AND WE’LL ALL BE FREE: THE ROLE OF THE PRESS IN THE INTEGRATION OF THE— UNITED STATES ARMY ( 1947 1950 )
By
ALAN FRIED
A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
1994
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LIBRARIES ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
the of I came to this enterprise with a great desire to leam more about development race relations in the United States, U.S. military policies, the growth of government /press
relations and the processes and methods of historical research. I have learned much
all illuminated for about all these topics and I owe a great debt of thanks to those the way
Dr. David Ostroff, me. I would first like to thank the members of my dissertation committee,
Dr. William McKeen, Dr. Richard Scher, Dr. David Colburn and Dr. Robert Kendall. Each
contributed mightily to my understanding of the process of history and political science. I would especially like to thank those librarians who taught me where and how to look for information: Dolores Jenkins of the University of Florida, who obtained a microfilm set of of the Fahy Committee documents, and Will Mahoney of the Military History Division of the
National Archives in Washington, DC, and Dennis Bilger of the Harry S. Truman Library,
Independence, Missouri, who were unstinting in their kindness and patience. I thank authors Richard Dalfiume, Morris MacGregor and Lee Nichols who first developed this
topic, I also thank the staffs of the Military History division of the Army War College in
Carlisle Barracks, the Wisconsin State Historical Society and the Library of Congress
Personal Manuscripts Division. I appreciate all those who put me up while I was doing research including Matthew and Sue Dodd of Marysville, Pennsylvania: Larry Ekin of
Mrs. of Independence Missouri; and my uncle and aunt, Washington, DC; Armand Helm ,
Adrian and Barbara Pelzner of Reston, Virginia. Finally, I thank my brother Arthur who taught me to revere history and who has always given my life an ethical balance and my parents Bernard and Anita Fried for virtually everything else. The good in this study comes from them; the errors are my own. 8
TABLE OF CONTENTS
page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ii
ABSTRACT v CHAPTERS
1 THE ROLE OF PUBLICITY IN GOVERNMENT 1
Publicity and the Political Elite 4 A Brief Review of Military Desegregation 12 Notes 15
2 CIVIL RIGHTS, MILITARY REFORM AND THE TRUMAN PRESIDENCY 1
Civil Rights and the Truman Presidency 22 Military Reform and the Truman Presidency 45 Military Democratization through Unification 55 Truman and the Press 62 Notes 69
3 MILITARY POLICIES 80
Gillem Board 82 James Forrestal 85 Kenneth Royall 94 Omar Bradley 108 J. Lawton Colins 121 Louis Johnson 127 Gordon Gray 133 Conclusions 137 Notes 138
4 A. PHILIP RANDOLPH AND THE COMMITTEE AGAINST JIM CROW IN THE ARMY 155
Randolph's Early Military Desegration Crusade ... 156 Desegregation of Umt 1 62 League for Non-Violent Civil Disobedience 170
Randolph's Influence in Military Desegregation ... 176 Notes 178
iii oagfl
5 THE FAHY COMMITTEE 183
Charles Fahy — 186 : ; Sengstacke and the Defender Tradition 188 First meeting 194 E. W. Kenworthy 201 Situation Analysis 203 Reaction to Johnson's April 6 Directive 207 Roy Davenport 210 Johnson's Second Directive 210 Johnson’s Usurpation 218 The Threat of Publicity 226 Notes 235
6 CONCLUSIONS 248
Why the Bureaucrats Substituted the Press for Public Opinion 252 How the Bureaucrats Viewed the Black Press 256 Acceptance of Truman's Mandate 257 Why Study the History of Press Access? 260 Notes 262 BIBLIOGRAPHY 263 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 277
IV Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University Of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
AND WE’LL ALL BE FREE: THE ROLE OF THE PRESS IN THE INTEGRATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY (1947—1950)
by
Alan Fried
April 1994
Chairman, Dr. David Ostroff Major Department: Mass Communications
When President Harry S. Truman convened the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services in 1949, he directed their work be done with a minimum of publicity. Consistently, however, the committee and their counterparts in the United States Army used press exposure and, more importantly, the threat of press exposure to gain political advantage. Surprisingly, a number of the key players in this incident, including the Executive Secretary of the committee and a committee member, were journalists; thus, members of the press were responsible for management of
government—press relations. By examining the history of the presidential
directive to racially integrate the United States Army, we can g£ n a fresh
understanding of how publicity shapes and influences policy-making.
v CHAPTER 1
THE ROLE OF PUBLICITY IN GOVERNMENT
of the In 1959, Douglass Cater identified a trend that might be one hallmarks of American political life in the last half of the twentieth century. “We have today what might be called government by publicity,” Cater wrote. He saw the influence of publicity growing as mass communications and public opinion
polling expanded into every phase of American life. Cater identified this trend as
a force uniquely indispensable to the American system in which 'public opinion' is called on daily to arbitrate between the two competing branches of government supposedly separate and coordinate what Woodrow Wilson called the 'literary theory' of our Constitution. 1
Communication scholars tend to agree with Cater and with Dan
Nimmo who said that information-dispensing by government usually serves some
political purpose. Governmental bodies craft promotional messages to explain and
to justify their policies; they then transmit them to individual citizens and interest
groups. 2 Within the environment of separate powers, a marketplace of ideas
operates to allow competitive public explanations of policy to vie with other
explanations. As the first recipient of public information, the press has become a
kind of citizen's procurator discriminating among the many messages. In doing this
work, the press has become more than a countervailing fourth estate of
noted, the government; it has become a separate public unto itself. As Cater has
1 2
creative power of government publicity lies in its facility for using the press to short-cut the classic ways of democracy. Cater wrote,
In an age of complex and fast-breaking events, the measurement of publicity comes to be taken as a cheap and convenient substitute for public opinion. For the politician and the bureaucrat the headline inch frequently serves as the day-to-day measure of public opinion on a great number of issues. By their responses to this synthetic public opinion, they stimulate further publicity and so commence a reflexive cycle that has been known to move news stories from the inside to the front page and to reshape policies as surely as if 3 public opinion had exerted its sovereign will.
To test eater's thesis that the expediency of publicity drives (and perhaps, obstructs) policymaking, we have decided to examine the extent to which these processes are peculiar to the “age of complex and fast-breaking events." For this analysis, we need to wrest the process from its contemporary connotations. We are still defining the policymaking process in a very traditional way, but we are suggesting that the disposition of that process has changed.
That is, operationally, we would accept any view of the process that includes (a) problem identification, (b) the formulation, legitimation and appropriation that comprise program development, (c) program implementation, (d) program
4 evaluation and (e) program termination. The distinction that we are making is that this process has run differently since the television-age.
Much of the academic literature about the effects of publicity on policy- making has naturally focused on events that occurred after 1960. President John
Kennedy’s abilities as a telegenic communicator and the graphic, public quality of his assassination have forever transformed the media. Relatively recent events such as the 1960s Civil Rights crusades, the Viet Nam War and the Watergate affair, and the events that have occurred in their aftermath were also powerful natural lodestones attracting the eye of the video camera and the attention of most 3
have, to political scientists and communication scholars. Yet these dramatic events some extent, obscured our understanding of the govemment/publicity process.
Robert Entman argues that federal policymakers were better able to
glaring resolve difficult matters internally, within the Washington system, before the concentration of intrusive and judgmental news coverage imposed an extra layer of strategic complexity on their decisions:
Presidents and legislators could concentrate more on selling the party elite and local activists, who understood the complexity of policy choice and resisted the demagogic manipulation by the opposing party. Public opinion
(perceived or actual) would tag along or not . . . Because of the media, elites may be more attentive than ever to what they perceive as public opinion. Before the television age, back when political parties held more power, a president's image beyond the Potomac could be less favorable than his professional reputation in Washington and he could still dominate the Washington power game. Now, maintaining that situation is more
difficult. Now, even if the public is not always tuned in, politicians behave and actual as if they are. Managing media impressions to bolster perceived public support has become one of the central tasks of presidents and other 5 politicians .
Entman’s conception helps to narrow the focus of this inquiry both in time
and in effect. To understand the consequences of publicity on policy-making, we
need to examine incidents that occurred before television poked its disruptive eye
into the political process. If Entman is right, the publicity machine has most affected
the activities of the elite. Whether for good or for ill, this new sensitivity by the
elites to publicity may have changed the spirit of decision-making in our pluralistic
society. To see if this true, we need to examine how elite policymakers functioned
without publicity, or better yet, how they functioned when publicity was not as
problematic. 4
Publicity and the Political Elite
Ever since Katz and Lazarsfeld theorized the existence of a two-step flow
6 the political elite have usually been seen as an intermediary in communication , between the information generated by the mass media and the public at large.
Although researchers have clearly articulated and proven empirically that a two- step flow of communications occurs in many situations, they have been less clear in how they define elite. We would adopt V.O. Key’s definition, “That thin stratum of persons referred to variously as the political elite, the political activists, the leadership echelons or the influentials .” 7 Although economic status may be a determinant of who is, and is not, a member of the elite, Bernard Hennessy said
on most matters of public concern, the relations between the economic and the political are much too subtle to be captured by any determinist prescription, and much interwoven by other social and psychological forces. 8
Perhaps Hennesy describes it best when he suggests that political elites
are those whose opinions matter. Thus, opinion leaders care more intensely about
the ends and means of public policy and hold their opinions with greater
9 articulateness, self-consciousness and with greater persistence. Where Entman
differs from these scholars is in his perspective; he sees the media as an
impediment to the good works of these elites.
The notion that elites depend upon the media to mirror popular opinion has been
widely accepted. 10 The structure and function of this feedback phase of the two-step
flow between the media and the elite has been well analyzed. For example, Doris Graber
has investigated how the media affects decision-making:
Publicity may narrow the policy choices available to public officials. It may engender action when no action may have taken place otherwise. 5
Alternatively by mobilizing hostile public or interest group opinions, it may 11 force a halt to ongoing or projected policies.
We contend that much of the current analysis may be based on
misapprehensions and symbolic projection. If the political elite do rely on the media as the voice of the people, they probably have false notions of its representativeness. J. David
Kennemar notes that elites often use the news media as a surrogate for public opinion
although there is no scientific evidence that the news reflects anything more than one
measure of the popular agenda. In deriving this insight, these elites use no systematic
means to shape these perceptions. In holding these unwarranted assumptions, they
12 exhibit a high degree of pluralistic ignorance.
Samuel Kemell blames the intrusion of the press into the affairs of policymakers for
creating a sea-change in our notions of pluralism. He argues that modem politicians are
caught between the structure of institutionalized and individualized pluralism, where the
former is characterized by stable bargaining of allocated resources by a network of
coalitions based on long-term loyalties and where the latter is characterized by
independent new traders more interested in short term successes. The second political
milieu is also distinguished by greater communication from Washington to the rest of the
country. Public opinion counts for more today because Washington elites are necessarily
13 more sensitive to public and press opinion.
Walter Lippmann saw the dangers of this division in the early 1950s. He wrote,
The press is no substitute for institutions. It is like the beam of a searchlight that moves restlessly about, bringing one episode then another out of the darkness into vision. Men cannot do the work of the world by this light alone. They cannot govern society by episodes, incidents and eruptions. It is only when they work by a steady light of their own, that the press, when turned upon them, reveals a situation intelligible enough for a popular decision. It lies in social organization based on a system of analysis and record, and in all the corollaries of that principle; in the abandonment of the theory in the decentralization of decision, in of the omnicompetent citizen , 14 the coordination of decision by comparable record and analysis .
Thus, we see how the introduction of publicity has been seen as an
or obstruction to some policymaking activities of the elite. Indeed, whether for good
of pluralism in the democratic ill, the media may have altered the very essence process. We have also seen that the elite have become ever more sensitive to the media as a surrogate for public opinion.
in the Our intention in this paper is to examine the role publicity played policy-making process before the media glare had so thoroughly irradiated government. We have chosen to study a time when media scrutiny was a bit less
intense, but a time when the relationship between elite policymakers and the
press was just as adversarial as it is today. Using a particular event as a
useful guidepost, we will examine how the process works when publicity is not a
expedient for decision-makers.
Publicity and Policy-Making in the Truman Era
To provide a new perspective on the origins of the relationship between
the press and government, we have chosen to examine the significance of press
coverage in an issue that transpired during the administration of President Harry
Truman. We will examine the relationship between the press and government in
the racial desegregation of the United States Army. In this study, we explain how
Truman's efforts to enlarge public support for desegregation fit within the context of
his campaign to reform the post-war defense establishment.
for It is important to remember that Truman was trying to build a mandate
civil rights legislation when the ground was not particularly fertile for this
development. For this reason, he did not shine the brightest light on his civil rights
reforms. He tried to take the focus from the controversy rather than making a 7
players in the political football of it. As will be seen, Truman, and the other incident, often tried to manage the press and government to their own best advantage. As part of this effort, the President’s Committee, the Army and the
recognize and to leading civil rights organizations all appointed former journalists to
control publicity-sensitive issues. In respect to the management of publicity and to
the ethical issues involved when journalists join government, and in the interplay
between these two issues, the achievements of President Harry Truman’s
Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the United States Armed
Services provide an interesting window of analysis.
There has been precious little written about the role of the press in
policymaking during the Truman era. Indeed as late as the 1970s, the history of the
Truman administration went largely unmined. 15 Through the next two decades,
some rich veins of study have been excavated. Most of Truman's biographers,
including McCullough, Ross, Phillips and Steinberg regard the role that civil rights
played in the 1 948 presidential campaign and in his dealings with Southern
Democrats in Congress as crucial to his presidency; they count his vocal
commitment to racial progress as one of his primary achievements. Although
scholars such as Berman, McCoy and Ruetten, Hamby, Sitkoff, Longaker and
Leuchtenberg have lavished attention on Truman's influence in propelling racial
reform, they each have treated military desegregation as a relatively minor
component within the broad sweep of the movement for political enfranchisement
and social integration.
While these civil rights historians analyzed the efforts of black leaders and
white liberals to influence Truman, they did not focus on changes in the military.
Conversely, those few historians who have examined Truman’s role in reforming
the American military such as Borklund, Hammond and Haynes have spent more 8
time examining the creation of the National Security Act than military desegregation.
Finally, those few scholars who have concentrated directly upon military desegregation have, to some extent, reduced Truman’s role to that of a catalyst.
Scholars such as Dalfiume, Nalty and MacGregor have not considered methods that Truman employed to create a positive climate for change.
In this study, we will also look beyond the White House to focus on how segregationists in the United States Army used information control techniques to delay and derail the Truman Administration effort to desegregate that institution.
Then we will show how civil rights proponents built support for reform among
certain select constituencies, notably African Americans and white liberals and
moderates. We will show how the President’s Committee and their allies in the
Truman White House served as intermediaries between these groups.
Elites and the Military Command Structure
By selecting the military command structure as one focal point of our
inquiry, we eliminate one serious definitional uncertainty; elites are easily identified
in the U.S. Armed Services hierarchy. Truman knew that he had to win over the
political elites in his own party, the industrialists and others whose labor policies
would change with military desegregation, and most important, the liberals whose
support he desired to help energize reform. But first, he needed to convince the
military leaders. As Juergen A. Heise has noted, even among military public
information officers, the commanding officer remains the focal point because the
authority structure emphasizes hierarchy to ensure uniform, central direction in
combat situations. Heise says the commander or other head of the organizational
16 unit is a significant factor, particularly in the way bad news is handled . When
the Defense Department was first being formed by Truman, there were few unified 9
policy-coordinating and disseminating mechanisms. Congress mandated that the
Secretary’s staff be small. Individual Service Secretaries often took it upon themselves to articulate administration policy themselves instead of relying on the
Defense Secretary staff. Often, these secretaries took a different line than the one promulgated by the Secretary of Defense. This confusion led to individual politicking and publicizing by the individual Secretaries and their subordinates.
Thus, disunity became a critical factor in the formulation of the military’s racial policies.
With less top-down direction, the personal opinions of individual public information officers, who presented specific policy-messages and provide publicity for the Armed Services, became more visible than they might have been
of in a more formal operation. Steven Chaffee and Michael Petrick have written the
17 special problems of military public information officers . The military values secrecy above disclosure, Chaffee and Petrick found, while the press has reversed values. The military PIO is somewhat marginalized and distrusted by
18 desegregation as one both worlds . In this paper, we will examine Army instance in which the expansion of the public and the isolation of the press and professional public information officer corps proved worthwhile.
How Public Information Officers Exercise Their Authority
Ostensibly, official Washington is primarily composed of public officials
who tell the citizen what government is doing. These people, who serve in
publicity offices of administrative agencies, make up one set of pivotal political
communicators—the communicators of messages that have consequences in the
19 activation, shaping and articulation of public opinion. In reality, the information officer is often less a servant to the public or the press than to his or her own organization. The information officer is an administrative specialist, skilled in the
employment and manipulation of symbols. Their expertise lies in mastery of the
means of distribution which will make the audience aware of the agency's
information policies and which will give a rationale for binding the citizen to the
20 program in the spirit of loyalty.
To govern a populace that is often inattentive, skeptical, fickle and
contradictory in its desires, governments have used a wide range of methods to
gamer positive support. From these, George Edwards has labeled two streams of
effort, information control and traditional public relations techniques. Edwards
identifies information control as (a) withholding information, (b) deemphasis, (c)
collection, i.e., controlling publication of statistical reports, (d) timing announcements
to hide bad news, (e) obfuscating and prevarication. Edwards contrasts these
methods with proactive techniques of (a) public information, (b) media events, (c)
21 interpretation and (d) the discrediting and (e) drowning out of the opposition.
Our aim in this paper is to merely recognize these practices as they occurred in the
desegregation of the military; it is not our intention to individually evaluate the
effectiveness nor the moral legitimacy of these forms of manipulation.
Nimmo cites three concurrent causes for the growth of informational
agencies in government. From these causes, he derives a functional set of
behaviors that circumscribe PIO responsibilities:
in for explanations to fill the gulf between policy (1. ) an increase the necessity
application by the administrator and policy acceptance by the citizen. interests. (2.) an increase in the need for promotion of departmental or agency
Governmental officials recognizing the phenomenon of publicity must choose informational messages that promote an effective framework for truth and need specialized separate organizational arrangements to effectively conduct them.
(3.) Communications through mass media are complex and require specialists who have mastered the techniques necessary to formulate messages and win prominent news space. Agencies need technocrats who speak the language both
22 of the government and of the news media.
One advocate for the division the politics and civil service was J. A. R.
Pimlott who saw it, more broadly, as an essentially positive protection for
democracy. The want of clear demarcation between the politician and the civil
servant in the organization of the executive branch thus explains much of the
public relations of the federal government,” Pimlott wrote. Pimlott established a
simple code of conduct: The first objective should be to facilitate the dissemination
of information by the mass media, and the information services should directly
inform the public only when the mass media fail to do so adequately.
Consequences of the Role of the Public Information Officer
Throughout the entire Federal bureaucracy, the growth of a professional
public information staff has resulted in a subtle shift in the power to define and the
power to legitimize the privatization of conflict within the purview of good
governance. By conjuring up a wall between public administration and the political
process, the creation of the public information officer did more than legitimize the
power of the office-holder. This invention removed the process of administration
from general public discourse and spread accountability for the product of
administration (number of roads built, taxes collected, etc.) to the several users 12
and other interested parties. The creation of the public information service created a separate corporate culture of insiders who would create, administer, and/or influence the creation and administration of policy; this policy elite would adopt a unique relationship with the press. Power has been redistributed in this
relationship so that the press, elite policymakers and the public information officer sometimes see each other as adversaries and sometimes seek to engage each
other as allies.
Some conservative analysts, such as Spiro Agnew and Patrick Buchanan,
have said that the press and government relationship has become more corrosive
since the early days of the Cold War. They discount the positive effect that the
expansion (and contraction) of the public has had on leadership. They argue that
to view governance as anything other than an adversarial process is to create a
23 it both dangerous illusion . Others, notably Graber, Nimmo and Rivers, see as
24 symbiotic and adversarial at the same time . In this paper, we will offer up a
situation in which public disclosure was seen by liberals as an impediment to
social progress.
A Brief Review of Military Desegregation
Events that led to the desegregation of the military were complex. To better
understand the extent to which the press influenced these events, the reader may
need to become familiar with some important historical milestones. During World
War I, African Americans accepted civil rights leader W.E.B. DuBois’s dictum to
“close ranks " and delay their demands for equality and justice until after the war;
they were not as tractable when the Second World War broke out. Though the
Roosevelt administration half-heartedly tried to muzzle the Black press, some
vocal protests by Black leaders in the military and in the nascent civil rights community resulted in some small experiments with integration of troops toward the war’s conclusion. In the immediate postwar period, A. Philip Randolph, the
Congress of Racial Equality and other desegregationists tried to build on these reforms but were thwarted by a clique of influential officers and civilians in the defense establishment who upheld the racial status quo on the grounds that most white servicemen would violently resist integration and that the military should not lead social reform. These officers tried to reimpose rigid segregation policies through the use of enlistment quotas while they promised reform and improvement; ultimately, this constituted a retreat from gains made at the end of the war.
At virtually the same time that these regressive policies were being
imposed in the military, white Southern segregationists began a reign of terror
against returning Black veterans. Also, at this time, Democratic party strategists
began to recognize the importance of the African American electorate to their
coalition. In 1947, Truman appointed a President’s Committee on Civil Rights.
Their final report found military segregation “particularly repugnant”; immediate
action to end it was recommended.
This combination of events elevated civil rights to a major political issue in
the 1948 presidential election campaign. Truman focused on military segregation as
an important symbol of his independence in a special message to Congress on
Civil Rights in February 1 948. But still the services resisted and civil rights activist
A. Phillip Randolph threatened to lead civil disobedience resistance against the
new draft law unless segregation was ended. To strengthen his political support
from black voters, Truman issued Executive Order 9981 which established the
President’s Committee on Equality of T reatment and Opportunity in the Armed
Services. On the day of that announcement, Army Chief of Staff Omar Bradley
told a press conference, in effect, that the Army would never desegregate before 14
the rest of the nation did. In the wake of Bradley’s statement, Bradley’s staff and an Army Public Relations consultant tried to articulate a policy separate from that of the Commander in Chief; after their effort proved unworkable, this act of resistance was quickly abandoned.
The Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity first met in
publicity to January 1 949. President Truman exhorted the members to avoid and seek true compliance from the service secretaries. The committee was chaired by former solicitor general Charles H. Fahy and its active members included John
Sengstacke, Publisher of the Chicago Defender. The Executive Secretary, E.W.
(Ned) Kenworthy was also a journalist and his inside knowledge of the press
proved a critical factor in the Committee’s success. Within two months, Secretary
of Defense James Forrestal, a gradualist on racial matters, quit his post for health
reasons and was replaced by Louis Johnson. Johnson eventually was
overwhelmed by interservice rivalries over scandals and other matters and
weakened on the race issue as the Army bitterly resisted change.
During the next year, a series of acrimonious negotiations transpired
between the Committee and the Army, with the Army’s leadership intent upon
wearing down or outmaneuvering the committee and forcing the administration to
accept less than full integration. The committee countered with documented
arguments demonstrating that segregated military units inevitably wasted
resources and prevented equal opportunity. Finally, the Secretary of the Army
issued a new policy stipulating that blacks would be utilized according to their
skills. A cabal of top Army officers attempted to rescind the Secretary’s order but
their plan was exposed by Kenworthy who, in subtle defiance of Truman’s
appeal to avoid publicity, brought evidence of the rescission attempt tc the
Washington Post. This imbroglio and the Committee’s steadfast resolve brought the Army Secretary to the Committee’s side. After some final negotiations, Truman was able to persuade the Secretary of the Army to eliminate a 1 0 percent quota on black enlistments and to facilitate desegregation.
From even this brief description, it is clear that we believe that the press and publicity were important factors for the President’s Committee, the military and
President Truman. Keeping in mind the larger question of the role publicity plays in a policy-making process, we will investigate the core question: How, if at all, did the press inform the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and
Opportunity in the Armed Services? Chapter two will contrast how Truman used
his Presidential power to create committees to enlarge public support for
desegregation and to institute that change he required. Chapter three describes
how the same American military leaders who helped craft or obstruct military
desegregation often implemented their policy by empowering their officers to
control publicity. Chapter four describes how some civil rights leaders used the
expansion of the public through publicity to shape policy. Chapter five explains
why Truman felt compelled to institute press curbs to facilitate desegregation and
why the President’s Committee on Equality felt equally compelled to openly defy
Truman's press curbs as well and surreptitiously challenge the President's press
rejoins. In the concluding chapter, we will discuss the degree to which this incident
may help explain the role of the press in the governance of presidential
commissions. Through the example, we will also examine what may occur when
journalists become policy-makers and, specifically, how they may affect the
management of publicity and news coverage.
Notes 1 Douglass Cater (1959) The Fourth Branch of Government . Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, p. 10.
2 Dan Nimmo, (1964) News gathering In Washington. New York: Atherton, p. 7.
3 Cater pp. 12-13.
4 See for instance Charles O. Jones (1977) An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy. Nova Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press; Charles E. Lindblom, (1968) The Policy-Making Process. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, David Easton (1965) A Framework for Political Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
5 Robert M. Entman, (1989) Democracy without Citizens: Media and the Decay of
American Politics . New York: Oxford University Press.
6 Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld, (1955) Personal Influence: The Part Plaved bv People in the Flow of Mass Communication. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press of Glencoe.
7 V.O.Key, Jr. (1967) Public Opinion and American Democracy. New York: Knopf, p.537.
8 Bernard C. Hennessy (1975) Public Opinion . Nova Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press, p.221.
9 Hennessy, p.314.
As early as 1937, the idea was a matter of controversy . Cf. Floyd Allport, (1937) “Toward a Science of Public Opinion,” The Public Opinion Quarterly, pp. 7-23; Benjamin I. Page, Robert Y. Shapiro and Glenn Dempsey, (1990) “What
Moves Public Opinion,” in Media Power in Politics . Washington. D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly, p. 1 14 ; Elisabeth Noelle Neumann, (1980) “Mass Media and Social Change in Developed Societies,” in Mass Communication Review
Yearbook Vol. 1 ed. G. Cleveland Wilhoit and Harold de Bock Beverly Hills Sage : Daniel Hallin (1984) “The Media, The War in Viet Nam and Political Support: A
Critique of the Thesis of an Oppositional Media” Journal of Politics 46:2-24 ; Herbert McCloskey and John Zaller (1984)“The Public Ethos: American attitudes toward Capitalism and Democracy” Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press .
11 Doris Graber, 1990) Media Power in Politics Washington, D.C. : Congressional
Quarterly ,p. 287.
12 J. David Kennamer (1992) Public Opinion, the Press and Public Policy .
Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, p. 11. 13 Kernell, p.197-199.
1 4 Walter Lippmann, “Newspapers” from Public Opinion. New York: MacMillan Publishing Company 1950.
15 Richard Kirkendall, ed.(1974) The Truman Period As a Research Field: A Reappraisal. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press.
16 Although Heise was unable to quantify the extent to which material is censored because it would tarnish the reputation of the Pentagon and its members, he notes that maintaining the best interests of the Defense Department has long been a cultural value of the department.
Juergen Arthur Heise, (1979) Minimum Disclosure: How the Pentagon
Manipulates the News . New York: W. W. Norton.
17 Steven H. Chaffee and Michael Petrick, (1975) “The military and its public” in Using the Mass Media. New York: MacMillan & Company, p. 92.
^Chaffee and Petrick, (1975) p. 96.
19 Nimmo, p. 6.
70 Nimmo, p. 20.
21 George C. Edwards (1983) The Public Presidency: The Pursuit of Popular Support. New York: St. Martin's Press.
22 Nimmo, p. 10-11.
23 John B. Donovan (1975) “Mass Communications and the Adversary Establishment,” Intellect May- June 1975 Volume 11: p. 525.
24 Graber , p. 288; Nimmo, p.2 11; William Rivers, (1970) The Adversaries Boston: Beacon Press pp. 101-102. CHAPTER 2
CIVIL RIGHTS, MILITARY REFORM AND THE TRUMAN PRESIDENCY
Harry Truman's penchant for reform, be it civil rights reform or military reform, was engendered by very personal impulses. He was also motivated by traditional political needs. Before we examine how racial desegregation became identified with his campaign to reform the post-war defense establishment, we need to examine Truman’s personal perceptions of the racial issue and the role that the African American electorate played in Truman's early political career and in his campaign for re-election to the presidency in 1948.
After that, we will review how racial desegregation fit into Truman's broader vision of military democratization.
Those who knew Truman as a boy would certainly have been surprised that he would become the first twentieth century president to aggressively advocate civil rights. All four of his grandparents were Kentucky slave owners who brought their slaves with them when they migrated to Missouri. He grew up
detesting abolitionists and Reconstruction. Throughout his entire life, even after
he established his credentials as an advocate of civil rights, he casually used
the word “Nigger” to describe African Americans. 1
Before becoming President, Truman had few dealings with African
Americans, although he received support from black voters as a state judge and
U.S. Senator. Truman’s first notion of the need to desegregate the military may
have started during World War I when he gained first-hand knowledge of the
battle-worthiness of African American troops. He found that the integrated and
18 19
French-led 93rd Negro Division served with distinction, but the 92nd, led by
Americans and segregated, did not measure up in combat. Truman told reporter Lee Nichols that he studied the record after the war and concluded that non-segregation was the only way in which ability and training were the sole basis for selecting leaders. 2
When Truman ran for local office in 1924, the Kansas City Chapter for the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) refused to endorse him, because he had briefly been affiliated with the Ku Klux Klan
(KKK). 3 Nonetheless, Truman received strong support from African Americans who lived in Jackson County for his 1926 campaign for judge as a result of his
alliance with the Tom Pendergast machine. 4 He also received crucial support from the black electorate for his 1934 Senate campaign. 5 Yet, during his first
6 term in the Senate, Truman's civil rights record was meager.
Truman's chances for reelection in 1940 were diminished because he
lost the support of Pendergast and Franklin Roosevelt (who refused to endorse
him because he privately preferred Governor Lloyd Stark for the seat). 7 In the
1940 campaign, Truman made moderately progressive speeches when he told
voters and members of the National Colored Democratic Club that while he was
not appealing for social equality, Negroes could not be denied their inalienable
constitutional rights. He closed that speech by noting that African Americans
had served their nation in the Spanish-American War at Guasimas, El Caney
and San Juan Hill. Speaking of the (first) World War, Truman noted that
General John J. Pershing had said, “I cannot commend too highly the spirit
shown among the colored combat troops who exhibit fine capacity for the most
dangerous work.” For this effort, Truman received strong organized support
among blacks in St. Louis and Kansas City and the local black newspaper, the 20
Kansas City Call. 8 Though many of the state’s leading newspapers opposed him, Truman won the three-way primary race on the basis of that support. 9
In terms of civil rights, Truman’s second Senate term was a bit more distinguished. He gave unqualified support to the Roosevelt Administration’s
Fair Employment Practices Commission; he recommended a combat command for General Benjamin Davis; he supported filibuster cloture on the poll tax. Most important, he supported a resolution that would have provided for an investigation of segregation in the armed services. Yet, he also opposed an anti-poll tax amendment to the soldier’s vote bill for national elections. This bill effectively enfranchised thousands of African American soldiers who were
10 denied the vote in their home state.
Perhaps the most noteworthy achievement of Truman’s second term in the Senate was his chairmanship of the Special Senate Committee to
Investigate the National Defense Program. While not directly related to civil rights, per se, this committee brought Truman national prestige. Because of his good stewardship of this committee, Franklin Roosevelt decided to nominate
Truman as his vice-president in 1944. The threat of American involvement in war was an important issue in Truman’s 1940 reelection campaign. After winning back his Senate seat, Truman responded to numerous rumors of military waste by conducting his own investigation of many defense plants, military camps and related military projects. He traveled more than thirty- thousand miles, in his own car, from Maryland to Florida, across the Gulf Coast to Texas, northward to Oklahoma and Nebraska to Wisconsin and Michigan and then back to Washington.
In February 1941, he addressed the Senate denouncing methods for awarding defense contracts, condemning the concentration of these awards among a few large manufacturers and citing several abuses by corporations, 21
especially cost-plus contracts. Truman proposed that a five-member committee investigate the national defense program. 11
Franklin Roosevelt, upon the counsel of Senator James F. Byrnes (D-
South Carolina), decided to support the committee with Truman as its chairman.
After some infighting, Truman was named to head a bipartisan, seven-member
Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program. Truman
showed surprising independence and political skill in the committee. During its four years of existence, Truman’s Committee saved the nation $1 5-billion while
spending about $400,000 for expenses. 12
Not only did this ad hoc committee provide Truman with national
prominence, but it would later provide a strong rationale for his military
modernization program. As will be seen, Truman’s desegregation committee
also based its ultimate argument for racial desegregation of the military upon
efficiency and not the justness of the cause. 13
During the Special Defense Investigation, a minor flap erupted involving
racial discrimination in defense industries. NAACP president Walter White
accused Truman of calling for premature hearings before the civil rights groups
could share their evidence. In seeming deference to the complaint, but really to
avoid the issue, Truman agreed to table the issue. In effect, they agreed to hear
the issue but refused to act. 14
When Roosevelt nominated Truman as his vice-president, the
Missourian’s Senate record disturbed liberals and the African American
community. In part, they denounced the removal of Henry Wallace from the
post. Traditionally black newspapers were especially disapproving.
The Norfolk Journal and Guide wrote, “Senator Truman ij a conservative
Democrat, who, it appears, was given the nomination for Vice Presidency for
reasons of political expediency.” The Pittsburgh Courier said that “Truman is a 22 long way from being a Henry Wallace whose nomination was an ‘appeasement of the South’ which must rank in cowardice and shortsightedness with the ineptitude shown by Chamberlin at Munich .” 15
To reassure the African American community, Truman consented to an interview with the largest circulation black daily. Interestingly, his thoughts revolved around the issue of military desegregation:
I have always been for equality of opportunity in work,
working conditions and political rights. I think the Negro in the armed forces ought to have the same treatment and opportunities as
every other member of the armed forces. I think this should be true
of Negro women in the armed forces ... I have a record for fair play 16 toward my Negro fellow citizens that will stand examination.
Although the nomination of Truman cost the Democratic ticket the endorsement of W. E. B. DuBois, Dr. Channing Tobias, William Hastie and
Charles Johnson, the vote from the black community in eight non-southern
17 states helped guarantee their victory .
Civil Rights and the Truman Presidency
When Truman became President less than a year later, he found black reporters were prominent among his press entourage. At his first Presidential press conference, the Washington bureau chief of the Chicago Defender, Harry
McAlpin asked 18 ,
Mr. President, probably as much as any group, the passing of President Roosevelt is very keenly felt by the Negroes in America, as they looked upon him as sort of a symbol of justice and equal
opportunity. I wonder if you would comment on the things that they were so specifically interested in and felt they knew where the President stood: on the fair employment practice, the right to vote without being hampered by poll taxes, and all that? .
23
Truman replied, “I will give you some advice. All you need to do is read the Senate record of one Harry S. Truman.”19
The black press and black people in general afforded Truman some allowance during his first year in office, much as the Caucasian community did.
Truman’s first year as President was, nonetheless, an unfulfilled one regarding civil rights. Although he had made some efforts for continuing the Fair
20 Employment Practices Commission, little else occurred.
The most crucial turning point in Truman’s racial policies occurred in
1946 when Southern whites attacked black veterans. Similar incidents occurred in 1940 when African Americans from the North were bivouacked in
Southern Army camps. Yet, where Roosevelt equivocated, Truman acted. 21
The most dramatic incident occurred on 13 February 1946, when a newly discharged black veteran, Isaac Woodward, was removed from a bus and blinded by the chief of police of Batesburg, South Carolina. Significantly,
Woodward was still wearing his uniform. The police chief escaped federal prosecution in a Columbia, South Carolina, federal court on grounds of self- defense. Barely a week later, in Columbia, Tennessee, the Ku Klux Klan, the local police and the National Guard conducted a reign of terror against that town’s black community. On 25 July 1946, a Klan-inspired Caucasian mob shot two black couples to death. These presumed killers were also later acquitted of the charge. 22
When he learned how much hate literature, minor acts of mob violence and other turmoil was occurring throughout the nation, Truman exclaimed, “My
God! I had no idea that it was as terrible as that! We have to do something . .
Everybody seems to believe that the President by himself can do anything he wishes on such matters as this, but the President is helpless unless he is backed by public opinion.”23 Truman reacted by ordering the President’s 24
Committee on Civil Rights to preserve and implement new civil rights
legislation. A more extensive analysis of this committee appears later in this
chapter. 24
Truman’s Civil Rights Speeches
Along with the Committee on Civil Rights, Truman won the respect of
much of the African American community for some of the most impassioned civil
rights speeches ever made by a United States President. Truman’s economic
message to Congress, in which he called for enactment of FEPC legislation,
stirred concern among Southern Democrats. Calling discrimination “repugnant
to the principles of our democracy,” Truman asked for an end to inequities in
25 employment and wages .
Six months later, Truman was the first President to address the NAACP.
He made the speech following his Truman Doctrine, in which he made the case
for broader American involvement in international affairs. Truman’s advisors
recommended that he devote less than a minute to the civil rights issue.
Instead, he eloquently committed the federal government to the cause.
Speaking in front of the Lincoln Memorial with Eleanor Roosevelt, Senator
Wayne Morse and Walter White at his side, Truman said,
We must keep moving forward with new concepts of civil rights to safeguard our heritage. The extension of civil rights today means, not protection of the people against the government, but protection of the people by the government. We must make the Federal Government a friendly, vigilant defender of the rights and
equalities of all Americans . . . There is much that state and local governments can do in providing positive safeguards for civil rights. But we cannot, any longer await the growth of a will to action in the slowest state or the most backward community. Our national government must show the way. This is a difficult and complex undertaking. Federal laws and administrative machinery must be improved and expanded. Our immediate task is to remove the last remnants of the barriers which stands between millions of our citizens and their .
25
birthright ... We cannot wait another decade or another generation to remedy these evils. We must work as never before to cure them now. The aftermath of the war and the desire to keep faith with our Nation’s historic principles makes the need of a
pressing one . . Every man should be free to live his life as he wishes. He should be limited only by his responsibility to his fellow
countrymen. If this freedom is to be more than a dream, each man must be guaranteed equality of opportunity. The only limit to an American’s achievement should be his ability, his industry and his character. 26
The reaction to this speech in the black community was electrifying.
While the Baltimore Afro-American wanted good words backed up by good deeds, Truman received strong support from the Kansas City Call which declared Truman had “left behind him Missouri’s tradition of second-class citizenship for Negroes.” The Pittsburgh Courier, traditionally reticent to support a Democrat, wrote that Truman, “where colored Americans are concerned, is
looming, on the record, to greater stature than his predecessor.” The speech naturally also won strong support from Walter White and the NAACP. They called the speech, “the most comprehensive and forthright statement on the
rights of minorities of a democracy . . . ever made by a President of the United
States.”27
Civil Rights and the 1948 Presidential Campaign
The Republicans capitalized on mounting inflation and labor unrest to
become the majority in the 1946 congressional election. To prevent a defeat in
1948 and to revitalize the Democratic party, a group of liberals devised a coherent political program appealing to labor and the urban minorities. 28 In mid-November 1947, Clark Clifford, the group’s White House liaison, delivered to Truman a forty-page memorandum dealing expressly with the issues and personalities of the 1948 campaign. They predicted: (1) Governor Thomas 26
Dewey of New York would probably be the Republican presidential candidate;
(2) Henry Wallace would run as a third-party candidate and would draw five to
ten percent of the vote in a few "key states which could throw the election to the
Republicans"; and (3) the South, as always, could be "considered safely
Democratic." They urged Truman to “go as far as he feels he possibly could in
recommending measures to protect the rights of minority groups,” adding that
even if we had “difficulty with our Southern friends, that is the lesser of two
evils.” The Clifford memorandum predicted that a liberal domestic program
could revitalize the Roosevelt political coalition while minimizing the defection
of voters to Henry Wallace on a third-party ticket. They warned Truman that he
should make farmers their first priority, that labor and African Americans would
be especially vulnerable to Wallace’s appeals, and that the New York vote
depended upon Jewish voters concerned with Palestine. 29 On this basis,
Truman decided to submit a presidential message on civil rights to Congress
after the State of the Union address he delivered on 7 January 1948. 30
While Clark Clifford wrote the President’s speech, other White House
staff members and Justice Department officials fashioned an omnibus civil
rights bill to complement the presidential message. 31 Even before the
administration sent its civil rights message and legislative recommendations to
Congress, Henry Wallace published his own seventy-four-point program,
including demands for anti-poll tax, anti-lynching, and FEPC legislation 32
Two days later, Mississippi Governor Fielding J. Wright announced his
opposition to federal action “aimed to wreck” the South and its institutions.
“Vital principles and eternal truths transcend party lines,” Wright said, “and the day is now at hand when determined action must be taken." The Mississippi state legislature passed a resolution supporting Wright’s threat to bolt the
Democratic Party if the White House pressed for civil rights legislation. 33 27
Aware of Wallace's potential strength among black voters and dismissive of Governor Wright's rhetoric, President Truman sent a powerful, but dispassionate message to Congress on 2 February 1948. He warned that if the states and local governments would not rectify civil inequities, "the federal government has a clear duty to see that constitutional guarantees of individual liberties and of equal protection under the law are not denied or abridged anywhere in America." The President sought a comprehensive restatement of the federal non-discrimination policy, together with appropriate measures to insure compliance, and he instructed the secretary of defense to have "the remaining instances of discrimination in the armed services eliminated as rapidly as possible." In concluding his message, Truman reiterated the idea that these measures strengthened American moral authority against communism. 34
Truman’s civil rights message immediately became a source of major political controversy. Most liberals or moderates were pleased with his stand.
The black press also responded positively. A White House administrative assistant, indicated as much in a 16 February memo he sent to the President:
Strong favorable language was the rule in the editorials. The President was described as the new champion of human freedom. The program as a whole was hailed as the strongest civil rights program ever put forth by any President. The message was referred to as the greatest freedom document since the Emancipation Proclamation. The language of the message was described as Lincolnesque. 35
White Southerners, on the other hand, disapproved of the message.
Among them, Virginius Dabney, editor of the Richmond Times-Dispatch, who, though opposed to lynching, called Truman “unfit to be nominated and re- elected to the Presidency." To avoid a firestorm among Southerners in 28
Congress, Senate minority leader Alben Barkley of Kentucky shelved the bill by
refusing to sponsor it when it came down from the White House.
While the President withstood the anger of Southern Democrats,
Congressional Republicans — fearing that Truman had outflanked them —
moved their own civil rights legislation through House and Senate committees.
Republicans on the House Judiciary Subcommittee pressed for anti-lynching
legislation. In the Senate, the Labor Committee brought an FEPC bill to the
Senate Floor, even though the committee chair, Robert Taft, voted with
Southerners to block passage. However, most Dixiecrat resistance occurred on
the local and state level. 36
In this charged climate, nine Southern governors met on the weekend of
6-8 February in Wakulla Springs, Florida. Ostensibly, they met to unify their
reaction to a Supreme Court decision which ordered the University of
Oklahoma Law School to provide separate but equal educational facilities for “a
37 Negro girl” who had applied for admission. To comply with the law, the
governors would be forced either to open new public educational facilities to
blacks or to integrate the existing ones.
Fielding Wright wanted to use the occasion to officially recommend a bolt
from the Democratic Party. Although the Democratic Governors resisted this
action, they unanimously warned Truman to cease his attacks on white
38 supremacy or face full-fledged revolt in the South.
Meanwhile, Wallace's campaign began to take on serious dimensions
when a Progressive Party candidate beat a Democrat for Congress in New York
and Wallace’s popularity improved in Michigan, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and
California. Wallace discussed civil rights at a black rally in Har,em. After noting
that the President's 2 February message had generally ignored the issue of
segregation in American life, Wallace said, 29
Southern Governors and Senators have no more reason
to fear action on Mr. Truman's . . . message than we have
to expect it. They are angry that the President has paid lip 39 service to the fundamental democratic principles.
To fend off Wallace, Truman began his 1948 election drive at the traditional Jefferson-Jackson Day banquet in February. For the first time since
before the 1946 election, Truman invoked the magical name of Franklin
Roosevelt, intimating, of course, that his administration was the true heir of the
New Deal tradition. He further declared that the Democratic party was the party
of "progressive liberalism," the Republican, the party of "reactionary
conservatism." 40 Having attracted the liberal vote, Truman next began to mollify
Southern Democrats by quietly shelving his omnibus civil rights bill. Also,
Democratic Party Chairman Senator J. Howard McGrath met with an ad hoc
committee from the Southern Governors' Conference. 41
On 5 February 1948, A. Philip Randolph of the Committee against Jim
Crow asked the administration to publicly repudiate any legislation
perpetuating military segregation. A Democratic National Committee
representative promised Randolph that "careful consideration" would be given
his request. On 22 March 1948, Randolph and other concerned citizens met
with Truman and requested his support for anti-segregation amendments to the
proposed draft bill. During this meeting, Randolph informed Truman that his
(Randolph's) recent travels around the country convinced him that "Negroes
are in no mood to shoulder guns for democracy abroad, while they are denied
democracy here at home;” he then announced that unless the government took
decisive action to change the current racial policies of the armed forces, a civil
disobedience campaign would be launched. Truman made it clear that he was
not happy with those remarks. The conference ended with nothing settled. 42 30
For three weeks in March, the Senate Armed Services Committee held extensive hearings on UMT and selective service. The 1948 Senate Hearings on Universal Military Training provided a particularly opportune moment for advocates of racial desegregation of the military. As will be discussed in later chapters, a short-lived, but powerful political constituency was born during these hearings when A. Philip Randolph and Grant Reynolds declared that they would counsel young African Americans to avoid a segregated draft into a segregated military. 43
On 17 March 1948, the president warned a joint session of Congress of the threat to world peace caused by Soviet expansionism. Truman
recommended to Congress three measures needed to improve the nation's strength and to maintain the free, democratic character of the nations of Europe: passage of the program for economic assistance for Europe, enactment of
universal training legislation, and temporary reenactment of selective service
legislation. (The Joint Chiefs of Staff had just advised him that voluntary enlistment had failed and that restoration of the draft was essential. The administration's draft of a bill that would have provided both renewal of
selective service (Title I) and establishment of UMT (Title II) was submitted to the
House by Secretary Forrestal early in April. After much struggle, Congress passed the Selective Service Act in June, providing for its termination in two years. However, the universal training proposal failed again. 44
The call for racial reform of the armed forces was soon repeated by twenty
Negro organizations which had gathered in New York on 27 March 1948, at the
request of the NAACP. They released a public statement pointing out that
Negro votes could play a "balance of power" role in at least seventeen states in a presidential election, and that their support required the elimination of segregation and discrimination from the armed forces. 45 31
Anti-Truman elements among the Southern Democrats began planning for a bold walkout at the Democratic Convention. The chairmen of the
Mississippi and Arkansas state Democratic committees arranged a states' rights conference in Jackson, Mississippi, on 10 May. Before the conference opened,
Alabama primary election voters decided that the state electors would be pledged to vote against Truman or any other so-called civil rights candidate.
Half of the elected Alabama delegation to the Democratic National Convention
civil rights plank. was committed to a bolt if the national convention adopted a
Despite these results, "the administration," according to Arthur Krock, "was not worried about the Southern uprising." 46
The Jackson, Mississippi, conference showed that the rebellion had its deepest roots in Mississippi and South Carolina. Plans were made for a states' rights nominating convention to meet if the Democratic National Convention
47 adopted Truman's civil rights program.
Throughout the spring of 1948, Truman refused to publicly discuss the
bolt issue; at a press conference on 13 May, he denied that the administration was preparing an executive order to end the practice of discrimination in the federal executive branch. 48 By taking this position Truman hoped to placate as
much of the South as possible before the start of the Democratic National
Convention. Arthur Krock, writing in the New York Times of 8 June, confirmed
that the Truman administration "was feverishly working to prevent a walkout by
some Southern delegations." 49
What the administration offered Southerners was a 1948 civil rights plank
comparable to the one included in the party's 1944 platform. The 1944 plank,
which Walter White four years earlier had called a splinter, was a rather
innocent statement: 32
We believe racial and religious minorities have the right to live, develop and vote equally with all citizens and share the rights that are guaranteed by our Constitution. Congress should exert its full constitutional powers to protect those rights. 50
The administration did not know if this tactic would satisfy die-hard Dixiecrats and still prove acceptable to party liberals. While Truman tried to unify the
Democratic Party behind his candidacy, the Republican Party convened in
Philadelphia and nominated New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey for
President. Dewey's civil rights record exceeded that of his Republican rivals for the Presidency. In 1945, Dewey helped create a State Commission against
Discrimination (a state FEPC law); throughout his years as governor, Dewy
51 appointed Negroes to state positions that they had never before held.
Dewey’s 1948 Republican Party’s platform called lynching or any other form of mob violence “a disgrace to any civilized state," and endorsed
legislation to end it. They also opposed racial segregation in the armed forces of the United States. They favored enactment and enforcement of federal legislation to maintain equal rights at all times in every part of this Republic.
They also endorsed the abolition of the poll tax as a requisite to voting. 52
Although this plank was not as inclusive or as far-reaching as Truman’s 2
February message, it placed the Republican Party on record in opposition to segregation in the armed forces.
However, the plank put Dewey in a quandary. To compete for a share of the Negro vote, he had to publicize his commitment to the civil rights plank and to discuss his New York State achievements. But such publicity would draw attention on the failure of the Republican Eightieth Congress to pass any civil rights legislation. 53 33
After the Republicans left Philadelphia, the Democrats prepared to hold their convention there. In the weeks before the opening of that convention,
Truman continued to pacify the Southerners. On 22 June, he met with
Congressman John Rankin of Mississippi and may have offered to write the
1944 civil rights plank into the 1948 platform. Following the publication of
Rankin's comments, Henry Wallace, speaking in Washington, charged the president with hypocrisy on the civil rights issue:
If we ever had any hesitancy before, Mr. Rankin has dispelled our doubts. We can now say of President Truman's civil rights message that the views in the message are not necessarily those of the sponsor. We can go further. We can say positively that they are not the views of Mr. Truman. 54
Nevertheless, the NAACP, holding its annual convention in St. Louis,
Missouri, during the last week of June, refused to condemn the President.
Truman was praised for his civil rights stand, while Wallace was attacked, particularly by Walter White, for his failure to fight discrimination or segregation during the years he had served as vice-president and secretary of agriculture
55 and commerce. It was evident that the NAACP leadership preferred Truman to Dewey or Wallace. 56
Before Truman was able to capitalize on the NAACP support another revolt erupted. This time, Democrats of various political persuasions were organizing a "Draft Eisenhower" movement. But their hopes of capturing the convention with Dwight Eisenhower were dashed on 10 July 1948, when the
57 General declared that he would not "accept even if nominated."
By 7 July, when the Democratic National Convention drafting committee met in Philadelphia to write the party platform, a fight on civil rights seemed imminent. Many historians would point to this fight as the progenitor of the 34
modern American civil rights movement. Before they began work, the drafters heard from a diverse group of organization representatives including the
NAACP and Americans for Democratic Action. 58 At Truman’s instruction, Clark
Clifford brought to Philadelphia a virtual rewrite of the 1944 plank, containing none of the specific recommendations demanded by these liberal groups. The
moderate plank still failed to placate the most intransigent Southerners, who
wanted not only the restoration of the two-thirds rule but a resolution in favor of
"states' rights" as well. Liberals were offended by the plank's equivocal
language; they wanted specific civil rights propositions, not bland generalities.
59 A floor fight loomed.
On 14 July, Congressman Andrew J. Biemiller of Wisconsin, speaking for
Hubert Humphrey, 60 Esther Murray, and himself, submitted a liberal civil rights
plank to the convention for consideration. Humphrey eloquently defended this
substitute plank. 61
After floor votes on a series of resolutions, it was time for the civil rights
resolution plank. As Sam Rayburn, the permanent chairman of the 1948
Democratic National Convention, was about to put it to a voice vote, an alert
California delegate requested a roll call vote. The roll call forced big city bosses
in New York, Illinois, and Pennsylvania to endorse the plank for fear that their
62 local and state tickets would be defeated without the black vote. Thus,
Truman's compromise failed. Immediately after the final civil rights vote was
taken, half the Alabama delegation and the entire Mississippi delegation
walked out of the convention. Most Southerners refused to bolt, but they
overwhelmingly chose Senator Richard Russell of Georgia over Truman as the
63 party's candidate to protest the civil rights vote.
Conventional wisdom expected a Truman defeat in November. Few
delegates anticipated the President's acceptance speech. But Truman quickly 35
dispelled the convention's gloom with a barn-burning speech, attacking the
record of the "do-nothing" Eightieth Congress. He demanded a special session of Congress that would enact into legislation the lofty resolutions of the
64 Republican Party platform. Of civil rights, the President commented:
Everybody knows that I recommended to the Congress the civil
rights program. I did so because I believe it to be my duty under the Constitution. Some members of my own party disagreed with
me violently on this matter, but they stand up and do it openly. People can tell where they stand. But the Republicans all professed to be for those measures, but the Eightieth Congress
did not act. They had enough men to do it and they could have had cloture. They didn't have to have a filibuster. There are enough people in that Congress that would vote for cloture.
Truman neglected to mention that he had not offered to cooperate with them in
any attempt to secure cloture. While Truman lambasted the Republicans, he
himself was under attack by former Democrats.
