. Youngdahl to Forrestal, 6 March 1948, 291.2, NARG 335.

59 Memorandum, Marx Leva to Forrestal, 8 March 1948, OSA 291 .2; memorandum, G-3 to

Deputy Chief of Staff, 8 April 1 948, WDSCA 291 .2, NARG 31 9; memorandum, Royall to Forrestal,

6 May 1948; memorandum, Leva to Forrestal, 7 May 1948, both in OS NARG 335.

60 Memorandum, Marx Leva to Forrestal, 8 March 1 948, OSA 291 .2; memorandum, G-3 to

Deputy Chief of Staff, 8 April 1948, WDSCA 291.2, NARG 319; memorandum, Royall to Forrestal,

6 May 1948; memorandum, Leva to Forrestal, 7 May 1948, both in OS NARG 335.

61 Memoranda, Leva to Forrestal, 5 and 20 May 1948, both in D54-1-1, NARG 330; Royall to

Governors of Connecticut and Minnesota, 20 May 1948, OSA 291.2, NARG 335.

62 “National Grapevine,” Charley Cherokee, Chicago Defender, 13 March 19 18.

63 "Crisis in the Making; U S. Negroes Tussle with Issue of Resisting a Draft Law because of

Racial Segregation," Newsweek 21 (June 7, 1948): 28-29. 145

as much racial progress as North 64 At this point, Royall said that no state in the Union had made

for Governor. Carolina, further attesting to the notion that he was running

Truman on 23 March to 65 Houston had been among those civil rights leaders who had met with protest military segregation.

26 April 1948, James 66 Report of the National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs, Monday

C. Evans Papers, Reports and Papers, p. 51-52.

University Press), p. 91; 67 Richard Haynes, (1973) Awesome Power, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana (Columbia, Mo.: University of Richard Dalfiume, (1969) Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces, 28-29. Missouri Press), p. 166; Newsweek. 21(7 June 1948):

National 68 Memorandum of Royall to Forrestal, CSUSA 291.2, Negroes (14 May 1948),

Archives.

Defense 69 National Military Establishment Press Release, 8 September 1948; “Negro

Conference Charges Army Discriminates,” New York Times, 9 September 1 948; Memorandum,

Leva to Forrestal, 30 August 1948; Forrestal to Granger, 30 August 1948.

of Leva to 70 Memorandum of Secretary of Defense to Marx, 22 September 1 948; Memorandum

Forrestal, 30 September 1948; CD 30-1-2, NARG.

of Leva to 71 Memorandum of Secretary of Defense to Marx, 22 September 1948; Memorandum

Forrestal, 30 September 1948; CD 30-1-2. NARG.

the 72 For a less abridged discussion of the role of Congress in the racial desegregation of

Votes Big Air military, see chapter four. Trussell, C. P. “Senate Body Approves Draft, Congress

Issue in Draft Force," New York Times, 12 May 1948; Trussell, "Race Segregation Still A Live

Program," New York Times, 13 May 1948; New York Times, 24 May 1948.

73 Memorandum from Secretary of the Army to Commanding General, First Army, (21 May 1948)

M. Leva to re: Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Postwar Army Policy NARG407 291 .2;

Secretary of Army (25 May 1948) OSA 291 .2 Negroes; James Evans to Royall (14 June 1948).

74 Geis (1952)p. 81. 146

Representative Harold C. 75 Representative John A. Blamik to Secretary Royall, 29 May 1948,

Governor of Connecticut to Hagen to Royall, 28 May 1 948, both in OSA 291 .2, NARG 335;

President, both in OSA 291.2, Royall, 29 June 1948; telegram, Governor of Minnesota to the NARG.

of the Army, n.d., OSA 76 Draft of proposed letter to Governor of Connecticut from Secretary

291.2, NARG 335.

77 Memorandum, Bradley to Royall, 7 July 1948, OSA 291 .2, NARG 335.

7^ Memoranda, Royall to Clark Clifford, 8 and 19 July 1948, OSA 291 .2, NARG 335.

79 Memorandum, Clifford to Royall, 8 July 1948, OSA 291.2, NARG

80 Memorandum, Royall to Clifford, 20 July 1948, OSA 291 .2, NARG.

81 Bradley Dairies, Clay and John Bliar Collection, Box Desk Diaries, 1948-1950, US Military

History Research Collection, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

July 82 Royall to HST, 29 July 1948, D-54-1-16, NARG 330; Bradley to HST, OSA 291 .2 (29

1948).

291 .2. 83 Letter, Royall to President, 1 7 September 1 948, Office of the Secretary of the Army

84 Truman seeks Resignations from Top Brass,” Philadelphia Inquirer, “Pentagon Shake-Up,”

Indianapolis Star, 7 November 1948.

85 MacGregor, p. 326.

86 “National Grapevine,” Chicago Defender, 12 February 1948.

87 Memorandum, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall for Secretary of Defense Louis

Johnson, 21 April 1949, subject: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services.

of the 88 Quoted in "Report on Gillem Board Policy and Implementation," Study in the Records

President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, HSTL;

Royall to Johnson, 22 April 1949, CD 30-1-4. 147

89 General Omar Bradley was one of the most beloved and successful heroes of World War II. the General Eisenhower, Commander of European Theater of Operations, tapped Bradley to lead

largest force ever to American contingent in the Normandy invasion. Bradley commanded the

divisions, they liberated fight under the American flag. A million-men strong, more than 40 combat

France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia.

90 MacGregor, p. 317.

91 "Army Snipes at Bias as UMT Fight Grows," Pittsburgh Courier 17 January 1948.

92 "Bradley Condemns Harsh Army Discipline, Promises Liberal Treatment of Draftees," New

York Times (22 June 1 948).

Defender 93 in a 1949 incident, Haislip and Major Brooks would be accused by Chicago

columnist, Charley Cherokee of issuing as illicit order reinstating segregation and rescinding a

desegregation offer issued by Army Secretary Gordon Gray. Bradley Diaries.

94 Bradley Diaries, Clay and John Blair Collection, Box Desk Diaries, 1948-1950, US Army Military

History Research Collection, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

95 Mary McNair, "Kenneth Royalls Entertain, Honoring Gen., Mrs. Bradley," Washington Post, 25

July 1948, p. IV-1.

96 Bradley Diaries, Clay and John Blair Collection, Box Desk Diaries, 1948-1950, US Army Military

History Research Collection, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

97 Mary Spargo, "Truman Orders Equal Rights in U.S. Jobs, Armed Services," Washington Post,

27 July 1948, p. 1.

98 Along with this article, Bradley kept a letter from Army Reserve Judge Advocate Major William

H. Ramsey who write that he was a friend of the Negro and a fighter for equality of treatment who

supported Bradley's statement. "Army May Furlough First Draftees," Washington Daily News (27

July 1948) in CSUSA 291.2 Negroes; Ramsey to Bradley (28 July 1948) in CSUSA 201.2

Negroes.

99 Evans to Royall (29 July 1 948) OSA 291 .2 Negroes.

100 Unidentified wire service transcript, OSA 291 .2 (29 July 1948). 148

101 OSA 291 .2 delivered to White House at 7:45 PM on 29 July 1 948. Copies were delivered to

Secretary of Defense Forrestal and the General Bradley.

102 Bradley Diaries, Clay and John Blair Collection, Box Desk Diary, 1948-1950, US Army Military

History Research Collection, Carlisle Barracks, PA.; Drew Pearson, “Washington Merry-Go-

Round," Philadelphia Bulletin, (3 August 1948).

103 "Army Hopes New Training Will Make Friends of Men," Washington Post, (29 July 1948), p.

3; Mary Spargo, "End of Troop Segregation Eventual Aim," Washington Post, (30 July 1948), p.

"Army Segregation To Go," New York Times (30 July 1948), p. 2. 1 ;

104 In view of its significance, the full text of Bradley's letter of apology to Truman is reprinted below:

Dear Mr. President: In view of your understandable concern over the views attributed to me on the issue of segregation by both the Associated and United Press on July 27th, the Secretary of the Army suggested that I explain the circumstances under which I was partially quoted. On Tuesday, July 27, a group of senior troop commanders, together with key officers of their staffs, assembled at Fort Knox to discuss and explore training methods to be employed by the Army in its expanded program. Particular emphasis had been placed on the vital issue of human relations and I attended the conference primarily to insist that commanders concern intimately with the welfare of their troops, that they indoctrinate their commanders with the need for safeguarding the dignity and the individuality of their men. For we readily recognize that if a peacetime draft is to be acceptable to the American people, then the Army must accord its men the consideration and respect they warrant as citizens of the United States.

During the last few minutes of the morning conference, I was invited to address the assembly. I spoke extemporaneously, without notes, and no record was made of my comments.

At the time, I did not know that reporters had been admitted to the conference and I had no reason to assume that I was not speaking privately. The schedule given me indicated a press conference at 12:45, and I was prepared to meet the reporters at that time. The question of segregation had been raised inadvertently earlier that morning when a commander asked for guidance in the establishment of separate service clubs for white and negro

(sic) soldiers. While I had no intention of involving either the Army or myself in a discussion of civil rights, I did feel that these commanders had need for some guidance to help them reply to questions that will be asked of them on segregation.

I explained that our problem was an acutely practical one. Our only reason for existence lies in our capacity to provide for the common defense of the nation. Any policy which would cut dangerously into our voluntary manpower; any policy which would impair our operating efficiency at this time, hazards our ability to maintain a minimum security force. A substantial portion of our volunteer enlistments come from Southern states where racial prejudice invokes antagonism and hostility toward progressive policies on integration. In attempting to give troop commanders some guidance in their replies to inquiries on segregation, I referred to a statement made five weeks ago in Los Angeles when I was queried on my views. At that time I said, "The question of integration of the negro (sic) is a vital problem of social reform--to be achieved first by the people of the United States--and thereafter by the United States Army." My paraphrase of this statement at Ft. Knox unfortunately employed the term "segregation" rather than "integration" and in subsequent newspaper accounts erroneously 149

totally achieved by suggested that the Army would stubbornly resist integration until it had been

is further from our intent. While I do believe that it the American people. I assure you nothing would be hazardous for us to employ the Army deliberately as an instrument of social reform, I do likewise believe the Army must be kept fully apace of the substantial progress being made by the civilian community in race relations.

of you in any way, and had I known the press I had no intention whatsoever embarrassing

of the segregation issue. At that time, I had not was present, I would have avoided any mention yet see the Executive Order published by you on July 27th.

evening of July 27, 1 learned that the Department When I returned to Washington on the had adopted a policy of "no comment" on this Executive Order. with at any time. If you wish, I shall be glad to discuss the incident you

Respectfully Yours

Omar Bradley

105 Clifford, p. 218; Bradley and Blair, pp. 485-486.

106 Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 2nd Session-Senate, pp. 9527,9456; Mary Spargo,

“End of Troop Segregation Eventual Aim, Truman Says," Washington Post, (30 July 1948).

107 This decision created an important rift between Randolph and members of the Congress of

Racial Equality and especially, Bayard Rustin. Randolph wrote the President of the National

Committee Against Conscription: "Now it seems to me that whenever a moral commitment is made by a movement, that moral commitment must be adhered to and lived up to even though it may constitute an apparent setback in the course of the progress of our cause. Our league made the

moral commitment to call off the campaign if President Truman issued an Executive Order banning discrimination and segregation in the armed forces. On July 26, 1948, President Truman did

issue such an order. In that order the term segregation was not used, but in a subsequent press

conference, when the President was interviewed as to whether his order referred to segregation,

he stated that it was his intention that the Executive Order should include segregation. Now since

the President took this position, which no one could misunderstand, I felt that the committee

[against Jim Crow in the Military] had no right to go behind the President to inquire into his motives

for issuing the order by making a certain statement to the press." Randolph to John M. Swomley:

(29 June 1949) Reel 12, #1039 in APR files.

"Army Segregation To Go, Says Truman," New York Times, (30 July 1948); Mary Spargo,

"End of Troop Segregation Eventual Aim, Truman Says," Washington Post (30 July 1948), p. 1;

"Fair Employment," Washington Post, (29 July 1948); "Segregated Army," Washington Post, (30

July 1948); "Segregation in the Army," New York Times (8 August 1948).

109 MacGregor, p. 316; Dalfiume, p. 172. 1

150

Spargo, 1 10 "Army Segregation To Go, Says Truman," New York Times, (30 July 1948); Mary

July 1; "End of Troop Segregation Eventual Aim, Truman Says," Washington Post, (30 1948), p. Post "Fair Employment," Washington Post, (29 July 1948); "Segregated Army," Washington (30

July 1948); Hanson Baldwin, "Segregation in the Army," New York Times (8 August 1948).

1 1 While the federal law prohibited any government agency from spending public funds to influence legislation, the War Department fiercely campaigned for UMT. Although the House

Subcommittee on Publicity and Propaganda formally condemned the practice, the Army brought

publication, journalists, civic leaders and others to Fort Knox free of charge on Army planes. A

The UMT Pioneer, was also issued at Fort Knox. While defended by the Army as "an ordinary camp newspaper," 4,000 of 5,000 published copies were distributed off-base to influential individuals and groups to enlist UMT support. The War Department also employed two special consultants to tour the country, delivering pro-UMT speeches to civic groups and organizing panel discussions. Clyde E. Jacobs and John F. Gallagher, (1 967) The Selective Service Act: A

Case Study of the Governmental Process, (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co.), pp. 32-33.

112 More than 100 articles are listed under the heading "Military Training" in the Reader's Guide

for Periodical Literature between April 1947 and March 1948. Among these are “Army Showcase:

Fort Knox School," New Republic 116:8; D. Landman, "Can Soldiers Be Gentlemen? Experiment at Fort Knox," Collier's 120: 18+19; "Is Untee the Answer? Fort Knox Universal Experimental

Unit," Christian Century, 64:680-2; "Report on the Umtees: Universal Military Training

Experimental Unit at Fort Knox, Ky." Senior Scholastic, 51:10-11.

113 Randolph to Truman (22 March 1948) in APR files, Reel 12; Testimony of Albert Black,

Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, Universal Military Training, 80th Cong., 2nd

session, 1948; Royall testimony, National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs, (26 April 1948).

Copies of NDCNA in James Evans Files, US Army Military History Research Collection, Carlisle

Barracks, PA. and in OSD 291.2 National Archives, p. 41.

U4 "Army Hopes New Training Will Make Friends of Men," Washington Post, (29 July 1948), p.

3; "Eventual End of Bias in Armed Forces," Pittsburgh Courier, (7 August 1948).

113 "Editorial," Elizabethtown News (26 July 1948).

I 16 Charley Cherokee, "National Grapevine," Chicago Defender, (3 August 1948). 151

Clifford to Forrestal (13 May 117 McCoy and Ruetten, p. 110; Niles to Clifford (12 May 1948);

Clifford June 1948) in Truman 1948); and a letter from Federal Judge G. T. Washington to (29

Library; Dalfiume, p. 168.

Louisiana State 118 J. Lawton Collins, (1979) Lightning Joe (Baton Rouge and London:

University Press), p. 340.

119 Rearden, pp. 76, 104.

120 Collins, p. 347.

121 Bradley and Blair, pp. 471-472.

122 MacGregor, pp. 369-371.

123 Collins, pp. 355-357.

124 Collins to Page, 30 July 1948; in Page papers in Wisconsin State Historical Society.

125 Page's letter says:

Dear Joe:

is if anyone can write out a satisfactory statement for I think the first thing to do to see publication about the Army's stand on racial segregation and the separation of officers 126 and men. should come from the Secretary of After that I am not sure but that the statement of those questions belongs to Defense's office. I rather think that the political defense 127 the civilian head of the armed forces. Probably no statement from civilian sources will be made during the political campaign. And probably the Administration will not want any statement made from any uninformed source either. But the first thing to do is to write a statement which the services can live with and which a sensible Secretary of Defense of either party will defend as essential to the efficiency of the armed services. Walter

Page to Collins (3 August 1948) CSUSA.

Noel Griese, "He Walked in the Shadows: Public Relations Counsel Arthur W. Page," Public

Relations Quarterly, 21 (Fall 1976), pp. 8-15.

Collins, p. 340. .

152

Inc. 3 January 1946; Page 128 page to Bryan Houston, Vice President of Young and Rubicam,

Collins to Page, 26 January 1 946; to Collins, 4 January 1 946; Collins to Page, 8 January 1 946; Page to Collins, 5 February Page to Collins, 28 January 1946; Collins to Page, 5 February 1946;

February 1946. All in Page 1946; Page to Forrestal, 21 February 1946; Forrestal to Page, 26 papers in Wisconsin State Historical Society.

291 .2. 129 Truman to Bradley and Truman to Royall (4 August 1948), CSUSA

of Preparation M&W BR, P&A 130 CSUSA, 291.2 (3 August 1948); File #CSGPA 291.2, Office

Div, GSUSA.

August 131 Summary Statement OSA 291.2 (26 August 1948) WM-31-48. Routing form (26

sent to Forrestal. OSA 291 .2 Negroes 1948) CSGPA 291 .2 Copy of Royall memo to Clifford also

Records 291 .2. (2 September 1948) all in National Archives Group

132 Collins, p. 344-45.

Truman (New 133 Alfred Steinberg, (1962) The Man from Missouri: The Life and Times of Harry S.

York: G. P. Putnam), pp. 320-321

134 Steinberg, p. 326.

135 For the best description on the transition from Forrestal to Johnson, see Marx Leva’s Oral

History Interview with Jerry N. Hess, Washington, D.C. in HSTL.

136 Borklund, pp. 65-67; Rearden, p.82; and in passim.

137 Borklund, pp. 65-67.

138 Even many Air Force officers felt that the B-36 project was riddled with waste, inefficiency,

effective against even current and mismanagement. Many questioned if the new aircraft would be

radar and rockets.

139 Some 48 articles were published in the nation's top consumer magazines. See for example, Report, L. Denfield, "Apprehension for the Security of the U.S.,“ U.S. News and World 27(21

Dispute." U.S. October 1949), p. 38; O.N. Bradley, “Complete Text of Statement in Defense

News and World Report, 27(28 October 1949), pp. 61-70; D. V. Gallery, "Don't Let Them Cripple

the Navy!" Saturday Evening Post, 222 (29 October 1949), pp. 36-37; H. L. Ickes, "Navy Hits .

153

"Revolt of the Admirals," Time, 53 Below the Belt," New Republic, 121 (7 November 1949), p. 17;

(7 November 1949), p. 20.

140 New York Times, 14 October 1949; Borklund, pp. 75-76; Haynes, p. 127.

141 Bradley and Blair, p. 542.

of Defense states that the 142 The official United States History of the Office of the Secretary with the timing of the North timing of the Chinese Communist Revolution probably had more to do Allen and W.V. Korean incursion than American preparedness. See Rearden, pp. 547-550; R.S.

Shannon, "Why Johnson Was Fired," New Republic, 123(25 September 1950), pp. 11-12.

143 Johnson Public Statements, 1949; Rearden, p. 77.

144 Rearden, pp. 81-82.

145 National Military Establishment, Office of Public Information, Press Release, 20 April 1949;

Memorandum, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall for Secretary Defense Louis Johnson,

Services; Letter, (21 April 1949), subject: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed

Louis Johnson to Charles Fahy, 4 May 1949.

146 National Military Establishment, Office of Public Information, Press Release, 11 May 1949;

Memorandum, Acting Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray for Secretary of Defense, 26 April 1949,

subject: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services.

147 National Military Establishment, Office of Public Information Press Release, 7 June.

94- 148 Timothy W. Stanley, (1 956) American Defense and National Security, (Washington), pp

95.

149 A complete examination of the incident follows in chapter five.

150 "The Happy Private," Time, (20 June 1949), p. 16; "Mr. Secretary," Newsweek, 33(20 June

1949).

151 Bradley and Blair, p. 261

152 Gray actually testified on the bill after he stepped down as Secretary of the Army. Collins, pp.

351-353. 154

153 Memorandum, Acting Secretary of Army for Secretary of Defense, 26 May 1949, subject:

Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services; See also Personnel and

Administration Summary Sheet, 19 May 1949, same subject, Fahy Committee file.

154 MacGregor, p. 364; Memorandum, Secretary of Army for Secretary of Defense, 30

September 1949, subject: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, Chief of Press Release 256-49, 30 Staff P&A 291 .2; Department of Defense, Office of Public Information,

September 1949, Fahy Committee Files.

155 Memorandum for the Record, Kenworthy, 9 December 1949, subject: Telephone

Conversation with Nash, Fahy Papers HSTL. CHAPTER 4

A. PHILIP RANDOLPH AND THE COMMITTEE AGAINST JIM CROW IN THE ARMY

effectively without publicity / agree with you that something can be accomplished sometimes more the point where their major and than with it. I am convinced however that Negroes have reached

1 maximum results that they can obtain from the government are going to come through pressure.

A. Philip Randolph

Thus far, we have largely examined military desegregation efforts made by Caucasians working in or with the United States government. Thus far we have chronicled the contributions made by African Americans such as Lewis

Granger, Roy Davenport, Walter White, William Hastie and Marcus Ray, and we will spotlight the efforts of John Sengstacke, editor of the Chicago Defender in the next chapter. While these blacks made a critical contribution, whites played the most prominent role in delineating, opposing and implementing military desegregation policy. Caucasians controlled the mainstream press, political opinion-making and the publicity processes and the public information positions

in the federal government.

We have shown how, in seeking to combat injustice, Truman became an

unexpected advocate for democratic reform of the military. Truman’s advocacy

of racial reform converged with his desire to modernize the post-war defense

establishment. He developed these broad themes to cast himself as a moderate

standard-bearer for the Democratic Party and an alternative to Henry Wallace,

2 on the left, and Strom Thurmond, on the right. Rather than speculate upon

155 156

Truman’s motivations, our attention has turned to the haggling for political advantage by the military and the White House forces. an To this end, we found publicity and the threat of public exposure was important accelerant and deterrent within this somewhat opaque political sphere. We have analyzed the actions of these political insiders and elites and

desires found that they disregarded, or assumed that the press represented, the

Philip of the governed. In this chapter, we examine the efforts made by A.

Randolph, the leading black activist of the 1940s, to represent these desires

and to advance the political dialogue. We will show that Randolph used

publicity and other public relations tools to create a climate for change.

Throughout his entire career as a union and civil rights leader, A. Philip

Randolph recognized the utility of public relations for garnering attention to

popular and unpopular causes. A well-timed speech, a petition signed by

influential political leaders, a carefully targeted newspaper or magazine article

could often create an aura of political inevitability for a cause that Randolph

supported. As he achieved his goals, Randolph became more adept at the use

of public relations as a political mechanism. In 1937, Randolph had forged the

first successful contract between a major American company (Pullman Motor

Car) and a black union (Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters), and in 1941 he

forced President Franklin Roosevelt to ban racial discrimination in federal

employment and defense industries by threatening a pre-war March on

Washington by 100,000 African-Americans. 3 Randolph built upon these

successes to become a particularly effective catalyst for military

democratization. His commitment to military desegregation took root during

World War II.

Randolph's Early Military Desegregation Crusade 157

mobilization of Officials in the Roosevelt administration were discussing

1934 through African American troops well before World War II began. From

Chief Counsel 1937, Roosevelt’s Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur and NAACP

Charles H. Houston exchanged a series of letters on relevant issues such as the quota. 4 As the United States began gearing up for war in the wake of

its desire Hitlerian aggression, the African American community began to voice

society. The for reform in the American military and throughout American hallmark of this campaign was the Pittsburgh Courier's call for a Double V (for

Victory) of democracy at home against discrimination and abroad against fascism. 5 Meanwhile, Walter White led a delegation that included the National

Urban League’s T. Walter Hill and Randolph to try to convince Roosevelt to

integrate the armed services; although Roosevelt promised to act, he effectively neutralized the opposition by issuing a press release that promised some

improvements but not integrated units. Moreover the administration implied that

the group (White, Hill and Randolph) had endorsed these moves, but the White

House later retracted this when the delegation formally registered their

protests. 6 Officially, the 1940 Draft Act mandated racial desegregation, but

Roosevelt also gave his imprimatur to an Army memo that, operationally, kept

7 African-Americans in separate battalions.

On another front, Randolph organized the March On Washington

Movement (MOWM) which called for desegregation of both the military and

defense plants; the latter largely succeeded but the former failed. Before

Randolph was able to secure an executive order from Roosevelt assuring

factory jobs for skilled black workers, African Americans had been largely shut

out of defense industries. According to a United States Employment Service

inquiry, more than fifty percent of companies engaged in defense work refused

8 to hire blacks; more than a quarter million jobs were effectively closed. To 158

march down protest this situation, Randolph wanted to bring 10,000 Negroes to

Pennsylvania Avenue and ask for a share of jobs and desegregation of the

the organ of military. Randolph actively promoted the idea in The Black Worker , the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, and received wide support and

to publicity from much of the black press. From this publicity, Randolph was able

up the ante to 100,000 protesters. A spirit of revolt was in the air. Although

White House intermediaries tried to win delays and to convince Randolph to

relent, Roosevelt was finally forced to meet with a civil rights delegation headed

without by Randolph in mid-June 1941. Randolph refused to call off the march

the a tangible concession. He got it in the form of Executive Order 8802,

formation of the Fair Employment Practices Committee and the de jure

desegregation of defense plants. Although it did not result in quite the

public reformation that it promised, Randolph’s victory was stunning as a

relations ploy. It was the first time that blacks would use political pressure and

leverage, rather than earnest requests, to achieve a goal. In turn, Randolph

agreed to postpone the march, but not to cancel it, as a means of maintaining

pressure on the Roosevelt administration.

During the war, Randolph fought racial segregation in the military

through his support of Winifred Lynn. Lynn and his brother, Conrad, a civil

liberties lawyer, brought a habeas corpus case against the U.S. Army on

grounds that racial segregation in the military was illegal. Randolph supported

the Lynns by publishing The War's Greatest Scandal! The Story of Jim Crow in

Uniform in April, 1943 through MOWM. The pamphlet, by Dwight McDonald,

argued for civil disobedience. Publication and distribution was complicated,

because Walter White of the NAACP refused to distribute it on grounds that,

“There is no sound reason why we should buy and distribute promotional

9 literature of a duplicating (competing) body.” This issue ripped open a rift 159

between the MOWM and the NAACP. In a policy/publicity packet for local organizations and in personal correspondence, Randolph denied that he was competing with the NAACP and other rights organizations because he was focused on mass action. Yet, White and others found MOWM offered too much

competition. 10

At war’s end, Randolph continued his military desegregation efforts by

forming the National Committee to Abolish Segregation in the Armed Services.

