Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia

ISSN 2221-9935 (Print) ISSN 2306-8000 (Online)

ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL of MARINE SCIENCE&EDUCATION

MARITIME TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN EAST ASIA

THEMATIC ISSUE

VOLUME 6, No. 1, 2016 based on materials of round-table discussions conducted at MSU(N) in 2014–2016

Adm. Nevelskoy Maritime State University Vladivostok, Russia 2016 "Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia". Thematic issue of "Asia-Pacific Journal of Marine Science and Education" based on materials of round-table discussions conducted at Adm. Nevelskoy Maritime State University in 2014–2016.

The present thematic issue includes papers and presentations of round-table discussions conducted at Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University (Vladivostok, Russia) in 2014–2016 on a problem maritime territorial disputes in East Asia. For historians, economists, foreign policy and law experts, lecturers, scholars and students interested in problems of international relations in East Asia.

Asia-Pacific Journal of Marine Science&Education

Published semiannually by Adm. Nevelskoy Maritime State University

Scientific Editor Boris I. Tkachenko

Adm. Nevelskoy Maritime State University 50a Verhneportovaya St., Vladivostok, Russia, 690059 E-mail: [email protected], [email protected] Phone/Fax: +7(423)230-1275

2014 VOLUME 4, No. 2

Anastasia O. Barannikova The Paracel Islands dispute and role of USA………………….4 Vladimir A. Lazarev Expansion of the living space of China in South China Sea….19 Nikolai I. Pereslavtsev Japanese-Korean territorial dispute and the prospects for its resolution……………………………………………….24 Peter Yu. Samoylenko Problems of international tension in North-East Asia and prospects for Russian-Japanese cooperation: communicative aspect of two countries’ dialogue……………………………..37 Sergey M. Smirnov Considering the changing nature of maritime boundary disputes in South East Asia……………………………………47 Boris I. Tkachenko Territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The Spratly Archipelago…………………………………………………...56 Contributors………………………………………………….95 Article abstracts in Russian………………………………....98

3 THE PARACEL ISLANDS DISPUTE AND ROLE OF USA

Anastasia O. Barannikova Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University, Vladivostok

Abstract: The article studies the long-term dispute over the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, positions of claimants and the role of USA. Key words: South China Sea, the Paracel Islands, China, Vietnam, USA

The dispute over the Paracel Islands [1] between China and Vietnam remains one of the most topical territorial claims in East Asia at the moment. The archipelago, which is approximately equidistant from the coastlines of China and Vietnam, is a group of small islands and reefs in the South China Sea with a total land area of approximately 7.75 square km The archipelago is considered as a single unit on the Vietnamese maps, and is divided into two groups of islands – Amphitrite and Crescent Groups on Chinese maps. The Amphitrite group lying in the northeast of the Paracel Islands includes the largest islands of the archipelago – Lincoln Island (about 2 square km) and Woody Island (1.85 square km), as well as a number of smaller islands, reefs and shoals. The Crescent Group, located about 70 km southwest of the Amphitrite group, consists of islands and reefs that form a crescent-like structure. The largest islands of this group are Triton Island, Pattle Island and Duncan Island.

Vietnamese name of the archipelago is Hoàng Sa. It is included administratively into the county of the same name of the city of Da Nang while Chinese name is the Xisha Islands of the Hainan Province. In the past Paracel and Spratly archipelagos had common name the Yellow Sands and were designated as the Paracel, Prasel or Parsel Islands by of international nautical charts drafters. The exact location of the Hoang Sa archipelago (Paracel Islands) was determined in the XVIIIth century. Since that time the archipelago was regarded separately from the Trường Sa Islands (the Spratly Islands) [2, с. 11].

The Paracel Islands importance

The strategic importance of both Paracel and Spratly archipelagos is determined by their geographical location and economic potential. Archipelagos are located in the central parts of the South China Sea and are considered as convenient posts to control important sea routes, essential for trade and defense of the East Asian region. The South China Sea is the shortest waterway for sea transport connecting Indian and Pacific Oceans. SCS connects East Asia with the countries of Southeast Asia and Oceania, as well as Western countries (Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia) with the Eastern ones (Philippines, Indonesia, America). 90% of goods are carried by sea with 45% of them transported via SCS. About $5 trillion of commercial goods pass through the area each year.