On 17 July, a states' rights conference in Birmingham, Alabama, selected
South Carolina's Governor Strom Thurmond and Governor Fielding Wright of
Mississippi to head a third party ticket. 65 The conferees hoped this ticket would
attract enough political support to force the House of Representatives to pick the
next president. 66 To throw the election into the House, where the South could then bargain with the various candidates on the civil rights issue, the Dixiecrats
needed strong backing not only in the deep South but in border states where
white supremacy was no longer quite as fashionable. Hence, Thurmond, in the
course of the conference, attacked lynching and advocated state abolition of the
poll tax in an attempt to persuade Southern moderates that his political
organization was in reality defending the noble heritage of Jeffersonian
Democracy. 67 Yet, lurking behind the scenes where they were exerting real
influence, were true segregationists like Senator James Eastland of Mississippi 36 and former Alabama governor Frank Dixon, whose presence revealed the party's true character. 68
The fourth political convention of 1948 began as the third was ending.
On 20 July, the Progressive Party also held its convention in Philadelphia; it was the only one in which blacks played a prominent role. Lankin Marshall
Howard, a black attorney from Des Moines, was the convention's keynote speaker. Approximately 150 other African Americans, including W. E. B. DuBois and Paul Robeson attended the convention as delegates or alternates.
(Robeson was later designated co-chairman of the party.) Black delegates were among those who approved the party platform, which "was more detailed in proposals affecting Negroes than were those of the major Parties, reflecting the Progressives' efforts to capitalize on Negro discontent." Evidently, the
Progressive Party's militant espousal of civil rights partly reflected the quasi-
Communist control of the party machinery. By working through the Progressive
Party, American Communists hoped to incorporate Negroes into a coalition of
"labor and the people against war and fascism." 69
Henry Wallace and Idaho's Senator Glenn Taylor, the Progressive Party nominees, had been longtime critics of segregation. For this reason, many
African Americans trusted them. But this was beginning to change.
Truman Issues Executive Order 9981
The day before Congress reconvened in special session, on 26 July,
70 Truman issued two civil rights-related executive orders. Executive Order 9980 created a review board in each department and agency of the federal executive
branch to whom government employees could appeal if they felt victimized by discriminatory employment practices. Executive Order 9981 provided for 37
equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin.
The orders were timed perfectly to focus attention on Congress and to undercut Wallace’s standing with many African Americans. Executive Order
9981 was also designed to avoid an immediate confrontation between the administration and A. Philip Randolph. 71
Professor Milton Konvitz characterized Executive Order 9981 “among the
72 most important steps taken to end racial discrimination." Yet, many found its language vague:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the President that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin. This policy shall be put into effect as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to effectuate any necessary changes without impairing efficiency or morale. 73
The order did not clearly outlaw segregation. Instead, it authorized creation of a President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces to study and resolve the problem of discrimination and segregation in the armed forces. Besides being criticized for vagueness,
Truman's action prompted criticism from other sources for a variety of reasons.
The Baltimore Sun suggested that "the timing of President Truman's executive orders against racial discrimination in civilian government employment and in the armed forces strongly suggests that they were politically inspired." The
Montgomery Advertiser stated that "Truman's army program is of more raw and repugnant character than that urged for the civilian provinces." The Shreveport
Times accused the President of "grandstanding to try to get back some of the
Roosevelt Negro vote which seems to be swinging to the Wallace-Communist
74 Progressive banner in some areas." 38
Henry Wallace generally criticized Truman's efforts to fight discrimination in the military, “The President's order on equality of treatment in the armed forces says nothing, promises nothing, does nothing — and leaves segregation intact.” 75
Senator Richard Russell, a powerful member of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, charged that Truman's executive orders were "articles of unconditional surrender to the Wallace convention, and to the treasonable civil disobedience campaign organized by the Negroes, by A. Philip Randolph and
Grant Reynolds." Russell further asserted that Truman was unwilling to prosecute those men who were defying the Selective Service Act because
"such action would alienate the few Negroes who remain loyal to him in the present political campaign." 76
On the same day that Truman delivered the Executive Orders at Fort
Knox, Kentucky, Army Chief of Staff Omar Bradley declared that "the Army is not out to make any social reforms. The Army will put men of different races in
different companies. It will change that policy when the Nation as a whole
77 changes it." Bradley’s statement forced the President to clarify the language of his executive order; at a 29 July press conference, Truman admitted that the order eventually would require the armed forces to abolish segregation. 78
When A. Philip Randolph and Grant Reynolds complained that Truman’s statements were vague and confusing, Democratic Party Chairman McGrath was charged to explain to them that the seven-man presidential committee would "initiate its activities and functions on the basis of non segregation." 79
They were apparently satisfied that Truman sincerely wanted a desegregated military. On 18 August, Randolph and Reynolds terminated their civil disobedience campaign. 80 39
The Republican leadership responded to Truman's speech by bringing to the floor of the Senate an anti-poll tax bill, which had cleared the House. This
bill immediately ran into a Southern filibuster, and it forced debate on the cloture rule that authorized procedural limitations on debate. 81
Congressional inactivity gave Truman a ready-made issue: the lackluster domestic record of the Eightieth Congress. Truman reiterated that theme while he solicited support from the New Deal coalition of labor, farmers, consumers, and African Americans. 82 By early September, Truman was solidifying his support among black voters. The Southern walkout at the
Democratic National Convention had distinguished him from the Dixiecrats; the imbroglio convinced many African Americans that Truman’s advocacy of civil rights legislation was sincere. Executive Order 9981 enhanced this support in the African American community.
White House aide Donald Dawson wrote the President on 9 September:
1) Since your executive order was issued all important opposition to the draft on the basis of the Army's race policy has disappeared. Philip Randolph and Grant Reynolds have withdrawn from their Committee Against Jim Crow, and only a few C.O.'s and other war resisters remain in the movement. 2) Negro leaders and their white friends have been universal in the praise of the order and in their support of the proposed committee. 3) The Committee will have complete minority press support. The Negro press, which had been conducting a vigorous campaign 83 against the Army's racial policy has now abandoned it.
To enhance his position with blacks, the President on 18 September named the seven men who were to become members of the President's
Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services.
This committee, subsequently known as the Fahy Committee, would begin its work in January 1949, assuming that Truman was still in the White House. 84 40
While Truman benefited from the release of his executive orders, Henry
Wallace toured the South and spoke before racially integrated audiences, wherever possible, to convince blacks of the sincerity of his egalitarian
85 convictions. It was a courageous effort which Truman did not match.
Instead, Truman ignored the civil rights issue during his late September campaign swing through Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, and Missouri at the behest of Democratic leaders in these states. They felt that civil rights was "too hot"; such talk would only drive Southern Democrats into the "states' rights party," and endanger their own local candidates’ election. Finally, on 30 September, in
Carbondale, Illinois, Truman briefly mentioned that his administration had
86 fought "to expand our civil liberties by new measures against discrimination."
By doing well in the South, Truman made up for the advances Wallace was making in the North. The Dixiecrat rebellion gained favor in only four
Southern states: South Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana.
Elsewhere in the South, Truman had no real opposition. Even Senator Richard
Russell of Georgia, Dixie's candidate at the Philadelphia convention, endorsed the Democratic standard-bearer a few days before the election because he felt the South was safe with Truman. 87
The Democratic state committee chairman of North Carolina complained:
What can we accomplish? . . . The Republicans are committed to a more determined civil rights program than our party is and Governor Dewey has already put into effect in the New York government many of the proposals to which we in the South most vigorously object. 88
During the last few weeks of the campaign, Truman focused on the key
industrial states in the North and East. On that final swing, Truman toured the slums of Philadelphia, spoke on behalf of civil rights in Chicago, in South Bend,
Indiana, and Cleveland. In one key speech, Truman reminded his audience 41
that the Republican Party, which had been paying lip service to this kind of
89 legislation for years, never acted upon it.
Truman climaxed his drive to win the vote of African Americans with a speech in Harlem on 29 October (though he decided to speak there at the last minute). He was warmly welcomed by some 65,000 people who heard his remarks and saw him receive the first Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorial
Brotherhood Medal from the Reverend Dr. C. A. Johnson. Truman told the crowd of the significance of To Secure These Rights on the first anniversary of the day he had been presented with the report of his civil rights committee. After praising the work and committee recommendations, Truman outlined his administration's civil rights record:
After the Civil Rights Committee submitted its report, I asked Congress to do ten of the things recommended by
the committee. You know what they did about that. So I went ahead and did what the President can do unaided by
Congress. I issued two executive orders. One of them established the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services. The other covered regulations governing fair employment practices within the federal establishment. In addition to that, the Department of Justice went into the Supreme Court and aided in getting a decision outlawing restrictive covenants. Several states and municipalities have taken action on the recommendations
of the Civil Rights Committee, and I hope more will follow after them. 90
Ironically, Truman failed to receive editorial endorsement from any major black newspaper except the Chicago Defender; the rest supported Dewey. For example, the Pittsburgh Courier, the most widely circulated Negro newspaper, declared on 30 October: “Put Governor Thomas E. Dewey in the White House where he can do for all Negroes of the nation what he has done for the Negroes of New York state." 91 42
The results of that election staggered millions of Americans, including most Republicans, many Democrats, and practically all political pollsters.
Truman achieved a certain political immortality because of his spectacular victory, which on the basis of hindsight was not quite so remarkable. 92 Although
Truman had been harassed on both flanks by political defectors and challenged in the center by the leader of a formidable political organization, he successfully routed his enemies by holding on to Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal coalition, which was still a potent political force in 1948. Widespread prosperity also contributed to Truman's 1948 success. Many voters felt that a depression would follow a Dewey victory. 93 As Clark Clifford, architect of the 1948
campaign, put it:
We had to be bold. If we had kept on plugging away in moderate terms, we might have reached mid-field when the gun went off, so we had to throw long passes, anything to stir up labor, and to get the mass votes of the great cities of the Middle West, New England and the East. 94
Many black Americans saw Truman as a spokesman for both their political and economic interests; almost two-thirds of the African Americans who voted in 1948 cast their ballots for him. According to a post-election survey conducted by the NAACP, sixty-nine percent of all Negro voters in twenty-seven major cities and communities voted for Truman. In some of these Negro districts, Truman received more votes than Franklin Roosevelt had ever polled.
Had Dewey or Wallace won a larger share of black voters in any two of the three key states of California, Illinois, and Ohio, Dewey would have won the
White House. 95
Dewey generally ignored black voters, a policy decision which did not help him on election day. In short, while Truman made capital of his civil rights promises, Dewey kept silent about his civil rights accomplishments. Dewey 43
further damaged his standing with most African Americans by actively soliciting
Southern votes. The latter maneuver was especially self-defeating because
few Southern Democrats voted for him, and most northern Negroes, offended
by his ostensible disregard of their interests especially economic — sided with
Truman. On the other hand, it seems clear that Dewey carried Delaware,
Indiana, and Maryland with the help of Negro voters. But in no state did Dewey
and the Republican Party receive a majority of the black vote in the 1948
election. 96
Henry Wallace’s apparent surge of the spring and the early summer
faded completely by 2 November 1948. The existence of widespread
prosperity, the total lack of support in the farm belt, the inability to rebut the
"Communist front" charge, the partial preemption of the Progressive Party's
domestic program by Truman, the Stalinist coup d'etat in Prague — all these
97 factors help to account for the rapid decline in Wallace's fortunes.
Wallace contributed to Truman's ultimate success by forcing Truman and
his advisers to devise a strategy to undercut the independent’s appeal with
liberal and other vital voting blocs. Not the least among them was the African
American bloc.
The Dixiecrats had been convinced of the sincerity of Truman's
commitment, so much so that they organized a political party for the purpose of
depriving him of the electoral votes he needed to win, thus allowing the House
of Representatives to decide the outcome. Their hopes were frustrated by the
fact that they carried only four Southern states: South Carolina, Alabama,
Mississippi and Louisiana. The relatively poor showing of the Thurmond-Wright
ticket (which received just 12,000 more votes than the Wallace-Taylor
combination) can be attributed to several factors: (I) a reasonably good
Democratic Party discipline that reinforced the ingrained voting habits of a 44
substantial number of Southerners; (2) fear on the part of Southern Democrats
that if Truman won, he would punish the bolters in and out of Congress by denying them their party position and patronage privileges; (3) distrust of
Dixiecrat motives; that is, a suspicion that the States' Rights Party was really a vehicle for economic conservatism, which (at least in 1948), many Southern whites, the beneficiaries of the New Deal, rejected; (4) a growing Southern liberalism as evidenced in newspapers, magazines, and the lessening of hard- core racism, especially in the border states and the upper South, where blacks
98 were beginning to vote in increasing numbers.
The results of the 1948 election demonstrated that the politics of civil rights had become institutionalized on the national level. Blacks had at last
crossed the threshold of influence, making it possible for them to win a place at the table. Thus, black political strength in states with the largest electoral votes was now sufficient to determine the outcome of a close national election. As
Henry Moon, voting analyst for the NAACP, suggested even before the 1948 election, blacks, because of their strategic position, were in a position to become a "balance of power" force in national politics. 99 Ideally, African
Americans might maximize their political leverage by alternating between the parties. In 1948, however, many blacks remained loyal to the Democratic Party after having been won over by Roosevelt.
After the election, civil rights remained a major domestic political issue.
On 16 November, Truman told a post-election press conference that another civil rights message would be in the Message on the State of the Union and it would include proposals agreed on in the Democratic platform." On 25
November, administration leaders hinted that the forthcoming Congress would try to modify the cloture rule to expedite passage of civil rights legislation. 45
Following a 28 November meeting with Truman at the White House, Walter
White reported this legislation would receive the President's active support. 100
On 24 December 1948, the New York Times disclosed that the
Republicans were hoping to embarrass the Democrats by pushing for civil
rights legislation at the beginning of the new session of Congress.
Specifically, Senate Republicans planned to modify the Senate rules so as to
curb the Southern filibuster. 101
Military Reform And The Truman Presidency
Now that we understand the motivational context of Truman's desire for
racial reform, we can examine how he was able to effectuate change through
the restructuring of the armed services. The civil rights reforms that Truman
instituted have rarely been discussed within the context of the journalistic
process or in terms of military reform. In this second part of the chapter, an
attempt will be made to merge these lines of inquiry. To better discern the role
that publicity played in policymaking, we interpret Truman’s efforts to enlarge
public support for desegregation within the context of his campaign to reform
the post-war defense establishment. Although he was not successful on all
fronts, Truman crusaded for military unification, postwar reorganization and
universal military training. To help sell this program of controversial military
reforms, Truman needed the support many of the same military officers who
would oversee military desegregation.
To place desegregation in the military reform setting, we will first evaluate
Truman’s use of the presidential power to create special commissions and
committees. More specifically, we will see how he used the symbolic,
representational aspect of these commissions to broaden the coalition for
reform and to create a climate for change. We will look at the Special Senate 46
Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, which Truman chaired
during World War II and compare it with the 1947 President’s Committee on
Civil Rights and the President’s Committee for Equality of Treatment and
Opportunity in the Armed Services. We will provide evidence that these committees broke with traditional practices in the way that they handled publicity and press coverage. We will examine how these special interest groups coalesced and broadened the public desire for racial reform.
After comparing the committees, we will explain how racial
desegregation fit into Truman’s broader vision of military democratization. We
will more carefully discuss how Truman’s reforms left the American military
more efficient, less biased, and more powerful than it had been before World
War II. We will analyze these three major military reforms: (1) a massive
restructuring of organizational and command relationships to achieve
unification of the armed forces: (2) the elimination of racial segregation in the
military services: and (3) the establishment of a system of universal military
training (UMT).
Finally, we will suggest how Truman’s mistrust of the American
publishing elite would help shape the instructions that he gave his military
desegregation committee. Truman encouraged that committee to avoid the
press and publicity. In so doing, he followed practices that he had used before
as chairman of the Special Senate Committee to Investigate the National
Defense Program. We will show how Senator Truman navigated between the
sometimes-adversarial and sometimes-collaborative relationship of the press
and government to win concessions from the military. 47
Presidential and Senate Commissions
Studying Truman’s actions on Senate Committee to Investigate the
National Defense Program, particularly the relations between the press and the committee, enables us to better understand both the 1947 President’s
Committee on Civil Rights and the President’s Committee for Equality of
Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services. Studying Truman’s Senate
Committee also helps to place desegregation in the military reform setting.
Through it, we will see how he used the symbolic, representational aspect of these commissions to broaden the coalition for reform and to create a climate for change. We will provide evidence that these committees broke with traditional practices in the way that they handled publicity and press coverage.
We examine how these special interest groups coalesced and broadened the public desire for racial reform.
Since Truman’s time, congressional and presidential commissions have become a popular way to identify societal goals and to secure and delay reform.
David Flitner, Jr., identifies these primary goals of commissions: (1) they put issues on the national agenda; (2) they help create policy; (3) they enable governments to surmount bureaucratic obstacles inherent in the separation of powers; (4) they provide a cooling off period during which tensions ease; (5) they educate society, even as they create a repository of wisdom and knowledge about vital issues, and (6) they influence American attitudes about these issues. They have demythologized conspiracies, lowered the heat on controversial issues and changed the language, i.e., altered the terms of national debate. 102
As Flitner notes, George Washington created the first presidential commission to mediate the Whiskey Rebellion. Many of Washington’s successors used commissions to handle local issues, but Theodore Roosevelt 48
was the first to appoint commissions whose purview was national in scope and
significance. In forming the Public Lands Commission and the Inland
Waterways Commission, and through his enthusiastic sponsorship, Teddy
Roosevelt “lent a legitimacy to his commissions which increased their stature as
a presidential tool and which maximized their potential for stimulating public
103 awareness in a pre-television age.”
Truman followed Teddy Roosevelt in the way he used the Bully Pulpit of
the presidency to enlarge the public pressure for reform. Where Teddy
Roosevelt was concerned with the institution of conservation measures, Truman
concentrated his attention on special interest groups within the electorate,
including the civil rights constituency and the military. He acted, in no small
measure, through his appointment of public information spokespersons and
through public commissions.
Truman perfected his skills in the use of public commissions as a
Senator in charge of a World War II defense oversight committee. Except for his
achievements during World War I and his experiences as Commander in Chief,
Truman encountered more military leaders as chairman of this committee than
in any other situation; his Senate experience is worth extensive examination
because it influenced his later actions. Before heading up this committee,
Truman had been an undistinguished member of the Interstate Commerce
Committee and the Appropriations Committee. He had been virtually unknown
outside of Washington, DC, and the state of Missouri during his first term.
Truman clearly learned much about the opportunities for military reform as
chairman of the Special Senate Committee to Investigate the National Defense
Program. 49
Comparison of the Senate and Presidential Committees
There is no demonstrable evidence that Truman directly influenced the
military desegregation committee by relating his experiences in the defense
efficiency program. Yet, there are strong procedural parallels between
Truman’s Special Senate Committee and the President’s Committee on
Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services. These similarities
help explain why each group was effective. Yet, before comparing these
committees with each other, it is important to recognize how each committee
diverged from other similar groups that had come before.
These committees were noteworthy (1) in the way they both criticized
military planning, (2) in their issuance of reports, (3) in the way they handled
relations with the press, and (4) in the way they refused to attribute blame. By
its very formation, the Senate Committee was trying to assure civilian control
over the military. Distrust of a “man on horseback” (i.e., a charismatic military
104 dictator) has a long tradition in American history. Although the Senate
generously praised cooperative military personnel, they insisted upon a need for some constraints in military spending. Testifying before them, Secretary of
War Robert Patterson and Lieutenant General Brehon Somervell questioned the Committee’s authority and argued that money should be no object for a
nation at war. In effect, the military saw every attempt to obtain value as unwise frugality. By demanding greater efficiency, and not accepting Patterson’s argument, the Senate Committee became a “domestic high command” criticizing the Army for having failed to plan adequately, for refusing to coordinate with other services and other powers, and for weaknesses in
personnel planning, intelligence efforts and quality of oversight. 105
The Army was consistently unwilling to allow reform to play a part in the war effort; this attitude would continue through the Cold War with the Soviet 50
Union. Just as the Senate Committee often heard that “money was no object for a nation at war,” the President’s Equality Committee often heard that, “the Army
.” 106 can not afford to be a social laboratory In each case, the military accused their critics of being unpatriotic and putting external issues above the life of the soldier. However, both the budgeting effort and desegregation would ultimately improve military efficiency.
Other Senate and Presidential investigations of war readiness attempted to ascribe blame for combat failures. There were at least eight contemporaneous investigations on Pearl Harbor and military operations; each of these inquiries devoted particular attention to such imputations. In contrast, the Special Senate Committee, which maintained its focus on industrial mobilization, gained credibility because Truman refused to denounce its witnesses, even those who may have been guilty of malfeasance. Instead, it did not try its witnesses in the court of public opinion and left those responsibilities
107 to the Justice Department . Similarly, the President’s Equality Committee carefully avoided accusations of wrongdoing. The Senate Committee refrained from inquiring into personnel matters in which there was not a clear and
legitimate public interest. It made a sincere effort to keep its investigations of fraud and corruption directed at conditions rather than individuals, and achieved a considerable measure of success. Similarly, the President’s
Equality Committee did not attempt to ascribe personal blame, even when officers attempted to evade orders that they received from the Secretary of the
Army and the Secretary of Defense.
The Senate Committee only issued unanimous reports. The Committee based its reports on solid factual investigations, kept all members informed of its findings and distributed duties among the Democratic majority and Republican minority on the Committee. Before any report was issued, galley proofs were 51
sent to each government agency, corporation and individual affected by the report with a request for comment. This gave affected parties an opportunity to offer rebuttal and assure accuracy. As will be seen, the President’s Equality committee often delayed publication to assure agreement from all members.
According to Donald Riddle, Truman’s Senate Committee enjoyed
excellent relations with the press, and it received exceptionally favorable press
treatment. It released information promptly and in large measure avoided leaks.
It resolved complex questions by permitting the press advance copies of reports. Through these practices, the committee put pressure on defense
108 agencies, particularly the military, to release information to the public.
He insisted that all reports be unanimous and thus retained bipartisan support.
He also assured that small manufacturers and suppliers received an equitable share of government contracts.
President’s Committee on Civil Rights
Truman’s commission to study the status of Afro-Americans was also not the first committee of its kind. Racially-motivated violence has been a source of anxiety for whites and established authorities since the earliest days of
European migration and colonization. However, the riot commission or other commission designed to investigate and explain specific outbursts of illegal collective violence involving blacks and whites is a twentieth century phenomenon. Commissions were created to study violence perpetrated by
109 blacks in 1917, 1919, 1935, 1943, 1965, 1968, 1969, 1970 and 1992. In
1947, in the wake of a series of savage attacks directed upon black soldiers by whites, Truman created a special Committee on Civil Rights. These attacks prompted picketing by the NAACP, some 20,000 letters of protest and the formation of the National Emergency Committee against Mob Violence.
Eleanor Roosevelt, Dr. Channing Tobias and Walter White, the executive 52
secretary of the NAACP, formed the Emergency Committee as a national protest group. 110
David K. Niles, a holdover from the Roosevelt administration who otherwise lacked great White House influence, suggested that Truman create the broad-based civil rights commission. (Importantly, this was the first generalized presidential commission to primarily study violence perpetrated by whites on blacks. Although William Hastie, as civilian aide to the Secretary of
War, studied violence committed by whites on black military recruits in 1940,
Truman’s generalized commission was the first formal body to study racially-
motivated violence from this perspective.) When Niles presented the commission idea to the delegation against mob violence, they readily accepted
it; Walter White approved potential delegation members. On 11 October 1946,
Attorney General Tom Clark suggested Truman issue an Executive Order, entitled “Establishing the President’s Committee on Civil Rights” to preserve
111 and implement civil rights.
The black press expressed ambivalence toward Truman’s Executive
Order. The Republican Pittsburgh Courier was very suspicious of it. The
Baltimore Afro-American and the Kansas City Call gave good play to the story.
The Chicago Defender ran a somewhat favorable editorial saying,
If the committee is not hampered in its inquiry and if its recommendations are not circumvented by a welter of administrative procedures, the results should be far more consequential to us than anything that has happened in the United States since slavery. 112
In October 1947, the President’s Committee on Civil Rights issued its report. The report was extraordinarily comprehensive and considered methods of legal enforcement, the personal safety and security of individuals, a broadening and guarantee of voting rights, and the elimination of segregation in 53
employment, education, housing, health services, public services and the
District of Columbia.
More than that, the committee examined and exploded the mythology that formed the foundation for racism. Foreshadowing the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka Supreme Court decision, the committee argued that a
“separate but equal” policy was inherently discriminatory. Moreover, the committee spoke out strongly against segregation in the armed forces. It said,
“Prejudice in any form is an ugly, undemocratic phenomenon and in the armed forces, where all men run the risk of death is particularly repugnant.”
The Committee applauded the services’ newly-stated commitment to try
to eliminate discrimination, but it called for more substantive action. Then the committee focused on one of the traditional obstacles to this action.
Segregationists and those who favored racial gradualism worked to delay military desegregation until after national policy was set. They argued that turning the armed services into a "laboratory for social change" would jeopardize military preparedness. To counter this casuistry, the President’s
Committee on Civil Rights said,
During the last war we . . . found that the military services can be used to educate citizens on a broad range of social and political jobs. The war experience brought to our attention a laboratory in which we may prove that the majority and minorities of our population can train and work and fight side by side in cooperation and harmony. 113
To those who argued military desegregation could cause internal unrest among the troops, and impair efficiency, the Committee retorted,
The injustice of calling men to fight for freedom while subjecting them to humiliating discrimination within the fighting forces is at once apparent. Furthermore, by preventing entire groups from making their maximum contribution to the national 54
defense, we weaken our defense to the extent and impose heavier burdens on the remainder of the population. 114
Recognizing the highly controversial nature of these remarks, Truman eliminated the service recommendations when he transmitted his recommendations to the Congress in early 1948. Truman had two pieces of military legislation to get through: a new draft law and provision for universal
115 military training. He considered these more vital than his pitch for civil rights.
While Truman may have subtly muted his support for portions of the Civil
Rights Committee report, he authorized the committee to send 25,000 copies of
To Secure These Rights to government officials, public libraries, civic, fraternal, farm, business, social-welfare, women’s and veteran’s organizations.
It was the subject of radio talk shows such as CBS’s “Peoples Platform,” ABC’s
‘Town Meeting of the Air” and Mutual’s “American Forum of the Air." The
Advertising Council issued one-minute spots on radio emphasizing tolerance and understanding.
Press and public commentary was vigorous. Most Southern newspapers
116 condemned the report, but Northern newspapers generally endorsed it. For
instance, The Washington Post noted that it had broad backing, the Chicago
Sun Times called it “the book of the year,” and the more conservative
Washington Star admitted it was a “fine statement” but noted that it required too much government interference. The black press was very enthusiastic.
The Afro-American, which had been suspicious of Truman’s sincerity, called the report “one of the most significant documents of all time.” The Norfolk
Journal and Guide reprinted commentary from other newspapers. In their own right, they praised Truman for his moral courage in issuing the report. The New
York People's Voice said the government had finally admitted, “segregation 55
and discrimination were cancerous sores sapping the strength of democracy
.” 117 and making it a mockery before the world
Military Democratization through Unification
Remarkably, Truman was able to begin military desegregation even as he was reshaping the services into a modern defense establishment. The struggle to unify the services and to improve inter-service coordination became one of the most divisive issues in modern American military history. In fact, the
reorganization issue was so visible and so divisive that it largely overshadowed the racial desegregation of the military. Reorganization and unification were, among military people at least, far more contentious issues than either desegregation or universal military training.
With respect to racial desegregation, unification did more than just make headlines and preoccupy the minds of the major governmental decision makers. It set the tone for the administration because there was no single policy-making or policy-coordinating mechanism. The services ostentatiously vied for favor or demonstrated their independence through their reconciliation with White House unification policies; they also contested through their accommodation with White House racial policies. The secretaries and their staffs used the details of unification to try to win their way on desegregation, just as they tried to use the details of personnel readiness and the efficacy of racially-separate, segregated facilities to frame the unification argument. The politics of unification also determined, to some extent, the appointment of
leaders in the defense establishment. For these reasons, it is important to review the origins of the unification controversy.
Discussion of unification of the services and reform of the defense establishment intensified during the Second World War. Truman’s Special 56
Senate Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program generally
avoided any evaluation of military strategy or tactics. Yet, they did criticize the
lack of unity of command. The committee argued, “As disclosed by the report of
the Roberts committee, lack of unity of command was one of the most important
circumstances contributing to the disaster at Pearl Harbor.” 118
In April 1944, a House subcommittee discussed War Department
unification. The Army proposed establishment of a single Armed Forces
Department administered by a secretary, who would be the principal adviser to
the Congress and the President on all defense subjects relevant to politics and
administration. The joint chiefs would advise the President on financial
allocations and other budgetary matters. 119 The Navy Department, represented
by Secretary James Forrestal, opposed the Army plan for fear that it might lose
control of its air force and the Marine Corps. Forrestal argued that a unified
system might be too cumbersome for efficient management. The secretary also
told a Senate committee that administering such an organization would be too
much for any one man. 120
In 1944, Truman voiced support for unification as a vice-presidential
candidate. In an influential article for Collier’s, Truman argued that the Pearl
Harbor disaster and subsequent early defeats demonstrated the danger of
dividing military responsibilities between the services. He proposed military
coordination under a single civilian secretary, administratively assisted by three
undersecretaries for the ground, sea, and air forces. 121
During the first two years of his presidency, Truman was often immersed
in the politics of military unification. While the President prepared for the
Potsdam Conference, the Navy and Army each prepared very different
unification plans. In October 1945, the Senate Military Affairs Committee heard the plans presented by Navy Secretary James Forrestal and Army General J. 57
Lawton Collins. These divergent proposals divided the services and provoked
a “Battle of the Potomac." 122
Until mid-December 1945, Truman remained aloof from the bitter inter-
service bickering, but he continued to delay his unification message. As the
struggle between the services grew more heated, it drew unfavorable press
commentary which tainted the universal military training proposal. In mid-
December, the Military Affairs Committee adjourned with the Army and Navy no
closer to agreement. Finally, Truman felt compelled to intervene. 123
Despite vocal objections from Forrestal, Truman sent his military
reorganization message to Congress on 19 December 1945. In it, the President
laid down broad guidelines that he wanted followed; he detailed nine reasons
why unification was necessary, stressing greater efficiency and economy and a
more effective civilian control over the military. 124
The President's message to Congress helped focus the debate. Truman
permitted the service secretaries and their staffs to discuss their own personal
feelings on unification before Congress, but he discouraged inter-service
125 quarreling in the press. Yet the public interservice wrangling continued, with
much of it directed by the Navy to the Thomas-Hill-Austin unification bill
(S.2044). Despite the fact that Truman had sent his clarification in June,
Congress adjourned early in August 1946, without taking action. 126
On 10 September, Truman invited the top military leaders to express their
views candidly on a new draft of the bill prepared by his assistant, Clark Clifford,
and Admiral Leahy. No one changed their opinions regarding the powers of the secretary of defense. 127 The meeting adjourned and there the matter
rested, unresolved, until early in 1947.
With the White House pressuring them to agree, Patterson and Forrestal finally relented. They sent their mutually acceptable ideas to Truman on 16 58
January 1947. Truman accepted their effort as a "thoroughly practical and
workable plan of unification." The New York Times headlined the White House
announcement as, "A Truman Victory—Patterson and Forrestal Compromise at
Last on Unification Ideas." 128 Yet the military leadership, having taken almost a
year and a half to agree on the principles of unification, still found it difficult to
agree on the text of the unification bill. Truman, tired of the dissension over
details of the bill, ordered Forrestal and Patterson to initial it. The Senate
129 Armed Services Committee debated it from 18 March to 8 May 1947.
After some small modifications, Congress passed the National Security
Act of 1947 on 25 July and Truman signed it into law the next day. Truman also
issued Executive Order 9877, which defined the roles and missions of each
branch of the armed forces. As finally passed, the act established the Army,
Navy, and Air Force as equal departments, each with its own civilian
administrator, under the supervision and control of a single civilian secretary of
defense. The act revamped military organization, while it strengthened
coordination among all the agencies and departments of the federal
government—both civilian and military—that affected national security. 130
New Appointments Affected Desegregation
The changes made in the military departments prompted Truman to make several new appointments. He asked Robert Patterson, then Secretary of
War, to become Secretary of Defense. Patterson, explaining that his strained financial condition would not permit his staying in government, refused the post and insisted upon resigning as Secretary of War (Army). The president asked
Forrestal to take the post and he accepted. Thus the man who had consistently believed that the job was too much of a burden for any man to bear, became
Secretary of Defense, and his suicide two years later marked an ironic fulfillment of his own prophecy. With Forrestal's concurrence, Truman .
59
appointed Undersecretary of War Kenneth C. Royall secretary of the Army;
Assistant Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan Secretary of the Navy; and
Assistant Secretary of War for Air Stuart Symington became the first Secretary of the Air Force. Forrestal was sworn in as Secretary of Defense on 17
September 1947, and the new military establishment became operational the following day. 131
These appointments represent one of the most significant factors affecting racial desegregation of the military. As will be seen in the next chapter, Kenneth Royall was a particularly vocal advocate for racial segregation in the United States Armed Services. Though Forrestal believed in gradual change, that is a virtual maintenance of the status quo, he did provide an
influential outlet for voices for reform within the Pentagon. The interplay between these two actors, and their respective staffs, as well as the actions of the newly-named Navy Secretary and Air Force Secretary, shaped both service
unification and racial desegregation of the military.
In fact, in a National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs that Forrestal called on 26 April 1948, he admitted the degree to which unification was affecting the desegregation effort. One delegate asked why the Defense
Department could not just issue a desegregation order and expect immediate compliance. Forrestal replied:
I would ask you to keep in mind that we (the newly-formed Department of Defense) are a child of six months of age. We began business last September, and there was a larger number of basic questions of organization, administration and policy that had to be settled. You can’t get those (racial) questions settled,
because if you settle them without thought, then they won’t be
settled. That takes work. .
I just want to revert to what I was trying to say. I would be
glad to clarify it. It would look as if you solved it. In my opinion,
that would not solve it. But, as I say, it was my own experience in
unification, all during the arguments of unification measure. I always maintain that by law, by fiat, you cannot force people into 60
the kind of cooperation and mutual respect and coordination that we hope to get out of unification. It has to come out of gradual experience and out of the kind of learning that each service has
its own contribution to make; and as each service learns more 132 about the other, there grows up a common effort.
Universal Military Training (UMT)
At a time when the American military was otherwise beset by factional bickering, the UMT experiment provided a common goal to unite the services.
Although the notion of continued military obligation would not gain favor among war-weary American civilians, UMT did represent a symbolic democratic ideal for the military. The services capitalized on UMT for positive publicity on recruitment and training. However, UMT further complicated the discussion of military unification. As will be seen, the services used both desegregation and, to a lesser extent, UMT as political footballs. They used their acceptance of UMT as a way to curry favor with Truman. Finally, UMT provided an ideal forum for civil rights leaders to discuss further democratization of the American military.
In his Memoirs, Harry Truman traced his preference for a trained soldier- citizenry over a large standing army to his military experience during World War
I. He once explained that a military program that emphasized physical and educational improvement would democratize the army and "overthrow the West
Point and Annapolis cliques" of the services by "recruiting commissioned
133 officers from the rank and file." At another juncture, Truman told a reporter that he had been for UMT since 1905, the year he joined the National Guard.
Truman often based his judgment of military affairs on his combat experiences. 134
Later, during his years in the Senate, Truman vainly supported a bill to
make the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) a permanent institution. He wanted the CCC converted into a universal training program. Truman's first chief of staff of the Army was General George C. Marshall, the leading military 61
advocate of UMT and a man for whom the president had a profound respect.
training Given these factors, it was natural for Truman to publicly back such a program from the very outset of his presidency. 135
Truman's first presidential statement on UMT occurred in a press conference in June 1945. At that time, he hinted about his unique vision when he told reporters: "I have got a few views on universal military training of my own, which don't agree with the Army, and don't agree with the Navy, and don't agree with the House or Senate.” 136
Many military planners considered Truman's idea of a citizen-army an ideal antidote to Soviet expansionism. Truman acknowledged that the fundamental reason for universal training was to provide full military preparedness for any potential aggression against the United States. But he also believed that individual training would lower the national illiteracy rate, improve the general physical condition, and remove minor medical disabilities.
Trainees would receive ample opportunity for self-improvement instruction in useful civilian skills, and proper care for their moral and spiritual well-being.
In explaining the plan to Congress, Truman distinguished this type of training from conscription which he defined as compulsory membership in a branch of the armed forces; UMT would simply be civilians receiving training. It would not replace selective service, which would continue to furnish troop
replacements. However, the plan met great resistance in the Republican-
137 controlled Congress and in the press.
Part of the public resistance grew because the military never understood
Truman’s goals. While Truman consistently held that there was no relationship
between UMT and the draft, the War Department did not agree. When queried for reaction to a new Presidential commission on Universal Training, a War
Department spokesman said that the Army would not request further 62
continuation of selective service, which was due to expire in March 1947, until congressional intentions on universal training were clear. The spokesman
138 added that if UMT was not forthcoming, then the draft would be inevitable.
The expectation was that enough volunteers would emerge from the UMT
program. On March 3, Truman decided to gamble on an all-volunteer force and
asked Congress to allow selective service to lapse on March 31. While Navy
Secretary James Forrestal and Secretary of War Robert Patterson agreed,
Selective Service Director Lewis Hershey and the Army's Chief of Personnel,
General W. S. Paul adamantly opposed the decision. Congress did allow the
draft to expire, and the nation was without peacetime conscription for fifteen
months. 139
Truman and the Press
Truman’s attitudes about the press also strongly shaped his strategy for
desegregating the military. For two reasons, he directed that the work of his
military desegregation committee, the President’s Committee for Equality of
Opportunity and Treatment, be accomplished with a minimum of news
coverage. First, Truman was determined to achieve “concrete results ... not
publicity on it.” He wanted the job done “so that everybody will be happy to
cooperate to get it done.” The Committee was not to impose integration of the
services from the top down. To achieve lasting success, the Committee had to
win over the opponents of desegregation in the Army and elsewhere. Truman
thought that mollifying sensitive feelings and coalition-building would succeed
best outside the public spotlight.
Second, in so doing, Truman made clear that he did not see the
Committee’s role as a publicity stunt. He would “knock somebody’s ears down,"
140 if he had to, but he wanted true compliance and real results. Why did 63
Truman lay down this edict in this way? Primarily, he believed that this was the surest way to win military compliance. The military aspects of this belief will be discussed in the next chapter.
We contend that Truman believed the spotlight of publicity would inhibit true compliance because he feared political opposition from conservative publishers and because he did not want a public discussion of U.S. military preparedness. Truman’s views can be studied from at least three aspects: (1)
The relationship between the nation’s newspaper publishers and Democratic candidates was traditionally adversarial. Truman was a particularly vocal critic of the nation’s publishing elite; (2) Although he came into the Presidency on a wave of popular opinion and press support, Truman suffered from press comparison to his predecessor, Franklin Roosevelt; (3) Although he often proclaimed support for freedom of the press, Truman would institute such
Constitutional abrogations as loyalty oaths and Executive Order 10290, which
broadened and extended government control of dissemination of government
information.
Editorial support for Truman was no different than editorial support for the next Democratic standard bearer, Adlai Stevenson. In 1948, Harry Truman
received support from only 17 per cent of the nation’s newspapers. Stevenson
141 won support from 16 per cent . Yet, there can be little doubt that Truman
cared about his relations with the press. Herbert Lee Williams combed
Truman’s press conferences, public speeches and personal letters. He found
that Truman made 206 significant references to the press in 324 press conferences, 118 significant references to the press in 1,101 speeches and 320
142 significant references to the press in 31,650 letters. As President, Truman received press synopses, and he read from half a dozen to a dozen 64
newspapers a day. He reported that he read everything from cartoons to letters
to the editor. 143
As did other Democrats, Truman often spoke approvingly of average
working reporters, and his relations with the working press were generally
144 good, but he strongly mistrusted the concentration of power and influence
among publishers. On 1 December 1948, he wrote a letter to the United States
ambassador to Chile in which he said: “I’ve never cared a great deal about what
the editorial writers and columnists say about me on the editorial page if I can
145 get a fair break on the front page in the news columns.” In a speech at
William Jewell College, Truman said,
There is not a single great newspaper in the United States that
could operate if it did not have these workmen down here in front of me today to do this work. They can’t all be managing editors. They can’t all be top-notch columnists to tell the President what to do. Somebody has to sit in the front row and do the work. 146
Although he respected the efforts of the working press, Truman often
railed against the concentration of power in the publisher’s office and the
concentration of money that corrupted the political process. As Truman saw it,
the communication facilities of the country represented another issue in the 1948 campaign . . . The segments of the press and radio which were not directly controlled by anti-administration interests depended to a great extent upon the advertising revenue which came from the wealthy, and often selfish, private groups. The power companies for instance, purchased millions of dollars’ worth of newspaper and magazine space in which to attack the public utility program of the federal government. Other lobbies and pressure groups, like the National Association of Manufacturers and the United States Chamber of Commerce, were constant contributors to press and radio in the guise of sponsors and advertisers.
Truman said that he did not mind Republican advertisements, because
Democrats had the same access. But he did resent 65
the commonplace practice of distorted editorials and slanted headlines in the press and of outright misrepresentations in the daily offerings of the columnists and commentators. The worst offense of all was the editing and distorting of the facts in the news.
Truman argued that the mere fact that a statement appeared in print
made it appear credible to many people. He said that newspaper owners,
publishers and columnists of the press and radio were deliberately
irresponsible and that they were not living up to the responsibilities attached to
their constitutional privileges. He wrote,
Too many candidates have lived in fear of the press and radio and
have courted their good will as if the outcome of the election
depended upon it. But I have learned the error of this idea in my
own political life. In my own state I always faced the overwhelming
majority of press opposition. I overcame it at every turn and never 147 had any respect for the so-called political influence of the press .
Truman’s predecessor, Franklin Roosevelt maintained an even warmer,
more intimate relationship with the working reporters. In press conferences, he
discouraged written questions, as had been the custom, and, instead,
encouraged informal questioning. He often provided off-the-record news
through a pattern of requiring reporters not attribute the information to him. This
intimacy allowed reporters to appreciate the flexibility of the President’s
position, while it permitted reporters to hear the President “thinking out loud .” 148
Truman, by contrast, was less discreet, more caustic and less willing to confer
with reporters. This is especially evident in the frequency with which the two
Presidents held press conferences. While Truman averaged about five press conferences every six weeks, Roosevelt averaged nine press conferences
149 every six weeks .
During the first thirty-three months of Truman’s administration, questions about security information and 150 press responsibility rarely came up . In the 66
beginning of his second term, he directed the President’s Committee on
Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services to sedulously
avoid press coverage. This action presaged a stricter move to control the press
near the end of his second term.
Truman responded to Soviet expansionism by becoming more conscious
of the need for safeguarding information of a strategic or military value. Some
scholars have argued that Truman’s reaction to a potential communist threat
exceeded the scope and nature of the threat itself. David Caute compares U.S.
reaction under Truman with the British reaction. He notes that Britain also
committed itself to a political and military alliance against the Soviet Union “but
without the corollary of domestic red-baiting and witch-hunting” that occurred in
the United States during Truman’s time in office. Caute concludes that “The
style— tactical and rhetorical— of Truman’s immersion in the Cold War
therefore emerges as crucial; it was here that the seeds of McCarthyism were
151 sown.” Caute blames Truman for creating the double standard that
obscured the motives of American foreign policy in the post-war era. Theoharis
agrees that Truman shaped the debate by acceding to McCarthyite arguments
rather than opposing them on a libertarian basis. For instance, Truman authorized his Attorney General, J. Howard McGrath, to warn how communists were intent on using the protection of the Bill of Rights to destroy the nation.
Through this interpretation, civil liberties such as the First Amendment could be seen as a threat to the national interest. 152
On 24 September 1951, Truman issued Executive Order 10290. The order empowered the administrator of any federal department — civilian or military — to embargo any item of news that he considered to be security- sensitive. Although the order did not impose any penalties, Truman expected 67
reporters to voluntarily cooperate with it. By framing the Order in this way,
Truman argued that there was no element of censorship, direct or implied.
A firestorm of protest resulted. The American Society of Newspaper
Editors protested the order before Truman proclaimed it, and reporters publicly
questioned it as soon as he announced it. Afterward, the professional
journalistic fraternity, Sigma Delta Chi, the Associated Press Managing Editors
Association, and the American Society of Newspaper Editors all worked
153 together to try to overturn it.
It appears that Harry Truman became quite disenchanted with the press
during his time in the White House. In the midst of the Executive Order conflict,
Editor & Publisher Columnist Robert Brown compared a tribute to the press that
Truman made to the Associated Press in April 1947 with his 1951 press attacks.
Brown noted,
It was more than a year after that (1947) speech when in the heat of the 1948 campaign he started accusing newspapers of serving special interests. And since then he has frequently lashed out at the press either individually or collectively. 154
James Pollard, whom Truman himself regarded as an expert on the
press and the presidency, characterized Truman’s press relationships before
he issued Executive Order 10290:
Time and the responsibilities of office work changes in a man and Harry Truman is no exception. It would be inaccurate to say that his six years in the White House made a new man of him, but the events of the years from 1945 to 1951 clearly made a different man of him. The early doubts and unsureness were replaced by confidence and self-assurance.
Later in the article, Pollard quotes an unnamed “‘longtime Washington reporter,”
Rather recently it seems to me that I have detected in Mr. Truman the beginning of a feeling of persecution. Newspaper criticism, for 68
example, he often considers unfair. I think perhaps this grows out
of the rise of what I call cockiness. He feels pretty sure of himself, and anyone who criticizes him does so, he thinks, out of evil
motives. I have seen the same thing in two other Presidents,
Roosevelt and Hoover. I think it is an occupational malady which comes upon any man after he has had several years of adulation. 155
In 1964, Pollard republished his Journalism Quarterly article as “Truman:
First Phase” in the second edition of Presidents and the Press. He followed this with ‘Truman: Second Phase,” a far more generous appraisal of the latter part of Truman’s second term. In this article, he concluded,
To the very end of his term and beyond, Mr. Truman excited
interest and controversy. It was greatly to his credit that he steadily maintained good relations with the working press. As with Franklin Roosevelt, his quarrels with the newspapers for the most part were with the publishers and with the press in general. Through eight difficult years he maintained the working relationship which he saw was essential in the public interest. It is for the soundness of this basic political philosophy for which he should be remembered and appraised rather than for occasional outbursts, indignant letters or public castigation of the press. Much of the latter could be charged off to his Missouri temper or simply to politics. Of significance also was the confidence he showed in (William) Hillman and the six (reporters) who were favored with the special interviews near the end of his administration. These things were a better measure of the man than the risibilities to which he sometimes yielded. 156
Pollard’s opinions of Truman’s press relations appear too charitable.
Truman was all too willing to discount the value of the press to a free society.
As will be seen, the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and
Opportunity in the Armed Services often had to work around Truman’s anti- press edict. In some ways, this injunction worked to the benefit of those who sought to preserve segregation. Ultimately, however, the journalists who worked on the President’s Committee were able to work around the rules and goad the Army into accepting desegregation. 69
We have seen how Truman's personal vision of a unified, efficient, democratic American military came to encompass a racially-desegregated armed force. Truman changed his racial beliefs on the basis of military justice.
Although his political position in 1948 appeared feeble, Truman implemented these ideas to craft a vigorous political stance. Ultimately, he revitalized the
New Deal coalition. We have surveyed press reaction to Truman’s military reforms and civil rights innovations. We examined Truman’s underlying attitudes about the press and focused on his second-term reaction to hostile publicity. In the next few chapters, we will examine how the military and the civil rights community reacted to Truman’s reform agenda, Through this analysis, we will continue to show that Truman’s personal commitment to racial reform in the military and his mistrust of the press, were central to his creation of a President’s
Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services.
Finally we will examine the communication processes of the Equality
Committee and see how they were able to create and preserve the goals of
Truman’s reforms.
Notes
1 W. Leuchtenberg, (November 1991) ‘The Conversion of Harry Truman” American Heritage, pp. 62-66.
2 L. Nicholls (1954) Breakthrough on the Color Front . New York: Random House, p. 85
According to Alfred Steinberg, Truman’s primary opponents were both members of the Klan. Two Truman supporters convinced him to join and he gave them ten dollars to sign him up. One of the supporters, Spencer Salisbury became one of Truman’s most formidable enemies. Salisbury claimed that Truman was not allowed to participate in KKK activities because they suspected his maternal grandfather, Solomon Young, was a Jew. (There was apparently no mention of the fact that Truman’s business partner for the past five years was also Jewish.) Truman and the other supporter, Edgar Hinde, claimed that the KKK returned his application fee when he refused to accept their discriminatory edicts and that Truman ran the group out of the county. Alfred Steinberg, (1962) The Man From Missouri,: The Life and Times of Harry S. Truman. New York: G.
P. Putnam, p. 64; F. Mitchell, (1968) Embattled Democracy: Missouri Politics. 1919-1932 . Columbia: University of Missouri Press, p.182 cites Kansas City Call, 31 October 1924.
4 Richard Dalfiume (1969) Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts.
1939-1953 . Columbia: University of Missouri Press, p.135. 8
70
5 Truman won a three-way Democratic primary for the seat on the basis of his votes in Jackson County and Kansas City. Truman wound up winning the state with a plurality of some 40,000 votes. Much of Truman’s victory came from the 130,000 votes cast by Missouri’s African Americans. Mitchell, p.124-139; Steinberg, pp. 110-119; William Berman (1970) The Politics of
Civil Rights in the Truman Administration . Columbus, Ohio:The Ohio State University Press, p.11.
6 He joined a move by Northern liberals to close debate on an anti-lynching bill and in 1 940, he supported an amendment to the Selective Service Act to prevent discrimination against minority groups in the Armed Services. Congressional Record, 75th Cong. 1st Session. 1938, LXXXIII, 1166, 2007 and 6th Cong. 2d Session, 1940, LXXXVI, 10895.
7 Stark fired the Board of Curators at Lincoln university and other black office holders. The Governor also had refused to receive black citizens at the state capital and he supported the John
D. Taylor bill, which appeared to discriminate against black law students. All in E. F.Schmidtlein, the Dissertation University of Missouri, reproduced by Arbor, (1962 ) Truman Senator from Ann Michigan: University Microfilms, p. 223.
8 Congressional Record, 76th Cong. 3d Session., 1940. Appendix, p. 4546 and pp. 53-67-5369.
9 He was opposed by the Kansas City Star and the Kansas City Times, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, as well as the Springfield Leader and Press, the St. Joseph Gazette, the Cape Missourian, the Dexter Statesman, and the Vandalia Leader. Cabel Phillips (1966) The Truman Presidency: The History of a Triumphant Succession New York: MacMillan & Co. p.30. ,
10 Berman, p. 15 and Dalfiume, p.136.
11 Donald Riddle, (19641 The Truman Committee: A Study in Congressional Responsibility . New Brunswick: Rutgers University, pp. 11-14.
12 Riddle, p. 154; Wesley McCune and John R. Beal, (June 1945) "The Job that Made Truman President." Harper's. Vol. 190, pp. 616-621.
13 Riddle, p.156.
14 Berman, pp. 15-17.
15 ‘Truman may cost Democrats the election” (editorial) Norfolk Journal and Guide, 5 August
1944, p.6; William Nunn, , “Democrats sell race, Wallace to buy South” and “Views vary on Truman candidacy,” Pittsburgh Courier, 29 July 1944, p.1.
16 Note that Truman’s language foreshadows the name of his presidential committee. Davis,
John, “I am for equality, Senator declares,” Pittsburgh Courier, 5 August 1944, p.1.
17 H.L. Moon (1948) Balance of Power: The Neoro Vote Garden City, N.Y. Doubleday 34- , pp. 35.
1 The Black press had been admitted to the White House Press Corps in 1 943 when McAlpin, was admitted to their ranks. Also in that year, the Negro Publishers’ Bureau organized a pool of reporters to visit the war theaters. By the end of the war, every major theater had been visited by at least one black war correspondent. Ulysses Lee, (1 966) United States Army in World War II:
Special Studies: The Employment of Negro Troops. Vol. 8, no. 8. Washington, D.C. : Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army p. 470, p.387, Chicago Defender, 4 March 1944. , . . ;
71
19 Item no. 7, Public Papers of the Presidents of The United States, Harry S. Truman: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, 1945, pp. 10-11.
20Donald R. McCoy, & Richard T. Ruetten, (1973) Quest and Response: Minority Rights and the of 29. Truman Administration . Lawrence, Kansas: University Press Kansas, p.
21 Lee, in passim.; Chicago Defender, 6 September 6 and 14 September 1941; Dalfiume, p. , 129-130.
22 York: MacMillan & Co., p. 102-103; L. F. Murray, . ed.,(1949) The Nearo Handbook. 1949. New Hughes, (1962) Fiaht for Freedom New York: WW. Norton, pp. 102-106; “Confer with Governor on Tennessee riot” and “Asks U.S. action on Tennessee riot,” Norfolk Journal and Guide, 16
1 total $1 ,500; GA lynch victims total 5; Nation deplores mob act, March 946, p.1 ; “Rewards 1 leaders call for action,” Norfolk Journal and Guide, 3 August 1 946, p.1
23 New York Times, 14 November 1946p. 33;‘Truman orders lynchers found; voices horror at Georgia crime,” New York Times, ( July 31, 1946), p.1; “Bomb rips home in open attack,” Pittsburgh Courier, 8 November 1946, p.1; Minutes of Executive Committee Against Mob Violence, 21 August 1946, Box 332, NAACP Papers; Walter White, (1948) A Man Called White, New York: Viking Press, pp. 330-331
24 Pittsburgh Courier 31 1947 Tom C. Clark to HST, 1 1 October McCoy, & Ruetten, p. 48; May ; 1946, Truman Papers, OF 596A HSTL.
