UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

In the National Interest - Borden and the Siberian Intervention, 1918-19

by

Lucas Stephen Thomas Ker

A THESIS

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JULY 2011

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1*1 Canada II

ABSTRACT

In August of 1918, the Canadian government authorized the Canadian Siberian

Expeditionary Force to proceed to Vladivostok as part of a larger Allied mission. While the majority of literature the expedition has inspired views it as a failure, the military objectives of the mission - victory in World War One - had been achieved before the main body ever arrived. The real story of the intervention in Siberia, however, is not a military one. Created and maintained almost exclusively through the effort of Prime Minister Robert Borden in an atmosphere of rising social unrest, the Canadian Siberian Expeditionary Force was sent to further Canadian national interests. Although it was accompanied by an economic commission in an attempt to further the Canadian export economy, the principal reason for

Borden's sending a 4,192 Canadians to a new military Front was to demonstrate growing national autonomy and Canada's emergence as a nation in the international arena.1

The definition of autonomy as independence from Britain was not how the term was understood by the vast majority of Canadians, including Borden, in 1918. Instead, autonomy was seen as Canadian equality within the British Empire, complete with self-government and a voice in foreign affairs. This is how the term is used throughout this paper. Ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract II

Table of Contents Ill

List of Abbreviations IV

Introduction 1

Chapter One 9

Chapter Two 38

Chapter Three 66

Conclusion 94

Bibliography 99 IV

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CSEF - Canadian Siberian Expeditionary Force

LAC - Library and Archives Canada

MP - Member of Parliament

NAUK - National Archives United Kingdom

POW-Prisoner of War

TLC - Trades and Labour Congress 1

INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 1990, Captain Thomas Charles Heath, Commander of the Second

Canadian Destroyer Squadron and Task Group Commander, entered the Soviet port of

Vladivostok. With three Canadian destroyers and the HMCS Provider, an oiler and replenishment ship, Heath and the 1200 Canadian men and women under his command where the first foreign nationals to visit the area, outside of some North Koreans, since it had been designated as a closed military city.

The visit was a festive affair. Official lunches and dinners were a regular occurrence among the officers, the Canadian band preformed daily, and Heath was even interviewed for Soviet Television on multiple occasions. Nearly 10,000 civilians had lined the pier to take in the arrival of the ships and showered the foreign visitors with questions on their lifestyle, clothing, and entertainment, even inviting them into their homes. According to

Heath they were treated like celebrities.

The trip was not solely made up of pleasantries, however. Vladivostok had been closed to foreign visitors for well over half a century, and as the Soviet Union's principal naval base on the Pacific Ocean, there was a great deal of valuable intelligence to be gathered. The United States Navy, which would be visiting the city in September, was also very much interested in Canada's mission, and to complement his detailed daily reports based on his own observations and regular crew debriefings, Heath and his staff provided as much film to those with cameras as they could shoot. In the end, approximately 400 rolls of 35 mm Polaroid slide film were shot by his crew in their jaunts through the town, with

2 Thomas Heath, Interviewed by Lucas Ker, April 12, 2011. 2 the pictures eventually ending up in the hands of Canadian and American intelligence agencies.

Among the Canadian photographers was the squadron's padre. After developing a strong relationship with the local populace by giving out as many bibles as he could requisition, this man, whose name Heath could not remember, was led to a small, poorly kept cemetery on a wooded hill on the Churkin Peninsula. Here, amid the brambles, lay 14

Canadian graves, their wooden markers askew or knocked over, obscured with graffiti, and suffering under the rot and wear of 71 years."

These graves, which had lain forgotten since 1919, belonged to soldiers of the

Canadian Siberian Expeditionary Force (hereafter CSEF), Canada's brief and ill-fated contribution to a larger Allied interventionist force which occupied Vladivostok and the surrounding area at the end of World War One. Championed by the French and British leaders, Georges Clemenceau and David Lloyd George, who were desperate to relieve some of the pressure on their exhausted armies, the force was originally designed to enter

Eastern Russia and help to reconstruct the Eastern Front. As an international contingent made up of representatives from Canada, Britain, France, the United States, Italy and

Japan, however, the expedition was almost immediately embroiled in political conflict with the major sides attempting to pursue their own agendas.

For his part, Prime Minister Robert Laird Borden had committed troops alongside those of the British with a set agenda of his own. Yet Borden's agenda had its roots before the War. On entering WWI, Borden and his government had three key goals for their nation: to demonstrate their loyalty to the British Empire, to encourage Canadian economic

3 Benjamin Isitt, "Evacuation." Canada's Siberian Expedition. htlp://www.siberianexpedition.ca/index.php (accessed May 5, 2011). 3 growth, and to advance Canadian autonomy, not in the sense of a separate nation, but as equals within the British Empire with a voice in foreign affairs. To these three goals would be added a fourth as well, the necessity for a closer relationship with their geographic neighbour to the south, and along with this, political harmony between the United States and the British Empire as a whole.

By the closing stages of the war, Canada had achieved considerable success towards its goals, yet was still considered a junior ally by the major powers, and with an uncertain post-war economic situation looming, Borden desired further advancement. The national gains had come with a price, however. In the four years since 1914, the Canadian people had grown war weary. Rising prices had surpassed wage increases and a growth of labour tension and social awareness among the workers, especially in Western Canada, had spurred class conflict. On top of this, Borden's policies on conscription and his cancellation of exemptions had isolated Quebec and caused a great deal of unrest among the French- speaking majority as well as further outraging the English-Canadian working class.

The advent of the intervention in Siberia provided Borden with the perfect opportunity to further his nation's newfound autonomy, and in spite of the growing unrest within Canada, he took it. In the Siberian arena, Borden's four national goals were present and more closely interwoven - and at times more contradictory - than any other instance brought about by the war. By committing troops at Britain's request he was demonstrating

Canada's continued loyalty, yet by securing independant Canadian leadership and the administration of the CSEF from Ottawa, it was more importantly a demonstration of national equality and autonomy within the Empire. With the United States involved, too,

4 George Gaddis Smith, "Nation and Empire: Canadian Diplomacy During the First World War," (PhD diss, Yale University, 1960), iii. 4 the Siberian intervention also provided Canada another opportunity to further its international relationship with its neighbour. Lastly, the material needs and immense economic possibilities of Siberia could, if cultivated correctly, provide Canada with a valuable trading partner for years to come, and in the short term, help to neutralize the expected post-war economic downturn.

When Borden agreed to play a role in Siberia, he did so with the best interests of his nation in mind and continued to work for his nation's benefit at every turn. Yet the timing of the intervention could not have been worse. The chaos of the situation in Russia precluded the development of any substantial trade relationships, and after the armistice, the growing working class unrest would be focused on Canadian troops in Siberia as many had been conscripted. As well as this, Borden's cabinet had only reluctantly agreed to send the CSEF in the first place and proved overly hesitant to take any further action during the following months. In the end it was a combination of these factors which led to Borden ordering the force's withdrawal. Although little progress was made militarily or economically, the force had played an important international role. Through it, Borden was able to demonstrate a new national identity and autonomy and strengthen his claim for a

Canadian seat among the nations of the world at the Paris Peace Conference.

Just as Borden's international and economic policies can be studied through the actions of the CSEF and the Canadian Economic Commission which was ordered to proceed alongside it, so too can the force be used to provide insight into the growing social unrest in Canada. The CSEF itself, with its high percentage of conscripts including many

French-Canadians, was surrounded by a perennial cloud of unrest, and when studying the interactions between the force and its officers, labour radicals, and finally the government's 5 reaction to all of it, a great deal can be learned as to the overall social and political situation in Canada.

Yet in spite of its unique circumstances, for the most part the CSEF has been ignored or forgotten by Canadian historians. The mud, blood, and roaring guns of WWI battlefields have provided much more compelling studies than the stasis in Siberia, and the immediate results seen at Vimy Ridge and during the Last Hundred Days are easier to quantify than the relatively intangible nature of Canadian nationalism and autonomy.

G.W.L. Nicholson's official history of Canadian efforts in WWI dedicates a mere six and a half pages to the military and political actions surrounding the CSEF. Originally published in 1962 at the height of the cold war, Nicholson concluded that "intervention in

Siberia must be regarded as a complete failure."3 His assumption that the activities of the force after the armistice were aimed towards deposing the Bolsheviks, however, is false.

Although several key policy makers in Britain and Canada were ardent anti-Bolsheviks who were very leery of the communist influences emanating from Russia, throughout the entire process Borden remained a proponent of national self-determination as expressed by the American President Woodrow Wilson.

In spite of its faults and its brevity, Nicholson's account has had a large influence on the historiography of the CSEF. The perceived failure of the mission, not to mention its minor nature, kept many authors away from the subject, and even after other monographs had been written on the topic, still influenced authors such as Robert Craig Brown, whose biography of Robert Laird Borden published in 1980 makes only passing references to the

CSEF. As an event wherein Borden played such a defining role and had invested so many

G.W.L. Nicholson, Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War: Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919. (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1962), 523. 6 hopes for his nation, Brown's reluctance to include it in his narrative is perplexing.

Throughout his book, Brown works hard to paint Canada's eighth Prime Minister as a nation-builder and by neglecting this vital episode, for whatever reason, he is missing an important chapter in both the biography of Robert Laird Borden and of Canada itself.

In an effort to broaden the account given by Nicholson, John Swettenham published his monograph Allied Intervention in Russia 1918-1919: And the Part Played by Canada in

1967. As the title suggests, however, this is not a history of Canada in Russia let alone in

Siberia. Although he reviewed many of the primary sources, Swettenham's material on

Canadian involvement is scant. This is primarily a history of the Russian Revolution and the responses of the major Allied nations to the situation from late 1917 onward, with the actions of the Canadian forces and government a sidebar. Also writing in the 1960s, he chose to follow Nicholson's conclusions as to the anti-Bolshevik nature of the force and thus shared his views on the failure of the Canadian intervention. Yet in Swettenham's portrayal Canada is little more than a passive participant in the larger events, and as such, avoids much of the blame.

The author who comes closest to capturing the story of the CSEF is the popular historian Roy MacLaren. In Canadians in Russia, 1918-1919 published in 1976, MacLaren rejected the anti-Bolshevik conclusions surrounding the deployment of the Allied force and was thus much less inclined to view the expedition as a failure. MacLaren's sole focus was on the Canadian aspect of the intervention and as a result he was able to identify the

Canadian government and Prime Minister Borden in particular, as key players among the

Allied policy makers. In his examinations of the currents which led toward involvement,

MacLaren identified important economic and political advantages that intervention in

Siberia presented for Canada. Finally, MacLaren looked at the steadily increasing 7

'nationalism' among Canadians and identifies the CSEF as an important stepping stone

towards Canadian autonomy.

Where his monograph suffers, however, is through a lack of the social history which

is connected with the CSEF. Although he stated in his preface that one of the goals of the

book was "to convey something of how it must have felt to be sent to Russia at the time,"

MacLaren's representation is very one sided. Very little is written on the considerable

resentment present among conscripts and even less on how the CSEF was viewed by

workers and labour organizations in Canada. In an effort to erase the negative bias

surrounding the topic, MacLaren went too far in the opposite direction, neglecting much of

the considerable controversy attached to the CSEF.

In the latest monograph on the CSEF, a lack of social and labour history is certainly

not the issue. Benjamin Isitt's From Victoria to Vladivostok: Canada's Siberian

Expedition, 1917-19 published in 2010 is just that - an examination of the CSEF through

the lens of labour history. Although it is by far the most meticulously researched

monograph to date, Isitt's examination of the events in both of the title cities leaves plenty

to be desired. To begin with, although he is not debating the success or failure of the

mission, he does return to Nicholson's conclusions in that he views the CSEF as part of the

capitalist agenda to defeat Bolshevism and correlates the Canadian government's efforts in

Siberia with their attempted suppression of socialism at home.

In his efforts to prove his argument, Isitt is also guilty of an overreliance on

questionable source material. To support many of his points he takes anything printed in the

BC Federationist - the bulletin published by the socialist BC Federation of Labour which

was twice considered for official censorship and accused by more than one source of

6 Roy MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, 1928-1919, (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1976), vii. 8 blackmail7 - as fact. Along with this, in his description of events, Isitt focuses almost entirely on Victoria with little context from the remainder of the country.

Although each of the available studies has brought something new to the table, the complete story of the CSEF has yet to be written. MacLaren's work has come the closest, yet it lacks the in-depth investigation of resources demonstrated through Isitt's work as well as a deeper analysis of the impact the enterprise had on Canada's labour history. Although

MacLaren was also able to identify Borden as a key participant, he misses the full extent of the Prime Minister's activities which, in the face of skepticism from his cabinet, forced him to create and maintain the force almost entirely through his own efforts. Once his goals had been obtained, too, Borden would be the driving force to secure the withdrawal of the

CSEF; single-handedly authoring an important chapter in Canada's struggle toward national autonomy.

7 Peter Weinrich, "The Censor and the BC Federationist 1916-1919." Bulletin of the Committee on Canadian Labour History, No.7 (Spring 1979): 6-9, hllp://www.jstor.org.ezproxy,lib.ucalgary.ca/slablc/25093623. 9

CHAPTER ONE

At noon on December 17, 1917 the guns along the Eastern Front fell silent. Russian withdrawal from the war, something Allied leaders had feared from the moment the

Bolsheviks seized power in Petrograd, had come about and the gears which would send

4,192 Canadians to Siberia were set into motion.

At the beginning of December the British and French had already agreed to support anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia, military supplies en-route to Russia were halted including

31,700 tons of heavy equipment in Vancouver, and tentative funding was even extended to

General Mikhail Alekseev, former Chief of Staff to Tsar Nicholas II, and General Alexei

Kaledin of the Don Cossacks.8 Yet with the cease-fire now a reality, actions began in earnest. Russia was divided into spheres in which the two Allied powers would endeavor to aid anti-Bolshevik forces, and by January 1st, 1918 a proposal for an interventionist force in Vladivostok was sent to, and rejected by, President Woodrow Wilson of the United

States - the first of several such rejections the Allies would receive from Wilson leading up to the summer.

As the months wore on, the situation on the Western Front decidedly worsened for the Allies, and at each turn the simplest solution seemed to lie with Russia and the Eastern

Front. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, signed on March 3rd, cemented Russia's role as a non- combatant, and the terms of the deal granted the German army access to 89 per cent of

John Swettenham. Allied Intervention in Russia 1918-1919 And the Paret Played by Canada, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1967) 33, 39. 10

Russia's coal production and 32 percent of her agricultural land. If exploited correctly these raw materials could effectively negate the British blockade.9 As well as this, although rested formations of battle-hardened German troops had been steadily streaming westward since December, a further one million soldiers in 50 divisions with an additional 50,000 guns had now been made free for immediate deployment to France.

Taking full advantage of these operational superiorities, the Germans attacked in the west. On March 21st at 4:40 am Operation Michael began. Making use of infiltrating storm troops and emphasizing momentum, over the next 16 days the Germans captured 1,200 square miles of territory, pushing the Allied lines back 40 miles, capturing 975 guns and inflicting over 245,000 casualties, mostly at the expense of the British. Although the objectives of Operation Michael had not been met - splitting the French and British armies and driving the later into the sea - the Germans would remain on the offensive until July.

Despite the fact that the German army had suffered devastating losses themselves, the reality of the German physical advance weighed heavily on the minds of the political leaders.10

In the meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet which had taken place in the spring of

1918, it had been taken as evident that the war would not end until 1919 when the full power of American involvement would be felt, and in all probability there would still be fighting in 1920. The setbacks in the spring of 1918 confirmed these ideas, yet added to them was now the fear that unless the Eastern Front was re-opened to split the German forces again and alleviate some of the pressure on the Western Front, the Allies might not

Clifford Kinvig, Churchill's Crusade: The British Invasion of Russia, 1918-1920, (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2006), 11. 10 National Archives United Kingdom (hereafter NAUK), The Cabinet Papers 1915-1980. CAB 23 First World War conclusions, online. War Cabinet Papers (438-479 inclusive), War Cabinet, 18, June 18, 1918. http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/cabinet-gov/cab23-first-world-war- conclusions.htm#Imperial%20War%20Cabinet%20Minutes 11 last that long. The British and French, already stretched thin on the Western front, could not man a force large enough to make an impact in Eastern Russia, and although the Japanese were able, willing, and geographically positioned to move quickly, the negative sentiments existing between Russia and the Japanese as a result of the 1905 Russo-Japanese War precluded the idea of a principally Japanese interventionist force. The best option was clearly a truly Allied initiative: one which involved the Americans.

In spite of increasingly desperate requests for action by the British, the Americans stood firm. Suspicious of British intentions to establish a reactionary government in

Siberia, and distrustful of the Japanese hegemonic interests in the area, Wilson refused to get involved.11 Yet with a mission in Vladivostok reporting steadily worsening conditions in the city, Britain would not sit idle. In mid-January H.M.S. Suffolk and two Japanese cruisers, the Iwami and Asahi, arrived in the harbour and, although Washington still resisted intervention, the U.S.S Brooklyn joined them in February to further the American policy of maintaining the established balance of power.12

What followed was a hesitant stand-off. The Bolsheviks who had seized the city on the 18th of November and been elected to a majority in the local soviet in the beginning of

December tolerated foreign civilians in the city, yet grew increasingly resentful of the naval presence in the harbour. The Allies, for their part, were highly suspicious of the Bolsheviks.

Civilians within the city complained that normal business and trade relations were disrupted with the change of government and reported the Vladivostok Bolsheviks were

11 NAUK, The Cabinet Papers 1915-1980. CAB 23 First World War conclusions, online. War Cabinet Papers (438-479 inclusive), War Cabinet, 450, July 22, 1918. Swettenham. Allied Intervention in Russia 1918-1919. 114. 12

1 -3 sending an estimated 40 carloads of stockpiled goods westward each day. " This material was part of an estimated 648,000 tons of ammunition, guns, tracks, and other war stuffs ordered by the Tsarist Government and stored haphazardly throughout the city.1 Although the goods were being sent to aid the new and vulnerable Bolshevik forces in central Russia, not formally a hostile power, the Allies were deeply distrustful of the Bolshevik relationship with Germany and could not risk their falling into enemy hands.

Just as on March 6th the British had landed troops in Murmansk in Northern Russia to 'protect' war supplies there, so too were they anxious to protect the goods in

Vladivostok, and actively looked for an excuse to stop the transfer. On April 5th, 1918 the day after two Japanese nationals were killed in the city, 500 Japanese marines closely followed by 50 British marines landed to protect the civilian population and took control of the city. To Wilson, hesitantly observing, it became very apparent that intervention would proceed with or without his participation, and without American troops, the Japanese would have a free hand to pursue their economic and territorial interests in the area.15 Although this is considered by historians such as Isitt to be the first stage of active intervention,16 the

British and Japanese would vacate the city by the end of the month, leaving the Bolsheviks to re-assume power.