5 In addition to favorable geographical position two disputed archipelagos are important due to their economic potential. Adjacent waters are rich in marine resources, and have offshore oil and gas fields. Geologic exploration conducted by China recorded 10 oil basins with oil reserves of 23 to 30 million tons and 20 trillion m3 of natural gas. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that there are 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in proven and probable reserves. Moreover, the Paracel Islands are important from the military-strategic point. Military air bases can be built there in order for protection of marine communications and providing starting point for airdrop and ground attacks. The area is also convenient for building ports, support points and observation posts for detecting submarines and alerting. The state controlling these territories would have military-strategic advantages in the case of armed conflict. To control these archipelagos is to control sea and air routes of the SCS.

History of a conflict around SCS

Disputes over the South China Sea last for centuries. Local insular areas in different periods were controlled by various states, including France and Japan. Exploration of the offshore hydrocarbon fields started in the 60–70s of the last century to involve the countries of the region into the struggle for access to rich deposits of oil and gas. As a result, the dispute over the SCS islands escalated and led to armed conflicts at sea – in 1974 [3, p. 509] and in 1988 [4].

One of the factors complicating solution of the territorial dispute over the Paracel Islands is its duration, as well as the lack of materials and evidence to substantiate sovereign rights of each country to the disputed areas. There are a number of historical and official documents, from both China [5, с. 157] and Vietnam [6], proving human presense on the territory of the Paracel Islands from the earliest times . But these documents are not sufficient to prove historical rights to the islands. The disputes around the islands of the SCS are long-term ones and cannot be resolved quickly. Both China and Vietnam finally understood it and started working on the dispute settlement through the development of economic cooperation and «freezing» political debates in the beginning of this century. In 2002, China and Vietnam along with other countries participating in the dispute over another archipelago of the SCS – the Spratly islands – signed an agreement, under which the decision on the status of the islands would be postponed until 2052. In November 2002, China and the ASEAN countries adopted a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties on the South China Sea, laying a political foundation for future possible commercial cooperation between China and ASEAN countries despite territorial claims and political discrepancies. Oil companies of China, Vietnam and the Philippines signed an agreement in 2005 on joint exploration of hydrocarbon fields, having emphasized the principle of «putting aside the disputes and jointly exploiting the region». Another good example of achieving bilateral compromise in the SCS is ratification of

7 Sino-Vietnamese Boundary Delimitation Agreement in the Gulf of Tonkin. During a meeting with the newly elected President of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Truong Tan Sang in September 2012, former Chinese President Hu Jintao called China and Vietnam to postpone disputes and start joint exploitation of the South China Sea resources. A year later during President of Vietnam’s official visit to China in June 19, 2013, the newly elected President Xi Jinping declared an intention to seek a solution of the SCS territorial disputes «by political means» and called not to let this issue affect bilateral relations. Thus, the conflict gradually moved to the «smoldering stage», with rare provocations committed by the fishing or cargo ships and statements and diplomatic moves made by two states leaders. However external factors are influencing these disputes recent years, particularly, USA Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy implementation accompanied by expanding American military presence in the region.

Role of USA

USA has no territorial claims to the South China Sea, but economic and political interests in the region. About $1.2 trillion of USA goods are transported through the SCS annually. Despite the statements about «neutral» position with regard to the territorial claims between other countries, USA often interferes in SCS disputes, including one related to the Paracel Islands. So, after the official opening of Sansha in 2012,

Washington accused Beijing of «subversive activities». It was followed by very sharp response of China, and Beijing through its state-run media offered Washington to «shut up» on the islands in the SCS [7]. Along with political statements USA traditionally uses military methods to promote its interests including building up military presence in the region on the pretext of «ensuring freedom of navigation». In October 2015, USA guided missile destroyer sailed near Subi Reef, one of China’s artificial islands, challenging its 12- nautical-mile territorial limit around the island. In response, China’s Ministry of National Defense vowed the country would «take any measures necessary to safeguard [its] security against U.S. military involvement in the area». US officials announced that they would carry out more naval operations in this region to assert the principle of international freedom of navigation. This summer U.S. Navy deployed two aircraft carriers USS John C. Stennis and USS Ronald Reagan near the South China Sea «to demonstrate USA position». According to MND of China, the US reconnaissance aircraft make up to 500 flights annually along the borders of China's territorial waters, the most of them in the South China Sea. This May USA president announced full lifting longstanding U.S. embargo on the sale of military equipment to Vietnam. Moreover, new defense pacts have been signed with Singapore and Australia, which can be considered as another step of USA strategy of surrounding and deterring China.