25 of Garden City, N Y. :Doubleday, Harry Truman, (1955) Years of Trial and Hope. Vol.2 Memoirs , pp. 213;ltem no. 4, Public Papers of the Presidents of The United States, Harry S. Truman: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, 1947, pp.31-32.
26 Truman (1955) Vol.2 of Memoirs pp. 212.
27 White, p. 249.
28 Berman, p.80; also see Phillips, pp. 162-65; and Irwin Ross, f19681 Loneliest Campaign: The Truman Victory of 1948 New York: New American Library, pp. 18-27.
29 Phillips, pp. 197-98; Clark Clifford, (1990) Counsel to the President New York: Random House.
Black voters constituted at least 4 percent of all potential voters in such critical states as New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Illinois. Truman’s political needs dictated a renewed commitment to civil rights.J.B. Shannon, (1 951 )“Political Obstacles to Civil Rights”
Legislative Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences . 53-60.
30 Item No, 2, Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1948, Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1964, p. 3. Also see Ross, pp. 60-61.
31 Berman, p. 82.
32 Knowes, C. “PCA (Progressive Citizens of America) votes 74—point platform embracing Wallace policies,” New York Times, 19 January 1948, p. 1
33 V. O.Key, (1949) Southern Politics in State & Nation. New York: A. A. Knopf, p. 330; “Southern Democrats threaten secession,” Norfolk Journal and Guide, 31 January 1948, p. 1. . ,
72
34 Item No. 20, Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1948, p. 122.
35 Memorandum to the President from David K. Niles, 16 February 1948, Philleo Nash Files, HSTL. See Norfolk Journal and Guide editorial, “We need only the will,” 14 February 1948, p. 8, for the following: "Mr. Truman received the report of his Civil Rights Committee on 29 October 1947. That he so promptly acted on some of its recommendations, and during an election year at that, demonstrates that he has honest and deeds, convictions and the courage to give official voice to them."
36 Trussell, C.P.," Committee Forces Senate to act on Ives FEPC bill," New York Times, 6 called for,” (editorial) Norfolk Journal & Guide, 2 March February 1 948, p.1 ; “Action on Rights 1948, p. 2
37 The “Negro girl” was 23-year old Ada Sipeul and her case was argued by NAACP attorney Thurgood Marshall. “Negro gets review of education plan,” New York Times, 1 1 November 1947, p.25.
38 Because of its political significance, the meeting was heavily covered by the press; some 54 reporters were in attendance including reporters from the major Florida dailies according to the Tallahassee Democrat, 8 February 1948, p.4 For another view, see R.A. Garson (1 974) The Democratic Party and the Politics of Press ‘Thompson fights bolt from Sectionalism . Baton Rouge Louisiana: Louisiana University ; party,” Pensacola Journal, 8 February 1948, p.1.
39 Times W. Moscow, ., “Wallace man wins; Sweeping victory in Bronx election,” New York 18 February 1948, p. 1 and p.16; Ross, p. 65-66; ‘Wallace rejects bid to rejoin party,” New York Times, 16 February 1948, pp. 1, 5.
40 Item No. 32 Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1948, pp. 147-151.
41 Key, p. 331 ; Phillips, p.207; Truman was asked (At his press conference on March 11):
Q: Mr. President, do you plan to send Congress bills to carry out your civil rights message ?A:
Congress never feels very happy when the Executive sends them bills and says "this is it." When I was in Congress it was customary for Congress to write its own bill. If they request suggestions from me, I will be glad to make them; Item no, 49, Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1948, p. 179.
42 Crisis, 45, (1948) p. 140; R. M. Moore to Senator Howard McGrath, Chairman of the Democratic Committee, February C.P. Trussell, “Report Senators favor draft, UMT,” New National 5, 1948; , York Times, 23 March 1948, p.21
43 Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, Universal Military Training, 80th Cong., 2d Session., 1948, p. 688.
Millis 393-398; Paul Hammond, (1963) “Super-Carriers and B-36 Bombers: Appropriations, , pp.
Strategy and Politics” in H. Stein, (ed ), American Civilian-Military Decisions: A Book of Case
Studies . Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, pp. 473-476; Item no. 52, Public Papers of the Presidents of The United States, Harry S. Truman: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, 1948, pp. 1 82-186.
45 Declaration of Negro Voters Folder, Box 376, NAACP Papers. . ,
73
46 On March 1 3, in Washington, seven of fifteen southern governors, upon receiving Strom Thurmond's report of his committee's fruitless negotiations with Chairman McGrath, repudiated Truman and his civil rights program, called for the restoration of the two-thirds rule in the convention, and urged Southerners to cast their electoral college votes for those candidates who did not support civil rights legislation.
Key, p.333-335. “Anti-Truman bloc leads in Alabama," New York Times, 6 May 1948 p.3; Krock, A. “In the Nation,” New York Times, 7 May 1948, p. 22..
47 Key, p. 181 and p. 334-335.
48 Item No. 97, Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1948, pp. 253-254;
49 A. Krock, New York Times 8 June 1948, p.24,
50 K. Porter, and D. Johnson. (19661 National Party Platforms: 1840-1964 Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, p. 404.
51 S. Lubell, (1956) The Future of American Politics. New York: Harper & Company, p. 100.
52 Porter and Johnson, pp.452-453.
53 Republican National Committee File, Box 1951, NAACP Papers, Library of Congress
54 Wood, L. “Wallace charges sham on rights,” New York Times, 26 June 1948, p. 4.
55 Walter White Folder, Box 376, NAACP Papers, Library of Congress
56 “Senate uncertain over draft, UMT,” New York Times, 21 March 1948, p.1 and p.8.
57 Included in this broad movement were liberals such as Senator Claude Pepper of Florida, Walter Reuther, president of the United Automobile Workers Union, Chester Bowles and Wilson Wyatt of Americans for Democratic Action, a recently formed private liberal organization, and southern conservatives such as Senator Richard Russell of Georgia and South Carolina's
Governor Strom Thurmond. C.MacDougal, (1965) Gideon's Army . New York: Marzani & Munsell pp. 473-75; also see Ross, pp. 72-75, and pp. 112-14.
58 Box 367, NAACP Papers, Library of Congress
59 Trussell, C.P., “Sharp floor tests due on platform,” New York Times, 12 July 1948, p. 31
60 Minneapolis Mayor Hubert Humphrey was a member of the drafting committee. He announced that he intended to fight for the inclusion of such specific civil rights recommendations as an anti- lynching law, abolition of the poll tax, an FEPC, and the abolition of segregation in the armed forces. Brock, C. (I 962 ), Americans for Democratic Action Washington: Public Affairs Press, p. 97; Also see Lautier, L. “Rights issue splits Democrats; Platform makers stynrred,” and” Platform makers warned of dilly-dallying,” Norfolk Journal and Guide, 17 July 1948, p 2; Ross, pp. 123-24
61 C. E. Brown, ed.,(1948) at Philadelphia: Democracy Work , Local Democratic Committee, p. 167., p. 178, p. 181 and p. 189.
62 Brown, p. 202;Trussell, , “South beaten on race issue as plank is widened,” New York Times, 15 July 1948, p. 8;. "Rout of the Bourbons," Nation CLXVII (1948), pp. 1-3. 74
63 Key, p. 335; New York Times, 15 July 1948, p. 9.
64 M. Ernst, and D.Loth, (1948) The People Know Best, Washington Public Affairs Press; Ross, pp. 133-35.
65 Key, p. 335.
66 J. Abels, (1959) Out of the Jaws of Victory . New York: Henry Holt & Co,p.147.
67 York Times 1 8 July 1 p. 3. New , 948,
68 Key, p.335.
69 Wilson Record, (19511 The Neoro and the Communist Party Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, pp. 280-81. Also see MacDougal. Gideon's Army II. 506-83.
70 , for example, Walter White Executive Orders 9980, 9981 , in F.R. 431 1 4314. Also see, to Harry Truman, 23 July 1948, Box 367, NAACP Papers, Library of Congress
71 As will be discussed, Randolph had announced that if the president permitted a segregated draft, then his organization would stage a campaign of civil disobedience. Pittsburgh Courier, 3 July 1 948, p. 1
72 M. Konvitz, (1966) Expanding Liberties: Freedom's Gains in Postwar America New York: Viking, p. 260.
73 Washington: Government Printing Office xi-xii. Freedom. To Serve , pp. , (1950)
74 27 Baltimore Sun, 27 1948; Montgomery Advertiser, 29 July 29,1948; Shreveport Times. 1 August 1948.
75 “Wallace scorns Truman,” New York Times, 28 July 1948, p.4.
76 w.White, “21 Southern Senators map a filibuster on civil rights," New York Times, 28 July 1948, p.6.
77 A more complex examination of the General’s statement follows in a subsequent chapter. “NAACP hits Bradley speech,” Washington Post, 29 July 1948, p.3.
78 Item No. 29, Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1948, pp. 422-23.
79 R. Reynolds, (1948) "Triumph for Disobedience," Nation CLXVIL228.
80 A more complex examination of the end of disobedience campaign follows in a subsequent chapter. “Civil disobedience program abandoned,” Norfolk Journal and Guide, 21 August 1948, p. 1 (Home edition) and “Civil disobedience drive abandoned, "(National edition) 28 August 1948, p. 2.
81 Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2d Session., 1948, XCIII 9651-52.
82 Abels, p. 82 .
75
83 Memorandum to the President from Donald Dawson, 9 September 1948, Philleo Nash Files, Box 6, HSTL.
84 Committee Members were Charles Fahy, former solicitor general of the United States; Lester Granger, executive secretary of the Urban League; John H. Sengstacke, editor of the Chicago Defender; Dwight Palmer and Charles Luckman, industrialists; William Stevenson, educator; and Alphonsus J. Donahue, a prominent Catholic layman. A comprehensive discussion of the Fahy Committee and its staff follows in a subsequent chapter. Philleo Nash Files, Box 28, HSTL. Luckman and Donahue contributed no work to the committee.
85 “Wallace opens Southern campaign with meeting," Norfolk Journal and Guide, 4 September
1948, p. 1; MacDougal, vol. Ill, 707-44
86 Pittsburgh Courier, 2 October 1948, pp. 4.;. Item no, 219, Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1948, p. 650.
87 Key, pp. 337-44; Cited in Abels, p. 219.
88 Abels, p. 219, p. 220.
89 Aronson and Spiegler, (December 1949) "Does the Republican Party Want the Negro Vote?", Crisis, p. 365.
90 Anthony Leveiro, “President receives civil rights plan,” New York Times, October. 30,1948, P-1-
91 C. Van Auken, "The Negro Press in the 1948 Presidential Election," Journalism Quarterly XXVI (1949), 431-35.
92 Lubell,p. 190; Ross, pp. 163-271.
93 For an analysis of the urban vote, see R. A.Lee, (1 966) Truman and Taft-Hartlev. Lexington: University of Kentucky Presspp. 143-52; for an analysis of the farm vote, see A. Matusow, (1967) Farm Policies and Politics in the Truman Years. Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, pp. 185-89. A reexamination of the farm vote is undertaken by Ross, pp. 256-60.
94 Clifford, p. 231
95 H.L. Moon, (1949)“What Chance for Civil Rights," Crisis LVI 42-45. ,
96 Aronson, A. and Spiegler, S. "Does the Republican Party Want the Negro Vote?", Chsis, LXVIII (1949), 365.
97 K. Schmidt, (1960) Henrv Wallace: Quixotic Crusade. Syracuse. N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, pp. 232-51
98 Reston, James, ‘Truman victory is found to contain four elements,” New York Times, Nov. 4,1948, p. 8; Ader, E. "Why the Dixiecrats Failed," Journal of Politics, XV (1953), 356-69.
99 Berman, W.C. "The Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Policies of the Truman Administration," in The Truman Era As a Research Period, ed. Richard Kirkendall, Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1967, p. 193.; Moon, in passim 76
100 Helen Gahagan Douglas to Walter White, December 3, 1948, Douglas File, Box 419, NAACP Papers, Library of Congress. Item No, 274, Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1948, p. 947.; W.White, ‘Truman forces convinced filibuster on rights will fail, New York Times., 27 November 1948, pp. 1, 63; 181. NAACP press release, 2 December 1948, NAACP Papers, Library Of Congress
101 “Republicans push rights challenge,” New York Times, 24 December 1948, p. 18.
102 David Flitner, Jr., (1986) The Politics of Presidential Commissions . Dobbs Ferry, New York: Transnational Publishers, pp. 10-12.
103 Flitner, p.12.
104 Samuel P. Huntington, (19611 The Common Defense. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 384-388; Adam Yarmolinsky, (19711 The Military Establishment. New York: Harper & Row, pp. 194-210.
105 Riddle, p. 144, p. 154 and p. 156. Also “Billion Dollar Watchdog,” Time, March 8, 1943.
106 Yet, as will be seen in Chapter Five, the President’s Committee would also fashion its case on the need for efficiency and better coordination in manpower planning, intelligence and oversight.
107 Riddle, in passim.
108 As will be shown in chapter four, the President’s Equality Committee also enjoyed excellent press relations because the Executive Secretary of the Committee and its most active Committee members were journalists. Riddle, p. 49.
109 Anthony Platt, (19711 The Politics of Riot Commissions. New York: Collier Books p. 3.
110 “Limited in lynching case,” New York Times, (14 November 1946) p. 33; ‘Truman orders lynchers found, voices horror at Georgia crime,” New York Times, (31 July 1946), p. 48; Minutes of Executive Committee Against Mob Violence, (21 August 1946) Box 332, NAACP Papers; White, pp. 330-331.
111 McCoy, & Ruetten “U.S. lynch probe felt not enough,” Pittsburgh , p. 48; Courier, (8 November 1946) p. 3; “American Justice? (editorial),” Pittsburgh Courier ,31 May 1947, p. 6 ; Tom C. Clark to HST, (1 1 October 1946) Truman Papers, OF 596A in HSTL.
112 ‘Truman may name lynch committee," Pittsburgh Courier, 5 October 1946, p.1 “Truman creates group to probe civil rights,” Pittsburgh Courier, 14 December 1946, p. 1; “Disappointing for US,” Pittsburgh Courier ,18 January 1 947, p. 6; The Georgia lynch inquiry,” Chicago Defender, 5 October 1946 p. 1; December 14, 21, 1946; ‘Truman hits hate groups,” , Baltimore Afro-American ,14 December 1946, p.1; Kansas City Call, 20 December 1946, p. 9.
113 To Secure These Rights, (1947) Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, in passim. Quotes from pages 41 and 47, respectively.
114 To Secure These Rights, p. 162.
115 Morris MacGregor, (1981) Defense Studies: Integration of the Armed Forces. 1940-1965. Washington: Center of Military History, pp. 296-297. 6 .
77
1 1 Sample of news articles reported in Norfolk Journal and Guide, 8 November 1 947, p. 8.
117 Chicago Sun-Times, 2 November 1947; Washington Post, 30 October 1947, Washington Star, 30 October 1947; New York Herald Tribune, 9 November 1947; Louis Lautier, “Segregation's end urged,” and “To secure these Rights,” Norfolk Journal and Guide, 8 November 1947, New York People’s Voice, 30 October 1947.
118 U.S. Congress, Senate. Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program. Hearings. 11 March 1943, p. 220 in Riddle, p. 28.
119 Arnold Rogow, (1 966) A Victim of Duty; A Study of James Forrestal. London: Rupert Hart- Davis, pp. 187-188; U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 15 April 1944, National Defense Establishment: Unification of the Armed Services, Hearings on S.758, 80th Cong., 1st
Session, Part 1 pp. 7-8.
120 |_ater, Truman appointed Forrestal the first Secretary of Defense; the pressures of the job eventually brought on a general breakdown in Forrestal’s mental health, forcing his resignation and suicide.
1 21 Harry S. Truman, (26 August 1944) “Our Armed Forces MUST Be Unified," Collier’s, pp. 16, 63-64; E. F. Raines, & D. R. Campbell, (1986) The Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Evolution of Army Ideas on the Command. Control and Coordination of the U.S. Armed Forces. 1942-1985. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, p. 37.
122 Walter Millis (ed.) (1951) Forrestal Diaries. New York: Viking Press, pp. 62-63; Rogow, p. 191;
C. Joseph Bernardo and Eugene H. Bacon, (19611 American Military Policy: Its Development
Since 1775 . 2nd ed. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, p. 456; Newsweek, 19 November 1945.
123 Richard Haynes, (1973) The Awesome Power: Hartv S. Truman as Commander in Chie f.
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, p. 99.
124 Item no. 52, Public Papers of the Presidents of The United States, Harry S. Truman: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, 1945, pp. 546- 560; Millis, pp. 119-120.
125 Millis pp. 148-149; Hearings, National Defense Establishment, Pt. 1, pp. 6-10, Truman to Patterson and Forrestal, 15 June 1946, Records Group 330, Office Secretary of Defense, Hoover Commission Report, Unification of the Armed Forces, National Archives.
126 Haynes, p. 102.
127 Millis, pp. 203-205.
1 28 House Documents, 80th Cong., 1st Session. “Patterson and Forrestal compromise at last on unification,” New York Times, 17 January 1947, p.1
129 Anthony Leveiro, “(Fleet Admiral) King fights Army-Navy bill on unification,” New York Times, 7 May 1947, p. 1.
130 pu b|jc Law 253, 80th Cong., 1st Session. 78
131 Forrestal to Truman, 28 July 1947, Official File 1285 in Truman Papers; Item no. 182, Public Papers of the Presidents of The United States, Harry S. Truman: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, 1947, pp. 420; Millis, pp. 295-299.
132Testimony in front of National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs, (26 April 1948). Copies in James Evans Files, US Army Military History Research Collection, Carlisle Barracks, PA. and in OSD 291.2 National Archives, pp. 72-74 and 78.
133 in Truman Library and Millis, ed. (1951) The Forrestal Diaries. Harold D. Smith Diary Harry S. , New York: Viking Press.
134 He enlisted in Battery B of the National Guard at Kansas City in the year it was organized. into a full regiment. As was When World War I broke out, the Kansas City batteries were extended customary at the time, the men elected their officers. Truman was elected a first lieutenant of light artillery in Battery F of the Second Missouri Field Artillery. After training in Oklahoma, his unit was shipped to Vosges, France in March, 1918. In July, he was given command of Battery D, 129th Field Artillery in the Vosges Mountains. He commanded his unit at St. Mihiel, the Meuse- Argonne, Varennes, Verdun and Metz. Truman, (1955) Vol. 2 of Memoirs, p. 46; Jonathon Vol. Daniels Man of Independence, Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, pp. 89-90; Truman, Memoirs ,
1, pp. 125-128; Steinberg, p. 42.
135 I, Item no. Public Papers of the Presidents of The Truman, Memoirs , Vol. pp. 153, 510; 36, United States, Harry S. Truman: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, 1947\ p. 147; Russell Weigley, (1962) Towards an American Army : Military Thought from Washington to Marshall, New York and London: Columbia University Press, p. 247.
1 36 Item no. 44, Public Papers of the Presidents of The United States, Harry S. Truman: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, 1945, p. 78
137 Item no. 128, Public Papers of the Presidents of The United States, Harry S. Truman: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, 1946, pp. 407- 408
138 Haynes, p. 85 and Item no. 268, Public Papers of the Presidents of The United States, Harry S. Truman: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, 1946, p. 509.
139 Lewis B. Hershey to Truman, 5 December 1946; Patterson to Truman, 4 February 1947, in Subject File, National Military Establishment, Selective Service, Clifford Papers in Harry S. Truman Library.
140 ‘Testimony before the Fahy Committee,” 12 January 1949, Vol. 1, 2-3, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL, Cited hereafter as "Testimony."
141 In a preliminary poll of 723 daily newspapers, Editor & Publisher showed that Tom Dewey led Truman by four to one in the volume of newspaper support given by the nation’s dailies. Specifically, the Republican candidate received support from 69 percent of the newspapers and these papers delivered 70 percent of the daily circulation. By contrast, Truman won support from 17 percent of the newspapers accounting for 14 percent of the circulation. Another 4 percent of the newspapers supported Henry Wallace and Strom Thurmond. The remaining 1 1 percent were independent or uncommitted. In terms of circulation, Dewey garnered eight times the support that Truman had. Four years later, Adlai Stevenson garnered 14 percent to Eisenhower’s 68 percent. Editor & Publisher, 11 September 1948, p. 5; 30 October 1948, p. 11; 1 November 1952, p. 9. 79
142 Herbert L. Williams, (1984) The Newspaperman’s President: Harrv S. Truman. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, pp. 206-210.
143 White House Press and Radio Conference, No. 36, 4 December 1945; Conference No. 124 17 October 1947; Williams, p.3.
144 ‘Truman and Press,” Editor & Publisher, 2 June 1945, p. 38.
145 Personal letter to Clyde C. Bowers, Santiago, Chile, 1 December 1948 cited in Williams, p. 176.
146 Informal remarks, William Jewell College, Liberty, MO quoted in Williams, p. 176.
147 Truman, Vol. 2 of Memoirs pp. 205-207.
148 York: Colin Seymour-Ure, (1982) The American President: Power and Communication. , New St. Martin’s Press, p. 34.
149 James Pollard, (1964) The Presidents and the Press Washington: Public Affairs Press, p. 27.
150 Williams, p. 104; In 1946, Truman appointed a Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty to examine the effectiveness of existing federal employment procedures in protecting both internal security and individual rights. He did this as much to grab the initiative away from Congress as to enact legislation. Athan Theoharis, (1971) Seeds of Repression. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, p. 127.
151 David Caute, (1978) The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge Under Truman and Eisenhower. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 30.
152 Theoharis, pp. 145-146.
153 J. Butler, 29 September 1951, “Voluntary Security Rules Broaden Restricted Area, Editor & October “Protest to Truman Voted on Censorship,” Editor & Publisher, p. 1 1 ; C. Watson, 6 1951 , Publisher, p. 12; G. Brandenburg, 24 November 1951, “Sigma Delta Chi Opposes Secrecy Rule,” Editor & Publisher, p. 12; “Editors Won’t Rewrite Gag, But Truman Sticks to Idea,” 22 December 1951 Editor & Publisher, p. 9. ,
154 R. U. Brown, 22 December 1951, “Shop Talk at Thirty,” Editor & Publisher, p. 68.
155 Item No. 86, Public Papers of the Presidents of The United States, Harry S. Truman: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, 1948, p. 231; James Pollard, (1951) “President Truman and the Press,” Journalism Quarterly,
156 Pollard, p. 59. CHAPTER 3
MILITARY POLICIES
Why did race relations begin to change in the postwar period? How did
the United States Army, an institution that was basically segregationist, become
the leading architect of desegregation? Most important, what role did the press,
publicity, and censorship play in this transformation?
In Truman's revolving-door Defense Department, individual initiative often colored the institutional response. In the interim between the end of World
War II and the start of the Korean War, two very different administrators led the department. One Defense Secretary was an implacable gradualist, the other was a flamboyant bull who charged headlong into every situation. These men, and their colleagues in the United States Army, left an indelible stamp of personal authority on their offices. It was not a time for bland organization men.
Given this contentious climate, it is remarkable that a policy as controversial as racial reform managed to survive, and ultimately thrive in the U.
S. military. In this chapter, we will focus upon the contrasting personalities of the men who helped shape this policy. We will begin to show how liberal policymakers capitalized upon the tumult and transition in the Defense
Department to expedite these reforms. We will argue that by airing, or more often, by threatening to expose the contradictions in the military's segregationist policies to public scrutiny, the desegregationists were able to w*n major concessions from the Army.
80 81
The atmosphere of crisis and personal reaction, rather than organizational response, was no less evident in the U. S. Army itself. In fact,
because it was a larger bureaucracy with a longer history, the tradition of
resistance to racial reform was better entrenched in the Army than in the
Defense Department. In this chapter, we will examine a series of incidents in which the Army tried to create a policy separate from that of the Truman White
House. Also, in this chapter, we begin to specifically explore the activities of the
President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed
Services and to meet the people who made that policy. A more comprehensive examination of the committee and its actions will appear in chapter five.
Interestingly enough, the first articulation of modern Army segregationist policy was presented to a group of journalists. In the aftermath of a series of racial incidents in southern Army training camps in 1940, Secretary of War
Henry Stimson ordered William Hastie, his Civilian Aide, to produce a comprehensive study of the violence. Hastie made recommendations concerning the integration of the "Negro Soldier into the Army." Upon receipt of
Hastie's report, Chief of Staff George Marshall formulated an official Army policy that rejected Hastie's recommendations. The policies he substituted would be in effect throughout the War. 1 In December 1941, Marshall argued that
a solution to the issues presented. ..would be tantamount to solving a social problem which has perplexed the American people throughout the history of this nation. The Army cannot be charged with the undertaking. The settlement of vexing racial problems cannot be permitted to complicate the tremendous task of the War Department and thereby jeopardize discipline and morale... 2
Marshall's policies, based on this rational, were first made public to a group of
Negro newspaper editors on December 8, 1941. The editor's opposition to both 82
the spirit and letter of these policies was lost in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor.
Although African Americans creatively expressed displeasure with Army policy
3 in their newspapers throughout the war, the policies continued after the war in the form of Circular 124, informally called the Gillem Board Report, which was designed to create separate-but-equal treatment for black Americans in the
4 Army by establishing parallel battalions of white and black soldiers.
Gillem Board
Although the military did not invite journalists to address its policy-making
sessions, it did depend on a group of black editors to help evaluate the policy as articulated in the Gillem Board Report. For this reason, and because of its centrality in later policy-making, that report is worth extended examination. The idea for the Board was suggested by Assistant Secretary of War John J.
McCloy, who had set up an Advisory Committee on Negro Troop Policies during
5 Would War II. Alvan Gillem, who chaired the committee, did not expect--or
want-the assignment when it was first made. He had expected to be sent to assist General Douglas MacArthur in the containment of postwar Japan. Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower gave Gillem this assignment because he had written a report on blacks in the military when he was a student at the Army War
6 College in the 1920s.
The Gillem Board Report was the most extensive inquiry ever made by the Army into its Negro policy. From October 1945 through January 1946, the three-person Gillem Board heard testimony from sixty-nine military and civilian witnesses. The Board also scanned various studies of Negro manpower made between the two world wars. Although the role of black servicemen in World
War II had been assessed by many different parties in and out of the 83
government, the Army based its decision-making on evaluations made by
McCloy's Advisory Committee on Special Troop Policy. Rather than statistically analyze the performance, the Committee depended on anecdotal evidence gleaned from interviews conducted with personnel from all branches and at all levels of command. Military analysts gave greater attention to the disappointing performance of large black combat units, especially the 92nd Division in Italy.
They ignored successful contributions made by smaller black units in Europe and the Pacific.
While the official service assessments focused on the failures, civil rights groups and other advocates of integration emphasized instances of black heroism and effectiveness, although their overall assessments were not always accurate. Notably, Congresswoman Helen Gahagan Douglas' report was generally balanced and widely circulated. The Gillem Board's recommendations were issued in April 1946 as the Army's "Utilization of Negro
Manpower in the Postwar Army Policy," superseding the official policies announced in October 1940 and reinterpreted by Marshall in December 1941. 7
As citizens, the Gillem Board said, African Americans had a right and obligation to serve in the armed forces. The Army was obliged to make the most
effective use of its manpower, but it had failed to do this during World War II.
They specifically exonerated the black troops themselves from failure. Without a definite combat mission, they said, Negro units were often formed for the sole purpose of absorbing black troops. The Gillem Board found that American blacks were better educated and could have accomplished a wider variety of tasks.
In this regard, the Gillem Board broke with traditional segregationist policy. Without setting a timetable, the Board did assert that the Army's future policy should "eliminate, at the earliest practicable moment, any special 84
consideration based on race." 8 While the Gillem Board recommended that blacks could be integrated into overhead or basic maintenance units, this was to be for duty hours only. Off-duty housing was to remain segregated.
Integration was left for some far-off time, at some “unknown date." In the future, perhaps, manpower would be used "without regard to antecedents of race." The report called for maximum utilization of Negro manpower while it imposed a quota of 10 percent Negro strength. This action by the Gillem Board was clearly contradictory. Maximum utilization could not be achieved with imposed strength limits.
Because the Gillem Board policy was filled with contradictory declarations. Army administrators were able to interpret the new policy as they pleased. The Personnel and Administration Division of the War Department (G-
1), who were charged with instituting the new policy, said that the ultimate goal was to integrate small Negro units into larger white units. 9 Yet, Secretary of War
Patterson told the National Negro Press Association that it meant the end of segregation. 10 Despite Patterson's optimism, most informed blacks saw the new policy as a failure. "This new Army directive indicates that the Army command has undergone no real change of heart..." the Pittsburgh Courier
11 reported. The Norfolk Journal and Guide felt that it was a step in the right
direction, but reserved its judgments until it saw how the policy was implemented. 12 Roy Wilkins of the NAACP and Lester Granger of the National
Urban League each condemned the policy as "inadequate" because it did not end segregation. Further, they said "there is nothing new in his announcement to show how vacillation or weak policy will be prevented.” 13
Although the War Department ordered the new policy "be initiated without delay," the policy mostly went unenforced. 14 This dereliction was attested to by a group of black newspaper publishers, who were invited by the 85
Secretary of War to tour European installations and another tour by Marcus H.
Ray, Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War. 15
Generally, Army staff openly rebelled against the liberal aspects of the
Gillem policy. Deputy Chief of Staff, General Willard S. Paul, formally replied to
Ray's report. Paul argued that segregation was needed to keep possible troublemakers out of combat divisions, to promote efficiency, and to placate regional racial prejudice among influential leaders in Congress and in the
Army. Integration should be postponed until the quality of black troops improved. 16
These views ran counter to both the official policy and the public statements of the Secretary of War. A vague impasse continued, with pragmatic resistance suppressing racial progress until the Korean War. Gradual change began, however, with the elevation of James Forrestal to the post of Secretary of Defense.
James Forrestal
Forrestal served as the nation's first Secretary of Defense. His characteristically grim, taut expression, flat, broken nose, thin lips, and compact body, all gave the impression of a man who was self-possessed, resolute and effective. Although Forrestal served as Secretary of Defense for less than two
years (1947-49), it was an especially stormy period within the defense establishment and among the nations of the world. As Hanson Baldwin wrote in the New York Times, "The disarray on the international scene and the uncertain direction of U.S. foreign and domestic policy immensely complicated the task of establishing new national security machinery." 17 To effectuate these changes, 86
Forrestal chose an evolutionary approach that stressed accommodation to build cooperation. For example, he held informal inter-service conferences in Key
West, Florida, and Newport, Rhode Island, among the service directors.
Forrestal gained wide respect for his leadership, though he had never served in
combat.
Forrestal was a gradualist on racial progress, as he was unification. His
primary contributions to racial progress were to establish a National Defense
Conference on Negro Affairs and to help facilitate issuance of the Executive
Order and formation of the President's committee, rather than a committee
under the office of the Secretary of Defense. On this issue, Forrestal consistently
impeded press coverage. He established the press management techniques
that were taken up by the President's desegregation committee. Forrestal urged
silence to expedite candid discussion and win cooperation. It will be shown that
Forrestal's views were uppermost in Truman's mind when the President spoke
to his Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces.
Forrestal's Career
Early in his life Forrestal was drawn to journalism. After high school and
before college, Forrestal had a brief career as a reporter. While he was a
student at Princeton, he served as editor of the college newspaper. In this
capacity he interviewed many people on and off campus including Franklin D.
Roosevelt, who was then Navy Undersecretary. After college, Forrestal gave up
his journalistic ambitions to pursue a career in business. After a series of jobs,
he became an employee and eventually moved up to the presidency of the
investment house of Dillon, Read and Company. Washington lawyer and later
Roosevelt confidant, Thomas G. Corcoran (Tommy the Cork) recommended the 87
46-year old Forrestal as an administrative assistant in 1940. Soon after, Navy
Secretary Frank Knox convinced Roosevelt to make Forrestal Undersecretary of the Navy. Forrestal performed brilliantly in the position, taking special care to
curry favor with the press and Congress. When Knox died suddenly in 1944,
Forrestal was the natural choice to replace him.
Although he did well as Undersecretary, Forrestal was not Truman's first
choice for Secretary of Defense in September 1947. War Secretary Robert
Patterson, however, turned down Truman's request because he feared that
Congress would not support the military adequately. "It was," he declared, "too
18 hard to put in for money." Forrestal accepted Truman's appointment, and
quickly began to deal with the financial restraints Congress placed on the new
of position. When it authorized the creation of the Office of the Secretary
Defense, Congress did not want "a plethora of assistant secretaries sweeping
into the Pentagon and unrolling large ribbons of red tape;" it therefore
authorized the Secretary to have only three assistants. Forrestal chose three
able men to fill these positions: Marx Leva was Forrestal's principal assistant
and focused chiefly on legal matters; Wilfred McNeil was primarily responsible
for overseeing the military budget; Jack Ohly served as public relations
assistant for the Secretary and functioned as liaison between civilians and the
19 military and between the Secretary and the three service secretaries.
McNeil who had been Navy fiscal director, introduced Leva to Forrestal.
Leva, an Alabama native, was a graduate of Harvard Law School and former
clerk to Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black. During World War II, Leva saw
combat with the Navy in the Mediterranean and in the invasion of Normandy.
After the war in Europe, Leva became General Counsel on Me sleil's staff. Leva
became Forrestal's closest confidant. 88
Leva suggested that Forrestal hire Ohly to balance the Navy-dominated
OSD. Ohly, a graduate of William and Mary and Harvard Law, was a member on the staff of Secretary of War Robert Patterson. Ohly gained renown by
serving as Executive Secretary of the President's Advisory Commission on
Universal Military Training. 20 Leva and Ohly served as de facto assistant under-
secretaries. They shared office space, lunched together almost daily, and
shared decision-making on a wide variety of issues. They were especially
influential in deciding Defense Department press and racial policies.
Forrestal and the Press
During Forrestal's watch as Secretary of Defense, there was public
conflict in virtually everything the Pentagon touched. From custody of the atom
bomb to the budget, every decision seemed marked by press leaks and
anonymous rumor-mongering. Pentagon quarreling, especially over the issue
of unification, became "one of shoddiest spitting contests in U.S. military
history." 21 This in-fighting was often played out publicly in the newspapers.
When Forrestal took office, he did not realize how press relations would
complicate his mission. During World War II, public relations developed as a
centrally-organized activity of the military services. It then acquired unstoppable
momentum in the postwar period; each branch of the military grew to rely on it
as a major weapon to further its budgetary organizational changes. The
publicity surrounding the 1945-1947 unification battle created a press war that
Forrestal feared would destroy the prestige and credibility of the military. 22
Personally, Forrestal enjoyed good relations with the press. He held one
or more press conferences a month and often met with reporters for off-the-
record background talks. His primary press enemies were Drew Pearson and 89
Walter Winchell, who depicted him as a dangerous conservative because of his support for an Arab Palestinian state.
About a month before he was sworn in as Secretary of Defense, Forrestal suggested that he would clamp down on those who leaked sensitive data to the news media. He wrote Vannevar Bush, head of the office of Scientific Research and Development,
With the general international situation as it is, it might be well to review this open publicity policy and start putting the brakes on the flow of information to the American public, which unfortunately, reaches all foreign sources. There comes a time when the worldwide press wire must be excluded from the various experiments and projects carried out by the military of this country. 2 3
Forrestal held his first press conference on 23 September 1947. At that meeting, and on 10 October 1947, Forrestal tried to comprehensively refashion military-press relations. Forrestal told the press there would be separate administration by service of public relations work, designation of a public relations service within his office, and prior clearance by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) of all statements concerning OSD personnel and functions, speeches by the War Council, and releases affecting two or more services which had not reached mutual agreement. On that same day, Forrestal confidentially directed the services to redefine and tighten security classifications and access. 24
Barely a month later, a Navy civilian engineer sent an unsolicited letter to the Washington Post accusing the Air Force of security violations. A flood of press leaks ripped through the media. To staunch the flow, in late 1947,
Forrestal suggested that the press should reimpose war-time voluntary censorship regulations. The Pentagon press corps refused to administer 90
controls as long as the military was unable to stop disclosures. Foreshadowing
Truman's 1951 self-censorship directive, Forrestal ordered a study on the press
25 and national security, which he received in January 1948.
In February, Forrestal issued a press policy which stated, "No article which touches on a controversial subject shall be published, nor shall any speech be delivered without prior approval of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense." This gag rule proved to be largely ineffective. A month later, Forrestal asked the publisher of the Arizona Star and a New York Times reporter to develop a new unified press policy for the services. They recommended a single press office run by a single press officer. 26
Whether his mind was on posterity or security, Forrestal established his own set of news-clippers, who collected relevant articles about the Defense
Department. In March 1949, during Forrestal's last month in office, the United
Press published two stories that contained classified information, one that described B-36 performance characteristics and the other quoted from an Air
Force study on strategic bombing of the Soviet Union. Forrestal reacted to these leaks by consolidating the Office of Public Information as the sole agency for dissemination for military information. 27 Defense Department attempts to control press coverage of infighting in the formation of racial policies would prove no more effective than other press curbs.
Forrestal and Racial Integration
In the period immediately preceding Forrestal's promotion, the Army was preoccupied with post-war demobilization. Generally, Caucasians were sent home first. Thus by default, by February 1946, African Americans represented
15 per cent of Army strength. To reduce that share, the Army suspended Negro 91
enlistments in July and discharged so-called "undesirable" troops in October.
However, by July 1947 in response to Soviet expansion, all enlistments were reopened.
As a result of Civilain Aide Marcus Ray's tour and the new Gillem policy, special training centers and personnel training efforts were established in
Europe. These training centers in Grafenwohr, Kaefetel, and Kitzingen were
primary destinations for a group of black publishers who toured post-war
Europe from 18 March through 8 April 1948. (Interestingly, recommendations be
28 this group of publishers figured in planning for the Berlin Airlift.)
The Army leadership saw the post-Gillem period as a success. As Army
historian Margaret Geis wrote,
The general trend of revisions in command procedures for European command was toward integrating small Negro units into composite larger units of the U.S. Army stationed in Germany, eliminating color as a factor in the recruitment and assignment of soldiers, and increasing the opportunities of affected Negro troops for education and advancement. During the entire period, the command devoted much thought and consideration 29 to use of its Negro troops.
One example of U. S. Army thought and planning revolved around the
possiblity of experimenting with integration on the individual unit level. In one of
his first reports on military desegregation, on 29 February 1948, Defense
Secretary Forrestal wrote Truman to discuss the concept of experimentation.
This particular plan may have been the brainchild of Army Secretary Kenneth
Royall. 30
On 12 March 1948, presidential counsel Clark Clifford met with Forrestal
and asked him to take the lead on racial desegregation. According to Clifford,
although he was personally sympathetic, Forrestal would not impose his views 92
on the three services. The next day Clifford wrote Forrestal a memo saying, "I think we are all fully aware of the difficulties and the fact that the world is not
going to be changed overnight, but I also think the time has come when we must make a start." 31
At the end of the 1948 Senate Hearings on Universal Military Training, civil rights leaders A. Philip Randolph and Grant Reynolds declared that they
32 would counsel young African Americans to avoid a segregated draft. The full import of this fiery declaration will be discussed in Chapter Five.
National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs 33
During a Pentagon-sponsored National Defense Conference on Negro
Affairs, Forrestal articulated his philosophy about publicity and the public to a distinguished group of black journalists, educators, and civil rights leaders.
Planning for the National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs began on 13
April 1948, when Marx Leva prepared a list of black leaders to be invited by
Secretary Forrestal to that conference. 34 The Conference was held at the
Pentagon on 26 April 1948. Nine conferees, along with seven other prominent guests, asked questions of Forrestal, Patterson, Leva, the service secretaries, their liaisons and aides. Journalists from eight different black newspapers were
represented at the Conference. These included Ira Lewis, President of the
Pittsburgh Courier, Cliff W. Mackay of the Baltimore Afro-Americarr, Louis Martin
and Charles Browning of the Chicago Defender, 35 Dowdal Davis of the Kansas
City Calf, Dan Burley of the Amsterdam News and P. B. Young, editor and ;
publisher of the Norfolk Journal and Guide.
The meeting was contentious. The conferees were encouraged by the
Navy's previously announced plans for desegregation, unhappy with delays in 93
policy implimentation by the Air Force and downright angry with Secretary of the
Army Kenneth Royall. After the conferees interviewed the service representatives, they held a final session with Forrestal. Together, they discussed points of agreement and conclusions. Forrestal, the former Secretary of the Navy, stressed that the gradualist approach had proven successful for the
Navy because it had been accomplished with a minimum of public discussion and with the aim of announcing success after it had been achieved, rather than
predicting it before it could be guaranteed. He pointed out that Navy changes
had been made with the full approval and support of top service leadership,
implying that such endorsement was absent among the Army General Staff.
Forrestal declared that he would not issue a statement of policy in the form of an official directive until he had more assurance that the directive would
be supported by those who would administer it. Forrestal declared, "the
utterance of a policy that is not followed through is more destructive than not
having one." Forrestal said he preferred to receive "unpleasant criticism" for
slow action, rather than to win plaudits for actions that are "manifestly insincere
and specious." He expressed a willingness to meet with an advisory group to
keep his office “conscious of the problem," but he insisted that the services
cannot be "forced into cooperation, mutual respect and coordination, such as
unification of the services required simply by law, by fiat."
Rather than address the dilemmas inherent in gradualism, the conferees
impressed upon Forrestal their absolute repudiation of Royall's support of
segregation. In sum, they argued that a national predilection for prejudice and
bigotry could not excuse its existence in the military; in fact, official policies of
segregation and military subservience to local discrimination policies
perpetuated and accelerated prejudice in American life. 94
On 12 May, Forrestal met again with Clark Clifford, along with White
House assistants Phileo Nash and David Niles to begin discussion of an executive order to desegregate the Armed Services. At that point, the White
House was, apparently, still considering the creation of a committee within the
Department of Defense to draft the Order. Authorship of the decision to create an Executive Order is less clear than authorship of the orders themselves.
According to Lee Nichols, Nash said he had previously contemplated a committee within the military establishment to push steps toward nonsegregation, similar to the War Department's Troop Policies Committee
(McCloy Committee) in World War II. Action was tabled until after the passage of
36 the selective service bill.
On 1 July, Clifford asked Nash to draft the two executive orders on civil rights. Clifford discussed the second order, which provided equal opportunity and treatment in the armed services, with Forrestal. The Defense Secretary requested that the order eliminate any specific timetable or deadline for compliance. He asked that each service be allowed to work out its own timetable and insisted that the order simply call for progress "as rapidly as possible." Clifford agreed and urged Truman to issue the amended executive order. 37
Kenneth Royall
Kenneth Royall, the Army’s highest ranking advocate for segregation, was blocked from attaining the top job in Truman's reorganized Department of
Defense. Royall worked for Secretary of War Robert Patterson. Patterson was
offered the post of Secretary of Defense by Truman. He declined it and resigned as War Secretary. During a brief interim, Royall took over as Patterson's 95
Royall by successor in the Secretary of War post. However, Truman snubbed offering him the lessor post of Secretary of the Army and offering the Defense
Secretary job to James Forrestal. The issue of military desegregation would,
of Army 38 eventually, cause Kenneth Royall to lose his position as Secretary ; yet, his tenure as one of the few vocal segregationists in the Truman administration was critical for the preservation of the Gillem Board policy. To do this Royall played a crucial role in the National Defense Conference on Negro
National 39 and in his Affairs, on the issue of desegregation of the Guard , support of General Omar Bradley who opposed the Executive Order. Perhaps because he anticipated his departure from the Pentagon, Royall was less active as the Army's point-man in later negotiations with the President's Committee on
Equality of Treatment and Opportunity.
Although General Omar Bradley would generate greater publicity at Fort
fight in Knox, it was Secretary of the Army Royall who led the against change the Army's racial practices. As the debate over these practices expanded in the
press, Royall emerged as the principal spokesman against further integration
and the principal target of civil rights forces. Royall was convinced that the
separate but equal formula of present policies did provide equality. When
questions of efficiency, compounded by fears of Soviet conspiracy, complicated
the debate, the issue seemed irrefutable to segregationists.
Royall was not only an outspoken opponent of desegregation, but he
may have also secretely worked with Omar Bradley and others in the Army and
in the Senate to hinder its implementation. It will be shown that he provided
false and incomplete statistics to prevent the President's desegregation
committee from completing its work. He recognized that early announcement of
desegregation plans could derail cooperation and tried to prematurely 96
announce them. In one of his last acts as Secretary of the Army, he threatened premature public exposure of White House efforts to block them.
Why did Royall feel empowered to take such a contrary stance with the
President and the Secretary of Defense? In part, it was because Forrestal
40 preferred to avoid conflict at any cost. It may also may have been because
Royall had strong support from all manner of segregationists. After virtually every public statement that he made, Royall received letters of support for his segregationist opinions. 41 For instance, after Truman's Executive Order, the
Army and Na vy Journal published an editorial extolling segregation. Royall
42 wrote Editor John Callan O'Laughlin praising him for the editorial
Royall's Career
General Omar Bradley was quoted as describing Royall as "a genial giant," who was 6 feet, 5 inches tall and 250 pounds. The scion of a noted
Southern family from Goldsboro, North Carolina, Royall was a Phi Beta Kappa graduate from the University of North Carolina and Harvard Law School.
Among his teachers at Harvard were Felix Frankfurter. After serving in the field
artillery in France in World War I, Royall returned to a lucrative law practice in
North Carolina, served in the state senate and was elected president of the
State Bar Association. Six months after Pearl Harbor, at the request of
Undersecretary Patterson, he returned to the Army as a reserve colonel in the
Army fiscal and legal branches. Patterson promoted him to brigadier general and put him in charge of the Army's congressional relations. When Patterson replaced Henry L. Stimson in 1945 as Secretary of War, Royall was named
Undersecretary. 43 97
Royall served as War Secretary from 24 July 1947 through 17
September 1947. On 18 September 1947, the day after Forrestal was sworn in as Secretary of Defense, Royall was effectively demoted, and sworn in as
44 Secretary of the Army.
Royall and Racial Integration
As Undersecretary of War at the end of World War II, Kenneth Royall had
in the formation little to do with the military's racial problems. He was not active
of the Gillem Board policy. He first became involved with racial policies as War
Secretary when some congressmen from Northern states and Civilian Aide
Marcus Ray suggested that individual states should be permitted integrated
policy National Guard units, if they so desired. Before these suggestions, Army
dictated the National Guard, as a reserve component of the Army, had to follow
the Gillem policy, which did not allow integration. The Army General Staff,
including Chief of Staff General Dwight Eisenhower agreed that federal
recognition should be withdrawn from those National Guard units which
integrated Negroes into white units. 45 Eisenhower decided, however, that
Negro companies could be included in white battalions. The Army's Operation
and Training Division (G*3) and the Air Force opposed even this concession. In
a policy statement, the division expressed the opinion that if Negroes gained an
opening in the National Guard, "the next step by Negro leaders conceivably will
be to demand the integration of Negroes into Regular Army units as
individuals." 46
The Army appeared to recognize that change was in the air, but it gave
no indication of accepting it willingly. Asked to comment on the Committee on
Civil Rights' report, Secretary of the Army Royall would say only that the Gillem
47 policy was the one the Army followed, and it would be continued. 98
The Gillem Board policy (officially, War Department Circular 124) was
Royall intended to conclude in late October 1947; this was barely a month after became the Secretary of the Army. When Royall urged continuation of the
Gillem policy, Walter White asked for a meeting with Forrestal and Navy
Secretary John L. Sullivan. White was unable to change the Gillem Board policy. 48
officials with In late November, General B. O. Davis urged the Army meet the nation's black newspaper editors to respond to the resurgent political
49 interest in military desegregation. (As one of a very few African-American
relevant officers in the Pentagon, General Davis had problems even receiving
information. General Collins had to request approval from Royall's
Undersecretary, William Draper, Jr., to let General Davis meet with General
Charles Hall, Director of Organization and Training, and with Personnel and
Administration Director Willard Paul on the latest progress in race relations.)
Davis's request led to the tour of European installations by members of the
Negro Newspaper Association.
In November 1947, the first major attempt to form composite units of
whites and Negroes was made public when it was announced that some black
50 units would be included in the Eighty-second Airborne Division. Inquiries to
the Army about how the Committee on Civil Rights' report affected Army policy
prompted a message to be sent to all Continental Army commanders: "Recent
newspaper and magazine accounts have highlighted portions of the President's
Committee on Civil Rights. . . Such accounts taken out of context might be
misunderstood." 51 99
Integration of the National Guard
conflicts In 1948, the President's civil rights message sparked new between the Army and the states over who had the right to regulate the National
Guard. New Jersey passed a new constitution with a clause forbidding
Alfred E. segregation in the militia. On 1 February 1948, New Jersey Governor
to Driscoll announced that the Department of the Army had forbidden his state
52 to the integrate its National Guard. Immediately, Walter White sent a telegram
Secretary of Defense, citing the President's civil rights message instructions to the Secretary to end remaining discrimination in the military. White asked how the Army's action could be consistent with state law and Presidential directive. 53
The Administration immediately recognized the political importance of the Army's action in New Jersey. Marx Leva recommended that Forrestal should talk with Secretary Royall: "This is a serious matter both from the standpoint of
practical considerations and the standpoint of the political implications." After
his talk with Forrestal, Royall wrote Governor Driscoll that "for the present" the
Army would continue to recognize the New Jersey National Guard. Royall
warned that the recognition of an integrated New Jersey militia would not
constitute change of the Regular Army segregation policy, because segregation
"was considered to be in the interest of national defense, and both the staff and I
54 feel that this is still the case."
Charley Cherokee of the Chicago Defender noted the Driscoll statement
put Royall on the spot and suggested, "Well, we scribblers said he (Royall) was
probably excited and forgot to ask advice of his aide, James Evans, on when to
.* 55 open and when to close his big mouth on race matters. . Walter White noted
a paradox and addressed this with Secretary Forrestal. In the past, the Army
had stated that its policy was to conform to local laws and customs when 100
White refusing to violate the Southern etiquette of segregation. "How, then,"
clear- said, “can the imposition of segregation upon northern states having such
56 cut laws and policies in opposition to such practices be justified by the Army?"
Henry Wallace, campaigning for the black vote in Harlem, charged that the
President was insincere on the question of civil rights. If Truman really wanted to end segregation in the armed forces, he would ask Secretary of the Army
Royall to resign. 57
The New Jersey incident prompted repercussions in Connecticut, New
York, and Minnesota. 58 The National Guard issue caused enough concern at the White House that Secretary Royall was ordered not to answer any inquiries
59 without prior approval by Clark Clifford. Royall was caught between the Army
General Staff and the National Guard Bureau on the one hand and intense
White House pressure on the other. In a compromise, he would continue to offer
Army recognition and support to any state that outlawed segregation in the militia by constitutional amendment or legislative act. He refused to accept a
60 governor's executive order to end segregation as sufficient. Against the advice of Forrestal and Clifford, Royall insisted on defending segregation in his
letters to the governors of Minnesota and Connecticut: "It is the opinion of the
policy of 27 Staff--with which I concur-that in the interest of national defense the
April 1946 [segregation], should be uniformly applied throughout the Federal
forces of the Army." 61
Rovall meets National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs
Before the National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs, Royall began
to circulate a plan to test an integrated unit; Charley Cherokee suggested the
idea would be proposed to the Negro Publishers Association who were 101
planning to tour Army bases in Europe. He said Royall planned to use it to win
62 recognition before his run for Governor of North Carolina .
Although the group was not specifically named, a Newsweek article provided one of the few reported descriptions of Forrestal's National Defense
Conference. Army Secretary Royall told them Tm from North Carolina and I know the Negro ." 63 While that statement epitomizes Royall's remarks, it does not begin to suggest their full significance.
Royall told the conferees that when he first became Secretary of War, he directed a restudy of the Gillem Board Report to see if it should be renovated.
Generals Eisenhower and Bradley and the Army staff urged that he retain the policy without changes. Royall declared that he concurred with these decisions.
When asked about his attitude toward experimental or demonstration integrated units, Royall declared that "after very careful study and consideration with those who know a great deal about the military," he concluded that such projects should not be attempted. He said that he fully appreciated the Negro point of view on non-segregation. He dismissed as "political" any notion that the Army's
64 racial policies presented an undemocratic example to the world .
Attorney Charles Houston suggested that continued military segregation
65 might engender civil disturbances . In this connection, Houston noted, Royall had once referred to black units as possibly being vulnerable to subversive propaganda. Royall said he thought that the possibility was unlikely, but would
66 be dealt with .
The Secretary argued that the Army insisted upon racial segregation because of "military expediency" and "experience." But the conferees pointed out that the Army never had even tried integration on a broad scale. This insistence, they explained, expressed an Army attitude, rather than an acquired experience. When the Army did integrate the training of specialists, and when 102
Northern states integrated their National Guards, the conferees noted, the Army dismissed the positive results.
The Army was forcing upon blacks "uniformly and without exception" a pattern of racial segregation which legally prevailed in a minority of the states of the Union. "In so doing,” the conferees concluded, "the Army does severe violence to the Negro as a citizen by deliberately operating below the level of
American experience and purpose."
The next day, Colonel David Ginsburgh met with a few reporters to clarify
Royall's remarks. He explained that Royall meant to say social advances could only be made in the framework of the Gillem Report, not that social advances could only be made within the framework of segregation. The Defense
Conference was largely ignored by the white press, but black newspapers
publicized it and they were far more critical of witnesses.