In April 1945, he drew Willard Townsend of the CIO, Morris Milgram of the

Workers Defense League (WDL) and Wilfred Kerr of the Lynn Committee to a

conference in Butler, New Jersey. Their plans soon proved too ambitious and

too expensive. When they realized they could not build a nation-wide

movement, the Committee disbanded. 11

Randolph then turned his attention back to establishment of a National

Council for a Permanent Fair Employment Practice Commission. This

undertaking placed Randolph at the forefront of what would become a

mainstream civil rights coalition. A rally in Madison Square Garden won

endorsement from President Harry Truman, a speech by the administration’s

Labor Secretary Lewis Schwellenbach and speeches by Mayor Fiorello

LaGuardia, Senators Wayne Morse (R-Oregon) and Robert Wagner (D-New

York).

To further the FEPC, Randolph issued a strategy manual that included

five pages of public relations policies. He specified use of radio, bulletin boards,

sample press releases and recommended ways to gain newspaper coverage.

He summed up the publicity philosophy saying, “everything that your [local

FEPC] council does, no matter how trivial, should have a place in your local

newspapers. The smaller the town, the larger your place in the local press.” This 160

philosophy of constant, consistent publicity-seeking also would inform

12 Randolph’s efforts to desegregate the military.

Randolph regarded Truman’s Civil Rights Committee and his NAACP appearance as mere rhetoric. But he found a savvy adversary in the thirty-third

President. Although Truman may have secretly harbored racist beliefs, he was willing to articulate comprehensive civil rights reform as part of his political agenda. From late 1947 through 1950, Randolph and other civil libertarians

13 tried to goad the President to keep his promises.

Randolph organized his post-war military desegregation campaign through three consecutive organizations, the Committee Against Jim Crow in

Military Service and Training (CAJCMS), the short-lived League for Non-Violent

Civil Disobedience Against Military Segregation (LNVCD) and a series of local

Commissions of Inquiry which operated under auspices of the Committee

Against Jim Crow. During the life of these groups, Randolph also served as a

leading officer of many other civil rights organizations and was employed by the

Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP); he funded the military crusade

through the BSCP auxiliaries and through like-minded liberal and radical

organizations.

In this publicity campaign, Randolph was joined by Captain Grant

Reynolds and four leading members of the Congress Of Racial Equality, William

Worthy, Bayard Rustin, George Houser and A.J. Muste. Of these, Reynolds and

Worthy were the most significant in this context because they served,

respectively, as Chairman and Public Relations Director for the Committee

Against Jim Crow. 14 Reynolds, a black Republican and New York State

Commissioner of Correction, had opposed a Communist-supported candidate

for the Harlem Congressional district. Before this, he had resigned his

commission as an army chaplain in January, 1944 in protest against persistent, 161

branch hired blatant racism in the armed forces. The Washington, D.C. NAACP him as an administrative assistant. 15 Reynolds became a Corrections Reynolds Commissioner in 1947. In that year, even before the CAJ formed, wrote his boss, New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey, as well as Truman,

Defense Secretary James Forrestal and Joint Chiefs of Staff head Dwight

Eisenhower asking their views on the issue of racial segregation. Copies of

16 Reynolds’ letters were distributed to the black and pacifist press.

Randolph and Reynolds formed the Committee Against Jim Crow in

October 1947. A month later, the pacifistic Congress Of Racial Equality voiced

their opposition to a peacetime draft, but announced they were unwilling to

endorse affiliation with Randolph’s newly-revived organization. Disagreement

with Randolph was not new. In 1943, CORE had refused to participate in the

March on Washington because Randolph felt that the March should be all-

black. CORE was an avowedly interracial organization. However, CORE

leaders joined the post-war group at the urging of William Worthy.

Worthy, an official of the New York Council for a permanent Fair

Employment Practices Commission, had joined CORE a few months earlier by

participating in a Journey of Reconciliation. To test a recent Supreme Court

decision desegregating interstate travel, CORE members and other civil rights

leaders chartered a bus for a two-week interracial trip through the South. The

Journey, which drew much attention in the black press, would become the

forerunner of the 1961 Freedom Ride. In early 1947, Worthy was appointed to

a temporary salaried post of CORE Action Director. He was hired to create

programs supporting desegregation of the armed forces, the YMCA, apartment

complexes and southern transportation. Funding from this highly-decentralized

organization was erratic, and Worthy was unable to institute any serious action.

At the meeting in which he received his appointment, Worthy urged his fellow 162

Randolph’s CORE members not to “make a fetish of inter-racialism,” and to join

Committee Against Jim Crow. Apparently, Worthy became executive secretary

17 of the Committee at this time.

Desegregation of UMT

The Committee Against Jim Crow took their first significant public action

in January, 1948, when they sent a press release announcing their opposition to H.R. 4278, Truman’s bill for Universal Military Training. They opposed the bill

because House Armed Services Committee Chairman Walter G. Andrews told

them, confidentially, that the War Department planned to keep the forces

segregated. 18 Dissatisfied with the amount of news coverage they received,

they stepped up their opposition by immediately calling for the use of civil

disobedience in February 1948. George Houser, a founder of CORE and a

Caucasian Methodist minister, and Worthy called for a boycott of the draft and

war taxes. 19 To further publicize this opposition, Worthy arranged for a radio-

broadcast interview with Randolph on WQXR and WQXQ, two radio stations

owned by the New York Times on February 25, 1948 and he wrote PM

columnist Albert Deutsch, noting that their releases seemed to get short shrift in

20 New York’s most liberal newspaper.

But the issue did not gain substantial publicity until after Randolph met

with Democratic Party officials in February 1948, and then with President Harry

Truman in mid-March. Randolph was accompanied by Dr. Channing H. Tobias

of the Civil Rights Committee, George S. Schuyler of the Pittsburgh Courier,

L.D. Reddick, curator of the Schomburg Collection of the New York Public

Library and Boxing champion Joe Louis. The Chicago Defender military 163

affairs columnist, who wrote under the pseudonym Charley Cherokee, described the meeting:

A. Phillip Randolph and Grant Reynolds through their Committee Against Jim Crow in Military Service and Training are

insisting on elimination of segregation in armed forces if UMT goes through. In an audience with the President last week, Phil came out and said what most Negroes think: "We don't want to

fight for democracy abroad until we get it at home." Truman got mad at first but later cooled to admit Negroes have justification.

Some editorialists and columnists are calling it disloyalty, but 21 from here it looks like the truth."

Randolph was frustrated by Truman’s reaction. Although he was able to

argue his position with Truman, his publicity campaign garnered little attention.

News of his meeting with Truman was buried on page 21 in the New York

22 Times at the end of an article on the Armed Services Committee meeting.

Meanwhile, the NAACP and other organizations met in late March to

endorse Truman’s recently announced civil rights program. However, they

obliquely urged “meticulous scrutiny” of the statements, voting and public

records of candidates even as they called for every vestige of segregation and

discrimination in the armed forces to be abolished and for any public official

who fails to act to be removed from office. 23

Randolph reacted more directly by raising the political heat and, as

Houser suggested, threatening civil disobedience in front of the Senate Armed

Services Committee. Randolph clearly knew that his provocation would draw

headlines because he alerted columnist Drew Pearson before his testimony. 24

When the Senate Armed Services Committee special subcommittee met to

hear interested persons comment upon UMT, Randolph and Reynolds

addressed them on behalf of the Committee Against Jim Crow in Military

Service. Randolph warned that if the draft remained segregated, he would

openly counsel, aid and abet youth, both white and Negro, to quarantine any Jim Crow . .

164

conscription system, whether it bears the label of

universal military training or selective service . . .

From coast to coast in my travels I shall call upon all Negro veterans to join this civil disobedience movement and to recruit their younger brothers in an organized refusal

to register and be drafted . .

I shall appeal to the thousands of white youths ... to demonstrate their solidarity with Negro youths by ignoring

the entire registration and induction machinery . .

I shall appeal to the Negro parents to lend their moral support to their sons, to stand behind them, as they march with heads held high to Federal prisons as a telling demonstration to the world that Negroes have reached the limit of human endurance, that in the words of the spiritual, 25 we will be buried in our graves before we will be slaves.

Senator Wayne Morse, liberal Republican from Oregon on the Armed

Services Committee was “somewhat surprised and no little shocked” at ,

Randolph’s new position. He had been a strong supporter, after all, of

Randolph’s FEPC efforts. Randolph acknowledged that this form of conscientious objection was new, based upon the conviction that since the government had not protected Negroes from discrimination, that even in times of national emergency, blacks and whites should not shoulder arms. Morse

asked if, under these circumstances, the government would be justified in charging treason. Randolph replied,

. . if there are sacrifices and sufferings, terrorism, and

concentration camps, whatever they may be, if that is the

only way by which Negroes can get their democratic rights, I

would unhesitatingly say that we have to face it.

When Morse asked if Randolph felt that treason indictments should necessarily follow specific overt acts, the civil rights leader replied,

... we would participate in no overt acts against our Government, no overt acts of any kind. In other words, ours would be one of nonresistance. Ours would be one of noncooperation; ours would be one of nonparticipation in the military forces of 165

our country . . . [however] we would be willing to absorb the terrorism, to face the music and to take whatever comes and we, as a matter of fact, consider that we are more loyal to our country than the people who perpetuate segregation and discrimination upon Negroes because of color or race.

Finally, when Morse asked if this action would not constitute aiding and

abetting the enemy, Randolph compared it with the action of a union strike

during wartime. Randolph reiterated the theme that he had expressed in his

testimony that no matter how the courts might construe their action,

we would be willing to face it on the grounds that our actions would be in obedience and in conformity with the higher law of righteousness than that set forth in the so-called law of treason. 26

Days later, Morse addressed the Senate on his recent colloquy and published critical reactions from Earl Brown of the New York Amsterdam News, the Pittsburgh Courier, the Washington Afro-American, NAACP Secretary

Walter White, Congressman William L. Dawson (one of two African Americans in the House at the time), and other black leaders. Morse declared that Gandhi’s philosophy could not be applied in this country because “Gandhi had no responsibility to a written Constitution.” Further, he argued, that the very act of passive resistance constituted an act of omission which would constitute legal commission in aiding and abetting an enemy. Morse said Randolph had set back civil rights legislation but promised to fight for the cause. 27

In a later column, Charley Cherokee reported on Randc ph's Senate appearance:

It was ’Negro Day' last Wednesday at the Senate Armed Forces hearing on UMT. With Negro witnesses segregated to the 166

end of the session, television, newsreels and thrill seekers who covered Hank Wallace the day before were absent. But there were thrills. A. Phillip Randolph stole the show with another mighty bluff (or is he bluffing?) --- "If we are to continue to have a Jim Crow

army, I will advise Negroes not to fight." Like a Joe Louis left hook

1 or like 'Saint Phil's own March-on-Washington bluff, it stung the white folks.

In that same article, Cherokee noted there was 'by-play.' The NAACP flatly opposed UMT, but Gibson, ex-army civilian aide and Negro member of the UMT Committee was publicly shocked at Randolph/Reynolds group. While segregationist Sen. Richard Russell praised Gibson for his “Americanism,”

Grant Reynolds called Gibson a “hand-picked mouthpiece of the War 28 Department who sat out the war in a swivel chair.

Caucasian Press Reaction to Randolph and Reynolds Statements

Unlike his meeting with Truman, Randolph’s Senate testimony caused enough alarm to win headlines in the white-dominated press. On 1 April, the day after the Soviets began blocking American and British traffic into Berlin, the

29 New York Times was filled with related stories about the draft and UMT. Yet, it also ran C.P. Trussell’s article on Randolph’s testimony on the front page.

Trussell called it “a blunt warning from the black public” and said that

“committee members indicated anxiety” as Randolph spoke. Morse’s debate with Randolph was carried in full on the jump-page (p.10) of the story. Although

the Times would later support draft desegregation, it did not comment editorially on Randolph’s statement. 30

Coverage of the hearings in the Washington Post also appeared prominently below that of news of the Berlin crisis. The Post 's John Norriss portrayed Grant Reynolds’ testimony as "a bitter, impassioned attack against

Jim Crowism" and noted Reynolds warned the civil rights activists would not accept “a weasel-worded amendment such as appeared in the 1940 draft bill.”

He also briefly cited Gibson's statement that he was “shocked” by the call for 167

resistance. In an editorial the next day, the Post cautioned against

exaggerating the significance of Randolph's remarks and suggested it was

meant more as moral pressure than as a threat. They agreed with Randolph,

“There is convincing evidence to show segregation is a wasteful procedure that

does not make the most efficient use of manpower.” However, they cast

Randolph’s appeal as imposing two standards of loyalty and agreed with

Gibson that “you can’t bargain with patriotism.”31

Time magazine ran an article entitled "Face the Music," in their regular

"Races" department, which was not entirely unsympathetic. They framed

Randolph’s testimony reminding readers that "too many Americans forget what

the Communists never let others forget — that democracy in the U.S. is far from

perfect." The three-paragraph article suggested that Randolph and Reynolds

were not threatening treason, but merely calling the nation to task. 32 While the

testimony did not prompt immediate coverage in Newsweek, it did move the

magazine’s editors to assign their Special Projects department to assess

African American reaction and to discuss the broader issues involved.

Newsweek included results of a poll “by the NAACP” of 2,200 “Negro college

youth polled on 26 campuses,” showed that 71 percent were inclined to favor the Randolph proposal.

Newsweek struggled to assess the impact of Randolph’s words outside of the black intelligentsia because the black press was split on the issue. After

numerous interviews and analysis, Newsweek concluded “most Negro newspapers agree with the diagnosis, but rejected the proposed cure.” The

Newsweek article did not purport “to cover the pros and cons of segregation, but

rather to assay how the Negroes themselves have reacted to the idea of passive resistance.” Although it avoided outright editorializing, the article gave high marks to Randolph, calling him “one of the most respected Negro leaders 168

in the country” who could be no Communist because “as a lifelong moderate

socialist, he has been fighting Communism for decades,” who “voiced strong

hostility toward Russian totalitarianism” and that Wayne Morse’s treason characterization “was shared by large numbers of citizens, but nettled some

whites and worried many Negroes.” They concluded that it was an issue for the courts which “ placed the Armed forces in one of the most difficult dilemmas they

had ever faced.”

Aside from the effect that the article had in broadening awareness and

clearly articulating the scope and complexity of the issues involved, Newsweek

also provided one of the best descriptions of Forrestal’s meeting with his

National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs. Army Secretary Royall told the group of fifteen university presidents, lawyers and preachers that “I’m from North

Carolina and I know the Negro.” Reasserting his support for the Gillem plan,

Royall tried to differentiate between discrimination and segregation as separate ideas. Newsweek wrote that the group reacted strongly to Royall’s words. “Not only did it fail to repudiate Randolph, but in effect [it] adopted his tactic by flatly refusing to form the Advisory committee that Forrestal had encouraged .” 33

Defense Department officials did not immediately react to Randolph’s statement. It did prompt discussion and communication among John H. Ohly, executive assistant to the Secretary of Defense, James C. Evans, civilian aide for Negro affairs, Truman Gibson, Expert Consultant to the Secretary of

Defense, and Marx Leva, the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

While Defense Department public relations officers were aware of expanding discontent, they dealt with it clumsily. For months, the Army and the Air Force refused to release news about Negro troops. The Navy tried to correct this through publication of a study, "The Integration of the Negro in the U.S. Navy," and with a press conference. Pittsburgh Courier columnist Lem Graves, Jr. 169

portrayed the Navy press conference “as a satisfactory rationalization of certain

obvious shortcomings in the present Navy program of racial integration, it

34 couldn’t fill the bill.”

Even before Randolph’s threat, Forrestal planned to hold his National

Defense Conference on Negro Affairs. That meeting was held on 13 April 1948.

As Newsweek noted, Randolph did not attend but the spirit of his protest and his

appearance before the Armed Services Committee were a recurring topic of

conversation. 35

Commission on Inquiry into Wartime Treatment of Negro Gl’s

Randolph, Reynolds and Worthy organized a series of defense-related

conferences of their own from May, 1948 through 1949. These inquiries were

held in Washington, D.C., New Orleans, St. Louis and Los Angeles. Arthur

Garfield Hayes, noted civil libertarian and attorney was counsel for the D.C.

inquiry. While many Defense Department officials were invited, only James

Evans attended. Familiar administration critics were featured speakers,

including Progressive Candidate Henry Wallace, who demanded Army

Secretary Kenneth Royall resign, and Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge,

who described segregation as an undeserved, unjustified humiliation that

jeopardized the national defense. 36

Defense Secretary Forrestal’s National Defense Conference on Negro

Affairs was held just before Randolph’s own Washington Inquiry. Charlie

Cherokee noted that Walter White tried to “pull a fast one and put Phil in his

place” because Randolph wasn’t invited to Forrestal’s Conference. But

Randolph’s spirit kept the 15 Negro Conference leaders unified against the

Army’s equally intransigent segregationist policy. In an editorial, the Defender

noted that the Conference members did not endorse civil disobedience but that 170

“many of them made it clear that Mr. Randolph’s views reflected the deep feeling among Negroes on the Jim Crow issue. The Commission would continue to meet into January, when the President's Committee met. Cherokee described Randolph's Commission as a 'bitter condemnation' of Army practices. 37

League for Non-Violent Civil Disobedience

On June 26, Randolph announced a new organization, the League for

Non-Violent Civil Disobedience Against Military Segregation whose immediate purpose was to force Truman to issue an executive order ending segregation in

the Armed Forces. If this was not done before the new draft act went into effect, on August 16, the League would openly call for non-compliance. For a number

of reasons, the League would prove to be a highly significant, if short-lived enterprise.

The Committee Against JimCrow in the Military had been funded in part by contributions from auxiliaries to the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters.

The League was formed to keep the union legally separate from any illegal activities related to draft resistance and to provide a forum of protest for the

Fellowship of Reconciliation. Randolph formed the League with A.J. Muste,

Bayard Rustin and George Houser, who were all founders of the Fellowship of

Reconciliation (FOR). FOR was a CORE offshoot, formed by its members to canvass support for pacifistic causes. Muste, a respected pacifist, suggested the need for a separate organization. While FOR members sought to eliminate all military conscription, Randolph only protested segregation in the draft. 38 171

Perhaps the most notable distinction between CAJ and the League was their approach to public relations and public action. The Committee Against

JimCrow operated in the national media, the League stressed local community action. This conformed with CORE practices. The League called for public relations, morale and financial committees. It counseled potential draftees, distributed anti-JimCrow buttons and propaganda pamphlets containing a “Civil

Disobedience" pledge. 39

During the summer, while the League attempted to establish itself on a local basis in a number of CORE strongholds, Randolph picketed the

Democratic and Republican Conventions. Members of the Americans for

Democratic Action forged a strong civil rights plank and won endorsement on the convention floor over objections of the national steering committee. In protest, South Carolina Governor Strom Thurmond led a walkout of southern delegates who formed their own party. The Republican platform also endorsed ending racial segregation in the military. In this way, Randolph’s formulation of the issues shaped the 1948 presidential campaign. Without his intervention,

Army Secretary Royall’s interpretation of desegregation might have prospered.

40 When he returned from the convention, Randolph became preoccupied with the legal aspects of non-compliance. He and Worthy carefully honed a statement that would enable him to counsel non-compliance without breaking the law. When the New York Times overstated this position, Randolph disavowed their interpretation of his stance.

An Ideological Split Or A Grab For Power

From the inception of the March On Washington Movement, Randolph's reliance on charismatic leadership rather than bureaucratic organization had put him at odds with other putative leaders of the African American community. 172

Although he was a well-recognized leader, members of the NAACP, National

Urban League and the black press disagreed with his tactics and methods. One of these critics, Bayard Rustin made strong efforts to take control of the military anti-discrimination movement. 41

The issue that Rustin and others broke with Randolph over was acceptance of Truman's Executive Order 9981. In the few days before

Omar Bradley's July 27 speech to Army training leaders at Fort Knox

Kentucky, Truman's call for 'equality of treatment and opportunity' had been considered vague. On July 29, reporters at a Presidential press conference asked Truman to clarify the Order in lieu of Bradley's statement. Truman said his order was aimed at the eventual end of segregation.

In late July, Grant Reynolds warned Randolph that Rustin had hidden ambitions to take over the League. Rustin took control of the funds, opened up a separate, secret bank account and tried to squeeze

William Worthy out of the organization. To counter this deception,

Reynolds immediately divided responsibilities, giving the Committee to

Worthy and the League to Rustin. Reynolds also confronted Rustin, declaring that Rustin’s memo to the League staff was inaccurate,

42 irresponsible and full of ‘unpleasant implications.’

At the time of the Rustin confrontation, Randolph was still dissatisfied with Truman because the Executive Order did not precisely call for an end to segregation. He and Reynolds wrote a letter to the

White House and to the Democratic Party leadership. Truman sent the

Party chairman, Senator Howard J. McGrath, to confer with the n.

McGrath assured them that all forms of discrimination were banned under the new order and that Truman would be appointing a strong 173

Presidential Commission to enforce the order. On August 18, Randolph and Reynolds formally discontinued their civil disobedience campaign.

However, they continued as the Committee Against Jim Crow in the

Military. 43

Houser and Rustin reacted angrily to this declaration of conscience. They felt that Randolph was abandoning those who declared non-compliance both inside and outside the Army. They reformed their group as the Campaign to

44 Resist Military Segregation. The pacifists argued that Randolph was trying to

improve and democratize the Army while they were trying to eliminate it. FOR spokesman Bayard Rustin denounced Randolph and Reynolds, declaring that they had “made a grave and tragic mistake” when they failed to follow through on their commitments. Immediately, Randolph and Reynolds publicly disassociated themselves from Rustin and the continuing civil disobedience campaign. And they felt obligated to issue another denunciation in November.

As historian Paula Pfeffer noted, “Rustin’s unauthorized letters and statements to both major political parties and his violation to clear press releases revealed a basic split in ideology and an internal weakness within the league.”45

Thus, twenty years before the Viet Nam War, a rift was beginning to emerge between those who fought racism and those who fought militarism. By lending his considerable influence to its pacifist agenda, Randolph elevated

CORE’S presence on the national scene even while he forced them to reassess their tactics. The schism between Randolph and CORE, which Worthy helped precipitate, would ultimately affect the anti-war agenda of the civil rights movement.

Funding Problems .

174

The entire postwar military desegregation movement, in all of its

incarnations, was continually running out of funds. In part, Randolph remedied

this by publishing another pamphlet, The Scandal Nobody Knows! Jim Crow in

the Military.” This pamphlet introduced cartoonist Al Capp’s beloved Shmoo,

featured cartoons by Bill Mauldin and a text by Dwight McDonald. Much as he

did with the 1943 pamphlet, Randolph sold the pamphlet to women’s auxiliary

units of his Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters and to other sympathetic

unions and liberal organizations. 46

Similarly, the CAJ and the League were constantly having trouble paying

their printing bills, their phone bills and keeping up with other expenses. In fact,

the rift between Randolph and Bayard Rustin and the other members of CORE

was, in part, triggered by William Worthy’s inadequacies as an accountant

Although most of his peers thought Worthy was likable and that he was an

effective public relations director, John Swomley, the President of the National

Council Against Conscription, found Worthy to be a divisive factor. 47

Swomley blamed Worthy for inept bookkeeping, claiming that Worthy

regularly used cash contributions for his own expenses and paid himself before

other bills. Swomley was present at the meeting in which Rustin reportedly

squeezed Worthy and Randolph out of the organization. He denied that this was

the meeting intent; instead, he called for the effort to be decentralized and

removed from strict New York control. Further Swomley declared, “I was

working in somewhat of a similar relationship to both Bayard and Bill until I

found Bill making assertions which he did not back up when Bayard was

present and when I discovered other actions on Bill’s part which made me

begin to doubt his procedures.” It is also significant that Worthy lost his job as

CORE Action director because he was unable to run a program with erratic funding. 48 175

In reply, Randolph ignored Swomley’s complaints about Worthy and

focused on the legitimacy of calling off the civil disobedience campaign, which

was not the primary focus of Swomley’s letter. Randolph noted that Ghandi

regularly discontinued campaigns and that he felt morally committed to ending

49 civil disobedience after Truman met his demands for a desegregated draft.

German Commission of Inquiry Flap

In late 1949, the Committee Against Jim Crow planned a Commission of

Inquiry in Germany. The Defender received copies of the Committee’s travels

requests that were sent to the Defense Secretary and chided Randolph for

rubber-stamping rather than signing the requests and for seeking Republican

rather than Democratic support for the travel plan.

In a note to Joseph Rauh, Randolph admitted the rubber stamp was

"quite a blunder." He noted that Worthy "was trying to run an organization

without money at the same time that he may do many things but not all may be

according to protocol.” Then he suggested that it might be necessary to take some responsibility from Worthy because he did not want ethical aspects of

military desegregation to be stymied by a lack of protocol. 50

On January 13, Reynolds apologized to Louis Johnson, Secretary of

Defense, for Worthy’s protocol violation and questioned how the Defender could receive access to Defense Secretary correspondence. In his reply,

Johnson never revealed how the Defender saw the travel request but he did reaffirm his support for the Pentagon travel policy.

As a result of the flap, Randolph was forced to accelerate his involvement with the Committee Against Jim Crow. On January 18, he personally met with

Truman’s Administrative assistant, David Niles and reiterated his case for a an 176 ad hoc Congressional Committee. The German Inquiry had broad support. 51

Finally, Leva drafted a letter sent under Niles signature which reminded

Randolph that he needed the support of a Congressional Committee chairman.