9 Some factors show that USA is interested in preserving status quo in the SCS and not interested in China-Vietnam dispute resolution. First, USA prefers military methods instead of the resolution of territorial disputes through negotiations between the claimants. Second, it actively interferes and opposes bilateral talks between claimants, including China-Vietnam, China- Philippines and China-Malaysia. Third, USA involves countries, having no relation to the dispute, into patrolling the South China Sea. For example, USA encourages Self-Defense Forces of Japan to support its military activity in the SCS. China and Japan have their own problems in bilateral relations. They are involved into dispute over Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and have historical issues unresolved. So interference of Japan in the SCS problems would rather aggravate than solve the dispute. Having the JSDF in an area where Japan has no territorial claims (unlike China) and its security and freedom of navigation are not threatened would intensify the emerging security dilemma between the U.S.-Japan alliance and China, as well as promote instability [8]. Given American military moves and strengthening of ties with neighbors involved in territorial disputes with China, the statements of Washington that it does not take sides in territorial disputes seem false and concerns of Beijing are understandable. Many in China believe that the United States is using the disputes over sovereignty in the South China Sea as a means of justifying more efforts to contain and undermine influence of China in the Asia-Pacific. Given the plans of THAAD system deployment in the South of the Korean Peninsula and further

10 expansion of USA TMD the threat to China’s security becomes even more serious.

Position of China

China is implementing the strategy of expansion of its spheres of influence as an emerging superpower. This strategy determines its position on international issues including territorial disputes in the SCS. At the same time Chinese leadership considers improving relations with neighbors in the region as a priority of foreign policy. The main points of China’s official stance were reflected in the speech of Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference (Beijing, 28–29 November 2014). In his address, Xi Jinping pointed out that: «While we pursue peaceful development, we will never relinquish our legitimate rights and interests, or allow China's core interests to be undermined… We should abide by the principle of non-interference in other countries' internal affairs, respect the independent choice of development path and social system by people of other countries, promote peaceful resolution of differences and disputes between countries through dialogue and consultation, and oppose the arbitrary use or threat of force… We should protect China's overseas interests and continue to improve our capacity to provide such protection…» [9]. Thus, the position of China on SCS can be viewed as a combination of two interrelated areas – protection of

11 «indisputable sovereignty» over the islands in the SCS adjacent waters and simultaneous promotion of friendship and partnership with neighbors, including rivals. In 1980s Chinese leadership Deng Xiaoping set forth formulation: «Sovereignty is ours; defer disputes; engage in joint development», and the current Chinese leadership continues this course. This course could significantly reduce the probability of a military conflict if there was no intervention of the so-called third countries. Nevertheless, USA strategy of using military means and involving allies into the disputes may finally force China to take harder positions. This year China conducted military drills around the disputed Paracel Islands [10]. These exercise though routine one was seen as a signal to the US [11]. China does not deny it. According to Beijing experts, the exercises were held to demonstrate China’s capacity to mobilise military and civilian forces and to defend the country’s maritime sovereignty. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) also held military exercises in July, ahead of the International Court of Arbitration ruling on China’s dispute with the Philippines [12]. China is also steadily increasing military cooperation with Russia. This autumn China and Russia conducted joint naval exercise in the South China Sea off the coast of China’s Guangdong province. The Joint Sea–2016 exercises involving surface ships, submarines, fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and amphibious vehicles became the first major drill of its kind involving China and a second country in the South China Sea.

Delivery of 24 Russian Su-35 aircraft worth $ 2 billion to China will begin in 2017. These aircraft are expected to patrol South China Sea borders. Along with military ties China maintains and develops efficient cooperation with Russia on foreign policy arena (two countries have common position on some international policy issues). Earlier this year, in anticipation of the International Court of Arbitration ruling, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reached an «important consensus» on the South China Sea. According to a statement by the Chinese foreign ministry, «Lavrov expressed that Russia holds that the South China Sea issue should be resolved through political and diplomatic means such as direct dialogues and negotiations by parties concerned. Forces outside the region should not intervene» [13]. The last statement was considered as ostensibly referencing the United States.

Conclusion

The Paracel Islands as any other territorial dispute is potential source of armed conflict. Despite the fact that at present China has full control over disputed territories, Vietnam refuses to recognize the current status of the islands. In the future, the situation is not excluded when in favorable conditions Vietnam can try to regain lost territory. Disputes between China and Vietnam in the past already led to clashes and one should not exclude the threat of new conflicts.