Newsweek did suggest that the group reacted strongly to Royall's words.
in "Not only did it fail to repudiate [Civil Rights leader A. Philip] Randolph, but
effect [it] adopted his tactic by flatly refusing to form the Advisory committee that
Forrestal had encouraged." 67 In 1948 Randolph had called upon young
African-Americans to refuse to cooperate with the draft.
On 30 April 1948, Royall complained to Forrestal that the other secretaries did not appear at the Defense Conference; Royall argued that their
68 neglect disrupted the spirit of unification. Defense Conference Chair Lewis
Granger's final report rebutted Royall's testimony, which in turn, drew umbrage from Royall. Without first advising his Secretary of the Army, Forrestal released
69 the Conference report to the press and the New York Times. In reply, Royall
complained about the "bad rap" that he was getting from the prt ss. In late
September 1948, Royall sent a confidential memo to Forrestal. He wrote, 103
with the It seems to me that the Army as compared other two Departments is taking an unnecessary rap among the Negro and the liberal press in the matter of race relations.
This is in large part due to the conference of Negro leaders last spring, which now appears to have been
generally unfortunate. At that conference it was of insisted that I be present even at the expense postponing a Congressional hearing. None of the other Secretaries appeared, with the result that the entire burden of the criticism was directed at the Department of the Army and me personally. This criticism has carried over into the press ever since....
In view of the fact that the Army's present policy has not been disapproved by your office (nor by the President), and there has been no suggestion from
either source that a change should be made, I feel that your office should go on record publicly as
approving the Army's position.... I believe this course would be much better than for me to state (in necessary defense of the Army) the facts showing the tacit approval of the Army's position and demonstrating the fact that our own treatment of the Negro is equal to that of the Air Force and superior to 70 that of the Navy .
On Forrestal's behalf, Marx Leva wrote a draft reply which acknowledged that the Army received the burden of criticism. However, the office of the
Secretary of Defense had not disapproved of the Army policy because it had not
the reviewed it. Consideration of these policies would soon be given by
President's Committee. Forrestal chose not to use Leva's letter but instead chose to speak to Royall directly. Using Leva's unsent memo as a talking paper,
71 Forrestal blocked Royall's ultimatum . 104
First Peace-Time Conscription
In late May, weeks after Clark Clifford first approached Forrestal about composing an Executive Order, Forrestal, Bradley, and Royall testified against race-related amendments to the 1948 draft bill. The Republican-controlled
Senate Armed Services Committee rejected all segregationist and integrationist amendments and the Senate concurred by voice vote. After that defeat,
Southern Democrats threatened to filibuster when the draft law reached the
Senate floor. 72
The issue of desegregation continued to be a prominent one throughout the spring. On 21 May, the Army Chief of Staff sent underlined copies of the
President's Committee on Civil Rights and Higher Education reports to the nation's commanding generals. On 25 May, Leva sent Royall a copy of a report by Dennis Nelson, USNR Navy Public Relations Department. The report favorably compared the Navy's integration policy with that of the other services.
On 14 June, Evans sent Royall a note stating that a similar Army study would be sent that day under separate cover. 73 On 21 June, Lieutenant General Willard
Paul prepared a summary of action on the Report of the Negro Publishers and
Editors tour of European installations. In accordance with the editors’ recommendations, Paul recommended that Negro officer strength be increased for the European command, that the Training Center at Kitzingen be continued, and that no interim directive be sent to the theater regarding use of Negroes in overhead installations. In response, Royall reiterated his support for the Gillem
Report but also recommended that a study be instituted to find ways to increase the number of Negro officers. 74 105
National Guard and the Executive Order
Agitation for action to permit integration of the National Guard by a governor's executive order continued through the late spring. 75 Secretary
Royall wanted to answer these letters with another firm reaffirmation of the Army
Staff's opposition to any deviation from the policy of segregation, but would include a statement that constitutional or legislative action would be reluctantly accepted. 76 Chief of Staff Omar Bradley said that "from the military point of
view, I still think that any integration of Negroes.. .in the National Guard will create problems which may have serious consequences in case of national mobilization of those units." 77 However, the White House refused to let Royall mail his letters. 78 Clark Clifford informed Royall that "the President has suggested that this entire matter be studied carefully in the light of recent happenings"; and he wanted to "discuss the subject thoroughly." 79 Secretary
Royall said he knew of nothing in recent events that would change the policy he had announced earlier. "The staff and myself strongly feel that this policy cannot be changed without adversely affecting national defense...." Royall answered. 80
(The "recent happenings" referred to by the President and Clifford concerned the Democratic convention. A liberal plank against segregation in the armed forces had been adopted and the Administration would act upon it.)
As the focus of attention turned to the political conventions, Royall made fewer public statements about racial policies. However, on 19 July 1948, Chief of Staff General Omar Bradley held a 9:40 A.M. telephone call with Major
Kenneth Cramer to set up an appointment with Royall. He intended to speak with Royall on "the question of segregation." They later had lunch with eleven members of the top staff including Alvan Gillem and Dwight Eisenhower, who had appointed Gillem to create the "Negro utilization policy." 81 Executive Order
9981 was released on 26 July 1948. On that same day, Bradley contradicted 106
Truman's order in a comment made to reporters at Fort Knox. In turn, Royall
instructed his staff that they were not to comment on the Order. He reassured
Truman that Bradley meant no disrespect and he advised Bradley to explain the
incident to Truman. 82
When the time came to choose members of the Presidential Committee
in mid-September, Royall recommended that no one serve on it who had made
a statement on military desegregation. It may have been that the appointment of
Georgia-born Solicitor General Charles Fahy as chairman of the President's
Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services was
a bow to Royall. 83
Experimental Unit
Royall was usually an inept politician. But at the end of 1948, after the
election, he hatched a plan that would temporarily torpedo integration and
extend the life of the Gillem Board plan for another year and a half. As Secretary
of War, he had political support in Congress and in the Army. Yet the
integrationists continued to gain ground. In October, Royall seemingly reversed
course, and again suggested the Army should create an experimental
integrated unit. He explained that they had deferred the idea because of the
international situation, the small size of the Army at that time, and the national
elections. This time, in deference to Forrestal, the plan was carefully drawn up
with an absence of publicity. (Meanwhile, on 7 November 1948, ten days after
his surprise reelection, Truman ordered a severe budget cut of the defense
department.) According to some Washington-insiders, Truman was seeking the
resignation of Forrestal, Royall, and Air Force Secretary Stuart Symington. 84
Then, in December, Royall formally proposed a defense-wide experiment in 107
integration involving all the services. The Navy and Air Force refused to go along with the experiment. The plan was cancelled. Through this stratagem, the
Army was able to delay integration until 1950. 85
A Final Ultimatum
During the first few months of 1949, Royall challenged the authority of the
President’s military desegregation committee by withholding and then suddenly releasing necessary enlistment data to them. For months, Royall refused to work with the Air Force on a desegregation plan. Royall's procrastination put Air
Force Public Relations Officer Lieutenant William Savoy in a spot, the Chicago
Defender reported. Black newsmen kept "taking potshots" at Savoy because he would not release news about Negroes. If he released information, he would delay implementation of the Air Force desegregation plan. If he did not, he would be a target of black newsmen. 86 Then, on 21 April 1949, Royall sent the new Secretary of Defense a memorandum which summarized the number of
Negro officers and the reenlistment rate among black soldiers in defense of existing Army racial policy. 87
Royall’s testimony before the President's Committee echoed his statements before the National Defense Conference. Then, in early April, the new Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, simply and unequivocally ignored the President’s Committee and ordered the services to prepare desegregation plans. When segregationists attacked the decision, Johnson ignored them. In his response to Johnson, Royall combined deception and intimidation to create another major obstacle to desegregation. Others in the Army also would try to block racial progress, but none were as highly placed as Royall. First, he argued that the Department of the Army practices and procedures were "in 108
accord with the policies of the National Military Establishment and with
Executive Order 9981." Royall falsely claimed that the Army was making assignments in schooling, placement, and promotion without regard to race.
With this action, Royall was defying the President, the Fahy Committee, and the
Secretary of Defense by sticking to his belief that equality could be achieved through segregation. Then, in a separate confidential note sent on the same day, Royall reminded Johnson that during the previous spring he and Forrestal had met with the Senate Armed Services Committee to discuss the draft law.
"Certain Senators stated that they would violently oppose the legislation unless they were convinced that President Truman would in no event issue a peremptory order as Commander-in-Chief completely abolishing segregation in the Army." He noted that Forrestal had promised them as much, and that
Truman gave his approval as well. Then Royall closed his letter by warning
Johnson, "if any action were later taken by you or by other authority to abolish
segregation in the Army, I am confident that these Southern Senators would remember this incident and might possibly call Mr. Forrestal and myself as witnesses on the question." 88 Royall resigned five days later.
Omar Bradley
89 After Bradley's heroic efforts in Europe, President Harry Truman appointed him to restore the Department of Veterans Affairs and to manage the nation's veteran's hospitals, which were in scandalous disrepair. Bradley reluctantly accepted the post. In 1948, Bradley was named Army Chief of Staff.
In this position, he streamlined Army bureaucracy by devising a vice-chief of staff position and consolidating technical services under the director of logistics, administrative services under the director of personnel and administration as 109
well as financial and management under the Army comptroller. Bradley answered to Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and Army Secretary
Kenneth Royall.
During the racially turbulent years of Truman's first term in office, Bradley occasionally spoke out on his belief about racial desegregation in the military.
Although Bradley's early opinions echoed official Army policy, he received more positive press from most black newspapers than Royall. That situation changed
in late July 1948.
On the same day that Truman issued Executive Order 9981 which established the President's Equality Committee, Bradley told a group of military men and reporters that the Army would not desegregate before the nation did.
Bradley's statement earned nation-wide headlines even as Truman was urging a hostile Congress to pass a strong civil rights bill. For this reason, historian
Morris MacGregor described the Bradley incident as "the most celebrated pronouncement on segregation at the moment of the Truman order." 90 This section will provide new light on this critical moment. We will make a case that
Bradley contrived this incident to embarrass Truman and possibly derail his election efforts.
Up until the summer of 1948, Bradley's civil rights beliefs could be characterized as moderately segregationist. In January 1948, he told the
American Jewish Committee that the Army could not induce men to become
soldiers if they were divested of their dignity and human rights. He further stated:
Contributing to this atmosphere of racial discrimination is often the lack of education which has retarded the Negro. This denial of equal education opportunity to a portion of our civilian population tends to drag down the whole economic level of our people by preventing intelligent 110
utilization of our manpower resources and by limiting their purchasing income.
The Pittsburgh Courier, the nation's largest black newspaper, called Bradley the first American general to speak for abolishing discrimination and segregation in the Army. 91
In June 1948, Bradley spoke out again. In addressing Los Angeles Town
Hall, Bradley earned headlines by condemning harsh Army discipline and promised liberal treatment of draftees. In this context, Bradley was asked if liberal treatment might include racial integration. Bradley replied that the
"complete integration" of Negro personnel as distinguished from the maintenance of separate-but-equal all-Negro units within a Caucasian Army
92 was a problem "which is up to the population as a whole."
Bradley's Pre-Fort Knox Action
Bradley's activities from mid-July through mid-August 1948 suggest that he participated in a deliberate plan to embarrass Truman. Although the case is admittedly circumstantial, the evidence is compelling. Bradley's diary shows that on 19 July 1948, he made a 9:40 A.M. telephone call with Major Kenneth
Cramer to set up an appointment with Army Secretary Kenneth Royall. That
record shows that he intended to speak with Royall on "the question of segregation." Later that day, Bradley had lunch with eleven members of the top brass including Alvan Gillem, who created Circular 124, the Army's plan to handle utilization of Negro troops, Dwight Eisenhower, who appointed Gillem to that assignment, and Wade Haislip, Army Deputy Chief of Staff. 93
On 20 July, Bradley met with Washington Post owner Eugene Meyer and publisher Philip Graham. The Post would figure prominently in the ensuing Ill
incident. Bradley attended a Joint Chiefs meeting later in the afternoon. On 21
July, he had dinner at the home of Secretary Forrestal; Lieutenant General
Lucius Clay, who headed the military government in Germany, Royall and Army
Undersecretary William H. Draper, Jr., also attended. Draper had recently taken over responsibility for the Fort Knox Training Center from Brigadier General
John M. Devine. It is quite possible that they may have planned the Fort Knox trip at this dinner. On July 22, Bradley met with the National Security Council,
President Truman, the service secretaries and Forrestal. Afterward, he met again with the Joint Chief's staff. Bradley's diary for Friday, 23 July was blank.
94 However, he was in the office on Saturday.
On Saturday night the Kenneth Royalls threw a "double-barrelled celebration" to honor Bradley's birthday and his one-year anniversary as Chief of Staff of the Army. The gala, held at the Mayflower Hotel, was one of
Washington's social highlights. More than 800 movers and shakers attended.
The Post featured it on its Society pages. It is not improbable to believe that the upcoming special session of Congress (nicknamed the "Turnip" session) and
95 civil rights would have been prominent topics at the party.
On Monday, 26 July, Bradley met with Lawton Collins, his chief of public information and deputy chief of staff; Colonel C. B. Hansen; Thomas Schroth,
Managing Editor of the Brooklyn Eagle, and Diana Mower and Marion Cranston of the CIO. After work, Bradley flew to Fort Knox, Kentucky with Information and
Education Division Director Brigadier General C. R. Lanham; Personnel and
Administration Director Lieutenant General Willard S. Paul; Lieutenant General
H. A. Craig, Chief of Staff for Materials, Colonel Robert S. Moore; Colonel H. T.
Miller; Colonel H. K. Whalen; and Lieutenant Colonel J. B. Matthews, Director of Organization and Training. 96 112
Fort Knox Statement
The next day, Truman announced the new Executive Order promising
"equality of treatment and opportunity in the Armed Forces." In her article on the
Order, Mary Spargo of the Post commented upon liberal political pressures that may have motivated Truman’s action:
The President's unheralded action was taken on the eve of his appearance before the special session of Congress today when he is expected to advocate passage of the poll-tax repeal and the anti-lynching
bill.
It followed by less than 24 hours the adoption in Philadelphia of the platform of Henry Wallace's Progressive Party which called for the end of discrimination and segregation in the armed services 97 and in Federal employment.
Truman’s order delicately skirted phrasing that used the politically- volatile term, “desegregation “ Instead he called for “equality of opportunity and training.” Royall’s distinction between "separate but equal" and desegregation was momentarily preserved. Bradley did not keep up his diary for Tuesday, 27 July. The official files of the Chief of
Staff included a scrap from the Washington Daily News front page of
Tuesday, 27 July. The second news brief, datelined Fort Knox, Kentucky, reported:
The nation's new soldiers may start their Army careers on furlough. Lieut. Gen. Willard Paul, director
of personnel, said the Army might find it necessary to furlough a number of its draftees as soon as they are inducted because facilities for housing and training them are not available.
Gen. Paul spoke at a conference of high-ranking officers. Gen. Omar Bradley, chief of staff, said in 113
reference to the issue of non-segregation of races in the Army that, "the Army is not out to make any social reforms. Gen. Bradley said "the Army will keep men of different races in different companies. It will change 98 that policy when the nation as a whole changes it.’
On Wednesday, 28 July, Bradley returned to his office. Although his statements made nation-wide headlines and would therefore have certainly have been on his mind, there is no evidence from his diary that Bradley was working on the controversy.
On 29 July, James Evans, Civilian Aide to the Secretary of the Army, sent a copy of a resolution for anti-discrimination issued by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People to Army Secretary Royall. It is worth
remembering that Truman spoke at this conference, the first President to address the NAACP. 99
Later that day, Truman held a press conference in which he disclaimed
Bradley's statement. According to the Associated Press news-wire copy,
Truman told the news conference that he envisioned an eventual elimination of
segregation in the Armed Forces. The President told the reporters that his
information from Army Secretary Royall was that General Bradley had NOT said
he favored segregation in the lower echelons of the Army. When asked about
the statement attributed to Bradley, the Chief Executive said that he had not
seen the Bradley remarks but had been informed by Royall that Bradley had
made no such statement. Then a reporter asked whether the President
envisioned an eventual end of segregation. Truman declared that his new
executive order did, in fact, mean the end of segregation in the military. With that
100 statement, the postwar civil rights movement gained its first victory. 114
That evening, a Sergeant Burns delivered a note from Royall to the White
House. Royall apologized noting that "I am sure that General Bradley would not
Furthermore have made the statement if he had known reporters were present. at the time he had not read your Order and did not know of my instructions that
no comment would be made thereon. While the quotation of General Bradley
101 was substantially correct, he tells me that this quotation was incomplete."
Bradley spent 29 July in his office. At 1 1:40 P.M., Bradley met with
columnist Drew Pearson and Colonel C. B. Hansen. On 3 August 1948,
Pearson reported that Bradley could not have known about the President's
declaration because he woke up at 6:30 A.M. and reported to the seminar at
7:30. 102
On 30 July 1948, Bradley wrote Truman an apology at the direction of
Kenneth Royall. Bradley said he attended the Fort Knox conference to instill
commanders with the need for safeguarding the dignity and the individuality of
their men. During the last few minutes of the morning conference, Bradley said
he spoke extemporaneously, without notes, and that no record was made of his
comments. He claimed that he did not know that reporters had been admitted
into the conference. He assumed that he was speaking privately, but he was
prepared to meet the reporters later, at a scheduled 12:45 P.M. press
conference.
Earlier that morning, a commander asked for guidance regarding
establishment of separate service clubs for white and Negro soldiers. Bradley
wrote these commanders deserved some guidance to help them answer
segregation questions. Bradley write that he explained to the men that the
Army's only reason for existence lay in this capacity to provide for the nation's
common defense. Any policy which cut dangerously into voluntary manpower,
any policy which impaired operating efficiency at this time would jeopardize the 115
ability to maintain a minimum security force. He also noted many Southern volunteers felt antagonism and hostility toward progressive integration policies.
In guiding the commanders on segregation issues, Bradley told Truman that he had referred to the statement he had made five weeks earlier in
California. In Los Angeles, Bradley had said, "the question of integration of the
Negro is a vital problem of social reform--to be achieved first by the people of the United States--and thereafter by the United States Army."
Press reports, however, contradict Bradley's recollections. Reporters from the Associated Press, the United Press International, and the International
News Services were in Kentucky on 27 July to report how Fort Knox lessons were being applied to the Third Armored Division. 103 These journalists also on
Bradley’s comments; no newspaper, however, reported that Bradley specifically mentioned either the word segregation or integration.
Press reports do confirm that Bradley reaffirmed his belief that it would be hazardous for the United States to employ the Army deliberately as an instrument of social reform. Likewise, they show he said the Army must be kept fully aware of the substantial civilian progress in race relations.
Bradley assured Truman that he had no intention whatsoever of embarrassing him in any way. He closed his letter of apology by reiterating that had he known the press was present, he would have avoided any mention of the segregation issue. He further claimed that at that time, he had not yet seen the Executive Order published on 27 July. Finally when he returned to
Washington on the evening of 27 July, Bradley said he learned that the
Department had adopted a policy of "no comment" on his Executive Order. 104
As Clark Clifford noted, Bradley did not retract the views ascribed to him.
In fact, Bradley was once quoted as saying that he had done much to discourage instant integration and that, "true integration of the armed forces 116
would not come for another ten years, following the general pattern in the civilian community.” 105
Congressional Reaction.
After the Fort Knox statement, Representative Joseph Bryson of South
Carolina commended Bradley; Representative Ed Gossett of Texas and Overton
Brooks of Louisiana both accused Truman of playing politics with American security. South Carolina Senator Burnett Maybank, an Armed Services
Committee member, hailed the statement and admitted that he and Army generals agreed to retain segregation. Maybank's statement included an
unidentified news report of Bradley's remarks. From this, it appears that the
Chief of Staff made extensive remarks saying the Army was "the favorite whipping boy of the country" and that the caste system would not only remain but that "it's only the just reward for those who work the hardest."
The Post reported on these reactions. Spargo noted the Southern
Democrats, "already alienated from Mr. Truman, grimly noted his statement, and
started figuring what they could do to block his program." Spargo notes that
Senator Tom Stewart of Tennessee wanted a bill that would allow white
soldiers to refuse to serve in integrated units. Others, such as Alabama's Lister
Hill said that Truman's move would impair Army morale when efficiency was
crucial. As has been shown, Spargo says they united in charging the President
was playing politics with the issue. 106
On the other hand, Truman's desegregation statement at his press
conference impressed the African American community. Based on this
pronouncement and later confirming statements, civil rights lea fer A. Philip
Randolph felt obligated to suspend a nation-wide civil disobedience campaign 117
against draft registration. (See chapter four for a fuller discussion of this issue.) 107
Press Reaction.
At this moment in the Presidential campaign, Bradley's comment was hardly regarded as a minor statement. It prompted front-page headlines, debate among commentators, and letters to the editor. While no major news magazines covered the incident, many newspapers used the occasion to voice their opinion on racial separation in the military. The Washington Post and the New
York Times each published two editorials.
The Times, which relied on the Associated Press report, said that Truman termed Bradley's statement as a misquotation "to the effect that segregation would continue in the lower echelons of the Army." They noted that, after the press conference, Army public information officers would make no statement either on the President's extemporaneous press conference remarks or regarding General Bradley's views. Bradley saved a copy of the 29 July Post editorial which said:
... if General Bradley's offhand remarks at Fort Knox Tuesday on racial segregation in the Army are indicative of how the President's anti-discrimination order is to be applied, the program is indeed to be a hollow one.
The Post editorial accepted that "in fairness to General Bradley, it must
be explained that he had not seen the President's order at the time he
delineated Army policy." The Post skeptically characterized Truman's Orders as
"vague in outline and weak in administrative implication." The editorial closed
by arguing that "it would be encouraging to have the great stature and breadth 118
of vision General Bradley has exhibited on so many occasions devoted to meeting this problem squarely."
In a by-lined article, Times chief Pentagon reporter, Hanson Baldwin argued on behalf of General Willard Paul's version of the story:
It was undoubtedly a straight-forward and
courageous statement and it put the problem in the
perspective in which it belonged-as a national
problem, rather than as an Army problem. It required
amplification, however, which it has now received.
His remarks should have been read against the background of the policy the General enunciated with such complete logic at Los Angeles earlier in the year. There he repeated what he said at Fort Knox but in a form somewhat less bald. The complete integration of Negro personnel in the Army was a 108 problem which is up to the population as a whole .
Questions and Contradictions.
Historians Morris MacGregor and Richard Dalfiume concluded that
Bradley was unaware of the President's Order and unaware of the presence of reporters in the Fort Knox training room. As evidence, they cite Bradley's letters
109 of apology and the article by the Posts Mary Spargo .
However, some things do not add up. First, Bradley's statement to
Truman differs substantially from press reports of the Fort Knox statement.
Bradley says that he confused the words "segregation" and "integration" in his talk. Yet in the Associated Press article, Bradley is clearly quoted as saying, "the
Army is not out to make any social reforms." In that account, he goes on to say
that "the Army will put men of different races in different companies. It will
change that policy when the nation as a whole changes it." In the Associated
Press account, Bradley did not utter the words "segregation" or "integration." 119
Clearly, in his Fort Knox statements, Bradley was advocating the same
110 gradualist approach that had been Army policy before the war.
Bradley surely knew that the Kentucky site would be the object of
publicity. It was the experimental model for Universal Military Training (UMT). As
111 such, it had been the focus of much press and Army publicity. On base, thirteen Public Relations Officers were assigned to help visiting journalists get out pro-UMT publicity. 112
Bradley surely also knew that Fort Knox had been the object of controversy regarding segregation. In March, civil rights leader A. Philip
Randolph had written Truman advising that House Armed Services Committee
Chairman Walter G. Andrews told him that an antidiscrimination bill was removed from the original UMT model. According to a witness who testified before the Senate Armed Services subcommittee on UMT, an unnamed clergyman, who was a member of the 1947 Fort Knox Advisory Committee recommended Negro participation in the UMT model. However, Camp
Commander Brigadier General John M. Devine said it would be impractical to create a separate black platoon and, thus, they would be left out. At the April
National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs, Dr. Charles Houston asked
Army Secretary Royall about the Model Battalion at Fort Knox. Royall answered that the UMT experiment had nothing to do with the current Army, and the question of whether or not the Army would try UMT was not being considered. 113
Bradley's ignorance of the presence of reporters at Fort Knox is unlikely.
Reporters from the Associated Press, the United Press International, and the
International News Service were at Fort Knox on 27 July and they had spoken with General Willard Paul. Surely someone on his staff or one of the thirteen 120
reporter might slip Public Relations Officers on staff could have imagined that a into a closed meeting.
Further, he admitted that he had a press conference planned for later in
Pittsburgh the day. In fact, according to Percival Prattis, executive editor of the
Courier, the press conference was held and Bradley repeated his statements
it noted that that he had made earlier that morning. If that is so--and must be only the Courier reported it--why did Bradley not recant or rephrase his
114 statement in the press conference.
about the Executive Order It is also unlikely that Bradley did not know
were filled with articles before he left. The nation's newspapers during the week about the special session, the chances of a Southern filibuster on civil rights
Rights Party and the general and the implications it might have on the States
election. Even the weekly Elizabethtown, (Ky.) News, the largest local
newspaper covering Fort Knox, carried an editorial on the Order. This was rare
115 because the newspaper usually editorialized only about local issues.
According to the Chicago Defender, the Washington press corps learned
on Saturday, 24 July 1948 that Truman planned to issue his Executive Order
9981. Saturday, 24 July was the day of Bradley's Mayflower Hotel Anniversary
116 celebration. This was three days before Bradley left for his trip.
Clark Clifford, James Forrestal, and others had been discussing the
feasilibity of forming a committee to deal with racial discrimination in the military
since 12 May 1948. At the time, they agreed that the committee would be
comprised of both service and civilian personnel and would work under
Defense Department auspices. Clifford proposed the committee idea to
Forrestal who was concerned that they were moving too rapidly. By late June,
the White House had apparently decided to issue the Executive Order and
establish the Presidential Committee. 117 121
To sum up, before his trip to Fort Knox, Bradley had at least three long, casual meetings with Forrestal, and a week before, he specifically spoke to
Royall about segregation. Later in the day, Bradley spoke to Eisenhower and
Gillem, the Army's appointed integration expert. And again, two days before the trip, Royall feted Bradley at a gala. Bradley was not isolated.
Why did the President blithely accept Bradley's errant behavior? Truman,
of the fighting for his political life, was in no position to question the integrity
popular war hero. He did not need any more fights, and he certainly did not
need them with his Army Chief of Staff.
Apparently, Truman did not hold a grudge. In August 1949, he appointed
Bradley to be the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Bradley served
directly under Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson. J. Lawton Collins took over
as Army Chief of Staff. Colonel Chet B. Hansen, Bradley's chief speech writer
and unofficial public relations counsel, went with Bradley to the new post.
However, after the Fort Knox speech, Bradley remained removed from the issue
of military integration.
J. Lawton Collins
Joe Collins was not happy when, on 16 December 1945, Eisenhower
appointed him to be Chief of Information of the War Department. As he told
Eisenhower, "I thought my metier was commanding troops."
In this post, Collins was responsible for three information agencies, each
headed by a communications officer; Public Relations under Major General
Floyd L. Parks; Congressional Relations under Major General Wilton B. "Jerry"
Persons; and Troop Information and Education under Major General Charles T.
Lanham. 118 122
Persons had been the Army's congressional liaison since 1939. In July
1948, Persons was appointed Marx Leva's deputy for legislative liaison. He also served as McNeil's congressional liaison officer on congressional appropriation matters. In early 1949, Lanham was appointed staff director of the
Personnel Policy Board under a civilian, Thomas R. Reid, Vice-President in
119 charge of human relations of McCormick and Company of Baltimore.
When Bradley was promoted to the post of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 16 August 1949, he was replaced as Army Chief of Staff by his Vice-
Chief of Staff, J. Lawton Collins. Collins immediately chose as his Vice Chief
General Wade Hampton "Ham" Haislip, with whom he served in World War
!20 II.
According to Bradley, Collins had grown enormously (more sophisticated) during his stint in post-war Washington. As chief of information, he had met and charmed the Washington press corps. As the War Department's leading planner and spokesman on unification, he became well-known in
Congress. Under Eisenhower, Collins became thoroughly familiar with many internal Army policy problems. Bradley wrote: "Joe was not a deep thinker or strategist. He was a 'doer,' an action man; and on occasion, he was all too apt to live up to his nickname 'Lightning.'" 121
Collins, unlike his immediate predecessors, was more concerned that
Army racial practices guaranteed a more efficient organization and less concerned with whether or not his actions would put the Army at the vanguard of American social practices. He was willing to accept substantive revisions in the Gillem Board Plan, although he believed a numerical quota was needed to restrict the number of blacks that could enlist. 122
Collins admitted, in his autobiography, that he was reluctant for the Army to take the lead in eliminating segregation, which he also distinguished from 123
discrimination in the ranks. He argued that Army life should be in accord with
local state and federal laws. Importantly, Collins credits pressure from black
activists and the liberal press with helping to diminish opposition to integration.
Nonetheless, as Army Chief of Staff, Collins made the historic agreement that
abolished the quota system that limited the percentage of black draftees to 10
per cent, the approximate percentage of blacks in the American population.
Moreover, even after the Fahy Committee submitted its final report, Collins
permitted General Matthew Ridgway to accelerate desegregation during the
123 Korean War and he ordered similar action in Europe.
The Page Letter
In his capacity as Deputy Chief of Staff, Collins began to prepare a new
approach to military desegregation. His efforts were a kind of contingency plan
using public procedures to prepare an independent course for the Armed
Services-independent, that is, from civilian authority.
On 30 July, three days after Bradley made his controversial remarks at
Fort Knox, Collins wrote a short note after telephoning Arthur W. Page, Public
Information Consultant to the Army. In the note, Collins said that he just learned
that Kenneth Royall did not wish the Chief of Staff to make any public utterance
on his subject. Collins then wrote: “this does not, however, preclude our further
consideration of when and how he should correct the mistaken impressions
given in his garbled dispatch." Collins asked Page if Bradley should say
anything further and what would be the most suitable means. 124
On 3 August 1948, Page replied, recommending that the Army write a
defense of its gradualist approach to racial segregation. Although Page did not
specify this policy preference in his letter, Collins and Bradley responded by 124
not been crafting a defense of segregation in the Army. This communication has
125 mentioned in any of the literature on Army desegregation.
Page, a pioneer in public relations philosophy who helped build AT&T into a modern corporation, first became involved with the Army when War
Secretary Henry Stimson asked him personally to supervise the indoctrination
of the Normandy invasion troops. He stayed on to become public relations
consultant to the Manhattan Project. After the war, Page retired from American
Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T), and spent his time fighting a socialist
takeover of Kennecott Copper in Chile. After this, he tried to convince other
American industrialists to create a corporation to rebuild Europe; that idea
inspired George Marshall to create the European Recovery Program. In October
1947, Marshall asked Page to become an Assistant Secretary of State. Page
declined but he helped form the Stimson Committee for the Marshall Plan along
with former Army Secretary Robert Patterson, Dean Acheson, Allen Dulles,
Clark Eichelberger, and Winthrop Aldrich. 126
Page and Collins were friends. In 1945, as an Army Public Relations
consultant, Page recommended to Bradley that Collins should, as Chief of
Information, attend all meetings at the Secretary of Chief of Staff level. From this
position, Collins was promoted to Deputy Chief of Staff and then to Chief of
Staff. 127 In early 1946, Page vigorously lobbied Collins and James Forrestal to
create a post-war version of the Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare
and Recreation. It was at this point, apparently, that Page and Collins cemented
their friendship. 128
The day after Page wrote his letter to Collins about integration, Truman
accepted written apologies from Bradley and Royall for the Fort Knox gaffe.
Truman told Bradley that the newspapers were violently opposed to his election
and would magnify any controversy. In his letter to Royall, Truman accepted 125
he could set Bradley's version of the incident. He also expressed the hope that
worked out in a manner up the sort of Committee which would get the matter
129 that would be satisfactory to the people affected.
Collins Page's letter was routed to various offices of the Pentagon.
noted that the Chief of attached a note and sent it to General Willard Paul. He
last paragraph Staff (Bradley) would like to have a statement as indicated in the
it to contact of Page's letter. He then asked to have whomever would work up
views. Information Officer Colonel Chet Hansen for General Bradley's personal him On 9 August, Hansen wrote Collins that General Joseph J. O'Hare advised
of "putting a of Page's letter. Hansen questioned whether anyone was capable hundred magic words that would explain, justify, or substantiate our position at this time." Hansen recommended that the statement “be a digested study prefaced by a party-line policy which would emphasize our only reason for existence and then interpret the problem in terms of our combat efficiency.”
Major General John Dahlquist, Acting Director of Personnel and
Administration (P&A) sent an undated note to General O'Hare and Colonel
Whalen. (Whalen accompanied Bradley to Fort Knox.) The memo routing slip
reported that General Collins felt the statement was inadequate becauseit did
the gist not contain (1) a resume of what the Army had done on the problem, (2)
of the Gillem Board report, and (3) a comparison of the benefits that Negroes
derived in the Army as compared with the other services and private business.
On 19 August, a Summary Sheet was issued which recommended that a
statement be devised to emphasize the Army's desire to achieve maximum
efficiency through effective utilization of its manpower. Dahlquist recommended
that this statement be approved, for the record, but that it not be published “in
view of the recent order of the President establishing a committee to examine
the procedures and practices regarding equality of treatment and opportunity for 126
this all personnel.” Dahlquist requested that the Chief of Staff approve
action. 130
On 26 August, Royall wrote Clark Clifford that the Army planned to
publish a report called, “The Negro in the Army.” A note attached to this memo
indicates the file was taken by the Secretary of the Army's office and not
returned. On that same day, Dahlquist sent a note to the P&A files noting that
the Deputy Chief of Staff (Collins) told Deputy Director of P&A Haislip that the
proposed statement was inadequate for the purpose intended. Collins later
ordered discontinuation of any action on the proposed statement.
Royall finally sent the "Negro in the Army” report to Clifford along with a
note from James Evans, the Office of the Civilian Aide to the Secretary of the
Army, recommending that Army policies and practices be summarized for
publication. Clifford suggested that all Army policies should conform to the
Executive Order. Effectively, Hansen's statement and Clifford's order stopped
any further action on a independent course. 131
Collins and the Press
Collins spent two years, from fall 1945 through fall 1947, as Chief of
Information of the War Department. In his memoirs, Collins recounts a series of
uncomfortable incidents during this time in which he looked bad. He uses his
memoirs to get in the last word. Yet Collins recalled the period fondly:
In retrospect, much as I had objected to my
assignment as Chief of Information, if I had deliberately chosen a position in which to school
myself to be Army Chief of Staff, I could not possibly
have picked a better one. It gave me insight to the problems of Congressional, public, and Army
information relations that I could not have gotten any other way. 132 127
Collins served as Chief of Information in the War Department before the battle for unification, and well before the subsequent budget war between the
Air Force and the Navy. The services were enjoying unprecedented respect as the war ended in triumph. During most of this period, Truman's popularity was
idyllic still high as well. By comparison with what would soon follow, it was an time. Still Collins had many problems. Most revolved around the slow, sometimes chaotic pace, of demobilization. As Collins put it, a barrage of press and congressional criticism surrounded this effort and, on the other hand, there was no small controversy about which local military installations would close.
Collins began to win support when he addressed a meeting of the
Associated Press managing editors. He asked if he could hold a panel
discussion on "The Responsibility of the Press and the Cold War," but was
turned down by Robert McLean, President of the Associated Press and
publisher of the Philadelphia Bulletin. Instead he explained to the editors the
problems of demobilizing a million men scattered around the globe, while trying
to maintain some deterrent to the Soviets. He noted that billions of dollars worth
of equipment were untended in the fields of Europe and the jungles of the
South Pacific. Apparently, he was successful in winning what he felt was
belated press support. He specifically felt fortunate for his friendly contacts with
the Washington Post, the Washington Star, and the Washington Times Herald.
Louis Johnson
Louis Johnson was a tough, ambitious, back-slapping politician who
lasted in the office of the Secretary of Defense for eighteen months. His
predecessor lasted nineteen months in the same job. In terms of personality 128
opposite of Forrestal. Despite and mode of operation, Johnson was the exact
often victims of negative their differences, both Johnson and Forrestal were
continued to receive publicity over unification; the interservice rivalry issue unwanted news coverage during Johnson's term. In terms of the military
is, where desegregation issue, however, the Secretaries reverted to type. That
far more Forrestal sought quiet cooperation, Johnson tried to use the press
during his assertively to control the issue. Where Forrestal reaped cooperation
silence with stint, the Committee threatened to break their vow of press
Johnson. Why was this so?
Johnson was a Virginia-born lawyer who graduated from the University
highly successful of Virginia in 1912, moved to West Virginia, and established a
law partnership, Steptoe and Johnson. He was elected to the West Virginia
House of Representatives before being drafted into the Army and serving as an
in politics infantry officer in World War I. Johnson's participation national
accelerated in the 1930s. In 1932 he helped create the American Legion.
Between 1936 and 1940 he served as National Chairman of the Democratic
Advisory Committee and in 1937 was named Assistant Secretary of War. In
1939, Johnson fought with the Secretary of War, Harry Woodring, on military
preparedness; they carried their fight to the newspapers. To build a bipartisan
consensus for war, Roosevelt dismissed Woodring, and named Henry Stimson
to the War Secretary post. When Johnson was passed over for the job, he quit.
Johnson returned to White House favor less than two years later and was
a major Democratic power-broker by the end of the war. When Senator Howard
McGrath called a financial meeting of the Democratic Party in 1948, few party
stalwarts showed up, and none of them would take the job of finance chairman.
McGrath was stunned. Then Johnson asked for a brief recess. He met with
Truman, returned to the meeting and took the job. As Senator Harley Kilgore 129
for Roosevelt explained it: "Louie had been hankering for a Cabinet post years." had appointed him Assistant Secretary of War with the understanding that he would succeed Secretary Woodring. Johnson settled for a promise of a Cabinet
133 post from Truman in exchange for raising campaign money.
Without Johnson, the campaign would never have gotten off the ground.
At the outset, he had to pay the Party's initial expenses from his own pocket.
Truman was occasionally cut off the air because he could not afford additional advertising time. Johnson, shrewdly, encouraged these situations to dramatize the meager funds and populist appeal of the Truman campaign. 134
When Forrestal resigned, Truman named Johnson the new Secretary of
Defense; he took over on 28 March 1949. Johnson was not well prepared for the job. Although his staff stayed on, Forrestal left less than a page of instructions. 135 The next day, Johnson held a disastrous press conference in which he promised openness but mostly offered "no-comments" to questions.
When asked about the issue of racial integration of the armed services,
Johnson answered vaguely: “you'll not have much argument on what we decide there, I'm sure." 136
Where Forrestal sought to elicit cooperation, Johnson ruled by fiat. He grabbed the best offices, would brook no opposition, eliminated more than 200 committees and summarily ordered unification. Pentagon insiders compared him with John Wilkes Booth, and suggested that he had pushed Forrestal out of office. 137
Before leaving office, Forrestal asked for amendments to the National
Security Act. The National Military Establishment became the Defense
Department. The Secretary of the Defense Department gained status in State
Department protocol. The three special assistants became Assistant
Secretaries. A new Deputy Secretary of Defense was appointed and a 130
to Eisenhower. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was approved, in a bow
fiscal procedures. And the Secretary gained power over a uniform budget and
construction of Before that legislation went into effect, Johnson cancelled
Secretary John L. the 65,000-ton aircraft carrier, the U.S.S. United States. Navy and Johnson Sullivan quit in protest and was replaced by Omaha lawyer
Air Force sycophant, Francis Matthews. In April, Johnson won approval from the Truman and Army to scuttle production of the aircraft carrier. On this basis,
a allowed the program to be killed. However, the Navy's aviators launched press near-mutiny that came to be called "the Revolt of the Admirals." Using
of 75 leaks and character defamation, the Navy aviators attacked production
138 bombers, the ten-engine B-36, for the Air Force.
139 This battle was largely fought in the press. Admiral Arthur W. Radford,
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, and the Chief of Naval Operations
140 focused their attack on Secretary Johnson. Air Force Secretary Stuart
the Symington made his case in the Saturday Evening Post. And a columnist for
New York Times made the pro-Navy case in a series of articles. Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, General Omar Bradley demanded a public withdrawal of Navy
charges. Less than three years later, the Air Force replaced the B-36 in its plans
with the jet-powered B-47 and the B-52.
After the revolt of the Admirals, Johnson conducted a severe budget-
cutting and drawdown of military forces. At the time, many Americans thought
the Soviets saw this drawdown as a weakening of American resolve. They
thought this retrenchment enabled the Soviets to support the North Korean
incursion into South Korea. Truman first openly considered replacing Johnson
141 in July 1950. By the time the Korean Conflict was a few mo iths old, in
September 1950, and it became clear that the U. S. had not adequately 131
feuding with prepared for war, Truman discharged Johnson for openly
142 Secretary of State Dean Acheson.
Johnson and the Office of Public Information
control When he took office, Johnson did not break with ForrestaPs press
warned (in efforts. At his first press conference, on 29 March 1949, Johnson
during his vain) that there would be no vying between the services for headlines
watch. The classification procedures would continue as previously adduced.
Johnson inherited ForrestaPs controversial policy that consolidated the Office of
Public Information (OPI) as the sole agency for dissemination for military
information. And he inherited a whirlwind of press condemnation as well.
Johnson reacted by narrowing the range of information under scrutiny to that
143 which is classified for security reasons.
OPI never became the information clearinghouse that some hoped and
materials for release, others feared it might be. In spite of its authority to review
OPI was almost powerless to stop the flow of unauthorized disclosures. Inter-
service feuding continued throughout Johnson's tenure and consolidation of
public affairs offices merely forced the services to find alternative outlets to air
their grievances. Civilian organizations, veterans groups, and retired officers
took up the cudgels on the services' behalf.
OPI failed, in large measure, because Secretary of Defense Johnson
neglected to use it. He held only five press conferences and gave 48 speeches,
usually without advance notification to OPI. Johnson's Deputy Secretary,
Stephen Early, was in charge of OPI and, in 1951, tried to reorganize it by
144 returning public relations responsibility to the individual services. 132
The Fahv Committee
Although Chairman Fahy negotiated directly with the services and
the reported periodically to President Truman, his committee depended upon
active cooperation of the Secretary of Defense. Johnson retained a brief but
At first, the Secretary interest in the committee's development and proceedings.
these of Defense recognized the Committee's right to review and approve
submissions, but in the protracted negotiations that surround the development
group's power by of a successful Army program, Johnson tried to curb the Fahy
going to the newspapers.
On 20 April 1949, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson announced that
he had directed the armed forces to examine equality of treatment and
opportunity in order to determine what changes in policy should be made. The
next day, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall reported on the number of
Negro officers and the reenlistment rate among black soldiers in defense of
current Army racial policy. It was one of Royall's last acts. In early May, Johnson
145 forwarded to Chairman Fahy responses outlining service policies.
policies On 1 1 May, Johnson announced his approval of the racial
proposed by the Air Force. Only after Fahy appealed to the White House was
the committee's right to review the service programs before their approval
reasserted. On 26 May 1949, Royall's successor, Acting Secretary of the Army
Gordon Gray, reviewed Army implementation of the recommendations of the
1946 Gillem Board. 146 On 7 June 1949, as a spur to the Army, Secretary
Johnson approved the Navy's proposed racial policy. 147
The first plan accepted by both the committee and Secretary Johnson
was that offered by the Air Force. Actually, this proposal had been completed
when the Fahy Committee first met. Stuart Symington, the service secretary,
had postponed the implementation so that a joint proposal could be devised 133
with the Army. The Navy shared the Air Force view that racial segregation represented a waste of manpower, but the Navy's good intentions were delayed because the plan was not acceptable to Secretary Johnson.
Then Johnson, reverting to type, tried to finesse the issue by accepting and promulgating an incomplete, but evasively-phrased, new policy. Although
Chairman Fahy met with Truman on the matter, Johnson sided with the Army and, for the first time, against the Fahy Committee. Johnson may have been seeking Army support during the celebrated interservice battle or to avert a
148 difficult situation. Either way, Johnson's press statement created an uproar among the nation's black and liberal newspapers. At Niles' suggestion, Truman told a press conference that the Johnson statement was just "a progress report" and that the work of the Fahy Committee had his full support. With that, Johnson removed himself from all negotiations with the President's Committee. The task
149 fell to Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray.
Gordon Gray
Following Kenneth Royall, Gordon Gray, the Assistant Secretary and a former newspaper publisher and radio station owner, was confirmed as Acting
Secretary on 13 June 1949. In an administration characterized by short-term tenure among military leaders, Gray served as Acting Secretary for only ten months. However, during this time, Gray was a key figure in military desegregation. Compared with Royall, Gray was far more sympathetic to the
Fahy Committee and more available to the press. Among the key players involved in desegregation of the Army, Gordon Gray was perhaps the most pragmatic. Although he would defend the traditional Army policy that blacks 134
could not compete in a desegregated Army, he did very little to challenge or obstruct the Fahy Committee.
A Phi Beta Kappa graduate of the University of North Carolina and editor of Law Journal at Yale Law School, Gray practiced law for years in New York and Winston-Salem. Although Gray was an heir to part of the R. J. Reynolds fortune, he preferred journalism. He bought the Winston-Salem Journal and
Twin-City Sentinel, which were both in lackluster shape. As publisher, he turned them into successes. Then in 1942, he enlisted in the Army. He rose from enlisted private to captain in the Twelfth Army Group in Europe during World
War II, but did not participate in any battles.
After the war, Gray became the principal Assistant Secretary of the Army.
Gray's only brush with controversy was in 1948, when he headed up a
commission called the Gray Board which recommended that the National Guard
150 should be taken out of state control and put under the federal government.
Johnson inveighed Gray to take the post of Secretary of Army. Gray was
on the verge of leaving the Army to take the post of dean of the University of
North Carolina School of Business. At Truman's request, Gray agreed to stay on
as Undersecretary of the Army for "a decent intervaP--at least until Johnson
could find a replacement for Royall.
Ultimately, Johnson offered Gray the job of Army Secretary. While Gray
was away on a trip, Johnson told Truman that Gray actually wanted the job of
Army Secretary. Without consulting Gray, Truman sent Gray's nomination to the
Senate. When Gray returned to Washington, he was stunned to learn what had
happened. Although Truman offered to "take the rap" and admit that he had
submitted the order by mistake, Gray agreed to accept the job for "a respectable
time," and spare Truman the embarrassment of the error. General Omar Bradley
saw the incident as another example of Louis Johnson's mentally-ill 135
151 bill, which Gray had worked on as Under behavior . An Army reorganization
152 Secretary, came before Congress during Gray's watch as Army Secretary .
Gray and Racial Integration
Perhaps because he was younger, or because he had attended an integrated Officers Candidates School, or simply because he was more open- minded, Gray offered a somewhat more sympathetic ear to advocates of desegregation. This is not to say that Gray was an avowed integrationist. Far
to develop from it. He defended segregation as giving black soldiers the chance
153 leadership without weakening morale and efficiency . But he joined the proceedings when opportunities were greater for change. The Fahy Committee had become far more shrewd at questioning Army objections to reform.
Integration plans of the Army and Navy had already been accepted. In short order, Gray would accept most of the Committee's recommendations, except for those that dealt with quotas.
Throughout the fall, Johnson and the middle level hierarchy of the Army tried to outmaneuver the Committee. Gray may have endorsed, or at least accepted, Johnson’s attempt to finesse the Committee. However, because of its
peremptory nature, the decision seems more attributable to Johnson. (See
above and chapter five.)
Then, Gray became victim of one of the Army's most important, most
elaborate, and least heralded, instances of insubordination. Gray sent out a
directive ordering opening of all military occupational specialties to all men,
abolished racial quotas for the Army's schools, and abolished racially separate
promotion systems and standards. Without Gray's approval, top Army officers
surreptitiously sent out an order that rescinded this directive. The issue forced 136
the Committee to defy their promise to Truman and take the issue to the newspapers. Gray learned of the incident through the newspapers, rescinded the rescission, and returned to his original plan. 154 The Fahy Committee objected to this turn of events and protested that they would be forced to
155 publicize the event, again, if they did not get requisite White House support.
These incidents opened Gray's eyes to the inconsistencies inherent in the traditional segregationist argument. He was ready to learn. In a meeting on
27 December 1949, Charles Fahy, chairman of the President's Committee on
Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, convinced Gray that the removal of discrimination was impossible without integration. Then Gray met with Roy Davenport, a key personnel expert working in the Personnel &
Administration department of the Army, who showed Gray that the Army staff was deceiving him and, using a wealth of personnel data, convinced him that desegregation must be carried out. On 16 January 1950, the Army began
identifying vacancies in white units that blacks could fill. The Gillem Board policy of "integration by unit but not by individual” was abolished.
All that remained to negotiate was the thorny issue of the quota. In later
Affirmative Action issues, corporations and institutions would challenge whether or not governments could require that they hire a minimum or quota of members of minority groups. Conversely, in 1950, the postwar Army tried to establish a maximum or quota of African Americans in their midst; obtaining black enlistments was not a problem. The Army feared that so-called black overstrength would reduce efficiency and jeopardize enlistments by white southerners.
In conference with Chairman Fahy, Truman reasserted his desire to abolish the ceiling-type quota and communicated that desire to Gray. The
Secretary of War was ready to comply. In turn, Gray won a promise from Truman 137
that a racial quota could be reinstituted if the balance of racial strength became
disproportionate. By 13 March 1950, the Army had agreed to abolish the 10 per
cent quota beginning in April 1950. Having accomplished important changes in
Army practices, Gray finally returned to the University of North Carolina as he
had originally desired.
Gray and the Press
During Gray's brief tenure, the Fahy Committee was willing to break its
vow of silence and take its story to the press. Indeed, it did this at least once.
Gray was an active journalist. Yet he apparently did not call upon his fellow
Southern publishers to editorialize and build a mandate for the prevailing
conservative view. It is difficult to speculate why an individual would choose not
to act. But it is possible to speculate that this decision by the Fahy Committee
was motivated by the fact that their adversary was a newspaperman. This point
will be discussed in depth in Chapter Five.
Conclusions
In this chapter, we have seen that the degree to which the individual
personalities of America's post-war military leaders shaped their interpretation
of racial policy. This was most strongly exemplified by the communication
policies of Secretaries of Defense James Forrestal and Louis Johnson. Where
Forrestal, a former newsman, believed cooperation was most possible without
the press spotlight, Johnson acted peremptorily, garnered headlines and did
not anticipate the consequences. In chapter five, it will be show i, that one of
these consequences was a change in press policy by the Fahy Committee. This
change empowered the Committee to win major concessions from the Army. 138
We have also seen how Kenneth Royall acted furtively, and threatened to use press exposure as a political weapon, and how his actions backfired. We have seen how Omar Bradley's apparent inept press action may have, in fact, been contrived, but was equally ineffective. Through his communication with a prominent public relations expert, Arthur Wilson Page, we have seen how J.
Lawton Collins conspired to create a policy separate from that of civilian leadership, but that Colonel Chet Hansen, a former newsman and Bradley speechwriter, quashed this effort. Finally, we have seen how it fell to Gordon
Gray, a pragmatic newspaper publisher, to cooperate with the committee and create a new racial policy for the Army.
Notes
1 Testimony in front of National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs, (26 April 1948). Copies in
James Evans Files, US Army Military History Research Collection, Carlisle Barracks, PA and in OSD
291 .2 National Archives.
2 Survey and Recommendations Concerning the Integration of the Negro Soldier into the Army,
Submitted to the Secretary of War by the Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War, in Memo, Civ Aide
/1 5640-1 for of Staff, to SW through USW, 22 September 1941 , G-1 20; Memo G-1 Chief 6
November 1941.
3 Louis Finkel, (1 975) Forum for Protest: The Black Press During World War II. (Cranbury, N.J.:
Fairieigh Dickinson U P); Patrick Washburn, (1 986) A Question of Sedition: The Federal
Government's Investigation of the Black Press During World War II, (New York: Oxford University
Press).
4 War Department Circular No. 124, "Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Postwar Army Policy,"
27 April 1946; Memorandum, Truman K. Gibson, Jr. for Assistant Secretary of War John J.
McCloy, 13 November 1945; Memorandum, Lt. General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., for Chief of Staff, 17
November 1945, subject; Report of Board of Officers of Utilization of Negro Manpower in the 139
Post-War Army; Memorandum, Assistant Secretary McCloy for Judge Patterson (The Secretary of
War), 24 November 1945; Memorandum, Truman K. Gibson, Jr., for Secretary of War Patterson,
28 November 1945; Supplemental report of Board of Officers (Gillem Board) on Utilization of
Negro Manpower in the Post-War Army, 26 January 1 946; Memorandum, Commanding General,
Army Air Forces Carl Spaatz for Chief of Staff, April 1946. All in Morris J. MacGregor and Bernard
C. Nalty (eds.), (1981) Blacks in the United States Armed Forces: Basic Documents, Volume VII:
Planning for Postwar Employment of Black Personnel, (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly
Resources Inc.).
5 He sent a memorandum to Robert P. Patterson, who had become Secretary of War on 27
September 1 945. Patterson had been assistant secretary and then under Secretary of War under
Henry Stimson. When Patterson became Stimson's assistant, he had replaced Louis Johnson, who had served as assistant under Secretary of War Harry Woodring. Morris MacGregor (1 985)
Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965, (Washington, D.C.:Center of Military History,
Government Printing Office), p. 153; Memo McCloy for Secretary of War, 17 September 1945,
Secretary of War 291 .2; Memo Secretary of War for Chief of Staff, 7 November 1 945, Secretary of
War 291.2.