52 Randolph was unable to find that support .

Randolph’s Influence on Military Desegregation

Morris MacGregor has argued, “Whatever its ultimate influence on national policy, the Randolph civil disobedience pledge had no visible effect on the position of the President or Congress. With a draft bill and a national political convention pending, the President was not about to change his hands- off policy toward the segregation issue in the services. In fact he showed some heat at what he saw as a threat by extremists to exploit an issue he claimed he was doing his best to resolve.” 53

Clearly, MacGregor is wrong in arguing that Randolph's pledge had no visible effect on Truman or Congress. The Republicans, the Democrats and the

Progressives were all vying for the votes of blacks. In light of these political considerations, the Secretary of Defense and the White House gave generous time and thought to Randolph even while they were transforming the National

Military Establishment into a unified Defense Department, instituting the

Marshall Plan and carrying out the Berlin Airlift. For instance, Truman sent

Democratic Party chairman, Senator Howard J. McGrath, to assure Randolph that the Executive Order banned all forms of discrimination.

MacGregor cites Quest and Response , by McCoy and Ruetten as his main source on Randolph’s role. Yet they contended that “the limelight was on 177

the White House, and its occupants were beginning to feel the heat.” Randolph was clearly one of those who was generating heat, through publicity and coalition-building among the unions and other traditional liberal organizations.

According to McCoy and Ruetten, Clifford and other staff members met with

Forrestal, on May 12, 1948 “to decide what might be done immediately without incurring the wrath of everyone concerned." 54 Wholesale draft resistance could be considered one form of ‘wrath’ to be incurred.

Second, MacGregor and McCoy and Reutten seem to have underestimated the effect that Truman's pledge had on Randolph. As a labor leader, Randolph was clearly uncomfortable invoking a call for civil disobedience in the military. Time and again, he consulted others to develop a speech that urged non-compliance without openly breaking the law. 55 During the war, military desegregation had caused a rift between Randolph's March on

Washington Movement and the NAACP. In the post-war period, the issue again

divided Randolph from CORE. If Randolph’s influence was limited, it was in part

because Randolph sought to limit it.

Third, through the efforts that the civil rights establishment force upon the

Truman administration, the military finally began to transform itself. The White

House and the Defense Department clearly regarded civil rights issues as an important priority. The service branches, especially the Army, were far more reluctant to acknowledge this priority. With the appeal of Randolph's call for civil disobedience, Truman and the Defense Department also began to acknowledge Randolph as the nation's most visible dissenter on the issue. After the Army began to seriously consider desegregation, individual racial altercations were no longer shunted to Defense Department civilian aids like

James Evans or to public relations specialists within the individual services. The military began instituting military training, social service and military justice that .

178

helped ease desegregation. Although it was small and weak compared with

1960s era civil rights groups, Randolph and his Committee Against Jim Crow

represented the best organized, most concerted voice for military desegregation

in the African American community. Randolph's sterling reputation, his skillful

use of all forms of publicity and public relations advocacy and his abiding

rapport with the black press had a measure of influence on military decision-

making.

Notes

1 Trezzvant Anderson wanted the U.S. Army to award the 761st Tank Battalion, an all Afro-

American unit, a medal for bravery for their World War II assault on Germany. Anderson, a Pittsburgh Courier editorial writer, felt that Randolph’s publicity drive was spoiling these plans. On June 28, 1948, Anderson received a press release from Randolph’s Committee Against Jim Crow in the Military. The Committee release asked President Harry Truman to issue an Executive Order to desegregate the Armed Forces. On May 28, Anderson mailed Randolph a copy of the award

request that he had sent to the Army. In June, Anderson wrote Randolph, “I think that [your] premature announcement of that [desegregation demand] would give the public idea of FORCING the President’s hand. The psychology of that will, naturally, make MY task much harder and far more difficult, simply because it is human nature to resist prodding as such ... in a public sense. Where one can beat a graceful retreat, then there is a much better possibility of success. Anderson, Trezzvant (28 June 1948), frame #711-718 in Reel 12, Asa Phillip Randolph (APR) Papers. Anderson's emphasis

2 For a more extensive discussion of Truman’s political motivations, see appendix.

3 Herbert Garfinkel, (1959) When Negroes March: The March on Washington Movement in the

Organizational Politics of FEPC . Glencoe, IL: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., , in passim. Eleanora W. Schoenman,(ed.) Political Profiles: I : (1976) Volume The Truman Years . New York: Facts on File Inc., p.450.

4 Morris J. MacGregor, (1985) Integration of the Armed Forces. 1940-1965 , Washington, DC: Center of Military History.

5 Lee Finkle, Forum for Protest: (1975) The Black Press During World War II . Cranbury, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press.

6 Walter Whitel (948) A Man Called White . New York: Viking Press,

7 Memo, Assistant Secretary of War (ASW) for President, 8 Oct. 1 940; Letter Secretary to President Franklin Roosevelt (Stephen Early to ASW, 9 October 1940, Adjutant General (National Archives Records Group 291.21)

8 Garfinkel, p. 186. 751

179

9 Morris to White, 1 December 1942, Memorandum to Walter White from Roy Wilkins, 21 May 1943 and penciled notes. Walter White to Randolph, 1 1 June 1943; Memo to White and Wilkins

from Konvitz, 9 June 1 943 all in Part Reel 1 1 1 , 3, 7, of NAACP papers.

Randolph to White, 9 September 1942 in NAACP papers; Pamphlet, National March on Washington Movement: Policies and Directives; March on Washington Movement: Proceedings of Conference Held in Detroit; Ray W. Guild to White, 15 April 1943; Paul Murray to Pittsburgh Courier editor George

Schuyler , 31 July 1942; Alfred Lewis Baker to White 18 September 1943, all in Reel 1 NAACP Papers.

1 National Committee to Abolish Segregation in the Armed Services, Reel 20, frame 596.

12 Manual of Strategy, National Council For a Permanent Fair Employment Practice Commission, October 1945. Reel 22, frames 241- 244.

13 W. Leuchtenberg, (November 1 991 ) ‘The Conversion of Harry Truman” American Heritage .

14 Worthy was among a delegation of 40 pro-FEPC civil rights leaders who attempted to meet with War Manpower Commission chairman Paul McNutt in 1 943; New York Age April 19, 1943.

1 Herbert Apthekar, H. (1 974) A Documentary History of the Nearo People in the United States Volume 4 NY: Citadel Publishing, p. 487.

16 Paula Pfeffer (1990) A. Philip Randolph. Pioneer of the Civil Rights Movement Baton Rouge : ,

Louisiana State University Press, p.137; Conscription News. Volume 124, 20 November 1947, p. 2; Pittsburgh Courier, 18 October 1947.

1 Worthy was Youth Committee for Democracy representative in a n FEPC delegation that 23 Randolph led. They met with Walter McNutt of the War Manpower Commission. New York Age. 1 4 April 1 943. Augustus Meier, A. & E. Rudwick, (1 973) CORE: A Study in the £MJ Rights Movement 1942-1968 New York: Oxford University Press.

18 Committee Against Jim Crow, Circulars, Memos and lists 1948, #445-446, Reel 12 in APR files.

19 Committee Against Jim Crow, Circulars, Memos and lists 1948, #794, Reel 12 in APR files..

20 Committee Against Jim Crow, Correspondence 1948, #445-446, Reel 12 in APR files.

21 According to a note from Worthy to Randolph, Defender columnist Al Smith had been writing the Cherokee column, but he was fired in mid-December, 1949. Venice Spraggs, who also had strong Pentagon ties, reportedly took his place. (15 December 1 949) # 510 in Reel 13 in APR files; Quote is from Defender, 3 April 1 948.

22 Evidence of Randolph’s frustration was reported by R. M. Moore to Senator Howard McGrath, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, 5 February 1948; Report of the meeting published in the New York Times. 23 March 1948, p.21.

Dalfiume,p. 163, “Negro Votes Urged to Aid Democracy,” The New

York Times . 28 March 1948 p.30. 180

24 APR to Drew Pearson, (26 March 1948) #858 in Reel 12, APR files.

25 Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services. Universal Military Training 80th Cong. 2d sess., p.688. , , 1948,

26 Ibid, p.688.

27 Congressional Record-Senate 12 April 1948. pp. 4312- 4317. Willard Townsend, Defender columnist and CIO leader also questioned whether African Americans were acculturated with ‘an inward aggressive personality’ which prevented them from accepting Hinduism and non- violence. ( Chicago Defender . 17 April 1948) and later he warned that Paul Robeson and Grant Reynolds were ‘selling blacks down the river’ in a coming ‘atomic-biological-supersonic World War III.’ ( Chicago

Defender . 23 May 1948) .

28 Charley Cherokee, “National Grapevine,” Chicago Defender. 3 April

1948, p. 1 8; “Gibson Explains Why He Backs Universal Military

Training,” Chicago Defender . 10 April , 1948, p.l.

29 “American, British Trains Held in Soviet Berlin for Inspection, Hinton, Harold, “U.S. Defense Need Put at 5 Divisions,” p.l; Leviero, James “Defense Planning Pushed by Truman," Baldwin, Hanson “Aims of Draft and UMT,” p. 10; Reston, James “U.S. Weighs Means to Bolster Europe,”

“Army Week Here to Stress Defense,” p.12 New York Times . 1 April 1 1948.

30 Trussell, C.P. “Senate Committee Reported Backing Draft and the UMT’ New York Times . 23

March 1948. p.21: New York Times. 1 April 1948, p.l.

31 Norriss, John, "Negroes May Ignore Draft" Washington Post . 1 April

1948, p.l;"Negroes in the Draft” (2 April, 1948,) Washington Post , p. 9.

32 “Face the Music,” (12 April . 1948) Time . 51:21.

33 Crisis in the Making: U.S. Negroes Tussle with Issue of Resisting a

Draft Law because of Racial Segregation (7 June 1948) Newsweek . 21: 28-

29; Haynes, p.91, Dalfiume, p. 166 .

34 Charley Cherokee, “National Grapevine,” Defender . 12 February 1948, p.13; Defender 7

February 1948. Lem Greaves, ‘Washington Notebook," Pittsburgh Courier . 7 February 1948; Committee Against Jim Crow, Correspondence 1948, #926, Reel 12 in APR files.

35 Newsweek . 21 : 28-29; Report of the National Defense Conference on Nec o Affairs, 26 April

1948 James C. Evans Reports and papers US army Military History Research i Election, Carlisle Barracks, PA and in OSD 291 .2 National Archives.

36 Letters from Randolph and Reynolds to Royall and to Evans, ( 3 May 1 948 SecArmy National Archives Records Group 291.21); Subsequently, Evans reported to the Secretary of Defense that the Inquiry kept “attention continuously focused on the needs and possibilities of improving ;

181

high-lighting of the the status of the Negro citizen in uniform [while] minimizing any attempted constructive. (Evans to SecDef, proposed civil disobedience plan.” Evans found this might prove 13 May 1948, CD 30-1-2 in SecDef, National Archives Records Group 291.21

37 Defender . 5 May 1948; 22 January 1949

38 Muste to Randolph, (9 June 1948), # 845, Reel 12 in APR files.

39 Bulletin, League for Non-Violent Civil Disobedience; New York Times, 27 June 1948; The #555- Strength of the Movement for Civil Disobedience Against Military Segregation^ n.d.) frame 556 in Reel 12 in APR files.

40 ANP Release, 21 June 1948, p.22.

41 New York Times, June 27, 1948.; Randolph to John Haynes Holmes, July 1 , 1948 Reel 12 in Pfeffer, in APR Files, Committee Against Jim Crow Correspondence, #790 Reel 12 in APR Files; passim.

42 Reynolds to Randolph, (24 July 1948, 25 July 1948) and Reynolds to Rustin (29 July 1948), himself from Rustin’s press #81 1 -81 3, Reel 1 2 in APR files. Reynolds formally disassociated releases which challenged Truman’s Executive Order. Reynolds urged Randolph to grant Democratic chairman McGrath ‘a period of non-embarrassment while he was seeking White House interpretation.’ (10 August 1948) #892, Reel 12 in APR files.

43 Telegram, Randolph to Truman, Reel 12, Committee Against New York Times . (17 July 1948); , Jim Crow, Correspondence, Press Statement (16 July 1948) #917, Reel 12 in APR files, Reel 12 in Memorandum Grant Reynolds to Senator Howard J. McGrath (1 August 1948) #641 , APR files; Black Worker August 1948.

44 1 Reel 1 of the APR files. Houser to Randolph (1 8 August 948), #801 , 2

45 Pfeffer, p. 153-154.

46 Randolph to Oregon NAACP (5 October 1948); to Ada Dillon, BSCP Ladies Auxiliary (14 July 1948); to the Federal Council of Churches (14 July 1948); to Campaign for World Government (8 June 1948); to Helena Wilson (14 July-29 July/1948); to National Council of Jewish Women (29 September 1948); to Dave Dubinsky of International Ladies Garment Workers Union (16 to Union of September 1949); to E. Corsi of Workers Defense League 4 February 1949) ; Packinghouse Workers (6 August 1949); to Amalgamated Meatcutters Union (20 August 1949); Hatters Union (14 November 1949); to W. Reutherof United Auto Workers (7 March 1949) all in Reel 12, # 719,751,754, 821-824, 852, 922-925, 932, 972, 969, 984, 999-1001, 1051 of APR files. Also, Randolph received Marshall Trust funding of the Inquiry Commissions. Randolph to Simon Gross of Marshall Trust (19 August 1948).

47 For example, A. G. Hays to Randolph (10 May 1948) and L. Graves (15 May 1948) and Reynolds to Randolph, (24 July 1948, 25 July 1948), #782, 769, #811, #812 in Reel 12, APR files.

48 Swomley to Worthy (4 September 1948), Swomley to Randolph (18 March 1949) # 910-912, #1032-1034 in Reel APR files 13, ,

49 files Randolph to Swomley (29 March 1949),# 1039 in Reel 13, , APR

50 Randolph to Rauh, (19 January 1950) in Reel 13, APR files. 182

51 Randolph noted that the African-American press, liberal and church organizations, especially the very influential Elmer Henderson, Director of the American Council on Human Rights, and the Liberal Party all favored the excursion.

52 Reynolds to Johnson, (19 December 1949); “ Charley Cherokee,” Chicago Defender 17 December 1949; Johnson to Reynolds (23 December 1949); Saltonstall to Leva (1 1 January 1950); Reynolds to Johnson (13 January 1950); Reynolds to Evans (13 January 1950); Randolph to Johnson (15 January 1950); Memorandum Leva to Johnson (17 January 1950); Randolph to Niles (19 January 1950); Memorandum Niles to Lava (1 February 1950);

Memorandum Leva to Niles and letter to Randolph (7 February 1950) All in ASD NARG 291 .2 .

53 Morris MacGregor, Jr., (1985) Integration of the Armed Forces 1940-1965 , Washington, DC: Center Of Military History, Government Printing Office, p.304.

54 D.R. McCoy & R.T. Ruetten (1 973) Quest and Response Lawrence, KS: The University Press

of Kansas, p. 109 .

55 See for example “Statement Counseling Non-registration to be Made by A. Philip Randolph When Asked by Negro and White Youths of Draft Age If They Should Register and Submit to Induction in the 1948 Draft Act.” (Undated) # 557-8, Reel 12 in APR files. Chapter 5 THE FAHY COMMITTEE

Custom has moved toward equal treatment, as is shown by development of recent years in the Government, in the armed services, in organized labor, in educational institutions, in sports, in the theater, and in restaurants in this community as examples. Circuit Court Judge Charles Fahy John R. Thompson Co. v. District of Columbia 203 F. 2d 579 (1st Cir1950)

In this chapter, we analyze the core question: How, if at all, did the press

inform the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services? Chapter two discussed the subtle and overt press

manipulations that Truman used to enlarge public support for his policies and

reforms. Chapter three showed how the same American military leaders who

helped craft or obstruct military desegregation often implemented their policy by

responding to or by attempting to control the press. In this chapter, we will show

how the Equality of Treatment Committee was shaped by Truman’s personal

attitudes about the press. We will examine the composition of that Committee,

concentrating on press influences, and then recount the significant operations

that led them to solicit and win Army acceptance of desegregation. We will show

how the Committee felt compelled to openly defy Truman’s press curbs as well

as how the Committee surreptitiously challenged the President’s press

restrictions. Although this incident is rather complicated, we will use it to lay out

the background for the final chapter. In that chapter, we will discuss the degree

to which aspects of this series of events can be directly used to understand

modern situations and the degree to which this method of studying government

publicity and press coverage may provide a useful technique for studying

183 184 history.

Committee Appointments

Through Kenneth Royall and Omar Bradley, the Army had let it be known

that it did not interpret President Harry Truman’s Executive Order 9981 as

requiring the end of segregation. In late 1948, the other services appeared far

more compliant. The Navy announced that it would extend its policy of

integration begun in the closing months of World War II. The Air Force leaked to

the press that it had completed plans for full integration that only waited

approval. 1 This put the Army on the defensive, but still determined to maintain

segregation.

To eliminate segregation in the armed services, Truman created the

President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed

Services in September 1948. The White House had considerable trouble

determining who should be appointed to this committee. Donald Dawson,

Administrative Assistant to the President, contacted Oscar Ewing and Harold

McGrath and asked for their recommendations for committee appointments. As

early as 30 July 1948, Federal Securities Commission Chairman and political

operative Ewing suggested the appointment of Charles Wilson, the former Chair

of the President’s Committee on Civil Rights as the chairman of the military

group. In that same letter, Ewing also strongly endorsed John Sengstacke,

Publisher of the Chicago Defender, as a member of the Committee.

(Sengstacke would be included among the appointees.) Many other journalists

were prominently under consideration, especially by the Secretary of Defense.

While Forrestal recommended (as Chair) Dr. Frank Graham, the President of the 185 University of North Carolina, he also nominated Ralph McGill, editor of the

Atlanta Constitution, Phillip Graham, Associate Publisher of the Washington

Post, Mark Ethridge, Editor of the Louisville Courier-Journal, and Clark Howell, publisher of the Atlanta Constitution. 2 The Office of the Secretary of the Navy

also submitted a list, but it mostly contained names of industrialists and not

3 narrow the list to include journalists . By mid-August, Dawson had begun to

Wilson, Graham, McGill, Sengstacke, and Lewis Granger, the head of the Urban

League, as well as Julius Ochs Adler, Vice-President of the New York Times,

Barry Bingham, publisher of the Louisville Courier-Journal. A few days later,

Dawson reported that Sengstacke was on the list and that answer was expected from Wilson. When Wilson turned the White House down, attention

4 turned to McGill and Phillip Graham as potential chairman . Dawson contacted

Marx Leva regarding Graham. Through Leva, Forrestal expressed his approval but Royall said he preferred Jonathan Daniels, Truman’s former Press

Secretary and the editor of the Raleigh, N.C. News and Observer. Dawson prepared a memo for Truman for an off-record meeting with Graham. He noted that Forrestal and Presidential Administrative Assistant David Niles felt that

Phillip Graham would make “an exceptionally good chairman” and prepared a final list that included five journalists, Phillip Graham, McGill, Sengstacke and

Adler as well as Granger and Alphonsus J. Donahue, who would eventually become an inactive member of the Committee. Dawson urged that Truman tell

Graham that (a) most opposition from the left had disappeared, (b) that the final report of the Defense Conference on Negro Affairs made positive recommendations for the President’s Committee and that (c) the Committee would have complete support of the Negro press. Apparently, Phillip Graham was unmoved because he was not appointed. McGill withdrew himself from 186 consideration, arguing that the local Southern situation would make it inadvisable and that the committee would only bring in a report that would be rejected by the segregationists in the military. Thus, none of the Caucasian journalists were finally appointed. 5

However, these recommendations demonstrate that neither the military nor the White House were adverse to working with liberal journalists on military desegregation. Although Forrestal had cautioned against the press, and though

Truman had often articulated his mistrust of publishers, both were still willing to consider empowering a journalist in this key position. Their reasoning is less evident and worthy of some speculation. This appointment may have been an innocuous mark of appreciation for expected political support; it seems less likely that the Administration tried to trade appointments for political endorsements. In either case, in September 1948, the Democrats themselves may have doubted that Truman would be reelected or that the military desegregation committee would ever meet. Truman and Forrestal may have considered a journalist would be more sensitive to the boundaries of press responsibility, or that a journalist would be a better conduit to the rest of the press and could articulate the need for press restrictions. In essence, a journalist on the committee might be more controllable and better able to control other journalists than a non-journalist. In any case, Truman did not appoint a journalist in the top post but a black journalist was appointed to the committee

6 and the Committee hired a very savvy journalist as its Executive Secretary.

Charles Fahv

the Secretary of the Army7 the White House Despite objections by ,

announced the names of the members of the President's committee on 18 187 September 1948. Basically, the President's committee was a liberal one.

Charles Fahy, a Georgia-born white Catholic was appointed as chairman.

Although a Southerner by birth, Fahy soon became accustomed to positions of authority in Washington, D.C. He had left Rome, Georgia, to become an undergraduate at Notre Dame and then earned a law degree from Georgetown

University and was admitted to the District of Columbia bar. When World War I broke out, he served as a naval aviator from 1917 through 1919. After the war,

he returned to his law practice in the nation’s capitol until 1924 when his health failed and he was hospitalized for a year and a half. For his health, he moved to

Santa Fe, , where he practiced law until 1933. Through the 1930s,

Fahy held many posts in the Roosevelt administration including Solicitor

General. 8 Under Truman, he was appointed legal adviser and director of the

Legal Division of the military government in Germany from 1945 through 1946,

a legal adviser to the Department of State, and an adviser to the American

delegation to the San Francisco conference on the United Nations. While he

was chairman of the President’s Equality Committee, he served as an alternate

representative to the U.N. general assembly and as chair of the Atomic Energy

Commission personnel security review board. As the Equality Committee began

to win compliance from the Armed Services, Truman decided to appoint Fahy to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 9 Clearly, from these

responsibilities, Fahy had a broad range of expertise and was widely respected

for his leadership over complex issues. Yet, these obligations monopolized

much of Fahy’s time and prompted him to delegate Equality Committee

activities to his executive secretary and the staff. However, when it counted,

Fahy met with Truman and the service secretaries to set broad policy objectives.

Fahy was known to be liberal on the race issue. In fact, in his very brief 188 hearing appointment to the District Court of Appeals, the Senate only questioned whether he might be “too liberal” for the court. 10

Other Caucasian members of the Fahy Committee were Dwight R. G.

Palmer, president of the General Cable Corporation, active in the National

Urban League, and proponent of equal employment opportunities and William

E. Stevenson, president of Oberlin College.

In addition, Truman appointed two African Americans, Lester Granger, the head of the National Urban League and close friend of Secretary of

Defense Forrestal, 11 and John H. Sengstacke, publisher of the Chicago

Defender. Sengstacke played a key role in preventing the Federal government

12 from closing the black press for sedition during World War II.

Sengstacke and the Chicago Defender Tradition

The appointment of Sengstacke was highly significant because the

Chicago Defender had a long tradition of demonstrating greater skepticism and greater political independence than other newspapers owned or operated by

blacks. During World War I, most black newspapers subscribed to black

1 historian W.E. B. DuBois dictum to “close ranks” behind the war effort and to wait to press their demands for equality until the Kaiser was beaten. Calls for

racial justice and equality were rarely published in the black press. Yet, the first

Defender Publisher, Robert Abbot, was nearly jailed for sedition for publishing

13 'inflammatory,' anti-segregationist cartoons during the first world war.

When Abbott died in 1940, his young cousin, John Sengstacke took over

as Defender publisher and continued the newspaper’s militant stance during

the Second World War. To understand Sengstacke and the political milieu in

which he was operating, it is worth briefly recounting his wartime efforts 189 regarding military desegregation and censorship.

At the onset of World War II, a few black publishers wanted to resurrect

DuBois’s conservative stance of World War I. In answer to these critics who called for more a subdued editorial stance, the Defender articulated their news policies in an editorial that "too many, far too many of our newspapers are

working at cross purposes" it called for other newspapers to abandon the strategy that had been employed 28 years earlier, during World War I, to “set aside our demands for democratic rights and forget our pleas against segregation, lynching and economic denial until the war is over." Instead, it called for an enlightened Negro press to unite and work toward the end of these

14 injustices and thus, ultimately, strengthen the nation's war effort. Perhaps surprisingly, this new stridency of the northern black press offended influential southern white liberals who charged that these newspapers were actively

15 increasing racial tension to force integration.

During the build-up toward war and in the early days after Pearl Harbor, the Roosevelt Administration monitored black-owned and operated newspapers through the United States Army, the Justice Department, the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, the Post Office Department and the Offices of Censorship, of Facts

and Figures (OFF), and of War Information (OWI). 16 On 22 May 1942, Roosevelt

directed his recently named Attorney General, , and Postmaster

General Frank Walker to meet with some black editors “to see what could be

done about preventing their subversive language.” 17

Washburn revealed that another meeting did occur; in a watershed

incident, Attorney General Biddle met with Sengstacke in June 1942. As creator

of the Negro Newspaper Publishers Association in 1941, as well as the

publisher of the second largest circulation black newspaper, Sengstacke was 190 an important leader among black journalists. In that meeting with the Attorney

General, Sengstacke skillfully reinforced Biddle's own libertarian views and convinced him to protect the black press from censorship by the FBI, the Post

Office and the Office of Censorship. 18

Sengstacke also met with Postmaster General Frank Walker and his assistants, who obliquely warned him to comply with the Espionage Act. After explaining that the black press existed to "play up" or give greater attention to discrimination that the white press ignored, Sengstacke accepted their

comments saying he was fully satisfied with them. In a letter, he thanked Post

Office officials for the meeting and said he better understood the government

position. He met twice with Office of Censorship officials and assured them that

19 the black press would be informed of the voluntary censorship guidelines.

However, despite these meetings, which suggested an accommodation,

the Defender did not change its editorial policies. At different times, it called for

the resignation of the head of the Fair Employment Practice Commission, the

Secretary of War and even the Attorney General. In the aftermath of racial riots in

1943, the newspaper did moderate its coverage. But it managed to do so in a

way that did not interfere with its larger journalistic responsibilities.

Torn between continuing frustration, and some apparent successes, the

Defender editorial board apparently adopted a highly sophisticated news

policy. It appeared to be moderating its coverage, in that it did not always give

front-page coverage to each racial incident of which it was informed. In fact,

some incidents were buried in editorial columns that may have only been read

by Washington insiders, the troops overseas, or the nation's black cognoscenti.