13 Nevertheless, the probability of this scenario is pretty low, if there is no interference of the third countries. Unprompted military conflict between China and Vietnam is possible only in the case of provocation, organized by third countries or sharp deterioration of regional situation. The most serious danger is escalation of USA – PRC competition in the Asia-Pacific region and USA actions in the range of its strategy implementation. Since USA interfered into the dispute, its conflict potential grew significantly. Disagreements over the Paracel islands, as well as other islands of the South China Sea, risk to turn from dispute between China and Vietnam into one between China and USA. Efforts by China and Vietnam directed to increasing cooperation and resolving dispute peacefully can be negated by the USA interference. Territorial disputes in the Asian part of the world for a long time were characterized by low conflict potential and risks of armed conflict. But Euro-Atlantic approach [14] if applied in Asia, can produce destabilizing effect, and pose a threat to the regional security.

REFERENCES

1. Archipelago in the South China Sea, located between 15°46'N 111°11'E and 16°8'N 112°54' E. 2. До Хоа Бинь. Международно-правовые аспекты проблемы архипелагов Хоангша (Парасельские острова) и Чыонгша (острова Спратли): Автореферат диссертации на соискание ученой степени кандидата

юридических наук. Московский государственный институт международных отношений МИД СССР. М., 1991. 3. The Battle of the Paracel Islands was a military engagement between the naval forces of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) in the Paracel Islands on January 19, 1974. As a result of the battle, the PRC established de facto control over the Paracels. 4. The Johnson South Reef Skirmish of 1988, a naval battle that took place between Chinese and Vietnamese forces over Johnson South Reef in the Spratly Islands on 14 March 1988. Resulted in Chinese victory. 5. References to the islands appear in a number of books dating as far back as the Han Dynasty (206 BC‐220 AD) – Yiwu Zhi (Records of Rarities), Three Kingdoms Period (220– 280) – Funan Zhuan (Journeys to and from Phnom), the Jin (265–410), Tang (618–907), Song (960–1279), Yuan (1271– 1368), Ming (1368–1644), and Qing (1644–1911) Dynasties. These include the Dao Yi Zhi Lue (Abridged Records of Islands and Barbarians) written by Wang Dayuan, and the Nanzhou Yuou Zhi (Records of Rarities in Southern Boundary) by Wan Zhen, Qiong Guan Zhi (Records of the Qiong Prefecture and its Jurisdiction). Reference to the islands can also be found in a number of maps, including the Hunyi Jiangli Lidai Guodu zhi Tu (Consolidated Map of Territories and Geography and Capitals of Past Dynasties), published during the Ming Dynasty, and the Geng Lu Bu (Road Map) of the Qing Dynasty. Zhu Fan Tu (Maps of the Various Barbarian Peoples) of the North Song Dynasty, the Zhu Fan Tu (Maps and Charts of the Various 15 Barbarian Peoples, the North Song Dynasties), Hunyijiangli Hdai Guodu zhi Tu (Consolidated Map of Territories and Geography and Capitals of Past Dynasties (1402). Official records of the Ming Dynasty, such as Qiong Guan Gu Zhi (Ancient Records on the Jurisdiction of Qiongzhou Fu), also refer to Chinese jurisdiction over the Spratlys and Paracels. Qing-era records (e.g., Records of Wanzhou Subprefecture, Records of Qiongzhou Prefecture and Guangdong Tong Zhi (General Records of Guangdong Province)) likewise reflect that the South China Sea islands, including the sea areas surrounding the islands, were within the jurisdiction of Wanzhou. Source: https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/IOP-2014-U-008433.pdf; Jianming Shen, «Security Flashpoint: Oil, Islands, Sea Access and Military Confrontation». 6. Evidence of Vietnamese sovereignty over the Paracel Islands can be found in the works of Do Ba in a series of maps of Vietnam in the third part of the Hong Duc Atlas, the 17th‐ century atlas — Toan Tap Thien Nam Tu Chi Lo Do Thu (Route Map from the Capital to the Four Directions, Other maps, documents, and publications cited by Vietnam include: Đại Nam thực lục tiền biên (1600–1775) (The Early Chapter of The Chronicles of Đại Nam); Đại Nam Thuc Luc Chinh Bien (relating to the subsequent period); Toản tập Thiên Nam tứ chí lộ đồ thư (1630–1653) (The Collection of the South’s Road Map); Giap Ngo Binh Nam Do (1774) (The Map for the Pacification of the South in the Giap Ngo Year); Phủ biên tạp lục (1776) (Miscellany on the Pacification at the Frontier); Lich trieu hien chuong loai chi (1821) (Classified Rules of the Dynasties); The 16