The final piece of the interventionist puzzle would be a legion of Czecho-Slovak troops working their way to Vladivostok from the now abandoned Eastern Front along the

Trans-Siberian Railroad. This force, which fluctuated greatly throughout the months as it 13 Alexander MacBain Cameron, "Padre in Siberia: The Edited Diary of Reverend Captain George Farquhar's Experiences with the Canadian Siberian Expeditionary Force in Vladivostock [sic] and with the l/9th Battalion of the British Hampshire Regiment in Omsk 1918-1919," (BA Thesis, Mount Allison University, 1982), 86. 14 MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, 125. Swettenham. Allied Intervention in Russia, 116. 16 Benjamin Isitt, From Victoria to Vladivostok: Canada's Siberian Expedition, 1917-19, (Vancouver, UBC Press, 2010), 57-58. 13 picked up deserters and POWs, peaking at nearly 70,000 well armed and organized soldiers, represented something different to each of the Western Allies. The movement of the Czecho-Slovak Legion across Russia had initially been peaceful. The Czechs had no quarrel with the Russians, desiring only to be extracted from the country in order to go the

Western Front where they might fight the Austro-Hungarians and Germans in the hope of earning national recognition at the war's close. Yet in late May, Lenin, under pressure from

Germany and concerned with an organized pro-western force occupying such a strategic location, attempted to have them disarmed, declaring that "every armed Czechoslovak found on the railway is to be shot on the spot."17 Instead of laying down their weapons the

Czechs did exactly what Lenin most feared and seized control of the Trans-Siberian

Railroad east of the Ural Mountains. Their size and military efficiency easily overpowered any local Bolshevik groups, and by June 29l , a detachment had made its way to

Vladivostok and seized the city.

To the French, the Czecho-Slovak Legion was a fresh source of manpower to be transferred to the Western Front in order to give some respite to their own beleaguered troops. Although the British had similar visions initially, to them the potential for the

Czechs evolved into what could be used as the nucleus of a force which, augmented by the

Russians themselves, could spread westward to re-create the Eastern Front.18 Yet most importantly, the Czech Legion represented an oppressed people fighting for freedom and self-determination. Although this was universally appreciated by the Allies, it appealed to no one more than President Wilson of the United States who, along with every other Allied leader, could now sell the idea of a 'rescue mission' to his people. One week after the

MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, 133. MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, 130. and Swettenham, Allied Intervention in Russia, 94. 14

Czechs seized Vladivostok Wilson agreed that American troops would be sent to Siberia to take part in limited intervention, ostensibly to save the plucky Czechs.19

To Canadian Prime Minister Robert Laird Borden, the Czecho-Slovak Legion was much less of a concern. Although he and his cabinet would sell the public on the image of valiant Czech forces holed up in a hostile land, defending themselves against the aggression of the Bolsheviks and the millions of now free German and Austro-Hungarian POWs,20

Canadian interests in Siberia lay elsewhere. For Borden, who represented the driving force behind Canadian involvement, sending troops to Siberia was motivated by three principle factors: a genuine desire to end the war as quickly as possible, opportunism in pursuance of national economic gain, and most importantly, as a means for Canada to demonstrate its emerging status as an autonomous member of the British Empire on the international stage.

Of the three motivating factors, Borden was arguably the least knowledgeable on military affairs. Canadian trade interests and international prestige were somewhat interwoven, and Borden had a long history of direct involvement in both. In these matters he was able to largely follow his own advice, yet on military matters he willingly deferred to the experts. For much of the war, Borden and the rest of the Canadian parliament were uninvolved in matters of military strategy and logistics. It was not until David Lloyd

George came to power in December 1916 and his subsequent creation of the Imperial War

Cabinet that Borden was put into a position to have a voice in Allied strategy and war aims.

Yet in spite of this new voice Borden chose to follow Lloyd George's lead in military

Ilya Somin, Stillborn Crusade: The Tragic Failure of Western Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1918- 1920, (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1996), 12. Swettenham, Allied Intervention in Russia, 36. 15 matters, using the meetings in March and April 1917 to instead advance his political agenda.

Although he may not have had the interest or ability to make an impact militarily, there can be no doubt as to Borden's devotion to the men in the field. At every opportunity when visiting England, Borden would extend his visits to include thorough inspections of military hospitals and trips to the Front. These visits truly touched him and his diaries and letters home were filled with praise for the soldiers.22 When Borden did get involved it was with the best interests of the Canadian troops in mind that he made decisions. Although mostly a political decision, the dismissal of Sam Hughes as Minister of Militia and Defence in late 1916 was also influenced by a litany of decisions the latter had made which had complicated, and even endangered, the lives of Canadian soldiers. Borden had been loyal to his controversial minister to a fault, but when notified by Colonel G.H. Bradbury, a

Conservative MP serving in France, that Hughes "was a major liability among the troops," he began the process of removing any sort of military responsibility from his erstwhile friend. With each increase in Canada's troop commitment too, and with the extremely controversial decision to proceed with conscription, Borden worked to ensure that the

Canadian troops already in action would have the reinforcements and support they needed.

Finally, in the summer of 1918 when Borden took his much lauded stand against the ineptitude of the Allied High Command, on the advice of Canada's top general, Arthur

Currie, he did so to protect the lives of Canadian troops which he thought were being needlessly squandered. This same interest in the lives of his nation's soldiers can be seen in

21 Robert Craig Brown, Robert Laird Borden a Biography: Volume II: 1914-1937. (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1980), 79. Craig Brown, Robert Laird Borden, 72. 23 Desmond Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics: Canada's Overseas Ministry in the First World War, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), 88. 16 the decision to send troops to Siberia, and as in the previously cited examples, Borden relied heavily on the advice of military experts and refused to shy away from controversy.

Borden arrived in London for the second round of Imperial War Cabinet meetings in June 1918. By the time these opened on the 11th, was in possession for the first time of a lengthy memorandum on intervention in Russia. This memorandum, sent to Borden by his personal friend Leopold Amery, a tactic that ensured it received extra attention, was penned by one of the leading British authorities on the area, General Alfred Knox.24 Knox preached the urgency of the situation in the face of a strengthening Germany, and almost disregarding the Bolsheviks entirely, provided a very optimistic assessment of the Russian reaction should a force be sent.25 That same day, seated with the other Cabinet representatives at the first meeting, Borden heard the full extent of the Allied setbacks that had occurred since their meeting in the early spring. As Lloyd George put it, the situation was "critical;"26 not only was victory a distant object, but there was a distinct possibility of defeat.

Armed with devastating reports on the Western Front from both Lloyd George and

General Currie, and with an obvious alternative available, one that could potentially shorten the war, save Canadian lives, and most importantly bring victory, the course was clear for

Borden. He was in possession of the latest information, all from highly respected sources, and militarily, it all pointed to Vladivostok.

Yet, as mentioned, military considerations were only one of three principal factors influencing Borden's decision to mobilize Canadian forces for Siberia. The second factor

MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, 135. 25 Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 55089, Mflm C- 4332. Amery to Borden, June 11, 1918. Craig Brown, Robert Laird Borden, 135. 17 was Canada's economy. As George Gaddis Smith put it, "No area of the world had been looked on between 1914 and 1918 as having greater potential for the development of future

Canadian markets."27 Although it certainly peaked during the war with Borden getting directly involved in promoting his nation's cause, Canadian economic interest in Russia had begun much earlier. In 1896 Canadian exports to Russia measured only $16,000, yet due to the geographic advantages and the fact that it was already a market for British

Columbia lumber, in both 1900 and 1901 the B.C. Board of Trade attempted to persuade the Minister of Trade and Commerce to organize a commission to investigate the

no possibilities of expanding trade.

Any further speculation at the time was halted by the Russo-Japanese War and although the interest was there on the part of Canadian manufacturers, by 1913, of the

$760,000,000 worth of imports into Russia, Canada's share was just over two million dollars. Nearly half of Russian imports were supplied by Germany, and through the mercantile firm Kunst and Albers, which greatly resembled the Hudson's Bay Company, the market in Siberia was effectively cornered.29 In spite of this, Borden himself was already involved in trying to bolster trade relations. When a Mr. I.M. Goldstein was sent by the Imperial Russian Government to study Canadian industry, commerce, and agriculture,

Borden personally saw that he was furnished with adequate letters of introduction to ensure that his trip was fruitful. But as Prince Imeretinsky put it in a letter to George Perley, the

Gaddis Smith, Nation and Empire, 328. 28 LAC, RG20, Vol. 1215, File 7072, December 12, 1900. And, LAC, RG20, Vol. 1222, File 7228, April 26, 1901. 29 Isitt, From Victoria to Vladivostok, 39-40. 18

Canadian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, most Russians were unaware of the existence of Canada and those who did know considered it a part of the United States.30

Yet with the outbreak of war all existing trade patterns in Russia were shattered.

Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire were now Russia's enemies, and Canadian politicians and manufacturers were determined to get their share of the Russian import market now available. Before the end of September the earlier sentiments of the B.C. Board of Trade were re-ignited by the Canadian Manufacturer's Association which began to lobby the Department of Trade and Commerce for "a small commission [...] to spy out the land, open negotiations in official quarters and make the acquaintance of the well established distributing houses in [...] Petrograd, Moscow and Odessa,"31 a sentiment echoed by several other local trade boards and individual businesses from across the country over the following months. Although George Foster, the Minister of Trade and Commerce, issued special bulletins and reports on the trade opportunities for Canadian firms in Russia, with an emphasis in Siberia, and even approached J. Macintosh Bell to act as a trade commissioner to that country, no official position was created until 1916 when C.F. Just and Dana Wilgress were stationed as trade commissioners in Petrograd and Omsk, respectively.

Throughout the course of the war, starting as early as December with a contract for

20,000 saddles, Canadian firms and manufacturers would provide Russia with a plethora of wartime products including ammunition, railway cars and materials, and even snowshoes and submarines.32 At every stage along the way Borden maintained his direct involvement.

He was informed of nearly every contract received by Canadian firms and continually

30 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 14654, Mflm C-4229. Imeretinsky to Perley, October 7, 1915. 31 LAC, MG27 IID7, Vol. 16, File 1394, Russia Trade, November 12, 1914. Isitt, From Victoria to Vladivostok, 40. 19 lobbied the British Foreign Office which represented Canada in Russia to push for more.

On one occasion when the Canadian Car and Foundary Company that was responsible for a considerable Russian shell order failed to deliver, Borden inserted himself directly into the center of the conflict, at first to attempt to salvage the situation, and then to ensure that the industrial reputation of the entire nation was not sullied by the affair.33 As well, Borden was instrumental in bringing a separate Russian purchasing commission to Canada in 1917 which, although short-lived, helped to actually increase Canadian exports to Russia after the February Revolution brought the Provisional Government to power in St. Petersburg.34

Yet, Borden was not content to serve only as a wartime trade partner with Russia.

Although shortly after they came to power the Bolsheviks repudiated approximately 13 billion dollars in foreign loans and all Allied imports into the nation had been halted by the summer of 1918, Borden could still see a great deal of economic opportunity if not in

Russia, than in Siberia, the staging point of the proposed Allied intervention. Amid almost weekly reports of the imminent collapse of Lenin's government being reported in the major

Canadian newspapers, no one expected the Bolshevik Revolution to last, and, with help from the Czecho-Slovak Legion, the main Siberian cities were already in the hands of anti-

Bolshevik White Russian forces who were desperately seeking financial and military aid.

Just as earlier in the war he had jumped at the chance to ingratiate his nation in the minds of the Russian people by the funding of 100 hospital beds for the Eastern Front,35 again

Borden saw an opportunity to increase the Canadian reputation in Russia, but more importantly, in Siberia, the market that had been repeatedly singled out for Canadian expansion for many years. As he stated to Major-General S.C. Mewburn, Minister of

33 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 24431, Mflm C-4239. Flavelle to Perley, May 31, 1916. 34 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 27328, Mflm C-4242. Borden to Foster, February 10, 1917. 35 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 27213, Mflm C-4239. Borden to Long, November 3, 1915. 20

Militia and Defence, "Intimate relations with that rapidly developing country will be of great advantage to Canada in the future. Other nations will make very vigorous and determined efforts to obtain a foothold and our interposition with a small military force would tend to bring Canada into favourable notice by the strongest elements in that great community."

Before the war Canada had been crippled by two consecutive economic depressions from 1907 to 1908 and again from 1913 to 1915, with the booming wartime economy being the principal reason for the end of the latter.37 To prevent another such depression which would very likely occur with the slump in demand following the war, the Canadian government was desperately seeking new markets to absorb surplus Canadian goods, especially those from the greatly increased heavy industry sector. Although the war was . still underway, economic reports released in the summer of 1918 already indicated a decrease of almost two hundred million dollars in Canadian trade from the previous year.38

In a speech to the House of Commons in April of 1916, Foster noted that, along with the representatives in Omsk and St. Petersburg, at least one Canadian trade commissioner was touring South Africa, New Zealand, India, Australia, China, South America, and what was left of Belgium, and complex Special Trade Commissions were planned for France, Italy

in and the United Kingdom.

Although he had been directly involved in facilitating Russian trade as a whole much earlier, Borden began to seek advice on Siberia in particular as early as 1915, consulting the leading economic experts in the area. This process continued throughout the 36 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 56162, Mflm C-4333. Borden to Mewburn, August 13, 1918. 7 David J. Bercuson, Fools and Wise Men: The Rise and Fall of the One Big Union, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1978), 22. 38 "Statement Shows Decrease of $200,000,000 in Canadian Trade." Manitoba Free Press, August 15, 1918. Pg-4. 39 LAC, MG27 II D7, Vol. 77, Speeches - 1916 Development of Industry and Trade, April 18, 1916. 21 war, culminating in late 1917 with regular reports from J.M. Bell. The same man who had been forced to turn down the position of Canadian trade Commissioner to Siberia in 1914,

Bell was attached to the British Intelligence Mission in Vladivostok and in November and

December sent increasingly desperate messages to Borden and the Canadian Government warning of the quickly disappearing opportunity for Siberian trade as the Americans and

Japanese jockeyed for position.

By July of 1918 when he was making his decisions on sending a force, Borden was in possession of the latest economic information on Siberia. For the most part it was positive. In the picture painted for him by the top advisers available, Borden saw a land not unlike Western Canada. It was ripe with abundant natural resources and productive farmland and home to a population which had steadily been increasing due to an aggressive colonization program by the Russian Imperial Government before the war. And, with the advanced transportation systems such as the Trans-Siberian Railroad and navigable waterways, it would be easy to disseminate Canadian goods deep into the territory from the well-established harbor in Vladivostok. In addition, the considerable local animosity which existed among the Siberian people toward the Japanese and their products due to the Russo-

Japanese War gave Canada geographic and psychological advantages over all other competitors.

In an interview recorded much later in his life, Dana Wilgress, the Canadian Trade

Commissioner to Omsk and later a member of the Economic Commission to Vladivostok, stated that the principle motivation for military intervention in Siberia was economic gain.41

Roy MacLaren, one of the first historians to look at Siberian intervention from a truly

40L AC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 128260, Mflm C-4407. Borden to Foster, November 14, 1917. 41 "Canada and the Siberian Intervention, 1918-1919" c. 1970 episode of Tuesday Night (CBC Radio, Special Collections, University of Victoria). 22

Canadian perspective, also acknowledged that it played a significant role.42 It is true also that the original memorandum penned by Knox which introduced the idea of intervention to

Borden contained specific mention of the economic possibilities. Yet Knox went on to say that economic assistance in any form would not be enough, and while it appealed to commercial circles, any policy on intervention that did not include a military presence would "sacrifice the cause of freedom for which we are fighting in the interests of a few capitalists."43

For Borden, the inclusion of a military mission was vital and much more important than an economic mission, for through it the principal reason for Canadian intervention could be realized - Canadian autonomy. Of the three principal factors for intervention, demonstrating Canadian autonomy on the international stage was the most important to

Borden and had the single largest influence upon his actions over the following ten months.

Protecting Canadian troops was a personal matter, one for which ultimate responsibility was out of his hands. The economic health of the nation, too, was a matter for his ministers and the capitalist market, and although it could help to increase Canada's international prestige, success in this field could not change the status of Canada itself. Moving toward national autonomy, however, was a task that could fall to Borden alone. It was something he had begun working for since well before the war, and should he prove successful in his efforts, he could change the very idea of Canada itself.

Although Borden certainly pushed for Canadian autonomy, it was not through a desire for separateness from Great Britain. Harold Wilson describes him as having "a

MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, 139. LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 55089, Mflm C-4332. Amery to Borden, June 11, 1918. 23 respect for British institutions that almost approached reverence," and as shown through his unhesitating commitment of Canadian troops during World War I, demonstrating the nation's loyalty to the Empire was a priority. As he stated in a 1914 speech in Montreal:

"There is only one respect in which we in Canada have not yet attained self-government, and that is with regard to foreign relations."45 Borden had no desire for autonomy as it is understood today. In a nation where much of the population made no differentiation between what it meant to be Canadian and what it meant to be British, all Borden was working towards was to stand as equals with the other members of the British Empire, and through a voice in British politics, to be involved in matters of peace and war and thus determine for which causes Canadians would be sent to die.

It was this respect for and loyalty to the British Empire which helped Borden to win the 1911 election. The Reciprocal Trade Agreement proposed by Wilfrid Laurier and his

Liberal government which looked to bring about a much closer trade relationship between

Canada and the United States caused an incredible stir among Imperial Nationalists and those who feared annexation by Canada's neighbour to the south. As leader of the

Conservative Party at the time, Borden led the campaign against reciprocity, and by looking at the justification behind this political stance it is possible to see the wartime ideals which motivated him to send troops to Siberia in their infancy. As Gaddis Smith puts it;

By rejecting reciprocity [...] Canada would be demonstrating her loyal ties to the British Empire. By rejecting reciprocity Canada would be advancing the growth of her own self- sufficient economy, especially her industry. By rejecting reciprocity Canada would be standing on her own feet as a i • -46 young and vigorous nation.

44 Harold A. Wilson, The Imperial Policy of Sir Robert Borden, (Gainsville FL: University of Florida Press, 1966), 34. 45 Quoted in: Craig Brown, Robert Laird Borden, 23. 46 Gaddis Smith, "Nation and Empire," 64. 24

And lastly, by rejecting reciprocity, Borden helped his party to ride the wave of English-

Canadian patriotism into power.

As a newly elected Prime Minister, Borden took the first available opportunity to pursue his desire for a Canadian voice in the foreign policy of the British Empire. In the late summer of 1912 Borden traveled to London for negotiations on funding the British dreadnought program. Although the bill which resulted was eventually voted down in the

Canadian Senate, the process sheds light on Borden's sense of loyalty to the Empire and dedication to his nation's cause. In return for a $35,000,000 cash contribution toward

British dreadnoughts which would be named in honour of Canadian provinces, Borden had secured the promise that several smaller ships would be ordered for the British Royal Navy from Canadian dockyards, thus boosting internal industry. More importantly, however, the

British government would make a seat available to Canadian representatives on the

Committee of Imperial Defence. While this body did not control policy, it put Canada for the first time in a position of consultation, a sure step toward the ultimate goal.