However, when the issues were important enough, the Defender clearly did not

shy away from reporting a controversy. Indeed, given the gravity of the task that 191 the Defender editors faced, it is clear that they did not accept censorship.

Instead, they risked being seen as inflammatory and seditious to assist their

20 community to work toward the resolution of racial intolerance.

Sengstacke’s Support of Truman

Why did Sengstacke, who had been obliquely accused of sedition by the

President’s Attorney General during World War II, become a key member of the

the Committee? The answer is really quite simple. The Chicago Defender was

21 only major black newspaper to support Truman for President in 1948. This policy began with the Defender’s support of the 1947 Civil Rights

Commission. 22

As 1948 began, Truman had little political support from the nation's black intelligentsia. When he called for a strong Civil Rights program during his 1948

State of the Union address, some Defender columnists like Langston Hughes,

W.E. B. DuBois, and NAACP President Walter White were skeptical. Many

preferred Wallace for his more socialistic political stance. DuBois, for instance,

suspected Truman would not sacrifice the segregationist South.

Many African Americans suspected that Truman would opt for southern

support and conveniently forget the recommendations of his civil rights

commission. Thus, Truman’s 2 February 1948 endorsement of civil rights struck

a clarion call for the Defender. In an editorial published with an editorial cartoon

that compared him with Douglass, Jefferson, and Lincoln, the Defender hailed

his message as a “courageous attack upon racism” and “a noble declaration of

principles.” They said, “we have asked for strong liberal leadei ship and Mr.

23 Truman is giving us that leadership.” When desegregation of the New Jersey

National Guard was opposed by the Army, the Defender praised Truman for 192 the ordering an end to discrimination in the Armed Services and blamed

enforcement. 24 The “bigots” in the military rather than blaming Truman for poor

Chicago newspaper similarly praised Truman’s firm stance of opposition to

Southern congressmen and governors who called for an end to the civil rights

Wallace, as well. It drive. In the same editorial, it decried supporters of Henry accused the Wallaceites of spreading fiction by calling Truman insincere. It argued,

We believe that President Truman’s Civil Rights program must be supported and we must make our support known. Our leadership

is duty-bound to speak out today. We must let the President know that in fighting the enemies of freedom and democracy at home, 25 he has the support of all true Americans.

the Defender Although it did not formally endorse Truman until July 1948, disavowed Wallace in March, calling his solutions phony black magic and

political tricks. In their endorsement, the Defender formed a special campaign

committee to assure Truman’s reelection. During the campaign, Sengstacke

26 and John Davis “looked after the Negro vote.”

As will be seen, Sengstacke’s Committee participation, while consistent,

was rather unremarkable until late 1949. His most important contribution up to

this point was to provide a conduit for information from the African American

community to the military and from the military to the community. Sengstacke’s

efforts were often delegated to Defender editorial staff member Charles

Browning, who served as an assistant to the Executive Secretary of the Fahy

Committee.

After the Appointment of the Committee

After the appointment of the committee members and before the Fahy 193 executive order Committee held its first meeting in 1949, the President's

influence of affected thinking about the military segregation policy. To blunt the the committee, Royall resubmitted his plan for an experimental integrated unit;

adversely through this experiment, he hoped to prove that integration would

27 affect the Army.

Despite protests from the Army General Staff, Secretary Royall made his formal proposal for an experiment in integration to the Secretary of Defense in

December 1948. The Navy objected to Royall’s proposal; an experimental unit was unnecessary, the Navy argued, because the Navy had already made

28 meaningful racial reforms.

The Air Force also refused to cooperate with Royall's experiment

of integration of its own. During the because it was already planning a policy

war, the Tuskegee Air Men had proven the competence of black pilots. More

than any other service, the Air Force was the least able, from a technological

29 stand-point, to set up an independent segregated unit. Lieutenant General

Idwal E. Edwards, the new Air Force's Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, had

of the waste of served on the McCloy Committee in World War II and was aware Edwards, manpower that resulted from the Army's segregation policy. General

reinforced by Stuart Symington, the first Secretary of the Air Force, faced down Symington bitter opposition to a policy of integration among Air Force officers.

do, later recalled that he went to the President, told him what he proposed to

"With reservations," Truman and asked if he had the President's backing. no

replied. There was delay in approving this new policy, however, because the

Army was aware that acceptance would leave it alone among the services in

maintaining and defending segregation. 30

Chairman Charles Fahy was also thinking about how he would conduct held its first the committee and what its goals should be. Before the committee

with Forrestal and with the meeting in January 1949, Fahy discussed his ideas

materials President. After meeting with Fahy, Forrestal authorized all necessary

appoint be forwarded to the Judge and he recommended that the services

31 contacts including the Personnel Policies Board to meet with the contact.

the final policy be agreed upon It was important, Fahy told Truman, that by both the committee and the armed forces. The armed forces should be

take persuaded to adopt a nondiscriminatory policy. The persuasion would time, but issuing a committee report without the military's approval would

tactics and accomplish little. President Truman agreed with Fahy's proposed

told told him to take whatever time was needed. Furthermore, the President

Fahy, he could count on Truman's full support to get the military services to

adopt the committee's suggestions. 32

First Meeting

On 12 January 1949, the committee held its first meeting with the

President in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Forrestal, Symington,

Sullivan, and Royall were present. Truman was apparently either unaware of

the complexity of the mission or undecided as to the degree of accomplishment

that the committee could achieve. Right before meeting with the military

desegregation committee, Truman met with the National Citizens Council on

33 Civil Rights chaired by Herbert Bayard Swope. Apparently, although other

historians have never suggested this, the Swope group strongly influenced

Truman’s instructions to the Fahy group. His desegregation gc ils, which had

previously been limited to the military, were suddenly broader after this meeting

with Swope. For the first time Truman advocated desegregating federal and 195 appears to expect state government. In his initial instructions, Truman almost

rather than substantive that they would produce fact-finding recommendations

Secretary change. At Dawson’s suggestion, Fahy and Worthington Thompson,

the President. of Defense Assistant, each prepared a drafts of statements for

Thompson’s statement called for a specific operable blueprint for constructive

impairing action. Fahy’s version called for any necessary change without 34 or publicity . efficiency or morale. Neither one spoke about the role of the press

However, Truman broadly departed from their script. Truman’s imprecision is

noteworthy when contrasted with the rigorously detailed language that Fahy

35 Truman told those demanded in all his dealings on the subject. President

present,

Order, last spring or Well, gentlemen, I issued an Executive better treatment — not fair fall— | forgot the date of it— on the treatment but equal treatment in the Government Service for everybody, regardless of his race or creed or color, and it’s slowly to and gradually taking hold. And I have asked you gentlemen serve on this Commission in an effort to expedite the thing in the Government Service so that you can actually carry out the spirit, as will survey, well as the letter, of the order. And I hope you make a not only in the Military Services, but in all the branches of the Federal Government, 36 and then inform me of anything that’s lacking, and make suggestions that you deem necessary for the improvement of the situation. willing to serve on this I appreciate the fact that you’re Commission — Committee, whatever you want to call it— and I’m satisfied that with this sort of a setup we can get the thing working

as it should work. The Navy’s made some progress; Army, of course has Air Force. made great progress. I don’t know about the Forrestal interrupts: “The Air Force has come along —what they have in mind, Mr. President, is very progressive—

little bit. I want the Truman: I want this rounded out a Department of the Interior, the Commerce Department, the Treasury Department interviewed on the subject while you are in

existence, and let’s make it a Government proposition as well as

an Armed Services. Of course, as Commander in Chief, I can issue orders to the Armed Services, and if there is some legal approach in all the rest of the branches of the Government, we might as well make a complete program while we are at it, and not 196

I in limit it to just one branch of the government. That’s what have mind, all the way down the line. further — not at this Not only that, I think that we’ve got to go time, but later— and see that the state and local governments carry out the spirit of the laws which we hope to get down on the book down here during this session of Congress.

If anybody’s got any suggestions to make to me on the subject, I’d be glad to listen to them.

Fahy: Mr. President, may I say, as the Chairman of the Committee, we appreciate this opportunity to meet with you when we are really getting down to work, and Secretary Forrestal, and Secretaries, Royall, Sullivan and Symington. We’ll push along now and do the best we can. We are very grateful to you for this

little meeting and encouragement to us and outline of what you expect. We will plug along and come back to you with the best 37 results that we can and do the best we can .

What Truman said next would determine the course of the Committee

it after- operations. It is difficult to tell from the written context whether was an thought or meant to be part of the Committee’s directions from the Commander-

in-Chief. Whatever the intent, it was the only part of the President’s oration that the Committee actually followed. They ignored his broader charge, but they did obey this dictum:

in Truman: That’s what I look for and I want it done such a

way that it is not a publicity stunt. I want concrete results, that’s

what I’m after — not publicity on it. I want the job done and I want

to get it done in a way so that everybody will be happy to

cooperate to get it done. Unless it is necessary to knock

if it somebody’s ears down, I don’t want to have to do that, but

becomes necessary, it can be done. But that’s about all I’ve got to 38 tell you.

After meeting with the President and the service secretaries, the Fahy

Committee met privately and expressed concern over its public image. Lester

Granger pointed out that Negroes were skeptical about what the committee could accomplish; they "expect us to look for an easy way out and to curve

around the main issue [segregation]." Fahy was fearful that, since the

committee's offices were in the Pentagon, people might think it was under the 197

Pentagon's control. It was obvious from the beginning that the committee's

39 members were resolved to be an independent body.

The Fahy Committee held its first formal hearings the next day when

representatives from the military staffs of each of the three services appeared

before it. The representatives from the Army General Staff said that the prime concern of the Army was “the desire to achieve maximum effective utilization of

all its available manpower.” There was no discrimination against the Negro,

despite the fact of segregation—there were equal opportunities and equal

facilities. Segregation of the Negro into separate units “has been the thing that

has given the Negro far greater opportunity than any business or profession in

40 the United States can point to.”

This argument was an often-repeated defense of segregation. The

reasoning behind it was that there were more black commissioned and

noncommissioned officers in a segregated system, because the "inferior"

Negroes did not have to compete with whites for these positions.

The Army spokesmen apparently failed to understand that this was a

poor argument for their stated goal of maximum efficiency. The Navy reiterated

its policy of integration, and the Air Force extolled its new policy of integration

pending before the Secretary of Defense. The committee was favorably

impressed by the latter services, but they spotted weaknesses in their programs.

The Air Force's proposed policy called for a maximum 10 per cent quota of

Negroes in any one unit. Two-thirds of the Negro sailors were segregated in the

Steward's Branch, and there were only five Negro officers out of forty-five

thousand on active duty with the Navy. 41

After this first hearing, Fahy and his colleagues realized that there were

many questions to which answers would have to be found before it could go 198 much further. One of the most important questions was how to interpret the

President's order. Was Truman’s intent to have the committee seek the end of

segregation as well as of discrimination? Most of the committee members

interpreted the order in this way, which appeared to answer for the moment the

second question the committee had posed for itself: Could there be equality of

treatment and opportunity in the armed forces without the elimination of

segregation? Was there such a condition as separate but equal? Chairman

Fahy suggested that the members would be wise to wait for more information

42 about the services' policies before taking a definite stand on these issues .

E-W. Kenworthv

In their second meeting, the Committee began considering the

appointment of an Executive Secretary. From the start, it was recognized that a

newsman would be valuable in this key post. Many top black journalists, such

as Harry McAlpin, the National Negro Press Association White House

correspondent and Venice Spraggs of the Chicago Defender applied. None of

them, however, was chosen for the post. Instead, Fahy was particularly

impressed by an ambitious white newsman named E. W. (Ned) Kenworthy. 43

Kenworthy had received his bachelors and masters at Oberlin College,

taught at Western Reserve Academy and Indiana University Extension. During

World War II, he wrote for the Office of War Information (OWI) as a civilian. In the

four years after the War, he went through a series of jobs as an editorial writer

for the Baltimore Sun, returned to London to work as an information officer for

the United States Information Service, and then was recruited by Publisher Max

Ascoli to help form a magazine of liberal commentary, The Reporter. When the

magazine moved to New York, Kenworthy wanted to stay in Washington. He 199 learned of the Executive Secretary opening from Wallace Carroll, an OWI writer

44 and former overseas correspondent for the United Press.

Kenworthy was thirty-nine years old when he joined the Committee; yet the highlights of his career would occur well after the committee wrapped up its

work. These later assignments, all of which occurred while Kenworthy was

employed as a Washington Bureau correspondent for the New York Times,

often put him at the cusp of history. These incidents also provide a clue to the

way he handled his Fahy Committee assignment.

Kenworthy figured as an interesting example in one of the most important

books in the development of mass communication theory. In The Press and

Foreign Policy, author Bernard Cohen argues,

... the press is significantly more than a purveyor of information

and opinion. It may not be successful much of the time in telling us

what to think, but, it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.

To make his point, Cohen cites The Monroney Resolution: Congressional

Initiative in Policy Making: Case Studies in Practical Politics. In this 1946

monograph, author James Robinson cites how Kenworthy, as a Congressional

correspondent for the New York Times, helped a first-year Congressman earn

front-page headlines and bring a bill past Committee red-tape to the floor of the

House of Representatives. 45

Beyond this, Kenworthy was the fourth reporter along with Neil

Sheehan, Hedrick Smith, and Fox Butterfield on the New York Times Pentagon

Papers46 and was sued by John Erlichman for refusing to surrender his notes

on Erlichman’s role in the Watergate cover-up. What do these events have in

common? In every incident, Kenworthy used his power as a journalist in an 200 report on policy- extraordinary way. That is, he used his power not merely to making, but to help make policy. On the Fahy Committee, however, Kenworthy made policy as a policy-maker, by using his knowledge of the media and the publicity-promulgating offices of the Army and the Secretary of Defense.

Kenworthv on Value of Publicity

In an oral history interview conducted by Jerry Hess of the Truman

Library, Kenworthy claims credit for the committee’s use of publicity as a

pressure tactic. He remembers telling the Committee that nothing could be done

political points out of the thing. if someone tried to make political capital or score

Taking the issue up to Capitol Hill in his estimation, or trying to make political

publicity out of this, would defeat the committee’s purposes.

In this regard, Kenworthy said he had heard, but did not know, that some

kind of understanding existed between Fahy, the Committee, and the President

that no political capital would be made on military desegregation. He said he

suspected that the Committee had promised that it would work with the military

and try to get it done and, in turn, the President promised he would say nothing

about the work of the committee until it was done. This does not make sense.

Kenworthy must have known what Truman had said, because he was

responsible for maintaining all files including the recorded testimony of

Truman’s remarks. However, Kenworthy’s implication that Truman’s agreement

47 was a quid pro quo negotiation only appears in this oral history.

When he was working for the Committee, Kenworthy often expressed

himself on the use of publicity. He compared the Fahy Committee with the 1947

Civil Rights Commission, for instance, and argued that the persuasive power of

publicity was needed to gain attention and build a mandate for the latter but 201 would be counter-productive for the military desegregation group. He saw that military people would be more likely to change their views and accept Truman’s

public opinion. orders if they free from the embarrassing spotlight of

Kenworthy was assigned a Pentagon office — really a conference room

48 without partitions — for himself, his two secretaries and two assistants.

Kenworthy’s Pentagon office was a major advantage for a person with strong

and experts reportorial skills because it provided ready access to documents

within the military and because he was able to develop contacts within the

Pentagon who would provide inside information. African Americans who

especially worked in the mailroom and mimeograph reproduction room were

helpful. 49

In the previous chapters, we have portrayed the news/publicity

environment in which the Fahy Committee functioned. In this chapter, we will

look at events from the Fahy Committee perspective, from its most active

participant, Kenworthy, and from the perspective of publisher Sengstacke.

Situation Analysis

During February and March, the Committee members attempted to

quickly absorb the many details of how military desegregation affected policy

and deployment, while most of the public focus turned to the Air Force. In early

February, the Air Force presented a plan to eliminate segregation to the

Committee. At this time, the Navy began circulating a basic policy statement

abolishing segregation in that service. On 26 February 1949, Sengstacke

produced a 33-page outline discussion of the Executive Order. He presented a 202 theoretical and legalistic approach to desegregation of the military and did not look at the individual services or their installations. In essence, it was less of blueprint and more of a rationale. 50

Kenworthy reacted strongly to Sengstacke’s statement. In a memo to

Fahy, he wrote

it attack this problem by I am inclined to think is a mistake to waving the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights and the Emancipation Proclamation. This has been done for 30 years, and the military readily conceded the validity of the moral argument

and says it is irrelevant, that their job is to defend the country and win battles, and that they must rely on military efficiency and not abstract justice.

Instead, Kenworthy recommended an analysis of the causes of Negro

inefficiency. At this point, he urged that efficient integrated units were a better

goal than achieving ten percent or equal to the population representation

throughout the military. Kenworthy’s thinking would soon change in this regard,

but early in the committee’s work, it was based on efficiency and not moral

arguments. 51

Army Testimony

On 28 March, the three service secretaries and General Bradley

appeared before the committee again. Secretary Symington of the Air Force

and Secretary John L. Sullivan of the Navy pointedly stated that they were

opposed to segregation and had policies of integration. The Air Force policy

was only awaiting the approval of the Secretary of Defense. Symington and

Sullivan made it clear that they both believed integration led to more efficient

use of manpower, in contrast to the Army's belief that integration would mean a

loss of efficiency. 52

Bradley, who had been campaigning on ways to improve morale in the 203 demobilized Army, argued that

I consider that a unit has a high morale when the men have confidence in themselves, confidence in their fellow members of

their unit, and confidence in their leaders. If we try to force integration on the Army before the country is ready to accept these customs, we may have difficulty attaining high morale along the 53 lines I have mentioned.

Secretary Royall restated the Army's familiar position: The Army was “not an instrument for social evolution.” Ending segregation would untangle administrative red tape for the Army, but the combat record of African American troops in two world wars indicated that they were not suited for combat units.

However, they were "peculiarly qualified" for manual labor. “It follows that in the

interest of efficient national defense, certain types of units should be entirely or

largely confined to white troops.” A large portion of the Army's volunteers came from the South where voluntary segregation was widely accepted. Royall felt

that integration would seriously inhibit Army enlistment and impede national

defense. 54

Royall argued that segregation improved opportunities for a Negro

soldier because he would not have to compete with whites. Committee criticism

could not alter Royall's position. When asked in conclusion if he thought that the

Army was carrying out the policy announced in Executive Order 9981, Royall

answered in the affirmative and claimed that this had been the case before the

order was issued. "The Army has done so much more and gotten so much less

credit for what is done [for the Negro] than any [other] Department of

.," 55 Government . . Royall concluded.

From this testimony, the Fahy Committee realized that moral and political

arguments would fall on deaf ears. Since the Army maintained that segregation 204 was needed for military reasons, the Fahy Committee decided to challenge them in terms of military efficiency. The Committee began to pore over Army personnel data and practices to prove that segregation was discriminatory and inefficient. In this way, the committee hoped to persuade the Army to liberalize

56 their policies .

Personnel Policy Board

As the Fahy Committee was beginning its hearings, Secretary Forrestal called in Thomas R. Reid, Chairman of the Personnel Policy Board, to provide

policy statements and serve as an Armed Services representative. Forrestal

asked Reid to formulate a general policy for the three armed forces to end

segregation and guarantee equal opportunity. Forrestal and Reid sought to

establish a new policy before the committee dictated one. While Kenworthy

continued working on his analysis of the three operant versions of the Gillem

Board recommendations, Reid asked to present a plan to the Fahy Committee

at their next meeting. Kenworthy predicted that the Air Force might “leak a story

to the press to the effect that the Defense level is trying to bottle up its own

liberal policy. And the Committee’s name might get dragged in.” At the same

time, Kenworthy questioned whether the Air Force, the Navy or the General

57 Staff killed Royall’s experimental unit plan .

The new Air Force policy then pending before the Secretary of Defense

was considered a workable base for discussion; it provided for an immediate

beginning of integration, but complete transition would be gradual. The Army

was reluctant to go along; the Army General Staff opposed Reid's proposed

policy on the grounds that it was “a directive to assign Negro personnel to

organizations without regard to race, and, as such, is complete integration. It is 205 the opinion of the Army that integration of individual Negroes in white

58 organizations should not and cannot be undertaken at this time.”

Reid finally convinced the new Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson to take the initiative rather than to wait for dictation from the Fahy Committee. On 1

April 1949, he told Johnson about Forrestal's earlier instructions and the proposed policy he had drawn up. Emphasizing that “this is a matter which has the President's direct interest,” Reid persuaded Johnson to issue the proposed

59 policy in the form of a directive to the service secretaries on April 6.

Johnson issued a new Department of Defense policy calling for equality of treatment and opportunity for all. To guarantee this, all personnel would be considered “on the basis of individual merit and ability” for enlistment, attendance at schools, promotion, and assignment. Although some all-Black units might continue in existence for a while, “all Negroes will not necessarily be assigned to Negro units.” Instead, “qualified Negro personnel shall be assigned

60 of to fill any type of position . . . without regard to race.” In short, the Secretary

Defense took the position, contrary to the Army, that equality of treatment and opportunity should abandon rigid segregation. Each service was directed to submit individual policies for approval that would meet the broad aims of this directive.

Despite its propitious aspect, Kenworthy saw this was a phony proposal

61 in which the Secretary hoped to evade Committee enforcement. He felt

Johnson’s proposal lacked any means of enforcement and would have been an

empty gesture rather than a fully-realized policy.

Whatever Johnson’s intentions, the move failed. The Ari ly and Navy

outlined their current policies and ignored Johnson’s request for future plans.

The Army provided a plethora of statistics to support their present policy and the 206

Navy drew its own conclusions that its policy was adequate. At Reid’s suggestion, Johnson rejected the Army and Navy proposals and accepted the

Air Force plan. Johnson’s rejection angered Secretary of the Army Kenneth

Royall, who threatened to arouse Southern Senators on the Army’s behalf. In

replying to the Secretary of Defense's April directive, the Army made clear its

disagreement with Johnson's analysis of military segregation. "The Department

of the Army," wrote Royall,

has reviewed its practices and procedures . . . and is of the opinion that they are sound in the light of actual experience, and are in accord with the policies of the National Military Establishment and with Executive Order 9981.

Moreover, Royall misrepresented the situation. He said that the Army was

already obeying Johnson's racial policies for promotion, assignment, and

the Fahy schooling. In defiance of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and

Committee, the Army was continuing to claim that equality of opportunity could

be achieved with segregation. 62

Apparently aware that the Army's reply would be unacceptable, Royall

wrote Johnson on April 22, warning him not to act precipitately against the

Army's segregation policy. According to Royall, the preceding spring certain

senators on the Senate Armed Services Committee had warned that they would

violently oppose the draft law pending before it if they felt that the President

would issue a preemptory order completely abolishing segregation in the Army.

Both he and Secretary Forrestal assured these senators that this would not be

Royall told the the case. "I think you should be advised of these circumstances,"

Secretary of Defense in conclusion, "because if any action were later taken by

you or other authority to abolish segregation in the Army, I am confident that

63 these Southern Senators would remember this incident.” When Royall's bluff 207 64 failed, he resigned.

To counter Royall, Secretary Johnson designated the Personnel Policy

Board as the liaison for the Defense Department, named some specific

individuals to help the Committee interpret data, and took a strong stand in favor

of integration in his replies to those questioning his action:

These policies have the support of millions of citizens who feel strongly that segregation in the armed forces is sharply at variance with our democratic principles and ideals and who understand that

its practice reduces the efficiency of our military strength. The practice of segregation is damaging to our country's reputation 65 with millions of people around the world.

Reaction to Johnson’s April 6 Directive

The Fahy Committee was surprised and angered by the peremptory

not informed nature of this action from the new Secretary of Defense. They were

the press. 66 The of the directive until April 18, the day before it was released to

their effect of the surprise directive on the committee was profound. It weakened

relationship with the office of the Secretary of Defense while it fostered their

goal of complete integration. Ned Kenworthy saw Johnson’s directive as

67 designed to put the Fahy Committee out of business. By going to the press

with this directive, and by acting so publicly within the first month of his term,

Johnson transformed what could have been an innocuous private reaffirmation

of the department’s pledge of equal treatment and opportunity into a confused

public exercise in military policy-making.

Johnson’s policy offered one of the first opportunities for the press to

comment upon the new Secretary and the military desegregation controversy.

However, the press tended to see the directive as a value statement rather than

a fully-realized policy. Reports in the New York Times, the Washington Evening

Star and front-page stories in the New York Herald-Tribune and the Washington 208 Post attempted to define the real effect of the new policy in terms of traditional military policy.

A number of newspapers published editorials the next day. Noting that the new directive “spells the end of the policy of segregation in the services at every level,” the Washington Post congratulated Johnson and said it looked

said forward to specific policies from the three branches. The Herald-Tribune

laudable touch of that, “Secretary Johnson has delivered an order which has a

declaration is the specific.” Arguing that “the amount and quality of purpose in a

prodding, but that the always hard to estimate," they characterized it as worthy

York substance of final reports would need to be keenly analyzed. The New

Times was less concerned with implementation of specifics and praised the

directive as a standard that was “sound in principle and practical in its

approach.”

editorial cartoon In early May, the Chicago Defender ran a Henry Brown

showing Defense Secretary Johnson smashing down the ‘Iron Curtain’ of Jim

Johnson, but Crow in the Armed Forces. The Defender editorial also praised

warned, “the brass hats in the military establishment, who have resised

order. integration will exploit any loop holes which may be found in the new

They are not going to give up their racial views without a struggle.” The Crisis,

published by the NAACP, saw the directive as ending segregation policies

however it was possible "for armed while the practice would continue. Now ,

service officers and civilian groups to work for the elimination of the practices

.” 68 and build a military establishment without a color line

Rov Davenport

Despite the method of announcement, Fahy was impressed with, and 209 optimistic over, the Army’s response to Johnson’s directive of 6 April 1949. The

portent. transfer of authority from Royall to Gray was certainly another optimistic

Yet, Kenworthy knew that Fahy was missing the equivocations inherent in

military language and technical jargon that would permit various

interpretations. 69

The new policy of the Secretary of Defense and accumulated statistical

evidence led Ned Kenworthy to conclude: “In my opinion, man-to-man

ago." Now, the integration has got to come much sooner than I thought a month

proper goal of the committee appeared to be the determination of procedures

by which the Army would integrate. 70 No longer did just lowering the degree of

segregation in the Army appear to be the only realistic goal.