Authentic Writings on Đại Nam (compiled between 1821 and 1844); Đại Nam Nhat Thong Toan Do (1838) (The Complete Map of the Unified Đại Nam); Kham Dinh Đại Nam Hoi Dien Su Le (1843‐1851) (The Đại Nam Administrative Repertory); Đại Nam thực lục chính biên (1848) (The Main Chapter of The Chronicles of Đại Nam); Đại Nam nhất thống chí–the geography and history of Đại Nam (The Record of The Unified Đại Nam) edited 1865‐1882;Hoàng Việt dư địa chí(1833) (Geography of The Viet Empire); Việt sử thông giám cương mục khảo lược (1876) (Outline of The Chronicles of The Viet History); and other official documents of the Nguyen Dynasty, as well as maps and documents made by other countries during the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries. Source: https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/IOP-2014-U-008433.pdf; История островов Южно-Китайского моря. Составлено Д.В.Ершовым (www.damanski-zhenbao.ru) по материалам сайтов www.globalsecurity.org, www.425dxn.org/dc3mf/ (Wolfgang Schippke), а также по материалам книги «Les archipeles Hoang Sa et Truong Sa», Hanoi,1984. 7. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa- southchinasea-idUSBRE87505N20120806 8. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/averting- deepening-us-china-rift-over-the-south-china-sea- 13019?page=show 9. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t 1215680.shtml

17 10. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy- defence/article/2011914/china-holds-joint-drills-show-maritime- strength-near 11. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy- defence/article/1984916/china-hold-military-drills-paracel- islands-ahead-hague 12. http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/international- court-issues-unanimous-award-in-philippines-v-china-case-on- south-china-sea/ 13. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t 1360540.shtml 14. This approach is described here: Smirnov S. Asia- Pacific Region and «western» model of collective security. Vladivostok, 2008.

EXPANSION OF THE LIVING SPACE OF CHINA IN SOUTH CHINA SEA

Vladimir A. Lazarev Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University, Vladivostok; Institute of Economic Research of Far Eastern Branch of Russian Academy of Sciences, Khabarovsk

Abstract: Article discusses the problem of expansion of living space of China. Contemporary situation in South China Sea where China tries to take control on over 90% of area forms the global threat to the stability in region. Efforts of world community are needed urgently to help the resolving and accommodation of multiple interstate contradictions in South China Sea. Keywords: China policy, South China Sea, contradictions, disputed area.

At present, China policy aiming to the expansion of living space is directed strongly to South China Sea. It is generally agreed that the modern history of conflict in South China Sea has begun in 1959 when China tried to seize the Paracel Islands involving of the civil fishermen. To that time the part of these islands belonged to China and another part – to Southern Vietnam. The attempt was not successful. Big group of fishermen have been arrested [2]. 15 years pause in actions was ended in 1974 when China has captured the Paracel Islands in one massive military

19 operation, and after that has established the total control over the islands. The further actions of China were expanding step by step the control over offshore zones of South China Sea, the measures were including the building of artificial islands. The Chinese policy in South China Sea has led to consequential conflicts with Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, Indonesia and Brunei. To the present China is aimed to capture the control over Spratly Archipelago but does not take the risk of entering the direct military operations. Simultaneously China declares the claim for 80% of area of South China Sea (see fig.1). An important notice. Wide engaging of civilians to the attacks on the neighboring states is not something new to China. In their conflicts with Russia during 19 and 20 centuries, China used local civil population, and even local gangster groups – «khungkhuz» ( 紅鬍子) as it happened in Manzovsky war in 1859, or in the conflict in Manchuria in 1900, or in the conflict over China East Rail Way in 1929. The similar scheme has been used in the conflicts with USSR during 1960th years. Apparently, governmental bodies of China prefer to operate within the simple framing scheme. The representatives of local authorities spread the information that the certain sites or territories are now under the control of China state, and these sites now are available for farming, or fishing. Information is presented to the low educated and mostly illiterate rural population, fishermen. When the local population heads for the specified sites, they meet border patrol forces of neighboring country and enter the conflict. As soon as it occurs, the army of

China comes to rescue their citizens, meanwhile capturing the site of interest.