As mentioned, the Canadian government headed by Borden unquestioningly followed Britain into World War One, and as the war progressed committed more and more troops. Although Borden deemed this contribution sufficiently large to gain a voice in

British war policy he was repeatedly rebuffed by Prime Minister Herbert Asquith. Yet when Asquith fell from power and David Lloyd George was named his successor in

December 1916 the political dynamic changed. To Borden's delight, one of the first actions of Lloyd George was to create the Imperial War Cabinet. As Borden described it in a speech to the Empire Parliamentary Association at the House of Commons before he left 25

Canada to attend, Ministers of the self-governing dominions would meet for the first time ever "on terms of equality."47

Although the Imperial War Cabinet was a wartime measure, Borden, supported by the other dominion leaders, was intent on prolonging the equality it afforded them. In an effort to achieve similar results as he had aimed for with the 1912 naval issue, Borden submitted Resolution IX to the Imperial War Cabinet which called for a readjustment of colonial relations. Standing together, but with Canada acting as the leading advocate, the dominions called for equal status and a voice in Imperial foreign policy. When the second round of Imperial War Cabinet meetings was called for June 1918, and a further round in late 1918 to discuss peace terms, it appeared as though these demands had been fulfilled.

Thus it was that in June 1918, the three issues Borden had been deeply involved in throughout the war were suddenly combined into one, a request by the British for a CSEF.

Having been consulted on the issue as he so desired, Roy MacLaren states that Borden's strong sense of responsibility prevented him from refusing the request, and now that he had equal status, it was up to him to show that his country deserved it. Thus, full of optimism for the military and economic potential of a mission to Siberia, and determined to prove Canada's worth as a new international power, Borden took the request to his cabinet.

It has been argued by historians such as Harold Wilson that, between the first two meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet, the inclusion of Liberal politicians into Borden's newly formed Unionist government forced him to move even further from Resolution IX to the point where he desired separation from the Empire, finding evidence of such a position

Robert Laird Borden, The War and the Future, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917), 144. MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, 139. 26 in his outburst against the British high command.49 This, however, is not the case. A detached lawyer at heart, Borden had never been a party man: his dedication was to his nation and he was not prone to making decisions based on emotion.50 Although he certainly advocated autonomy, Borden was content with Canada's newfound voice, a voice within the Empire. He had no need or desire for "revolutionary" concepts such as the complete independence colleagues like former Liberal Clifford Sifton were encouraging.51

The role Liberal Unionists may have played, however, was as a catalyst for

Borden's increasing political relationship with the United States, an issue which although separate from the three main principles, can be linked to Canada's new autonomous international position. Although this was exactly what Borden had campaigned against in the 1911 Reciprocity issue, by wartime the international situation had changed. Anglo-

American relations in 1916 had become obviously hostile due to American uncertainty over

British war aims and their blockade of Germany. Borden had initially stepped into the political standoff between the two countries as an intermediary, yet the extraordinary circumstances brought on by the war had also changed global lending and trade patterns.

By 1917 New York had supplanted London as the prime source for Canadian borrowing and a significant trade imbalance had developed. In a visit to Washington in 1918, after the

Unionist government had been formed, Borden was able to convince American Secretary of the Treasury, William McAdoo, to redress the situation by utilizing Canadian facilities and pooling the nations' resources in pursuance of mutual war aims.52 With the growing connection between the bordering nations, the tensions over Siberia between a hesitant

49 Wilson, The Imperial Policy of Sir Robert Borden, 48. 50 Gaddis Smith, "Nation and Empire," 19. 51 Craig Brown, Robert Laird Borden, 82. 52 Robert Craig Brown and Ramsay Cook, Canada 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed, (Toronto: McCelland and Stewart Limited, 1974), 276-277. 27

Wilson and an adamant Lloyd George could not be ignored. The fact that Japan and Britain were bound through the Anglo-Japanese Alliance further complicated matters, and the fierce territorial rivalries between the Pacific powers might upset the fragile balance

Canada was attempting to establish between her allies, or even put her in the position of having to take sides between the two parties.

Borden had been formally asked for Canadian troops on July 10th, 1918 and upon submitting the request to his cabinet, defining the Canadian political position in regards to the United States and the British and Japanese alliance was one of the first questions asked.

Borden, being in London, was forced to communicate slowly and briefly using cables, resulting in many debates being confused, unfocused, and often out of date by the time the cables were received by the other party. Although early Unionist cabinet meetings were described as informal and relaxed, it was Borden who had made the decisions as "very few issues were put to a vote."53 This was so much the case that Foster, one of the most veteran members of Borden's cabinet, was prompted to write in his diary in February of 1918 that

"Government is getting to be too much a one man Government.. .There is too much inequality in the Cabinet - the head too dominant and the members too restrained."54 There were also several cabinet members whom Borden viewed with distrust if not contempt,55 a situation he would try and right on his return to Canada with a cabinet shuffle. In July, however, without his steadying influence, his cabinet was often querulous and inconsistent, regretting and rethinking decisions on Siberia from day to day, a trend which would continue whenever he was abroad. Although several concerns emanated from his cabinet,

Craig Brown, Robert Laird Borden, 131. 5 Quoted in MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, 167. 55 Borden viewed his Minister of Labour Thomas Crothers as "useless" and disposed of him at the earliest opportunity, Craig Brown, Robert Laird Borden, 167. Also, although he stayed on as he was Canada's most experienced politician, the Minister of Trade and Commerce George Foster and Borden had never worked well together, Gaddis Smith, "Nation and Empire," 45. 28 none were more pointed than concerns that for no definite national benefit in their eyes,

Canada "might have to elect between antagonizing either the United States or Britain."56

With a great deal of time being spent in debate as Borden attempted to answer the queries of his cabinet, the British government grew impatient. In an attempt to speed up the process the Governor General was called upon to intervene directly with the cabinet. On hearing of it Borden was furious, both at the affront to his position as Prime Minister and the apparent relapse into old colonial patterns after the newly won equality. In a terse and strongly worded cable to his cabinet he stated that "no reply shall be sent to the British

Government's message except through me."57 If the Siberian Expedition was to be a statement of Canadian nationhood and emergence into the realm of international politics, then the old patterns of diplomacy would have to end.

Although Borden's cabinet complied with his request and no further attempts were made by the British government to circumvent his authority, the original message had done its job. Three days after Borden's order, on July 28th, his cabinet gave him approval to make the arrangements, and, on his further bidding, penned the first of three Orders in

Council on August 12th authorizing the force. Canadian troops were going to Siberia.

In spite of their nominal agreement, Borden was still bombarded with concerns from his government. He had done little to calm their fears over contributing to a joint mission where the British, Americans, and Japanese all had different and often contradictory agendas, and now the reality of recruiting for that mission added further concerns. The conscription issue had already split the nation between the French and the

English. Riots in Quebec City that Easter, when it was enforced, had led to violent clashes

MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, 140-141. 57 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 56135, Mflm C-4333. Borden to Cabinet, July 25, 1918. 29 between soldiers and civilians. Also upset over conscription were Canadian workers and the trade unions which were steadily attracting more and more subscriptions, especially in the much more socialist and radical West. Resentful at being forced to fight against those they saw as their international brethren as well as anxious that military conscription could lead to industrial conscription, they had attempted to fight the policy through the electoral system, a plan originating from the central Canadian unions. When this measure failed a significant geographic rift had opened within the Trades and Labour Congress with the

Western unions still resentful and militant.58

The Siberian Expeditionary Force was intended to be made up of volunteers, yet conscription had originally been necessary due to the fact that fresh recruits had long since stopped coming forward of their own accord in any numbers. Although it was hoped that the draw of an exotic location and the potential for less immediate danger would act as motivators, in many areas such as Toronto, the vast majority of those who could enlist had already done so.59 There was little reason to believe the recruitment situation would be different for a different Front. None of Borden's cabinet were as aware of the issue as

Mewburn and the day after the order-in-council, when information had been released to the public, he voiced his concern. In a letter to Borden he asked "How will the public of

Canada view the raising of another force to be sent to another theatre of war. It must be remembered that if this force is once committed, it will have to be supported by re­ inforcements [sic] and in view of the unrest in Canada, it might have a serious effect on our re-inforcements [sic] for France."60

58 Bercuson, Fools and Wise Men, 62. Ian Miller, Our Glory and Our Grief: Torontonians and the Great War, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 104-105. 60 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 56164, Mflm C-4333. Mewburn to Borden, August 13, 1918. 30

Borden, too, was well aware of "the dangerous condition of public opinion in

Canada," 'even voicing his concerns in private conversation with Lloyd George, yet the expedition in his mind seemed at the time, more than ever, necessary. In a report of the

Committee of Prime Ministers in mid-August it was again brought forward that no conceivable end to the war could be predicted before late 1919 if not 1920. Combined with this, even if victory was secured on the Western front by driving Germany from France and

Belgium, there would be no guarantee that she would relinquish her newly acquired territories in the East without direct intervention.62 Since the force had been agreed upon, the circumstances had also improved for Canada. Although the overall command would fall to the Japanese General Kikuzo Otani in light of the numbers his nation would contribute, a battalion each of the Hampshire and Middlesex Regiments, Britain's contribution, would be integrated into the Canadian force and overall command would fall to a Canadian.

The commanding dominion officer came in the form of Major-General James

Harold Elmsley. A career soldier injured in the Boer War, Elmsley had commanded the 8th

Canadian Brigade on the Western Front through the Somme, Vimy Ridge, Hill 70, and

Passchendaele and had been promoted in anticipation of the Siberian action. The bill for the operation, excepting organizational costs in Canada, would be paid by the British and, as a result, dominion forces would first and foremost report to the British War Office. Yet, although it was stipulated that all communication would be repeated to the Canadian

Department of Militia and Defence, Borden wanted more. Under his direct instruction paragraph nine was included which, along with ensuring that all administrative duties

61 Henry Borden, ed. Robert Laird Borden: His Memoirsyo\. 2, (London: MacMillan & Co., Ltd., 1938), 844. 62 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 66354, Mflm C-4347. Report of the Committee of Prime Ministers, August 15, 1918. 31 would be carried out from Canada, stated "that no disposition of the Force in the field shall be made, nor shall such Force be committed to any Military Operations without carrying the judgement [sic] of the Canadian General Officer Commanding and therefore the later shall at all times have the right of direct communication with the Canadian Government."63

In addition, Elmsley was given the right to appeal any of General Otani's orders which he deemed could "imperil [the] safety [of] his forces" and no appeal could be decided against him without the consent of the Canadian government.64 Through the inclusion of this paragraph Borden ensured that a Canadian force would be organized, administered, and if need be, commanded from Canada.

To exploit economic opportunities, too, Borden was intent on an entirely Canadian effort. On August 8th he had cabled his cabinet to consider the possibility of a Canadian economic commission to match those being sent by the United States and Britain, and this time without comment, approval was granted. In the eyes of Foster an economic commission would not only benefit Canadian trade, it would also be to some extent an aid mission bringing much needed agricultural implements and other items to a "starving" people. Although an offer was extended by the British for an inter-Allied commercial commission, this was refused. The British had moved quickly and formed their own institution in September - the Siberian Supply Company administered by Leslie Urquhart - and by utilizing it to supply Siberia with consumer goods, had given it a virtual monopoly on British goods. Borden and his cabinet had been well informed of the anger this had caused among existing British organizations in Siberia and those who hoped to take

63 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 56192, Mflm C-4334. Borden to Mewburn, September 16, 1918. 64 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 56182, Mflm C-4333. Gow to Mewburn, September 4, 1918. 65 LAC, MG27 II D7, Vol. 7, Foster Diaries April 1 to Dec 31, 1918, September 9, 1918. 32 advantage of the new opportunities and wanted to avoid making those types of mistakes due to hasty action.66

Listening to the advice from their existing trade commissioners in Russia as well as suggestions from J.S. Dennis, who was attached to the British and Canadian Recruiting

Mission in New York, Borden and his cabinet waited to make anything official. In Privy

Council Order 2595, approved on October 21st, it was decided to build the four-man commission around Wilgress who had previously been the trade commissioner for Omsk and by this point had established himself in Vladivostok. Wilgress and Ross Owen of the

Canadian Pacific Railroad Company -who was already in Vladivostok and was included in the economic commission after his services were offered by the CPR free of charge— were to begin making a complete study of the area. The commercial needs, means of transport, and the barter system including currency and credit issues were all unknown in Canada and further information was needed before decisions on the sending of actual goods would be made. The final two initial appointees, C.F. Just, previously the trade commissioner to

Petrograd, and the aforementioned J.S. Dennis, now associated with the Canadian Red

Cross, who were still in Canada were tasked with helping to select four additional commissioners to be added later and would not sail for several months.

With a Canadian military force and a Canadian economic mission authorized,

Borden's final task was to ensure Canadians themselves supported the project. Borden had returned to Canada on August 24th and had immediately begun extolling Canada's new military independence. With his return, too, concerns from his cabinet were quieted, yet the issue with conscription did not go away. A very active recruiting program had been implemented across the country on August 1 ll , yet within four days, Mewburn issued the

66 LAC, RG24, Vol. 1369, File 21916, Canadian Economic Commission in Siberia, October 5, 1918. 33 order that "if men are not coming forward voluntarily rapidly enough, fill ranks with men obtained under Military Service Act." 7 In the end 1,653 men in the CSEF would be conscripts, well over one-third of the contingent.

The use of conscripts in the expeditionary force was a very large potential problem for Borden and his government. Initially drafted for the defence of the realm, the conscripts in the expeditionary force in Siberia would not be putting down any direct threat to Canada herself. In addition to this, voices in the radical labour groups had been praising the

Bolshevik efforts in Russia with the view that "there is no other sign post upon the social horizon pointing the way to peace than the movement which is now typified in the Russian

Bolsheviki."68 Even for the majority of Canadians there was no desire to see the reactionary

Tsarist regime reinstated. Although most Canadians actually knew very little about Russia, the majority had viewed the Tsarist rule as despotic and backward and had been happy to see it overthrown. 9

In light of this, every effort was taken to ensure Canadians knew that troops were being sent to Siberia to fight Germany and to save Russia from Germanic domination.

Newton Rowell, who served as President of the Privy Council, would do the most to insure this message was heard with a cross-country speaking tour which stretched from Port Hope,

Ontario to Victoria, B.C.. His message was simpler: Canada, a Pacific power with a vested interest in Pacific affairs, was going to Siberia to re-establish the Eastern Front against

Germany, to help the beleaguered Czecho-Slovak Legion set upon by fifth columnists in the form of released German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war, and finally, to bring

Quoted in, Isitt, From Victoria to Vladivostok, 73. Quoted in, Isitt, From Victoria to Vladivostok, 32. MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, 213. 34 economic aid to the Siberian people through a mutually beneficial trade relationship.70

Mainstream newspapers were also content to carry this storey. Barely a single day in

August, September and October went by without a story of some type on Russia, generally running on the front page. The Manitoba Free Press was especially vocal in this matter, and along with articles calling for aid to the Czecho-Slovak Legion, outlining the trade opportunities in Siberia, and commenting on the German influence in Russia, the paper made mention of the CSEF whenever possible with a running tally of volunteers from the

71 region.

While these traditional methods of ensuring the desired message was received proved successful among the members of social groups targeted through political speeches and mainstream news sources, a large proportion of the population fell outside these parameters. For these people, in the eyes of the government, what news they received from mainstream sources was less important than the information circulated among them from others. In an atmosphere made volatile by the growth of trade union and individual working class radicalism, and the discontent of returned soldiers, Order 2384 was released on

September 28th by the Privy Council. Through this order and a series of censorship notices which followed it, Borden and his government banned a large number of socialist and

'inflammatory' publications and set severe limitations on further public meetings and written material in 14 foreign languages. Although the object of these actions was most

Isitt, From Victoria to Vladivostok, 6., MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, 140-141. And ""Siberian Success Vital to Canada," Manitoba Free Press, September 13, 1918, pg 9. 71 "Would Seriously Menace Canada," Manitoba Free Press, August 13, 1918, pg. 7. "German Plans to Recapture Trade," Manitoba Free Press, October 19, 1918. Pg. 18. John R. Vannick "The Romance of the Czecho-Slovaks: First Article," Manitoba Free Press, September 7, 1918, editorial section, pg. 9. "Siberian Campaign Has Fascination," Manitoba Free Press, August 17, 1918, pg. 4. 72 Bercuson, Fools and Wise Men, 70-71. 35 certainly aimed at reducing local unrest and labour radicalism, one side effect was certainly a dampening of potential dissent against the CSEF.

Although positive newspaper reports on voluntary rank-and-file enlistment may have been irregular due to a lack of recruits, the same could not be said for the officers. In

England and on the home front the Canadian Army had built up a large surplus of idle officers who were anxious for some form of front-line experience. Once the CSEF was announced, applications began pouring in to the Department of Militia and Defence. The motivation behind their eagerness was varied. For some, such as Raymond Massey, there was a certain potential for glory due to the fact that this would be Canada's first independent military mission.73 For others who knew a little of the circumstances in the area, it was a moral mission to "go to the people, deceived, illiterate. Win confidence,"74 as the Reverend Captain George Farquhar recorded in his diary. Yet, for the majority of applicants this was their last opportunity to see action. Many were willing to put up their own money for transportation and equipment, or even revert to a lesser rank to get it. In a desperate letter to the Militia Department, Captain A.J. Manville of the 252nd Battalion acknowledged that at 44 years old he would never get another chance to serve his country and was willing to go as low as Regimental Quartermaster Sergeant in order to secure an appointment.75

As with most applicants, Manville was turned down. The selection of officers into the CSEF was largely based on their political connections, one example of which is the fact that the aforementioned Raymond Massey would have been declared unfit to serve had his

73 Raymond Massey, When I Was Young (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1976), 200. 74 Cameron, "Padre in Siberia," 135. 75 LAC, MG27 II D7, Vol. 25, File 4016, Canadian Siberian Expeditionary Force Employment, September 18, 1918. And LAC, RG24, Vol. 4684, File 18-85-1, CEF Infantry Draft Siberian Expedition, August 21, 1918. 36 brother, Vincent Massey, not worked for the Cabinet War Committee at the time and used

"If* his influence to shunt him into a role with the artillery. In a surprising turn of events for

Borden and his cabinet, who had done so much to cut off reprisals from the socialist and labour fronts, the largest outcry in the period before November erupted over this issue. In particular the appointment of Colonel H.C. Bickford, formerly responsible for military training in the Toronto Military District, to command an infantry brigade, infuriated many returned officers. In a very public affair which spilled onto the pages of mainstream newspapers, M. Stewart, the acting secretary treasurer of the Great War Veteran's

Association, wrote to Mewburn protesting Bickford's lack of overseas experience when so many qualified officers were available.77 Although he had received a staff college education, he was unproven in action and could very well put the lives of his men at risk.

Behind the scenes the argument was even more heated. In September and October

Mewburn and Fleming McCurdy, Parliamentary Secretary of the Department of Soldiers'

Civil Re-establishment, exchanged a series of angry letters on the topic. Along with the appointment of Bickford, McCurdy was upset over a lack of officers representing all

Canadian regions, and concerned over the number of senior officers who had received their promotions in England or Canada and not on the battlefield.78 Through all of the scrutiny

Mewburn stood by his appointments. McCurdy would resign his position over the issue, yet by October, the CSEF was set.