Kenworthy was shown how to pierce the Army obfuscation by a black

personnel expert, Roy K. Davenport. Unlike other African Americans in

professional positions in the Pentagon, who tried to base their careers on race-

related issues, Davenport preferred to stay away from the fray. Yet his area of

expertise, personnel, made Davenport an important resource on determining

like the race-based assignments. Still, when it came to do-gooder commissions

Fahy Committee, Davenport was very reticent and plainly suspicious. After

many conversations, Kenworthy convinced Davenport of the Committee’s

sincerity. 71

Davenport told Kenworthy about the ‘45 report, a secret monthly report

that compared the authorized and actual strength of the Army by every military

occupation specialty (MOS). Unlike other reports, this was one included a

in classification by race and it showed the Army would not allow blacks many

72 specialties, even though they needed personnel to fill these positions.

Fahy and Kenworthy lived near each other in the northwest section of the 210 nation’s capital. Kenworthy would occasionally meet with Fahy at the Judge’s home on evenings and Sundays. 73 One evening, in April 1949, Davenport joined Kenworthy and Sengstacke at Fahy’s home to discuss the Army’s reply to the April 6 directive. When asked, Davenport explained how the Army reply was filled with carefully-phrased deceptions. Davenport showed that the Army evaded sweeping change, even as it called for it, because it did not reform training procedures. Fahy was still inclined to accept the Army procedures but he re-read the directive in light of Davenport’s criticism. Plainly angry by these

74 deceptions, Fahy demanded a new examination of the data.

The Committee met in formal session on 28 April 1949. The committee's examination of the Army's statistical record exposed deficiencies in the Army's segregation policy. The Gillem policy was not being implemented and, contrary to Army claims, segregation by its nature precluded equality of treatment and opportunity.

Johnson’s Second Directive

Johnson accepted the On 1 1 May , after Royall’s resignation, Secretary

Air Force plan, but rejected the plans submitted by the Army and the Navy. He

said that the Army and Navy had not responded to his request for “a detailed

plan for such additional forward steps as can and should be made.” He was

pleased that the Army had made progress recently but felt “that much remains to

be done and that the rate of progress toward the objectives of the Executive

Order must be accelerated.” The Army was directed to submit “specific

75 additional actions” which it planned to take in the future by May 25. At this

point, Thomas Reid suggested to the Fahy Committee that it should indicate

informally to the Army and Navy the steps that it thought were necessary to get 211 76 their policies approved by the Secretary of Defense.

This time, Reid included the Fahy Committee in his planning and they readily accepted their role by beginning work on a set of ‘Initial

Recommendations.’ 77 The Fahy group was aware that the acceptance of its propositions by the Army would mean the eventual end of segregation. “We will have undermined segregation and it will come tumbling down of its own

78 weight," said Executive Secretary Kenworthy. To avoid the risk of an outcry from Congress, the Committee sought a gradual, rather than immediate, transition to effect these changes. Although the Committee accepted slow, rather than abrupt change, the Personnel Policy Board continually took issue with these recommendations in conference and urged Secretary Johnson challenge the Fahy Committee on the details. The Navy, which had enjoyed

Forrestal’s confidence, and had worked through many of these problems in

1944 and 1945, decided on a conciliatory course that generally followed the suggestions of the President’s Committee. Johnson agreed to accept the second Navy plan and his announcement on 7 June 1949 received wide

79 coverage in the press.

In an editorial, the Washington Afro-American described the Navy proposals as “a far-reaching step which will be applauded by right-thinking

citizens.” While it expressed the hope that “the day of double talk and gobbledygook is gone,” the newspaper withheld judgment until after June 20 when the Secretary expected a revised report. The National Grapevine column in the Chicago Defender was equally circumspect; columnist Charley Cherokee reported on the “strange hush-hush (as far as the daily press is concerned)” surrounding race relations and the White House. Noting that Truman’s “Armed

Forces committee brought him the race democracy progress reports from the 212 Army, Navy and Air. There were no news pictures but the word leaked a bit and

Navy, always good at timing, rushed out a press release on existing and intended integration." Cherokee noted, “the Navy release report is approved by the Defense Secretary Johnson and altho’ it contains little new it does include most of the things originality (sic) recommended by Lester Granger and

80 (reported by) Lt. Dennis Nelson in his monograph. It’s a score for our side.”

Rather than succumbing to the new pressure of publicity, the Army reacted by defending its conservative policies. In its second reply, the Army, now under Gordon Gray, renewed its defense of the Gillem policy of segregation and the alleged progress under that policy. In effect, the Army still refused to modify its policies of assignment, segregation, or the quota system as the Fahy Committee suggested. 81

Knowing what was coming from the Army, the Committee issued its

“Initial Recommendations to the President,” on the same day that the Secretary of Defense passed judgment on the Navy and Army plans. The committee's

analysis of the Army's second reply indicated that it was still full of inaccurate and misleading statements. African Americans were still excluded from eight of ten Army school courses. 82 To assign black soldiers to schools and subsequently to units without regard to race, as the committee suggested, would mean the end of segregation. The Army understood this fact. Moreover, the committee disproved the Army contention that open enlistments would result

83 in African Americans comprising 30 to 40 per cent of Army personnel.

Although considerable friction had been generated between Johnson and the Fahy Committee, they were still able to reach some accord. The

Committee, with Reid’s strong support, convinced Johnson to reject the Army’s segregationist response. 84 In refusing the Army's second reply of 7 June, the 213 Secretary of Defense called for another report by 20 June, and for the first time he formally asked the Army to consider the Fahy Committee proposals. In its progress report to the President, the committee reported "considerable

85 progress" though the Army lagged behind the Air Force and the Navy.

Rejection of the Army engendered continuing negotiations between the

Fahy Committee and Army officials, with the Army's deadline for its third report being extended several times. 86 Although the committee perceived progress from time to time, there were some reversals over the impact of its arguments upon the Army. At a meeting with Chief of Staff Bradley on 13 June, Dwight

Palmer and Fahy saw hope that the Army was beginning to see things their way. 87 When the Secretary of Defense questioned Committee demands regarding education, Fahy explained that the Army need not 'displace white

88 men' in order to grant African Americans equal opportunity for schooling. The

Committee often knew what the Army was going to propose ahead of time, because Kenworthy had an office in the Pentagon which he kept unlocked.

Unnamed Pentagon sources would either advise Kenworthy of their plans or would leave information in his office. For instance, on 23 June, Kenworthy got advance word of a report stating that “the Army cannot yield on the segregation principle.” 89

On 5 July, Fahy and Palmer again met with General Bradley and the new

Secretary of the Army, Gordon Gray. Gray presented the committee with an

"Outline Plan for Utilization of Negro Manpower to Provide Further Equality of

Opportunity." The new proposal increased the number of black units and

90 opened all Army job classifications to African Americans. However, Fahy

Committee recommendations to ease complete segregation in units and to abolish the 10 per cent quota were again ignored. Furthermore, the Army 214 refused to adopt their position on assignment; although the Army's new proposal would allow Negroes to attend all of its schools, the fact that the black soldier could be assigned only to an all-black unit meant that he might not be assigned to a job for which he was trained. The committee realized that equality of treatment and opportunity could be accomplished only by ending segregation. Army proposals would not be not acceptable until the quota system was abolished and black soldiers were assigned to units on the basis of

91 their training, regardless of race.

Kenworthv Press Contacts

The dispute began to founder into a stalemate between the committee and the Army. Somehow, the story began to reach the press. For instance, the

New York Times accused the Army of stalling and equivocating engaging in a

“private insurrection,” and trying “to preserve a pattern of bigotry which caricatures the democratic cause in every corner of the world.” There was no room for compromise, the Times added, and President Truman could not retreat without abdicating as Commander in Chief. And the Pittsburgh Courier predicted, “With Army brass and the Fahy Committee at logerheads (sic) on

proposals to integrate Negro personnel, it was indicated that only President

Truman may be able to bring the warring parties to an agreement acceptable to

Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson .” 92

How did a conference that was supposed to be held without publicity leak to the press? Kenworthy may have been responsible for these press contacts. Apparently, he occasionally contacted the press although he was discouraged from doing so by Truman. One incident is particularly revealing.

Afro American columnist and reporter Woody Taylor questioned how long the 215 Fahy Committee would be in existence. He had heard a rumor that their days were numbered. He reported that the Defense Secretary planned to order complete equality and that Truman would disband the Fahy Committee. In a column two weeks later, Taylor reported,

On Wednesday afternoon, Joseph H. B. Evans, associate executive secretary of the Fahy Committee telephoned to advise me that Edward (sic) Kenworthy, the committee’s executive secretary wanted to talk to me. Kenworthy came on saying: “I’ve got a hot tip for you. I’ve just writing (sic) some letters asking some service men to testify before the Fahy Committee. You know the Committee held a meeting on Monday in which the members did some long term planning; so you see we’re not .” 93 going to fold up after all

In a front-page story, the New York Times’ Walter Waggoner reported that the Committee and Army were at a standstill. (Interestingly, Waggoner usually reported on the State Department, not the Pentagon, and was in fact, the

President-elect of a State-Department correspondents association. It might be

remembered that Kenworthy had served as a State Department Public

Information Officer during the War.) The story included a report that the Army planned to resubmit its “policy of following community custom,” which might have come to Kenworthy from his inside Pentagon sources. Waggoner also spoke to an unnamed source at the Fahy Committee. That source reported that there was little indication that the Committee would accept the Army’s newest

proposals, that it regarded the Army as “the Peck’s Bad Boy” of the military

94 services and that it was far from optimistic that the situation would be resolved .

Waggoner’s story had a marked effect. The New York Post, the Times’

rival, reported in an editorial,

Now Walt Waggoner, in a Washington Dispatch to The

Times, reveals that the Army has decided to fight it out. Its chieftains are planning to reiterate their defiance to the Fahy 216 committee, Waggoner reports. This means that the generals propose to tell the President and his Defense Secretary that the Army is an autonomous republic, laying down its own rules, taking orders from no higher authority and brushing off the commander- in-chief when his words outline a departure from Pentagon protocol. Such independence of thought is rare indeed in high military places. On this issue the Army’s private insurrection is intolerable. 95

In reply, which was part of a more general interview, Secretary Gray publicly announced that the Army was contemplating certain new proposals on the Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) issue. Gray erroneously claimed that the Committee sought to raise the 10 percent [ceiling] quota on the share of

African American allowed in the Army. In fact, the Committee sought to abolish the quota. Gray also said,

I would certainly be the last to say that a decision taken in 1946 would be necessarily a sound decision in 1949 and I’m not sure

that in every respect the Gillem Board’s Report was sound, and it

is our intention to further study some of these basic policies in the course of study to be made by people who will actually command these combat troops, as of today’s attitudes and conditions, to see whether these policies established by the Gillem Board actually seem sound today. 96

The committee was determined that the Secretary of Defense should not accept the current Army policy as fulfilling either the Executive Order 9981 or the Defense Department's 6 April directive. In a campaign of letters, Fahy made the views of the Committee official. In a memo to Gordon Gray, Fahy pointed out the Army proposal would fail to give African Americans equal opportunity for schooling and, thus, would not ensure that the Army made the best use of the black soldier who has received special training. In a letter to Louis Johnson, he stated that “the committee believes that the Army, by retention of the quota system and by not undertaking to use school-trained Negroes except 217 substantially on the present basis fails to meet the standard of equality of opportunity.” Finally, in a progress report to President Harry Truman, Fahy summarized progress made by the services, stressing the recommendations made to the Army. 97 On the day that Fahy issued his public statement to

Truman, the Judge gave a short interview with the Washington Afro-American and the Pittsburgh Courier Press summarized the news from Gray’s interview.

September 30 Directive

For two months, neither side would officially compromise. During this

period, Fahy worked assiduously to secure assurances from the White House that the committee's demands on assignment and on the quota would be a

98 required in any Army proposal. In a mid-September meeting, Fahy and

Dwight Palmer were able to convince Gray to open the assignment of black

graduates of specialist schools to any unit, not just overhead positions. But they

were unable to convince him of the need for a quota. Gray agreed to study the

quota question. Fahy was so pleased with the progress, that he reported to

President Truman, “It is the Committee’s expectation that it will be able within a

few weeks to make a formal report to you on a complete list of changes in Army

policy and practices.” He even anticipated that the Committee and the Army

99 would be able to resolve the quota problem together.

On 27 September, the Army informed Fahy that they were sending their

proposed policy to the Secretary of Defense. Without furnishing the committee a

copy, Army officials assured Fahy that they were adopting the committee's

suggestions on assignment. 100 218 Johnson’s Usurpation

In late September, Secretary of Defense Johnson was under fire on a number of fronts. An embarrassing influence-peddling scandal, the five- percenter scandal, flared up during the summer. At the same time, budget battles which were going to turn into the Revolt of the Admirals started to surface. On Capitol Hill, liberals were beginning to complain that the Army was

101 compromising Johnson’s authority .

Johnson wanted the desegregation problem out of the way. He typically acted quickly without much consultation. In April, he had tried to subvert

committee control. Now, he would try it again in an even more abrupt, more devious and yet more public way. Without first informing the Committee or even his own advisors, the Secretary of Defense announced to the press that he had approved the Army's proposals. What further angered the Committee was that the Army had not accepted its policy on assignment or the quota. Furthermore, the Army had given the impression that its proposal had received the approval

102 of the Fahy Committee .

Reaction in the press was volcanic. African American and liberal

103 organizations blasted the Army's new policy for not ending segregation .

Kenworthy summarized press reaction for Fahy noting,

If Gray’s intention on assignment was the same as the Committee’s, this intention was evidently not made clear to those who wrote the release, nor to the official ‘spokesman’ for the Army

and Defense Department who were entrusted with interpreting it 104 for the press .

Kenworthy cited articles by John Norris of the Washington Post, Robert

Donovan 105 of the New York Herald-Tribune, a United Press story in the

Washington Times-Herald, Venice Spraggs of the Chicago Defender, and Lem 219

Graves of the Pittsburgh Courier. Norris called it a disappointment, Donovan and the UP noted that “present segregation will continue,” Spragg said the new

Army plan “trails miserably behind the forthright policies of the Air Force and

Navy and flaunts what President Truman stated was the intent of the Executive

Order,” and Graves said Negroes who qualify might be utilized alongside whites, but then would be sent back to their own units. In that same memo,

Kenworthy noted that neither Marx Leva nor James Evans, both of whom would normally see race-related Defense Department policies, saw the new Johnson policy. 106

Although Army segregationists were able to convince Johnson and his

107 cohorts to resist new policies, they were not prepared for Fahy’s reaction to the Army’s new attitude. 108 Fahy called David Niles and Philleo Nash, White

House Special Assistant for Minority Affairs, urging the President to hold a blanket approval until the White House received the Committee’s report. In his phone call to Nash, Fahy requested that the President refrain from making any comment about Johnson’s action until after his Committee had a chance to meet. 109 Later, the committee sent a memorandum to the President complaining that the Army plan still condoned race-based assignments. This was clearly unacceptable and contrary to the requirements of Executive Order

9981. Since Defense would not listen to the Committee, they requested

Presidential intercession.

Niles advised Truman that Johnson’s statement was “arousing a good deal of controversy and has resulted in inquiries from a number of reporters, and letters and telegrams from interested organizations.” The ublicity \ prompted Truman to respond even before he received the Committee’s written

110 appeal. At his 6 October press conference, in accordance with Niles’ 220 suggestion, Truman labeled the Army's statement a "progress report" and made

it clear that there would be further recommendations from the Fahy Committee.

In addition, Truman once again stated that his goal was integration of the Army

111 to be accomplished through the Fahy Committee. The final committee memo for the President, which was received days after Truman’s press conference, did not emphasize their ultimatum to contact the press and, instead, stressed the

112 need for continuing negotiations with the Army.

In the meantime, Kenworthy continued to feed his press contacts with interesting committee-related stories. For instance, a contretemps occurred when socialist and civil rights activist Paul Robeson declined an invitation to speak at Oberlin College. Kenworthy provided Alan Barth of the Washington

Post with the inside story which he apparently learned from committee member

William Stevenson, who was president of Oberlin. (Stevenson was one of the less active Fahy committee members.) Robeson refused to appear on stage with the Rev. Horace White who would present a contrasting view. Through

these actions, it is clear that Kenworthy felt justified in serving as the committee’s conduit to the press. 113

Rebellion in the Ranks

Truman’s press conference did not convince Army segregationists to

surrender. In fact, it inspired them to mobilize for rebellion. But they fought their

battle as a bureaucratic flanking maneuver. On October 1, the Army had sent its

new policy to all major commands: All Army jobs and schools would be now be

opened to African Americans. Still, the Army would not yet accept quotas, so

integrated assignments were to be allowed only in overhead (post

housekeeping and administrative) positions or in positions where there were 221 critical shortages of specialists. Even this modest policy was, apparently, too much for some conservative forces in the Army.

On 27 October, a second order was issued by the Army. This one stated that the limited integration authorized in Secretary Gray's order of 1 October should be disregarded; Negroes would be assigned only to Negro jobs.

Although the rescission was sent through normal channels, neither the

Secretary the Army nor the Secretary of Defense had any knowledge of this

114 new order. Several weeks later an anonymous person left with the Fahy

Committee a copy of this order. In an interview for the Truman Library,

Kenworthy remembered the incident,

I always kept the door to my office [in the Pentagon]

unlocked. I always kept the drawers to my desk unlocked, because

I always knew if there was ever any hanky-panky going on, that there were blacks in the Department of the Army who worked the mimeograph machines, and in the message center office, and you would know eventually. For instance, once when we had an agreement after long negotiations with Secretary of the Army Gray, about opening up all educational courses, Army courses regardless of color, and he put

this order out. I walked in one morning to my desk and opened the drawer and there was a message going out from the message center from the Chief of Staff’s office which effectively countermanded the order of the Secretary of the Army. And this

was the only time that I ever went to the press.

Clearly, this is an exaggeration on Kenworthy’s part. As has been shown, he regularly contacted reporters. In a telephone interview with Kenworthy (27

December 1991), I spoke to him about this issue and he reaffirmed that this was

115 the only time that he contacted the press. I wonder if, this was truly the first time that he went to the press without first directly obtaining permission from

Fahy, or if he felt that this was the first time that his press contact put the

Committee in an adversarial position with the Army and Defense. In any case,

Kenworthy clearly remembered the results of his action, 222

I exactly what I went to the Washington Post and told them had happened and they wrote a story, and they wrote an editorial saying that Gray was getting a run-around from the brass. But, of course, the offending general was not penalized, but a colonel — 116 he was on his way to Germany within about forty-eight hours.

Gray was furious to learn that the rescission order was issued without his permission, and on November 3 he issued a statement that the second order violated the Army's announced policy. Some qualified Black specialists would

117 indeed be assigned to white units, Gray emphasized.

Kenworthy wrote Fahy a hand-written note, which was not microfilmed in the official record, but is of enough interest in this context that it deserves full

replication:

Phileo Nash just called to ask whether we had seen the Post pieces. He said they were happy that the Post had picked up this story and had come down hard on Gray and the Army.

Phileo said it was time for a move, either for the Committee to meet with the President, or for the White House to send a memo to Johnson dictating him to get the Army in line with the Committee. Possibly, he’ll call you on this. There is no question in my mind that the time is ripe for action. Gray is very angry at the manner in which the policy was undercut by orders sent to the field, and generals have been scurrying up and down all morning. The Personnel and Administration Division is trying to fasten the blame on The

Adjutant General’s office (TAG), and the TAG has said it merely send out instructions on policy interpretation as directed by P&A, etc. etc. P&A is evidently fearful of a crackdown. Gray’s position is

that he knew nothing of the order which, I believe, is true. The point is, he should have some one as advisor in his office — preferably a civilian — who knows thoroughly personnel procedures and Army structures to protect him against such errors, not only with respect to Negro personnel, but on all personnel matters. This ideal person, in my opinion, would be Roy Davenport, who has had years of experience in Army pi rsonnel and is the final clearing authority on most personnel actions. As a matter of fact, there has been a good discussion about recommending Davenport to the Secretary as an aide. However, P&A would like to confine Davenport’s advisory capacity to Negro

affairs. This would be a mistake and I know Davenport would not 223 take the job under such limitations.

If the Committee has the advantage of having Davenport in

Gray’s office, and if P&A would assign Major Lieblich to work with

the Committee, I believe agreement would be soon reached. Of

course, we can’t make those recommendations, but if they are made within the Army, we should welcome them. 118

On 17 November, Gray wrote Fahy to assure him that the Johnson’s

119 September 30 directive was still in effect. While the story reached and was

reported by the Washington Post and The New York Times, it did not create

much of a reaction in the mainstream white press. In the editorial, the Post wrote,

From all indications Secretary Gray is sincerely trying to do away with the restrictions on efficient use of Negro manpower, and the circumstances seem to indicate that he did not see this order

before it went out. That is all the more reason for him to assert

himself, for it is difficult to believe that the new order can be anything but an attempt at sabotage of the declared policies of the President and Defense Secretary Johnson — policies already 120 implemented much more fully by the other two services.

Meanwhile, the black press treated it as a mystery to be solved and as an

important indicator of Caucasian resistance. The Pittsburgh Courier compared

the incident to the Revolt of the Admirals against the Secretary of the Navy. In a

front-page story headlined, “Army Brass Defies Integration Order,” Lem Graves

revealed that the Army had ordered a complete investigation of the issuance of

the order and that disciplinary transfers would be taken against offending Army

officers. Graves noted that the name of the officer had been discovered by Army

Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins but that his name would not be revealed. Graves

said the directive was sent out over the signature of Maj. Gen. E.F. Witsall, the

adjutant General. However, he noted,

this is a normal procedure and it has been discovered that the directive was actually wired to the commanders by a colonel in the 224

personnel section. It was never seen by the Secretary nor by the Adjutant General. Informed sources here believe that the unidentified personnel section colonel was inspired to forward this message to field commands by a group of Army generals at staff level who oppose any efforts to integrate Negroes into the Army.

Then Graves accused the members of the cabal by name. In doing so, he named some of the most powerful men in the Armed Forces,

One of the most persistent foes of racial integration, according to these sources, is General Wade Haislip, vice chief of

staff. It is believed here that General Haislip has quietly surrounded himself in key positions with generals who share his point of view including Lieut. Gen. E.H. Brooks, who heads the personnel section; Col. B.N. MacFadden, head of the military personnel management group and Maj. Gen. C.E. Byers, deputy 121 director of personnel .

Graves closed the article by comparing leadership on racial issues articulated by Generals Marshall, Eisenhower, Bradley and Collins. He

concluded that Marshall was neutral, that Eisenhower was liberal, and that

Bradley and Collins were foes of integration. One week later, in his Washington

Notebook, Lem Graves, Jr. revealed to his readers that Col. John H. Reipe, chief

of the assignment section of the Army’s personnel and administration branch,

was taking ‘the rap’ for releasing the field directive. However, he noted, more

important general officers, specifically General Brooks or General C. E. Byers,

122 were spared .

For the Fahy Committee, the whole episode exposed the deep conviction

of the segregationists and their willingness to resort to unauthorized tactics. For

a while, attention was diverted from policy-making to detection and

management of resistance. Meanwhile, the Committee was having problems

getting the Personnel and Administration Division to agree on the statistics. To 225 policy, the forestall the repetition of the incident of officers countermanding Army

Committee asked to be placed on the distribution list for all regulations and messages coming from the Army. They also identified Generals McFayden and

123 Brooks as the bottlenecks and as the source of the unauthorized policy.

The Army now began preparing still another new policy on Negro troops

policy. that would incorporate its approved third reply and replace the Gillem

The angry reaction of the Fahy Committee and of the public to the approval of the Army's statement of October 1 put the White House on guard. Word was

again passed to the Army and to the Fahy Committee that any new Army policy

124 must have the committee's approval before it would be acceptable.

Sengstacke and Kenworthv

Up to this point, Sengstacke and Granger had mostly given tacit approval

to the Fahy and Kenworthy methods. Empowered by the incident, the black

Committee members began calling for another committee meeting and a press

125 release detailing the impasse between the Army and the committee.

Although both were journalists, Kenworthy and Sengstacke had very different

ideas about the way that the Committee should conduct its actions. Talking

about Sengstacke’s opinions about the final report, Kenworthy recalled,

But you know, there was nothing to do except to prepare proposals by the committee and then negotiate. In the first place, John Sengstacke and Charlie Browning [consultant to the Fahy

Committee and Defender editorial assistant] and I think other Negroes would have liked to have a big book that would have

gone all the way back to Crispus Attucks, you know. I saw no point in this. This problem was not going to be solved by rehashing history, but by getting equal opportunity written into the Army and Navy and Air Force regulations, and to hell with the past. 126

In the wake of the unauthorized October 27 directive, Kenworthy was 226 more willing to recognize the unusual pressure placed on Sengstacke. The newspaper publisher wanted President Truman to rebuke Gray and Johnson in front of the Committee. Kenworthy disapproved of this tactic but he sympathized with both Sengstacke and Granger, who were being subjected to a great deal of pressure from the NAACP. Kenworthy recognized that the NAACP had “as its object the constant application of pressure and unremitting agitation for overdue

reform.” But he argued, “our tactics are sound, and that we shall accomplish more in the end by keeping doggedly at our work rather than by making a public scene.” 127

The disagreement lasted at least into December 1949. When he learned that Kenworthy had begun working on the final report, Sengstacke complained,

“I understood we were working on our report but did not contemplate we had

reached the final stages so soon ... I would like to see members from our

Committee make a few field trips before a preliminary report is drafted.

Particularly do I think our Committee should go to Germany to make a study of

our operations there. (With this, Sengstacke may have been giving tacit support

to A. Phillip Randolph’s proposed German Commission of Inquiry expedition.)”

128

The Threat of Publicity

By mid-November, Fahy wanted to put the threat of publicity behind him.