Fig. 1. The disputed areas: China and others claims in South China Sea [1] In the conflict over the South China Sea, Russia holds mostly the wait-and-see attitude being strongly interested in maintenance of good relationships with China. Thus, the leading role in restraint of the Chinese expansion in the region goes to the USA. US actions in cooling down of China expansion are 21 consequential during last decades and include permanent presence of large airborne group near the South China Sea, numerous assurances of Philippines and Indonesia in support of their position on contest of China domination, keeping the group of 2000 men of quick-reaction troops in Australia, and regular visiting of warships in disputed waters. Pragmatic interest of China in expansion of living space is necessary for maintenance of growth of living standard of 1,3 billion Chinese population. Such pragmatism has led China logically to the attempt to form an image of South China Sea with all its resources as inner Chinese sea. The international law does not support the position of China that particularly confirmed by the statement of Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague from July, 12, 2016. However, dispute is not finished. Seemingly Japan, that has occupied Archipelago Spratly in 1939 and kept it until the Second World War ended, joins the conflict on the side of Philippines. South China Sea holds more than 12% of world fishery. Energy stocks in conflict areas are estimated in 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 billion cubic foots of gas, including 2,5 billion barrels of the proved reserves [3]. This volume represents a great interest for China. Chinese companies operate now in fast manner the accessible deposits near the Pearl River (Zhu Jiang) mouth. Simultaneously the Chinese companies aspire to expand their efforts to the far offshore zone of South China Sea purposing to start exploitation of oil and gas deposits including in disputable sites.

The situation in South China Sea remains difficult, and considerable efforts of many states of the world, including Russia, will probably be necessary to reconcile interests of the arguing parties. It remains to hope that the policy of modern China will not develop the way taken by Japan in the first half of 20 century, and will not become a basis for the world conflict of 21 century.

REFERENCES

1. China Claims A Big Backyard – available at http://www.southchinasea.org 2. Mosyakov D.V. Conflict in South China Sea and ways of decision. South-East Asia: Actual Problems of Development, № 21 / 2013, pp. 16–22. 3. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Publication South China Sea – available at https://www.eia.gov/beta/ international/ regions- topics.cfm?RegionTopicID=SCS

23 JAPANESE-KOREAN TERRITORIAL DISPUTE AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ITS RESOLUTION

Nikolai I. Pereslavtsev Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University, Vladivostok

Abstract: This article considers the reasons behind the dispute between Korea and Japan over the Liancourt (Dokdo/Takeshima) islands located in the Sea of Japan, makes a detailed analysis of the arguments and positions of each of the parties from a historical, legal and economic point of view, and suggests ways and means to solve the problem taking into account the interests of international cooperation and security in the region. Keywords: Dokdo, Takeshima, Liancourt islands, Japan, Korean Peninsula, International Court of Justice.

It is believed that the geographical neighborhood rarely creates the basis for interstate trouble-free coexistence because of itself can be the source of various problems, including territorial conflicts. There are many examples of such situations (more than 20 in Asia [16]), on all continents. The roots of territorial disputes usually lie in historical times and can be surmounted only after a long period of controversies and contradictions and if in the relations of opponents there appear common interests which clearly prevail over the moments of the rivalry. Let us consider in this regard the dispute between Japan and Korea, who for more than 70 years claim their rights to the

24 group of islands in the Sea of Japan (217 km from the Korean Peninsula and 212 km from Japan [7]). Each side views them as their own and calls by original name: «Dokdo» («Lonely») in Korean and «Takeshima» («Bamboo») in Japanese. There is also the European designation of the archipelago – «Liancourt» (named after the French ship whose crew discovered and put the islands on the map in 1849 [22]), and we’ll call it so from now onwards for the sake of neutrality. Since 1954 Liancourt is being under Korean jurisdiction and control [8] and both sides periodically raise the issue for discussion, trying to reinforce them with historical and documentary evidences. In any territorial dispute, including Asia, it seems most logical to rely primarily on existing documentary evidences, and only then, if they do not exist, on historical ones. Legally valid documents confirming the possession of certain territories have appeared mostly after Second World War and we’ll begin right from these times. Speaking of that it should be noted that Japanese arguments contain a lot of rather vulnerable points that don’t allow their definite support in the present proceedings. On the contrary, Korean positions seem more reasonable, maybe because they mostly appeal to the decisions approved by victorious powers on multilateral basis. Meanwhile, Tokyo is often based on purely one-sided interpretations of dispute around Liancourt, stemming, in particular, from American opinions and steps.