6 Alvan Gillem Oral History Interview in Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
7 This was published as War Department Circular No. 1 24 on 27 April 1 946. All references to the
Gillem Report in the following paragraphs, unless otherwise noted, are from this document. NARG.
^ Specifically the Board ordered that African Americans should be integrated in duty assignments
in special and overhead units (post housekeeping and administrative jobs); they should form 10
percent of the Army; a special staff group should be formed within the War Department to see that
Negro policy was implemented; Black officers should be accorded equal opportunities for
advancement and assignment; groupings should be made of smaller Negro units with larger white
units in "composite organizations"; desegregated use of the post recreational facilities should
continue; commanders of Negro troops should be made fully aware of the Army's race policies.
9 Memorandum, G-1 to the Secretary of War, 24 December 1946, OSW 291 .2, NARG.
10 “End of Army Jim Crow Near, Says Army Chief’ Baltimore Afro-American, 9 March 1946.
11 “No Real Change in Army Policy” Pittsburgh Courier, 11 May 1946. 140
12 A Right Step for Army,” Norfolk Journal and Guide, 9 March 1 946.
13 Hanson Baldwin, “An Uncertain Defense Posture,” New York Times, 5 March 1946.
14 The Adjutant General to Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Army Service Forces, 6
May 1946, WDAG 291.2, NARG 319.
15 Frank Stanley, "Report of the Negro Newspaper Publishers Association to the Honorable
Secretary of War on Troops and Conditions in Europe, 18 July 1946, OSW, NARG 330, 291.2;
Marcus Ray, Report to Secretary of War, Robert Patterson, "Tour of European Installations," 17
December 1946.
16 Morris MacGregor, (1981) Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965 (Washington, D.C.:
Center of Military History, Government Printing Office), pp. 213-215.
17 Hanson Baldwin, "Forrestal Faces Trials," New York Times, Sept. 21 , 1947.
18 Steve Rearden, (1 984) History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Volume I: The
Formative Years, (Washington, D.C.: U S. Government Printing Office), p. 538; R. S. Allen and W.
V. Shannon, "Why Johnson Was Fired," New Republic, 123(25 September 1950): 11-12.
Carl Borklund, (1966) Men of the Pentagon. (New York: Praeger), p. 37.
20 Carl W. Borklund, (1966) Men of the Pentagon. (New York: Praeger), p. 39.
21 Rearden, pp. 60-61.
22 Borklund, p. 45.
23 Rearden, p. 78.
24 Rearden, p. 78; “Forrestal Calls for Tightened Security,” Baltimore Sun, 24 September 1947.
25 Washington Evening Post, 16 January 1948; New York Herald-Tribune, Des Moines Register,
24 September 1948.
26 Rearden, p. 78. 141
27 “ Is Press a Threat to National Security?” Chicago Tribune, 28 November 1948; Rearden, p.
81.
2 & Margaret Geis, (1952) Negro Personnel in the European Command: 1 January 1946 to 30
June 1950. Historical Division, European Command. Report of the Secretary of Defense, Center of Military History.
29 Geis, p.26.
30 The original suggestion may have come from Granger. MacGregor, p.326.
31 Clark Clifford, (1 990) Counsel to the President: A Memoir, (New York: Random House), p.
210.
32 Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Sen/ices, Universal Military Training, 80th
Congress, 2nd Session, 1948, p. 688.
33 Most of this section is from the Report of National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs,
Monday, 26 April 1948. Copies available in Fahy Committee Papers HSTL and James C. Evans
Papers, Reports and Papers, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
34 Letter, Secretary of Defense Forrestal to President Harry S. Truman, 29 February 1948;
Memorandum, Special Assistant to Secretary of Defense, Marx Leva, for Secretary of Army et.al.,
13 April 1948.
The conferees included Lester Granger, the Executive Secretary of the National Urban League
and consultant to the Secretary of Defense; Attorney Sadie T. M. Alexander; Dr. John W. Davis,
President of West Virginia State College; Truman K. Gibson, former civilian aide to the Secretary
of War; Rev. Bishop J. W. Gregg; Charles Houston, Dean of the Howard University Law School;
Rev. John H. Johnson, rector of St. Martin's Church; and Dr. Mordecai Johnson, President of
Howard University.
The other attendees included Benjamin Mays, President of Morehouse College; Attorney
Loren Miller; Hoben E. Reynolds of the International Order of Elks; Director Channing Tobias, of 142
the Phelps-Stokes Foundation; George Weaver sitting in for columnist and union president
Willard Townsend; and Roy Wilkins, Assistant Secretary of the NAACP.
35 Browning would later serve as an assistant to the Executive Secretary on the President's
Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services.
36 Truman Papers, HSTL; David K. Niles to Clark Clifford, 12 May 1948; Clifford to Fon-estal, 13
May 1 948; Clifford Papers: Judge George T. Washington of the Federal Court to Clifford, 29 June
1948; Nicholls, L. (1954) Breakthrough on the Color Front, (New York: Random House), p. 86.
37 Clifford, p. 210.
38 Rearden, p.49; Robert Donovan, (1977) Conflict and Crisis: The Presendency of Harry S.
Truman, (New York: W. W. Norton), p. 53.
39 The actions of the Committee on Civilian Components or Gray Board are of tertiary importance
here. (The Committee was named for its chairman, Under Secretary Gordon Gray, who would later
succeed Royall as Secretary of the Army.) As part of the unification issue, the Gray Board was
charged to analyze the feasibility and desirability of federalizing the National Guard. The issue
raised important objections among those states who had otherwise opposed the notion of States
Rights. See “Gray Board Calls for Changes in National Guard,” Armed Forces, 31 July 1948, “Gray
Board Calls for Federalizing Guard,” Washington Post, 8 November 1947.
40 For comparison, see how Forrestal dealt with insubordination from Secretary of the Air Force
Stuart Symington. James Forrestal, (1951) The Forrestal Diaries, ed. by Walter Millis, (New York:
Viking Press), pp. 464-465.
41 Bernard Manning (son-in-law of John Clemson Henry of Durham, N. C.) to Kenneth C. Royall
(5 December 1947) OSA 291.2; Edwin Powell to Royall (2 March 1948); Attorney F. H. Brooks,
Smithfield, N.C., to K. Royall, (18 May 1948) OSA 291.2; J. C. O'Laughlin to Royall (15
September 1948) OSA 291.2 NARG 335.
Royall received notable support from the article “The Negro in the Armed Services" written by
Paul Davis and published in the Virginia Quarterly Review 24(Autumn 1948), pp. 495-523. Davis
argues that black Americans must play a vital role in the military service, but also supports Royall's
segregationists positions. He supports the Army's long-held contention that, while it must be alert
to the latest trends in psychology and sociology, that the Army "must not attempt social reform so 143
advanced as to create interracial friction, to antagonize community attitudes nor to reduce over-all effectiveness.
42 J. O'Laughlin to Royall (15 September 1948) Army and Navy Journal ( 11 September 1948); C.
OSA 291.2.
43 Omar Bradley and Clay Blair, (1983) A General's Life, (New York: Simon & Schuster), p. 47.
44 With this action, the protocol section of the State Department announced that the branch
secretaries sat at a lower status in state dinners. “Changing of the Guard,” Washington Star, 5
October 1947. When Royall took over for Patterson, he also took Patterson's Pentagon office.
When Forrestal became Secretary of Defense, he took that office away from Royall and Royall
returned to the office he used as Under Secretary. Armed Forces, 9 August 1 947.
45 Secretary of War Patterson to Walter White, 14 February 1947; Patterson to Senator Brien
McMahon of Connecticut, memorandum, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff to G-3, 17 May 1947 all
in WDSCA 291.2, NARG 319; “National Grapevine,” Chicago Defender, Charley Cherokee, 28
February 1948.
46 Memorandum, G-3 to Deputy Chief of Staff, 28 May 1947, WDGOT 325, NARG 335.
47 Memorandum, G-3 to Deputy Chief of Staff, 28 May 1947, WDGOT 325, NARG 335.
48 w White to J. Forrestal, 9 October 1947; J. Forrestal to W. White, 21 October 1947 OSA
291 .2 21 October 1 947 and Reel 080 NAACP 21 October 1947; K. C. Royall to White 9 October
1947 OSA 291.2.
49 A similar conference had been hosted by Forrestal's predecessor, Robert Patterson, in March
1946; this conference was part of the Gillem investigation. Memorandum, G-1 to The Adjutant
General, 8 December 1947, G-1 291.2, NARG 319.
50 Memorandum, G-1 to The Adjutant General, 8 December 1 947, G-1 291 .2, NARG 31 9.
51 Memorandum, G-1 to Undersecretary of the Army, 29 April 1948, NARG 319; also referred to
in Menning to Royal and reply, RG 407. 291 .2.
52 “Army Forbids New Jersey Guard to Integrate," New York Times, 5 February 1948 and
“Driscoll Replies to Army” New York Times 28 February 1948. 1
144
53 Telegram to Forrestal from White, 5 February 1948, Office of the Secretary of the Army 291 .2,
NARG 335.
54 New York Times, 5 February 1948; memorandum, Forrestal to Royall, 5 February 1948, OSA
291.2, NARG 335.
55 “National Grapevine,” Chicago Defender, Charley Cherokee, 21 February 1948 and 28
February 1948.
56 White to Forrestal, 17 February 1948, D54-1-1, NARG 330.
57 “Wallace Blasts Truman in Harlem,” New York Times, 16 February 1948.
58 The Governor of Connecticut was told that integrating this state's National Guard would jeopardize federal recognition and support. The Governor requested that Truman direct the Army to change its policy to conform with the Rights Committee report. Governor Thomas E. Dewey of
New York, supported a special legislative committee investigation to end segregation in the New
York National Guard. Governor James L. McConaughy of Minnesota also wrote that he wanted to integrate National Guard units of his state by executive order. Telegram, Governor James L.
McConaughy to the President 9 February 1948, OF 155, HSTL; The New York Times, 10 and 1
February 1948; Governor Luther W. Youngdahl to Forrestal, 6 March 1948, 291.2, NARG 335.
59 Memorandum, Marx Leva to Forrestal, 8 March 1948, OSA 291 .2; memorandum, G-3 to
Deputy Chief of Staff, 8 April 1 948, WDSCA 291 .2, NARG 31 9; memorandum, Royall to Forrestal,
6 May 1948; memorandum, Leva to Forrestal, 7 May 1948, both in OS NARG 335.
60 Memorandum, Marx Leva to Forrestal, 8 March 1 948, OSA 291 .2; memorandum, G-3 to
Deputy Chief of Staff, 8 April 1948, WDSCA 291.2, NARG 319; memorandum, Royall to Forrestal,
6 May 1948; memorandum, Leva to Forrestal, 7 May 1948, both in OS NARG 335.
61 Memoranda, Leva to Forrestal, 5 and 20 May 1948, both in D54-1-1, NARG 330; Royall to
Governors of Connecticut and Minnesota, 20 May 1948, OSA 291.2, NARG 335.
62 “National Grapevine,” Charley Cherokee, Chicago Defender, 13 March 19 18.
63 "Crisis in the Making; U S. Negroes Tussle with Issue of Resisting a Draft Law because of
Racial Segregation," Newsweek 21 (June 7, 1948): 28-29. 145
as much racial progress as North 64 At this point, Royall said that no state in the Union had made
for Governor. Carolina, further attesting to the notion that he was running
Truman on 23 March to 65 Houston had been among those civil rights leaders who had met with protest military segregation.
26 April 1948, James 66 Report of the National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs, Monday
C. Evans Papers, Reports and Papers, p. 51-52.
University Press), p. 91; 67 Richard Haynes, (1973) Awesome Power, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana (Columbia, Mo.: University of Richard Dalfiume, (1969) Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces, 28-29. Missouri Press), p. 166; Newsweek. 21(7 June 1948):
National 68 Memorandum of Royall to Forrestal, CSUSA 291.2, Negroes (14 May 1948),
Archives.
Defense 69 National Military Establishment Press Release, 8 September 1948; “Negro
Conference Charges Army Discriminates,” New York Times, 9 September 1 948; Memorandum,
Leva to Forrestal, 30 August 1948; Forrestal to Granger, 30 August 1948.
of Leva to 70 Memorandum of Secretary of Defense to Marx, 22 September 1 948; Memorandum
Forrestal, 30 September 1948; CD 30-1-2, NARG.
of Leva to 71 Memorandum of Secretary of Defense to Marx, 22 September 1948; Memorandum
Forrestal, 30 September 1948; CD 30-1-2. NARG.
the 72 For a less abridged discussion of the role of Congress in the racial desegregation of
Votes Big Air military, see chapter four. Trussell, C. P. “Senate Body Approves Draft, Congress
Issue in Draft Force," New York Times, 12 May 1948; Trussell, "Race Segregation Still A Live
Program," New York Times, 13 May 1948; New York Times, 24 May 1948.
73 Memorandum from Secretary of the Army to Commanding General, First Army, (21 May 1948)
M. Leva to re: Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Postwar Army Policy NARG407 291 .2;
Secretary of Army (25 May 1948) OSA 291 .2 Negroes; James Evans to Royall (14 June 1948).
74 Geis (1952)p. 81. 146
Representative Harold C. 75 Representative John A. Blamik to Secretary Royall, 29 May 1948,
Governor of Connecticut to Hagen to Royall, 28 May 1 948, both in OSA 291 .2, NARG 335;
President, both in OSA 291.2, Royall, 29 June 1948; telegram, Governor of Minnesota to the NARG.
of the Army, n.d., OSA 76 Draft of proposed letter to Governor of Connecticut from Secretary
291.2, NARG 335.
77 Memorandum, Bradley to Royall, 7 July 1948, OSA 291 .2, NARG 335.
7^ Memoranda, Royall to Clark Clifford, 8 and 19 July 1948, OSA 291 .2, NARG 335.
79 Memorandum, Clifford to Royall, 8 July 1948, OSA 291.2, NARG
80 Memorandum, Royall to Clifford, 20 July 1948, OSA 291 .2, NARG.
81 Bradley Dairies, Clay and John Bliar Collection, Box Desk Diaries, 1948-1950, US Military
History Research Collection, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
July 82 Royall to HST, 29 July 1948, D-54-1-16, NARG 330; Bradley to HST, OSA 291 .2 (29
1948).
291 .2. 83 Letter, Royall to President, 1 7 September 1 948, Office of the Secretary of the Army
84 Truman seeks Resignations from Top Brass,” Philadelphia Inquirer, “Pentagon Shake-Up,”
Indianapolis Star, 7 November 1948.
85 MacGregor, p. 326.
86 “National Grapevine,” Chicago Defender, 12 February 1948.
87 Memorandum, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall for Secretary of Defense Louis
Johnson, 21 April 1949, subject: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services.
of the 88 Quoted in "Report on Gillem Board Policy and Implementation," Study in the Records
President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, HSTL;
Royall to Johnson, 22 April 1949, CD 30-1-4. 147
89 General Omar Bradley was one of the most beloved and successful heroes of World War II. the General Eisenhower, Commander of European Theater of Operations, tapped Bradley to lead
largest force ever to American contingent in the Normandy invasion. Bradley commanded the
divisions, they liberated fight under the American flag. A million-men strong, more than 40 combat
France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia.
90 MacGregor, p. 317.
91 "Army Snipes at Bias as UMT Fight Grows," Pittsburgh Courier 17 January 1948.
92 "Bradley Condemns Harsh Army Discipline, Promises Liberal Treatment of Draftees," New
York Times (22 June 1 948).
Defender 93 in a 1949 incident, Haislip and Major Brooks would be accused by Chicago
columnist, Charley Cherokee of issuing as illicit order reinstating segregation and rescinding a
desegregation offer issued by Army Secretary Gordon Gray. Bradley Diaries.
94 Bradley Diaries, Clay and John Blair Collection, Box Desk Diaries, 1948-1950, US Army Military
History Research Collection, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
95 Mary McNair, "Kenneth Royalls Entertain, Honoring Gen., Mrs. Bradley," Washington Post, 25
July 1948, p. IV-1.
96 Bradley Diaries, Clay and John Blair Collection, Box Desk Diaries, 1948-1950, US Army Military
History Research Collection, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
97 Mary Spargo, "Truman Orders Equal Rights in U.S. Jobs, Armed Services," Washington Post,
27 July 1948, p. 1.
98 Along with this article, Bradley kept a letter from Army Reserve Judge Advocate Major William
H. Ramsey who write that he was a friend of the Negro and a fighter for equality of treatment who
supported Bradley's statement. "Army May Furlough First Draftees," Washington Daily News (27
July 1948) in CSUSA 291.2 Negroes; Ramsey to Bradley (28 July 1948) in CSUSA 201.2
Negroes.
99 Evans to Royall (29 July 1 948) OSA 291 .2 Negroes.
100 Unidentified wire service transcript, OSA 291 .2 (29 July 1948). 148
101 OSA 291 .2 delivered to White House at 7:45 PM on 29 July 1 948. Copies were delivered to
Secretary of Defense Forrestal and the General Bradley.
102 Bradley Diaries, Clay and John Blair Collection, Box Desk Diary, 1948-1950, US Army Military
History Research Collection, Carlisle Barracks, PA.; Drew Pearson, “Washington Merry-Go-
Round," Philadelphia Bulletin, (3 August 1948).
103 "Army Hopes New Training Will Make Friends of Men," Washington Post, (29 July 1948), p.
3; Mary Spargo, "End of Troop Segregation Eventual Aim," Washington Post, (30 July 1948), p.
"Army Segregation To Go," New York Times (30 July 1948), p. 2. 1 ;
104 In view of its significance, the full text of Bradley's letter of apology to Truman is reprinted below:
Dear Mr. President: In view of your understandable concern over the views attributed to me on the issue of segregation by both the Associated and United Press on July 27th, the Secretary of the Army suggested that I explain the circumstances under which I was partially quoted. On Tuesday, July 27, a group of senior troop commanders, together with key officers of their staffs, assembled at Fort Knox to discuss and explore training methods to be employed by the Army in its expanded program. Particular emphasis had been placed on the vital issue of human relations and I attended the conference primarily to insist that commanders concern intimately with the welfare of their troops, that they indoctrinate their commanders with the need for safeguarding the dignity and the individuality of their men. For we readily recognize that if a peacetime draft is to be acceptable to the American people, then the Army must accord its men the consideration and respect they warrant as citizens of the United States.
During the last few minutes of the morning conference, I was invited to address the assembly. I spoke extemporaneously, without notes, and no record was made of my comments.
At the time, I did not know that reporters had been admitted to the conference and I had no reason to assume that I was not speaking privately. The schedule given me indicated a press conference at 12:45, and I was prepared to meet the reporters at that time. The question of segregation had been raised inadvertently earlier that morning when a commander asked for guidance in the establishment of separate service clubs for white and negro
(sic) soldiers. While I had no intention of involving either the Army or myself in a discussion of civil rights, I did feel that these commanders had need for some guidance to help them reply to questions that will be asked of them on segregation.
I explained that our problem was an acutely practical one. Our only reason for existence lies in our capacity to provide for the common defense of the nation. Any policy which would cut dangerously into our voluntary manpower; any policy which would impair our operating efficiency at this time, hazards our ability to maintain a minimum security force. A substantial portion of our volunteer enlistments come from Southern states where racial prejudice invokes antagonism and hostility toward progressive policies on integration. In attempting to give troop commanders some guidance in their replies to inquiries on segregation, I referred to a statement made five weeks ago in Los Angeles when I was queried on my views. At that time I said, "The question of integration of the negro (sic) is a vital problem of social reform--to be achieved first by the people of the United States--and thereafter by the United States Army." My paraphrase of this statement at Ft. Knox unfortunately employed the term "segregation" rather than "integration" and in subsequent newspaper accounts erroneously 149
totally achieved by suggested that the Army would stubbornly resist integration until it had been
is further from our intent. While I do believe that it the American people. I assure you nothing would be hazardous for us to employ the Army deliberately as an instrument of social reform, I do likewise believe the Army must be kept fully apace of the substantial progress being made by the civilian community in race relations.
of you in any way, and had I known the press I had no intention whatsoever embarrassing
of the segregation issue. At that time, I had not was present, I would have avoided any mention yet see the Executive Order published by you on July 27th.
evening of July 27, 1 learned that the Department When I returned to Washington on the had adopted a policy of "no comment" on this Executive Order. with at any time. If you wish, I shall be glad to discuss the incident you
Respectfully Yours
Omar Bradley
105 Clifford, p. 218; Bradley and Blair, pp. 485-486.
106 Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 2nd Session-Senate, pp. 9527,9456; Mary Spargo,
“End of Troop Segregation Eventual Aim, Truman Says," Washington Post, (30 July 1948).
107 This decision created an important rift between Randolph and members of the Congress of
Racial Equality and especially, Bayard Rustin. Randolph wrote the President of the National
Committee Against Conscription: "Now it seems to me that whenever a moral commitment is made by a movement, that moral commitment must be adhered to and lived up to even though it may constitute an apparent setback in the course of the progress of our cause. Our league made the
moral commitment to call off the campaign if President Truman issued an Executive Order banning discrimination and segregation in the armed forces. On July 26, 1948, President Truman did
issue such an order. In that order the term segregation was not used, but in a subsequent press
conference, when the President was interviewed as to whether his order referred to segregation,
he stated that it was his intention that the Executive Order should include segregation. Now since
the President took this position, which no one could misunderstand, I felt that the committee
[against Jim Crow in the Military] had no right to go behind the President to inquire into his motives
for issuing the order by making a certain statement to the press." Randolph to John M. Swomley:
(29 June 1949) Reel 12, #1039 in APR files.
"Army Segregation To Go, Says Truman," New York Times, (30 July 1948); Mary Spargo,
"End of Troop Segregation Eventual Aim, Truman Says," Washington Post (30 July 1948), p. 1;
"Fair Employment," Washington Post, (29 July 1948); "Segregated Army," Washington Post, (30
July 1948); "Segregation in the Army," New York Times (8 August 1948).
109 MacGregor, p. 316; Dalfiume, p. 172. 1
150
Spargo, 1 10 "Army Segregation To Go, Says Truman," New York Times, (30 July 1948); Mary
July 1; "End of Troop Segregation Eventual Aim, Truman Says," Washington Post, (30 1948), p. Post "Fair Employment," Washington Post, (29 July 1948); "Segregated Army," Washington (30
July 1948); Hanson Baldwin, "Segregation in the Army," New York Times (8 August 1948).
1 1 While the federal law prohibited any government agency from spending public funds to influence legislation, the War Department fiercely campaigned for UMT. Although the House
Subcommittee on Publicity and Propaganda formally condemned the practice, the Army brought
publication, journalists, civic leaders and others to Fort Knox free of charge on Army planes. A
The UMT Pioneer, was also issued at Fort Knox. While defended by the Army as "an ordinary camp newspaper," 4,000 of 5,000 published copies were distributed off-base to influential individuals and groups to enlist UMT support. The War Department also employed two special consultants to tour the country, delivering pro-UMT speeches to civic groups and organizing panel discussions. Clyde E. Jacobs and John F. Gallagher, (1 967) The Selective Service Act: A
Case Study of the Governmental Process, (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co.), pp. 32-33.
112 More than 100 articles are listed under the heading "Military Training" in the Reader's Guide
for Periodical Literature between April 1947 and March 1948. Among these are “Army Showcase:
Fort Knox School," New Republic 116:8; D. Landman, "Can Soldiers Be Gentlemen? Experiment at Fort Knox," Collier's 120: 18+19; "Is Untee the Answer? Fort Knox Universal Experimental
Unit," Christian Century, 64:680-2; "Report on the Umtees: Universal Military Training
Experimental Unit at Fort Knox, Ky." Senior Scholastic, 51:10-11.
113 Randolph to Truman (22 March 1948) in APR files, Reel 12; Testimony of Albert Black,
Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, Universal Military Training, 80th Cong., 2nd
session, 1948; Royall testimony, National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs, (26 April 1948).
Copies of NDCNA in James Evans Files, US Army Military History Research Collection, Carlisle
Barracks, PA. and in OSD 291.2 National Archives, p. 41.
U4 "Army Hopes New Training Will Make Friends of Men," Washington Post, (29 July 1948), p.
3; "Eventual End of Bias in Armed Forces," Pittsburgh Courier, (7 August 1948).
113 "Editorial," Elizabethtown News (26 July 1948).
I 16 Charley Cherokee, "National Grapevine," Chicago Defender, (3 August 1948). 151
Clifford to Forrestal (13 May 117 McCoy and Ruetten, p. 110; Niles to Clifford (12 May 1948);
Clifford June 1948) in Truman 1948); and a letter from Federal Judge G. T. Washington to (29
Library; Dalfiume, p. 168.
Louisiana State 118 J. Lawton Collins, (1979) Lightning Joe (Baton Rouge and London:
University Press), p. 340.
119 Rearden, pp. 76, 104.
120 Collins, p. 347.
121 Bradley and Blair, pp. 471-472.
122 MacGregor, pp. 369-371.
123 Collins, pp. 355-357.
124 Collins to Page, 30 July 1948; in Page papers in Wisconsin State Historical Society.
125 Page's letter says:
Dear Joe:
is if anyone can write out a satisfactory statement for I think the first thing to do to see publication about the Army's stand on racial segregation and the separation of officers 126 and men. should come from the Secretary of After that I am not sure but that the statement of those questions belongs to Defense's office. I rather think that the political defense 127 the civilian head of the armed forces. Probably no statement from civilian sources will be made during the political campaign. And probably the Administration will not want any statement made from any uninformed source either. But the first thing to do is to write a statement which the services can live with and which a sensible Secretary of Defense of either party will defend as essential to the efficiency of the armed services. Walter
Page to Collins (3 August 1948) CSUSA.
Noel Griese, "He Walked in the Shadows: Public Relations Counsel Arthur W. Page," Public
Relations Quarterly, 21 (Fall 1976), pp. 8-15.
Collins, p. 340. .
152
Inc. 3 January 1946; Page 128 page to Bryan Houston, Vice President of Young and Rubicam,
Collins to Page, 26 January 1 946; to Collins, 4 January 1 946; Collins to Page, 8 January 1 946; Page to Collins, 5 February Page to Collins, 28 January 1946; Collins to Page, 5 February 1946;
February 1946. All in Page 1946; Page to Forrestal, 21 February 1946; Forrestal to Page, 26 papers in Wisconsin State Historical Society.
291 .2. 129 Truman to Bradley and Truman to Royall (4 August 1948), CSUSA
of Preparation M&W BR, P&A 130 CSUSA, 291.2 (3 August 1948); File #CSGPA 291.2, Office
Div, GSUSA.
August 131 Summary Statement OSA 291.2 (26 August 1948) WM-31-48. Routing form (26
sent to Forrestal. OSA 291 .2 Negroes 1948) CSGPA 291 .2 Copy of Royall memo to Clifford also
Records 291 .2. (2 September 1948) all in National Archives Group
132 Collins, p. 344-45.
Truman (New 133 Alfred Steinberg, (1962) The Man from Missouri: The Life and Times of Harry S.
York: G. P. Putnam), pp. 320-321
134 Steinberg, p. 326.
135 For the best description on the transition from Forrestal to Johnson, see Marx Leva’s Oral
History Interview with Jerry N. Hess, Washington, D.C. in HSTL.
136 Borklund, pp. 65-67; Rearden, p.82; and in passim.
137 Borklund, pp. 65-67.
138 Even many Air Force officers felt that the B-36 project was riddled with waste, inefficiency,
effective against even current and mismanagement. Many questioned if the new aircraft would be
radar and rockets.
139 Some 48 articles were published in the nation's top consumer magazines. See for example, Report, L. Denfield, "Apprehension for the Security of the U.S.,“ U.S. News and World 27(21
Dispute." U.S. October 1949), p. 38; O.N. Bradley, “Complete Text of Statement in Defense
News and World Report, 27(28 October 1949), pp. 61-70; D. V. Gallery, "Don't Let Them Cripple
the Navy!" Saturday Evening Post, 222 (29 October 1949), pp. 36-37; H. L. Ickes, "Navy Hits .
153
"Revolt of the Admirals," Time, 53 Below the Belt," New Republic, 121 (7 November 1949), p. 17;
(7 November 1949), p. 20.
140 New York Times, 14 October 1949; Borklund, pp. 75-76; Haynes, p. 127.
141 Bradley and Blair, p. 542.
of Defense states that the 142 The official United States History of the Office of the Secretary with the timing of the North timing of the Chinese Communist Revolution probably had more to do Allen and W.V. Korean incursion than American preparedness. See Rearden, pp. 547-550; R.S.
Shannon, "Why Johnson Was Fired," New Republic, 123(25 September 1950), pp. 11-12.
143 Johnson Public Statements, 1949; Rearden, p. 77.
144 Rearden, pp. 81-82.
145 National Military Establishment, Office of Public Information, Press Release, 20 April 1949;
Memorandum, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall for Secretary Defense Louis Johnson,
Services; Letter, (21 April 1949), subject: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed
Louis Johnson to Charles Fahy, 4 May 1949.
146 National Military Establishment, Office of Public Information, Press Release, 11 May 1949;
Memorandum, Acting Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray for Secretary of Defense, 26 April 1949,
subject: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services.
147 National Military Establishment, Office of Public Information Press Release, 7 June.
94- 148 Timothy W. Stanley, (1 956) American Defense and National Security, (Washington), pp
95.
149 A complete examination of the incident follows in chapter five.
150 "The Happy Private," Time, (20 June 1949), p. 16; "Mr. Secretary," Newsweek, 33(20 June
1949).
151 Bradley and Blair, p. 261
152 Gray actually testified on the bill after he stepped down as Secretary of the Army. Collins, pp.
351-353. 154
153 Memorandum, Acting Secretary of Army for Secretary of Defense, 26 May 1949, subject:
Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services; See also Personnel and
Administration Summary Sheet, 19 May 1949, same subject, Fahy Committee file.
154 MacGregor, p. 364; Memorandum, Secretary of Army for Secretary of Defense, 30
September 1949, subject: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, Chief of Press Release 256-49, 30 Staff P&A 291 .2; Department of Defense, Office of Public Information,
September 1949, Fahy Committee Files.
155 Memorandum for the Record, Kenworthy, 9 December 1949, subject: Telephone
Conversation with Nash, Fahy Papers HSTL. CHAPTER 4
A. PHILIP RANDOLPH AND THE COMMITTEE AGAINST JIM CROW IN THE ARMY
effectively without publicity / agree with you that something can be accomplished sometimes more the point where their major and than with it. I am convinced however that Negroes have reached
1 maximum results that they can obtain from the government are going to come through pressure.
A. Philip Randolph
Thus far, we have largely examined military desegregation efforts made by Caucasians working in or with the United States government. Thus far we have chronicled the contributions made by African Americans such as Lewis
Granger, Roy Davenport, Walter White, William Hastie and Marcus Ray, and we will spotlight the efforts of John Sengstacke, editor of the Chicago Defender in the next chapter. While these blacks made a critical contribution, whites played the most prominent role in delineating, opposing and implementing military desegregation policy. Caucasians controlled the mainstream press, political opinion-making and the publicity processes and the public information positions
in the federal government.
We have shown how, in seeking to combat injustice, Truman became an
unexpected advocate for democratic reform of the military. Truman’s advocacy
of racial reform converged with his desire to modernize the post-war defense
establishment. He developed these broad themes to cast himself as a moderate
standard-bearer for the Democratic Party and an alternative to Henry Wallace,
2 on the left, and Strom Thurmond, on the right. Rather than speculate upon
155 156
Truman’s motivations, our attention has turned to the haggling for political advantage by the military and the White House forces. an To this end, we found publicity and the threat of public exposure was important accelerant and deterrent within this somewhat opaque political sphere. We have analyzed the actions of these political insiders and elites and
desires found that they disregarded, or assumed that the press represented, the
Philip of the governed. In this chapter, we examine the efforts made by A.
Randolph, the leading black activist of the 1940s, to represent these desires
and to advance the political dialogue. We will show that Randolph used
publicity and other public relations tools to create a climate for change.
Throughout his entire career as a union and civil rights leader, A. Philip
Randolph recognized the utility of public relations for garnering attention to
popular and unpopular causes. A well-timed speech, a petition signed by
influential political leaders, a carefully targeted newspaper or magazine article
could often create an aura of political inevitability for a cause that Randolph
supported. As he achieved his goals, Randolph became more adept at the use
of public relations as a political mechanism. In 1937, Randolph had forged the
first successful contract between a major American company (Pullman Motor
Car) and a black union (Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters), and in 1941 he
forced President Franklin Roosevelt to ban racial discrimination in federal
employment and defense industries by threatening a pre-war March on
Washington by 100,000 African-Americans. 3 Randolph built upon these
successes to become a particularly effective catalyst for military
democratization. His commitment to military desegregation took root during
World War II.
Randolph's Early Military Desegregation Crusade 157
mobilization of Officials in the Roosevelt administration were discussing
1934 through African American troops well before World War II began. From
Chief Counsel 1937, Roosevelt’s Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur and NAACP
Charles H. Houston exchanged a series of letters on relevant issues such as the quota. 4 As the United States began gearing up for war in the wake of
its desire Hitlerian aggression, the African American community began to voice
society. The for reform in the American military and throughout American hallmark of this campaign was the Pittsburgh Courier's call for a Double V (for
Victory) of democracy at home against discrimination and abroad against fascism. 5 Meanwhile, Walter White led a delegation that included the National
Urban League’s T. Walter Hill and Randolph to try to convince Roosevelt to
integrate the armed services; although Roosevelt promised to act, he effectively neutralized the opposition by issuing a press release that promised some
improvements but not integrated units. Moreover the administration implied that
the group (White, Hill and Randolph) had endorsed these moves, but the White
House later retracted this when the delegation formally registered their
protests. 6 Officially, the 1940 Draft Act mandated racial desegregation, but
Roosevelt also gave his imprimatur to an Army memo that, operationally, kept
7 African-Americans in separate battalions.
On another front, Randolph organized the March On Washington
Movement (MOWM) which called for desegregation of both the military and
defense plants; the latter largely succeeded but the former failed. Before
Randolph was able to secure an executive order from Roosevelt assuring
factory jobs for skilled black workers, African Americans had been largely shut
out of defense industries. According to a United States Employment Service
inquiry, more than fifty percent of companies engaged in defense work refused
8 to hire blacks; more than a quarter million jobs were effectively closed. To 158
march down protest this situation, Randolph wanted to bring 10,000 Negroes to
Pennsylvania Avenue and ask for a share of jobs and desegregation of the
the organ of military. Randolph actively promoted the idea in The Black Worker , the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, and received wide support and
to publicity from much of the black press. From this publicity, Randolph was able
up the ante to 100,000 protesters. A spirit of revolt was in the air. Although
White House intermediaries tried to win delays and to convince Randolph to
relent, Roosevelt was finally forced to meet with a civil rights delegation headed
without by Randolph in mid-June 1941. Randolph refused to call off the march
the a tangible concession. He got it in the form of Executive Order 8802,
formation of the Fair Employment Practices Committee and the de jure
desegregation of defense plants. Although it did not result in quite the
public reformation that it promised, Randolph’s victory was stunning as a
relations ploy. It was the first time that blacks would use political pressure and
leverage, rather than earnest requests, to achieve a goal. In turn, Randolph
agreed to postpone the march, but not to cancel it, as a means of maintaining
pressure on the Roosevelt administration.
During the war, Randolph fought racial segregation in the military
through his support of Winifred Lynn. Lynn and his brother, Conrad, a civil
liberties lawyer, brought a habeas corpus case against the U.S. Army on
grounds that racial segregation in the military was illegal. Randolph supported
the Lynns by publishing The War's Greatest Scandal! The Story of Jim Crow in
Uniform in April, 1943 through MOWM. The pamphlet, by Dwight McDonald,
argued for civil disobedience. Publication and distribution was complicated,
because Walter White of the NAACP refused to distribute it on grounds that,
“There is no sound reason why we should buy and distribute promotional
9 literature of a duplicating (competing) body.” This issue ripped open a rift 159
between the MOWM and the NAACP. In a policy/publicity packet for local organizations and in personal correspondence, Randolph denied that he was competing with the NAACP and other rights organizations because he was focused on mass action. Yet, White and others found MOWM offered too much
competition. 10
At war’s end, Randolph continued his military desegregation efforts by
forming the National Committee to Abolish Segregation in the Armed Services.
In April 1945, he drew Willard Townsend of the CIO, Morris Milgram of the
Workers Defense League (WDL) and Wilfred Kerr of the Lynn Committee to a
conference in Butler, New Jersey. Their plans soon proved too ambitious and
too expensive. When they realized they could not build a nation-wide
movement, the Committee disbanded. 11
Randolph then turned his attention back to establishment of a National
Council for a Permanent Fair Employment Practice Commission. This
undertaking placed Randolph at the forefront of what would become a
mainstream civil rights coalition. A rally in Madison Square Garden won
endorsement from President Harry Truman, a speech by the administration’s
Labor Secretary Lewis Schwellenbach and speeches by Mayor Fiorello
LaGuardia, Senators Wayne Morse (R-Oregon) and Robert Wagner (D-New
York).
To further the FEPC, Randolph issued a strategy manual that included
five pages of public relations policies. He specified use of radio, bulletin boards,
sample press releases and recommended ways to gain newspaper coverage.
He summed up the publicity philosophy saying, “everything that your [local
FEPC] council does, no matter how trivial, should have a place in your local
newspapers. The smaller the town, the larger your place in the local press.” This 160
philosophy of constant, consistent publicity-seeking also would inform
12 Randolph’s efforts to desegregate the military.
Randolph regarded Truman’s Civil Rights Committee and his NAACP appearance as mere rhetoric. But he found a savvy adversary in the thirty-third
President. Although Truman may have secretly harbored racist beliefs, he was willing to articulate comprehensive civil rights reform as part of his political agenda. From late 1947 through 1950, Randolph and other civil libertarians
13 tried to goad the President to keep his promises.
Randolph organized his post-war military desegregation campaign through three consecutive organizations, the Committee Against Jim Crow in
Military Service and Training (CAJCMS), the short-lived League for Non-Violent
Civil Disobedience Against Military Segregation (LNVCD) and a series of local
Commissions of Inquiry which operated under auspices of the Committee
Against Jim Crow. During the life of these groups, Randolph also served as a
leading officer of many other civil rights organizations and was employed by the
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP); he funded the military crusade
through the BSCP auxiliaries and through like-minded liberal and radical
organizations.
In this publicity campaign, Randolph was joined by Captain Grant
Reynolds and four leading members of the Congress Of Racial Equality, William
Worthy, Bayard Rustin, George Houser and A.J. Muste. Of these, Reynolds and
Worthy were the most significant in this context because they served,
respectively, as Chairman and Public Relations Director for the Committee
Against Jim Crow. 14 Reynolds, a black Republican and New York State
Commissioner of Correction, had opposed a Communist-supported candidate
for the Harlem Congressional district. Before this, he had resigned his
commission as an army chaplain in January, 1944 in protest against persistent, 161
branch hired blatant racism in the armed forces. The Washington, D.C. NAACP him as an administrative assistant. 15 Reynolds became a Corrections Reynolds Commissioner in 1947. In that year, even before the CAJ formed, wrote his boss, New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey, as well as Truman,
Defense Secretary James Forrestal and Joint Chiefs of Staff head Dwight
Eisenhower asking their views on the issue of racial segregation. Copies of
16 Reynolds’ letters were distributed to the black and pacifist press.
Randolph and Reynolds formed the Committee Against Jim Crow in
October 1947. A month later, the pacifistic Congress Of Racial Equality voiced
their opposition to a peacetime draft, but announced they were unwilling to
endorse affiliation with Randolph’s newly-revived organization. Disagreement
with Randolph was not new. In 1943, CORE had refused to participate in the
March on Washington because Randolph felt that the March should be all-
black. CORE was an avowedly interracial organization. However, CORE
leaders joined the post-war group at the urging of William Worthy.
Worthy, an official of the New York Council for a permanent Fair
Employment Practices Commission, had joined CORE a few months earlier by
participating in a Journey of Reconciliation. To test a recent Supreme Court
decision desegregating interstate travel, CORE members and other civil rights
leaders chartered a bus for a two-week interracial trip through the South. The
Journey, which drew much attention in the black press, would become the
forerunner of the 1961 Freedom Ride. In early 1947, Worthy was appointed to
a temporary salaried post of CORE Action Director. He was hired to create
programs supporting desegregation of the armed forces, the YMCA, apartment
complexes and southern transportation. Funding from this highly-decentralized
organization was erratic, and Worthy was unable to institute any serious action.
At the meeting in which he received his appointment, Worthy urged his fellow 162
Randolph’s CORE members not to “make a fetish of inter-racialism,” and to join
Committee Against Jim Crow. Apparently, Worthy became executive secretary
17 of the Committee at this time.
Desegregation of UMT
The Committee Against Jim Crow took their first significant public action
in January, 1948, when they sent a press release announcing their opposition to H.R. 4278, Truman’s bill for Universal Military Training. They opposed the bill
because House Armed Services Committee Chairman Walter G. Andrews told
them, confidentially, that the War Department planned to keep the forces
segregated. 18 Dissatisfied with the amount of news coverage they received,
they stepped up their opposition by immediately calling for the use of civil
disobedience in February 1948. George Houser, a founder of CORE and a
Caucasian Methodist minister, and Worthy called for a boycott of the draft and
war taxes. 19 To further publicize this opposition, Worthy arranged for a radio-
broadcast interview with Randolph on WQXR and WQXQ, two radio stations
owned by the New York Times on February 25, 1948 and he wrote PM
columnist Albert Deutsch, noting that their releases seemed to get short shrift in
20 New York’s most liberal newspaper.
But the issue did not gain substantial publicity until after Randolph met
with Democratic Party officials in February 1948, and then with President Harry
Truman in mid-March. Randolph was accompanied by Dr. Channing H. Tobias
of the Civil Rights Committee, George S. Schuyler of the Pittsburgh Courier,
L.D. Reddick, curator of the Schomburg Collection of the New York Public
Library and Boxing champion Joe Louis. The Chicago Defender military 163
affairs columnist, who wrote under the pseudonym Charley Cherokee, described the meeting:
A. Phillip Randolph and Grant Reynolds through their Committee Against Jim Crow in Military Service and Training are
insisting on elimination of segregation in armed forces if UMT goes through. In an audience with the President last week, Phil came out and said what most Negroes think: "We don't want to
fight for democracy abroad until we get it at home." Truman got mad at first but later cooled to admit Negroes have justification.
Some editorialists and columnists are calling it disloyalty, but 21 from here it looks like the truth."
Randolph was frustrated by Truman’s reaction. Although he was able to
argue his position with Truman, his publicity campaign garnered little attention.
News of his meeting with Truman was buried on page 21 in the New York
22 Times at the end of an article on the Armed Services Committee meeting.
Meanwhile, the NAACP and other organizations met in late March to
endorse Truman’s recently announced civil rights program. However, they
obliquely urged “meticulous scrutiny” of the statements, voting and public
records of candidates even as they called for every vestige of segregation and
discrimination in the armed forces to be abolished and for any public official
who fails to act to be removed from office. 23
Randolph reacted more directly by raising the political heat and, as
Houser suggested, threatening civil disobedience in front of the Senate Armed
Services Committee. Randolph clearly knew that his provocation would draw
headlines because he alerted columnist Drew Pearson before his testimony. 24
When the Senate Armed Services Committee special subcommittee met to
hear interested persons comment upon UMT, Randolph and Reynolds
addressed them on behalf of the Committee Against Jim Crow in Military
Service. Randolph warned that if the draft remained segregated, he would
openly counsel, aid and abet youth, both white and Negro, to quarantine any Jim Crow . .
164
conscription system, whether it bears the label of
universal military training or selective service . . .
From coast to coast in my travels I shall call upon all Negro veterans to join this civil disobedience movement and to recruit their younger brothers in an organized refusal
to register and be drafted . .
I shall appeal to the thousands of white youths ... to demonstrate their solidarity with Negro youths by ignoring
the entire registration and induction machinery . .
I shall appeal to the Negro parents to lend their moral support to their sons, to stand behind them, as they march with heads held high to Federal prisons as a telling demonstration to the world that Negroes have reached the limit of human endurance, that in the words of the spiritual, 25 we will be buried in our graves before we will be slaves.
Senator Wayne Morse, liberal Republican from Oregon on the Armed
Services Committee was “somewhat surprised and no little shocked” at ,
Randolph’s new position. He had been a strong supporter, after all, of
Randolph’s FEPC efforts. Randolph acknowledged that this form of conscientious objection was new, based upon the conviction that since the government had not protected Negroes from discrimination, that even in times of national emergency, blacks and whites should not shoulder arms. Morse
asked if, under these circumstances, the government would be justified in charging treason. Randolph replied,
. . if there are sacrifices and sufferings, terrorism, and
concentration camps, whatever they may be, if that is the
only way by which Negroes can get their democratic rights, I
would unhesitatingly say that we have to face it.
When Morse asked if Randolph felt that treason indictments should necessarily follow specific overt acts, the civil rights leader replied,
... we would participate in no overt acts against our Government, no overt acts of any kind. In other words, ours would be one of nonresistance. Ours would be one of noncooperation; ours would be one of nonparticipation in the military forces of 165
our country . . . [however] we would be willing to absorb the terrorism, to face the music and to take whatever comes and we, as a matter of fact, consider that we are more loyal to our country than the people who perpetuate segregation and discrimination upon Negroes because of color or race.
Finally, when Morse asked if this action would not constitute aiding and
abetting the enemy, Randolph compared it with the action of a union strike
during wartime. Randolph reiterated the theme that he had expressed in his
testimony that no matter how the courts might construe their action,
we would be willing to face it on the grounds that our actions would be in obedience and in conformity with the higher law of righteousness than that set forth in the so-called law of treason. 26
Days later, Morse addressed the Senate on his recent colloquy and published critical reactions from Earl Brown of the New York Amsterdam News, the Pittsburgh Courier, the Washington Afro-American, NAACP Secretary
Walter White, Congressman William L. Dawson (one of two African Americans in the House at the time), and other black leaders. Morse declared that Gandhi’s philosophy could not be applied in this country because “Gandhi had no responsibility to a written Constitution.” Further, he argued, that the very act of passive resistance constituted an act of omission which would constitute legal commission in aiding and abetting an enemy. Morse said Randolph had set back civil rights legislation but promised to fight for the cause. 27
In a later column, Charley Cherokee reported on Randc ph's Senate appearance:
It was ’Negro Day' last Wednesday at the Senate Armed Forces hearing on UMT. With Negro witnesses segregated to the 166
end of the session, television, newsreels and thrill seekers who covered Hank Wallace the day before were absent. But there were thrills. A. Phillip Randolph stole the show with another mighty bluff (or is he bluffing?) --- "If we are to continue to have a Jim Crow
army, I will advise Negroes not to fight." Like a Joe Louis left hook
1 or like 'Saint Phil's own March-on-Washington bluff, it stung the white folks.
In that same article, Cherokee noted there was 'by-play.' The NAACP flatly opposed UMT, but Gibson, ex-army civilian aide and Negro member of the UMT Committee was publicly shocked at Randolph/Reynolds group. While segregationist Sen. Richard Russell praised Gibson for his “Americanism,”
Grant Reynolds called Gibson a “hand-picked mouthpiece of the War 28 Department who sat out the war in a swivel chair.
Caucasian Press Reaction to Randolph and Reynolds Statements
Unlike his meeting with Truman, Randolph’s Senate testimony caused enough alarm to win headlines in the white-dominated press. On 1 April, the day after the Soviets began blocking American and British traffic into Berlin, the
29 New York Times was filled with related stories about the draft and UMT. Yet, it also ran C.P. Trussell’s article on Randolph’s testimony on the front page.
Trussell called it “a blunt warning from the black public” and said that
“committee members indicated anxiety” as Randolph spoke. Morse’s debate with Randolph was carried in full on the jump-page (p.10) of the story. Although
the Times would later support draft desegregation, it did not comment editorially on Randolph’s statement. 30
Coverage of the hearings in the Washington Post also appeared prominently below that of news of the Berlin crisis. The Post 's John Norriss portrayed Grant Reynolds’ testimony as "a bitter, impassioned attack against
Jim Crowism" and noted Reynolds warned the civil rights activists would not accept “a weasel-worded amendment such as appeared in the 1940 draft bill.”
He also briefly cited Gibson's statement that he was “shocked” by the call for 167
resistance. In an editorial the next day, the Post cautioned against
exaggerating the significance of Randolph's remarks and suggested it was
meant more as moral pressure than as a threat. They agreed with Randolph,
“There is convincing evidence to show segregation is a wasteful procedure that
does not make the most efficient use of manpower.” However, they cast
Randolph’s appeal as imposing two standards of loyalty and agreed with
Gibson that “you can’t bargain with patriotism.”31
Time magazine ran an article entitled "Face the Music," in their regular
"Races" department, which was not entirely unsympathetic. They framed
Randolph’s testimony reminding readers that "too many Americans forget what
the Communists never let others forget — that democracy in the U.S. is far from
perfect." The three-paragraph article suggested that Randolph and Reynolds
were not threatening treason, but merely calling the nation to task. 32 While the
testimony did not prompt immediate coverage in Newsweek, it did move the
magazine’s editors to assign their Special Projects department to assess
African American reaction and to discuss the broader issues involved.
Newsweek included results of a poll “by the NAACP” of 2,200 “Negro college
youth polled on 26 campuses,” showed that 71 percent were inclined to favor the Randolph proposal.
Newsweek struggled to assess the impact of Randolph’s words outside of the black intelligentsia because the black press was split on the issue. After
numerous interviews and analysis, Newsweek concluded “most Negro newspapers agree with the diagnosis, but rejected the proposed cure.” The
Newsweek article did not purport “to cover the pros and cons of segregation, but
rather to assay how the Negroes themselves have reacted to the idea of passive resistance.” Although it avoided outright editorializing, the article gave high marks to Randolph, calling him “one of the most respected Negro leaders 168
in the country” who could be no Communist because “as a lifelong moderate
socialist, he has been fighting Communism for decades,” who “voiced strong
hostility toward Russian totalitarianism” and that Wayne Morse’s treason characterization “was shared by large numbers of citizens, but nettled some
whites and worried many Negroes.” They concluded that it was an issue for the courts which “ placed the Armed forces in one of the most difficult dilemmas they
had ever faced.”
Aside from the effect that the article had in broadening awareness and
clearly articulating the scope and complexity of the issues involved, Newsweek
also provided one of the best descriptions of Forrestal’s meeting with his
National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs. Army Secretary Royall told the group of fifteen university presidents, lawyers and preachers that “I’m from North
Carolina and I know the Negro.” Reasserting his support for the Gillem plan,
Royall tried to differentiate between discrimination and segregation as separate ideas. Newsweek wrote that the group reacted strongly to Royall’s words. “Not only did it fail to repudiate Randolph, but in effect [it] adopted his tactic by flatly refusing to form the Advisory committee that Forrestal had encouraged .” 33
Defense Department officials did not immediately react to Randolph’s statement. It did prompt discussion and communication among John H. Ohly, executive assistant to the Secretary of Defense, James C. Evans, civilian aide for Negro affairs, Truman Gibson, Expert Consultant to the Secretary of
Defense, and Marx Leva, the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.
While Defense Department public relations officers were aware of expanding discontent, they dealt with it clumsily. For months, the Army and the Air Force refused to release news about Negro troops. The Navy tried to correct this through publication of a study, "The Integration of the Negro in the U.S. Navy," and with a press conference. Pittsburgh Courier columnist Lem Graves, Jr. 169
portrayed the Navy press conference “as a satisfactory rationalization of certain
obvious shortcomings in the present Navy program of racial integration, it
34 couldn’t fill the bill.”
Even before Randolph’s threat, Forrestal planned to hold his National
Defense Conference on Negro Affairs. That meeting was held on 13 April 1948.
As Newsweek noted, Randolph did not attend but the spirit of his protest and his
appearance before the Armed Services Committee were a recurring topic of
conversation. 35
Commission on Inquiry into Wartime Treatment of Negro Gl’s
Randolph, Reynolds and Worthy organized a series of defense-related
conferences of their own from May, 1948 through 1949. These inquiries were
held in Washington, D.C., New Orleans, St. Louis and Los Angeles. Arthur
Garfield Hayes, noted civil libertarian and attorney was counsel for the D.C.
inquiry. While many Defense Department officials were invited, only James
Evans attended. Familiar administration critics were featured speakers,
including Progressive Candidate Henry Wallace, who demanded Army
Secretary Kenneth Royall resign, and Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge,
who described segregation as an undeserved, unjustified humiliation that
jeopardized the national defense. 36
Defense Secretary Forrestal’s National Defense Conference on Negro
Affairs was held just before Randolph’s own Washington Inquiry. Charlie
Cherokee noted that Walter White tried to “pull a fast one and put Phil in his
place” because Randolph wasn’t invited to Forrestal’s Conference. But
Randolph’s spirit kept the 15 Negro Conference leaders unified against the
Army’s equally intransigent segregationist policy. In an editorial, the Defender
noted that the Conference members did not endorse civil disobedience but that 170
“many of them made it clear that Mr. Randolph’s views reflected the deep feeling among Negroes on the Jim Crow issue. The Commission would continue to meet into January, when the President's Committee met. Cherokee described Randolph's Commission as a 'bitter condemnation' of Army practices. 37
League for Non-Violent Civil Disobedience
On June 26, Randolph announced a new organization, the League for
Non-Violent Civil Disobedience Against Military Segregation whose immediate purpose was to force Truman to issue an executive order ending segregation in
the Armed Forces. If this was not done before the new draft act went into effect, on August 16, the League would openly call for non-compliance. For a number
of reasons, the League would prove to be a highly significant, if short-lived enterprise.