He told the President’s Committee about a recent favorable conversation he

had had with Phileo Nash. Nash told him that the Committee’s position was

strong and that only the quota problem remained. Fahy recommended, “my own

feeling is we should go along getting things done as in the past without any

particular public statement at this time, but I am of course I am willing to 227 129 reconsider this.”

it the The Army finished its revision of the Gillem policy and brought to

White House for approval. Kenworthy got an advance view of it, and described it

130 civilian special as “full of gimmicks, shifts and devices.” , a consultant to the Secretary of the Army, took it to the White House but David

Niles was not in. Kenworthy wrote, ‘The Army has a very firm understanding that

(this policy) shall not be given out to the papers or sent to the field without the approval of the Committee.” 131 Nash analyzed the policy for David Niles. Then

Niles officially informed the Army that if the new order was satisfactory to the

132 President's Committee it would be satisfactory to the White House. The new policy was not acceptable to the committee, however, because it maintained

segregation and it only dissolved the quota for specialists, that is men recruited for specially needed jobs without touching the quota for specialties, that is the

larger category of men who were trained in Army schools for routine jobs. The

new directive allowed only a few Black specialists to be integrated into white

units. 133

After so many false starts, so many obstructions, so many evasions and

diversions from the Army, Fahy and his colleagues were once again prepared

to at least threaten to break their vow of silence and go to the press. They

carefully considered the effect that a public progress report might have. On

November 25, Fahy called Karl Bendetsen. If the Army officially issued this

revised policy, Fahy warned Bendetsen, the Committee would notify the White

House of its disapproval and would issue a statement to the press condemning

the new procedure. As a matter of follow-up, Kenworthy called Bendetsen

requesting additional copies of Circular 124. Bendetsen asked if the Committee

contemplated meeting again soon and Kenworthy told him of their planned 228 schedule. 134

Hours after that, Bendetsen called Fahy and tried to badger him. It was an extraordinary conversation. First, Bendetsen asked how the Committee reacted to the revised policy. Fahy said the Committee could not reply because

asked Fahy it had not yet met, but Bendetsen disputed this. Second, Bendetsen

the policy if he would agree that the revision of 124 accurately reflected

statement issued by Secretary Gray and approved by Johnson on September

30. Fahy replied that he would by no means agree to such a procedure, and

that, if the Army issued such a revision of Circular 124 to commanders he would

notify the White House of the Committee’s disapproval and he would issue a

statement to the press making it clear that the Committee had not approved the

Army’s policy. If this were done, Fahy told Bendetsen, “then a situation would

arise which had so far been successfully avoided, i.e. a controversy in public.”

Third, Bendetsen asked Fahy if the Committee had the authority to

prevent the Secretary of Defense from approving an Army policy. Fahy said he

was not trying to usurp the power of either Secretary Gray or Secretary Johnson

and that they, of course, had the right to issue an approved policy statement.

However, the Committee operated under an executive order of the President

and the Army policy did not meet the requirements expressed in that Order.

They ended the call. Fahy then had Kenworthy call Bendetsen to confirm that

135 the call would be put on the record.

Kenworthy advised Philleo Nash that the Committee would issue a

statement soon unless the Army retreated. Kenworthy read the press release to

Nash. As the Committee expected, the White House wanted to avoid publicity

on the issue. Nash advised against a statement and suggested that the

committee send its proposal on assignment and the quota to the Army and to 229 the White House. In Nash's opinion, “the White House would indicate to the

Army that it should move to meet the recommendations of the President's

Committee.”136

With the threat of publicity in the air, suddenly everything changed. Gray, a newspaperman, and Collins, who had recently made his career by managing the Army’s public information offices were suddenly far more amenable. While it

has been suggested that these men were younger than their predecessors and

might be characterized as less driven by the ideology of race than the need for

pragmatic action, 137 publicity clearly played a role as well.

For the first time, the Army would seriously consider policy

recommendations affecting the issue of black assignments; the Committee

reiterated its stance in a proposal which it sent to the President and to the Army

on 15 December. That proposal called for an end to the racial quota and a

statement specifying that African Americans would be assigned to units without

regard to race. 138 Marx Leva met with Secretary Gray to arrange a meeting

between Bendetsen and Archibald King, of the Judge Advocates’ Group. Leva,

Secretary of Defense Assistant Worthington Thompson and James Evans also

attended. In that meeting, Thompson tried to reassure Kenworthy that the Army

would soon fall in line. Later, however, Kenworthy told Fahy that he thought that

139 the President might still need to get involved.

However, the Defense Department effort did mark the turning of the tide.

Now, the White House and Defense were united in opposing further Army

obstinance. At the same time, perhaps in reaction to the Army experience, the

Navy and Air Force made rapid progress in implementing their integration

programs. 140 Ebony magazine praised the integration of the Air Force as “the

swiftest and most amazing upset of racial policy in the history of the U.S. 230 military.” 141

Events moved rapidly now. Secretary of the Army Gray asked for a meeting with Fahy on December 27. At this meeting Gray admitted that the

White House had given him the committee’s recommendations for revision of the Gillem policy, and the Army had rewritten its proposed policy with these suggestions in mind. There was still concern with the committee's proposed

language on assignment, which stated simply that African Americans be

assigned to any unit on the basis of need and ability and without regard to race.

Gray said he was in agreement in principle with this, but wanted language that

would allow integration to take place gradually, starting with skilled African

Americans and working down. After this meeting Fahy informed the committee

members: “I feel we are much closer to agreement than at any time in the past,

and I am very hopeful that by some modification in the language we can reach agreement." 142

Fahy felt that the Army was sincere, and he agreed to compromise the

language on assignment so that integration would be gradual. 143 With Senator

Jacob Javits (R-NY) prodding action by introducing a resolution to investigate

military segregation, the full committee met on 14 January 1950 to approve the

Army's revision of its Gillem policy. The compromise involved acceptance of the committee's language on assignment: Negroes "will be utilized in accordance

with . . . skills and qualifications, and will be assigned to any . . . unit without

regard to race or color." To this was added the Army’s suggestions for

"additional steps" toward the attainment of the goal stated by the committee, which involved beginning with the integrated assignment of Negroes to specialty jobs for which there was a shortage of qualified personnel. The 231 committee informed the President of its approval of the Army policy on January

16, and on the same day the Army issued its successor to the Gillem policy.

Only the committee's recommendation for an end to the racial quota was left unresolved, and discussion began immediately on this point. 144

The reaction of African Americans to the announcement of the new policy

1 was mixed. The Pittsburgh Courier saw it as a “victory’ on the other hand, the ;

Norfolk Journal and Guide claimed that a “basic flaw" of the new policy was the

145 fact that it made individual commanders responsible for its implementation.

A. Philip Randolph was critical of the new policy because he felt that it did not end segregation. Randolph asked Niles for a meeting to discuss establishment of an ad hoc Congressional Committee to investigate in lieu of his Commission of Inquiry. Others apparently felt this was the case too, because several congressmen introduced bills calling for an end to segregation in the armed forces. The Committee, finally free to unleash its powerful publicity machine, gathered strong support from the mainstream Caucasian press, the New York

Times, the Louisville Courier Journal, the Cox papers — the Atlanta Journal,

Dayton News, Miami News —the Christian Science Monitor, Baltimore Sun. and Eric Sevareid of CBS Radio. Kenworthy personally briefed reporters from each of these papers. He told the Committee that the New York Times sent the story to its syndicate “on the budget” but that the story broke too late for the news magazines. 146

The racial quota remained the last obstacle because it seemed to be an issue of policy implementation rather than policy-making. The President's

committee was convinced that it should continue to negotiate over this last obstacle. There was considerable support within the Office of the Secretary of

Defense, however, for ending the Fahy Committee immediately and allowing .

232 the Army a free hand in implementing its new policy. The Fahy Committee was

opposed to this step until it had achieved the end of the quota. They had powerful support within the White House in Clark Clifford and David Niles, who advised the President that the committee should remain in existence until the quota was abolished. 147 The President agreed. 148 President Truman apparently told Secretary Gray of his desire that the quota be abolished, and

the Army agreed to do so if the President would agree that a racial quota could

be reinstituted if the percentage of Blacks in the Army became too great. “If as a result of this new system," Secretary Gray wrote the President, “there ensues a

disproportionate balance of racial strength .... it is my understanding that I have

your authority to return to a system which will . . control enlistment by race.”

President Truman approved. 149

Bendetsen and Haislip told Fahy that the Army planned to abolish the quota but that they needed strict complete press silence. Fahy passed this on to

the Committee, noting that “they desire to do this initially without publicity ... It is their expectation that this order within a few days will result in queries from the

press, in event of which the Army will confirm abolition of he quota. If there are no press queries, the Army within a week or two of the order will release a short statement announcing that the racial quota has been abolished.” With that announcement, Fahy asked the Committee to avoid press contact. Fahy informed Niles of this action on 13 March 1950. 150

Although Bendetsen and Haislip personally informed Fahy of the Army’s intentions, the Fahy Committee was never formally informed of this agreement.

On March 13, however, the Army promised Truman that it would abolish the quota on African American strength, beginning in April, 1950. Reassuring the

Army that it was the right move, President Truman wrote Secretary Gray that he 233 appreciated the Army's action: “I am sure everything will work out as it should.”

151

The Fahy Committee began preparation of its final report with a feeling of

a job well done. 152 In a special article he wrote for the New York Times

Magazine, Kenworthy admitted that the new racial programs of the services

were far from finished:

Much remains to be done. But I think it is fair to say that they

represent an unprecedented stride toward the solution of a 153 problem that has embarrassed the nation since its beginning.

The committee's final report, Freedom to Serve, was submitted to the

President 22 May 1950. Before he received it, Truman received a note that was prepared by Nash and Stephen Spingarn, former NAACP official and Special

Assistant in the White House. They recommended that Truman include a message about the Fair Employment Practices Commission in his statement.

Truman did this and then added that he had followed the committee's work closely since its beginning and had confidence that its recommendations would be carried out and that “within the reasonably near future, equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons within the armed services would be accomplished.” 154

To ensure that the new racial policies would actually be carried out- something that had not always been done in the past— most of the committee members wanted a successor body appointed. 155 This was opposed by

Secretary of Defense Johnson, however, who felt rather strong'y about having a watchdog committee over him. Instead, Johnson wanted the services to make semi-annual progress reports to his Personnel Policy Board. 156 The President went along with his Secretary of Defense and informed the committee on 6 July 234

1950, that it was being discontinued:

“The necessary programs having been adopted, I feel that the Armed Services should now have an opportunity to work out in detail the procedures which will complete the steps so carefully initiated by the Committee.”

He was leaving Executive Order 9981 in effect, however, because “at

some later date, it may prove desirable to examine the effectuation of your

Committee's recommendations.” 157

Did the Fahy Committee really convince high-ranking officers within the

Army to accept integration? Although the Chamberlin Board, a committee of generals told Gray “almost without exception they vigorously opposed amalgamation and strongly urged the retention of the Negro unit,” 158 the formal framework was in place by the Fahy Committee.

Truman’s executive order, and the Committee which implemented it, (a) provided an impetus for the Air Force to move rapidly to a policy of integration;

(b) moved the Navy to bring its practices in line with its policy; and most

important, (c) it helped define and encourage the Army to press for true integration.

These insurgencies should be viewed in the larger context of the battle of unification and the jockeying for position in the formation of the National

Security Administration. In the same way that those political issues were fought in the press, the entire military desegregation issue also revolved around sensitivity to the implementation of the press and publicity. The bitterness expressed to black journalists by the Army at Forrestall’s National Negro

Defense Conference, the reaction to the desegregation of the New Jersey

National Guard, the impolitic statements that Omar Bradley made at Fort Knox, 235 the aborted attempt by Joe Collins to develop a separate racial policy statement, the threat by Kenneth Royall to go to the Congressional Armed

Services Committees (an action which resulted in his leaving office), the

Johnson pronouncements without Fahy Committee (or White House) consultation, the personal intimidation of Fahy by Karl Bendetsen, and finally the subversive recission of the Gray order by Generals Haislip, McFayden, and

Brooks are all egregious indicators of a greater pattern of Army hostility and

intransigence. The record details many more minor bureaucratic delaying

tactics that the Army also used.

Whether by intention or by luck, the problem of Army obstinance was

ameliorated through the appointment of journalists to policy-making positions.

These policy-makers often followed Truman’s (and Forrestal’s) dictum and kept

the story out of the mainstream press. Yet, from this conflict, there is a verity

revealed. Even before the cynicism of Viet Nam and Watergate, before

television instant analysis and the blurring of lines between public

pronouncements and photo-op and sound-bite publicity, journalists were

important actors in the story. Government by publicity, and the creative use of

publicity to short-circuit democratic access predate the telegenic qualities of

President John Kennedy. In the concluding chapter, we will examine reasons

why we recommend further analysis of history through a perspective of press

and publicity.

Notes

1 Announcements of Navy and Air Force reported in “ Committee begins work on ending service

bias,” Pittsburgh Courier, 22 January 1948, p. 1 .

2 Among Forrestal’s other nominees were Lester Granger of the National Urban League, Mary McLeod Bethune of the National Committee of Negro Women, Senator Cabot Lodge and Charles Wilson as an alternate choice for chairman. Ewing to the President, 30 July 1948, HSTL; Forrestal to the President, 3 August 1948, D54-1-16, National Archives Record Group (Herein referred to as NARG) 330 and “B Files” HSTL. 236

3 Among the Navy’s nominees were Rawleigh Warner, Chairman of Pure Oil Co. C. Douglas Dillon of Dillon Read & Co., Dr. Henry T. Heald, President of Illinois Institute of Technology, and John Meyer, Secretary of Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co., et al. Beauregard to Leva, 9 August 1948, “B Files” Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO. (Herein, listed as HSTL.)

4 Memorandum, Dawson to the President, 13 August 1948; Memorandum, Dawson to Matthew J. Connelly (Truman’s Appointments Secretary) 17 August 1948, “B Files,” HSTL.

5 White House Secretary’s notes to Donahue, 8 September 1 948; Memoranda, from Dawson for the President, 9 September 1948; telegram, McGill to Dawson, 15 September 1948. HSTL.

6 Ewing to the President, 30 July 1948, HSTL; Forrestal to the President, 3 August 1948, D54-1- 16, National Archives Record Group (Herein referred to as NARG) 330 and “B Files” HSTL; memorandum, Marx Leva to Forrestal, 31 August 1948, OSA 334, NARG 335.

7 In addition to the problem of finding a chairman, Secretary of the Army Royall felt that many of the people under consideration had expressed themselves as being opposed to segregation in the armed services. "I feel strongly that no person should serve on this Committee who has formed a fixed opinion on this subject on either side," Royall complained to the President. Royall to the President, 17 September 1948, OSA 334, NARG 335.

8 Fahy served as an assistant solicitor for the Department of the Interior, chairman of the Petroleum Administrative Board, general counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, assistant solicitor general, and then served as solicitor general from 1941 through 1945. Who’s Who in America, 1951; Washington Post, 11 October 1949.

9 Who’s Who in America, 1951; Washington Post, 11 October 1949.

10 Nomination of Charles Fahy, of New Mexico to be Judge of U.S. Court of Appeals for D.C.

Court, 1 April 1950, Senate Committee on Judiciary.

1 1 Granger’s appointment was repudiated by Kenneth Royall. Royall to the President, 17 September 1948, OSA 334, NARG 335.

12 Patrick S. Washburn, (1986) A Question of Sedition: The Federal Government's Investigation of the Black Press During World War II. New York: Oxford University Press.

13 Lee Finkle, (1975) Forum for Protest: The Black Press During World War II. Cranburv. N.J.: Associated University Press, pp. 46-48.

14 ‘The Chicago Defender, 1905-1942,” (an editorial) Chicago Defender, 9 May 1942, p.2; “The Negro Press and the War,” (an editorial) Chicago Defender, 18 July 1942, p.14.

15 Two of the most respected white liberals to express their concern were Virginius Dabney and Mark Ethridge.

On April 26, 1942, Richmond Times editor Virginius Dabney, who had previously decried lynching of blacks, warned that the prevailing assumption by southern conservatives was that black newspapers were instigating racial incidents in Southern cities adjacent to military camps to achieve change. 237

Immediately, Westbrook Pegler, one of the leading syndicated conservative columnists and radio commentators, capitalized upon the attacks upon the black press and gave them national exposure. In his column, Pegler specifically compared the Defender and Courier with the Communist Daily Worker and fascist Social Justice in their “obvious, inflammatory bias in the treatment of news" and charged the newspapers with "exploiting the war emergency to push the aspirations of the colored people." The Defender responded to the attack with a full-page feature " that reviled Pegler as "a slime slinger, "liar, " and "great defamer." They castigated the man, with columns by their own Managing Editor, Lucius C. Harper, and highly critical portraits reprinted from the Rocky Mountain News and New Yorker . In June 1942, Mark Ethridge, liberal publisher of the Louisville Courier-Journal and Times and chairman of the Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) warned that "those Negro newspaper editors who demand 'all or nothing... 'are playing into the hands of the white demagogues." He further assured white southerners that the combined mechanized forces of the Axis and the Allies could not force Southern white people to abandon social segregation. Ethridge's speech, which was made at an FEPC meeting in Birmingham Alabama, was intended to allay Southern fears that the administration would accept the agenda of the black press and dismantle segregation. No black newspaper supported his contentions regarding segregation. To the contrary, the Chicago Defender joined A. Phillip Randolph in calling for Ethridge to resign his FEPC post. Finkle, p.63-64; New York World Telegram, 28 April 1942; Lucius C. Harper, “Who is Westbrook Pegler?” Chicago Defender, 12 May 1942, p.7; Committee on Fair Employment Practices, "Seventh Hearing" Birmingham, Ala. 18 June 1942, p. 18; Herbert Garfinkle. U9591 When Negroes March: The MOWM in the

Organizational Politics for FEPC . Glencoe, IL: The Free Press., p. 103, “Ask Ethridge ouster, called pussyfooter,” Chicago Defender, 25 July 1942, p.1; “Mark Ethridge must resign,” (an editorial) Chicago Defender, 25 July 1942, p.14.

16Washburn, in passim.

^According to Washburn, this action was prompted when Roosevelt received two special reports from the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF) on May 19 documenting black press attitudes on the war. Washburn, p.80- 82.

1®Washburn, p.90.

19 Washburn, p.1 31, p.1 08.

20 Alan Fried, “Censorship of the Chicago Defender During World War II,” Paper delivered at the Association of Educators of Journalism and Mass Communication, Southeast Division, Orlando, FL 1991.

2-1 “We march forward— with Truman,” (an editorial) Chicago Defender, 24 July 1948, p.1

22 “If the committee is not hampered in its inquiry and if its recommendations are not circumvented by a welter of administrative procedures, the results should be far more consequential to us than anything that has happened in the United States since slavery.” “To secure these Rights (editorial),” Chicago Defender 5 October 1946, p.1; December 14, 21, 1946.

23 ‘Truman Acts, “Chicago Defender 14 February 1948, p. 13.

24 “Jim Crow in the military” Chicago Defender 21 February 1948, p.1 5.

25 “Mr. Truman stands firm” Chicago Defender 6 March 1948, p.15. 238

26 Charley Cherokee, “National Grapevine,” Chicago Defender, 27 March, p.12, 24 July 1948; Samuel C. Brightman, Assistant Director of Publicity for the Democratic National Committee, Oral History Interview conducted by Jerry N. Hess. Washington D.C. p. 93. HSTL

27 Pittsburgh Courier, 14 August 1948.

23 John Nicolas Brown, Acting Secretary of the Navy, to Secretary Forrestal, 28 December 1948, OSA 291.2, NARG 335.

29 Charles Francis. (1956) Tuskeaee Airmen: The Story of the Nearo in ASAAF. Boston: Bruce Humphries, p.225; Authors interview with Lawrence Paschek, author of “Negroes on the Air Force, 1939-1949,” Military Affairs, Spring 1967, vol. 31.

30 Nichols, pp. 75-81; memorandum, Secretary Symington to Secretary Forrestal, 6 January 1949, OSA 291.2, NARG 335; Pittsburgh Courier, 5 February 1949.

31 Memorandum, from Forrestal to Secretaries of Army, Navy and Air Force, 21 October 1948 and Memorandum, from Leva to Secretaries of Army, Navy and Air Force, 30 December 1948, “B” Files HSTL files.

32 Dalfiume, Richard (1 969) Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces. Columbia, Mo: University of Missouri Press, p. 179.

33 “Civil Rights Action is Near,” New York Times, 13 January 1949, Fahy Committee files, HSTL.

34 Letter from Dawson to Fahy, 8 January 1949, and Memorandum from Thompson to Dawson, 11 January 1949, “B” files, HSTL.

35 Compare, for example, Fahy’s 43-page criticism of Morris MacGregor’s f19811 Defense Studies: Integration of the Armed Forces. 1940-1965 in the Library of Congress collection of Fahy papers. He often offers pages of rebuttal or contrary evidence to a single sentence or paragraph of MacGregor’s work. Fahy Personal files, Library of Congress.

36 This was never attempted by the Fahy Committee.

37 "Testimony before the Fahy Committee,” 12 January 1949. Vol. 1,2-3, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL cited hereafter as "Testimony."

38 "Testimony.” 12 January 1949.

39 ‘Testimony," Vol. 11, 12-18, 12 January 1949.

40 ‘Testimony,” Vol. 111,32, 204, 13 January 1949.

41 ‘Testimony,” Vol. 1 1 , 39 ff., and Vol. Ill, 69-84.

42 ‘Testimony,” Vol. V, 4 ff. February 21 1949; memorandum by Joseph H. B. Evans, Associate Secretary of the Fahy Committee, 1 March 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL. —

239

43 Applicants also included Warren Roudebush, George Mott, Robert Beers, John Powell, Alonzo Hammond, William Strong, and James Parsons. Fahy Files, HSTL.

44 E. W. Kenworthy, (26 January 1 971 )Oral History Interview conducted by Jerry N. Hess. Washington D.C. pp. 1-13 HSTL.

45 Princeton: Princeton University Press, Bernard Cohen, (1963) The Press and Foreign Policy. ; p.39.

46 Neil Sheehan, et al., (1971) The Pentagon Papers as Published by The New York Times, New York: Bantam Books.

47 E. W. Kenworthy, Oral History Interview conducted by Jerry N. Hess. Washington D.C. 26 January 1971. pp. 16-17 HSTL. 48 The staff included two African American assistants Joseph H.B. Evans (who was often confused with Civilian Assistant James Evans) and Chicago Defender Editorial assistant Charles Browning, as well as a Caucasian, Jack Durham. There were three secretaries —one Caucasian Annabelle Price, formerly of OWI, and two African Americans— Beatrice William Dillard and Vivian S. Bullock. Memo from Kenworthy to Fahy, subject: Organizations to be heard by the Committee, 25 March 1949; “An analysis of the work of the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services” by Charles Browning, 28 March 1949; E. W. Kenworthy, Jerry N. Hess. Washington D.C. 26 January 1971 p. 28. Both Oral History Interview conducted by . in HSTL.

49 For instance, on 19 April 1949, Kenworthy reported, “I think the Committee should take the

opportunity to question [Personnel Policy Board Chair] Reid about the Board’s latest moves. I have the feeling that something is brewing. Royall’s office sent down for a transcript of the latest meeting today, though a copy had already been sent up there and General Nugent also sent over for another copy. Memo, Kenworthy to Fahy, subject: Mr. Reid, 19 April 1949, all in HSTL.

50 “AF plans non-segregation policy,” Army and Navy Journal, 12 February 1949, p.693; Memorandum, Thompson for Evans, 16 February 1949 “B” files; Analysis of the Executive Order 26 February 1949, Fahy files, HSTL.

51 Confidential memo to Judge Fahy, subject: Approach and Method, 10 March 1949, Fahy files, HSTL.

52 ‘Testimony,” Vol. X, 2-3S, 28 March 1949, HSTL.

53 ‘Testimony,” Fahy Committee Hearings, 28 March 1949, pp. 71-72, HSTL.

54 Testimony of the Secretary of the Army, Fahy Committee Hearings, 28 March 1949, morning session, p. 28, HSTL.

55 ‘Testimony," Vol. IX, 16-50. Also see Testimony,” Vol. X, pp. 66-73, Army Chief of Staff General Omar Bradley's testimony that is very similar in reasoning to that of Secretary Royall, HSTL.

56 “An Analysis of the Work of the President's Committee... Through 28 March 1949;” “Report on Gillem Board Policy and Implementation,” pp. 130-31; Memoranda, Kenworthy to Fahy, 9, March 1949; 10 March 1949, all in Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL. . ,

240

57 Memo, Kenworthy to Fahy, subject: Some Questions on the Gillem Board Report . 9 March 1949; subject, Various Versions of the Gillem Board Report, 16 March 1949; subject: Request of Personnel Policy Board to Appear Before Committee, 16 March 1949; Subject: Royal’s (sic) Memo to Forrestal on an Experimental Non-Segregated Unit, 16 March 1949; Proposed Policy For the National Military Establishment, Draft of a Proposal to Achieve Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, 17 March 1949, all in Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.

5® Memorandum, G-l to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration, 30 March 1949, CS 291 .2, NARG 319. Dalfiume, p. 183; memorandum, Reid to Worthington Thompson, 15 February, 1949, and memorandum, Reid to John H. Ohly, 15 March 1949, both in PPB 291 .2, NARG 330.

Memorandum, Reid to Secretary Johnson, 1 April 1949; memorandum, Allen to Secretary Johnson, 5 April 1949, both in D54-1-16, NARG 330.

60 Memorandum, Secretary Johnson to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Chairman of the Personnel Policy Board, 6 April 1949, copy in Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL. The earlier draft of the proposed policy drawn up by Reid had called for the new policy to begin in July, 1949, and to be completed by July 1950: "It is the intent of this directive that the maximum integration of members of minority groups throughout the military establishment shall be

accomplished by 1 July 1950." Apparently this was deleted because of Army objections. See "Draft of Proposed Directive for the Armed Forces,’ n.d. PPB 291 .2, NARG 330.

61 E. W. Kenworthy, Oral History Interview conducted by Jerry N. Hess. Washington D C. 26 January 1971. p. 31, HSTL.

62 Quoted in "Report on Gillem Board Policy," pp. 154-55, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.

Memorandum, Secretary Royall to Secretary Johnson, 22 April 1949, OSA 291 .2, NARG 335.