In all, the Canadian commitment to Siberia officially consisted of: 259th Infantry Battalion 260th Infantry Battalion

76 Massey, When I Was Young, 199. 77 "Canadian Officers on Siberian E.F." Manitoba Free Press, September 9, 1918, pg. 8. 78 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 62988, Mflm C-4342. McCurdy to Mewburn, October 10, 1918. 37

20 Machine Gun Company 85th Battery, Canadian Field Artillery 16th Field Company, Canadian Engineers "B" Squadron, Royal North-West Mounted Police (Calvary) 6th Signal Company No. 16 Field Ambulance No. 11 Stationary Hospital No. 9 Ordnance Detachment No. 1 Company Division Train

Not all of them would reach Vladivostok, however. Over the next several months disease, accident and a changing political landscape would all contribute to change the composition of the force. Yet on October 11th, as Elmsley and the 679 other members of the advance party sailed from Victoria on the Empress of Japan, to all involved, they were sailing into

Canadian history. 38

CHAPTER TWO

The first official duty for Canadian troops in Vladivostok was to celebrate peace.79

News of the armistice had arrived two days late to the city and immediately joint preparations for a peace parade began. On November 15th, as the civilian population lined

Svetlanskaya Street, the main economic thoroughfare, Canadian, American, British,

French, Japanese, and Czecho-Slovak troops streamed past. According to one of the marchers, although the crowd was boisterous and cheered for the Canadians, nothing but stony silence met the passing of the Japanese and the Czechs whom they regarded as little more than invaders.80 Taking the salute, Elmsley, Otani, and General William Graves of the

01

American expedition, stood together as a sign of their solidarity. Yet, the reality of the situation was much different, something Elmsley had begun complaining of shortly after his arrival.

The Empress of Japan had docked in Vladivostok on October 26th after a treacherous voyage. Rough seas had claimed the life of a Chinese crewman and caused unbearable seasickness, and although the entire force had been cleared of infection before departure, influenza struck the ship and Private Edward Biddle became the first Canadian casualty of the expedition on October 22nd and was buried at sea.

Upon arrival, the city offered little relief. The meager utilities and public services, already burdened by the influx of Allied soldiers, had been overwhelmed with a flood of

Isitt, From Victoria to Vladivostok, 88. 80 Massey, When I Was Young, 208. 81 Swettenham, Allied Intervention in Russia, 148. 39 refugees. What sanitation system there was relied on coolies carting wooden barrels and the smell was complemented by an overall drabness.82 With the Canadians arriving later to the city as well, all that was left of suitable accommodation had long since been claimed by other military forces. After spending their first night in warehouses on the dock, the CSEF was marched ten kilometers outside of town to the East Barracks. This, along with the

Gornostai Barracks, a further 15 kilometers outside the city and a third at Second River would serve as housing for the full contingent when it arrived. Along with these, the

Pushkinsky Theatre in the centre of the city, seized by Elmsley three days after his arrival, would serve as command headquarters. Although the distance from the city would severely limit the availability of entertainment for soldiers without leave to enter the city, the same distance prevented them from causing disturbances among the civilian population and afforded Canadian troops one of the best reputations among the Allied forces in Russia.83

Once Elmsley had settled his troops into permanent accommodations and established a formal headquarters, he turned his attention to the situation in the city. As mentioned, although they would stand together to review their troops after the armistice, the commanders of the various Allied contingents were very frequently at odds. Writing to

Mewburn on November 2nd, Elmsley voiced his concerns:

At first glance one assumes that everyone distrusts everyone else - the Japs being distrusted more than everyone else. The Americans and Japs don't hit it off. The French keep a very close eye on the British, and the Russians as a whole appear to be indifferent of [sic] their country's needs so long as they keep their women, have their vodka, and play cards all night into daylight.[...] the whole situation here is so intricate and apparently so full of

82 Elkington, Eric Henry William, interviewed by Reginald H. Roy January 24 1986, Special Collections, University of Victoria. 83 Isitt, From Victoria to Vladivostok, 79-80. intrigue that I have not yet been able to get a clear grasp of the situation.

To the Canadian government this served only to confirm the fears they had previously expressed surrounding Canada's policy regarding the Americans and Britain's ally, the

Japanese. As well as this problem, and although they were not officially in Russia to support the White Russian forces, Canada had entered into the expedition with the understanding that these Russian forces were prepared to move against the German influences in their country, help restore order, and most importantly, provide the majority of troops for a re-established Eastern Front. The indifference of the Russians was worrying.

By this stage in the war, however, the Eastern Front no longer appeared to be necessary. With Canadian forces spearheading attacks at Arras and Cambrai, and marching successfully on to Mons as part of the "Hundred Days" campaign, Allied pressure was quickly beginning to take its toll on the German army. Bulgaria had signed an armistice with the Allied forces on September 30th and on the 30th of October, the Ottoman Empire followed suit. On October 26th Lloyd George had even gone so far as to request the presence of the Dominion leaders at a third round of Imperial War Cabinet meetings to discuss imminent peace demands. Although no politician could have predicted that the fighting would cease by November 11th, they could sense that peace was close, and with it there were a number of questions regarding the CSEF which would need to be answered.

In preparation for his trip to London, Borden spent a great deal of time organizing the Union government for what could very well be a lengthy absence and as a result, lessened his involvement with the CSEF, delegating its management to his cabinet heads.

Without his driving interest in the force, however, the previous fears surrounding the

84 Quoted in, MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, 154. 41

Canadian mission returned. On November 2nd, even before he had read Elmsley's letter hinting at the futility of the situation in Vladivostok, Mewburn along with his Chief of the

General Staff, British Major-General W.G. Gwatkin, made the first move to disengage

Canadian troops. In a letter to the British War Office they suggested that due to the changing nature of the war an Eastern Front was no longer necessary and as a result the

CSEF should be recalled and disbanded.85 Although this initial probe failed to illicit a clear response, the idea had been voiced. From this point on politicians in Canada would, almost to a man, focus their efforts on the withdrawal of troops from Siberia.

Although it was still in its infancy and little was expected of it at this point, the

Canadian economic commission, too, was already embroiled in problems. In a preliminary report from Vladivostok, Wilgress did not paint an overly positive picture. Getting goods to

Russia would be challenging as shipping was at a premium and thus very expensive, and once in the city, overwhelming foreign competition would further cut down on potential profit margins. Vladivostok, too, he declared, was an unimportant area in traditional

Russian trade patterns. Real opportunity lay in the Baltic and interior areas such as Omsk which would need to be explored at the first opportunity. Although he did not mention it in his letter, one other serious issue was immediately apparent to any visitors to the city:

Vladivostok was already overcrowded with goods. The wartime materials sent to the

Tsarist government without thought to transportation westward occupied almost every available storage area. The fact that Canadian troops were able to spend their first night in a warehouse belies the fact that mountains of equipment were piled throughout the city and surrounding area, much of it exposed to the elements and left to molder. The majority of

85 MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, 155. 86 LAC, RG24, Vol. 1369, File 21916, Canadian Economic Commission in Siberia, October 29, 1918. 42 these materials, however, were not for civilian consumption or of any practical use outside of combat. Civilian goods were still needed, though there was nowhere to put them.

Unlike Elmsley, however, Wilgress had a clear grasp of the situation in Siberia and was eager to begin. By the end of October he had secured road frontage office space in the center of the city and had begun disseminating "propaganda" through Russian language articles he had submitted to local newspapers. He also had begun plans for pamphlets, maps, and other material to be distributed and urged the Department of Trade and

Commerce for film rolls to better advertise available Canadian equipment and expertise.87

Yet just as the members of Borden's cabinet were hesitant to become too militarily involved in Siberia, so too were they reticent to take on any economic risk. Despite the warnings of a quickly closing window of opportunity which had begun arriving in the previous December, Foster forbade Wilgress from assuming any financial obligations without his direct approval. Wilgress was joined by other members of the economic commission as well as F.A.A Butler of the British Department of Overseas Trade in urging the Canadian Government to extend credit to Canadian manufacturers and Russian purchasers alike in order to give Canadian products a head start in Russia. However, Foster,

oo in consultation with the Minister of Finance Thomas White, was unwilling to do so. And lastly, although an educational film reel to send along with the later members of the group was investigated, nothing came of this. Deprived of the ability to engage in independent negotiations, on November 7th, a frustrated Wilgress beseeched Ottawa for instructions as to how he was to proceed. The difficult task of facilitating trade between the two nations

87 LAC, RG24, Vol. 1369, File 21916, Canadian Economic Commission in Siberia, October 29, 1918. 88 LAC, RG24, Vol. 1369, File 21916, Canadian Economic Commission in Siberia, August 18, 1918., LAC, RG24, LAC, RG24, Vol. 1369, File 21916, Canadian Economic Commission in Siberia, December 4, 1918., and Vol. 1369, File 21916, Canadian Economic Commission in Siberia, October 29, 1918. 43 amid the chaos of occupation was made more so through a consistent hesitancy on the part of Borden's ministers.

Borden had left for London on November 8l and received the news of the armistice while at sea. In his diary he noted that "revolt has spread all over Germany. The question is whether it will stop there." Although he was cognizant of the unrest and war-weariness in

Canada, and over the coming months would repeatedly warn his cabinet of threats which arose from it, he was still firmly attached to continuing Canada's Siberian mission regardless of the public backlash. As mentioned, however, his cabinet was not, and with the

Armistice, a new period emerged in the Siberian saga. Now more than ever, the issue became a political one. Military strategy was no longer a factor and politicians would take full control from generals.90 With Borden out of the country, White was assigned the role of acting Prime Minister. Although he was gifted when it came to finances, he was described as "an alarmist who had a tendency to exaggerate every vagrant sign of criticism" and was

"subject to sharply alternating moods of high spirit and depression."91

With White at the helm, the fears of Borden's cabinet were allowed free reign, and on November 14th they all bubbled over. In a cable to Albert Kemp, Canada's Minister of

Overseas Military Forces who was awaiting Borden's arrival in London, White urged that the Prime Minister be apprised of the situation as soon as he disembarked, stating:

All our colleagues are of opinion that public opinion here will not sustain us in continuing to send troops many of whom are draftees under Military Service Act and Order in Council now that the war is ended. We are all of opinion that no further troops should be sent and that Canadian

Henry Borden, ed. Robert Laird Borden, 865. MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, 6. Gaddis Smith, "Nation and Empire," 43. 44

forces in Siberia should, as soon as situation will permit, be returned to Canada. Consider matter of serious 92 importance.

That same day Mewburn cabled to S.H. Morres, the Naval Secretary of the British Naval and Military Committee, stating that "in view of recent developments, Canadian

Government begins to doubt wisdom of sending Canadian Force to Siberia, and is inclined to think it is advisable to recall from Vladivostok Canadian troops both those already there and those en route in 'Monteagle.'" ~

Despite concerns from the cabinet, however, the members opposed to the interventionist force were hesitant to act without Borden's approval. Consequently, deployment continued as scheduled. Although Mewburn had already reported the

Monteagle as at sea when he threatened to recall it, this was not the case. On November

17th troops consisting of RNWMP, desperately needed engineers, and the lone female member of the CSEF, Grace Potter, a nurse attached to the Canadian Red Cross, left

Vancouver for Vladivostok, arriving on December 5th. Although Borden arrived in London on the 17l , his attention was focused on peace celebrations and preparing for the opening of the Imperial War Cabinet's third round of meetings, and he paid little attention to

White's anxious cable.

Faced with silence from Borden and Kemp, White cabled yet again demanding that

"Cabinet should have answer to cables fourteenth and fifteenth instant [regarding] Siberian

Expedition."94 Prompted by White's exasperated cable, Borden turned his attention back to his Canadian cabinet and the CSEF. Replying to White, Borden conceded that he would not

92 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 56216, Mflm C-4334. White to Kemp, November 14, 1918. 93 LAC, RG24, Vol. 3968, File 1047-14-26, Defensive Measures, Expeditionary Forces, Contingent for Siberia, November 14, 1918. 94 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 56218, Mflm C-4334. White to Borden, November 20, 1918. 45 involve Canadian troops in front line action, thus removing the danger of a further public backlash over casualties among those drafted under the Military Service Act. Yet that was where his conciliation ended. Borden was adamant that Canadian soldiers were vital to maintaining order in the area and significant economic opportunities were still available which warranted the CSEF remaining until at least the spring.95

Unlike the members in Canada, cabinet ministers in London such as Kemp who

Borden had by this point taken into his confidence, were in favour of continuing the expedition. So too were the British politicians with whom he consulted. Foster, who had sailed to London too, was also in favour of intervention. Due to the uncertainty surrounding the mission, he had been slow to commit to the economic commission in Siberia which was overseen by his department. Yet Foster, of all the members of Borden's Cabinet, was preoccupied with communism in Russia. Ever since the Bolshevik revolution began Foster had kept abreast of Russian politics and recorded his increasing concern with the "murder,"

"anarchy," and "exploitation" he saw being perpetrated against a helpless and starving people in his diary.96 Although his desire to remove the Bolshevik elements in Russia did not reflect Borden's policy there, he would number among Borden's supporters on the overarching issue of intervention. Along with Foster and Kemp, Arthur Sifton, Minister of

Public Works, and Charles Doherty, Minister of Justice, also supported Borden's Siberian aspirations, yet unwittingly, Borden had taken all of his supporting ministers with him across the Atlantic.

At home, Borden's supporters were few. Although he acknowledges that Rowell, who had helped to sell the idea of the mission to the Canadian public initially, was in

95 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 56221, Mflm C-4334. Borden to White, November 20, 1918. 96 LAC, MG27 IID7, Vol. 7, Foster Diaries April 1 to Dec 31, 1918, April 25, 1918. And LAC, MG27 IID7, Vol. 7, Foster Diaries April 1 to Dec 31, 1918, August 14, 1918. 46 favour, MacLaren states that "there is no evidence that any cabinet minister, other than

Borden himself, could identify after the Armistice any major benefit justifying Canadian participation. Skepticism among ministers in Ottawa deepened into grave doubt as public opposition and social unrest, especially in western Canada, became more acute."

This unrest was slow to begin. Until the Armistice, general opinion had been focused on the Western Front and what unrest existed was not heightened by the activities of the CSEF. Once peace was declared, however, a period of uncertainty set in. The

Manitoba Free Press continued to closely document every reported atrocity perpetrated by the Bolshevik government and acclaim the trade opportunities in Siberia, printing the regular articles by W.E. Playfair, a correspondent with the troops in Vladivostok. In an article shortly after the Armistice, Playfair, generously slotted onto the third page amid the headlines of peace and German surrender, declared that with the Armistice only one stage of the war was over. "Utter lack of a stable government renders Russia a menace to the security of the world for years to come, and it will be a necessary factor in achieving permanent peace to restore order and good government where today there is anarchy and widespread misery."98 The newspaper, too, amid a growing atmosphere of labour unrest in

Western Canada, added its voice to those who, like Foster, were concerned with the spread of Bolshevism in Canada."

In Toronto, however, the Globe began to take a strong position against the CSEF after the armistice. Concerned over the lack of an Allied political agenda in Siberia, and very conscious that no legal declaration of war had been made against any Russian

MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, 156. "Russian Situation Remains Unchanged," Manitoba Free Press, November 13, 1918, pg. 3. "Big Bolsheviki Element in Canada," Manitoba Free Press, November 14, 1918, pg. 1. 47 government,100 the paper began regular editorials against the continuation of the force and

Ministers such as White were quick to see them as evidence of widespread public antipathy toward the force.101 At this stage, despite a relaxation of the censorship against socialist institutions in the country, the majority of dissent arriving in Ottawa was penned by the

109 parents of men about to disembark.

Despite the clear message from Borden desiring that Canada stay the course in

Siberia, White and the cabinet in Ottawa were intent to voice their dissatisfaction with the undertaking. Along with White, Charles Ballantyne, one of the few members of the

Unionist government to be elected from Quebec, J.A. Calder, Minister of Immigration and

Colonization, John Reid, Minister of Railways and Canals, and most fervently, Thomas 1 0^

Crerar, Minister of Agriculture, were most opposed to the continuation of the CSEF.

Two days after Borden's response, Crerar left Ottawa to return to the western provinces.

Before he left, however, he delivered a letter to White declaring his "absolute" opposition to continuing the Siberian expedition.104 His strongly worded missive which focused primarily on the fact that many of the troops in Siberia and many more about to depart were secured through the Military Service Act caused a stir among the rest of the cabinet.

In response to this letter Mewburn postponed the departure of any further troopships to Siberia and White again returned to the telegraph. Without mentioning Crerar specifically, White cabled that the majority of the cabinet was "strongly opposed to our sending troops" and cited the increasing numbers of parents writing to complain over the

Quoted in Isitt, From Victoria to Vladivostok, 91. LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 56253, Mflm C-4334. White to Borden, November 26, 1918. MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, 158. MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, 160-161. LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 56231, Mflm C-4334. Crerar to White, November 22, 1918. 48 mobilization of their sons to fight in Siberia as evidence of public dissent. What volunteers there may be to stay on, he suggested, could enlist with the British Imperial Army.105

This solution was unacceptable to Borden. In the midst of Imperial War Cabinet meetings and in negotiations for representation at the upcoming peace discussions, the

CSEF represented a significant bargaining piece.106 Should the force be withdrawn from

Siberia and Canadian volunteers folded into the Imperial Army, Canada would lose this along with what prestige it had already obtained through commanding British forces. The loss of this position which, to Borden, represented an acceptance from Britain and the international community of Canada's new national identity, would be further compounded by the loss of esteem Canada would sustain through stepping away from a project which it had forced Britain to mould to Canadian specifications. In addition, Borden was under significant pressure to continue the expedition, most notably from Winston Churchill with whom he was in regular communication, and also from the former Chief of Staff of the

Canadian Corps, General Percy Radcliffe, who was well respected by Canadian military and political figures and now served as the British director of military operations in Siberia.

After the Armistice the British and French had reaffirmed the spheres of influence in

Russia which were agreed on the previous December.10 In addition to this, the British had sent 194 field guns and complete sets of equipment for 100,000 men to Siberia with another

100,000 planned for December. The intervention in Siberia represented a significant economic investment on the part of the British. Not only were they paying the vast majority of Canadian expenses for the mission, employing over 4,000 Canadians in uncertain times,

LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 56234, Mflrn C-4334. White to Borden, November 22, 1918. Craig Brown, Robert Laird Borden, 148. Swettenham. Allied Intervention in Russia, 150. they had also ordered a further three million rounds of .303 ammunition from Canadian plants for direct use in Siberia.