25 To begin with, because of American pressure during preparation of San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan (1951) Liancourt islands were not mentioned in it as the territory that Japan should abandon [25,27]. On these grounds, Japanese researchers began to claim (and have been doing so a lot of times) that this document confirmed status of the archipelago as Japan’s possession. The South Korean side offered well-founded objections. First, the principles of international law are usually determined by international community and not by the assessment of one single country. American rejection to include Liancourt in the list of territories, excluded from the governance of Japan in accordance of San Francisco Treaty, reflects only the position of United States, but not the collective opinion of the Allied powers [3]. Second, Korea has not signed San Francisco Peace Treaty, although it fully respects all decisions of the Allied Powers about Japan [11]. Third, immediately after the war, the archipelago had been separated from the rest of Japan’s territory and was under the control of the US Armed Forces Military Command [9]. Special legal documents for the transfer of the Liancourt islands to Japan (as in the later case of Okinawa) were not issued. On the contrary, the Islands were transferred by United States to the Republic of Korea since its establishment in 1948 [9]. Fourth, Tokyo shows the apparent inconsistency and the absence of logic. In the past the Japanese denied obligatory provisions of the certain documents adopted by the Allied

Powers about borders of Japan’s territory because they did not participate in their drafting and implementation. However, Japan could not participate, as it had been an aggressor, was defeated, and agreed to the terms of unconditional surrender. As for San Francisco Peace Treaty Japan also played no role in its drafting, but nevertheless considers necessary to refer to it in proving its claims to the Islands. Fifth, Liancourt Islands were acquired by Japan in 1905 through the use of force during a period of aggressive policy (Tokyo refuses to consider acquiring Liancourt as an act of aggression). Though in this case it all depends on how you look at the things. In an administrative sense the Islands since 1905 were the part of Japanese Shimane prefecture [18] and not of Korean Governor-General. On the other hand, according to Potsdam Declaration [15], international law and the fact of surrender Japan had been deprived of Liancourt (and several other territories) quite rightly and reasonably on the basis of results of the Second World War and in this question there could be no various opinions [3]. By the way, in 1954, 1962, and 2012 Japan proposed to Seoul that the issue of the Islands’ possession be referred to the International Court of Justice, but all three times Korea refused, basing on above mentioned arguments. Taking into account their validity, no one, by and large, could blame Seoul for this step. To understand finally the essence of the dispute it is necessary to remember that, in addition to strategic (mid-way between Korea and Japan, on the sea routes from Russian Primorye to East China Sea) position, Liancourt Islands have an

27 economic value. The bottom topography of the Sea of Japan, especially in the southern and central part, including Liancourt, and the map of currents in this area create conditions for the concentration of significant number of fish resources (squid, crab, cod, pollock, shrimp etc.) and different seafood [26].

Fig. 1. The coast of one of Liancourt islands Besides, according to some reports, reserves of gas hydrate on the sea bottom, which have been found here, are estimated to be approximately 600 million tons [5]. Both for Korea and Japan which almost entirely import their fuel and energy, these natural resources would be very useful. However, if the commercial and profitable development of the gas is a possibility of the remote future, then the fish resources are being actively obtained right now by fishermen of countries adjacent to the Sea of Japan, as well as China. Russia, South Korea and Japan have 200-mile exclusive economic zones, which converge nearly right at the center of the Sea of Japan. As Republic of Korea has established sovereignty over the Liancourt

28 islands and considers them as the part of its own EEZ, then this country in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) proclaimed the priority of rights for the development of seafood and marine research (Article 56, p. 1) in this area [6]. Although, speaking in principle, Seoul has never refused to discuss the possibility of the allocation of certain quotas to the citizens of neighboring countries on a partnership basis (Article 62, p.2). But for the Japanese fishermen and politicians this, apparently, is not enough, and there is something here to fight for. According to estimates, an unlimited access to fishery resources in the Liancourt area could contribute to a sharp reduction of fish imports (now 2.0–2.4 million tons per year, which is equal to the volume of Japan’s entire coastal fisheries) [2]. Therefore, fishermen in Japan occasionally put pressure on parliament deputies, especially before coming elections; deputies, in turn, apply to the government, and government members state their position and put forward various initiatives. Different statements appear and are accompanied by documents and history books, which assert that the inclusion of the Islands in Korean territory and EEZ is actually illegal, so Korea has monopolized the production of seafood in the Liancourt area without legitimate reasons. Of course, Korean side expresses protests, which can be alternatingly moderate during periods of political calm – and stormy with demonstrations such as military exercises around the