The Committee Against JimCrow in the Military had been funded in part by contributions from auxiliaries to the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters.
The League was formed to keep the union legally separate from any illegal activities related to draft resistance and to provide a forum of protest for the
Fellowship of Reconciliation. Randolph formed the League with A.J. Muste,
Bayard Rustin and George Houser, who were all founders of the Fellowship of
Reconciliation (FOR). FOR was a CORE offshoot, formed by its members to canvass support for pacifistic causes. Muste, a respected pacifist, suggested the need for a separate organization. While FOR members sought to eliminate all military conscription, Randolph only protested segregation in the draft. 38 171
Perhaps the most notable distinction between CAJ and the League was their approach to public relations and public action. The Committee Against
JimCrow operated in the national media, the League stressed local community action. This conformed with CORE practices. The League called for public relations, morale and financial committees. It counseled potential draftees, distributed anti-JimCrow buttons and propaganda pamphlets containing a “Civil
Disobedience" pledge. 39
During the summer, while the League attempted to establish itself on a local basis in a number of CORE strongholds, Randolph picketed the
Democratic and Republican Conventions. Members of the Americans for
Democratic Action forged a strong civil rights plank and won endorsement on the convention floor over objections of the national steering committee. In protest, South Carolina Governor Strom Thurmond led a walkout of southern delegates who formed their own party. The Republican platform also endorsed ending racial segregation in the military. In this way, Randolph’s formulation of the issues shaped the 1948 presidential campaign. Without his intervention,
Army Secretary Royall’s interpretation of desegregation might have prospered.
40 When he returned from the convention, Randolph became preoccupied with the legal aspects of non-compliance. He and Worthy carefully honed a statement that would enable him to counsel non-compliance without breaking the law. When the New York Times overstated this position, Randolph disavowed their interpretation of his stance.
An Ideological Split Or A Grab For Power
From the inception of the March On Washington Movement, Randolph's reliance on charismatic leadership rather than bureaucratic organization had put him at odds with other putative leaders of the African American community. 172
Although he was a well-recognized leader, members of the NAACP, National
Urban League and the black press disagreed with his tactics and methods. One of these critics, Bayard Rustin made strong efforts to take control of the military anti-discrimination movement. 41
The issue that Rustin and others broke with Randolph over was acceptance of Truman's Executive Order 9981. In the few days before
Omar Bradley's July 27 speech to Army training leaders at Fort Knox
Kentucky, Truman's call for 'equality of treatment and opportunity' had been considered vague. On July 29, reporters at a Presidential press conference asked Truman to clarify the Order in lieu of Bradley's statement. Truman said his order was aimed at the eventual end of segregation.
In late July, Grant Reynolds warned Randolph that Rustin had hidden ambitions to take over the League. Rustin took control of the funds, opened up a separate, secret bank account and tried to squeeze
William Worthy out of the organization. To counter this deception,
Reynolds immediately divided responsibilities, giving the Committee to
Worthy and the League to Rustin. Reynolds also confronted Rustin, declaring that Rustin’s memo to the League staff was inaccurate,
42 irresponsible and full of ‘unpleasant implications.’
At the time of the Rustin confrontation, Randolph was still dissatisfied with Truman because the Executive Order did not precisely call for an end to segregation. He and Reynolds wrote a letter to the
White House and to the Democratic Party leadership. Truman sent the
Party chairman, Senator Howard J. McGrath, to confer with the n.
McGrath assured them that all forms of discrimination were banned under the new order and that Truman would be appointing a strong 173
Presidential Commission to enforce the order. On August 18, Randolph and Reynolds formally discontinued their civil disobedience campaign.
However, they continued as the Committee Against Jim Crow in the
Military. 43
Houser and Rustin reacted angrily to this declaration of conscience. They felt that Randolph was abandoning those who declared non-compliance both inside and outside the Army. They reformed their group as the Campaign to
44 Resist Military Segregation. The pacifists argued that Randolph was trying to
improve and democratize the Army while they were trying to eliminate it. FOR spokesman Bayard Rustin denounced Randolph and Reynolds, declaring that they had “made a grave and tragic mistake” when they failed to follow through on their commitments. Immediately, Randolph and Reynolds publicly disassociated themselves from Rustin and the continuing civil disobedience campaign. And they felt obligated to issue another denunciation in November.
As historian Paula Pfeffer noted, “Rustin’s unauthorized letters and statements to both major political parties and his violation to clear press releases revealed a basic split in ideology and an internal weakness within the league.”45
Thus, twenty years before the Viet Nam War, a rift was beginning to emerge between those who fought racism and those who fought militarism. By lending his considerable influence to its pacifist agenda, Randolph elevated
CORE’S presence on the national scene even while he forced them to reassess their tactics. The schism between Randolph and CORE, which Worthy helped precipitate, would ultimately affect the anti-war agenda of the civil rights movement.
Funding Problems .
174
The entire postwar military desegregation movement, in all of its
incarnations, was continually running out of funds. In part, Randolph remedied
this by publishing another pamphlet, The Scandal Nobody Knows! Jim Crow in
the Military.” This pamphlet introduced cartoonist Al Capp’s beloved Shmoo,
featured cartoons by Bill Mauldin and a text by Dwight McDonald. Much as he
did with the 1943 pamphlet, Randolph sold the pamphlet to women’s auxiliary
units of his Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters and to other sympathetic
unions and liberal organizations. 46
Similarly, the CAJ and the League were constantly having trouble paying
their printing bills, their phone bills and keeping up with other expenses. In fact,
the rift between Randolph and Bayard Rustin and the other members of CORE
was, in part, triggered by William Worthy’s inadequacies as an accountant
Although most of his peers thought Worthy was likable and that he was an
effective public relations director, John Swomley, the President of the National
Council Against Conscription, found Worthy to be a divisive factor. 47
Swomley blamed Worthy for inept bookkeeping, claiming that Worthy
regularly used cash contributions for his own expenses and paid himself before
other bills. Swomley was present at the meeting in which Rustin reportedly
squeezed Worthy and Randolph out of the organization. He denied that this was
the meeting intent; instead, he called for the effort to be decentralized and
removed from strict New York control. Further Swomley declared, “I was
working in somewhat of a similar relationship to both Bayard and Bill until I
found Bill making assertions which he did not back up when Bayard was
present and when I discovered other actions on Bill’s part which made me
begin to doubt his procedures.” It is also significant that Worthy lost his job as
CORE Action director because he was unable to run a program with erratic funding. 48 175
In reply, Randolph ignored Swomley’s complaints about Worthy and
focused on the legitimacy of calling off the civil disobedience campaign, which
was not the primary focus of Swomley’s letter. Randolph noted that Ghandi
regularly discontinued campaigns and that he felt morally committed to ending
49 civil disobedience after Truman met his demands for a desegregated draft.
German Commission of Inquiry Flap
In late 1949, the Committee Against Jim Crow planned a Commission of
Inquiry in Germany. The Defender received copies of the Committee’s travels
requests that were sent to the Defense Secretary and chided Randolph for
rubber-stamping rather than signing the requests and for seeking Republican
rather than Democratic support for the travel plan.
In a note to Joseph Rauh, Randolph admitted the rubber stamp was
"quite a blunder." He noted that Worthy "was trying to run an organization
without money at the same time that he may do many things but not all may be
according to protocol.” Then he suggested that it might be necessary to take some responsibility from Worthy because he did not want ethical aspects of
military desegregation to be stymied by a lack of protocol. 50
On January 13, Reynolds apologized to Louis Johnson, Secretary of
Defense, for Worthy’s protocol violation and questioned how the Defender could receive access to Defense Secretary correspondence. In his reply,
Johnson never revealed how the Defender saw the travel request but he did reaffirm his support for the Pentagon travel policy.
As a result of the flap, Randolph was forced to accelerate his involvement with the Committee Against Jim Crow. On January 18, he personally met with
Truman’s Administrative assistant, David Niles and reiterated his case for a an 176 ad hoc Congressional Committee. The German Inquiry had broad support. 51
Finally, Leva drafted a letter sent under Niles signature which reminded
Randolph that he needed the support of a Congressional Committee chairman.
52 Randolph was unable to find that support .
Randolph’s Influence on Military Desegregation
Morris MacGregor has argued, “Whatever its ultimate influence on national policy, the Randolph civil disobedience pledge had no visible effect on the position of the President or Congress. With a draft bill and a national political convention pending, the President was not about to change his hands- off policy toward the segregation issue in the services. In fact he showed some heat at what he saw as a threat by extremists to exploit an issue he claimed he was doing his best to resolve.” 53
Clearly, MacGregor is wrong in arguing that Randolph's pledge had no visible effect on Truman or Congress. The Republicans, the Democrats and the
Progressives were all vying for the votes of blacks. In light of these political considerations, the Secretary of Defense and the White House gave generous time and thought to Randolph even while they were transforming the National
Military Establishment into a unified Defense Department, instituting the
Marshall Plan and carrying out the Berlin Airlift. For instance, Truman sent
Democratic Party chairman, Senator Howard J. McGrath, to assure Randolph that the Executive Order banned all forms of discrimination.
MacGregor cites Quest and Response , by McCoy and Ruetten as his main source on Randolph’s role. Yet they contended that “the limelight was on 177
the White House, and its occupants were beginning to feel the heat.” Randolph was clearly one of those who was generating heat, through publicity and coalition-building among the unions and other traditional liberal organizations.
According to McCoy and Ruetten, Clifford and other staff members met with
Forrestal, on May 12, 1948 “to decide what might be done immediately without incurring the wrath of everyone concerned." 54 Wholesale draft resistance could be considered one form of ‘wrath’ to be incurred.
Second, MacGregor and McCoy and Reutten seem to have underestimated the effect that Truman's pledge had on Randolph. As a labor leader, Randolph was clearly uncomfortable invoking a call for civil disobedience in the military. Time and again, he consulted others to develop a speech that urged non-compliance without openly breaking the law. 55 During the war, military desegregation had caused a rift between Randolph's March on
Washington Movement and the NAACP. In the post-war period, the issue again
divided Randolph from CORE. If Randolph’s influence was limited, it was in part
because Randolph sought to limit it.
Third, through the efforts that the civil rights establishment force upon the
Truman administration, the military finally began to transform itself. The White
House and the Defense Department clearly regarded civil rights issues as an important priority. The service branches, especially the Army, were far more reluctant to acknowledge this priority. With the appeal of Randolph's call for civil disobedience, Truman and the Defense Department also began to acknowledge Randolph as the nation's most visible dissenter on the issue. After the Army began to seriously consider desegregation, individual racial altercations were no longer shunted to Defense Department civilian aids like
James Evans or to public relations specialists within the individual services. The military began instituting military training, social service and military justice that .
178
helped ease desegregation. Although it was small and weak compared with
1960s era civil rights groups, Randolph and his Committee Against Jim Crow
represented the best organized, most concerted voice for military desegregation
in the African American community. Randolph's sterling reputation, his skillful
use of all forms of publicity and public relations advocacy and his abiding
rapport with the black press had a measure of influence on military decision-
making.
Notes
1 Trezzvant Anderson wanted the U.S. Army to award the 761st Tank Battalion, an all Afro-
American unit, a medal for bravery for their World War II assault on Germany. Anderson, a Pittsburgh Courier editorial writer, felt that Randolph’s publicity drive was spoiling these plans. On June 28, 1948, Anderson received a press release from Randolph’s Committee Against Jim Crow in the Military. The Committee release asked President Harry Truman to issue an Executive Order to desegregate the Armed Forces. On May 28, Anderson mailed Randolph a copy of the award
request that he had sent to the Army. In June, Anderson wrote Randolph, “I think that [your] premature announcement of that [desegregation demand] would give the public idea of FORCING the President’s hand. The psychology of that will, naturally, make MY task much harder and far more difficult, simply because it is human nature to resist prodding as such ... in a public sense. Where one can beat a graceful retreat, then there is a much better possibility of success. Anderson, Trezzvant (28 June 1948), frame #711-718 in Reel 12, Asa Phillip Randolph (APR) Papers. Anderson's emphasis
2 For a more extensive discussion of Truman’s political motivations, see appendix.
3 Herbert Garfinkel, (1959) When Negroes March: The March on Washington Movement in the
Organizational Politics of FEPC . Glencoe, IL: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., , in passim. Eleanora W. Schoenman,(ed.) Political Profiles: I : (1976) Volume The Truman Years . New York: Facts on File Inc., p.450.
4 Morris J. MacGregor, (1985) Integration of the Armed Forces. 1940-1965 , Washington, DC: Center of Military History.
5 Lee Finkle, Forum for Protest: (1975) The Black Press During World War II . Cranbury, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press.
6 Walter Whitel (948) A Man Called White . New York: Viking Press,
7 Memo, Assistant Secretary of War (ASW) for President, 8 Oct. 1 940; Letter Secretary to President Franklin Roosevelt (Stephen Early to ASW, 9 October 1940, Adjutant General (National Archives Records Group 291.21)
8 Garfinkel, p. 186. 751
179
9 Morris to White, 1 December 1942, Memorandum to Walter White from Roy Wilkins, 21 May 1943 and penciled notes. Walter White to Randolph, 1 1 June 1943; Memo to White and Wilkins
from Konvitz, 9 June 1 943 all in Part Reel 1 1 1 , 3, 7, of NAACP papers.
Randolph to White, 9 September 1942 in NAACP papers; Pamphlet, National March on Washington Movement: Policies and Directives; March on Washington Movement: Proceedings of Conference Held in Detroit; Ray W. Guild to White, 15 April 1943; Paul Murray to Pittsburgh Courier editor George
Schuyler , 31 July 1942; Alfred Lewis Baker to White 18 September 1943, all in Reel 1 NAACP Papers.
1 National Committee to Abolish Segregation in the Armed Services, Reel 20, frame 596.
12 Manual of Strategy, National Council For a Permanent Fair Employment Practice Commission, October 1945. Reel 22, frames 241- 244.
13 W. Leuchtenberg, (November 1 991 ) ‘The Conversion of Harry Truman” American Heritage .
14 Worthy was among a delegation of 40 pro-FEPC civil rights leaders who attempted to meet with War Manpower Commission chairman Paul McNutt in 1 943; New York Age April 19, 1943.
1 Herbert Apthekar, H. (1 974) A Documentary History of the Nearo People in the United States Volume 4 NY: Citadel Publishing, p. 487.
16 Paula Pfeffer (1990) A. Philip Randolph. Pioneer of the Civil Rights Movement Baton Rouge : ,
Louisiana State University Press, p.137; Conscription News. Volume 124, 20 November 1947, p. 2; Pittsburgh Courier, 18 October 1947.
1 Worthy was Youth Committee for Democracy representative in a n FEPC delegation that 23 Randolph led. They met with Walter McNutt of the War Manpower Commission. New York Age. 1 4 April 1 943. Augustus Meier, A. & E. Rudwick, (1 973) CORE: A Study in the £MJ Rights Movement 1942-1968 New York: Oxford University Press.
18 Committee Against Jim Crow, Circulars, Memos and lists 1948, #445-446, Reel 12 in APR files.
19 Committee Against Jim Crow, Circulars, Memos and lists 1948, #794, Reel 12 in APR files..
20 Committee Against Jim Crow, Correspondence 1948, #445-446, Reel 12 in APR files.
21 According to a note from Worthy to Randolph, Defender columnist Al Smith had been writing the Cherokee column, but he was fired in mid-December, 1949. Venice Spraggs, who also had strong Pentagon ties, reportedly took his place. (15 December 1 949) # 510 in Reel 13 in APR files; Quote is from Defender, 3 April 1 948.
22 Evidence of Randolph’s frustration was reported by R. M. Moore to Senator Howard McGrath, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, 5 February 1948; Report of the meeting published in the New York Times. 23 March 1948, p.21.
Dalfiume,p. 163, “Negro Votes Urged to Aid Democracy,” The New
York Times . 28 March 1948 p.30. 180
24 APR to Drew Pearson, (26 March 1948) #858 in Reel 12, APR files.
25 Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services. Universal Military Training 80th Cong. 2d sess., p.688. , , 1948,
26 Ibid, p.688.
27 Congressional Record-Senate 12 April 1948. pp. 4312- 4317. Willard Townsend, Defender columnist and CIO leader also questioned whether African Americans were acculturated with ‘an inward aggressive personality’ which prevented them from accepting Hinduism and non- violence. ( Chicago Defender . 17 April 1948) and later he warned that Paul Robeson and Grant Reynolds were ‘selling blacks down the river’ in a coming ‘atomic-biological-supersonic World War III.’ ( Chicago
Defender . 23 May 1948) .
28 Charley Cherokee, “National Grapevine,” Chicago Defender. 3 April
1948, p. 1 8; “Gibson Explains Why He Backs Universal Military
Training,” Chicago Defender . 10 April , 1948, p.l.
29 “American, British Trains Held in Soviet Berlin for Inspection, Hinton, Harold, “U.S. Defense Need Put at 5 Divisions,” p.l; Leviero, James “Defense Planning Pushed by Truman," Baldwin, Hanson “Aims of Draft and UMT,” p. 10; Reston, James “U.S. Weighs Means to Bolster Europe,”
“Army Week Here to Stress Defense,” p.12 New York Times . 1 April 1 1948.
30 Trussell, C.P. “Senate Committee Reported Backing Draft and the UMT’ New York Times . 23
March 1948. p.21: New York Times. 1 April 1948, p.l.
31 Norriss, John, "Negroes May Ignore Draft" Washington Post . 1 April
1948, p.l;"Negroes in the Draft” (2 April, 1948,) Washington Post , p. 9.
32 “Face the Music,” (12 April . 1948) Time . 51:21.
33 Crisis in the Making: U.S. Negroes Tussle with Issue of Resisting a
Draft Law because of Racial Segregation (7 June 1948) Newsweek . 21: 28-
29; Haynes, p.91, Dalfiume, p. 166 .
34 Charley Cherokee, “National Grapevine,” Defender . 12 February 1948, p.13; Defender 7
February 1948. Lem Greaves, ‘Washington Notebook," Pittsburgh Courier . 7 February 1948; Committee Against Jim Crow, Correspondence 1948, #926, Reel 12 in APR files.
35 Newsweek . 21 : 28-29; Report of the National Defense Conference on Nec o Affairs, 26 April
1948 James C. Evans Reports and papers US army Military History Research i Election, Carlisle Barracks, PA and in OSD 291 .2 National Archives.
36 Letters from Randolph and Reynolds to Royall and to Evans, ( 3 May 1 948 SecArmy National Archives Records Group 291.21); Subsequently, Evans reported to the Secretary of Defense that the Inquiry kept “attention continuously focused on the needs and possibilities of improving ;
181
high-lighting of the the status of the Negro citizen in uniform [while] minimizing any attempted constructive. (Evans to SecDef, proposed civil disobedience plan.” Evans found this might prove 13 May 1948, CD 30-1-2 in SecDef, National Archives Records Group 291.21
37 Defender . 5 May 1948; 22 January 1949
38 Muste to Randolph, (9 June 1948), # 845, Reel 12 in APR files.
39 Bulletin, League for Non-Violent Civil Disobedience; New York Times, 27 June 1948; The #555- Strength of the Movement for Civil Disobedience Against Military Segregation^ n.d.) frame 556 in Reel 12 in APR files.
40 ANP Release, 21 June 1948, p.22.
41 New York Times, June 27, 1948.; Randolph to John Haynes Holmes, July 1 , 1948 Reel 12 in Pfeffer, in APR Files, Committee Against Jim Crow Correspondence, #790 Reel 12 in APR Files; passim.
42 Reynolds to Randolph, (24 July 1948, 25 July 1948) and Reynolds to Rustin (29 July 1948), himself from Rustin’s press #81 1 -81 3, Reel 1 2 in APR files. Reynolds formally disassociated releases which challenged Truman’s Executive Order. Reynolds urged Randolph to grant Democratic chairman McGrath ‘a period of non-embarrassment while he was seeking White House interpretation.’ (10 August 1948) #892, Reel 12 in APR files.
43 Telegram, Randolph to Truman, Reel 12, Committee Against New York Times . (17 July 1948); , Jim Crow, Correspondence, Press Statement (16 July 1948) #917, Reel 12 in APR files, Reel 12 in Memorandum Grant Reynolds to Senator Howard J. McGrath (1 August 1948) #641 , APR files; Black Worker August 1948.
44 1 Reel 1 of the APR files. Houser to Randolph (1 8 August 948), #801 , 2
45 Pfeffer, p. 153-154.
46 Randolph to Oregon NAACP (5 October 1948); to Ada Dillon, BSCP Ladies Auxiliary (14 July 1948); to the Federal Council of Churches (14 July 1948); to Campaign for World Government (8 June 1948); to Helena Wilson (14 July-29 July/1948); to National Council of Jewish Women (29 September 1948); to Dave Dubinsky of International Ladies Garment Workers Union (16 to Union of September 1949); to E. Corsi of Workers Defense League 4 February 1949) ; Packinghouse Workers (6 August 1949); to Amalgamated Meatcutters Union (20 August 1949); Hatters Union (14 November 1949); to W. Reutherof United Auto Workers (7 March 1949) all in Reel 12, # 719,751,754, 821-824, 852, 922-925, 932, 972, 969, 984, 999-1001, 1051 of APR files. Also, Randolph received Marshall Trust funding of the Inquiry Commissions. Randolph to Simon Gross of Marshall Trust (19 August 1948).
47 For example, A. G. Hays to Randolph (10 May 1948) and L. Graves (15 May 1948) and Reynolds to Randolph, (24 July 1948, 25 July 1948), #782, 769, #811, #812 in Reel 12, APR files.
48 Swomley to Worthy (4 September 1948), Swomley to Randolph (18 March 1949) # 910-912, #1032-1034 in Reel APR files 13, ,
49 files Randolph to Swomley (29 March 1949),# 1039 in Reel 13, , APR
50 Randolph to Rauh, (19 January 1950) in Reel 13, APR files. 182
51 Randolph noted that the African-American press, liberal and church organizations, especially the very influential Elmer Henderson, Director of the American Council on Human Rights, and the Liberal Party all favored the excursion.
52 Reynolds to Johnson, (19 December 1949); “ Charley Cherokee,” Chicago Defender 17 December 1949; Johnson to Reynolds (23 December 1949); Saltonstall to Leva (1 1 January 1950); Reynolds to Johnson (13 January 1950); Reynolds to Evans (13 January 1950); Randolph to Johnson (15 January 1950); Memorandum Leva to Johnson (17 January 1950); Randolph to Niles (19 January 1950); Memorandum Niles to Lava (1 February 1950);
Memorandum Leva to Niles and letter to Randolph (7 February 1950) All in ASD NARG 291 .2 .
53 Morris MacGregor, Jr., (1985) Integration of the Armed Forces 1940-1965 , Washington, DC: Center Of Military History, Government Printing Office, p.304.
54 D.R. McCoy & R.T. Ruetten (1 973) Quest and Response Lawrence, KS: The University Press
of Kansas, p. 109 .
55 See for example “Statement Counseling Non-registration to be Made by A. Philip Randolph When Asked by Negro and White Youths of Draft Age If They Should Register and Submit to Induction in the 1948 Draft Act.” (Undated) # 557-8, Reel 12 in APR files. Chapter 5 THE FAHY COMMITTEE
Custom has moved toward equal treatment, as is shown by development of recent years in the Government, in the armed services, in organized labor, in educational institutions, in sports, in the theater, and in restaurants in this community as examples. Circuit Court Judge Charles Fahy John R. Thompson Co. v. District of Columbia 203 F. 2d 579 (1st Cir1950)
In this chapter, we analyze the core question: How, if at all, did the press
inform the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services? Chapter two discussed the subtle and overt press
manipulations that Truman used to enlarge public support for his policies and
reforms. Chapter three showed how the same American military leaders who
helped craft or obstruct military desegregation often implemented their policy by
responding to or by attempting to control the press. In this chapter, we will show
how the Equality of Treatment Committee was shaped by Truman’s personal
attitudes about the press. We will examine the composition of that Committee,
concentrating on press influences, and then recount the significant operations
that led them to solicit and win Army acceptance of desegregation. We will show
how the Committee felt compelled to openly defy Truman’s press curbs as well
as how the Committee surreptitiously challenged the President’s press
restrictions. Although this incident is rather complicated, we will use it to lay out
the background for the final chapter. In that chapter, we will discuss the degree
to which aspects of this series of events can be directly used to understand
modern situations and the degree to which this method of studying government
publicity and press coverage may provide a useful technique for studying
183 184 history.
Committee Appointments
Through Kenneth Royall and Omar Bradley, the Army had let it be known
that it did not interpret President Harry Truman’s Executive Order 9981 as
requiring the end of segregation. In late 1948, the other services appeared far
more compliant. The Navy announced that it would extend its policy of
integration begun in the closing months of World War II. The Air Force leaked to
the press that it had completed plans for full integration that only waited
approval. 1 This put the Army on the defensive, but still determined to maintain
segregation.
To eliminate segregation in the armed services, Truman created the
President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed
Services in September 1948. The White House had considerable trouble
determining who should be appointed to this committee. Donald Dawson,
Administrative Assistant to the President, contacted Oscar Ewing and Harold
McGrath and asked for their recommendations for committee appointments. As
early as 30 July 1948, Federal Securities Commission Chairman and political
operative Ewing suggested the appointment of Charles Wilson, the former Chair
of the President’s Committee on Civil Rights as the chairman of the military
group. In that same letter, Ewing also strongly endorsed John Sengstacke,
Publisher of the Chicago Defender, as a member of the Committee.
(Sengstacke would be included among the appointees.) Many other journalists
were prominently under consideration, especially by the Secretary of Defense.
While Forrestal recommended (as Chair) Dr. Frank Graham, the President of the 185 University of North Carolina, he also nominated Ralph McGill, editor of the
Atlanta Constitution, Phillip Graham, Associate Publisher of the Washington
Post, Mark Ethridge, Editor of the Louisville Courier-Journal, and Clark Howell, publisher of the Atlanta Constitution. 2 The Office of the Secretary of the Navy
also submitted a list, but it mostly contained names of industrialists and not
3 narrow the list to include journalists . By mid-August, Dawson had begun to
Wilson, Graham, McGill, Sengstacke, and Lewis Granger, the head of the Urban
League, as well as Julius Ochs Adler, Vice-President of the New York Times,
Barry Bingham, publisher of the Louisville Courier-Journal. A few days later,
Dawson reported that Sengstacke was on the list and that answer was expected from Wilson. When Wilson turned the White House down, attention
4 turned to McGill and Phillip Graham as potential chairman . Dawson contacted
Marx Leva regarding Graham. Through Leva, Forrestal expressed his approval but Royall said he preferred Jonathan Daniels, Truman’s former Press
Secretary and the editor of the Raleigh, N.C. News and Observer. Dawson prepared a memo for Truman for an off-record meeting with Graham. He noted that Forrestal and Presidential Administrative Assistant David Niles felt that
Phillip Graham would make “an exceptionally good chairman” and prepared a final list that included five journalists, Phillip Graham, McGill, Sengstacke and
Adler as well as Granger and Alphonsus J. Donahue, who would eventually become an inactive member of the Committee. Dawson urged that Truman tell
Graham that (a) most opposition from the left had disappeared, (b) that the final report of the Defense Conference on Negro Affairs made positive recommendations for the President’s Committee and that (c) the Committee would have complete support of the Negro press. Apparently, Phillip Graham was unmoved because he was not appointed. McGill withdrew himself from 186 consideration, arguing that the local Southern situation would make it inadvisable and that the committee would only bring in a report that would be rejected by the segregationists in the military. Thus, none of the Caucasian journalists were finally appointed. 5
However, these recommendations demonstrate that neither the military nor the White House were adverse to working with liberal journalists on military desegregation. Although Forrestal had cautioned against the press, and though
Truman had often articulated his mistrust of publishers, both were still willing to consider empowering a journalist in this key position. Their reasoning is less evident and worthy of some speculation. This appointment may have been an innocuous mark of appreciation for expected political support; it seems less likely that the Administration tried to trade appointments for political endorsements. In either case, in September 1948, the Democrats themselves may have doubted that Truman would be reelected or that the military desegregation committee would ever meet. Truman and Forrestal may have considered a journalist would be more sensitive to the boundaries of press responsibility, or that a journalist would be a better conduit to the rest of the press and could articulate the need for press restrictions. In essence, a journalist on the committee might be more controllable and better able to control other journalists than a non-journalist. In any case, Truman did not appoint a journalist in the top post but a black journalist was appointed to the committee
6 and the Committee hired a very savvy journalist as its Executive Secretary.
Charles Fahv
the Secretary of the Army7 the White House Despite objections by ,
announced the names of the members of the President's committee on 18 187 September 1948. Basically, the President's committee was a liberal one.
Charles Fahy, a Georgia-born white Catholic was appointed as chairman.
Although a Southerner by birth, Fahy soon became accustomed to positions of authority in Washington, D.C. He had left Rome, Georgia, to become an undergraduate at Notre Dame and then earned a law degree from Georgetown
University and was admitted to the District of Columbia bar. When World War I broke out, he served as a naval aviator from 1917 through 1919. After the war,
he returned to his law practice in the nation’s capitol until 1924 when his health failed and he was hospitalized for a year and a half. For his health, he moved to
Santa Fe, New Mexico, where he practiced law until 1933. Through the 1930s,
Fahy held many posts in the Roosevelt administration including Solicitor
General. 8 Under Truman, he was appointed legal adviser and director of the
Legal Division of the military government in Germany from 1945 through 1946,
a legal adviser to the Department of State, and an adviser to the American
delegation to the San Francisco conference on the United Nations. While he
was chairman of the President’s Equality Committee, he served as an alternate
representative to the U.N. general assembly and as chair of the Atomic Energy
Commission personnel security review board. As the Equality Committee began
to win compliance from the Armed Services, Truman decided to appoint Fahy to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 9 Clearly, from these
responsibilities, Fahy had a broad range of expertise and was widely respected
for his leadership over complex issues. Yet, these obligations monopolized
much of Fahy’s time and prompted him to delegate Equality Committee
activities to his executive secretary and the staff. However, when it counted,
Fahy met with Truman and the service secretaries to set broad policy objectives.
Fahy was known to be liberal on the race issue. In fact, in his very brief 188 hearing appointment to the District Court of Appeals, the Senate only questioned whether he might be “too liberal” for the court. 10
Other Caucasian members of the Fahy Committee were Dwight R. G.
Palmer, president of the General Cable Corporation, active in the National
Urban League, and proponent of equal employment opportunities and William
E. Stevenson, president of Oberlin College.
In addition, Truman appointed two African Americans, Lester Granger, the head of the National Urban League and close friend of Secretary of
Defense Forrestal, 11 and John H. Sengstacke, publisher of the Chicago
Defender. Sengstacke played a key role in preventing the Federal government
12 from closing the black press for sedition during World War II.
Sengstacke and the Chicago Defender Tradition
The appointment of Sengstacke was highly significant because the
Chicago Defender had a long tradition of demonstrating greater skepticism and greater political independence than other newspapers owned or operated by
blacks. During World War I, most black newspapers subscribed to black
1 historian W.E. B. DuBois dictum to “close ranks” behind the war effort and to wait to press their demands for equality until the Kaiser was beaten. Calls for
racial justice and equality were rarely published in the black press. Yet, the first
Defender Publisher, Robert Abbot, was nearly jailed for sedition for publishing
13 'inflammatory,' anti-segregationist cartoons during the first world war.
When Abbott died in 1940, his young cousin, John Sengstacke took over
as Defender publisher and continued the newspaper’s militant stance during
the Second World War. To understand Sengstacke and the political milieu in
which he was operating, it is worth briefly recounting his wartime efforts 189 regarding military desegregation and censorship.
At the onset of World War II, a few black publishers wanted to resurrect
DuBois’s conservative stance of World War I. In answer to these critics who called for more a subdued editorial stance, the Defender articulated their news policies in an editorial that "too many, far too many of our newspapers are
working at cross purposes" it called for other newspapers to abandon the strategy that had been employed 28 years earlier, during World War I, to “set aside our demands for democratic rights and forget our pleas against segregation, lynching and economic denial until the war is over." Instead, it called for an enlightened Negro press to unite and work toward the end of these
14 injustices and thus, ultimately, strengthen the nation's war effort. Perhaps surprisingly, this new stridency of the northern black press offended influential southern white liberals who charged that these newspapers were actively
15 increasing racial tension to force integration.
During the build-up toward war and in the early days after Pearl Harbor, the Roosevelt Administration monitored black-owned and operated newspapers through the United States Army, the Justice Department, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Post Office Department and the Offices of Censorship, of Facts
and Figures (OFF), and of War Information (OWI). 16 On 22 May 1942, Roosevelt
directed his recently named Attorney General, Francis Biddle, and Postmaster
General Frank Walker to meet with some black editors “to see what could be
done about preventing their subversive language.” 17
Washburn revealed that another meeting did occur; in a watershed
incident, Attorney General Biddle met with Sengstacke in June 1942. As creator
of the Negro Newspaper Publishers Association in 1941, as well as the
publisher of the second largest circulation black newspaper, Sengstacke was 190 an important leader among black journalists. In that meeting with the Attorney
General, Sengstacke skillfully reinforced Biddle's own libertarian views and convinced him to protect the black press from censorship by the FBI, the Post
Office and the Office of Censorship. 18
Sengstacke also met with Postmaster General Frank Walker and his assistants, who obliquely warned him to comply with the Espionage Act. After explaining that the black press existed to "play up" or give greater attention to discrimination that the white press ignored, Sengstacke accepted their
comments saying he was fully satisfied with them. In a letter, he thanked Post
Office officials for the meeting and said he better understood the government
position. He met twice with Office of Censorship officials and assured them that
19 the black press would be informed of the voluntary censorship guidelines.
However, despite these meetings, which suggested an accommodation,
the Defender did not change its editorial policies. At different times, it called for
the resignation of the head of the Fair Employment Practice Commission, the
Secretary of War and even the Attorney General. In the aftermath of racial riots in
1943, the newspaper did moderate its coverage. But it managed to do so in a
way that did not interfere with its larger journalistic responsibilities.
Torn between continuing frustration, and some apparent successes, the
Defender editorial board apparently adopted a highly sophisticated news
policy. It appeared to be moderating its coverage, in that it did not always give
front-page coverage to each racial incident of which it was informed. In fact,
some incidents were buried in editorial columns that may have only been read
by Washington insiders, the troops overseas, or the nation's black cognoscenti.
However, when the issues were important enough, the Defender clearly did not
shy away from reporting a controversy. Indeed, given the gravity of the task that 191 the Defender editors faced, it is clear that they did not accept censorship.
Instead, they risked being seen as inflammatory and seditious to assist their
20 community to work toward the resolution of racial intolerance.
Sengstacke’s Support of Truman
Why did Sengstacke, who had been obliquely accused of sedition by the
President’s Attorney General during World War II, become a key member of the
the Committee? The answer is really quite simple. The Chicago Defender was
21 only major black newspaper to support Truman for President in 1948. This policy began with the Defender’s support of the 1947 Civil Rights
Commission. 22
As 1948 began, Truman had little political support from the nation's black intelligentsia. When he called for a strong Civil Rights program during his 1948
State of the Union address, some Defender columnists like Langston Hughes,
W.E. B. DuBois, and NAACP President Walter White were skeptical. Many
preferred Wallace for his more socialistic political stance. DuBois, for instance,
suspected Truman would not sacrifice the segregationist South.
Many African Americans suspected that Truman would opt for southern
support and conveniently forget the recommendations of his civil rights
commission. Thus, Truman’s 2 February 1948 endorsement of civil rights struck
a clarion call for the Defender. In an editorial published with an editorial cartoon
that compared him with Douglass, Jefferson, and Lincoln, the Defender hailed
his message as a “courageous attack upon racism” and “a noble declaration of
principles.” They said, “we have asked for strong liberal leadei ship and Mr.
23 Truman is giving us that leadership.” When desegregation of the New Jersey
National Guard was opposed by the Army, the Defender praised Truman for 192 the ordering an end to discrimination in the Armed Services and blamed
enforcement. 24 The “bigots” in the military rather than blaming Truman for poor
Chicago newspaper similarly praised Truman’s firm stance of opposition to
Southern congressmen and governors who called for an end to the civil rights
Wallace, as well. It drive. In the same editorial, it decried supporters of Henry accused the Wallaceites of spreading fiction by calling Truman insincere. It argued,
We believe that President Truman’s Civil Rights program must be supported and we must make our support known. Our leadership
is duty-bound to speak out today. We must let the President know that in fighting the enemies of freedom and democracy at home, 25 he has the support of all true Americans.
the Defender Although it did not formally endorse Truman until July 1948, disavowed Wallace in March, calling his solutions phony black magic and
political tricks. In their endorsement, the Defender formed a special campaign
committee to assure Truman’s reelection. During the campaign, Sengstacke
26 and John Davis “looked after the Negro vote.”
As will be seen, Sengstacke’s Committee participation, while consistent,
was rather unremarkable until late 1949. His most important contribution up to
this point was to provide a conduit for information from the African American
community to the military and from the military to the community. Sengstacke’s
efforts were often delegated to Defender editorial staff member Charles
Browning, who served as an assistant to the Executive Secretary of the Fahy
Committee.
After the Appointment of the Committee
After the appointment of the committee members and before the Fahy 193 executive order Committee held its first meeting in 1949, the President's
influence of affected thinking about the military segregation policy. To blunt the the committee, Royall resubmitted his plan for an experimental integrated unit;
adversely through this experiment, he hoped to prove that integration would
27 affect the Army.
Despite protests from the Army General Staff, Secretary Royall made his formal proposal for an experiment in integration to the Secretary of Defense in
December 1948. The Navy objected to Royall’s proposal; an experimental unit was unnecessary, the Navy argued, because the Navy had already made
28 meaningful racial reforms.
The Air Force also refused to cooperate with Royall's experiment
of integration of its own. During the because it was already planning a policy
war, the Tuskegee Air Men had proven the competence of black pilots. More
than any other service, the Air Force was the least able, from a technological
29 stand-point, to set up an independent segregated unit. Lieutenant General
Idwal E. Edwards, the new Air Force's Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, had
of the waste of served on the McCloy Committee in World War II and was aware Edwards, manpower that resulted from the Army's segregation policy. General
reinforced by Stuart Symington, the first Secretary of the Air Force, faced down Symington bitter opposition to a policy of integration among Air Force officers.
do, later recalled that he went to the President, told him what he proposed to
"With reservations," Truman and asked if he had the President's backing. no
replied. There was delay in approving this new policy, however, because the
Army was aware that acceptance would leave it alone among the services in
maintaining and defending segregation. 30
Chairman Charles Fahy was also thinking about how he would conduct held its first the committee and what its goals should be. Before the committee
with Forrestal and with the meeting in January 1949, Fahy discussed his ideas
materials President. After meeting with Fahy, Forrestal authorized all necessary
appoint be forwarded to the Judge and he recommended that the services
31 contacts including the Personnel Policies Board to meet with the contact.
the final policy be agreed upon It was important, Fahy told Truman, that by both the committee and the armed forces. The armed forces should be
take persuaded to adopt a nondiscriminatory policy. The persuasion would time, but issuing a committee report without the military's approval would
tactics and accomplish little. President Truman agreed with Fahy's proposed
told told him to take whatever time was needed. Furthermore, the President
Fahy, he could count on Truman's full support to get the military services to
adopt the committee's suggestions. 32
First Meeting
On 12 January 1949, the committee held its first meeting with the
President in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Forrestal, Symington,
Sullivan, and Royall were present. Truman was apparently either unaware of
the complexity of the mission or undecided as to the degree of accomplishment
that the committee could achieve. Right before meeting with the military
desegregation committee, Truman met with the National Citizens Council on
33 Civil Rights chaired by Herbert Bayard Swope. Apparently, although other
historians have never suggested this, the Swope group strongly influenced
Truman’s instructions to the Fahy group. His desegregation gc ils, which had
previously been limited to the military, were suddenly broader after this meeting
with Swope. For the first time Truman advocated desegregating federal and 195 appears to expect state government. In his initial instructions, Truman almost
rather than substantive that they would produce fact-finding recommendations
Secretary change. At Dawson’s suggestion, Fahy and Worthington Thompson,
the President. of Defense Assistant, each prepared a drafts of statements for
Thompson’s statement called for a specific operable blueprint for constructive
impairing action. Fahy’s version called for any necessary change without 34 or publicity . efficiency or morale. Neither one spoke about the role of the press
However, Truman broadly departed from their script. Truman’s imprecision is
noteworthy when contrasted with the rigorously detailed language that Fahy
35 Truman told those demanded in all his dealings on the subject. President
present,
Order, last spring or Well, gentlemen, I issued an Executive better treatment — not fair fall— | forgot the date of it— on the treatment but equal treatment in the Government Service for everybody, regardless of his race or creed or color, and it’s slowly to and gradually taking hold. And I have asked you gentlemen serve on this Commission in an effort to expedite the thing in the Government Service so that you can actually carry out the spirit, as will survey, well as the letter, of the order. And I hope you make a not only in the Military Services, but in all the branches of the Federal Government, 36 and then inform me of anything that’s lacking, and make suggestions that you deem necessary for the improvement of the situation. willing to serve on this I appreciate the fact that you’re Commission — Committee, whatever you want to call it— and I’m satisfied that with this sort of a setup we can get the thing working
as it should work. The Navy’s made some progress; Army, of course has Air Force. made great progress. I don’t know about the Forrestal interrupts: “The Air Force has come along —what they have in mind, Mr. President, is very progressive—
little bit. I want the Truman: I want this rounded out a Department of the Interior, the Commerce Department, the Treasury Department interviewed on the subject while you are in
existence, and let’s make it a Government proposition as well as
an Armed Services. Of course, as Commander in Chief, I can issue orders to the Armed Services, and if there is some legal approach in all the rest of the branches of the Government, we might as well make a complete program while we are at it, and not 196
I in limit it to just one branch of the government. That’s what have mind, all the way down the line. further — not at this Not only that, I think that we’ve got to go time, but later— and see that the state and local governments carry out the spirit of the laws which we hope to get down on the book down here during this session of Congress.
If anybody’s got any suggestions to make to me on the subject, I’d be glad to listen to them.
Fahy: Mr. President, may I say, as the Chairman of the Committee, we appreciate this opportunity to meet with you when we are really getting down to work, and Secretary Forrestal, and Secretaries, Royall, Sullivan and Symington. We’ll push along now and do the best we can. We are very grateful to you for this
little meeting and encouragement to us and outline of what you expect. We will plug along and come back to you with the best 37 results that we can and do the best we can .
What Truman said next would determine the course of the Committee
it after- operations. It is difficult to tell from the written context whether was an thought or meant to be part of the Committee’s directions from the Commander-
in-Chief. Whatever the intent, it was the only part of the President’s oration that the Committee actually followed. They ignored his broader charge, but they did obey this dictum:
in Truman: That’s what I look for and I want it done such a
way that it is not a publicity stunt. I want concrete results, that’s
what I’m after — not publicity on it. I want the job done and I want
to get it done in a way so that everybody will be happy to
cooperate to get it done. Unless it is necessary to knock
if it somebody’s ears down, I don’t want to have to do that, but
becomes necessary, it can be done. But that’s about all I’ve got to 38 tell you.
After meeting with the President and the service secretaries, the Fahy
Committee met privately and expressed concern over its public image. Lester
Granger pointed out that Negroes were skeptical about what the committee could accomplish; they "expect us to look for an easy way out and to curve
around the main issue [segregation]." Fahy was fearful that, since the
committee's offices were in the Pentagon, people might think it was under the 197
Pentagon's control. It was obvious from the beginning that the committee's
39 members were resolved to be an independent body.
The Fahy Committee held its first formal hearings the next day when
representatives from the military staffs of each of the three services appeared
before it. The representatives from the Army General Staff said that the prime concern of the Army was “the desire to achieve maximum effective utilization of
all its available manpower.” There was no discrimination against the Negro,
despite the fact of segregation—there were equal opportunities and equal
facilities. Segregation of the Negro into separate units “has been the thing that
has given the Negro far greater opportunity than any business or profession in
40 the United States can point to.”
This argument was an often-repeated defense of segregation. The
reasoning behind it was that there were more black commissioned and
noncommissioned officers in a segregated system, because the "inferior"
Negroes did not have to compete with whites for these positions.
The Army spokesmen apparently failed to understand that this was a
poor argument for their stated goal of maximum efficiency. The Navy reiterated
its policy of integration, and the Air Force extolled its new policy of integration
pending before the Secretary of Defense. The committee was favorably
impressed by the latter services, but they spotted weaknesses in their programs.
The Air Force's proposed policy called for a maximum 10 per cent quota of
Negroes in any one unit. Two-thirds of the Negro sailors were segregated in the
Steward's Branch, and there were only five Negro officers out of forty-five
thousand on active duty with the Navy. 41
After this first hearing, Fahy and his colleagues realized that there were
many questions to which answers would have to be found before it could go 198 much further. One of the most important questions was how to interpret the
President's order. Was Truman’s intent to have the committee seek the end of
segregation as well as of discrimination? Most of the committee members
interpreted the order in this way, which appeared to answer for the moment the
second question the committee had posed for itself: Could there be equality of
treatment and opportunity in the armed forces without the elimination of
segregation? Was there such a condition as separate but equal? Chairman
Fahy suggested that the members would be wise to wait for more information
42 about the services' policies before taking a definite stand on these issues .
E-W. Kenworthv
In their second meeting, the Committee began considering the
appointment of an Executive Secretary. From the start, it was recognized that a
newsman would be valuable in this key post. Many top black journalists, such
as Harry McAlpin, the National Negro Press Association White House
correspondent and Venice Spraggs of the Chicago Defender applied. None of
them, however, was chosen for the post. Instead, Fahy was particularly
impressed by an ambitious white newsman named E. W. (Ned) Kenworthy. 43
Kenworthy had received his bachelors and masters at Oberlin College,
taught at Western Reserve Academy and Indiana University Extension. During
World War II, he wrote for the Office of War Information (OWI) as a civilian. In the
four years after the War, he went through a series of jobs as an editorial writer
for the Baltimore Sun, returned to London to work as an information officer for
the United States Information Service, and then was recruited by Publisher Max
Ascoli to help form a magazine of liberal commentary, The Reporter. When the
magazine moved to New York, Kenworthy wanted to stay in Washington. He 199 learned of the Executive Secretary opening from Wallace Carroll, an OWI writer
44 and former overseas correspondent for the United Press.
Kenworthy was thirty-nine years old when he joined the Committee; yet the highlights of his career would occur well after the committee wrapped up its
work. These later assignments, all of which occurred while Kenworthy was
employed as a Washington Bureau correspondent for the New York Times,
often put him at the cusp of history. These incidents also provide a clue to the
way he handled his Fahy Committee assignment.
Kenworthy figured as an interesting example in one of the most important
books in the development of mass communication theory. In The Press and
Foreign Policy, author Bernard Cohen argues,
... the press is significantly more than a purveyor of information
and opinion. It may not be successful much of the time in telling us
what to think, but, it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.
To make his point, Cohen cites The Monroney Resolution: Congressional
Initiative in Policy Making: Case Studies in Practical Politics. In this 1946
monograph, author James Robinson cites how Kenworthy, as a Congressional
correspondent for the New York Times, helped a first-year Congressman earn
front-page headlines and bring a bill past Committee red-tape to the floor of the
House of Representatives. 45
Beyond this, Kenworthy was the fourth reporter along with Neil
Sheehan, Hedrick Smith, and Fox Butterfield on the New York Times Pentagon
Papers46 and was sued by John Erlichman for refusing to surrender his notes
on Erlichman’s role in the Watergate cover-up. What do these events have in
common? In every incident, Kenworthy used his power as a journalist in an 200 report on policy- extraordinary way. That is, he used his power not merely to making, but to help make policy. On the Fahy Committee, however, Kenworthy made policy as a policy-maker, by using his knowledge of the media and the publicity-promulgating offices of the Army and the Secretary of Defense.
Kenworthv on Value of Publicity
In an oral history interview conducted by Jerry Hess of the Truman
Library, Kenworthy claims credit for the committee’s use of publicity as a
pressure tactic. He remembers telling the Committee that nothing could be done
political points out of the thing. if someone tried to make political capital or score
Taking the issue up to Capitol Hill in his estimation, or trying to make political
publicity out of this, would defeat the committee’s purposes.
In this regard, Kenworthy said he had heard, but did not know, that some
kind of understanding existed between Fahy, the Committee, and the President
that no political capital would be made on military desegregation. He said he
suspected that the Committee had promised that it would work with the military
and try to get it done and, in turn, the President promised he would say nothing
about the work of the committee until it was done. This does not make sense.
Kenworthy must have known what Truman had said, because he was
responsible for maintaining all files including the recorded testimony of
Truman’s remarks. However, Kenworthy’s implication that Truman’s agreement
47 was a quid pro quo negotiation only appears in this oral history.
When he was working for the Committee, Kenworthy often expressed
himself on the use of publicity. He compared the Fahy Committee with the 1947
Civil Rights Commission, for instance, and argued that the persuasive power of
publicity was needed to gain attention and build a mandate for the latter but 201 would be counter-productive for the military desegregation group. He saw that military people would be more likely to change their views and accept Truman’s
public opinion. orders if they free from the embarrassing spotlight of
Kenworthy was assigned a Pentagon office — really a conference room
48 without partitions — for himself, his two secretaries and two assistants.
Kenworthy’s Pentagon office was a major advantage for a person with strong
and experts reportorial skills because it provided ready access to documents
within the military and because he was able to develop contacts within the
Pentagon who would provide inside information. African Americans who
especially worked in the mailroom and mimeograph reproduction room were
helpful. 49
In the previous chapters, we have portrayed the news/publicity
environment in which the Fahy Committee functioned. In this chapter, we will
look at events from the Fahy Committee perspective, from its most active
participant, Kenworthy, and from the perspective of publisher Sengstacke.
Situation Analysis
During February and March, the Committee members attempted to
quickly absorb the many details of how military desegregation affected policy
and deployment, while most of the public focus turned to the Air Force. In early
February, the Air Force presented a plan to eliminate segregation to the
Committee. At this time, the Navy began circulating a basic policy statement
abolishing segregation in that service. On 26 February 1949, Sengstacke
produced a 33-page outline discussion of the Executive Order. He presented a 202 theoretical and legalistic approach to desegregation of the military and did not look at the individual services or their installations. In essence, it was less of blueprint and more of a rationale. 50
Kenworthy reacted strongly to Sengstacke’s statement. In a memo to
Fahy, he wrote
it attack this problem by I am inclined to think is a mistake to waving the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights and the Emancipation Proclamation. This has been done for 30 years, and the military readily conceded the validity of the moral argument
and says it is irrelevant, that their job is to defend the country and win battles, and that they must rely on military efficiency and not abstract justice.
Instead, Kenworthy recommended an analysis of the causes of Negro
inefficiency. At this point, he urged that efficient integrated units were a better
goal than achieving ten percent or equal to the population representation
throughout the military. Kenworthy’s thinking would soon change in this regard,
but early in the committee’s work, it was based on efficiency and not moral
arguments. 51
Army Testimony
On 28 March, the three service secretaries and General Bradley
appeared before the committee again. Secretary Symington of the Air Force
and Secretary John L. Sullivan of the Navy pointedly stated that they were
opposed to segregation and had policies of integration. The Air Force policy
was only awaiting the approval of the Secretary of Defense. Symington and
Sullivan made it clear that they both believed integration led to more efficient
use of manpower, in contrast to the Army's belief that integration would mean a
loss of efficiency. 52
Bradley, who had been campaigning on ways to improve morale in the 203 demobilized Army, argued that
I consider that a unit has a high morale when the men have confidence in themselves, confidence in their fellow members of
their unit, and confidence in their leaders. If we try to force integration on the Army before the country is ready to accept these customs, we may have difficulty attaining high morale along the 53 lines I have mentioned.
Secretary Royall restated the Army's familiar position: The Army was “not an instrument for social evolution.” Ending segregation would untangle administrative red tape for the Army, but the combat record of African American troops in two world wars indicated that they were not suited for combat units.
However, they were "peculiarly qualified" for manual labor. “It follows that in the
interest of efficient national defense, certain types of units should be entirely or
largely confined to white troops.” A large portion of the Army's volunteers came from the South where voluntary segregation was widely accepted. Royall felt
that integration would seriously inhibit Army enlistment and impede national
defense. 54
Royall argued that segregation improved opportunities for a Negro
soldier because he would not have to compete with whites. Committee criticism
could not alter Royall's position. When asked in conclusion if he thought that the
Army was carrying out the policy announced in Executive Order 9981, Royall
answered in the affirmative and claimed that this had been the case before the
order was issued. "The Army has done so much more and gotten so much less
credit for what is done [for the Negro] than any [other] Department of
.," 55 Government . . Royall concluded.
From this testimony, the Fahy Committee realized that moral and political
arguments would fall on deaf ears. Since the Army maintained that segregation 204 was needed for military reasons, the Fahy Committee decided to challenge them in terms of military efficiency. The Committee began to pore over Army personnel data and practices to prove that segregation was discriminatory and inefficient. In this way, the committee hoped to persuade the Army to liberalize
56 their policies .