Although at this point he was determined that the force continue, Borden knew that a certain amount of finesse was needed to convince his cabinet. Replying immediately after receiving White's latest cable, Borden reiterated that Canadian troops would be used solely to maintain order, having no offensive role, and as it was, were providing much needed aid to the local Russian government. Through the economic commission too, which would have to be removed should the CSEF be withdrawn, the civilian population was being aided and Canada was developing its foreign trade.109 At the same time, Borden knew that while he was out of the country the final decision did not fall to him. Two days later, without prompting from White, Borden wrote again. This time, almost pleading with his cabinet, he reminded them:

In my judgment we shall stand in an unfortunate situation unless we proceed with Siberian Expedition. We made definite arrangements with British Government on which they have relied. They could reasonably hold us responsible for great inevitable delay in making other arrangements. Canada's present position and prestige would be singularly impaired by deliberate withdrawal from definite arrangement under these conditions. When that arrangement was made prospective demand upon our man power was much greater than at present. Draftees sent to take part in terrible fighting in France have much more right to complain than draftees sent to Siberia where no fighting is anticipated beyond possible quelling of some local disturbance and where the chief duty will be to assist the new Russian Government to train Russian garrisons. However I leave the matter to Judgment of Council with the strong feeling that withdrawal from our deliberate

MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, 154. And LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 56223, Mflm C- 4334. Radcliffe to Borden, November 22, 1918. Henry Borden, ed. Robert Laird Borden, 86p. 50

engagement will have extremely unfortunate effect. Foster, Sifton, Doherty concur. no

Yet, the members of the cabinet in Ottawa stood firm. With the support of the four aforementioned ministers, White replied the following day. Ignoring any obligations

Canada might have to Britain, White turned to what he knew best, finances. Although the mission was largely being financed by Britain, Canada was responsible for mustering and transportation costs while the troops remained in Canada. And where as both Britain and

France had significant financial reasons to create a stable government in Russia, one which could one day repay the massive debt incurred by Tsarist government, Canada had no such interests. Lastly, White stated that "so far as I can judge public opinion will not support further action on a large scale if at all." 1H

With this latest negative cable from White it is possible to see Borden stepping back from the CSEF. He had done all he could do to convince his obstinate government and, as he was out of the country, the ultimate decision lay with them in Ottawa. In London, too, negotiations for representation at the upcoming peace conference were coming to a head with Borden attempting to secure distinct representation for Canada at the negotiation table.

Although there was opposition from President Wilson, should Borden succeed, the need for the CSEF would be diminished. The loss of prestige due to Elmsley's withdrawal would be more than mitigated by separate signatures on a document as important internationally as the peace agreement would surely be. In addition, Borden was meeting regularly with the

Imperial War Cabinet in discussions surrounding the proposed League of Nations and the withdrawal of Canadian forces in England. Although he was still assured of the economic

11U LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 56238, Mflm C-4334. Borden to White, November 24, 1918. 111 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 56241, Mflm C-4334. White to Borden, November 25, 1918. 51 opportunities Siberia possessed, the military need for the expedition had ceased and as time wore on it was becoming more and more apparent that the nationalist benefits for Canada afforded by command in Siberia could be realized elsewhere and to a greater extent.

Without the time or patience to argue with his cabinet over the issue, he wrote to White on the 25th and washing his hands of the argument, stated: "The situation is undoubtedly difficult but I hope you can arrange to carry out our agreement with the British Government in some reasonable measure."112

In spite of their repeated messages warning against the continuation of Canada's participation in Siberia, Borden's will proved too much for his cabinet in Ottawa. In spite of the absolute opposition of Crerar and the other three ministers, after four days of deliberation White informed Borden that the Canadian Siberian Expeditionary Force would continue as planned, as soon as appropriate troopships were made available. Although they had conceded their position, the cabinet did include one caveat; within one year of the signing of the armistice all members of the force, save for those who volunteered for continued service, must be withdrawn.113 For the time being Borden's nationalistic and economic aspirations would remain in Siberia, yet with an expiration date, and his cabinet had reaffirmed their support for him. Yet, this had not been a private debate. The British government had been informed of the changing Canadian position throughout, and although relieved at their decision to stay, were beginning to grow impatient with the indecision from Ottawa.

Although Borden had been assured by Radcliffe that the trade opportunities in

Siberia were still plentiful, Foster and his department were still hesitant and had begun

112 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 56243, Mflm C-4334. Borden to White, November 25, 1918. 113 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 56260, Mflm C-4334. White to Borden, November 29, 1918. 52 looking for an exit strategy. Well aware of the complaints of existing British merchants in

Vladivostok and their resentment of the Siberian Supply Company, Wilgress had written at the beginning of November to ensure that a similar situation was not being contemplated for the Canadian mission without his knowledge.114 Assured that this was not the case,

Wilgress had returned to business. In addition to assuring local merchants of the Canadian dedication to independent enterprise, the Royal Bank of Canada had announced that it would be opening a branch in Vladivostok and preparations needed to be made. Finally,

Wilgress worked to secure larger and more visible offices in preparation for the arrival of the other members which at this point had been swelled with the addition of Louis Kon, a

Russian immigrant to Canada to act as secretary, and A.D. Braithwaite, recently retired from the Bank of Montreal, to work as a commissioner for finance.

Despite the assurances that there would be no union with the Siberian Supply

Company from C.T. O'Hara, the Deputy Minister of the Department of Trade and

Commerce who ran the department in Foster's absence, Foster had other ideas. While working in London he was supplied with economic reports from the British Consul in

Vladivostok. These reports highlighted the benefits of the Siberian Supply Company's buying power, and with the financial backing of the government, its ability to speculate in the market. As Russian consumers were showing an unwillingness to order products, preferring to purchase on the spot, this purchasing power was vital for maintaining competitiveness. With the Japanese employing aggressive and often underhanded trade practices, too, smaller ventures were being forced out. By the beginning of December, without consulting Wilgress, Foster had opened negotiations with Butler on the possibility

114 LAC, RG9, II B-12 Vol. 1, Daily Routine Orders - Siberia, November 3, 1918. And LAC, RG24, Vol. 1369, File 21916, Canadian Economic Commission in Siberia, November 19, 1918. 53 of Canada combining its efforts with the official British organ, a proposal which was enthusiastically received, and written to his department for its input. Although the commission would remain a purely Canadian institution into the New Year while behind- the-scenes negotiations continued, an important step had been taken to reduce one more of

Canada's obligations in Russia.

Just as Borden began to step away from the CSEF, the negative public opinion of which White had warned began to make itself apparent. Although concerned parents continued to express their concern, these were quickly supplanted in volume and intensity by left wing political groups and labour organizations which, for the first time, were firmly focused on Canadian troops in Russia.

At the initial Imperial War Cabinet meetings in the spring of 1918, the Dominion representatives had been asked to supply a limited number of volunteers for an expedition to Northern Russia. Just as had occurred in Vladivostok, approximately 162,495 tons of war materials had collected in the ports of Murmansk and Archangel and the Allies were intent that they should not fall into enemy hands. Initially providing 16 volunteers no longer fit for service on the Western Front, Canada's commitment had grown during the following months. Although Borden, who was directly involved in the affair, rejected further calls for an entire infantry battalion, volunteers were sent in increasing increments, specifically requested by the British for their supposed experience in harsh northern climates.1,5 Finally, in mid-August at the request of the British War Office, the 16th

Brigade, Canadian Field Artillery, was created from 497 superfluous gunners in England for service in Archangel, arriving at the end of September.

115 Frank J. Shrive, The Diary of a P.B.O.: Poor Bloody Observer (Erin Ont: The Boston Mills Press, 1981), 38. 54

Unlike the troops in Siberia, these forces were not under a distinct Canadian command. With the overall command in the hands of the British Major-General F.C. Poole,

Canadians in Northern Russia, in conjunction with British, American, French, and local

White Russian forces, were directly involved in front line combat against Bolshevik forces and sustained casualties. On November 11th, as their comrades on the Western Front shouldered their arms, one particularly furious Bolshevik attack was repulsed primarily through the quick actions of the Canadian gunners for which Lieutenant William Bradshaw received the Military Cross and several of his men the Distinguished Conduct and Military

Medals.

Until this stage of the war, activities in Northern Russia had been carried out under a veil of secrecy. Troops were not told of their destination before departure and were forbidden to disclose it to anyone back home once they had arrived.11 Yet, with the signing of the armistice this secrecy was no longer deemed necessary and after due censorship, reports of the prowess of the Canadian gunners began to trickle into Canadian newspapers.117

On November 29th, the same day that cabinet granted its approval for the continuation of the CSEF, Rowell wrote to Borden to express his alarm at the secrecy which had surrounded Canadian troops in Northern Russian. The lone supporter of

Canada's interventionist force in Ottawa, Rowell was very aware of the mounting unrest among the Canadian public and with the announcement of Canada's continued role in

Siberia set to hit newsstands the following day, was very concerned over the effect this new development might have. "People here have been much surprised to read reports of

116 Shrive, The Diary of a P.B.O, 40-41. 117 "Ironside Praises Work of Canadian Troops in Russia." Manitoba Free Press, December 11, 1918, pg. 1. 55 engagements of Canadian troops at Murman [sic] and Archangel," he wrote, "there having been no prior announcement to Canadian people that any of our troops had gone to

Northern Russia. [...] Already some influential papers are demanding withdrawal." Unlike other members of the cabinet in Ottawa, however, Rowell trusted the judgment of the public and went on to state that "Canadian people will support all reasonable governmental action provided they are kept fully informed of the reasons therefore." Any negative backlash from the force, Rowell assured, could be negated by an official statement explaining the necessity of the expedition and the reasons for secrecy.118

As the force was not under Canadian control, however, Borden required approval from the British War Office for such a statement and it was not until December 27th that any explanation was forthcoming. Outlining the situation quite honestly, Borden stressed the volunteer nature of the force and the fact that they were in Northern Russia in support of a regional government headed by a member of the Social Revolutionary Party that had been legally elected to the original Russian Provisional Government.ll9 Yet, coming nearly a month after Rowell's request, Borden's statement arrived too late. In the intervening time, socialist and labour organizations from across the country had implemented an all out attack on Canadian activities in any part of Russia.

With the coming of December, motions and formal protests passed by political parties and labour organizations began arriving in Ottawa and making their way into newspaper headlines in increasing numbers. The year 1918 represented a turning point in working class unrest. Following the general trend of the war years, organized labour subscription had risen another 21 per cent. After the armistice, too, the reality of increasing

118 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 55527, Mflm C-4333. Borden to White, November 26, 1918. MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, 71-72. 56 unemployment drove many workers toward the belief that "they had sacrificed more and suffered more as a result of the war than any other class in society."120 Thus, after the armistice, the continued use of working class conscripts struck a chord with many of the radical Western organizations, who, now more than ever, were willing to use the strike as a political tool, and made their displeasure at the continuation of the CSEF known. These resolutions were not exclusive to the more radical groups either. On the 6th the Trades and

Labour Congress, traditionally a moderate organization, adopted a resolution from the

Tailors' Union "demanding that the Canadian troops now in Siberia and western Russia be immediately withdrawn, also that all troops being mobilized in Canada to invade Russia be immediately demobilized."121 Through the language of their resolution the TLC made their views on the nature of the CSEF very clear, and they were joined in their position by the labour councils of Vancouver, Toronto, and Winnipeg who passed similar motions, the latter even briefly entertaining a proposal to carry out a general strike in order to force their

122 position.

Although out of the country, Borden was kept informed about the mounting dissent.

Before he left for London, he had tasked members of his cabinet whom he trusted in the utmost to keep him informed on the political situation in Canada. Through their efforts

Borden received regular summations of press clippings and their candid opinions on the situation in the country. In mid-December, these reports were increasingly filled with accounts of "very great unrest" and calls for him to return to Canada to help his

A. Ross McCormack, Reformers, Rebels, and Revolutionaries: The Western Canadian Radical Movement 1899-1919. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977) 139. 121 "Object to Sending Troops to Siberia." Manitoba Free Press, December 6, 1918, pg. 7. Isitt, From Victoria to Vladivostok, 95. 57 government face the upcoming parliamentary session.123 Designed as a war-time government, the Unionists were beginning to fall apart and many members wanted him back in the country in a last effort to hold the ministry together. These same reports noted that across the country more and more mainstream newspapers were adding their voices to the ranks of those who questioned the continuation of the CSEF. Along with the Globe in

Toronto, which had been opposed from the outset, the Hamilton Herald and Montreal's La

Press began to criticize the government's decisions to continue the expedition.124 And on

December 20th, the Manitoba Free Press, which up this point had so staunchly defended and even encouraged all government actions in Russia, published an editorial questioning the motivation and possible positive outcome of continuing the force. "

What newspaper reports and published resolutions failed to inform either Borden or his cabinet, however, was of the growing grass-roots movement targeted directly at the soldiers bound for Siberia who still remained in Victoria. The officers and men who volunteered for the expedition knew very little of Russia at all and little was done by the government to educate them. After taking the situation into their own hands while stuck at

Willows Camp in Victoria, several officers searched the city and the sole person who knew anything of the country was invited to mess with the officers and teach them what he knew. Among the men obtained through the Military Service Act, however, the situation was much worse. Along with a general ignorance of their destination or the purpose for the mission, these men were highly resentful of being conscripted, shipped across the country,

123 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 54545, Mflm C-4332. Meighan to Borden, December 17, 1918. 124 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 45943, Mflm C-4324. Bulletin from A.E. Blount, December 18, 1918. (These reports from Borden's cabinet ministers were filled with newspaper clippings from a variety of national newspapers, which, along with commentary, were designed to keep Borden informed on the social situation in Canada.) 125 "The Siberian Expedition." Manitoba Free Press, December 19, 1918, pg. 6. 126 "Canada and the Siberian Intervention," episode of Tuesday Night. 58 and through November and December, forced to wait through unseasonably miserable weather which turned their makeshift canvas encampment into a "sea of mud." To add to the negative atmosphere, the Spanish Flu had traveled with the troops to Victoria and spread rapidly in the close confines of the camp.

In light of this obvious discontent the officers kept the camp under close observation. At one point, in the face of what was perceived as growing Bolshevik sympathies, one unit of 135 Russians immigrants to Canada, who had served on the

Western Front and subsequently volunteered for service in Siberia, was broken up. When the mission was advertised as an effort to save Russia from the exploitation of the Germans and to re-establish the Eastern Front, these men were all too happy to participate. As it became clear that the mission might involve fighting their fellow Russians, however, many began to refuse. Of these, 74 of the soldiers who it was deemed had displayed particularly

'Bolshevist' sympathies were discharged, with General Gwatkin issuing orders for them to be put under surveillance after their release from the military.128 There was little anyone could do about the activities of Victoria's civilians, however. The soldiers at Willows

Camp were increasingly bombarded with pamphlets from the Victoria Trades and Labour

Council and other more radical socialist groups. Increasingly these materials found an audience in the discontented soldiers. Without any other source of information, many received their education on the situation in Russia from socialist and radical propaganda.

Although soldiers were banned from attending labour meetings, this order was frequently flaunted too, especially among the French-Canadian soldiers of the 259th battalion.

Quoted in Isitt, From Victoria to Vladivostok, 84. "Canada and the Siberian Intervention," episode of Tuesday Night. 59

As the largest body of troops began to prepare to embark for Vladivostok, the socialist activities in Victoria increased with obvious results. Barely a day went by in

December without some sort of punishment being meted out for infractions ranging from

'breaking out of camp' to 'highly improper conduct in the ranks.' Finally, on December

20th, the day before they were to embark, seven soldiers were declared to be deserters by a court of inquiry. Throughout December, as the restrictions on public gatherings put in place due to the flu epidemic were lifted, labour meetings increased. These were so successful at drawing soldiers that officers were compelled to break up several meetings and forcibly escort some of the soldiers back to camp.13 Few reports of the events in

Victoria were conveyed beyond the confines of Vancouver Island, however, and even less information was sent on to the soldiers already in Siberia. In fact, troops who had already crossed the Pacific knew very little at all of the growing discontent in Canada. Military transports and the newspapers and personal mail they carried with them were infrequent to the point where in an article written on December 27th which described the situation, the author reported that the latest news enlisted men had from Canada came in newspapers from December 5th.131

Lacking in readily available entertainment and news from home, troops in Siberia began to grow restless. Aside from continuing drill to keep the men modestly active, however, there was little Elmsley and his staff could do. Faced with what had initially been inadequate housing conditions and the debilitating political atmosphere in Vladivostok marked by animosity between the Americans and the Japanese, Elmsley had been an early

129 Benjamin Isitt, "Mutiny from Victoria to Vladivostok, December 1918" The Canadian Historical Review, 87, 2, June 2006, University of Toronto Press Inc.. 130 Stuart Ramsay Tompkins, A Canadian's Road to Russia: Letters from the Great War Decade, Doris H. Pieroth ed. (Edmonton: The University of Alberta Press, 1989), 358. 131 "Canadians in Siberia Without Christmas Mail." Manitoba Free Press, December 27, 1918, pg3. 60 supporter of continuing on to Omsk where the British troops which technically fell under his command were stationed. Closely advised by Radcliffe, Borden, too, was in agreement, and had forwarded this opinion to his cabinet on November 20l in his first response to

White's early cables.132 In the aforementioned debate which immediately followed, however, this idea was firmly shelved. Although Borden's original plans for the force when they were first laid out in August had called for the actions of the force to be left entirely up to Elmsley,133 all this had changed with the armistice. With the politicians taking control in

Ottawa and a continuous conversation crossing back and forth across the Atlantic, Elmsley was forgotten. Falling from a position of near autonomy, he was forced to write to Ottawa to request orders. In spite of Borden's wishes and repeated requests from the British War

Office for Elmsley to advance inland, the reply remained consistent: "the Dominion

Government cannot permit them [the CSEF] to engage in military operations nor without its express consent, to move up country; and Elmsley should not leave Base [.. .]"134 The only option available for Elmsley and his force was to wait.

In his concluding thoughts on the Canadian Prime Minister, MacLaren postulates that Borden's actions throughout his entire association with the CSEF demonstrate a remarkable aptitude for political survival that made itself apparent in the face of criticism. " Yet although several factors such as his failing health, his reputation for supreme honesty, and his demonstrated willingness to resign his position belie MacLaren's suggestion, one example does stand out in favour of his position. On December 2nd, as public opposition increased in volume and intensity, Borden attempted to further remove

132 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 56221, Mflm C-4334. Borden to White, November 20, 1918. 133 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 56164, Mflm C-4333. Mewburn to Borden, August 13, 1918. 134 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 56320, Mflm C-4334. CGS to Troopers, December 22, 1918. 5 MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, 214. 61 himself from decisions surrounding the CSEF. In twin cables to White and Radcliffe he urged the War Office and the Ottawa cabinet to communicate directly. Although he desired to be kept informed, he no longer wanted to act as their intermediary.13 When both

Radcliffe and White continued to involve him he repeated his request, and, obviously frustrated, stated bluntly: I "have nothing to add. Question should be settled by Council without further reference to me."137

Although MacLaren makes an astute observation in noting that Borden's attempts to cut ties with the Siberian expedition coincided with a rise in public dissent, an alternate explanation is available. Over the preceding weeks Borden had been used as a glorified messenger between Radcliffe and the Ottawa cabinet, each side hoping that the other would attribute more weight to the argument based on the deliverer - nothing had prevented the two parties from communicating directly. While Borden had commanded his cabinet back in July to communicate with the British only through him, he had long since ceded his outright control of the day-to-day actions of the CSEF to the department heads responsible for the force. While in London, too, Borden had a myriad of duties to attend to. He had already made his desires for the continuation of the CSEF clear to his cabinet and it was obvious that further attempts at persuasion would be a waste of time he did not have. Thus, frustrated at the continued indecision in Ottawa, Borden attempted to gain some separation from the issue in order to focus on issues such as the upcoming peace conference and the

League of Nations which were quickly forming into much more of an opportunity to demonstrate national autonomy than the CSEF had ever presented.

LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 56275, Mflm C-4334. Borden to White, December 2, 1918. LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 56303, Mflm C-4334. Borden to White, December 9, 1918. 62

Yet in spite of his repeated requests, Borden could not escape the force which he had done so much to initiate and maintain. Although out of the country, his office in

Ottawa continued to receive the resolutions against further action in Russia such as those mentioned above, and in the face of the increasing numbers coming to the offices of the other cabinet ministers, White wrote both to him and the British War Office.138 Like

Rowell, White asked for an official statement laying out Canadian and Allied policy to quiet the chorus of dissent from across the country.139

This call for a statement on Allied policy in Russia as a whole had not originated from the cabinet, however. The original explanation of recreating the Eastern Front had long since been proven obsolete and the Czecho-Slovak Legion which so many nations had leapt to save, while still fighting the Bolsheviks, had its rear secured by the Allies and could easily be withdrawn at any time. Although the hope for economic opportunities still existed - and for lack of a better argument was given as justification in speeches by

Mewburn - to many, any benefits afforded to Canada by continuing its economic commission were outweighed by the negative trading atmosphere and the economic risks which would need to be taken to get goods to Vladivostok. The benefits certainly did not warrant keeping a military force with a high proportion of conscripts in what was technically a neutral country, and to many cynics, the expedition looked more and more like an anti-communist crusade.140

In London, in the meetings of the British War Cabinet and the Imperial War

Cabinet, the politicians were very aware of the demands for some sort of statement emanating not only from Canada, but from the British public, too, where considerable

138 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 56324, Mflm C-4334. Trotter to Borden, November 26, 1918. 139 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 56279, Mflm C-4334. White to Borden, December 3, 1918. 140 This is the view largely taken by Isitt in his book From Victoria to Vladivostok. 63 opposition was building. Yet, crafting such a statement was proving difficult. No post-war policy existed on Russia and the formation of one was hindered by a deep divide among the

Dominion leaders as well as the need for approval from President Wilson whose troops played an important role in both Siberia and the Northern theatres. The political decision makers, like the public, were also bombarded with constant streams of conflicting information on the actual situation in Russia. As Lloyd George stated in a meeting on the final day of the year, expressing his frustration at the lack of reliable information, "Russia was a jungle in which no one could say what was within a few yards of him."141

In spite of Lloyd George's further assertion that "nothing could be worse than having no policy, and it was better to proceed resolutely on a wrong hypothesis than to go on hesitating as the Allies had been doing,"142 a distinct policy and accompanying statement would have to wait until the New Year. Although Churchill was a vehement supporter of continued action with an aim to overthrow the Bolsheviks, he had little support from the other members of the Imperial War Cabinet. Yet, although the members were unwilling to consider a full-scale military invasion, neither were they willing to side with the American President whose opinions were carried to the cabinet by Lloyd George.

Having never been fully supportive of the campaigns in Northern Russia and upset over the unilateral actions of the Japanese in Siberia, Wilson was ready for a full withdrawal.143

To Borden and the other more moderate members of the cabinet, even though many were eager to see Allied troops withdrawn from Russia, the consensus was that they still

141 NAUK, The Cabinet Papaers 1915-1980. CAB 23 First World War conclusions, online. Imperial War Cabinet 1918: Minutes of Meetings 30-48, Imperial War Cabinet, 48, December 31, 1918. 142 NAUK, The Cabinet Papaers 1915-1980. CAB 23 First World War conclusions, online. Imperial War Cabinet 1918: Minutes of Meetings 30-48, Imperial War Cabinet, 48, December 31, 1918. 143 Somin, Stillborn Crusade, 109-110. and NAUK, The Cabinet Papaers 1915-1980. CAB 23 First World War conclusions, online. Imperial War Cabinet 1918: Minutes of Meetings 30-48, Imperial War Cabinet, 47, December 30, 1918. 64 had obligations to the governments and institutions that had sprung up under their protection. Although none of the Allies had at this point recognized the government in

Siberia under Rear-Admiral Alexander Kolchak who had assumed power on November

18th, their forces, especially those of the British, were helping to support his regime in

Omsk. Kolchak's army had also received a great deal of military aid from the Allies including training from a small contingent of Canadians who had been allowed to travel forward to Omsk, and were increasing in efficiency. Yet, as evidenced by an uprising led by the Social Revolutionary Party on December 22nd, which was only put down through the efforts of the Czecho-Slovak Legion, Kolchak's government was far from secure.

In Northern Russia as well, the government supported by the Allies was proving less popular than had been expected. Before he had left, General Poole had estimated he would be able to swell his ranks with over a million eager recruits and sweep down to take

St. Petersburg. By the end of December, however, he had "failed to obtain more than perhaps 3,000 Russian adherents, and these were very half hearted and exceedingly costly."144 Although Poole's undersized army fought very well and held off repeated

Bolshevik attacks, they were consistently outmanned, outgunned, and outmaneuvered.

While the leaders possessed an acknowledged deficiency of information on Russia, the Imperial War Cabinet was in agreement that they were not winning over the people.

The industrial workers in Russia were firmly on the side of the Bolsheviks and despite resentment among the peasantry over the Bolsheviks' food seizures policies, they were unlikely to revolt in any great numbers. With these two groups representing over 80 per cent of the total Russian population Lloyd George acknowledged that they had no right "to

144 NAUK, The Cabinet Papaers 1915-1980. CAB 23 First World War conclusions, online. Imperial War Cabinet 1918: Minutes of Meetings 30-48, Imperial War Cabinet, 45, December 23, 1918. 65 support a minority against a majority because we happened to have political relations with the former."145

Despite Borden's actions earlier in the month when he attempted to extricate himself from the negotiations between his Ottawa cabinet and the British War Office, he had maintained his interest in the CSEF. As the Imperial War Cabinet debated a possible solution to the situation in Russia without results, it was Borden who finally put forward the solution. Anxious to see a resolution to the impasse Borden made the somewhat controversial suggestion of diplomacy with the Bolsheviks. "Would it not be possible," he asked, "to make an arrangement with the Bolsheviks permitting the withdrawal of the

Czechs and of our own troops, and safeguarding the people who had co-operated with us?"146 Although there were many opponents of the suggestion who saw the move as diplomatic recognition of the Bolsheviks, it was eagerly picked up by Lloyd George and later President Wilson.

Although not yet a policy, Borden and Lloyd George at least had the idea of a negotiated settlement to take to their anxious governments, and preparations were begun for what would become the Prinkipo Conference. Much like Elmsley in Vladivostok, the politicians in London now took on a wait-and-see approach. A clear step had been made towards withdrawing Allied troops. Yet, in the meantime, transports to Siberia continued.

On December 21st, after a 5 a.m. reveille and a quick breakfast, the 259th Battalion and several smaller units left Willows Camp to march the six kilometers to the Victoria

Harbour where the Teesta awaited to take them to Vladivostok.

143 NAUK, The Cabinet Papaers 1915-1980. CAB 23 First World War conclusions, online. Imperial War Cabinet 1918: Minutes of Meetings 30-48, Imperial War Cabinet, 45, December 23, 1918. 146 NAUK, The Cabinet Papaers 1915-1980. CAB 23 First World War conclusions, online. Imperial War Cabinet 1918: Minutes of Meetings 30-48, Imperial War Cabinet, 45, December 23, 1918. 66

CHAPTER THREE

Halfway from Willows Camp to the Teesta the column was stopped to rest. To expedite the boarding process, troops from the 259th Battalion, the 20th Machine Gun

Company and various other smaller units had been broken up and organized alphabetically, yet little thought had been put to language. Already separated from their regular NCOs, many of the French-Canadian conscripts now found themselves taking orders from English officers and abuse from civilians who had lined the roads to watch the departure. After weeks of enduring sickness, poor living conditions, and regular exposure to radical propaganda both from labour radicals and "barrackroom lawyers," many of the troops were understandably agitated. When the order came for them to continue on, the resentment which had been building since their conscription bubbled forward.

What followed is a somewhat contentious subject. Earlier monographs by

Swettenham and MacLaren do make passing mention of a minor mutiny, yet fail to fully capture its scale or the undercurrents of resentment which it demonstrated. This is not an issue for Isitt, the latest author to examine the CSEF. In From Victoria to Vladivostok:

Canada's Siberian Expedition, 1917-19, Isitt makes an in-depth study of every available record on the matter. Yet, in his use of the affair as the centerpiece to his study he tends to sensationalize its importance and broader impact. From the records newly uncovered by

Isitt it is clear that when the rest period was over and the order went out to fall in, a large number of French-Canadian soldiers refused. In the ensuing confrontation, made more 67 difficult as the English officer involved in the affair understood no French, a shot was fired over the heads of the immobile troops and when some still refused to move, an "honour guard" of loyal troops from Ontario marched them onward using their belts as motivation.147 On reaching the docks, these men were incarcerated in a nearby shed with the ringleaders handcuffed together until the Teesta had docked. Although he is adamant that along with the belts, the mutinous men had been driven forward at bayonet point, Isitt's main source is a clearly biased socialist publication, the BC Federationist. Up until this point, each fact reported by Isitt can be corroborated through the correspondence of observing officers, and although these accounts have their own agendas too, they do acknowledge the bayonet rumour and discount it as pure propaganda issued by the very people Isitt quotes.148

Nevertheless, far from a mere six French-speakers who MacLaren reported had refused to go, over 40 men had been involved in the affair.149 When inspected by

Lieutenant-Colonel Albert Swift, commanding officer of the 259th battalion, 30 of these men received summary sentences and at least a further ten were taken into custody aboard the ship to await court-martial in Vladivostok. All of these men were conscripts and all were French-speakers. Yet although the mutiny is a significant statement on the fact that any type service - especially service in an unknown area for unknown purposes such as

Siberia - was resented by conscripts, particularly those from Quebec, to the point where they were willing to risk execution on charges of mutiny, the event did little to alter the overall situation. Mainstream newspapers did not carry the story and although the Globe

147 Isitt, From Victoria to Vladivostok, 101. 148 "Canada and the Siberian Intervention, 1918-1919" Tuesday Night (CBC Radio, Special Collections, University of Victoria) MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, 175. 68 still put forward regular editorials against the CSEF, it helped the government's cause in this situation by denying the rumours of a mutiny on a troopship that were being spread by socialist and labour based publications.150

The diligent efforts of government censors and the skepticism of the editors at the major newspapers across the country kept the news contained and once the Teesta had sailed the event was over. The 260th Battalion, primarily made up of English-speaking soldiers, had been scheduled to sail on the following day. However, their departure was delayed in order to ease any tensions which might possibly be lingering. The 2601

Battalion was allowed to spend Christmas in Canada and the next day, after a lavish feast, marched to the docks where the Protesilaus waited to take it to Russia. This time there were no disturbances. Although protestors attempted to stir up trouble they were drowned out by large crowds of supporters who made the send-off a festive affair.151 By the end of the year, 1,100 Canadians were in Russia, another 2,700 were en-route, and a final 1,200, including the 85th Artillery Battery, remained spread between Willows Camp and further camps in and around Vancouver awaiting deployment.

Although there is little evidence that Borden was ever informed of the mutiny in

Victoria, he was very aware of the unrest in the Western provinces. The day before it occurred, Borden was contacted by White who had given him regular communiques on the social situation. This time, however, it was different. Information sent from Frank Barnard, the Lieutenant-Governor of British Columbia, had driven White into a panic. He suggested that Borden talk to the War Office about sending a British warship to the West Coast where its presence might serve to dampen some of the rampant unrest in Canada's most radical

Swettenham, Allied Intervention in Russia, 153-154. 51 Stuart Ramsay Tompkins, A Canadian's Road to Russia: Letters from the Great War Decade, Doris H. Pieroth ed. (Edmonton: The University of Alberta Press, 1989), 363. 69 province.152 To Borden this request was "one of the most absurd suggestions that ever came to my attention,"153 and going over White to reply to Barnard directly, he made his views on the suggestion clear as it pertained to Canadian autonomy:

"The proposal that a cruiser should be sent for the purpose mentioned does not strike me favourably. Having regard to the notable and wonderful effort of Canada in this war it would seem a most lame and impudent conclusion to ask for a British Warship on the ground that we cannot keep the peace within our own territories."154

Thus, without raising the issue with the British, the idea was dismissed. Over all other issues in Borden's mind, securing and maintaining Canada's newly won national status reigned supreme, and in this situation, as with the CSEF, he was willing to carry-on through threats of social unrest to achieve his aims.

What White and Barnard's suggestion did achieve, however, was to strengthen

Borden's commitment to finding an honourable exit strategy for Canadian troops. In a meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet, Borden admitted that he had had to exert considerable pressure on his government to gain their consent for the operation in the first place, and it would be very difficult to carry that consent past the spring melt.155 He had already made the suggestion to open diplomatic lines with the Bolsheviks to discuss possible guarantees for the governments and institutions that would remain after the Allied withdrawal, and as the idea had been agreeable to several of the other dominion leaders, on

December 30th, Borden brought it forward again. Playing on the fears of the other Imperial

152 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 54626, Mflm C-4332. White to Borden, December 20, 1918. 153 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 54632, Mflm C-4332. Borden to White, January 1,1919. 154 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 54631 A, Mflm C-4332. Borden to Barnard, January 1,1919. 155 NAUK, The Cabinet Papers 1915-1980. CAB 23 First World War conclusions, online. Imperial War Cabinet 1918: Minutes of Meetings 30-48, Imperial War Cabinet, 45, December 23, 1918. 70

War Cabinet members that the situation might escalate, an excerpt from the minutes of the meeting shows that Borden painted the situation as black and white: "There were only two alternatives: one was to go and forcibly intervene in Russia itself; the other, which he preferred, was to induce the Governments of the various States in Russia to send representatives to Paris for conference with the Allied and associate nations." Should the conference prove successful, there was the potential for stability in all of Russia with the new governments working in unison with the League of Nations. Otherwise, "he did not see how the war could be regarded as terminated if we left the Peace Conference with five or six nations and Governments still fighting in Russia."156

With his proposal, Borden's participation in the planning of the conference ended.

The idea was immediately championed by British politicians such as Lord Robert Cecil and

Lloyd George, the latter taking it to foreign leaders such as Wilson and Clemenceau in the ensuing weeks. While Wilson eagerly took to the idea, Clemenceau would have preferred to continue military intervention. Without international support, however, Clemenceau eventually agreed by the end of January. His country was tired and war-weary from the protracted fighting within its borders, and there was no way he could attempt expanded military intervention on his own, especially as the Bolshevik's Red Army was beginning to gain both strength and momentum.157

Invitations were sent out almost immediately to the various Russian governments. A cease-fire was suggested followed by an international conference to be held on the Princess, or Prinkipo, Islands in the sea of Marmara near Istanbul on February 15l , and attention was then turned to choosing delegates. Here Borden returned to the picture with another

156 NAUK, The Cabinet Papaers 1915-1980. CAB 23 First World War conclusions, online. Imperial War Cabinet 1918: Minutes of Meetings 30-48, Imperial War Cabinet, 47, December 30, 1918. 157 MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, 248. 71 accolade to his nation's international status. Unlike at the Paris Peace Conference where

Canada would stand on its own, the British Commonwealth would have a single delegation to the Princess Islands Conference. Yet, just as Canada held the overall command of their combined forces in Siberia, so too would they head the conference.

Much to the chagrin of Foster, who saw the entire conference as a betrayal of the anti-Bolshevik forces and worried over how news of the negotiations would be received back in Canada, ~ Lloyd George asked Borden to chair the event. As the initial voice behind the idea, however, Borden did not share Foster's reservations. Eager to assume a position which carried so much international weight, Borden cabled his cabinet outlining the importance of the mission and his desire to go.159 As with seemingly all decisions on

Russia, however, his cabinet was indecisive. Officially, White cabled that the cabinet was split on the issue and the decision was up to Borden. Yet, later that day, both he and Calder sent further notes laying out their personal opposition to the idea. Although no doubt happy that steps were being taken toward Canadian withdrawal, both politicians were concerned about the upcoming parliamentary session and were anxious that Borden be available to lead his party through it.

Disregarding the concerns of Calder and his acting Prime Minister, Borden accepted the position and details were released to the Canadian public. Although Foster had been certain of a public outcry, his opinions on the evils of Bolshevism and the need to stamp them out were not shared by the majority of his countrymen. Instead, mainstream newspapers - which had been moving more and more to positions in opposition to Allied

158 LAC, MG27 IID7, Vol. 8, Foster Diary 1919, lanuary 24, 1919. 159 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 90464, Mflm C-4373. Borden to White, January 23, 1919. 160 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 90465. Mflm C-4373. Calder to Borden, January 24, 1919. And LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 90468, Mflm C-4373. White to Borden, January 24-25, 1919. 72 actions in Russia - lauded the idea. A Manitoba Free Press editorial pointed to the upcoming conference as a victory for civilization over anarchy, as rule by right instead of rule by might, and as an auspicious start for the ideals of the League of Nations.161

Despite the hope many held for a diplomatic solution to the affair, which would appease all sides, after a month-long period of speculation, the conference fell apart. The fact did not come as a surprise to many. It was not a well thought-out idea and Borden himself had been skeptical of the success of the conference when he first accepted Lloyd

George's offer and told his cabinet that he doubted that the meeting would even take place.

The French had been against the idea from the start and although Clemenceau had been convinced to support the plan, his government had made its continued opposition clear, something not missed by the White Russian governments.1 2 Encouraged by the French antagonism and determined to reclaim all of Russia, Russian refugees in Paris paraded through the streets in protest. As well, each of the White Russia governments in Russia refused to be a part of any negotiations with the Bolsheviks, who for their part were willing to come to the table.163 Although some were willing, such as Evgeny Miller in the North who could not attend due to geographic and time constraints, most White Russian political and military leaders viewed the proposed conference as a betrayal by the Allies.

Throughout late December and January the indecision evidenced through the reaction of the cabinet to Borden's proposed role in the Princess Islands Conference, had remained prevalent. Without Borden in the country to direct their international policy, his cabinet refused to make any further decisions on the CSEF without a clearly defined policy

161 "Making Progress." Manitoba Free Press, January 24, 1919, pg. 11. 162 "France Disturbed Over Decisions in Regard to Russia." Manitoba Free Press, January 25, 1919, pg. 4. And MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, 251. 163 Margaret MacMillan, Paris, 1919: Six Months that Changed the World, (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2003) 76. 73 from London. As politicians in London had decided that such a statement would not be cemented until after the proposed conference, a stalemate between the two sides developed.