64 Walter Waggoner, “Royall resignation accepted, his assistant will carry on,” The New York Times, 22 April 1 949, p.1

Memo, Acting Secretary of the Navy for Chairman of the Personnel Policy Board, 2 May 1949; subject: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Navy and Marine Corps; Memo, Secretary of the Army for Secretary of Defense, 21 April 1 949, subject: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, both in Fahy Committee files. Minutes, Personnel Policy Board Meeting, 5 May 1949; Memo, Reid for Secretary of Defense, 10 May 1949, subject: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services; Memo, Secretary of Army for Secretary of Defense, 22

April 1 949, Office of the Secretary of the Army 291 .2.

66 Letter, Kenworthy to Fahy, 28 April 1 949, “B” files, HSTL

67 MacGregor, p.346.

68 “Johnson orders racial equality,” New York Times, 21 April 1949, p.1, “Army, Navy, Air Force ordered to report on racial policies,” Washington Evening Star 21 April 1949, p.1; “Secretary Johnson’s Order,” New York Herald-Tribune, 21 April 1949; “Services told to report on race policy,” Washington Post, 21 April 1949, p.1; “Equality for Defense,” New York Times, New York Herald-Tribune, 22 April 1949; “Mr. Johnson cracks the whip (editorial), “Chicago Defender, 7 May 1949, p. 6 (National edition), p.6; “Armed Service Jim Crow Policy Ends," The Crisis . 1 1

241

Magazine 56 (May, 1949), p. 137. All in Fahy Committee Newspaper Clipping file, HSTL

69 MacGregor, p. 346.

70 Memorandum, Kenworthy to Fahy, 27 April 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL, illustrates records. the change in thinking of the committee and the results of the study of the Army's

71 E. W. Kenworthy, Oral History Interview conducted by Jerry N. Hess. Washington D.C. 26 January 1971. p. 19.

72 E. W. Kenworthy, Oral History Interview conducted by Jerry N. Hess. Washington D.C. 26 January 1971. p. 19-21.

73 Diary of Charles Fahy in Personal papers in Library of Congress.

74 MacGregor, p. 354; Kenworthy Oral History, p. 19-21.

75 Quoted in "Report of the Gillem Board Policy," 156; “Johnson approves plan to distribute Negroes among units,” The New York Times, 12 May 1949, p.1.

76 “Report on Gillem Board Policy," p.156, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL..

77 "Initial Recommendations by the President's Committee . . 7 June 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.

78 Memorandum, Kenworthy to Fahy, 12 May 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL. MacGregor, p. 356.

79 National Military Establishment, Office of Public Information, Release 78-49A, 7 June 1949; Washington Post 7 June 1949 and New Yori< Times, 8 June 1949; “Secretary Johnson okehs Navy plan to train and assign Navy personnel without regard to race,” Pensacola FL Journal 7 Venice Spraggs, “Report Navy integration plan ready,” Chicago Defender 1 June 1949, p.1 ; June 1949, p. 1; End Jim Crow Now, Johnson tells Army," Washington Afro-American, 14 June 1949.

80 “Judgment day for the Army, “ (an editorial) Washington Afro-American 14 June 1949; Charley Cherokee, ‘Time for Action,"(an editorial) “National Grapevine,” Chicago Defender, 18 June

1949, p.1 1

81 The Army's reply is quoted in "Report on Gillem Board Policy," 57-59, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.

82 Under these procedures, a black soldier could enroll in an Army school course only if there was a vacancy for his specialty in a black unit. Since only a few all-black units existed and they were of a limited type, many qualified black soldiers were not allowed to pursue their interests or aptitudes.

83 “Report of the Gillem Board Policy," pp. 159-60, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.

84 Memo, Kenworthy for Fahy, 30 May 1949, subject: Replies of Army and Navy to Johnson’s 1 May Memo; Memo, Reid for Secretary of Defense 1 June 1949, subject: Army and Navy Replies to Your Memorandum of 6 April on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services; Minutes Personnel Policy Board 2 June 1949; Letter, Fahy to Johnson 25 July 1949, Fahy 242

Committee File, HSTL.

85 The President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, A Progress Report for the President, 7 June 1949, HSTL.

86 “Army deadline extended for ban on segregation," Washington Star, 22 June 1949, p.25-A.

87 Kenworthy to W. E. Stevenson, 13 June 1949; Fahy to Secretary Johnson, 14 June 1949, both in Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.

88 Letter. Charles Fahy to Secretary of Defense Johnson, 15 June 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.

89 E. W. Kenworthy, Oral History Interview conducted by Jerry N. Hess. Washington D.C. 26 January 1971. p. 19; Kenworthy to Fahy, 23 June 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL

90 Largely prepared by Wade Haislip, Lieutenant General S.J. Chamberlin and General Jacob Devers, among others, see Personnel & Administration Sheet to the Department of the Chief of Staff (administration) 24 June 1949, subject: Utilization of Negro Manpower, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army and attachments in 291 .2 Negroes NARG 335.

91 Meeting of President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, 11 July 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.

92 “ Pittsburgh Courier, 1 1 July “Army defies chief on racial plan, New York Times, 17 July 1949 ; 1949.

93 Woody Woody Taylor, “Inside government, “Washington Afro-American , 25 June 1949; July Fahy Committee Papers, Taylor, “Inside Government,” Washington Afro-American , 9 1949, HSTL.

94 Walter Waggoner, “Army defies chief on racial policies, “New York Times, 17 July 1949.

95 “The Army sits down (editorial), New York Post (Home News edition), 18 July 1949.

96 Interview, NBC's “Meet the Press” with Gordon Gray 18 July 1949.

97 Letter, Fahy to Secretary Johnson, July 25, 1949; Memorandum, Charles Fahy for the Secretary of the Army, subject: Evaluation by President's Committee of the Army's "Outline Plan for Utilization of Negro Manpower to Provide Further Equality of Opportunity; 25 July 1 949; Fahy to the President, President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, Second Interim Report, 27 July 1949; all in Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.

98 According to Judge Fahy’s diary, Fahy met on a near daily basis throughout September, with either Kenworthy, White House Civil Rights expert David Niles, Army Secretary Gray or his special assistant Karl A. Bendetsen. Diary of Charles Fahy in Personal papers in National Archives. Boxes 1, 15, 93, 96, 100 & 101.

Also see Memorandum, Fahy to Members of the Committee, 3 August 1949; Memorandum, Charles Fahy for the Secretary of the Army, subject: The substitution of a GCT Quota for a Racial Quota. 9 September 1949; Memorandum, E. W. Kenworthy to members of the committee, 19 September 1949; all in Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL. .

243

99 Memorandum, Vice Chief of Staff for Gray, 29 August 1949, subject: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, Chief of Staff for U.S. Army 291 .2 Negroes; Memorandum, Kenworthy for Committee, 19 September 1949; Letters, Fahy to Truman, 21 September and 26 September 1949, Fahy Papers, HSTL.

100 Memorandum Kenworthy to the committee, 27 September 1949.

101 Succession , York: Cabell Phillips, The Truman Presidency : The History of a Triumphant New Macmillan Co., pp. 404-406; Letter Secretary of Defense to Congressman 7 July 1949; Memo, Lanham for Reid, 29 March 1949, both in Personnel Policy Board files.

102 MacGregor, p.365. Department of Defense, Office of Public Information Press Release, 30 September 1949; “Johnson asked to withdraw okay on Negro policy,” Washington Post, 1

October 1 949, p.6 in Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.

103 Pittsburgh Courier, 8, 15. October 1949; Press Release of the Committee Against Jim Crow in Military Service and Training, 6 October 1949, and Elmer W. Henderson. Director of American Council on Human Rights, to Fahy, both in Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL. Charles M. LaFollette, National Director of Americans for Democratic Action, to the President, 1 October 1949, OF 190 T, HSTL.

104 Memorandum, Kenworthy to Fahy, Subject: The Army’s New Policy, 2 October 1949, HSTL.

105 Donovan would become an important biographer of Truman. Conflict and Crisis, (1972) New

York: Norton and The Tumultuous Years . (1982) New York: Norton.

106 Memo Kenworthy to Fahy, Subject: The Army’s New Policy, 2 October 1949; John Norris, “Army continues segregation, but widens racial equality,” Washington Post, 1 October 1949, p.1; “Army reviews promotion set-up to give Negroes equal chances,” New York Herald-Tribune, 1 “ October 1949, p.1; Washington Times-Herald, “Gray’s Desegregation Plan disappointing, October “Army integration attacked by critics,” Pittsburgh Chicago Defender, 5 1949, p.3 ; Courier, 5 October 1949, p.1

1°7 Army segregationists were apparently successful in inciting Defense Department officials. Thomas R. Reid admitted that “the Army position was so well documented and so strongly presented that my own conviction that we were doing the right thing was shaken from time to time."; Defense Department trepidation over forcing the Army to alter effectiveness is also indicated in memorandum to Reid from Colonel J. F. Cassidy, 23 August 1 949, PPB 291 .2, NARG 330; Dalfiume, p. 92.

108 Kenworthy reported to Fahy,

Roy Davenport told me last night that on Friday afternoon just before the release of the Army’s new policy, he spoke to Major Lieblich, who did the major work on the statement. Davenport said he was a little bit puzzled why the statement contained merely the announcement that Johnson approved the policy, and all the quoted statements were those of Secretary Gray.

"*09 Diary of Charles Fahy in Personal papers in National Archives. 3 October 1949 Boxes 1,15,

93, 96, i 00 & 101 . Memorandum, Charles Fahy to the President, 1 1 October 1 949, Fahy Committee Papers; Telephone Memorandum, Nash Files, “B" files, HSTL.

0 At this point, the Committee felt a gauntlet had been thrown which could force them out of 244

Thursday, existence before their work was done. Committee attention during the weekend, from 6 October through Sunday, 9 October, was almost wholly focused on how they would break with Truman's instructions and go to the press. Committee member Dwight Palmer was concerned that Johnson’s statement could cause “a renewal of Civil Disobedience plans,” and strongly urged that the Committee release a statement to the press setting forth its disagreements with the Secretary of Defense. He suggested that the Committee advise the President that they planned to make the statement, then confront Johnson and Gray on the issue. They rejected two other alternatives, (a) asking the President to order that Gray and Johnson to issue a supplementary statement or (b) going back into negotiation with the Army. Truman’s press conference statement made these actions moot, but they do indicate the severity of the breach between Johnson and the Fahy Committee. Draft of Memorandum for the President, 6 October 1949; Letter, Dwight Palmer to Charles Fahy, 6 October 1949; Night Letter, Palmer to Kenworthy, 7 October 1 949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL. Also see Memorandum, David K. Niles to the President, 5 October 1949, Philleo Nash Papers, HSTL.

11 1 Memorandum, Niles for the President, 5 October 1 949, “B” files, HSTL; Item No. Public “Full Army equality for Negro planned," New York Times, Papers of the Presidents: 1949, p. 501 ; 7 October 1949, in Fahy Committee newspaper clipping files.

1 12 Memo for the President from Fahy, 11 October 1949“B” files, HSTL.

113 Letter, Kenworthy to Alan Barth, 10 October 1949. President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces files, HSTL.

114 The two orders are quoted in "Report on Gillem Board Policy,” p. 71-72, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.

1 15 E. W. Kenworthy, Oral History Interview conducted by Jerry N. Hess. Washington D C. 26 January 1971, HSTL; Author telephone interview with Kenworthy conducted on 27 December 1991.

1 16 E. W. Kenworthy, Oral History Interview conducted by Jerry N. Hess. Washington D.C. 26 January 1971. pp. 20-21, HSTL.

117 Department of Defense, Office of public Information Release 400-49, 3 November 1949, Fahy Committee files, HSTL; New York Times, 4 November 1949.

118 Letter, Kenworthy to Fahy, 3 November 1949, Fahy Committee files, HSTL.

119 Department of Defense, Office of public Information Release 400-49, 3 November 1949, Fahy Committee files; New York Times, 4 November 1 949.

12° ‘The Army recants,” (an editorial) Washington Post, 3 November 1949, p.20, Fahy Committee files, HSTL.

1 21 Lem Graves, Jr. “Army Brass Defies Investigation Order, Pittsburgh Courier, 12 November 1949, p.1.

1 22 Lem Graves, Jr. “Army Brass Defies Investigation Order, Pittsburgh Courier, 12 November 1949, p. 1; Lem Graves, Jr. “Washington Notebook,” Pittsburgh Courier, 19 November 1949 in Fahy Committee files, HSTL.

123 on October 18, before the incident, David Niles asked Marx Leva if the Army was planning to 245 revise Circular 124. Leva asked a special assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Worthington

Thompson, to look into it. Within that week, Leva asked another Defense assistant, Karl Bendetsen to show any revision of Circular 124 to Niles. Kenworthy twice expressed confidence that Leva would prevent a revision from being issued without Committee approval. Yet on 29 October 1949, Kenworthy sent a copies of the unauthorized rescission of the policy. Memorandum, Kenworthy to Fahy, 18 October 1949; memorandum, Kenworthy to Fahy, 26 October 1949; memorandum, Kenworthy to committee, 29 October 1949, all in Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.

124 Memorandum, Kenworthy to Fahy, 29 October 1949; memorandum, Kenworthy to committee members, 29 October 1949; memorandum, Kenworthy to Philleo Nash, 3 November 1949; memorandum, Kenworthy to the committee, 3 November 1949, all in Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL. Secretary Gray's reaction is discussed in memorandum, Worthington Thompson to Marx Leva, 3 November 1949, D54-1-61, NARG 330.

I 23 Sengstacke to Fahy, 8 November 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.

126 E. W. Kenworthy, Oral History Interview conducted by Jerry N. Hess. Washington D. C.. 26 January 1971. p. 30. Kenworthy expressed the idea, at greater length, in his confidential memo to Judge Fahy, subject: Approach and Method, 10 March 1949, HSTL.

127 Memo, Kenworthy to Fahy, 29 October 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL..

128 Letter for Fahy from Sengstacke, 15 December 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.

129 Memorandum for the Presidents Committee from Fahy, 17 November 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL..

130 Bendetsen had gotten his first military assignment from Haislip in the 1920s. During World War

II, he was in charge of Japanese-American Relocation Camps. After the war, Bendetsen worked as a special consultant on a number of projects for the military, such as coordinating use of bombing ranges in New Mexico. In September, 1949, Gray asked him to be Assistant Secretary of the Army. Although the official appointment was delayed until January 1950, Bendetsen worked as an executive member of the management committee of the Department of Defense. In that capacity, he oversaw issues such as force structure, deployment, procurement, budgeting, and planning. It was in that capacity that he occasionally worked with the Fahy Committee. Karl Bendetsen, Oral History Interview conducted by Jerry N. Hess. Washington D. C. p. 180, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.

131 Typed Note, Kenworthy to Fahy 15 November 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL..

132 Memoranda, Nash to Niles, 21 November 1949; Kenworthy to Fahy, 22 November 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.

133 “Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army,” 16 November 1 949, copy in Fahy Committee Papers. Memo, Kenworthy to The President’s Committee, subject: Successor Policy to War ; Department Circular 124, 18 November 1949; The committee's unfavorable analysis of this proposed policy is summarized in memorandum, Kenworthy to Fahy, subject: Revised War Department Circular 124, 28 November 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.

134 Telephone calls from Fahy to Karl Bendetsen on 25 November 1949 and to Kenworthy on 27 November, 1949; Results of conversation in Memorandum for the record by Kenworthy, 27 November 1949 and 28 November 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL; See John H. 246

Sengstacke to Fahy, 29 November 1949; Dwight R. G. Palmer to Kenworthy, 28 November 1949, in Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.

135 Memorandum for the record by Kenworthy, subject : Telephone Calls with Mr. Fahy of 27

November, 28 November 1 949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.

1 36 Memorandum for the record by Kenworthy, subject : Telephone Call with Nash, 9 December 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.

137 MacGregor, p. 369.

I®8 Memorandum, the President's Committee to the President, 15 December 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.

139 Memorandum, Kenworthy to Fahy, 19 December 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.

140 In December 1949, the Air Force reported that its integrated units increased from 273 in June 1949, to 797 in August. Furthermore, there had been no racial conflict within the newly integrated units. Memorandum, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force to the Chairman of the Personnel

Policy Board, 5 December 1949, PPB 291 .2, NARG 330. For accounts of the integration at various Air Force bases, see New York Times, 18 September, 28 November 1949; Memorandum, the Under Secretary of the Navy to the Chairman of the Personnel Policy Board, 22 December 1949, PPB 291. 2, NARG 330.

141 ‘The Air Force Goes Interracial,” Ebony, 4 (September, 1949), 15-1 8.

^ 4 ® Memorandum, Fahy to the committee members, 27 December 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL; Nichols, p. 96.

^ 48 These negotiations can be followed in memoranda to the committee members, 29, 30, December 1949, 5, 6, January 1950, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.

1 44 Press Release, Senator Jacob Javits, 12 January 1950; Memorandum, Fahy to the President, 16 January 1950, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL. The Army's new policy was released as Special Regulations No. 600-629-1 , a copy of which is in Fahy Committee Papers. An accurate account of these final negotiations with the Army is contained in New York Times, 16 January 1950.

145 Pittsburgh Courier, 28 January 1950, “New Army race policy flawed,” Norfolk Journal and Guide, 4 February 1 950, p. 9.

146 “Army is planning to end racial bar,” The New York Times, 16 February 1950; 22 February 1950, 5 May 1950, Letter from Randolph to Niles, 19 January 1950, Memorandum, Kenworthy for the President’s Committee, 23 January 1950, Letter from Kenworthy to Sevareid and transcript of radio broadcast, 24 February 1 950 and 27 February 1950, Kenworthy “B” files HSTL.

1 47 Memorandum, J. F. Cassidy to Admiral McCrea, 1 1 8 January 950, PPB 291 . 2, NARG 330; memorandum, Clark Clifford to the President n. d. January, 1 950, Nash Papers, HSTL.

148 Memorandum, Fahy to committee members, 1 February 1950, Fahy Committee Papers HSTL. 247

149 Secretary Gray to the President, 1 March 1950, OF 1285, HSTL.

150 Memorandum, for President’s Committee from Fahy 8 March 1950; Memorandum for Mr. Niles, 13 March 1950, Niles file, HSTL.

151 Memorandum, the President to Secretary Gray, 27 March 1950, OSA 291 . 2, NARG 335.

1 52 For the reactions of individual committee members, see Fahy to William Stevenson, 30 March 1950; Kenworthy to John H. Sengstacke, 25 April 1950; Sengstacke to Fahy, 25 May 1950; all in Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.

153 £ w. Kenworthy, "Taps for Jim Crow in the Services," New York Times Magazine (1 1 June 1950), pp. 12, 24-27.

154 Memo from Nash to Spingarn, 22 May 1950; John Norris, ‘Truman lauds Fahy Committee Work, “ New York Times, 23, May 1950,p.3 in Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.

155 Memorandum, Kenworthy to Philleo Nash, 26 April 1950; memorandum, Kenworthy to Fahy, 28 April 1 950, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.

1 56 Memorandum, David Niles to the President, 22 May 1950, Nash Papers, HSTL; memorandum, Kenworthy to Fahy, 10 July 1950, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.

157 President Truman to Fahy, 6 July 1950, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.

158 “Report of the Board of Officers on Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army to the Secretary of the Army," 9 February 1950, OSA 291. 2, NARG 335. CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS

An informed citizenry must, by definition, be informed. Denial of information and denial of access to information, has usually proved antithetical to the best interests of democracy. Yet, by definition, democracies are egalitarian. Thus, racial desegregation is a quintessential good for a democracy.

President Harry S. Truman denied the press access to information about a commission because he thought he could achieve a greater good by restraining debate about military segregation. Through his restraint, the Armed Services became, in principle if not in fact, racially desegregated. How and why that event transpired in the way that it did tells us much about policy-making in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

In the introduction, we resolved that this study would examine the role that publicity played in one instance of policy-making in the period before the introduction of regular television news broadcasts.

We sought to study David B. Truman’s contention that publicity could serve as an important indicator of access to administrative and legislative decision-making. He had written that governments make policies palatable by enlarging the public for those policies and by consolidating the segments of the public that will support those policies. 1 By examining the methods that governments use to enlarge

248 249

(or diminish) support, we hoped to gain an important insight into the effectiveness of access and of persuasive power as a means to garner compliance. To a surprising extent, the process worked as David B.

Truman hypothesized that it would.

Harry Truman ordered his Presidential equality committee to seek Army compliance with his desegregation order without involving the press and publicity. 2 Although he ultimately won that measure of compliance, he was unsuccessful in keeping the issue completely out of the newspapers. The Fahy Committee did use the press effectively to blunt the Army’s contravening actions. By contacting the press directly, most often as a non-attributed source,

Kenworthy and the others were able to keep proponents of desegregation allied on the issue.

Looking at motivation, we have not found any evidence to explain why President Truman chose to warn the committee about the dangers of press publicity. We do not have any documents that specifically explain why he chose to depart from the speeches that his aides provided. However, the basic logic of his argument is fairly apparent; compromises are more easily reached when the parties to the compromise are free from public pronouncements and commitments. Moreover, governments, especially war-time governments, have made a long and prosperous career of avoiding the press. In some ways, the deployment of African American soldiers was a military preparedness issue. Deployment information did receive security classification. However, military leaders probably used the classification stamp to hide this information because it was politically sensitive as well. 250

Beyond this, Truman may have counseled press evasion because he had no great fondness for newspaper companies and columnists. Later in his second term as president, he even tried to institute some controversial press curbs. Truman’s view of the relationship between working reporters and the office of the publisher seems, at best, naive. Although he was always able to win praise from some White House reporters and although he appointed

relations. able press secretaries, he frequently mismanaged his press The Indeed, his reputation has benefited from historical perspective. press and public opinion of him in his own time was frequently critical. Motivations aside, Truman was not that unusual. Other

Presidents also frequently evaded the press. What was different

here?

Historians who previously covered this event have missed the

significance of the role that press and publicity played in serving as a

potential forum for those who dissented from Truman’s civil rights

dictates and for those whose mission it was to enforce them. In

studying the role of publicity in military desegregation, we found

evidence of a pattern of defiance of presidential authority by the

military. That defiance was expressed through the press or the threat

of press exposure. When Kenneth Royall and Louis Johnson

threatened to publicly dispute policy and when Omar Bradley and the

clique of generals who sent the recission order each tried to

countermand presidential authority, they were each committing

serious acts of insubordination. The threat of press exposure was

important in those incidents. And when the members of the

presidential commission stood up to this military intimidation with 251

their own threats of press exposure, this became a very unusual situation.

It is important, in this regard, to remember how often, during

Truman’s time in office, the branches of the service made their case in the newspapers. Whether it was the ‘Battle of the Potomac’ over unification or the ‘Revolt of the Admirals’ over the naval carrier budget, the U.S. military became quite used to publicly airing its grievances. Although not covered in this study, the issue of military insubordination came to a head when Douglas MacArthur defied

Truman over the way the Korean War was being fought. Yet, in at least three key ways, the issue of press access to racial desegregation of the military was different from these other incidents.

Racial desegregation of the military went forward because of

(a) the actions of lower-level bureaucrats, (b) press coverage by the

black press and (c) the appointment of two modern public relations-

conscious military leaders, J. Lawton Collins and Gordon Gray, who

accepted the Presidential mandate. Lower-level bureaucrats, Ned

Kenworthy, Marx Leva and Roy Davenport, effectively transformed

the anomalies of this situation into a consistent policy; the importance

of Kenworthy, a journalist acting as a policy-maker, can not be

underestimated. In addition, the black press served as an unusual

two-way conduit between the insiders and the African American

community. Through their efforts, the multifarious intrigues within

the Pentagon and between the military and the Presidential

Committee were revealed. Finally, Collins and Gray had a much

better understanding of post-war sensibilities and the negative

impression that inter-service squabbling made in the press. Their 252

ultimate compliance launched the remediation of the problem. With

acceptance by Collins and Gray, the civil rights mission turned to the

schools, public facilities and voting rights.

Whv the Bureaucrats Substituted the Press for Public Opinion

Other historians studying the racial desegregation of the

military also credited the actions of lower-level bureaucrats. Richard

Dalfiume has written, “Throughout this period it was the support of

the civilian leaders within the military establishment for integration

that proved decisive .” 3 Although Morris MacGregor gives a bit more

credit to the Fahy Committee than to the services, he also argues that

much of the responsibility for interpretation and enforcement fell to

the Secretary of Defense. Given that understanding, it is important to

understand why these bureaucrats looked at the press as their

measure of public opinion.

“A democratic government lives and dies by publicity,” wrote

E.E. Schattsneider. Thus, effective democratic governments depend

upon their capacity to respond to conflict situations resourcefully, by

providing an arena for conflict, publicizing them , and taking steps to

rectify the source of wrong-doing. 4 Yet Schattsneider also urges us to

follow the sympathies of the crowd, i.e. of general public sentiment,

as a divination tool for predicting the success of policy. In the case of

post-war race relations, conventional wisdom held that the

segregationists and desegregationists were beyond reconciliation; it

was assumed that there was little latitude for compromise. Thus, we

asked ourselves where we should look if there were no opportunities

for crowds to gather? How do we measure conflict resolution if the 253

government surreptitiously closes the forum for dissent? Where do

we look if the government distracts the crowd with other issues?

Where dissent is less discernible, historians have often

examined how policies are accepted by looking at the actions of

primary dissenters. Through the lives of pacifists, civil libertarians

and other activists, historians illustrate the formation of public

support and opposition. Yet all too often, these activists are the

leaders of the cause. By the mere virtue of their leadership, they may

be different from the ordinary public. To be thorough, we did look at

the role of A. Philip Randolph and the post-war civil rights

movement. We concluded that, aside from being a catalyst to

government action, Randolph and other civil rights leaders were

ancillary to the effort.

Thus, for this study, we did not concentrate on the general

public or on the leaders of dissent but on those who could keep an

issue out of the public forum. We posited the notion that the

government was more concerned with the publicity the military

desegregation story would generate than the actual public reaction to

that publicity. To this end, we suggested that “for the politician and

the bureaucrat, the headline inch serves as a day-to-day measure of

public opinion on a great number of issues.” We turned instead to the

press relations of the lower-level policy-makers.