Personnel Policy Board
As the Fahy Committee was beginning its hearings, Secretary Forrestal called in Thomas R. Reid, Chairman of the Personnel Policy Board, to provide
policy statements and serve as an Armed Services representative. Forrestal
asked Reid to formulate a general policy for the three armed forces to end
segregation and guarantee equal opportunity. Forrestal and Reid sought to
establish a new policy before the committee dictated one. While Kenworthy
continued working on his analysis of the three operant versions of the Gillem
Board recommendations, Reid asked to present a plan to the Fahy Committee
at their next meeting. Kenworthy predicted that the Air Force might “leak a story
to the press to the effect that the Defense level is trying to bottle up its own
liberal policy. And the Committee’s name might get dragged in.” At the same
time, Kenworthy questioned whether the Air Force, the Navy or the General
57 Staff killed Royall’s experimental unit plan .
The new Air Force policy then pending before the Secretary of Defense
was considered a workable base for discussion; it provided for an immediate
beginning of integration, but complete transition would be gradual. The Army
was reluctant to go along; the Army General Staff opposed Reid's proposed
policy on the grounds that it was “a directive to assign Negro personnel to
organizations without regard to race, and, as such, is complete integration. It is 205 the opinion of the Army that integration of individual Negroes in white
58 organizations should not and cannot be undertaken at this time.”
Reid finally convinced the new Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson to take the initiative rather than to wait for dictation from the Fahy Committee. On 1
April 1949, he told Johnson about Forrestal's earlier instructions and the proposed policy he had drawn up. Emphasizing that “this is a matter which has the President's direct interest,” Reid persuaded Johnson to issue the proposed
59 policy in the form of a directive to the service secretaries on April 6.
Johnson issued a new Department of Defense policy calling for equality of treatment and opportunity for all. To guarantee this, all personnel would be considered “on the basis of individual merit and ability” for enlistment, attendance at schools, promotion, and assignment. Although some all-Black units might continue in existence for a while, “all Negroes will not necessarily be assigned to Negro units.” Instead, “qualified Negro personnel shall be assigned
60 of to fill any type of position . . . without regard to race.” In short, the Secretary
Defense took the position, contrary to the Army, that equality of treatment and opportunity should abandon rigid segregation. Each service was directed to submit individual policies for approval that would meet the broad aims of this directive.
Despite its propitious aspect, Kenworthy saw this was a phony proposal
61 in which the Secretary hoped to evade Committee enforcement. He felt
Johnson’s proposal lacked any means of enforcement and would have been an
empty gesture rather than a fully-realized policy.
Whatever Johnson’s intentions, the move failed. The Ari ly and Navy
outlined their current policies and ignored Johnson’s request for future plans.
The Army provided a plethora of statistics to support their present policy and the 206
Navy drew its own conclusions that its policy was adequate. At Reid’s suggestion, Johnson rejected the Army and Navy proposals and accepted the
Air Force plan. Johnson’s rejection angered Secretary of the Army Kenneth
Royall, who threatened to arouse Southern Senators on the Army’s behalf. In
replying to the Secretary of Defense's April directive, the Army made clear its
disagreement with Johnson's analysis of military segregation. "The Department
of the Army," wrote Royall,
has reviewed its practices and procedures . . . and is of the opinion that they are sound in the light of actual experience, and are in accord with the policies of the National Military Establishment and with Executive Order 9981.
Moreover, Royall misrepresented the situation. He said that the Army was
already obeying Johnson's racial policies for promotion, assignment, and
the Fahy schooling. In defiance of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and
Committee, the Army was continuing to claim that equality of opportunity could
be achieved with segregation. 62
Apparently aware that the Army's reply would be unacceptable, Royall
wrote Johnson on April 22, warning him not to act precipitately against the
Army's segregation policy. According to Royall, the preceding spring certain
senators on the Senate Armed Services Committee had warned that they would
violently oppose the draft law pending before it if they felt that the President
would issue a preemptory order completely abolishing segregation in the Army.
Both he and Secretary Forrestal assured these senators that this would not be
Royall told the the case. "I think you should be advised of these circumstances,"
Secretary of Defense in conclusion, "because if any action were later taken by
you or other authority to abolish segregation in the Army, I am confident that
63 these Southern Senators would remember this incident.” When Royall's bluff 207 64 failed, he resigned.
To counter Royall, Secretary Johnson designated the Personnel Policy
Board as the liaison for the Defense Department, named some specific
individuals to help the Committee interpret data, and took a strong stand in favor
of integration in his replies to those questioning his action:
These policies have the support of millions of citizens who feel strongly that segregation in the armed forces is sharply at variance with our democratic principles and ideals and who understand that
its practice reduces the efficiency of our military strength. The practice of segregation is damaging to our country's reputation 65 with millions of people around the world.
Reaction to Johnson’s April 6 Directive
The Fahy Committee was surprised and angered by the peremptory
not informed nature of this action from the new Secretary of Defense. They were
the press. 66 The of the directive until April 18, the day before it was released to
their effect of the surprise directive on the committee was profound. It weakened
relationship with the office of the Secretary of Defense while it fostered their
goal of complete integration. Ned Kenworthy saw Johnson’s directive as
67 designed to put the Fahy Committee out of business. By going to the press
with this directive, and by acting so publicly within the first month of his term,
Johnson transformed what could have been an innocuous private reaffirmation
of the department’s pledge of equal treatment and opportunity into a confused
public exercise in military policy-making.
Johnson’s policy offered one of the first opportunities for the press to
comment upon the new Secretary and the military desegregation controversy.
However, the press tended to see the directive as a value statement rather than
a fully-realized policy. Reports in the New York Times, the Washington Evening
Star and front-page stories in the New York Herald-Tribune and the Washington 208 Post attempted to define the real effect of the new policy in terms of traditional military policy.
A number of newspapers published editorials the next day. Noting that the new directive “spells the end of the policy of segregation in the services at every level,” the Washington Post congratulated Johnson and said it looked
said forward to specific policies from the three branches. The Herald-Tribune
laudable touch of that, “Secretary Johnson has delivered an order which has a
declaration is the specific.” Arguing that “the amount and quality of purpose in a
prodding, but that the always hard to estimate," they characterized it as worthy
York substance of final reports would need to be keenly analyzed. The New
Times was less concerned with implementation of specifics and praised the
directive as a standard that was “sound in principle and practical in its
approach.”
editorial cartoon In early May, the Chicago Defender ran a Henry Brown
showing Defense Secretary Johnson smashing down the ‘Iron Curtain’ of Jim
Johnson, but Crow in the Armed Forces. The Defender editorial also praised
warned, “the brass hats in the military establishment, who have resised
order. integration will exploit any loop holes which may be found in the new
They are not going to give up their racial views without a struggle.” The Crisis,
published by the NAACP, saw the directive as ending segregation policies
however it was possible "for armed while the practice would continue. Now ,
service officers and civilian groups to work for the elimination of the practices
.” 68 and build a military establishment without a color line
Rov Davenport
Despite the method of announcement, Fahy was impressed with, and 209 optimistic over, the Army’s response to Johnson’s directive of 6 April 1949. The
portent. transfer of authority from Royall to Gray was certainly another optimistic
Yet, Kenworthy knew that Fahy was missing the equivocations inherent in
military language and technical jargon that would permit various
interpretations. 69
The new policy of the Secretary of Defense and accumulated statistical
evidence led Ned Kenworthy to conclude: “In my opinion, man-to-man
ago." Now, the integration has got to come much sooner than I thought a month
proper goal of the committee appeared to be the determination of procedures
by which the Army would integrate. 70 No longer did just lowering the degree of
segregation in the Army appear to be the only realistic goal.
Kenworthy was shown how to pierce the Army obfuscation by a black
personnel expert, Roy K. Davenport. Unlike other African Americans in
professional positions in the Pentagon, who tried to base their careers on race-
related issues, Davenport preferred to stay away from the fray. Yet his area of
expertise, personnel, made Davenport an important resource on determining
like the race-based assignments. Still, when it came to do-gooder commissions
Fahy Committee, Davenport was very reticent and plainly suspicious. After
many conversations, Kenworthy convinced Davenport of the Committee’s
sincerity. 71
Davenport told Kenworthy about the ‘45 report, a secret monthly report
that compared the authorized and actual strength of the Army by every military
occupation specialty (MOS). Unlike other reports, this was one included a
in classification by race and it showed the Army would not allow blacks many
72 specialties, even though they needed personnel to fill these positions.
Fahy and Kenworthy lived near each other in the northwest section of the 210 nation’s capital. Kenworthy would occasionally meet with Fahy at the Judge’s home on evenings and Sundays. 73 One evening, in April 1949, Davenport joined Kenworthy and Sengstacke at Fahy’s home to discuss the Army’s reply to the April 6 directive. When asked, Davenport explained how the Army reply was filled with carefully-phrased deceptions. Davenport showed that the Army evaded sweeping change, even as it called for it, because it did not reform training procedures. Fahy was still inclined to accept the Army procedures but he re-read the directive in light of Davenport’s criticism. Plainly angry by these
74 deceptions, Fahy demanded a new examination of the data.
The Committee met in formal session on 28 April 1949. The committee's examination of the Army's statistical record exposed deficiencies in the Army's segregation policy. The Gillem policy was not being implemented and, contrary to Army claims, segregation by its nature precluded equality of treatment and opportunity.
Johnson’s Second Directive
Johnson accepted the On 1 1 May , after Royall’s resignation, Secretary
Air Force plan, but rejected the plans submitted by the Army and the Navy. He
said that the Army and Navy had not responded to his request for “a detailed
plan for such additional forward steps as can and should be made.” He was
pleased that the Army had made progress recently but felt “that much remains to
be done and that the rate of progress toward the objectives of the Executive
Order must be accelerated.” The Army was directed to submit “specific
75 additional actions” which it planned to take in the future by May 25. At this
point, Thomas Reid suggested to the Fahy Committee that it should indicate
informally to the Army and Navy the steps that it thought were necessary to get 211 76 their policies approved by the Secretary of Defense.
This time, Reid included the Fahy Committee in his planning and they readily accepted their role by beginning work on a set of ‘Initial
Recommendations.’ 77 The Fahy group was aware that the acceptance of its propositions by the Army would mean the eventual end of segregation. “We will have undermined segregation and it will come tumbling down of its own
78 weight," said Executive Secretary Kenworthy. To avoid the risk of an outcry from Congress, the Committee sought a gradual, rather than immediate, transition to effect these changes. Although the Committee accepted slow, rather than abrupt change, the Personnel Policy Board continually took issue with these recommendations in conference and urged Secretary Johnson challenge the Fahy Committee on the details. The Navy, which had enjoyed
Forrestal’s confidence, and had worked through many of these problems in
1944 and 1945, decided on a conciliatory course that generally followed the suggestions of the President’s Committee. Johnson agreed to accept the second Navy plan and his announcement on 7 June 1949 received wide
79 coverage in the press.
In an editorial, the Washington Afro-American described the Navy proposals as “a far-reaching step which will be applauded by right-thinking
citizens.” While it expressed the hope that “the day of double talk and gobbledygook is gone,” the newspaper withheld judgment until after June 20 when the Secretary expected a revised report. The National Grapevine column in the Chicago Defender was equally circumspect; columnist Charley Cherokee reported on the “strange hush-hush (as far as the daily press is concerned)” surrounding race relations and the White House. Noting that Truman’s “Armed
Forces committee brought him the race democracy progress reports from the 212 Army, Navy and Air. There were no news pictures but the word leaked a bit and
Navy, always good at timing, rushed out a press release on existing and intended integration." Cherokee noted, “the Navy release report is approved by the Defense Secretary Johnson and altho’ it contains little new it does include most of the things originality (sic) recommended by Lester Granger and
80 (reported by) Lt. Dennis Nelson in his monograph. It’s a score for our side.”
Rather than succumbing to the new pressure of publicity, the Army reacted by defending its conservative policies. In its second reply, the Army, now under Gordon Gray, renewed its defense of the Gillem policy of segregation and the alleged progress under that policy. In effect, the Army still refused to modify its policies of assignment, segregation, or the quota system as the Fahy Committee suggested. 81
Knowing what was coming from the Army, the Committee issued its
“Initial Recommendations to the President,” on the same day that the Secretary of Defense passed judgment on the Navy and Army plans. The committee's
analysis of the Army's second reply indicated that it was still full of inaccurate and misleading statements. African Americans were still excluded from eight of ten Army school courses. 82 To assign black soldiers to schools and subsequently to units without regard to race, as the committee suggested, would mean the end of segregation. The Army understood this fact. Moreover, the committee disproved the Army contention that open enlistments would result
83 in African Americans comprising 30 to 40 per cent of Army personnel.
Although considerable friction had been generated between Johnson and the Fahy Committee, they were still able to reach some accord. The
Committee, with Reid’s strong support, convinced Johnson to reject the Army’s segregationist response. 84 In refusing the Army's second reply of 7 June, the 213 Secretary of Defense called for another report by 20 June, and for the first time he formally asked the Army to consider the Fahy Committee proposals. In its progress report to the President, the committee reported "considerable
85 progress" though the Army lagged behind the Air Force and the Navy.
Rejection of the Army engendered continuing negotiations between the
Fahy Committee and Army officials, with the Army's deadline for its third report being extended several times. 86 Although the committee perceived progress from time to time, there were some reversals over the impact of its arguments upon the Army. At a meeting with Chief of Staff Bradley on 13 June, Dwight
Palmer and Fahy saw hope that the Army was beginning to see things their way. 87 When the Secretary of Defense questioned Committee demands regarding education, Fahy explained that the Army need not 'displace white
88 men' in order to grant African Americans equal opportunity for schooling. The
Committee often knew what the Army was going to propose ahead of time, because Kenworthy had an office in the Pentagon which he kept unlocked.
Unnamed Pentagon sources would either advise Kenworthy of their plans or would leave information in his office. For instance, on 23 June, Kenworthy got advance word of a report stating that “the Army cannot yield on the segregation principle.” 89
On 5 July, Fahy and Palmer again met with General Bradley and the new
Secretary of the Army, Gordon Gray. Gray presented the committee with an
"Outline Plan for Utilization of Negro Manpower to Provide Further Equality of
Opportunity." The new proposal increased the number of black units and
90 opened all Army job classifications to African Americans. However, Fahy
Committee recommendations to ease complete segregation in units and to abolish the 10 per cent quota were again ignored. Furthermore, the Army 214 refused to adopt their position on assignment; although the Army's new proposal would allow Negroes to attend all of its schools, the fact that the black soldier could be assigned only to an all-black unit meant that he might not be assigned to a job for which he was trained. The committee realized that equality of treatment and opportunity could be accomplished only by ending segregation. Army proposals would not be not acceptable until the quota system was abolished and black soldiers were assigned to units on the basis of
91 their training, regardless of race.
Kenworthv Press Contacts
The dispute began to founder into a stalemate between the committee and the Army. Somehow, the story began to reach the press. For instance, the
New York Times accused the Army of stalling and equivocating engaging in a
“private insurrection,” and trying “to preserve a pattern of bigotry which caricatures the democratic cause in every corner of the world.” There was no room for compromise, the Times added, and President Truman could not retreat without abdicating as Commander in Chief. And the Pittsburgh Courier predicted, “With Army brass and the Fahy Committee at logerheads (sic) on
proposals to integrate Negro personnel, it was indicated that only President
Truman may be able to bring the warring parties to an agreement acceptable to
Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson .” 92
How did a conference that was supposed to be held without publicity leak to the press? Kenworthy may have been responsible for these press contacts. Apparently, he occasionally contacted the press although he was discouraged from doing so by Truman. One incident is particularly revealing.
Afro American columnist and reporter Woody Taylor questioned how long the 215 Fahy Committee would be in existence. He had heard a rumor that their days were numbered. He reported that the Defense Secretary planned to order complete equality and that Truman would disband the Fahy Committee. In a column two weeks later, Taylor reported,
On Wednesday afternoon, Joseph H. B. Evans, associate executive secretary of the Fahy Committee telephoned to advise me that Edward (sic) Kenworthy, the committee’s executive secretary wanted to talk to me. Kenworthy came on saying: “I’ve got a hot tip for you. I’ve just writing (sic) some letters asking some service men to testify before the Fahy Committee. You know the Committee held a meeting on Monday in which the members did some long term planning; so you see we’re not .” 93 going to fold up after all
In a front-page story, the New York Times’ Walter Waggoner reported that the Committee and Army were at a standstill. (Interestingly, Waggoner usually reported on the State Department, not the Pentagon, and was in fact, the
President-elect of a State-Department correspondents association. It might be
remembered that Kenworthy had served as a State Department Public
Information Officer during the War.) The story included a report that the Army planned to resubmit its “policy of following community custom,” which might have come to Kenworthy from his inside Pentagon sources. Waggoner also spoke to an unnamed source at the Fahy Committee. That source reported that there was little indication that the Committee would accept the Army’s newest
proposals, that it regarded the Army as “the Peck’s Bad Boy” of the military
94 services and that it was far from optimistic that the situation would be resolved .
Waggoner’s story had a marked effect. The New York Post, the Times’
rival, reported in an editorial,
Now Walt Waggoner, in a Washington Dispatch to The
Times, reveals that the Army has decided to fight it out. Its chieftains are planning to reiterate their defiance to the Fahy 216 committee, Waggoner reports. This means that the generals propose to tell the President and his Defense Secretary that the Army is an autonomous republic, laying down its own rules, taking orders from no higher authority and brushing off the commander- in-chief when his words outline a departure from Pentagon protocol. Such independence of thought is rare indeed in high military places. On this issue the Army’s private insurrection is intolerable. 95
In reply, which was part of a more general interview, Secretary Gray publicly announced that the Army was contemplating certain new proposals on the Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) issue. Gray erroneously claimed that the Committee sought to raise the 10 percent [ceiling] quota on the share of
African American allowed in the Army. In fact, the Committee sought to abolish the quota. Gray also said,
I would certainly be the last to say that a decision taken in 1946 would be necessarily a sound decision in 1949 and I’m not sure
that in every respect the Gillem Board’s Report was sound, and it
is our intention to further study some of these basic policies in the course of study to be made by people who will actually command these combat troops, as of today’s attitudes and conditions, to see whether these policies established by the Gillem Board actually seem sound today. 96
The committee was determined that the Secretary of Defense should not accept the current Army policy as fulfilling either the Executive Order 9981 or the Defense Department's 6 April directive. In a campaign of letters, Fahy made the views of the Committee official. In a memo to Gordon Gray, Fahy pointed out the Army proposal would fail to give African Americans equal opportunity for schooling and, thus, would not ensure that the Army made the best use of the black soldier who has received special training. In a letter to Louis Johnson, he stated that “the committee believes that the Army, by retention of the quota system and by not undertaking to use school-trained Negroes except 217 substantially on the present basis fails to meet the standard of equality of opportunity.” Finally, in a progress report to President Harry Truman, Fahy summarized progress made by the services, stressing the recommendations made to the Army. 97 On the day that Fahy issued his public statement to
Truman, the Judge gave a short interview with the Washington Afro-American and the Pittsburgh Courier Press summarized the news from Gray’s interview.
September 30 Directive
For two months, neither side would officially compromise. During this
period, Fahy worked assiduously to secure assurances from the White House that the committee's demands on assignment and on the quota would be a
98 required in any Army proposal. In a mid-September meeting, Fahy and
Dwight Palmer were able to convince Gray to open the assignment of black
graduates of specialist schools to any unit, not just overhead positions. But they
were unable to convince him of the need for a quota. Gray agreed to study the
quota question. Fahy was so pleased with the progress, that he reported to
President Truman, “It is the Committee’s expectation that it will be able within a
few weeks to make a formal report to you on a complete list of changes in Army
policy and practices.” He even anticipated that the Committee and the Army
99 would be able to resolve the quota problem together.
On 27 September, the Army informed Fahy that they were sending their
proposed policy to the Secretary of Defense. Without furnishing the committee a
copy, Army officials assured Fahy that they were adopting the committee's
suggestions on assignment. 100 218 Johnson’s Usurpation
In late September, Secretary of Defense Johnson was under fire on a number of fronts. An embarrassing influence-peddling scandal, the five- percenter scandal, flared up during the summer. At the same time, budget battles which were going to turn into the Revolt of the Admirals started to surface. On Capitol Hill, liberals were beginning to complain that the Army was
101 compromising Johnson’s authority .
Johnson wanted the desegregation problem out of the way. He typically acted quickly without much consultation. In April, he had tried to subvert
committee control. Now, he would try it again in an even more abrupt, more devious and yet more public way. Without first informing the Committee or even his own advisors, the Secretary of Defense announced to the press that he had approved the Army's proposals. What further angered the Committee was that the Army had not accepted its policy on assignment or the quota. Furthermore, the Army had given the impression that its proposal had received the approval
102 of the Fahy Committee .
Reaction in the press was volcanic. African American and liberal
103 organizations blasted the Army's new policy for not ending segregation .
Kenworthy summarized press reaction for Fahy noting,
If Gray’s intention on assignment was the same as the Committee’s, this intention was evidently not made clear to those who wrote the release, nor to the official ‘spokesman’ for the Army
and Defense Department who were entrusted with interpreting it 104 for the press .
Kenworthy cited articles by John Norris of the Washington Post, Robert
Donovan 105 of the New York Herald-Tribune, a United Press story in the
Washington Times-Herald, Venice Spraggs of the Chicago Defender, and Lem 219
Graves of the Pittsburgh Courier. Norris called it a disappointment, Donovan and the UP noted that “present segregation will continue,” Spragg said the new
Army plan “trails miserably behind the forthright policies of the Air Force and
Navy and flaunts what President Truman stated was the intent of the Executive
Order,” and Graves said Negroes who qualify might be utilized alongside whites, but then would be sent back to their own units. In that same memo,
Kenworthy noted that neither Marx Leva nor James Evans, both of whom would normally see race-related Defense Department policies, saw the new Johnson policy. 106
Although Army segregationists were able to convince Johnson and his
107 cohorts to resist new policies, they were not prepared for Fahy’s reaction to the Army’s new attitude. 108 Fahy called David Niles and Philleo Nash, White
House Special Assistant for Minority Affairs, urging the President to hold a blanket approval until the White House received the Committee’s report. In his phone call to Nash, Fahy requested that the President refrain from making any comment about Johnson’s action until after his Committee had a chance to meet. 109 Later, the committee sent a memorandum to the President complaining that the Army plan still condoned race-based assignments. This was clearly unacceptable and contrary to the requirements of Executive Order
9981. Since Defense would not listen to the Committee, they requested
Presidential intercession.
Niles advised Truman that Johnson’s statement was “arousing a good deal of controversy and has resulted in inquiries from a number of reporters, and letters and telegrams from interested organizations.” The ublicity \ prompted Truman to respond even before he received the Committee’s written
110 appeal. At his 6 October press conference, in accordance with Niles’ 220 suggestion, Truman labeled the Army's statement a "progress report" and made
it clear that there would be further recommendations from the Fahy Committee.
In addition, Truman once again stated that his goal was integration of the Army
111 to be accomplished through the Fahy Committee. The final committee memo for the President, which was received days after Truman’s press conference, did not emphasize their ultimatum to contact the press and, instead, stressed the
112 need for continuing negotiations with the Army.
In the meantime, Kenworthy continued to feed his press contacts with interesting committee-related stories. For instance, a contretemps occurred when socialist and civil rights activist Paul Robeson declined an invitation to speak at Oberlin College. Kenworthy provided Alan Barth of the Washington
Post with the inside story which he apparently learned from committee member
William Stevenson, who was president of Oberlin. (Stevenson was one of the less active Fahy committee members.) Robeson refused to appear on stage with the Rev. Horace White who would present a contrasting view. Through
these actions, it is clear that Kenworthy felt justified in serving as the committee’s conduit to the press. 113
Rebellion in the Ranks
Truman’s press conference did not convince Army segregationists to
surrender. In fact, it inspired them to mobilize for rebellion. But they fought their
battle as a bureaucratic flanking maneuver. On October 1, the Army had sent its
new policy to all major commands: All Army jobs and schools would be now be
opened to African Americans. Still, the Army would not yet accept quotas, so
integrated assignments were to be allowed only in overhead (post
housekeeping and administrative) positions or in positions where there were 221 critical shortages of specialists. Even this modest policy was, apparently, too much for some conservative forces in the Army.
On 27 October, a second order was issued by the Army. This one stated that the limited integration authorized in Secretary Gray's order of 1 October should be disregarded; Negroes would be assigned only to Negro jobs.
Although the rescission was sent through normal channels, neither the
Secretary the Army nor the Secretary of Defense had any knowledge of this
114 new order. Several weeks later an anonymous person left with the Fahy
Committee a copy of this order. In an interview for the Truman Library,
Kenworthy remembered the incident,
I always kept the door to my office [in the Pentagon]
unlocked. I always kept the drawers to my desk unlocked, because
I always knew if there was ever any hanky-panky going on, that there were blacks in the Department of the Army who worked the mimeograph machines, and in the message center office, and you would know eventually. For instance, once when we had an agreement after long negotiations with Secretary of the Army Gray, about opening up all educational courses, Army courses regardless of color, and he put
this order out. I walked in one morning to my desk and opened the drawer and there was a message going out from the message center from the Chief of Staff’s office which effectively countermanded the order of the Secretary of the Army. And this
was the only time that I ever went to the press.
Clearly, this is an exaggeration on Kenworthy’s part. As has been shown, he regularly contacted reporters. In a telephone interview with Kenworthy (27
December 1991), I spoke to him about this issue and he reaffirmed that this was
115 the only time that he contacted the press. I wonder if, this was truly the first time that he went to the press without first directly obtaining permission from
Fahy, or if he felt that this was the first time that his press contact put the
Committee in an adversarial position with the Army and Defense. In any case,
Kenworthy clearly remembered the results of his action, 222
I exactly what I went to the Washington Post and told them had happened and they wrote a story, and they wrote an editorial saying that Gray was getting a run-around from the brass. But, of course, the offending general was not penalized, but a colonel — 116 he was on his way to Germany within about forty-eight hours.
Gray was furious to learn that the rescission order was issued without his permission, and on November 3 he issued a statement that the second order violated the Army's announced policy. Some qualified Black specialists would
117 indeed be assigned to white units, Gray emphasized.
Kenworthy wrote Fahy a hand-written note, which was not microfilmed in the official record, but is of enough interest in this context that it deserves full
replication:
Phileo Nash just called to ask whether we had seen the Post pieces. He said they were happy that the Post had picked up this story and had come down hard on Gray and the Army.
Phileo said it was time for a move, either for the Committee to meet with the President, or for the White House to send a memo to Johnson dictating him to get the Army in line with the Committee. Possibly, he’ll call you on this. There is no question in my mind that the time is ripe for action. Gray is very angry at the manner in which the policy was undercut by orders sent to the field, and generals have been scurrying up and down all morning. The Personnel and Administration Division is trying to fasten the blame on The
Adjutant General’s office (TAG), and the TAG has said it merely send out instructions on policy interpretation as directed by P&A, etc. etc. P&A is evidently fearful of a crackdown. Gray’s position is
that he knew nothing of the order which, I believe, is true. The point is, he should have some one as advisor in his office — preferably a civilian — who knows thoroughly personnel procedures and Army structures to protect him against such errors, not only with respect to Negro personnel, but on all personnel matters. This ideal person, in my opinion, would be Roy Davenport, who has had years of experience in Army pi rsonnel and is the final clearing authority on most personnel actions. As a matter of fact, there has been a good discussion about recommending Davenport to the Secretary as an aide. However, P&A would like to confine Davenport’s advisory capacity to Negro
affairs. This would be a mistake and I know Davenport would not 223 take the job under such limitations.
If the Committee has the advantage of having Davenport in
Gray’s office, and if P&A would assign Major Lieblich to work with
the Committee, I believe agreement would be soon reached. Of
course, we can’t make those recommendations, but if they are made within the Army, we should welcome them. 118
On 17 November, Gray wrote Fahy to assure him that the Johnson’s
119 September 30 directive was still in effect. While the story reached and was
reported by the Washington Post and The New York Times, it did not create
much of a reaction in the mainstream white press. In the editorial, the Post wrote,
From all indications Secretary Gray is sincerely trying to do away with the restrictions on efficient use of Negro manpower, and the circumstances seem to indicate that he did not see this order
before it went out. That is all the more reason for him to assert
himself, for it is difficult to believe that the new order can be anything but an attempt at sabotage of the declared policies of the President and Defense Secretary Johnson — policies already 120 implemented much more fully by the other two services.
Meanwhile, the black press treated it as a mystery to be solved and as an
important indicator of Caucasian resistance. The Pittsburgh Courier compared
the incident to the Revolt of the Admirals against the Secretary of the Navy. In a
front-page story headlined, “Army Brass Defies Integration Order,” Lem Graves
revealed that the Army had ordered a complete investigation of the issuance of
the order and that disciplinary transfers would be taken against offending Army
officers. Graves noted that the name of the officer had been discovered by Army
Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins but that his name would not be revealed. Graves
said the directive was sent out over the signature of Maj. Gen. E.F. Witsall, the
adjutant General. However, he noted,
this is a normal procedure and it has been discovered that the directive was actually wired to the commanders by a colonel in the 224
personnel section. It was never seen by the Secretary nor by the Adjutant General. Informed sources here believe that the unidentified personnel section colonel was inspired to forward this message to field commands by a group of Army generals at staff level who oppose any efforts to integrate Negroes into the Army.
Then Graves accused the members of the cabal by name. In doing so, he named some of the most powerful men in the Armed Forces,
One of the most persistent foes of racial integration, according to these sources, is General Wade Haislip, vice chief of
staff. It is believed here that General Haislip has quietly surrounded himself in key positions with generals who share his point of view including Lieut. Gen. E.H. Brooks, who heads the personnel section; Col. B.N. MacFadden, head of the military personnel management group and Maj. Gen. C.E. Byers, deputy 121 director of personnel .
Graves closed the article by comparing leadership on racial issues articulated by Generals Marshall, Eisenhower, Bradley and Collins. He
concluded that Marshall was neutral, that Eisenhower was liberal, and that
Bradley and Collins were foes of integration. One week later, in his Washington
Notebook, Lem Graves, Jr. revealed to his readers that Col. John H. Reipe, chief
of the assignment section of the Army’s personnel and administration branch,
was taking ‘the rap’ for releasing the field directive. However, he noted, more
important general officers, specifically General Brooks or General C. E. Byers,
122 were spared .
For the Fahy Committee, the whole episode exposed the deep conviction
of the segregationists and their willingness to resort to unauthorized tactics. For
a while, attention was diverted from policy-making to detection and
management of resistance. Meanwhile, the Committee was having problems
getting the Personnel and Administration Division to agree on the statistics. To 225 policy, the forestall the repetition of the incident of officers countermanding Army
Committee asked to be placed on the distribution list for all regulations and messages coming from the Army. They also identified Generals McFayden and
123 Brooks as the bottlenecks and as the source of the unauthorized policy.
The Army now began preparing still another new policy on Negro troops
policy. that would incorporate its approved third reply and replace the Gillem
The angry reaction of the Fahy Committee and of the public to the approval of the Army's statement of October 1 put the White House on guard. Word was
again passed to the Army and to the Fahy Committee that any new Army policy
124 must have the committee's approval before it would be acceptable.
Sengstacke and Kenworthv
Up to this point, Sengstacke and Granger had mostly given tacit approval
to the Fahy and Kenworthy methods. Empowered by the incident, the black
Committee members began calling for another committee meeting and a press
125 release detailing the impasse between the Army and the committee.
Although both were journalists, Kenworthy and Sengstacke had very different
ideas about the way that the Committee should conduct its actions. Talking
about Sengstacke’s opinions about the final report, Kenworthy recalled,
But you know, there was nothing to do except to prepare proposals by the committee and then negotiate. In the first place, John Sengstacke and Charlie Browning [consultant to the Fahy
Committee and Defender editorial assistant] and I think other Negroes would have liked to have a big book that would have
gone all the way back to Crispus Attucks, you know. I saw no point in this. This problem was not going to be solved by rehashing history, but by getting equal opportunity written into the Army and Navy and Air Force regulations, and to hell with the past. 126
In the wake of the unauthorized October 27 directive, Kenworthy was 226 more willing to recognize the unusual pressure placed on Sengstacke. The newspaper publisher wanted President Truman to rebuke Gray and Johnson in front of the Committee. Kenworthy disapproved of this tactic but he sympathized with both Sengstacke and Granger, who were being subjected to a great deal of pressure from the NAACP. Kenworthy recognized that the NAACP had “as its object the constant application of pressure and unremitting agitation for overdue
reform.” But he argued, “our tactics are sound, and that we shall accomplish more in the end by keeping doggedly at our work rather than by making a public scene.” 127
The disagreement lasted at least into December 1949. When he learned that Kenworthy had begun working on the final report, Sengstacke complained,
“I understood we were working on our report but did not contemplate we had
reached the final stages so soon ... I would like to see members from our
Committee make a few field trips before a preliminary report is drafted.
Particularly do I think our Committee should go to Germany to make a study of
our operations there. (With this, Sengstacke may have been giving tacit support
to A. Phillip Randolph’s proposed German Commission of Inquiry expedition.)”
128
The Threat of Publicity
By mid-November, Fahy wanted to put the threat of publicity behind him.
He told the President’s Committee about a recent favorable conversation he
had had with Phileo Nash. Nash told him that the Committee’s position was
strong and that only the quota problem remained. Fahy recommended, “my own
feeling is we should go along getting things done as in the past without any
particular public statement at this time, but I am of course I am willing to 227 129 reconsider this.”
it the The Army finished its revision of the Gillem policy and brought to
White House for approval. Kenworthy got an advance view of it, and described it
130 civilian special as “full of gimmicks, shifts and devices.” Karl Bendetsen, a consultant to the Secretary of the Army, took it to the White House but David
Niles was not in. Kenworthy wrote, ‘The Army has a very firm understanding that
(this policy) shall not be given out to the papers or sent to the field without the approval of the Committee.” 131 Nash analyzed the policy for David Niles. Then
Niles officially informed the Army that if the new order was satisfactory to the
132 President's Committee it would be satisfactory to the White House. The new policy was not acceptable to the committee, however, because it maintained
segregation and it only dissolved the quota for specialists, that is men recruited for specially needed jobs without touching the quota for specialties, that is the
larger category of men who were trained in Army schools for routine jobs. The
new directive allowed only a few Black specialists to be integrated into white
units. 133
After so many false starts, so many obstructions, so many evasions and
diversions from the Army, Fahy and his colleagues were once again prepared
to at least threaten to break their vow of silence and go to the press. They
carefully considered the effect that a public progress report might have. On
November 25, Fahy called Karl Bendetsen. If the Army officially issued this
revised policy, Fahy warned Bendetsen, the Committee would notify the White
House of its disapproval and would issue a statement to the press condemning
the new procedure. As a matter of follow-up, Kenworthy called Bendetsen
requesting additional copies of Circular 124. Bendetsen asked if the Committee
contemplated meeting again soon and Kenworthy told him of their planned 228 schedule. 134
Hours after that, Bendetsen called Fahy and tried to badger him. It was an extraordinary conversation. First, Bendetsen asked how the Committee reacted to the revised policy. Fahy said the Committee could not reply because
asked Fahy it had not yet met, but Bendetsen disputed this. Second, Bendetsen
the policy if he would agree that the revision of 124 accurately reflected
statement issued by Secretary Gray and approved by Johnson on September
30. Fahy replied that he would by no means agree to such a procedure, and
that, if the Army issued such a revision of Circular 124 to commanders he would
notify the White House of the Committee’s disapproval and he would issue a
statement to the press making it clear that the Committee had not approved the
Army’s policy. If this were done, Fahy told Bendetsen, “then a situation would
arise which had so far been successfully avoided, i.e. a controversy in public.”
Third, Bendetsen asked Fahy if the Committee had the authority to
prevent the Secretary of Defense from approving an Army policy. Fahy said he
was not trying to usurp the power of either Secretary Gray or Secretary Johnson
and that they, of course, had the right to issue an approved policy statement.
However, the Committee operated under an executive order of the President
and the Army policy did not meet the requirements expressed in that Order.
They ended the call. Fahy then had Kenworthy call Bendetsen to confirm that
135 the call would be put on the record.
Kenworthy advised Philleo Nash that the Committee would issue a
statement soon unless the Army retreated. Kenworthy read the press release to
Nash. As the Committee expected, the White House wanted to avoid publicity
on the issue. Nash advised against a statement and suggested that the
committee send its proposal on assignment and the quota to the Army and to 229 the White House. In Nash's opinion, “the White House would indicate to the
Army that it should move to meet the recommendations of the President's
Committee.”136
With the threat of publicity in the air, suddenly everything changed. Gray, a newspaperman, and Collins, who had recently made his career by managing the Army’s public information offices were suddenly far more amenable. While it
has been suggested that these men were younger than their predecessors and
might be characterized as less driven by the ideology of race than the need for
pragmatic action, 137 publicity clearly played a role as well.
For the first time, the Army would seriously consider policy
recommendations affecting the issue of black assignments; the Committee
reiterated its stance in a proposal which it sent to the President and to the Army
on 15 December. That proposal called for an end to the racial quota and a
statement specifying that African Americans would be assigned to units without
regard to race. 138 Marx Leva met with Secretary Gray to arrange a meeting
between Bendetsen and Archibald King, of the Judge Advocates’ Group. Leva,
Secretary of Defense Assistant Worthington Thompson and James Evans also
attended. In that meeting, Thompson tried to reassure Kenworthy that the Army
would soon fall in line. Later, however, Kenworthy told Fahy that he thought that
139 the President might still need to get involved.
However, the Defense Department effort did mark the turning of the tide.
Now, the White House and Defense were united in opposing further Army
obstinance. At the same time, perhaps in reaction to the Army experience, the
Navy and Air Force made rapid progress in implementing their integration
programs. 140 Ebony magazine praised the integration of the Air Force as “the
swiftest and most amazing upset of racial policy in the history of the U.S. 230 military.” 141
Events moved rapidly now. Secretary of the Army Gray asked for a meeting with Fahy on December 27. At this meeting Gray admitted that the
White House had given him the committee’s recommendations for revision of the Gillem policy, and the Army had rewritten its proposed policy with these suggestions in mind. There was still concern with the committee's proposed
language on assignment, which stated simply that African Americans be
assigned to any unit on the basis of need and ability and without regard to race.
Gray said he was in agreement in principle with this, but wanted language that
would allow integration to take place gradually, starting with skilled African
Americans and working down. After this meeting Fahy informed the committee
members: “I feel we are much closer to agreement than at any time in the past,
and I am very hopeful that by some modification in the language we can reach agreement." 142
Fahy felt that the Army was sincere, and he agreed to compromise the
language on assignment so that integration would be gradual. 143 With Senator
Jacob Javits (R-NY) prodding action by introducing a resolution to investigate
military segregation, the full committee met on 14 January 1950 to approve the
Army's revision of its Gillem policy. The compromise involved acceptance of the committee's language on assignment: Negroes "will be utilized in accordance
with . . . skills and qualifications, and will be assigned to any . . . unit without
regard to race or color." To this was added the Army’s suggestions for
"additional steps" toward the attainment of the goal stated by the committee, which involved beginning with the integrated assignment of Negroes to specialty jobs for which there was a shortage of qualified personnel. The 231 committee informed the President of its approval of the Army policy on January
16, and on the same day the Army issued its successor to the Gillem policy.
Only the committee's recommendation for an end to the racial quota was left unresolved, and discussion began immediately on this point. 144
The reaction of African Americans to the announcement of the new policy
1 was mixed. The Pittsburgh Courier saw it as a “victory’ on the other hand, the ;
Norfolk Journal and Guide claimed that a “basic flaw" of the new policy was the
145 fact that it made individual commanders responsible for its implementation.
A. Philip Randolph was critical of the new policy because he felt that it did not end segregation. Randolph asked Niles for a meeting to discuss establishment of an ad hoc Congressional Committee to investigate in lieu of his Commission of Inquiry. Others apparently felt this was the case too, because several congressmen introduced bills calling for an end to segregation in the armed forces. The Committee, finally free to unleash its powerful publicity machine, gathered strong support from the mainstream Caucasian press, the New York
Times, the Louisville Courier Journal, the Cox papers — the Atlanta Journal,
Dayton News, Miami News —the Christian Science Monitor, Baltimore Sun. and Eric Sevareid of CBS Radio. Kenworthy personally briefed reporters from each of these papers. He told the Committee that the New York Times sent the story to its syndicate “on the budget” but that the story broke too late for the news magazines. 146
The racial quota remained the last obstacle because it seemed to be an issue of policy implementation rather than policy-making. The President's
committee was convinced that it should continue to negotiate over this last obstacle. There was considerable support within the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, however, for ending the Fahy Committee immediately and allowing .
232 the Army a free hand in implementing its new policy. The Fahy Committee was
opposed to this step until it had achieved the end of the quota. They had powerful support within the White House in Clark Clifford and David Niles, who advised the President that the committee should remain in existence until the quota was abolished. 147 The President agreed. 148 President Truman apparently told Secretary Gray of his desire that the quota be abolished, and
the Army agreed to do so if the President would agree that a racial quota could
be reinstituted if the percentage of Blacks in the Army became too great. “If as a result of this new system," Secretary Gray wrote the President, “there ensues a
disproportionate balance of racial strength .... it is my understanding that I have
your authority to return to a system which will . . control enlistment by race.”
President Truman approved. 149
Bendetsen and Haislip told Fahy that the Army planned to abolish the quota but that they needed strict complete press silence. Fahy passed this on to
the Committee, noting that “they desire to do this initially without publicity ... It is their expectation that this order within a few days will result in queries from the
press, in event of which the Army will confirm abolition of he quota. If there are no press queries, the Army within a week or two of the order will release a short statement announcing that the racial quota has been abolished.” With that announcement, Fahy asked the Committee to avoid press contact. Fahy informed Niles of this action on 13 March 1950. 150
Although Bendetsen and Haislip personally informed Fahy of the Army’s intentions, the Fahy Committee was never formally informed of this agreement.
On March 13, however, the Army promised Truman that it would abolish the quota on African American strength, beginning in April, 1950. Reassuring the
Army that it was the right move, President Truman wrote Secretary Gray that he 233 appreciated the Army's action: “I am sure everything will work out as it should.”
151
The Fahy Committee began preparation of its final report with a feeling of
a job well done. 152 In a special article he wrote for the New York Times
Magazine, Kenworthy admitted that the new racial programs of the services
were far from finished:
Much remains to be done. But I think it is fair to say that they
represent an unprecedented stride toward the solution of a 153 problem that has embarrassed the nation since its beginning.
The committee's final report, Freedom to Serve, was submitted to the
President 22 May 1950. Before he received it, Truman received a note that was prepared by Nash and Stephen Spingarn, former NAACP official and Special
Assistant in the White House. They recommended that Truman include a message about the Fair Employment Practices Commission in his statement.
Truman did this and then added that he had followed the committee's work closely since its beginning and had confidence that its recommendations would be carried out and that “within the reasonably near future, equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons within the armed services would be accomplished.” 154
To ensure that the new racial policies would actually be carried out- something that had not always been done in the past— most of the committee members wanted a successor body appointed. 155 This was opposed by
Secretary of Defense Johnson, however, who felt rather strong'y about having a watchdog committee over him. Instead, Johnson wanted the services to make semi-annual progress reports to his Personnel Policy Board. 156 The President went along with his Secretary of Defense and informed the committee on 6 July 234
1950, that it was being discontinued:
“The necessary programs having been adopted, I feel that the Armed Services should now have an opportunity to work out in detail the procedures which will complete the steps so carefully initiated by the Committee.”
He was leaving Executive Order 9981 in effect, however, because “at
some later date, it may prove desirable to examine the effectuation of your
Committee's recommendations.” 157
Did the Fahy Committee really convince high-ranking officers within the
Army to accept integration? Although the Chamberlin Board, a committee of generals told Gray “almost without exception they vigorously opposed amalgamation and strongly urged the retention of the Negro unit,” 158 the formal framework was in place by the Fahy Committee.
Truman’s executive order, and the Committee which implemented it, (a) provided an impetus for the Air Force to move rapidly to a policy of integration;
(b) moved the Navy to bring its practices in line with its policy; and most
important, (c) it helped define and encourage the Army to press for true integration.
These insurgencies should be viewed in the larger context of the battle of unification and the jockeying for position in the formation of the National
Security Administration. In the same way that those political issues were fought in the press, the entire military desegregation issue also revolved around sensitivity to the implementation of the press and publicity. The bitterness expressed to black journalists by the Army at Forrestall’s National Negro
Defense Conference, the reaction to the desegregation of the New Jersey
National Guard, the impolitic statements that Omar Bradley made at Fort Knox, 235 the aborted attempt by Joe Collins to develop a separate racial policy statement, the threat by Kenneth Royall to go to the Congressional Armed
Services Committees (an action which resulted in his leaving office), the
Johnson pronouncements without Fahy Committee (or White House) consultation, the personal intimidation of Fahy by Karl Bendetsen, and finally the subversive recission of the Gray order by Generals Haislip, McFayden, and
Brooks are all egregious indicators of a greater pattern of Army hostility and
intransigence. The record details many more minor bureaucratic delaying
tactics that the Army also used.
Whether by intention or by luck, the problem of Army obstinance was
ameliorated through the appointment of journalists to policy-making positions.
These policy-makers often followed Truman’s (and Forrestal’s) dictum and kept
the story out of the mainstream press. Yet, from this conflict, there is a verity
revealed. Even before the cynicism of Viet Nam and Watergate, before
television instant analysis and the blurring of lines between public
pronouncements and photo-op and sound-bite publicity, journalists were
important actors in the story. Government by publicity, and the creative use of
publicity to short-circuit democratic access predate the telegenic qualities of
President John Kennedy. In the concluding chapter, we will examine reasons
why we recommend further analysis of history through a perspective of press
and publicity.
Notes
1 Announcements of Navy and Air Force reported in “ Committee begins work on ending service
bias,” Pittsburgh Courier, 22 January 1948, p. 1 .
2 Among Forrestal’s other nominees were Lester Granger of the National Urban League, Mary McLeod Bethune of the National Committee of Negro Women, Senator Cabot Lodge and Charles Wilson as an alternate choice for chairman. Ewing to the President, 30 July 1948, HSTL; Forrestal to the President, 3 August 1948, D54-1-16, National Archives Record Group (Herein referred to as NARG) 330 and “B Files” HSTL. 236
3 Among the Navy’s nominees were Rawleigh Warner, Chairman of Pure Oil Co. C. Douglas Dillon of Dillon Read & Co., Dr. Henry T. Heald, President of Illinois Institute of Technology, and John Meyer, Secretary of Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co., et al. Beauregard to Leva, 9 August 1948, “B Files” Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO. (Herein, listed as HSTL.)
4 Memorandum, Dawson to the President, 13 August 1948; Memorandum, Dawson to Matthew J. Connelly (Truman’s Appointments Secretary) 17 August 1948, “B Files,” HSTL.
5 White House Secretary’s notes to Donahue, 8 September 1 948; Memoranda, from Dawson for the President, 9 September 1948; telegram, McGill to Dawson, 15 September 1948. HSTL.
6 Ewing to the President, 30 July 1948, HSTL; Forrestal to the President, 3 August 1948, D54-1- 16, National Archives Record Group (Herein referred to as NARG) 330 and “B Files” HSTL; memorandum, Marx Leva to Forrestal, 31 August 1948, OSA 334, NARG 335.
7 In addition to the problem of finding a chairman, Secretary of the Army Royall felt that many of the people under consideration had expressed themselves as being opposed to segregation in the armed services. "I feel strongly that no person should serve on this Committee who has formed a fixed opinion on this subject on either side," Royall complained to the President. Royall to the President, 17 September 1948, OSA 334, NARG 335.
8 Fahy served as an assistant solicitor for the Department of the Interior, chairman of the Petroleum Administrative Board, general counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, assistant solicitor general, and then served as solicitor general from 1941 through 1945. Who’s Who in America, 1951; Washington Post, 11 October 1949.
9 Who’s Who in America, 1951; Washington Post, 11 October 1949.
10 Nomination of Charles Fahy, of New Mexico to be Judge of U.S. Court of Appeals for D.C.
Court, 1 April 1950, Senate Committee on Judiciary.
1 1 Granger’s appointment was repudiated by Kenneth Royall. Royall to the President, 17 September 1948, OSA 334, NARG 335.
12 Patrick S. Washburn, (1986) A Question of Sedition: The Federal Government's Investigation of the Black Press During World War II. New York: Oxford University Press.
13 Lee Finkle, (1975) Forum for Protest: The Black Press During World War II. Cranburv. N.J.: Associated University Press, pp. 46-48.
14 ‘The Chicago Defender, 1905-1942,” (an editorial) Chicago Defender, 9 May 1942, p.2; “The Negro Press and the War,” (an editorial) Chicago Defender, 18 July 1942, p.14.
15 Two of the most respected white liberals to express their concern were Virginius Dabney and Mark Ethridge.
On April 26, 1942, Richmond Times editor Virginius Dabney, who had previously decried lynching of blacks, warned that the prevailing assumption by southern conservatives was that black newspapers were instigating racial incidents in Southern cities adjacent to military camps to achieve change. 237
Immediately, Westbrook Pegler, one of the leading syndicated conservative columnists and radio commentators, capitalized upon the attacks upon the black press and gave them national exposure. In his column, Pegler specifically compared the Defender and Courier with the Communist Daily Worker and fascist Social Justice in their “obvious, inflammatory bias in the treatment of news" and charged the newspapers with "exploiting the war emergency to push the aspirations of the colored people." The Defender responded to the attack with a full-page feature " that reviled Pegler as "a slime slinger, "liar, " and "great defamer." They castigated the man, with columns by their own Managing Editor, Lucius C. Harper, and highly critical portraits reprinted from the Rocky Mountain News and New Yorker . In June 1942, Mark Ethridge, liberal publisher of the Louisville Courier-Journal and Times and chairman of the Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) warned that "those Negro newspaper editors who demand 'all or nothing... 'are playing into the hands of the white demagogues." He further assured white southerners that the combined mechanized forces of the Axis and the Allies could not force Southern white people to abandon social segregation. Ethridge's speech, which was made at an FEPC meeting in Birmingham Alabama, was intended to allay Southern fears that the administration would accept the agenda of the black press and dismantle segregation. No black newspaper supported his contentions regarding segregation. To the contrary, the Chicago Defender joined A. Phillip Randolph in calling for Ethridge to resign his FEPC post. Finkle, p.63-64; New York World Telegram, 28 April 1942; Lucius C. Harper, “Who is Westbrook Pegler?” Chicago Defender, 12 May 1942, p.7; Committee on Fair Employment Practices, "Seventh Hearing" Birmingham, Ala. 18 June 1942, p. 18; Herbert Garfinkle. U9591 When Negroes March: The MOWM in the
Organizational Politics for FEPC . Glencoe, IL: The Free Press., p. 103, “Ask Ethridge ouster, called pussyfooter,” Chicago Defender, 25 July 1942, p.1; “Mark Ethridge must resign,” (an editorial) Chicago Defender, 25 July 1942, p.14.
16Washburn, in passim.
^According to Washburn, this action was prompted when Roosevelt received two special reports from the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF) on May 19 documenting black press attitudes on the war. Washburn, p.80- 82.
1®Washburn, p.90.
19 Washburn, p.1 31, p.1 08.
20 Alan Fried, “Censorship of the Chicago Defender During World War II,” Paper delivered at the Association of Educators of Journalism and Mass Communication, Southeast Division, Orlando, FL 1991.
2-1 “We march forward— with Truman,” (an editorial) Chicago Defender, 24 July 1948, p.1
22 “If the committee is not hampered in its inquiry and if its recommendations are not circumvented by a welter of administrative procedures, the results should be far more consequential to us than anything that has happened in the United States since slavery.” “To secure these Rights (editorial),” Chicago Defender 5 October 1946, p.1; December 14, 21, 1946.
23 ‘Truman Acts, “Chicago Defender 14 February 1948, p. 13.
24 “Jim Crow in the military” Chicago Defender 21 February 1948, p.1 5.
25 “Mr. Truman stands firm” Chicago Defender 6 March 1948, p.15. 238
26 Charley Cherokee, “National Grapevine,” Chicago Defender, 27 March, p.12, 24 July 1948; Samuel C. Brightman, Assistant Director of Publicity for the Democratic National Committee, Oral History Interview conducted by Jerry N. Hess. Washington D.C. p. 93. HSTL
27 Pittsburgh Courier, 14 August 1948.
23 John Nicolas Brown, Acting Secretary of the Navy, to Secretary Forrestal, 28 December 1948, OSA 291.2, NARG 335.
29 Charles Francis. (1956) Tuskeaee Airmen: The Story of the Nearo in ASAAF. Boston: Bruce Humphries, p.225; Authors interview with Lawrence Paschek, author of “Negroes on the Air Force, 1939-1949,” Military Affairs, Spring 1967, vol. 31.
30 Nichols, pp. 75-81; memorandum, Secretary Symington to Secretary Forrestal, 6 January 1949, OSA 291.2, NARG 335; Pittsburgh Courier, 5 February 1949.
31 Memorandum, from Forrestal to Secretaries of Army, Navy and Air Force, 21 October 1948 and Memorandum, from Leva to Secretaries of Army, Navy and Air Force, 30 December 1948, “B” Files HSTL files.
32 Dalfiume, Richard (1 969) Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces. Columbia, Mo: University of Missouri Press, p. 179.
33 “Civil Rights Action is Near,” New York Times, 13 January 1949, Fahy Committee files, HSTL.
34 Letter from Dawson to Fahy, 8 January 1949, and Memorandum from Thompson to Dawson, 11 January 1949, “B” files, HSTL.
35 Compare, for example, Fahy’s 43-page criticism of Morris MacGregor’s f19811 Defense Studies: Integration of the Armed Forces. 1940-1965 in the Library of Congress collection of Fahy papers. He often offers pages of rebuttal or contrary evidence to a single sentence or paragraph of MacGregor’s work. Fahy Personal files, Library of Congress.