Although Ottawa had conceded that the arrival of Billingsley with the 259th battalion might change the situation for Elmsley, the prohibition on his moving inland remained in effect. Yet, despite their resolve for inaction, troops continued to be sent to the overcrowded city with the departure of the two Canadian battalions at Christmas. On hearing of these sailings, the British War Office cabled to Ottawa stating that without approval to move inland further Canadian troops were unnecessary. For their part, British troops would be moved back to Vladivostok as they were not prepared to continue their actions unilaterally, and as accommodations were at a premium, the Canadian troops in the city might as well be sent home and the ships en-route turned around.164

Although this message had been relatively diplomatic, General Knox, who as commander of the British Forces in Siberia had been pushing for a similar proposition for some time, had been much less so. Thoroughly frustrated with Elmsley and the Canadian government, Knox had repeatedly pressed to have Canadian troops moved forward, even urging Elmsley to force the issue by sending an advance party to Omsk without Ottawa's approval.1 When this and other such suggestions were refused, Knox wrote to his government in London, and in a letter read before Borden and the Imperial War Cabinet, vented his frustrations. Because of their unwillingness to take any real form of action, Knox requested the removal of the Canadian forces and their replacement with Indian troops, whose British leadership would prove more pliable.166

164 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 56336, Mflrn C-4334. War Office to CGS, January 4, 1919. 1 5 MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, 173-174. 166 NAUK, The Cabinet Papaers 1915-1980. CAB 23 First World War conclusions, online. Imperial War Cabinet 1918: Minutes of Meetings 30-48, Imperial War Cabinet, 48, December 31, 1918. 74

This was never really an option, however, and any possibility of Indian troops playing a role in Russia was quickly laid to rest by India's representative at the meetings,

Satyendra P. Sinha. Yet even without a replacement, the Ottawa cabinet had what they had been pushing for almost since November; a clear opportunity to remove Canadian troops from Siberia. As the British War Office had suggested the move, too, concerns from

Borden over Canada abandoning its promises were no longer relevant. Also, although the

Paris Peace Conference was still in its infancy, Borden's campaign to win Canada and her sister Dominions their own delegates to the conference had proven successful, and

Borden's role as chief delegate to the Princess Islands conference further added to

Canada's international status. With these elements in place the CSEF was no longer necessary as a bargaining chip, and little argument remained for its continuation from any source. Yet even with the express approval from many sides, the cabinet in Ottawa refused.

British pressures to solicit Canadian withdrawal had largely been a power-play to encourage Canadian cooperation and troop movement inland - something Ottawa was easily able to recognize. Although these requests had been made out of frustration by high ranking officials, other voices in the British government were very vocal in encouraging the

Canadians to stay. Winston Churchill, who had been made Secretary of State for War in

January, was anxious that a more active interaction be undertaken. He continually pressured

Borden for the Siberian and Northern Russian forces to remain in position.167 Colonel R.A.

Johnson, commanding officer of the 5th Battalion of the Hampshire Regiment at Omsk, also wrote stating that without the Canadian forces, British troops would be without rear support and would likely fail. Without the moral presence of the British, Johnson avowed that "the

MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, 251. 75 whole fabric will collapse."168 What Johnson understood, however, was that the decision was a political one, not a military one, and as the CSEF was an entirely Canadian force, commanded and administered from Ottawa, the decision was not one to be made in Britain.

In response to the letters from Knox and the War Office, the cabinet in Ottawa pointed to the actions of the forces from the other Allied nations in Vladivostok. As they understood it, neither the Americans nor the Japanese were allowing their forces to proceed any further inland than the positions that been established by the armistice. As a result, neither would the Canadians. Nor would the troops be immediately withdrawn without a statement of Allied policy.169 Without direction from Borden his cabinet was maintaining the status quo.

In fact, after the armistice, the Japanese had begun to remove some of their approximately 70,000 troops. Although of all the Allied nations, the Czecho-Slovak legion excluded, they had been the most active, even penetrating as far inland as Lake Baikal, since the armistice and the closer international supervision it carried with it, they had largely discontinued offensive action. For the Japanese, who harboured thinly veiled hegemonic and economic aspirations in Siberia, every effort had been made to keep the area unstable, even to the point of funding the Cossack Grigori Semenov and his small army. Although a staunch anti-Bolshevik, Semenov acted as little more than an armed bandit, and for the majority of the time the Allies were in Siberia, actively opposed the

White government set up by Admiral Kolchak. Without the distraction of the Great War to cover their activities, however, the Japanese found themselves under significant

"* LAC, MG27 II D7, Vol. 65, File 135, Peace Conference Russia 1919, January 10, 1919. 169 LAC, RG24, Vol. 3968, File 1047-14-26, Defensive Measures, Expeditionary Forces, Contingent for Siberia, January 6, 1919. 76 international pressure to discontinue their Siberian agenda and began to lose interest in the entire undertaking.

For their part, the Americans had only reluctantly agreed to join the intervention for the publicly stated purpose of protecting the Czecho-Slovak Legion. Privately, however, they were much more interested in curtailing Japan's Pacific influence and winning some of the Siberian trade market for their own use. All of these goals were easily achieved through their presence in Vladivostok alone, for as long as American troops were in the area the Japanese could not act unilaterally, and as President Wilson was set against any

1 T1 type of increased involvement, no movement inland was expected.

By associating their actions in Siberia, or lack thereof, with the policy being followed by the Americans, the Ottawa cabinet was sending a clear message to the British regarding the changing international stage. Moreover, for once, they were in complete agreement with their Prime Minister. As already mentioned, Borden had been working to improve relations between Canada and the United States throughout the war as the pragmatic need for a closer relationship with Canada's geographic neighbour became more and more clear. By the end of 1918, this, along with his insistence on advancing the national status of Canada, had become one of his principle focuses, something fully supported by his cabinet. As Gaddis Smith notes, "Ottawa acted in agreement with

American declared policy and not with the views of the British War and Foreign

Offices."172

Although Borden and his cabinet were certainly beginning to shift the focus of some of Canada's foreign interests - particularly on the economic side - into the American camp,

Swettenham, Allied Intervention in Russia, 151-153. Somin, Stillborn Crusade, 108-109. 172 Smith, "Nation and Empire," 336. 77 he had to balance his nation's international relationships. In particular, both he and the vast majority of Canadians remained ever the loyal British subjects who saw Canada's close ties with the Empire as their country's foreign policy bulwark. Just as he desired

Canadian autonomy only within the confines of the British Empire, so too were his interests in increasing his nation's friendship with America tempered with the desire for Britain to enter into this friendship, too. Borden had already acted as an intermediary between the two powers and helped to alleviate some of the tensions which had existed earlier in the war, and now that the war was over, he returned to this role. In meetings of the Imperial War

Cabinet, Borden worked hard to reconcile the British and American policies and openly stated to the assembly that "one of the most important assets that we could get out of the war would be assured goodwill and a clear understanding between Great Britain and the

United States."173 Continuing his efforts through the Paris Peace Conference, in conversation with Lloyd George, Borden even went so far as to state that if the League of

Nations should fail, a union should be formed between "the two great English speaking commonwealths who share common ancestry, language, and literature, who are inspired by like democratic ideals, who enjoy similar political institutions and whose united force is sufficient to ensure the peace of the world."174

While Borden and his government had been attempting to adhere to American political policy in Siberia, for economic guidance in the chaos of Vladivostok, Foster and the Department of Trade and Commerce increasingly turned to the British. In spite of the fact that the balance of the Canadian Economic Commission was still gathering in Canada and had yet to prove its worth, in the face negative reports from Vladivostok, Foster had

173 NAUK, The Cabinet Papaers 1915-1980. CAB 23 First World War conclusions, online. Imperial War Cabinet 1918: Minutes of Meetings 30-48, Imperial War Cabinet, 44, December 20, 1918. 174 MacMillan, Paris, 1919, 48. 78 already opened negotiations with the British to incorporate Canadian efforts into the British

Siberian Supply Company. Although the members of the commission had been told that this was not the case, the first indication that something was seriously awry came in early

January when it was decided that the vacant agricultural, mining, and manufacturing commissioner positions would not be filled. By then, however, Just and Kon had already embarked for Vladivostok, leaving amid the controversy with the troops on the Teesta and arriving in the city on January 12th. Dennis would join them on February 3rd, and lastly, after meetings with officials from the Moscow-Narodny Bank to better understand the financial situation in Russia, Braithwaite set sail on February 12' ,175

Work began in earnest after the arrival of Dennis and his subsequent election to chair of the commission. It was immediately obvious to the newly arrived commissioners that theirs was a task of preparing for the future. Immediate trade possibilities were almost non-existent with the confusion on the railway making the movement of goods to interior markets nearly impossible. To compound the problems, along with the issues of supply and competition mentioned earlier, the entire area was awash in multiple worthless currencies.

According to a report filed by Braithwaite after his arrival, bills printed by the Tsarist and

Kerensky governments without any type of security were still in wide-spread circulation as were a large number of counterfeits. Bolshevik currency was also prevalent without any way to substantiate its value, and although Kolchak's Minister of Finance, Mr. Michayloff, claimed to have eight billion roubles worth of precious metals to secure his government's currency, as well as substantial natural resources to be given as concessions if necessary, there was no way to be certain. It was rumoured that each of Kolchak's armies had their own printing press, and as the bills no longer bore dates or serial numbers, there was no

7 MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, 231. 79 way to tell how many were in circulation. In a little less than a month and a half, the value of the rouble had fallen from ten to a dollar to over sixteen.17

Yet, forming subcommittees to look at each of the major problems, the trade commission persisted, gathering large amounts of data for future use. From these investigations the market potential that had originally been anticipated when the commission was established was confirmed, especially in the agricultural sector which was in desperate need of machinery and inputs such as seed and binder twine. In another positive development, a new agreement on the control of the Trans-Siberian Railroad had been signed in January which wrested sole authority over this vital artery away from the

1 77

Japanese and divided it amongst the various Allied factions. This would present its own problems as each faction would go on to use their section of railway as leverage, and approximately 30,000 railcars were idle on sidings, having been requisitioned for housing.178 Yet, at the time, this agreement represented a chance for significant improvement.

The commissioners were under no illusions that these small positive steps would lead to any immediate or drastic turn-around in the trade situation. Yet, with the team together for the first time, and making progress, it came as a shock when the Canada's independent economic commission was officially ended. Foster's negotiations had borne fruit early, and at the Paris Peace Conference he went further by securing deals with

France, Belgium, Romania and Greece whereby Canada would provide each nation with loans of 25 million dollars to be used to purchase reconstruction materials from Canada.179

176 LAC, RG24, Vol. 1369, File 22804, Canadian Economic Commission to Siberia, April 12, 1919. 7 Swettenham, Allied Intervention in Russia, 153. 178 LAC, RG24, Vol. 1369, File 22804, Canadian Economic Commission to Siberia, April 4, 1919. 179 "Canadian Credits to Europe." Manitoba Free Press, March 14, 1919, pg. 13. 80

By securing footholds in these markets which would hopefully help mitigate the economic downturn expected after the war, the necessity for independent trade in Siberia was lessened. In a Privy Council order coming four months less-a-day from the one which had created it, it was announced that the Canadian Government would employ the Siberian

Supply Company to fill its trading needs in Russia. A commission based in Ottawa would be responsible for ordering and transporting goods while they were still in Canada, and the commissioners in Vladivostok would be returned home, save for Wilgress who would act as Canada's representative to the British company.180

Despite fervent objections from Dennis and the other commissioners who had been informed of the impending Privy Council order only three days before it was passed, the decision had been made. Before they had even submitted an official report, the Canadian

Siberian Economic Commission had been dissolved. When it had initially been envisioned,

Borden had meant for it to be a purely Canadian institution and had gone so far as to reject early solicitations by the British for cooperation. Yet, as time wore on and other means became available to demonstrate Canadian autonomy, the need for a separate economic commission was lessened. Canadian trade relations were focused elsewhere and the

Canadian Siberian Economic Commission became the first casualty to mounting pressure for withdrawal.

After the intense lobbying from Canadian manufacturers who had encouraged the expedition in the late summer of the previous year, the cancellation of the Siberian

Economic Commission brought with it surprisingly few complaints. The transportation and storage issues had made it nearly impossible for Canadians manufacturers to exploit any trade opportunities in Russia, and although the relationship with the Siberian Supply

180 LAC, RG24, Vol. 1369, File 22804, Canadian Economic Commission to Siberia, February 20, 1919. 81

Company precluded private enterprise, the Canadian government had authorized a one million dollar credit for the Ottawa buying commission, which for the short term would actually expedite Canadian sales. In fact, the response from Canadians to the news of the changing economic relationship with Russia was one of indifference if not approval. The confusion in Vladivostok was public knowledge thanks to reports carried by several of the leading newspapers in Canada. On top of this, the Montreal Gazette printed a story penned by a Professor Mavor at the University of Toronto who blamed the abundance of Allied trade representatives for the lukewarm reception by many of the Russians. Their presence,

Mavor argued, made the Russians suspicious that the Allies only intended to seize their ports and then proceed to exploit them through unfair trade arrangements.181

Similar suspicions of exploitation were held by many Canadians as well. For lack of any clear policy on continued intervention after the armistice, the economic opportunities in

Siberia had repeatedly been used to justify the Canadian presence in the area. This had been reiterated in speeches by White, Rowell, and most notably Mewburn whose comment that

"trade follows the flag" had sparked considerable incredulity.182 As a result, by 1919 there was little differentiation in the minds of Canadians between the CSEF and the economic commission, despite their being completely separate institutions.

This was nothing new in socialist and radical circles, however. In October, in its last publication before it was censored by the Canadian government, the Western Clarion described the Allied intervention as little more than "insatiable hunger on the part of enterprising capitalists to make profitable investments and to exploit undeveloped

1 LAC, RG24, Vol. 1369, File 22804, Canadian Economic Commission to Siberia, March 19, 1919. 2 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 45945, Mflm C-4324. Blount to Borden, December 18, 1918. 82 territories and backward people."183 It was a sentiment echoed in much of the radical propaganda which had been issued to the troops in Victoria and spread illegally throughout the nation. In the spring of 1919 this was continued, too, in the resolutions which had never really stopped filtering into Ottawa. In one particular motion sent by the Mount Hope Grain

Growers Association in Saskatchewan, the assembled representatives called yet again for the withdrawal of the CSEF, primarily objecting to their "tax money being expended for the benefit of the Capitalist."184

Before 1919, what had limited these radical organizations was a lack of class consciousness among the majority of Canadian workers who had little understanding of the

Utopian goals put forward in socialist propaganda or the proposed means to reach them. As well as this, outside of British Columbia, little solidarity existed among workers and labour organizations.185 All this changed with the New Year, however. In March, at the Western

Labour Conference in Calgary, a decidedly leftward movement was made whereby the labour organizations of Western Canada separated themselves further from those in the East operating under the auspices of the TLC.186 While this helped to strengthen the relationships and the feelings of solidarity among the unions present at the conference, a similar unrelated growth in general working-class consciousness and solidarity was progressing outside of organized labour. Despite the leftward agenda now inherent in

Western unions, the propaganda with which the leadership now approached their membership from this point on was not representative of the increased socialism. Instead,

Quoted in McCormack, Reformers, Rebels, and Revolutionaries, 155. LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 56423, Mflm C-4334. Clay to Borden, March 31, 1919. McCormack, Reformers, Rebels, and Revolutionaries, 169. Bercuson, Fools and Wise Men,%\. 83 after this conference, labour leaders developed a much more practical strategy, one that workers could imagine succeeding regardless of their political beliefs and education.187

Armed with the strategy of the general strike, leadership which had never been as radical as it was at this point, and a militant and united workforce, Western Canadian labour presented an extremely threatening picture to Ottawa. Writing to Borden in the midst of this, White resurrected his desire for a British cruiser to be sent to British

Columbia. Blaming propaganda spreading north out of Seattle, White declared that "plans are being laid for revolutionary movement which if temporarily successful would immediately bring about serious disturbances in Calgary and Winnipeg where socialism rampant [sic]." As returned soldiers, disillusioned by a lack of employment, had been increasingly influenced by socialist ideals, White was unsure if the small militia and

RNWMP detachments would be able to deal with any large-scale action should it erupt.

Borden's response to this renewed call for British aid remained as it had been the previous year. Yet, when White refused to back down and his fears were validated by the

Comptroller of the RNWMP and authorities within the Provincial government and militia,

Borden relented. Although Borden would not ask for British help in dealing with an internal situation, it was decided that a Royal Navy Squadron would be asked to Vancouver so that Canada might properly show its appreciation for British war efforts. In order to avoid any suspicion that the request was due to the social unrest, another squadron was also invited to Halifax.189

The growing unrest in Canada was not reflected among the troops in Siberia, however, in spite of the injection of the disgruntled 259th Battalion. When the Teesta

187 McCormack, Reformers, Rebels, and Revolutionaries, 169. 188 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 49821, Mflm C-4328. White to Borden, April 16, 1919. 189 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 60927, Mflm C-4340. Borden to White, April 29, 1919. 84 docked in Vladivostok on January 12th the Canadian Command set up a Field General

Court Martial and over five days of inquiries, nine of the ten "leaders" were convicted of crimes ranging from "joining in a mutiny in Forces belonging to His Majesty's Auxiliary

Forces" to "disobeying a lawful command given by his superior officer."19 Although two of the men were given lighter sentences of 28 and 30 days field punishment, several received 2 years hard labour - a sentence later suspended by Elmsley as Canadian troops prepared to withdraw.191

These sentences, handed down on January 28l , were intended to send a strong message to the rest of the conscripted troops in Vladivostok in order to secure their continued good conduct, and for all intents, it worked. Although infractions still occurred, by virtue of their distance from the city, the CSEF's service record was much cleaner than those of other interventionist forces. Packed away in the holds of the Teesta and the

Protesilaus which brought the 259th and 260th battalions was a great deal of sporting equipment. Now, instead of continuous drill, inter-Allied matches were held with

Canadians going unbeaten in tug-of-war and Mclntyre, one of only 12 black soldiers in the

Canadian contingent, claiming the Allied light heavyweight boxing title. Most notably, however, professional equipment was sent for 30 full hockey teams, and playing on four newly-constructed ice rinks the 11th Stationary Hospital opened the Siberian hockey season with an 8-0 win over the Force Headquarters. Elmsley had also specifically charged

Raymond Massey with performing for the troops, and scrounging costumes and a piano

iyu LAC, RG9, II B-12 Vol. 1, Daily Routine Orders Siberia II, February 2, 1919. 1 ' Isitt, From Victoria to Vladivostok, 102-103. 192 "Canadian Hockey League is Organized in Siberia." Manitoba Free Press, March 26, 1919, pg. 14. 85 from the Gornostai barracks he and his team of 25 actors and musicians performed for

i no troops from all nationalities.