Truman’s action can be seen as a two-stage process; he wanted

to win over the military before he sought approval from the general

public. Further he sought to win over the military leaders before

winning over the rank and file. Truman seemed to confine his

personal influence on the issue to those within the military. However 254

the military leaders and members of the Fahy Committee communicated with the traditional prestige press, i.e. the New York

others; they were, undoubtedly, Times, the Washington Post , and trying to make their case and influence traditional elites. Grossman and Kumar have argued that the constitutional and institutional prerogatives of the office are insufficient for the President to achieve many important objectives without popular support. Effective leadership requires an ability to use a variety of political skills. To win over the public at large, a president must first persuade Congress, the bureaucracy, his political party, state and local officials and, most important here, special interest groups and other public opinion

5 leaders . Grossman and Kumar argued.

In contrast to the view that they are adversaries whose relations recently have gone undergone dramatic change, the White House and the news media are involved in a continuing relationship rooted in permanent factors that affect both sides

no matter who is the president or who is doing the reporting.

Continuing forces shape both sides more than specific incidents, however traumatic, or the impact or particular personalities, however unusual. What's more, the cooperative elements in this relationship are at least as strong as those that are antagonistic, for a fundamental reason: presidents and news people depend 6 upon each other to do the job for which they are responsible.

Certainly, government is not obligated to seek press coverage.

But in issuing an unlimited directive, Truman exercised a broad use of

Presidential prerogative. He altered, or at least attempted to alter the

symbiotic relationship between government and the press. Without

encouraging press scrutiny, the press-committee relationship could

have become purely adversarial. In its role as citizen procurator, the 255

and the press might only seek to expose the actions of the committee

finally setting military. After all, the committee and the military were

the social policy. By not permitting the press, they were excluding public from this deliberation.

This evasion of the press could have been counter-productive to the good intentions of the administration and the desegregation

found a committee. It is conceivable that conservatives might have

way to interpret the implementation of liberal social policy as

somehow subversive. Imagine, for instance, how Senator Richard

Russell might have portrayed a secret Army committee setting liberal

racial policies. Truman’s gambit might well have set back the Civil

Rights movement by a decade or more.

Kenworthy, Fahy and the other desegregationist forces kept the

liberal interpretation of the story in the newspapers as a way of

acting as a pressure valve for the liberal forces and of standing up to

their conservative counterparts, All sides, including and especially

the committee and David Niles kept huge scrap-books of newspaper

stories. It often fell to the lower level bureaucrats to monitor these

clippings and, as we will see, to contact the press in an unobtrusive

way, to keep the press informed of the progress of negotiations. Even

the Secretaries of Defense and of the Army kept news files. During

the Fort Knox imbroglio. General Omar Bradley and his publicity-

conscious aide Whalen followed the newspaper reports. All of this

clipping and saving provides evidence that the key players saw press

coverage as one measure of public opinion. These players did not

confine their clipping files to the white mainstream press. 256

The Bureaucrats View of the Black Press

It is important to remember that the post-war civil rights movement did not carry the clout that it would during later eras.

Although the NAACP had been long-established, most of its efforts at that time were concentrated in educational and voting rights reform.

There was little common consensus among African Americans and among liberals as to what constituted success. Despite his success in helping create the FEPC, Randolph did not set the civil rights agenda any more than did Lewis Granger of the Urban League or did Walter

White.

During World War II, the black press assumed an important role in giving voice to the disparate voices in the black community.

Members of the Negro Press Association were at the White House when war was declared and they often went to Europe to report on the conditions under which black troops lived and worked. This is

something the mainstream white press largely failed to do. More than

that, press coverage by the black press was important because it

went beyond the surface events to the inner-workings of

government. African American journalists had great contacts

throughout the Pentagon, the services and the Truman

Administration. Although their publication schedule often prevented

them from breaking the most dramatic news in a timely fashion, they

kept their readers better informed about the negotiations than did

their Caucasian counterparts. It is from their news reports that we

find some of the few public reports about the committee actions.

We have alluded to one important way that this procedure

worked. We showed how Kenworthy received inside reports from the 257

can African American civilians who worked inside the Pentagon. We arrangements. speculate that black reporters may have had similar

Such secret alliances were less necessary for the Chicago Defender.

The best evidence that Truman cared about the opinion of the black press was that he appointed John Sengstacke as a member of the

Fahy Committee. A number of African American reporters applied

of for the position of Executive Secretary to the Fahy Committee. It is

further import that another African American, Charles Browning of

of his assistants. the Defender , served as one

Acceptance of Truman’s Mandate

The racial desegregation of the U.S. military occurred during the

formation of the National Security Council and the reformation of the

War Department into the Department of Defense (DOD). For that

reason and because it affected personnel deployment, we examined

the structure of the DOD as an institution. The charismatic appeal and

personal opinions of the military leaders proved to be a very

influential factor in policy-making. The military proved to be far

more driven by hierarchy of command and other institutional factors.

We found that all departmental structures that were created to deal

with the press were ignored by the defense secretaries. They were

not factors worth considering.

Instead, we found that the Forrestal and Johnson, Royall and

Bradley were important impediments to desegregation. These war-

time leaders were not mere Pentagon paper-pushers. They

commanded through their charisma. Similarly, we believe that the

accommodating nature of Collins and Gray contributed to the 258

Collins and Gray facilitation of this policy. It is interesting to see how

roles as each exercised this conciliatory capacity in their respective For publisher and Chief of Information for the War Department. be published instance. Gray once allowed anti-smoking information to Collins opened in his Winston-Salem, North Carolina newspaper and

hesitate to say that his door to Associated Press editors. We would

not as Collins and Gray were crucial players; they were certainly

certainly imagine crucial as Fahy, Kenworthy or Davenport. One can Board other moderates, such as Chairman of the Personnel Policy

Thomas Reid or Air Force Secretary Stuart Symington, responding in

that the same way in the same position. Yet, we would conclude

Collins and Gray were influenced by what the newspapers, as

surrogates for public opinion, would say about the Army’s racial

policies.

Senate and Presidential Commissions

We studied the structure of presidential commissions for much

the the same reason that we studied the institutional structure of

newly-formed Department of Defense. Here, we found, that the Fahy

Committee, Truman’s Commission on Civil Rights and Truman’s Special

Senate Committee on Defense Appropriation all conformed to a set of

press/committee guidelines. First, Truman avoided dissension among

program, all parties to the conflict. In his investigation of the defense

he refused to denounce witnesses and ascribe blame. He would not

grandstand and in this way he kept the focus on substantive reform.

a good reporter by keeping all members of his Next , Truman acted as

committees informed of his findings and checking his facts. He 259

distributed galley copies of all reports to both Democrats and

Republicans as well as to each government agency, corporation and individual affected. Judge Charles Fahy was equally meticulous. He often delayed publication of committee press releases until all the committee members agreed. What is significantly different, however, is that except the final committee report, Fahy did not seek Army support for any of his press releases, although he often sought a measure of support from the Defense Department.

This is one factor that distinguishes the Truman Committee from the Fahy Committee. Both were dealing with volatile public topics. Fahy did not open the issue to public debate nor did he permit

a dissenting view. In fact, the Fahy Committee often threatened press exposure of the Army viewpoint. In turn, the Army and the Defense

Department occasionally tried to intimidate the Fahy Committee.

Army Secretary Kenneth Royall lost his job when he tried it. Defense

Secretary Johnson and Army consultant Karl Bendetsen were both

chastened when they tried it. Certainly Fahy’s ability to withstand

intimidation enabled him to keep the lid on the Committee’s efforts.

Meanwhile, Kenworthy acted as a pressure valve, releasing a steady

stream of confidential reports to the press. This interaction enabled

the White House and the Fahy Committee to control the press.

The cult of personality turned out to be the strongest influence

in the rigid hierarchy of the U.S. Defense Department. In the Truman

administration and, especially in the President’s Committee on

Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services,

procedures proved to be as important as personality. However, in 260

contributed both cases, the most apparent common denominator that

journalism. to the reform of civil right policy was a background in

In the end, then, we do see the racial desegregation of the U.S. military as an exceptional example of ‘government by publicity.’ The manipulation was strange and subtle, as significant for the circumstances surrounding its absence as for the manifestations of its presence. This form of government by publicity, or policy-making by the publicity-sensitive, was different from the kind of government by publicity practiced in the television age. We have seen that Truman was more concerned with selling the military leadership and the liberal policymakers than selling the general populace on racial reform. When necessary, as in his Civil Rights speeches, Truman did

take up the bully-pulpit. But in the matter of reforming military, he

tried to avoid publicity. The segregationists tried to use Truman’s

mistrust of the press to their own advantage. But savvy journalists,

ultimately, prevented them from succeeding.

Whv Study the History of Press Access?

What constitutes press history? Must press history be limited

to the development of the news media and individual newspapers,

magazines and broadcast stations? Must press history be limited to

the famous publishers, renowned reporters and leading lights whose

names have become synonymous with great reportage? Although a

number of journalists figure prominently in this research, this study

is not a ‘traditional’ press history. Rather, it is a study of how public

opinion has influenced the formation of policy. Some might argue 261

history or political that this is really civil rights history or military

take comfort history, but not a true press history. In that regard, we from the words of James D. Startt and William David Sloan,

It is in fact, difficult to place boundaries on communication history. Its study is an invitation to investigate not only the media in the past but also subjects such as publicity, propaganda, public opinion, censorship, and civil liberties. Communication historians are interested also in opinion-policy relationships. Their studies, consequently deal with many aspects of how people communicated and how communications interacted with societies in the past. Therefore, their inquiries have little validity if they concentrate solely on 7 communications media .

Truman’s decision to deny publicity was really a denial of press

access. Although very important parts of the story did find their way

into the press, much of the story remained buried in the archived

this event, files of the Secretaries of Army and Defense. In examining

we found that the ordinary documents of government, the transmittal

forms and filed memos were more revealing than the public

pronouncements and staged news events. Only a historical study

could bring these documents to light. Only a scholar interested in

press history could see the value of these documents in this light.

other It is traditional at this point in a dissertation to suggest

areas of exploration and to recommend other avenues of study.

There may be more to learn about the role of the press in this

particular incident. However, we would urge future scholars to look

far beyond Truman’s desegregation order to other administrations, to

other eras and to other incidents in which the press was denied

access. When the press is denied access, the people are denied a 262

the special forum to debate the great issues of the day. By viewing relationship between the press and government from this particular perspective, we can gain a whole new understanding of the policy- making process. There is much to learn.

Notes

Alfred A. 1 David B. Truman. (1958) The Governmental Process New York:

Knopf, p. 463.

Congress passed the 2 in a literal sense, he was only following the law. In 1913, to prohibit Gillett Amendment (Section 3107) of Title V of the United States Code spending taxpayer dollars to pay publicity experts unless specifically appropriated for that purpose. We tend to think Truman was using the term ‘publicity’ generically and was trying to restrain the use of any communication from the Committee or the Armed Services on the desegregation issue.

3 Richard Daifimue. n 9691 Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces; Fighting on of Missouri Press, p. 200. Two Fronts . 1 939-1953 . Columbia: University

4 Hinsdale: The Dryden E. E. Schattsneider, (1960) The Semi-Sovereign People , Press

5 Michael Grossman and Martha Kumar (1 98 1 ) Portraving the President : The White University Press. House And The News Media Baltimore : Johns Hopkins

6 Grossman and Kumar, p. 14.

7 James D. Startt and William David Sloan.M 989) Historical Methods in Mass

Communication. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, p.15 . BIBLIOGRAPHY

Manuscript Collections

Army General Staff Papers. National Archives Records Group 319, Washington, DC

James C. Evans Reports and papers. US Army Military History Research Collection, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

Charles Fahy, 1949 Diary in Personal papers in Library of Congress.

Minutes of Executive Committee Against Mob Violence, (21 August 1946) Box 332, NAACP Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

Phileo Nash Papers. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.

Arthur W. Page papers. Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madison, Wl.

Personnel Policy Board Papers. National Archives Records Group 330, Washington, DC.

President’s Committee on Equality of T reatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.

Secretary of the Army and Assistant Secretary of the Army Papers. National Archives Records Group 335, Washington, DC.

Secretary of Defense and Assistant Secretary of Defense Papers. National Archives Records Group 330, Washington, DC.

Secretary of War and Assistant Secretary of War Papers. National Archives Records Group 335, Washington, DC.

Harry S. Truman Papers. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.

Public Documents

Margaret L. Geis, Negro Personnel in the European Command 1 January 1946 to 30 June 1950. 1952 Historical Division, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.

Dennis D. Nelson, The Integration of the Negro into the , 1776- 1947, Washington, DC, 1947.

President’s Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights, Washington, DC. United States Government Printing Office, 1947.

President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, Interim And Final Reports, in Committee Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.

263 ,

264

President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, Freedom to Serve, Washington, DC, United States Government

Printing Office, 1 950.

Frank Stanley, Report of the Negro Newspaper Publishers Association to the Honorable Secretary of War on Troops and Conditions in Europe, 18 July 1946, OSW, NARG 330, 291.2.

Marcus Ray, Report to Secretary of War, Robert Patterson, "Tour of European Installations," 17 December 1946.

Harry S. Truman Papers, Public Papers of the Presidents of The United States: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, 1945-1948, Washington DC, United States Government Printing Office, 1961- 1965.

U.S. Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, 1948.

War Department Circular No. 124, "Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Postwar Army Policy," 27 April 1946.

Hearings

National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs, 26 April 1948, Washington, DC.

U.S. Committee on Fair Employment Practices, "Seventh Hearing." Birmingham, Ala. 18 June 1942.

U.S. Senate. Committee on Judiciary. Nomination of Charles Fahy, of New Mexico to

be Judge of U.S. Court of Appeals for D.C. Court, 1 April 1950.

U.S. Senate. Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program. Hearings. 11 March 1943.

U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services, 15 April 1944, National Defense Establishment: Unification of the Armed Services, Hearings on S.758, 80th Cong., 1st Session, Part 1.

U.S. Senate. Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, Universal Military Training, 31 March 1948 80th Cong., 2d Session.

Newspapers

Army & Navy Journal 1 947-1950 Baltimore Afro-American, 1940-1950 Baltimore Sun, 1947 Pittsburgh Courier, 1940-1950 Chicago Defender, 1940-1950 Chicago Tribune, 1948 Indianapolis Star, 1948 Kansas City Call, 1940-1950

Norfolk Journal and Guide, 1 940-1 950

The New York Times, 1 940-1 950 New York Herald-Tribune, 1945-1950 New York People’s Voice, 1947

Philadelphia Bulletin, 1 948 Philadelphia Inquirer, 1948 Washington Post, 1940-1950 265

Washington Star, 1945-1950

Oral Histories and Interviews

Except where noted, all interviews come from the Oral History collection of the Harry S. Truman Library in Independence, MO. The following listings show the name of the interviewee, the interviewer and the location of the interview.

Jack L. Bell, Oral History Interview conducted by Jerry N. Hess. Washington, DC.

Karl Bendetsen, Oral History Interview conducted by Jerry N. Hess. Washington, DC.

Samuel C. Brightman, Assistant Director of Publicity for the Democratic National Committee, Oral History Interview conducted by Jerry N. Hess. Washington, DC.

Alvan Gillem Oral History Interview in Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

Gordon Gray Interview, NBC's “Meet the Press,” 18 July 1949.

E. W. Kenworthy, Oral History Interview conducted by Jerry N. Hess. Washington, DC.

Articles

“The Air Force Goes Interracial." Ebony, Vol. 4, September 1 949, 15-18.

R. S. Allen and W. V. Shannon, "Why Johnson Was Fired." New Republic, vol. 123, 25 September 1950, 11-12.

Hanson Baldwin, "The Military Move In." Harper's, vol. 195, December 1947, 481- 489.

Horace Mann Bond, "Should the Negro Care Who Wins the War?" The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 223, September 1 942, 81 - 84.

R. & E. Brecher, "The Military's Limited War Against Segregation." Harper's Magazine, vol. 217, September 1963, 79-92.

W. H. Brown, "A Negro Looks at The Negro Press." Saturday Review of Literature 25, 19 December 1942, 5-6.

Roy Carter, Jr. "Segregation and the News: A Regional Content Study." Journalism Quarterly, vol. 34 (Winter 1 957): 3.

, "Segregation and the News: A Regional Content Study, " Journalism Quarterly, vol. 36 (Spring 1959): 284.

Kenneth Clark, "Morale of the Negro on the Homefront: World Wars I and II." Journal of Negro Education, vol. 12 (Summer 1943,): 417-28.

D. Cohn, "How the South Feels." The Atlantic Monthly, 173, January 1943, 94-100.

Robert H. Connery, "Unification of the Armed Forces: The First Year." American Political Science Review, vol. 43, February 1 949, 38-52.

"Crisis in the Making: U.S. Negroes Tussle with Issue of Resisting a Draft Law because of Racial Segregation, "Newsweek, 21, 7 June 1948, 28-29. ,

266

Richard Dalfiume, "The 'Forgotten Years' of the Negro Revolution." The Journal of American History, vol. 57 (1967): 91-106.

Richard Dalfiume, "Military Segregation and the 1940 Presidential Election." Phylon vol. 30, 1969,42-55.

Paul C. Davis, "The Negro in the Armed Services." Virginia Quarterly Review, vol. 24, (Autumn 1 948): 495-523.

John B. Donovan, “Mass Communications and the Adversary Establishment." Intellect vol. 11, 1975, 525.

James C. Evans and David A. Lane Jr. "Integration in the Armed Services." Annals of t he American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 304, March 1 956, 78-85.

“Face the Music,” Time, 51, 12 April 1948, 21.

William T. R. Fox, "Representatives and Efficiency: Dual Problem of Civil-Military Relations." Political Science Quarterly., vol 76 (September 1961): 354-366.

William T. R. Fox, "Civilians, Soldiers, and American Military Policy." World Politics, vol. 7, April 1955,402-418.

Alan Fried, “Censorship of the Chicago Defender During World War II.” Paper delivered at the Association of Educators of Journalism and Mass Communication, Southeast Division, Orlando, FL, 1991.

Noel Griese, "He Walked in the Shadows: Public Relations Counsel Arthur W. Page." Public Relations Quarterly, vol. 21 (Fall 1976): 8-15.

E. T. Hall, Jr., "Race Prejudice and Negro-White Relations in the Army." American J oumal of Sociology, vol. 52 (March 1947): 401-409.

Paul Hammond, “Super-Carriers and B-36 Bombers: Appropriations, Strategy and Politics” in H. Stein (ed.), American Civilian-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies, Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1963.

Richard Haynes, "The Defense Unification Battle, 1947-1950: The Army." Prologue; vol. 7(1), Spring 1975.

Ernest Johnson, "The Washington News Beat." Phylon 7 (Second Quarter 1946): 120- 29.

L. M. Jones, "The Editorial Policy of the Negro Newspapers of 1917-1918 as compared 942." vol. 1 (Summer 1 943): with that of 1941-1 Journal of Negro Education , 2 298-306.

E. W. Kenworthy, "The Case Against Army Segregation." Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 275, May 1951, 27-33.

E. W. Kenworthy, "Taps for Jim Crow in the Services." New York Times Magazine, 11 June 1950, 12-13, 24-27.

H. Krieghbaum, "The Office of War Information and Government News Policy." Journalism Quarterly, vol. 19 (September 1942). , . " " ,,

267

Jack C. Lane, "American Military Past: The Need for New Approaches." Military Affairs vol. 41 (October 1977): 109-113.

Wesley McCune and John R. Beal. "The Job that Made Truman President." Harper's vol. 190, June 1945, 616-621.

Monthly Summary of Events and Trends in Race Relations, (various issues, 1 940- 1946).

Charles S. Moskos, "Racial Integration in the Armed Forces." American Journal of Sociology, vol. 72 (September 1966): 132-148.

P. L. Prattis, "The Morale of the Negro in the Armed Services of the United States. Journal of Education, vol. 12 (September 1943): 355-63.

P. L. Prattis, “The Role of the Negro Press in Race Relations." Phylon , vol. 7 (Third Quarter 1946): 269-284.

Lawrence D. Reddick, "The Negro Policy of the American Army Since World War II." Journal of Negro History, vol. 38 (April 1953): 194-215.

Dietrich C. Reitzes, "Institutional Structures and Race Relations," Phylon vol.20 (First , Quarter 1959): 48-66.

Arnold M. Rose, "Army Policies Toward Negro Soldiers -- A Report on a Success and Failure." Journal of Social Issues, vol. 3 (Fall 1 947): 26-31

A. Rutledge, The Negro Problem Reaches a Crisis: What if the South Should Be Right?" The American Mercury, vol. 59 (December 1944): 680-86.

G. S. Schuyler, "More Race Riots are Coming." The American Mercury, vol. 59 (December 1944): 680-86.

Harry Sitkoff, "Harry Truman and the Election of 1948: The Coming of Age of Civil Rights In American Politics." Journal of Southern History, vol. 37 (November 1971): 597- 616.

R. W. Steele, "Preparing the Nation for Wan Efforts to Establish a National Propaganda Agency, 1940-41," American Historical Review vol. 75 (1970): 1640-53.

Harry S. Truman, “Our Armed Forces MUST Be Unified,” Collier’s, 26 August 1944, 16, 63-64.

Patrick Washburn, "The 'Pittsburgh Courieri and Black Workers in 1942." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication (AEJMC), Corvallis, Oregon, 1983.

Unpublished Studies

A. E. Barbeau, "The Black American Soldier in World War I," Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1970.

J. H. Holland, "A Study of Negroes Employed by the Sun Ship-building and Drydock

Company during World War II and Their Problems in the Post-war Period, Dissertation, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1950. 268

Anthony Newberry, "Without Urgency or Ardor: The South's Middle-of-the-Road Liberals and Civil Rights, 1945-1960," Dissertation, Ohio University, 1982.

Gerald W. Patton, "War and Race: The Black Officer in the American Military 1915- 1925," Dissertation, Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa, 1978.

"Report on Gillem Policy Board and Implementation," Study in the Records of President’s Committee on Equality of T reatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO, 1947.

Eugene Francis Schmidtlein, “Truman the Senator,” Dissertation, University of Missouri (reproduced by Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms), 1962.

B. R. Skinner, "The Double 'V': The Impact of World War II on Black America," Dissertation, Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1978.

Books

Herbert H. Apthekar, A Documentary History of the Negro People in the United States.

vol. 4 . New York: Citadel Publishing, 1974.

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Numan V. Bartley and Hugh Graham, Southern Politics and the Second Reconstruction. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975.

Jack Bass and Walter DeVries. The Transformation of Southern Politics: Social

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John R. Beishline, Military Management for National Defense . New York: Prentice- Hall, 1950.

William C. Berman, The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration . Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1970.

C. Joseph Bernardo and Eugene H. Bacon, American Military Policy: Its Development Since 1775. 2nd ed. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1961.

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Barton J. Bernstein and Alan Matusow, (eds.) The Truman Administration: A

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M. Block, Current Biography. 1942-1948 . New York: H.H. Wilson, 1942-1948.

Leo Bogart, Social Research and the Desegregation of the U.S. Army . Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1969.

Carl W. Borklund, Men of the Pentagon . New York: Praeger, 1 966. 269

Carl W. Borklund, The Department of Defense . New York: Praeger, 1968.

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Russell A. Buchanan, Black Americans in World War II . Santa Barbara, CA: Clio, 1977.

Andrew Buni, in The Negro Virginia Politics. 1902-1965 . Charlottesville, VA: 1967.

Demetrios Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and the Policy Process. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966.

Robert K. Carr, Federal Protection of Civil Rights: Quest for a Sword . Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1947.

Douglass Cater. The Fourth Branch of Government .. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959.

David Caute, The Great Fean The Anti-Communist Purge Under Truman and

Eisenhower . New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978.

Steven H. Chaffee and Michael Petrick, “The military and its public” in Using the Mass

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American History: Sources for Research . Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1981.

Clark Clifford, Counsel to the President: A Memoir. New York: Random House, 1990.

Bert Cochran, Harry Truman and the Crisis Presidency . New York: Funk & Wagnalls,

Tristam Coffin, Missouri Compromise. Boston: Little, Brown, 1947.

Bernard Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.

David Colburn and Robert Scher, Florida's Gubernatorial Politics . Tallahassee: University Presses of Florida, 1980.

Charles Collins, Whither Solid in South: A Study Politics and Race Relations . New Orleans: Pelican Press, 1947.

J. Lawton Collins, Lightning Joe . Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1979.

Richard N. Current, Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft . New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1954. 270

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Caucasian, Although he has never served in the United States military and is a

Even as a boy, Alan Fried has had a long and abiding interest in the civil rights struggle.

Riders, the Southern he avidly followed and admired the great work of the Freedom

Christian Leadership Council and other civil rights organizations.

advertising in the Fried has never worked as a journalist, either. He did write copy

Petersburg Times and sales promotion departments of the Chicago Sun-Times, The St.

the the Lakeland Ledger. He received his Bachelor of Science in broadcasting at

University of Illinois in University of Southern Illinois in 1972, his Master of Science at the

in mass advertising in 1975 and, in 1989, he decided to obtain his doctorate

the only way out. communications at the University of Florida. At the time, it seemed

his family moved to Park He was bom in Detroit, Michigan, in 1950 and in 1954

century ago, and the last Forest, Illinois. Though he moved from there more than a quarter

Park Forest home. He of his relatives left there a decade and a half ago, he still considers

graduate course in library is currently teaching undergraduate courses in advertising and a

resources for mass communication at the University of South Carolina.

277 opinion it conforms to acceptable I certify that I have read this study and that in my standards of scholarly presentation and is fully ade^ate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy/

David Ostroff, Chair Professor of Joumalisi Communications

that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable I this and I certify that have read study standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy___^ 'U* Robert Kendc Professor of Journalism and Communications

it conforms to acceptable I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy*

William McKeen Associate Professor of Journalism and Communications

it I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosopbyx /)

David Colburn Professor of History it I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. _

Richard Scher Associate Professor of Political Science

This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the College of Journalism and Communications and to the Graduate School and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

April, 1994

Communications

Dean, Graduate School