36 This was never attempted by the Fahy Committee.
37 "Testimony before the Fahy Committee,” 12 January 1949. Vol. 1,2-3, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL cited hereafter as "Testimony."
38 "Testimony.” 12 January 1949.
39 ‘Testimony," Vol. 11, 12-18, 12 January 1949.
40 ‘Testimony,” Vol. 111,32, 204, 13 January 1949.
41 ‘Testimony,” Vol. 1 1 , 39 ff., and Vol. Ill, 69-84.
42 ‘Testimony,” Vol. V, 4 ff. February 21 1949; memorandum by Joseph H. B. Evans, Associate Secretary of the Fahy Committee, 1 March 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL. —
239
43 Applicants also included Warren Roudebush, George Mott, Robert Beers, John Powell, Alonzo Hammond, William Strong, and James Parsons. Fahy Files, HSTL.
44 E. W. Kenworthy, (26 January 1 971 )Oral History Interview conducted by Jerry N. Hess. Washington D.C. pp. 1-13 HSTL.
45 Princeton: Princeton University Press, Bernard Cohen, (1963) The Press and Foreign Policy. ; p.39.
46 Neil Sheehan, et al., (1971) The Pentagon Papers as Published by The New York Times, New York: Bantam Books.
47 E. W. Kenworthy, Oral History Interview conducted by Jerry N. Hess. Washington D.C. 26 January 1971. pp. 16-17 HSTL. 48 The staff included two African American assistants Joseph H.B. Evans (who was often confused with Civilian Assistant James Evans) and Chicago Defender Editorial assistant Charles Browning, as well as a Caucasian, Jack Durham. There were three secretaries —one Caucasian Annabelle Price, formerly of OWI, and two African Americans— Beatrice William Dillard and Vivian S. Bullock. Memo from Kenworthy to Fahy, subject: Organizations to be heard by the Committee, 25 March 1949; “An analysis of the work of the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services” by Charles Browning, 28 March 1949; E. W. Kenworthy, Jerry N. Hess. Washington D.C. 26 January 1971 p. 28. Both Oral History Interview conducted by . in HSTL.
49 For instance, on 19 April 1949, Kenworthy reported, “I think the Committee should take the
opportunity to question [Personnel Policy Board Chair] Reid about the Board’s latest moves. I have the feeling that something is brewing. Royall’s office sent down for a transcript of the latest meeting today, though a copy had already been sent up there and General Nugent also sent over for another copy. Memo, Kenworthy to Fahy, subject: Mr. Reid, 19 April 1949, all in HSTL.
50 “AF plans non-segregation policy,” Army and Navy Journal, 12 February 1949, p.693; Memorandum, Thompson for Evans, 16 February 1949 “B” files; Analysis of the Executive Order 26 February 1949, Fahy files, HSTL.
51 Confidential memo to Judge Fahy, subject: Approach and Method, 10 March 1949, Fahy files, HSTL.
52 ‘Testimony,” Vol. X, 2-3S, 28 March 1949, HSTL.
53 ‘Testimony,” Fahy Committee Hearings, 28 March 1949, pp. 71-72, HSTL.
54 Testimony of the Secretary of the Army, Fahy Committee Hearings, 28 March 1949, morning session, p. 28, HSTL.
55 ‘Testimony," Vol. IX, 16-50. Also see Testimony,” Vol. X, pp. 66-73, Army Chief of Staff General Omar Bradley's testimony that is very similar in reasoning to that of Secretary Royall, HSTL.
56 “An Analysis of the Work of the President's Committee... Through 28 March 1949;” “Report on Gillem Board Policy and Implementation,” pp. 130-31; Memoranda, Kenworthy to Fahy, 9, March 1949; 10 March 1949, all in Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL. . ,
240
57 Memo, Kenworthy to Fahy, subject: Some Questions on the Gillem Board Report . 9 March 1949; subject, Various Versions of the Gillem Board Report, 16 March 1949; subject: Request of Personnel Policy Board to Appear Before Committee, 16 March 1949; Subject: Royal’s (sic) Memo to Forrestal on an Experimental Non-Segregated Unit, 16 March 1949; Proposed Policy For the National Military Establishment, Draft of a Proposal to Achieve Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, 17 March 1949, all in Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.
5® Memorandum, G-l to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration, 30 March 1949, CS 291 .2, NARG 319. Dalfiume, p. 183; memorandum, Reid to Worthington Thompson, 15 February, 1949, and memorandum, Reid to John H. Ohly, 15 March 1949, both in PPB 291 .2, NARG 330.
Memorandum, Reid to Secretary Johnson, 1 April 1949; memorandum, Allen to Secretary Johnson, 5 April 1949, both in D54-1-16, NARG 330.
60 Memorandum, Secretary Johnson to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Chairman of the Personnel Policy Board, 6 April 1949, copy in Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL. The earlier draft of the proposed policy drawn up by Reid had called for the new policy to begin in July, 1949, and to be completed by July 1950: "It is the intent of this directive that the maximum integration of members of minority groups throughout the military establishment shall be
accomplished by 1 July 1950." Apparently this was deleted because of Army objections. See "Draft of Proposed Directive for the Armed Forces,’ n.d. PPB 291 .2, NARG 330.
61 E. W. Kenworthy, Oral History Interview conducted by Jerry N. Hess. Washington D C. 26 January 1971. p. 31, HSTL.
62 Quoted in "Report on Gillem Board Policy," pp. 154-55, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.
Memorandum, Secretary Royall to Secretary Johnson, 22 April 1949, OSA 291 .2, NARG 335.
64 Walter Waggoner, “Royall resignation accepted, his assistant will carry on,” The New York Times, 22 April 1 949, p.1
Memo, Acting Secretary of the Navy for Chairman of the Personnel Policy Board, 2 May 1949; subject: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Navy and Marine Corps; Memo, Secretary of the Army for Secretary of Defense, 21 April 1 949, subject: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, both in Fahy Committee files. Minutes, Personnel Policy Board Meeting, 5 May 1949; Memo, Reid for Secretary of Defense, 10 May 1949, subject: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services; Memo, Secretary of Army for Secretary of Defense, 22
April 1 949, Office of the Secretary of the Army 291 .2.
66 Letter, Kenworthy to Fahy, 28 April 1 949, “B” files, HSTL
67 MacGregor, p.346.
68 “Johnson orders racial equality,” New York Times, 21 April 1949, p.1, “Army, Navy, Air Force ordered to report on racial policies,” Washington Evening Star 21 April 1949, p.1; “Secretary Johnson’s Order,” New York Herald-Tribune, 21 April 1949; “Services told to report on race policy,” Washington Post, 21 April 1949, p.1; “Equality for Defense,” New York Times, New York Herald-Tribune, 22 April 1949; “Mr. Johnson cracks the whip (editorial), “Chicago Defender, 7 May 1949, p. 6 (National edition), p.6; “Armed Service Jim Crow Policy Ends," The Crisis . 1 1
241
Magazine 56 (May, 1949), p. 137. All in Fahy Committee Newspaper Clipping file, HSTL
69 MacGregor, p. 346.
70 Memorandum, Kenworthy to Fahy, 27 April 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL, illustrates records. the change in thinking of the committee and the results of the study of the Army's
71 E. W. Kenworthy, Oral History Interview conducted by Jerry N. Hess. Washington D.C. 26 January 1971. p. 19.
72 E. W. Kenworthy, Oral History Interview conducted by Jerry N. Hess. Washington D.C. 26 January 1971. p. 19-21.
73 Diary of Charles Fahy in Personal papers in Library of Congress.
74 MacGregor, p. 354; Kenworthy Oral History, p. 19-21.
75 Quoted in "Report of the Gillem Board Policy," 156; “Johnson approves plan to distribute Negroes among units,” The New York Times, 12 May 1949, p.1.
76 “Report on Gillem Board Policy," p.156, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL..
77 "Initial Recommendations by the President's Committee . . 7 June 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.
78 Memorandum, Kenworthy to Fahy, 12 May 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL. MacGregor, p. 356.
79 National Military Establishment, Office of Public Information, Release 78-49A, 7 June 1949; Washington Post 7 June 1949 and New Yori< Times, 8 June 1949; “Secretary Johnson okehs Navy plan to train and assign Navy personnel without regard to race,” Pensacola FL Journal 7 Venice Spraggs, “Report Navy integration plan ready,” Chicago Defender 1 June 1949, p.1 ; June 1949, p. 1; End Jim Crow Now, Johnson tells Army," Washington Afro-American, 14 June 1949.
80 “Judgment day for the Army, “ (an editorial) Washington Afro-American 14 June 1949; Charley Cherokee, ‘Time for Action,"(an editorial) “National Grapevine,” Chicago Defender, 18 June
1949, p.1 1
81 The Army's reply is quoted in "Report on Gillem Board Policy," 57-59, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.
82 Under these procedures, a black soldier could enroll in an Army school course only if there was a vacancy for his specialty in a black unit. Since only a few all-black units existed and they were of a limited type, many qualified black soldiers were not allowed to pursue their interests or aptitudes.
83 “Report of the Gillem Board Policy," pp. 159-60, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.
84 Memo, Kenworthy for Fahy, 30 May 1949, subject: Replies of Army and Navy to Johnson’s 1 May Memo; Memo, Reid for Secretary of Defense 1 June 1949, subject: Army and Navy Replies to Your Memorandum of 6 April on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services; Minutes Personnel Policy Board 2 June 1949; Letter, Fahy to Johnson 25 July 1949, Fahy 242
Committee File, HSTL.
85 The President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, A Progress Report for the President, 7 June 1949, HSTL.
86 “Army deadline extended for ban on segregation," Washington Star, 22 June 1949, p.25-A.
87 Kenworthy to W. E. Stevenson, 13 June 1949; Fahy to Secretary Johnson, 14 June 1949, both in Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.
88 Letter. Charles Fahy to Secretary of Defense Johnson, 15 June 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.
89 E. W. Kenworthy, Oral History Interview conducted by Jerry N. Hess. Washington D.C. 26 January 1971. p. 19; Kenworthy to Fahy, 23 June 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL
90 Largely prepared by Wade Haislip, Lieutenant General S.J. Chamberlin and General Jacob Devers, among others, see Personnel & Administration Sheet to the Department of the Chief of Staff (administration) 24 June 1949, subject: Utilization of Negro Manpower, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army and attachments in 291 .2 Negroes NARG 335.
91 Meeting of President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, 11 July 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.
92 “ Pittsburgh Courier, 1 1 July “Army defies chief on racial plan, New York Times, 17 July 1949 ; 1949.
93 Woody Woody Taylor, “Inside government, “Washington Afro-American , 25 June 1949; July Fahy Committee Papers, Taylor, “Inside Government,” Washington Afro-American , 9 1949, HSTL.
94 Walter Waggoner, “Army defies chief on racial policies, “New York Times, 17 July 1949.
95 “The Army sits down (editorial), New York Post (Home News edition), 18 July 1949.
96 Interview, NBC's “Meet the Press” with Gordon Gray 18 July 1949.
97 Letter, Fahy to Secretary Johnson, July 25, 1949; Memorandum, Charles Fahy for the Secretary of the Army, subject: Evaluation by President's Committee of the Army's "Outline Plan for Utilization of Negro Manpower to Provide Further Equality of Opportunity; 25 July 1 949; Fahy to the President, President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, Second Interim Report, 27 July 1949; all in Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.
98 According to Judge Fahy’s diary, Fahy met on a near daily basis throughout September, with either Kenworthy, White House Civil Rights expert David Niles, Army Secretary Gray or his special assistant Karl A. Bendetsen. Diary of Charles Fahy in Personal papers in National Archives. Boxes 1, 15, 93, 96, 100 & 101.
Also see Memorandum, Fahy to Members of the Committee, 3 August 1949; Memorandum, Charles Fahy for the Secretary of the Army, subject: The substitution of a GCT Quota for a Racial Quota. 9 September 1949; Memorandum, E. W. Kenworthy to members of the committee, 19 September 1949; all in Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL. .
243
99 Memorandum, Vice Chief of Staff for Gray, 29 August 1949, subject: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, Chief of Staff for U.S. Army 291 .2 Negroes; Memorandum, Kenworthy for Committee, 19 September 1949; Letters, Fahy to Truman, 21 September and 26 September 1949, Fahy Papers, HSTL.
100 Memorandum Kenworthy to the committee, 27 September 1949.
101 Succession , York: Cabell Phillips, The Truman Presidency : The History of a Triumphant New Macmillan Co., pp. 404-406; Letter Secretary of Defense to Congressman Carl Vinson 7 July 1949; Memo, Lanham for Reid, 29 March 1949, both in Personnel Policy Board files.
102 MacGregor, p.365. Department of Defense, Office of Public Information Press Release, 30 September 1949; “Johnson asked to withdraw okay on Negro policy,” Washington Post, 1
October 1 949, p.6 in Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.
103 Pittsburgh Courier, 8, 15. October 1949; Press Release of the Committee Against Jim Crow in Military Service and Training, 6 October 1949, and Elmer W. Henderson. Director of American Council on Human Rights, to Fahy, both in Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL. Charles M. LaFollette, National Director of Americans for Democratic Action, to the President, 1 October 1949, OF 190 T, HSTL.
104 Memorandum, Kenworthy to Fahy, Subject: The Army’s New Policy, 2 October 1949, HSTL.
105 Donovan would become an important biographer of Truman. Conflict and Crisis, (1972) New
York: Norton and The Tumultuous Years . (1982) New York: Norton.
106 Memo Kenworthy to Fahy, Subject: The Army’s New Policy, 2 October 1949; John Norris, “Army continues segregation, but widens racial equality,” Washington Post, 1 October 1949, p.1; “Army reviews promotion set-up to give Negroes equal chances,” New York Herald-Tribune, 1 “ October 1949, p.1; Washington Times-Herald, “Gray’s Desegregation Plan disappointing, October “Army integration attacked by critics,” Pittsburgh Chicago Defender, 5 1949, p.3 ; Courier, 5 October 1949, p.1
1°7 Army segregationists were apparently successful in inciting Defense Department officials. Thomas R. Reid admitted that “the Army position was so well documented and so strongly presented that my own conviction that we were doing the right thing was shaken from time to time."; Defense Department trepidation over forcing the Army to alter effectiveness is also indicated in memorandum to Reid from Colonel J. F. Cassidy, 23 August 1 949, PPB 291 .2, NARG 330; Dalfiume, p. 92.
108 Kenworthy reported to Fahy,
Roy Davenport told me last night that on Friday afternoon just before the release of the Army’s new policy, he spoke to Major Lieblich, who did the major work on the statement. Davenport said he was a little bit puzzled why the statement contained merely the announcement that Johnson approved the policy, and all the quoted statements were those of Secretary Gray.
"*09 Diary of Charles Fahy in Personal papers in National Archives. 3 October 1949 Boxes 1,15,
93, 96, i 00 & 101 . Memorandum, Charles Fahy to the President, 1 1 October 1 949, Fahy Committee Papers; Telephone Memorandum, Nash Files, “B" files, HSTL.
0 At this point, the Committee felt a gauntlet had been thrown which could force them out of 244
Thursday, existence before their work was done. Committee attention during the weekend, from 6 October through Sunday, 9 October, was almost wholly focused on how they would break with Truman's instructions and go to the press. Committee member Dwight Palmer was concerned that Johnson’s statement could cause “a renewal of Civil Disobedience plans,” and strongly urged that the Committee release a statement to the press setting forth its disagreements with the Secretary of Defense. He suggested that the Committee advise the President that they planned to make the statement, then confront Johnson and Gray on the issue. They rejected two other alternatives, (a) asking the President to order that Gray and Johnson to issue a supplementary statement or (b) going back into negotiation with the Army. Truman’s press conference statement made these actions moot, but they do indicate the severity of the breach between Johnson and the Fahy Committee. Draft of Memorandum for the President, 6 October 1949; Letter, Dwight Palmer to Charles Fahy, 6 October 1949; Night Letter, Palmer to Kenworthy, 7 October 1 949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL. Also see Memorandum, David K. Niles to the President, 5 October 1949, Philleo Nash Papers, HSTL.
11 1 Memorandum, Niles for the President, 5 October 1 949, “B” files, HSTL; Item No. Public “Full Army equality for Negro planned," New York Times, Papers of the Presidents: 1949, p. 501 ; 7 October 1949, in Fahy Committee newspaper clipping files.
1 12 Memo for the President from Fahy, 11 October 1949“B” files, HSTL.
113 Letter, Kenworthy to Alan Barth, 10 October 1949. President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces files, HSTL.
114 The two orders are quoted in "Report on Gillem Board Policy,” p. 71-72, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.
1 15 E. W. Kenworthy, Oral History Interview conducted by Jerry N. Hess. Washington D C. 26 January 1971, HSTL; Author telephone interview with Kenworthy conducted on 27 December 1991.
1 16 E. W. Kenworthy, Oral History Interview conducted by Jerry N. Hess. Washington D.C. 26 January 1971. pp. 20-21, HSTL.
117 Department of Defense, Office of public Information Release 400-49, 3 November 1949, Fahy Committee files, HSTL; New York Times, 4 November 1949.
118 Letter, Kenworthy to Fahy, 3 November 1949, Fahy Committee files, HSTL.
119 Department of Defense, Office of public Information Release 400-49, 3 November 1949, Fahy Committee files; New York Times, 4 November 1 949.
12° ‘The Army recants,” (an editorial) Washington Post, 3 November 1949, p.20, Fahy Committee files, HSTL.
1 21 Lem Graves, Jr. “Army Brass Defies Investigation Order, Pittsburgh Courier, 12 November 1949, p.1.
1 22 Lem Graves, Jr. “Army Brass Defies Investigation Order, Pittsburgh Courier, 12 November 1949, p. 1; Lem Graves, Jr. “Washington Notebook,” Pittsburgh Courier, 19 November 1949 in Fahy Committee files, HSTL.
123 on October 18, before the incident, David Niles asked Marx Leva if the Army was planning to 245 revise Circular 124. Leva asked a special assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Worthington
Thompson, to look into it. Within that week, Leva asked another Defense assistant, Karl Bendetsen to show any revision of Circular 124 to Niles. Kenworthy twice expressed confidence that Leva would prevent a revision from being issued without Committee approval. Yet on 29 October 1949, Kenworthy sent a copies of the unauthorized rescission of the policy. Memorandum, Kenworthy to Fahy, 18 October 1949; memorandum, Kenworthy to Fahy, 26 October 1949; memorandum, Kenworthy to committee, 29 October 1949, all in Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.
124 Memorandum, Kenworthy to Fahy, 29 October 1949; memorandum, Kenworthy to committee members, 29 October 1949; memorandum, Kenworthy to Philleo Nash, 3 November 1949; memorandum, Kenworthy to the committee, 3 November 1949, all in Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL. Secretary Gray's reaction is discussed in memorandum, Worthington Thompson to Marx Leva, 3 November 1949, D54-1-61, NARG 330.
I 23 Sengstacke to Fahy, 8 November 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.
126 E. W. Kenworthy, Oral History Interview conducted by Jerry N. Hess. Washington D. C.. 26 January 1971. p. 30. Kenworthy expressed the idea, at greater length, in his confidential memo to Judge Fahy, subject: Approach and Method, 10 March 1949, HSTL.
127 Memo, Kenworthy to Fahy, 29 October 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL..
128 Letter for Fahy from Sengstacke, 15 December 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.
129 Memorandum for the Presidents Committee from Fahy, 17 November 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL..
130 Bendetsen had gotten his first military assignment from Haislip in the 1920s. During World War
II, he was in charge of Japanese-American Relocation Camps. After the war, Bendetsen worked as a special consultant on a number of projects for the military, such as coordinating use of bombing ranges in New Mexico. In September, 1949, Gray asked him to be Assistant Secretary of the Army. Although the official appointment was delayed until January 1950, Bendetsen worked as an executive member of the management committee of the Department of Defense. In that capacity, he oversaw issues such as force structure, deployment, procurement, budgeting, and planning. It was in that capacity that he occasionally worked with the Fahy Committee. Karl Bendetsen, Oral History Interview conducted by Jerry N. Hess. Washington D. C. p. 180, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.
131 Typed Note, Kenworthy to Fahy 15 November 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL..
132 Memoranda, Nash to Niles, 21 November 1949; Kenworthy to Fahy, 22 November 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.
133 “Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army,” 16 November 1 949, copy in Fahy Committee Papers. Memo, Kenworthy to The President’s Committee, subject: Successor Policy to War ; Department Circular 124, 18 November 1949; The committee's unfavorable analysis of this proposed policy is summarized in memorandum, Kenworthy to Fahy, subject: Revised War Department Circular 124, 28 November 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.
134 Telephone calls from Fahy to Karl Bendetsen on 25 November 1949 and to Kenworthy on 27 November, 1949; Results of conversation in Memorandum for the record by Kenworthy, 27 November 1949 and 28 November 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL; See John H. 246
Sengstacke to Fahy, 29 November 1949; Dwight R. G. Palmer to Kenworthy, 28 November 1949, in Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.
135 Memorandum for the record by Kenworthy, subject : Telephone Calls with Mr. Fahy of 27
November, 28 November 1 949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.
1 36 Memorandum for the record by Kenworthy, subject : Telephone Call with Nash, 9 December 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.
137 MacGregor, p. 369.
I®8 Memorandum, the President's Committee to the President, 15 December 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.
139 Memorandum, Kenworthy to Fahy, 19 December 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.
140 In December 1949, the Air Force reported that its integrated units increased from 273 in June 1949, to 797 in August. Furthermore, there had been no racial conflict within the newly integrated units. Memorandum, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force to the Chairman of the Personnel
Policy Board, 5 December 1949, PPB 291 .2, NARG 330. For accounts of the integration at various Air Force bases, see New York Times, 18 September, 28 November 1949; Memorandum, the Under Secretary of the Navy to the Chairman of the Personnel Policy Board, 22 December 1949, PPB 291. 2, NARG 330.
141 ‘The Air Force Goes Interracial,” Ebony, 4 (September, 1949), 15-1 8.
^ 4 ® Memorandum, Fahy to the committee members, 27 December 1949, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL; Nichols, p. 96.
^ 48 These negotiations can be followed in memoranda to the committee members, 29, 30, December 1949, 5, 6, January 1950, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.
1 44 Press Release, Senator Jacob Javits, 12 January 1950; Memorandum, Fahy to the President, 16 January 1950, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL. The Army's new policy was released as Special Regulations No. 600-629-1 , a copy of which is in Fahy Committee Papers. An accurate account of these final negotiations with the Army is contained in New York Times, 16 January 1950.
145 Pittsburgh Courier, 28 January 1950, “New Army race policy flawed,” Norfolk Journal and Guide, 4 February 1 950, p. 9.
146 “Army is planning to end racial bar,” The New York Times, 16 February 1950; 22 February 1950, 5 May 1950, Letter from Randolph to Niles, 19 January 1950, Memorandum, Kenworthy for the President’s Committee, 23 January 1950, Letter from Kenworthy to Sevareid and transcript of radio broadcast, 24 February 1 950 and 27 February 1950, Kenworthy “B” files HSTL.
1 47 Memorandum, J. F. Cassidy to Admiral McCrea, 1 1 8 January 950, PPB 291 . 2, NARG 330; memorandum, Clark Clifford to the President n. d. January, 1 950, Nash Papers, HSTL.
148 Memorandum, Fahy to committee members, 1 February 1950, Fahy Committee Papers HSTL. 247
149 Secretary Gray to the President, 1 March 1950, OF 1285, HSTL.
150 Memorandum, for President’s Committee from Fahy 8 March 1950; Memorandum for Mr. Niles, 13 March 1950, Niles file, HSTL.
151 Memorandum, the President to Secretary Gray, 27 March 1950, OSA 291 . 2, NARG 335.
1 52 For the reactions of individual committee members, see Fahy to William Stevenson, 30 March 1950; Kenworthy to John H. Sengstacke, 25 April 1950; Sengstacke to Fahy, 25 May 1950; all in Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.
153 £ w. Kenworthy, "Taps for Jim Crow in the Services," New York Times Magazine (1 1 June 1950), pp. 12, 24-27.
154 Memo from Nash to Spingarn, 22 May 1950; John Norris, ‘Truman lauds Fahy Committee Work, “ New York Times, 23, May 1950,p.3 in Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.
155 Memorandum, Kenworthy to Philleo Nash, 26 April 1950; memorandum, Kenworthy to Fahy, 28 April 1 950, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.
1 56 Memorandum, David Niles to the President, 22 May 1950, Nash Papers, HSTL; memorandum, Kenworthy to Fahy, 10 July 1950, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.
157 President Truman to Fahy, 6 July 1950, Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.
158 “Report of the Board of Officers on Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army to the Secretary of the Army," 9 February 1950, OSA 291. 2, NARG 335. CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS
An informed citizenry must, by definition, be informed. Denial of information and denial of access to information, has usually proved antithetical to the best interests of democracy. Yet, by definition, democracies are egalitarian. Thus, racial desegregation is a quintessential good for a democracy.
President Harry S. Truman denied the press access to information about a commission because he thought he could achieve a greater good by restraining debate about military segregation. Through his restraint, the Armed Services became, in principle if not in fact, racially desegregated. How and why that event transpired in the way that it did tells us much about policy-making in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
In the introduction, we resolved that this study would examine the role that publicity played in one instance of policy-making in the period before the introduction of regular television news broadcasts.
We sought to study David B. Truman’s contention that publicity could serve as an important indicator of access to administrative and legislative decision-making. He had written that governments make policies palatable by enlarging the public for those policies and by consolidating the segments of the public that will support those policies. 1 By examining the methods that governments use to enlarge
248 249
(or diminish) support, we hoped to gain an important insight into the effectiveness of access and of persuasive power as a means to garner compliance. To a surprising extent, the process worked as David B.
Truman hypothesized that it would.
Harry Truman ordered his Presidential equality committee to seek Army compliance with his desegregation order without involving the press and publicity. 2 Although he ultimately won that measure of compliance, he was unsuccessful in keeping the issue completely out of the newspapers. The Fahy Committee did use the press effectively to blunt the Army’s contravening actions. By contacting the press directly, most often as a non-attributed source,
Kenworthy and the others were able to keep proponents of desegregation allied on the issue.
Looking at motivation, we have not found any evidence to explain why President Truman chose to warn the committee about the dangers of press publicity. We do not have any documents that specifically explain why he chose to depart from the speeches that his aides provided. However, the basic logic of his argument is fairly apparent; compromises are more easily reached when the parties to the compromise are free from public pronouncements and commitments. Moreover, governments, especially war-time governments, have made a long and prosperous career of avoiding the press. In some ways, the deployment of African American soldiers was a military preparedness issue. Deployment information did receive security classification. However, military leaders probably used the classification stamp to hide this information because it was politically sensitive as well. 250
Beyond this, Truman may have counseled press evasion because he had no great fondness for newspaper companies and columnists. Later in his second term as president, he even tried to institute some controversial press curbs. Truman’s view of the relationship between working reporters and the office of the publisher seems, at best, naive. Although he was always able to win praise from some White House reporters and although he appointed
relations. able press secretaries, he frequently mismanaged his press The Indeed, his reputation has benefited from historical perspective. press and public opinion of him in his own time was frequently critical. Motivations aside, Truman was not that unusual. Other
Presidents also frequently evaded the press. What was different
here?
Historians who previously covered this event have missed the
significance of the role that press and publicity played in serving as a
potential forum for those who dissented from Truman’s civil rights
dictates and for those whose mission it was to enforce them. In
studying the role of publicity in military desegregation, we found
evidence of a pattern of defiance of presidential authority by the
military. That defiance was expressed through the press or the threat
of press exposure. When Kenneth Royall and Louis Johnson
threatened to publicly dispute policy and when Omar Bradley and the
clique of generals who sent the recission order each tried to
countermand presidential authority, they were each committing
serious acts of insubordination. The threat of press exposure was
important in those incidents. And when the members of the
presidential commission stood up to this military intimidation with 251
their own threats of press exposure, this became a very unusual situation.
It is important, in this regard, to remember how often, during
Truman’s time in office, the branches of the service made their case in the newspapers. Whether it was the ‘Battle of the Potomac’ over unification or the ‘Revolt of the Admirals’ over the naval carrier budget, the U.S. military became quite used to publicly airing its grievances. Although not covered in this study, the issue of military insubordination came to a head when Douglas MacArthur defied
Truman over the way the Korean War was being fought. Yet, in at least three key ways, the issue of press access to racial desegregation of the military was different from these other incidents.
Racial desegregation of the military went forward because of
(a) the actions of lower-level bureaucrats, (b) press coverage by the
black press and (c) the appointment of two modern public relations-
conscious military leaders, J. Lawton Collins and Gordon Gray, who
accepted the Presidential mandate. Lower-level bureaucrats, Ned
Kenworthy, Marx Leva and Roy Davenport, effectively transformed
the anomalies of this situation into a consistent policy; the importance
of Kenworthy, a journalist acting as a policy-maker, can not be
underestimated. In addition, the black press served as an unusual
two-way conduit between the insiders and the African American
community. Through their efforts, the multifarious intrigues within
the Pentagon and between the military and the Presidential
Committee were revealed. Finally, Collins and Gray had a much
better understanding of post-war sensibilities and the negative
impression that inter-service squabbling made in the press. Their 252
ultimate compliance launched the remediation of the problem. With
acceptance by Collins and Gray, the civil rights mission turned to the
schools, public facilities and voting rights.
Whv the Bureaucrats Substituted the Press for Public Opinion
Other historians studying the racial desegregation of the
military also credited the actions of lower-level bureaucrats. Richard
Dalfiume has written, “Throughout this period it was the support of
the civilian leaders within the military establishment for integration
that proved decisive .” 3 Although Morris MacGregor gives a bit more
credit to the Fahy Committee than to the services, he also argues that
much of the responsibility for interpretation and enforcement fell to
the Secretary of Defense. Given that understanding, it is important to
understand why these bureaucrats looked at the press as their
measure of public opinion.
“A democratic government lives and dies by publicity,” wrote
E.E. Schattsneider. Thus, effective democratic governments depend
upon their capacity to respond to conflict situations resourcefully, by
providing an arena for conflict, publicizing them , and taking steps to
rectify the source of wrong-doing. 4 Yet Schattsneider also urges us to
follow the sympathies of the crowd, i.e. of general public sentiment,
as a divination tool for predicting the success of policy. In the case of
post-war race relations, conventional wisdom held that the
segregationists and desegregationists were beyond reconciliation; it
was assumed that there was little latitude for compromise. Thus, we
asked ourselves where we should look if there were no opportunities
for crowds to gather? How do we measure conflict resolution if the 253
government surreptitiously closes the forum for dissent? Where do
we look if the government distracts the crowd with other issues?
Where dissent is less discernible, historians have often
examined how policies are accepted by looking at the actions of
primary dissenters. Through the lives of pacifists, civil libertarians
and other activists, historians illustrate the formation of public
support and opposition. Yet all too often, these activists are the
leaders of the cause. By the mere virtue of their leadership, they may
be different from the ordinary public. To be thorough, we did look at
the role of A. Philip Randolph and the post-war civil rights
movement. We concluded that, aside from being a catalyst to
government action, Randolph and other civil rights leaders were
ancillary to the effort.
Thus, for this study, we did not concentrate on the general
public or on the leaders of dissent but on those who could keep an
issue out of the public forum. We posited the notion that the
government was more concerned with the publicity the military
desegregation story would generate than the actual public reaction to
that publicity. To this end, we suggested that “for the politician and
the bureaucrat, the headline inch serves as a day-to-day measure of
public opinion on a great number of issues.” We turned instead to the
press relations of the lower-level policy-makers.
Truman’s action can be seen as a two-stage process; he wanted
to win over the military before he sought approval from the general
public. Further he sought to win over the military leaders before
winning over the rank and file. Truman seemed to confine his
personal influence on the issue to those within the military. However 254
the military leaders and members of the Fahy Committee communicated with the traditional prestige press, i.e. the New York
others; they were, undoubtedly, Times, the Washington Post , and trying to make their case and influence traditional elites. Grossman and Kumar have argued that the constitutional and institutional prerogatives of the office are insufficient for the President to achieve many important objectives without popular support. Effective leadership requires an ability to use a variety of political skills. To win over the public at large, a president must first persuade Congress, the bureaucracy, his political party, state and local officials and, most important here, special interest groups and other public opinion
5 leaders . Grossman and Kumar argued.
In contrast to the view that they are adversaries whose relations recently have gone undergone dramatic change, the White House and the news media are involved in a continuing relationship rooted in permanent factors that affect both sides
no matter who is the president or who is doing the reporting.
Continuing forces shape both sides more than specific incidents, however traumatic, or the impact or particular personalities, however unusual. What's more, the cooperative elements in this relationship are at least as strong as those that are antagonistic, for a fundamental reason: presidents and news people depend 6 upon each other to do the job for which they are responsible.
Certainly, government is not obligated to seek press coverage.
But in issuing an unlimited directive, Truman exercised a broad use of
Presidential prerogative. He altered, or at least attempted to alter the
symbiotic relationship between government and the press. Without
encouraging press scrutiny, the press-committee relationship could
have become purely adversarial. In its role as citizen procurator, the 255
and the press might only seek to expose the actions of the committee
finally setting military. After all, the committee and the military were
the social policy. By not permitting the press, they were excluding public from this deliberation.
This evasion of the press could have been counter-productive to the good intentions of the administration and the desegregation
found a committee. It is conceivable that conservatives might have
way to interpret the implementation of liberal social policy as
somehow subversive. Imagine, for instance, how Senator Richard
Russell might have portrayed a secret Army committee setting liberal
racial policies. Truman’s gambit might well have set back the Civil
Rights movement by a decade or more.
Kenworthy, Fahy and the other desegregationist forces kept the
liberal interpretation of the story in the newspapers as a way of
acting as a pressure valve for the liberal forces and of standing up to
their conservative counterparts, All sides, including and especially
the committee and David Niles kept huge scrap-books of newspaper
stories. It often fell to the lower level bureaucrats to monitor these
clippings and, as we will see, to contact the press in an unobtrusive
way, to keep the press informed of the progress of negotiations. Even
the Secretaries of Defense and of the Army kept news files. During
the Fort Knox imbroglio. General Omar Bradley and his publicity-
conscious aide Whalen followed the newspaper reports. All of this
clipping and saving provides evidence that the key players saw press
coverage as one measure of public opinion. These players did not
confine their clipping files to the white mainstream press. 256
The Bureaucrats View of the Black Press
It is important to remember that the post-war civil rights movement did not carry the clout that it would during later eras.
Although the NAACP had been long-established, most of its efforts at that time were concentrated in educational and voting rights reform.
There was little common consensus among African Americans and among liberals as to what constituted success. Despite his success in helping create the FEPC, Randolph did not set the civil rights agenda any more than did Lewis Granger of the Urban League or did Walter
White.
During World War II, the black press assumed an important role in giving voice to the disparate voices in the black community.
Members of the Negro Press Association were at the White House when war was declared and they often went to Europe to report on the conditions under which black troops lived and worked. This is
something the mainstream white press largely failed to do. More than
that, press coverage by the black press was important because it
went beyond the surface events to the inner-workings of
government. African American journalists had great contacts
throughout the Pentagon, the services and the Truman
Administration. Although their publication schedule often prevented
them from breaking the most dramatic news in a timely fashion, they
kept their readers better informed about the negotiations than did
their Caucasian counterparts. It is from their news reports that we
find some of the few public reports about the committee actions.
We have alluded to one important way that this procedure
worked. We showed how Kenworthy received inside reports from the 257
can African American civilians who worked inside the Pentagon. We arrangements. speculate that black reporters may have had similar
Such secret alliances were less necessary for the Chicago Defender.
The best evidence that Truman cared about the opinion of the black press was that he appointed John Sengstacke as a member of the
Fahy Committee. A number of African American reporters applied
of for the position of Executive Secretary to the Fahy Committee. It is
further import that another African American, Charles Browning of
of his assistants. the Defender , served as one
Acceptance of Truman’s Mandate
The racial desegregation of the U.S. military occurred during the
formation of the National Security Council and the reformation of the
War Department into the Department of Defense (DOD). For that
reason and because it affected personnel deployment, we examined
the structure of the DOD as an institution. The charismatic appeal and
personal opinions of the military leaders proved to be a very
influential factor in policy-making. The military proved to be far
more driven by hierarchy of command and other institutional factors.
We found that all departmental structures that were created to deal
with the press were ignored by the defense secretaries. They were
not factors worth considering.
Instead, we found that the Forrestal and Johnson, Royall and
Bradley were important impediments to desegregation. These war-
time leaders were not mere Pentagon paper-pushers. They
commanded through their charisma. Similarly, we believe that the
accommodating nature of Collins and Gray contributed to the 258
Collins and Gray facilitation of this policy. It is interesting to see how
roles as each exercised this conciliatory capacity in their respective For publisher and Chief of Information for the War Department. be published instance. Gray once allowed anti-smoking information to Collins opened in his Winston-Salem, North Carolina newspaper and
hesitate to say that his door to Associated Press editors. We would
not as Collins and Gray were crucial players; they were certainly
certainly imagine crucial as Fahy, Kenworthy or Davenport. One can Board other moderates, such as Chairman of the Personnel Policy
Thomas Reid or Air Force Secretary Stuart Symington, responding in
that the same way in the same position. Yet, we would conclude
Collins and Gray were influenced by what the newspapers, as
surrogates for public opinion, would say about the Army’s racial
policies.
Senate and Presidential Commissions
We studied the structure of presidential commissions for much
the the same reason that we studied the institutional structure of
newly-formed Department of Defense. Here, we found, that the Fahy
Committee, Truman’s Commission on Civil Rights and Truman’s Special
Senate Committee on Defense Appropriation all conformed to a set of
press/committee guidelines. First, Truman avoided dissension among
program, all parties to the conflict. In his investigation of the defense
he refused to denounce witnesses and ascribe blame. He would not
grandstand and in this way he kept the focus on substantive reform.
a good reporter by keeping all members of his Next , Truman acted as
committees informed of his findings and checking his facts. He 259
distributed galley copies of all reports to both Democrats and
Republicans as well as to each government agency, corporation and individual affected. Judge Charles Fahy was equally meticulous. He often delayed publication of committee press releases until all the committee members agreed. What is significantly different, however, is that except the final committee report, Fahy did not seek Army support for any of his press releases, although he often sought a measure of support from the Defense Department.
This is one factor that distinguishes the Truman Committee from the Fahy Committee. Both were dealing with volatile public topics. Fahy did not open the issue to public debate nor did he permit
a dissenting view. In fact, the Fahy Committee often threatened press exposure of the Army viewpoint. In turn, the Army and the Defense
Department occasionally tried to intimidate the Fahy Committee.
Army Secretary Kenneth Royall lost his job when he tried it. Defense
Secretary Johnson and Army consultant Karl Bendetsen were both
chastened when they tried it. Certainly Fahy’s ability to withstand
intimidation enabled him to keep the lid on the Committee’s efforts.
Meanwhile, Kenworthy acted as a pressure valve, releasing a steady
stream of confidential reports to the press. This interaction enabled
the White House and the Fahy Committee to control the press.
The cult of personality turned out to be the strongest influence
in the rigid hierarchy of the U.S. Defense Department. In the Truman
administration and, especially in the President’s Committee on
Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services,
procedures proved to be as important as personality. However, in 260
contributed both cases, the most apparent common denominator that
journalism. to the reform of civil right policy was a background in
In the end, then, we do see the racial desegregation of the U.S. military as an exceptional example of ‘government by publicity.’ The manipulation was strange and subtle, as significant for the circumstances surrounding its absence as for the manifestations of its presence. This form of government by publicity, or policy-making by the publicity-sensitive, was different from the kind of government by publicity practiced in the television age. We have seen that Truman was more concerned with selling the military leadership and the liberal policymakers than selling the general populace on racial reform. When necessary, as in his Civil Rights speeches, Truman did
take up the bully-pulpit. But in the matter of reforming military, he
tried to avoid publicity. The segregationists tried to use Truman’s
mistrust of the press to their own advantage. But savvy journalists,
ultimately, prevented them from succeeding.
Whv Study the History of Press Access?
What constitutes press history? Must press history be limited
to the development of the news media and individual newspapers,
magazines and broadcast stations? Must press history be limited to
the famous publishers, renowned reporters and leading lights whose
names have become synonymous with great reportage? Although a
number of journalists figure prominently in this research, this study
is not a ‘traditional’ press history. Rather, it is a study of how public
opinion has influenced the formation of policy. Some might argue 261
history or political that this is really civil rights history or military
take comfort history, but not a true press history. In that regard, we from the words of James D. Startt and William David Sloan,
It is in fact, difficult to place boundaries on communication history. Its study is an invitation to investigate not only the media in the past but also subjects such as publicity, propaganda, public opinion, censorship, and civil liberties. Communication historians are interested also in opinion-policy relationships. Their studies, consequently deal with many aspects of how people communicated and how communications interacted with societies in the past. Therefore, their inquiries have little validity if they concentrate solely on 7 communications media .
Truman’s decision to deny publicity was really a denial of press
access. Although very important parts of the story did find their way
into the press, much of the story remained buried in the archived
this event, files of the Secretaries of Army and Defense. In examining
we found that the ordinary documents of government, the transmittal
forms and filed memos were more revealing than the public
pronouncements and staged news events. Only a historical study
could bring these documents to light. Only a scholar interested in
press history could see the value of these documents in this light.
other It is traditional at this point in a dissertation to suggest
areas of exploration and to recommend other avenues of study.
There may be more to learn about the role of the press in this
particular incident. However, we would urge future scholars to look
far beyond Truman’s desegregation order to other administrations, to
other eras and to other incidents in which the press was denied
access. When the press is denied access, the people are denied a 262
the special forum to debate the great issues of the day. By viewing relationship between the press and government from this particular perspective, we can gain a whole new understanding of the policy- making process. There is much to learn.
Notes
Alfred A. 1 David B. Truman. (1958) The Governmental Process New York:
Knopf, p. 463.
Congress passed the 2 in a literal sense, he was only following the law. In 1913, to prohibit Gillett Amendment (Section 3107) of Title V of the United States Code spending taxpayer dollars to pay publicity experts unless specifically appropriated for that purpose. We tend to think Truman was using the term ‘publicity’ generically and was trying to restrain the use of any communication from the Committee or the Armed Services on the desegregation issue.
3 Richard Daifimue. n 9691 Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces; Fighting on of Missouri Press, p. 200. Two Fronts . 1 939-1953 . Columbia: University
4 Hinsdale: The Dryden E. E. Schattsneider, (1960) The Semi-Sovereign People , Press
5 Michael Grossman and Martha Kumar (1 98 1 ) Portraving the President : The White University Press. House And The News Media Baltimore : Johns Hopkins
6 Grossman and Kumar, p. 14.
7 James D. Startt and William David Sloan.M 989) Historical Methods in Mass
Communication. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, p.15 . BIBLIOGRAPHY
Manuscript Collections
Army General Staff Papers. National Archives Records Group 319, Washington, DC
James C. Evans Reports and papers. US Army Military History Research Collection, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
Charles Fahy, 1949 Diary in Personal papers in Library of Congress.
Minutes of Executive Committee Against Mob Violence, (21 August 1946) Box 332, NAACP Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
Phileo Nash Papers. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Arthur W. Page papers. Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madison, Wl.
Personnel Policy Board Papers. National Archives Records Group 330, Washington, DC.
President’s Committee on Equality of T reatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.
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Margaret L. Geis, Negro Personnel in the European Command 1 January 1946 to 30 June 1950. 1952 Historical Division, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.
Dennis D. Nelson, The Integration of the Negro into the United States Navy, 1776- 1947, Washington, DC, 1947.
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Marcus Ray, Report to Secretary of War, Robert Patterson, "Tour of European Installations," 17 December 1946.
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U.S. Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, 1948.
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National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs, 26 April 1948, Washington, DC.
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Norfolk Journal and Guide, 1 940-1 950
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Washington Star, 1945-1950
Oral Histories and Interviews
Except where noted, all interviews come from the Oral History collection of the Harry S. Truman Library in Independence, MO. The following listings show the name of the interviewee, the interviewer and the location of the interview.
Jack L. Bell, Oral History Interview conducted by Jerry N. Hess. Washington, DC.
Karl Bendetsen, Oral History Interview conducted by Jerry N. Hess. Washington, DC.
Samuel C. Brightman, Assistant Director of Publicity for the Democratic National Committee, Oral History Interview conducted by Jerry N. Hess. Washington, DC.
Alvan Gillem Oral History Interview in Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
Gordon Gray Interview, NBC's “Meet the Press,” 18 July 1949.
E. W. Kenworthy, Oral History Interview conducted by Jerry N. Hess. Washington, DC.
Articles
“The Air Force Goes Interracial." Ebony, Vol. 4, September 1 949, 15-18.
R. S. Allen and W. V. Shannon, "Why Johnson Was Fired." New Republic, vol. 123, 25 September 1950, 11-12.
Hanson Baldwin, "The Military Move In." Harper's, vol. 195, December 1947, 481- 489.
Horace Mann Bond, "Should the Negro Care Who Wins the War?" The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 223, September 1 942, 81 - 84.
R. & E. Brecher, "The Military's Limited War Against Segregation." Harper's Magazine, vol. 217, September 1963, 79-92.
W. H. Brown, "A Negro Looks at The Negro Press." Saturday Review of Literature 25, 19 December 1942, 5-6.
Roy Carter, Jr. "Segregation and the News: A Regional Content Study." Journalism Quarterly, vol. 34 (Winter 1 957): 3.
, "Segregation and the News: A Regional Content Study, " Journalism Quarterly, vol. 36 (Spring 1959): 284.
Kenneth Clark, "Morale of the Negro on the Homefront: World Wars I and II." Journal of Negro Education, vol. 12 (Summer 1943,): 417-28.
D. Cohn, "How the South Feels." The Atlantic Monthly, 173, January 1943, 94-100.
Robert H. Connery, "Unification of the Armed Forces: The First Year." American Political Science Review, vol. 43, February 1 949, 38-52.
"Crisis in the Making: U.S. Negroes Tussle with Issue of Resisting a Draft Law because of Racial Segregation, "Newsweek, 21, 7 June 1948, 28-29. ,
266
Richard Dalfiume, "The 'Forgotten Years' of the Negro Revolution." The Journal of American History, vol. 57 (1967): 91-106.
Richard Dalfiume, "Military Segregation and the 1940 Presidential Election." Phylon vol. 30, 1969,42-55.
Paul C. Davis, "The Negro in the Armed Services." Virginia Quarterly Review, vol. 24, (Autumn 1 948): 495-523.
John B. Donovan, “Mass Communications and the Adversary Establishment." Intellect vol. 11, 1975, 525.
James C. Evans and David A. Lane Jr. "Integration in the Armed Services." Annals of t he American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 304, March 1 956, 78-85.
“Face the Music,” Time, 51, 12 April 1948, 21.
William T. R. Fox, "Representatives and Efficiency: Dual Problem of Civil-Military Relations." Political Science Quarterly., vol 76 (September 1961): 354-366.
William T. R. Fox, "Civilians, Soldiers, and American Military Policy." World Politics, vol. 7, April 1955,402-418.
Alan Fried, “Censorship of the Chicago Defender During World War II.” Paper delivered at the Association of Educators of Journalism and Mass Communication, Southeast Division, Orlando, FL, 1991.
Noel Griese, "He Walked in the Shadows: Public Relations Counsel Arthur W. Page." Public Relations Quarterly, vol. 21 (Fall 1976): 8-15.
E. T. Hall, Jr., "Race Prejudice and Negro-White Relations in the Army." American J oumal of Sociology, vol. 52 (March 1947): 401-409.
Paul Hammond, “Super-Carriers and B-36 Bombers: Appropriations, Strategy and Politics” in H. Stein (ed.), American Civilian-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies, Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1963.
Richard Haynes, "The Defense Unification Battle, 1947-1950: The Army." Prologue; vol. 7(1), Spring 1975.
Ernest Johnson, "The Washington News Beat." Phylon 7 (Second Quarter 1946): 120- 29.
L. M. Jones, "The Editorial Policy of the Negro Newspapers of 1917-1918 as compared 942." vol. 1 (Summer 1 943): with that of 1941-1 Journal of Negro Education , 2 298-306.
E. W. Kenworthy, "The Case Against Army Segregation." Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 275, May 1951, 27-33.
E. W. Kenworthy, "Taps for Jim Crow in the Services." New York Times Magazine, 11 June 1950, 12-13, 24-27.
H. Krieghbaum, "The Office of War Information and Government News Policy." Journalism Quarterly, vol. 19 (September 1942). , . " " ,,
267
Jack C. Lane, "American Military Past: The Need for New Approaches." Military Affairs vol. 41 (October 1977): 109-113.
Wesley McCune and John R. Beal. "The Job that Made Truman President." Harper's vol. 190, June 1945, 616-621.
Monthly Summary of Events and Trends in Race Relations, (various issues, 1 940- 1946).
Charles S. Moskos, "Racial Integration in the Armed Forces." American Journal of Sociology, vol. 72 (September 1966): 132-148.
P. L. Prattis, "The Morale of the Negro in the Armed Services of the United States. Journal of Education, vol. 12 (September 1943): 355-63.
P. L. Prattis, “The Role of the Negro Press in Race Relations." Phylon , vol. 7 (Third Quarter 1946): 269-284.
Lawrence D. Reddick, "The Negro Policy of the American Army Since World War II." Journal of Negro History, vol. 38 (April 1953): 194-215.
Dietrich C. Reitzes, "Institutional Structures and Race Relations," Phylon vol.20 (First , Quarter 1959): 48-66.
Arnold M. Rose, "Army Policies Toward Negro Soldiers -- A Report on a Success and Failure." Journal of Social Issues, vol. 3 (Fall 1 947): 26-31
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G. S. Schuyler, "More Race Riots are Coming." The American Mercury, vol. 59 (December 1944): 680-86.
Harry Sitkoff, "Harry Truman and the Election of 1948: The Coming of Age of Civil Rights In American Politics." Journal of Southern History, vol. 37 (November 1971): 597- 616.
R. W. Steele, "Preparing the Nation for Wan Efforts to Establish a National Propaganda Agency, 1940-41," American Historical Review vol. 75 (1970): 1640-53.
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Patrick Washburn, "The 'Pittsburgh Courieri and Black Workers in 1942." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication (AEJMC), Corvallis, Oregon, 1983.
Unpublished Studies
A. E. Barbeau, "The Black American Soldier in World War I," Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1970.
J. H. Holland, "A Study of Negroes Employed by the Sun Ship-building and Drydock
Company during World War II and Their Problems in the Post-war Period, Dissertation, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1950. 268
Anthony Newberry, "Without Urgency or Ardor: The South's Middle-of-the-Road Liberals and Civil Rights, 1945-1960," Dissertation, Ohio University, 1982.
Gerald W. Patton, "War and Race: The Black Officer in the American Military 1915- 1925," Dissertation, Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa, 1978.
"Report on Gillem Policy Board and Implementation," Study in the Records of President’s Committee on Equality of T reatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO, 1947.
Eugene Francis Schmidtlein, “Truman the Senator,” Dissertation, University of Missouri (reproduced by Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms), 1962.
B. R. Skinner, "The Double 'V': The Impact of World War II on Black America," Dissertation, Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1978.
Books
Herbert H. Apthekar, A Documentary History of the Negro People in the United States.
vol. 4 . New York: Citadel Publishing, 1974.
William D. Barnard, Dixiecrats and Democrats: Alabama Politics. 1942-1950 . Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1974.
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iges . Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 970.
Numan V. Bartley and Hugh Graham, Southern Politics and the Second Reconstruction. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975.
Jack Bass and Walter DeVries. The Transformation of Southern Politics: Social
Change and Political Consequence since 1945 . New York: Basic Books, 1976.
John R. Beishline, Military Management for National Defense . New York: Prentice- Hall, 1950.
William C. Berman, The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration . Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1970.
C. Joseph Bernardo and Eugene H. Bacon, American Military Policy: Its Development Since 1775. 2nd ed. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1961.
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Barton J. Bernstein and Alan Matusow, (eds.) The Truman Administration: A
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Leo Bogart, Social Research and the Desegregation of the U.S. Army . Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1969.
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Caucasian, Although he has never served in the United States military and is a
Even as a boy, Alan Fried has had a long and abiding interest in the civil rights struggle.
Riders, the Southern he avidly followed and admired the great work of the Freedom
Christian Leadership Council and other civil rights organizations.
advertising in the Fried has never worked as a journalist, either. He did write copy
Petersburg Times and sales promotion departments of the Chicago Sun-Times, The St.
the the Lakeland Ledger. He received his Bachelor of Science in broadcasting at
University of Illinois in University of Southern Illinois in 1972, his Master of Science at the
in mass advertising in 1975 and, in 1989, he decided to obtain his doctorate
the only way out. communications at the University of Florida. At the time, it seemed
his family moved to Park He was bom in Detroit, Michigan, in 1950 and in 1954
century ago, and the last Forest, Illinois. Though he moved from there more than a quarter
Park Forest home. He of his relatives left there a decade and a half ago, he still considers
graduate course in library is currently teaching undergraduate courses in advertising and a
resources for mass communication at the University of South Carolina.
277 opinion it conforms to acceptable I certify that I have read this study and that in my standards of scholarly presentation and is fully ade^ate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy/
David Ostroff, Chair Professor of Joumalisi Communications
that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable I this and I certify that have read study standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy___^ 'U* Robert Kendc Professor of Journalism and Communications
it conforms to acceptable I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy*
William McKeen Associate Professor of Journalism and Communications
it I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosopbyx /)
David Colburn Professor of History it I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. _
Richard Scher Associate Professor of Political Science
This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the College of Journalism and Communications and to the Graduate School and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
April, 1994
Communications
Dean, Graduate School