In spite of efforts to keep the men active, throughout their time in Vladivostok there continued to be a paucity of information as to the purpose of the expedition, and as one

Calgary recruit put it after his return, "The Canadian soldier...very soon became obsessed with one idea - that [he] had no business in Russia, that it was Russia's business to settle her own troubles, that the Russians were a hopeless lot anyway, and that he was only prolonging the muddle by staying there."194 With significantly improved entertainment to boost their morale, however, and the knowledge that firm measures would be taken against those who misbehaved, soldiers of the CSEF toughed it out. However disgruntled they may have been, most simply wanted to finish their duty and go home.195

Another issue which made the waiting less arduous for the troops was the fact that a clear deadline had been set for withdrawal. On January 25th Borden had written to White authorizing the demobilization of those troops who remained encamped in British

Columbia.196 As quietly as possible, so as not to hearten the Bolshevik Government, the

85' Battery, Canadian Field Artillery and several other smaller units were disbanded and sent home. With this act, one the troops in Siberia where well aware of, demobilization became a reality and began to move much more quickly.

In the month since Borden had removed himself from direct dealings with the CSEF very few decisions had been made regarding the force by any party. Although troops had continued across the Pacific Ocean, there had been no direction as to what they should do

193 Massey, When I Was Young, 217-218. Quoted in MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, 213. 5 "Canada and the Siberian Intervention, 1918-1919" Tuesday Night (CBC Radio, Special Collections, University of Victoria) 196 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 56379, Mflm C-4334. Borden to White, January 25, 1919. 86 once they got there, and even when Billingsley arrived in Vladivostok, the prohibition on

Elsmsley's movement inland remained in effect. With Borden returning to the helm, however, momentum picked up again and after dealing with the remaining forces in Canada he turned his attention to those in both the Siberian and Northern Russian theatres.

By February it had become abundantly clear that no amount of pressure from the

Allies could compel the White Russian representatives to meet with the Bolsheviks to resolve the conflict. Although invitations had been re-issued without much hope of success, the Princess Islands Conference was dead before it had begun. In the following meetings of the British Empire Delegation to Paris, which had replaced the Imperial War Cabinet as the forum for Commonwealth issues, it became apparent to Borden that no common policy would emerge on Russia in the near future.1 7 In light of this, Borden moved to disengage his country. Writing to Lloyd George on the 7th, Borden made the declaration that "unless they say good reason to the contrary Canadian troops would be brought back from Siberia as soon as spring opens say about April."198

To some extent this statement, galvanized the British policy makers to action. With the Paris Peace Conference occupying their time and energy, little attention had been paid to Russia. Shortly after Borden's letter, however, meetings were convened to discuss the issue, and over four days Churchill and Balfour, the remaining proponents of intervention, pressed their case for continuation. As any further British effort hinged on Canadian involvement, Churchill was desperate and argued that the Bolshevik government was only months away from defeat should the Allies stay. Should they leave, however, the combined power of a communist Russia and a communist Germany would be far too much for the

MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, 184. 198 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 173355, Mflm C-4449. Borden to Mewburn, February 13, 1919. 87

Allies to chance. Yet, Borden remained firm in the face of these arguments. Responding that "Russia must work out her own salvation,"199 he washed his hands of the affair and informed his government that Canada's policy would be to withdraw. Three days before his government was to face the opening of parliament without his leadership, a concrete policy had finally been formed on the CSEF with which to answer the questions from the opposition.

Despite the resolution to withdraw, when parliament opened on February 20th, opposition MPs held nothing back. Immediately, the Liberal representative from Brome,

Andrew McMaster, attacked the Union government for sending troops to Siberia without convening parliament to consult the elected representatives of the people, and once the troops were engaged, for neglecting to explain why they had been sent in the first place. If the reason was to secure Canadian trade, as had been suggested, McMaster declared, "I for one would rather that in all the future history of Canada we never sold a single mowing machine or other article of manufacture [...] there than that the blood of a single Canadian lad should be spilled in vain."200

Over the following days and weeks Liberal MPs from North Essex, Laval-les Deux-

Montagnes, and Rimouski added their voices to the growing clamour and on March 10th

Hermas Deslauriers of the St. Mary's riding in Montreal, stood, and quoting from an editorial in the Toronto Sun, ranted that:

Canada committed a national crime in sending to Russia, to participate in a domestic quarrel, men who had no business to interfere with this country's striving for freedom, no matter how blind its efforts may be. The crime is doubly

199 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 56404, Mflm C-4334. Borden to White, February 17, 1919. 200 Quoted in Swettenham, Allied Intervention in Russia, 154. 88

heinous when you think that men who refused to go were nevertheless forced to embark for Siberia. It is a flagrant violation of the law of the country which allows men to be sent beyond the borders of Canada 'for the defence of Canada' only. No matter what distortion is made of the phraseology of this clause it can never be claimed that men sent to Siberia to interfere in the quarrels of factions at war with one another are fighting 'for the defence of Canada.201

To this the Liberal representative from Stanstead, Willis Baldwin, asked the question that, in the face of an overwhelming national war-debt, why should Canada spend money on an expeditionary force in Siberia in order "to protect the interests of the United States, Great

Britain, or France [.. .]?"202

Borden's government was slow to respond. Although the opposition's complaints had been shouted down by Unionist backbenchers who hurled their own accusations of

Bolshevik sympathies and a shirking of military duty at the Liberal members from Quebec, an official reply was not made until April 1st. Finally rising in the House, Rowell began his defense with an examination of Borden's actions within the Imperial War Cabinet and declared that through this institution "Canada has reached the status of a nation." From his strong start, however, Rowell proceeded unconvincingly. Only vaguely tying the CSEF with Canada's new nationhood, he explained that the CSEF had been sent at the request of the British and Canada would have failed in her duty had the troops been refused. As well as this, Rowell returned to one of the main themes of his earlier national speaking tour and explained that as a growing power on the Pacific Ocean, Canada had an obligation to play a role in Pacific affairs.

Quoted in MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, 187. Quoted in Swettenham, Allied Intervention in Russia, 154. 203 "Fifteen at Evening Session of Housel." Manitoba Free Press, April 4, 1919, pgl. and "Siberian Corps Rightly Sent." The Globe, April 2, 1919, pg3. 89

Rowell's response had done little to appease the opposition. Borden, still attending the Paris Peace Conference, was well aware of his government's situation. Despite the fact that most of the criticism was emanating from MPs with ridings in Quebec, a province

Borden had long since alienated with his policies on conscription and his subsequent cancellation of exemptions, his government was concerned. As early as December, members of his cabinet had been calling for his return to Canada to help them through the upcoming session of parliament, and these calls had turned to pleas upon his decision to accept the position as Britain's chief delegate to the Princess Islands Conference. Despite their requests and the growing social tension, Borden had remained overseas in pursuance of his dreams for Canadian autonomy, leaving his ministers to respond, rather lamely, to the opposition's criticisms.

Yet, Borden had not abandoned his government on the issue and was fighting his own battles in Paris to secure the withdrawal of the CSEF. After he had made his intentions clear in late February, the British government had stalled, haggling over the price of transportation. As Churchill used the time to assess the interest other Allies might have in continuing intervention - with little success - after waiting a month Borden grew frustrated. Turning his attention to R.M. Stephens, the secretary of the Naval and Military

Committee which was responsible for arranging the transportation, Borden insisted that

Canadian troops be withdrawn as soon as possible regardless of the expense.204

This would be the final nudge needed. On the same day that Stephens forwarded

Borden's latest demand, Churchill wrote to the Canadian Prime Minister personally. "In view of the very decided attitude taken up by Canada regarding the withdrawal of her

204 LAC, RG24, Vol. 3968, File 1047-14-26, Defensive Measures, Expeditionary Forces, Contingent for Siberia, March 17, 1919 troops from Vladivostok, the War Office have [sic] no option but to acquiesce, as they have felt it impossible to continue to urge the Dominion Government to share, against its will, in a task of much difficulty and anxiety."205 From this point on the dismantling of the CSEF progressed quickly. In Vladivostok, Elmsley prepared his troops for departure, and on a suggestion from parliament, suspended any of the remaining sentences to the mutineers from Victoria.

On April 21st, 1,076 soldiers were loaded onto the Monteagle and to the envy of their comrades, sent home. Mainly made up of conscripts from the 259th battalion which

Canadian politicians were eager to see disbanded, the first batch arrived in Victoria on May

5th, where, after a being debriefed, they were discharged and sent home.206 Yet, even at this stage Churchill made one final appeal. To ensure the furtherance of his "most righteous crusade" he pleaded with Borden to allow Canadian soldiers to volunteer for service with the British Army. Kolchak's spring campaign was gaining momentum, and, ever the optimist, Churchill was certain that Bolshevik defeat was imminent. If Canadian troops were to volunteer, he was sure Australia would follow. To further the stakes, too, Churchill played on the national and economic potential which had originally been so important to

Borden, and in his letter of March 1st he reasoned: "It may well be that our future friendly relations with a regenerated Russian State, with all of its immense commercial and military possibilities, may depend upon action taken now."207

The 1st Canadian Tank Battalion still in England had already volunteered to a man, and as long as the Canadian government was willing to loan them and any others who

205 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 56417, Mflm C-4334. Churchill to Borden, March 17, 1919. 206 Isitt, From Victoria to Vladivostok, 154. 207 Clifford Kinvig, Churchill's Crusade: The British Invasion of Russia, 1918-1920, (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2006), 210 and LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 56426, Mflm C-4334. Churchill to Borden, May 1, 1919. 91 might be willing to the British Army, Churchill was sure others would follow suit and he would be able to secure a large enough force to continue what had become his mission since the armistice. Although Borden was receptive to the idea, it was quite obvious that his nation would not stand for further troops to be sent to Siberia. Only those already in Russia would be given the option. But even then, on the advice of his ministers Borden stipulated that any volunteers must leave the Canadian Army completely before joining the British

Siberian Expeditionary Force. Canada was washing its hands of the whole affair and wanted nothing to do with anything or anyone that might remain.208

Over the following month the number of Canadians in Siberia dwindled until on

June 5th, to the strains of the American band, Elmsley and his headquarters departed for

Canada. Answering Churchill's call, 53 Canadians agreed to serve with the British Military

Mission, 20 agreed to stay with the Canadian Red Cross - a shortened tenure as the

Chairman back in Canada was uninterested in keeping the organization in Russia without a

Canadian military presence - three others stayed to join the American Red Cross, the

French Legion, and White Russian Officers School respectively, and six others deserted.209

One of the final official acts for Elmsley was to bury the dead. Thirteen Canadian soldiers had died of disease while in the city, and one further, a lieutenant, had killed himself in March. On June 1st, Elmsley, along with the other Allied leaders traveled to what is today the Churkin Naval cemetery where, under wooden crosses, the 14 Canadian dead were interred. A large stone sculpture was also dedicated for the site, and although the markers have rotted, it still stands today.210

208 LAC, Sir Robert Borden Fonds, MG26-H, p. 56432, Mflm C-4334. Sifton to Borden, May 5, 1919. 209 MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, 206-207. 210 Benjamin Isitt, "Evacuation." Canada's Siberian Expedition, http://www.siberianexpedition.ca/index.php (accessed May 5, 2011). 92

Calls for the withdrawal of the CSEF had originated the previous November from

Borden's own government, and as opposition MPs and the working class added their voices, the demands could no longer be ignored. Yet aside from the first shipment of soldiers which made headlines in April and early May, the return of the CSEF occurred under a near media blackout. On May 15th, the pressure that had been building within

Western Canadian workers and labour organizations finally boiled over in Winnipeg. What had starting as relatively ordinary disputes in the metal-works and building trades quickly developed into a nearly complete city-wide general strike.21' Supported by radical and moderate workers alike, the situation would continue to escalate, and with the military getting involved and limited sympathy strikes across the western provinces, over the next six weeks the nation would have eyes for little else.

Thus it was that the CSEF returned not with a bang, but with a whimper. The failure of the Winnipeg General Strike had subdued working class radicalism, and with the discrediting of the new, leftist union leadership and the general strike as a political tactic,212 there was little energy left to further pursue their anger over the use of conscripts in what was perceived as an attempt to overthrow Bolshevism. The clamour in the House of

Commons brought forward by the representatives from Quebec had mostly died out too.

Borden had returned to Canada, and as they received very little support from their fellow

Liberals, the political moment passed.

Churchill's dream was never to reach fruition either. Not nearly enough Canadians had volunteered, the Australians did not follow suit, and political and social restrictions

211 Bercuson, Fools and Wise Men, 102-103. 212 Bercuson, Fools and Wise Men, 259. 93 from Britain limited his ability to operate effectively. Over the summer, British troops and the few Canadians who remained with them would be withdrawn. Although at the outset President Wilson had been the most hesitant of the Allied leaders, American troops weathered another winter, remaining in Vladivostok to guard stores and to keep an eye on the Japanese until they were eventually withdrawn in April of the following year, ironically having outlasted the Kolchak Government. The Czecho-Slovak Legion followed the

Americans in September, and on October 25th, 1922, the last Japanese soldier left the city.

Finally, without anything to stop them, the Bolsheviks who had waited just out of sight from the time they had first taken the city, swept in, and raised the red banner, closing

Vladivostok to the West for almost 70 years.

213 Kinvig, Churchill's Crusade. 318. 94

CONCLUSION

Robert Laird Borden retired in July of 1920. He had successfully led his nation through the war, and by his policies, established Canada as a member of the victorious

Allies on its own merits. He had proceeded to the Paris Peace Conference as a member of the British delegation. Yet, Borden had ensured that his nation would receive separate representation, and he and other Canadian representatives would play important roles on several of the conference's sub-committees. Although he was forced to be absent from his country for extended periods of time during 1918 and early 1919, during which his cabinet was left to fend for itself, his actions had secured for Canada the right to full membership in both the League of Nations and the newly formed International Labour Organization, as well as the right to be elected to a non-permanent position on the League's council.214 After his return from Europe, the House of Commons would independently vote its approval of the Treaty of Versailles. This action, and his signature on the treaty itself, marked the final achievement of the goals Borden had been striving toward since his election as prime minister in 1911. Although the CSEF was only one of the many individual and interwoven events in the path toward Canadian autonomy and national identity, it was certainly an important one.

Throughout his tenure in office prior to World War I, Borden's efforts had been hampered by a sluggish economic environment, a strong imperialist lobby, partisan political infighting, and a lack of any sort of international forum wherein to move a

Canadian national identity forward. With the outbreak of war, however, many of these

214 Smith, "Nation and Empire," 351. 95 impediments were removed. Although Borden's response to the British declaration of war was certainly a demonstration of loyalty to the British Empire, the overwhelming response from the English-Canadian majority was also a statement of national vigour and a nascent

'nationalism'.215 The Canadian performance on the battlefield only served to further this trend. And despite the fact that it split the country along linguistic lines, the strong mandate given to him with the victory of his Unionist government in the 1917 election allowed

Borden free rein to pursue his goal of a distinct Canadian voice within the British Empire.

The advent of the Allied Siberian Interventionist Force provided the perfect arena in which Borden could further Canadian autonomy within the Empire. In Siberia, Canada would be able to stand as an equal alongside the major powers, and through political maneuvering, Borden secured full control of Canadian forces and policy in Siberia for

Ottawa. On top of this, a Canadian, Major-General James Elmsley, would be in charge of all Imperial forces. The Siberian expeditionary force was proof of Canadian national equality with Britain in action.

Yet, the ability to advance Canada toward a position of equality with Britain was not the only attraction Borden could see in Siberia. Along with his 'nationalist' cause, the

Prime Minister took a direct interest in building the Canadian economy and Siberia seemed to present an incredible opportunity to do so. A vast, little-developed region, rich in natural resources, Siberia greatly resembled Canada's own western provinces, and Canadian manufacturers were clamouring for the opportunity to expand their trade into the region.

Furthermore, at the time the expedition was first considered, the momentum on the

Western Front was being carried by the German Army, and although it is often lost in the historical discussion, intervention in Siberia represented a legitimate opportunity for the

215 Smith, "Nation and Empire," 350. 96

Allies to help Russia recreate the Eastern Front. While deeply committed to winning the war, no matter the cost, Borden also felt a deep personal responsibility for the Canadian soldiers and would have grasped any opportunity that offered the possibility of shortening the war and thus saving Canadian lives. For Borden, both of these convictions moved him to favour launching the Siberian intervention.

Borden had to exert a great deal of personal influence on his cabinet to secure

Canadian intervention and would continue to maintain it almost single-handedly. His interest in its success stemmed from a legitimate desire to further Canadian interests as he conceived them, and he did so in much the same way as he approached many other wartime issues - by identifying them and then almost single-mindedly pursuing them. Yet his timing was poor. The war which had created the opportunity for the CSEF brought with it intense war-weariness and a surge in social and labour unrest, which, after the armistice, began to focus in no small way on the conscripted Canadians continuing to serve in Vladivostok.

Among the working-class, anti-Bolshevik intervention was a non-starter, but even among those many Canadians swept up in the domestic 'Red Scare' of 1919, there was no enthusiasm for fighting the Bolsheviks in Siberia. This was combined with the original hesitancy of the great majority of his cabinet ministers, and without a clear Allied policy to focus the efforts of the various military forces occupying Eastern Russia after the end of fighting on the Western Front, the chaos of the situation overwhelmed Canadian involvement.

Militarily and economically, the Canadian Siberian Expeditionary Force had no lasting impact and for this it is often dismissed as a failure. Yet this should not besmirch the entire operation. From a 'national' standpoint, the CSEF was certainly a success - a useful stepping stone towards something greater. Initially, Elmsley's role as the commanding 97

Dominion officer boosted Canadian military prestige, and with Canadian forces in Siberia as one of his bargaining chips, Borden was able to maneuver his way to achieving a distinct

Canadian voice in Paris. The force would also act as a catalyst in the tentative process of re­ defining Canadian foreign policy as Borden attempted to balance his traditional relationship with Britain and her allies with the necessity of achieving a closer relationship with

Canada's geographic neighbour, the United States. Lastly, Borden's willingness to stand up to members of the British government, such as Churchill, to limit involvement initially and then to secure Canadian withdrawal, demonstrates his willingness to exercise his nation's newfound national identity and autonomy.

Today, the significant gains Borden was able to achieve are taken for granted, those who served in 1919 have long since passed away, and aside from some dusty uniforms tucked away in museums and 14 graves just outside of Vladivostok, little remains of the

CSEF. Yet this World War I 'side show,' so easily overlooked amid the compelling action on the Western Front, nonetheless constituted an important step along the path toward

Canadian autonomy.

The graves in the Churkin cemetery are marked with proper tombstones now. After their re-discovery, the Canadian government authorized a reclamation project for the graveyard, and the 14 Canadians, along with casualties from the other Allied participants, are now catalogued with the Commonwealth War Graves Commission. Along with the physical remembrances of the CSEF, the construction of its history is slowly improving too. In 1990 when Heath and his Canadian contingent arrived in Vladivostok, not a single member of the officer corps was aware that Canadians had ever been militarily involved in

"Cemetery Reports." Commonwealth War Graves Commission, http://www.cwgc.org/scarch/ccmetery reports.aspx?cemeterv=49435&mode=1 (accessed May 2, 2010). 98 the city.217 Today, it is still true that few people outside academic circles know the story.

Yet through the efforts of historians such as Isitt who have re-opened the subject and are attempting to broaden public awareness through newly published material and an interactive database, prospects for the future historiography of the CSEF are brighter.

217 Thomas Heath, Interviewed by Lucas Ker, April 12, 2011. 99

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