29 Islands and the interim recall of ambassadors during the pre- election. All above mentioned collisions and confrontations are added with old mutual claims, based on historical grievances and hostility. So, what are the prospects for settlement of the dispute around Liancourt? The UN Charter says: «All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state» [24]. The open use of force nowadays is unlikely possible. Generally speaking, neither Korea, nor Japan, nor their common ally, the United States, basing in their own political and economic interests just can't afford to begin the internecine armed conflict in the strategically important region which is close to North Korea, China and Russia. Thus, the dispute can be resolved in two main peaceful forms [17]: – By the conclusion of agreement. For this, Korea and Japan should sit down at the negotiating table and reach an agreement about final settlement of the dispute or about referring it to the intermediary party, for example, judicial authority; – In the form of judicial decisions. But as it was mentioned earlier, Korea has rejected Japanese proposal to refer the issue of the Islands to the International Court of Justice. At the same time the prospects for final settlement of the dispute around Liancourt and even compromise on bilateral basis seem vague and very unclear. Seoul and Tokyo have no inclination for it and are interested mostly in a sluggish

30 confrontation which is a good excuse for the solution of certain current problems in domestic and foreign policy. So in light of the unlikelihood of a bilateral Korean- Japanese compromise about Liancourt, it seems to be more reasonable and appropriate to work towards a multilateral agreement – for example, in the context of common concerns about security on the Korean Peninsula, about the legal consolidation of international non-war regimes in the area of the Sea of Japan, and about the ban on demonstrations of any military force outside its own territorial waters. Moreover, it’ll be necessary as well to get North Korea involved in the preparation of such a multilateral agreement because of its repeated missile launches without notice towards the sea area. It would be premature to talk about quick reducing of military confrontation on Korean Peninsula, but the effective guarantees from United States and South Korea to freeze the arms level in this area could stimulate Pyongyang to accept the conditions about ban of missile launches (in the security context of the Sea of Japan) and to sign relevant documents. The next stage is the implementation of international integration projects in the area of the Sea of Japan, such as the joint development of fish resources. Naturally, the most interested in such projects will be countries adjoining the Sea of Japan. It is assumed that the coastal countries (an active role, including a political one, in the promotion of joint projects should belong to Russia) will jointly invest in the conservation, research, restoration and production of seafood, and later,

31 perhaps, in the development and transportation of hydrocarbons [8]. One of the main meanings of such activities is the fact that economic integration will gradually make irrelevant the motivation for sea territorial disputes in this area and significantly reduce the possibility of their relapse. Of course, in view of the current reality, this may be a matter of the distant future. But if we do not all keep these possibilities in mind – do not even consider them or strive to actualize them – then, taking into account the danger of any escalating «glow» of territorial dispute into a «hot conflict» under conditions of excess nuclear and conventional weapons, then this future may never occur.

REFERENCES

1. Pamphlet of the Ministry of Foreign affairs of Republic of Korea «Dokdo is the territory of Korea» / Брошюра МИД Республики Корея «Токто – территория Кореи», URL: http://www.korea.net/pdfcontent/general/dokdo/2014_dokdo_Ru ssian.pdf 2. «East Asia in disputes for oil and fish»/ «Восток Азии в спорах за нефть и рыбу», 01.02.2012, URL: http://www.pravda.ru/world/asia/fareast/01-02-2012/1106609- eastasia-1 3. «Ten arguments about Dokdo islands, distorted by Japan», pamphlet of North-East Asia history fund / Десять истин об островах Токто, искажаемых Японией», брошюра

Фонда изучения истории СВА Республики Корея, URL: http://www.nahf.or.kr/Data/board_100/dokdo_Truth/Russian.pdf 4. «Once more about territorial disputes of Japan with China and Korea – Fund of strategic culture / «Ещё раз о территориальных спорах Японии с Китаем и Кореей» (II) – Фонд стратегической культуры, URL: http://m.fondsk.ru/news/2012/11/16/esche-raz-o-territorialnyh- sporah-japonii-s-kitaem-i-koreej-ii-17645.html 5. «Who? Dokdo!» / «Кто-кто? Токто!» // Российская газета, URL: http://www.rg.ru/2005/06/24/korea- ostrov.html 6. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea/Конвенция ООН по морскому праву 1982 г., URL: www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclo s_r.pdf 7. «Liancourt, information from Wikipedia / «Лианкур», материал из Википедии — свободной энциклопедии, URL: https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Лианкур. 8. Nikolai I. Pereslavtsev. «Korean-Japanese discord concerning the Liancourt Islands / Николай Переславцев «О корейско-японских разногласиях вокруг островов Лианкур», «Asia-Pacific Journal of Marine Science&Education», vol. 5, No.1, 2015, thematic issue «Russian Far East and Korean Peninsula», pp. 43–52. 9. Refutation concerning pamphlet about Dokdo, published by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Dokdo Research Center. Seoul / Опровержения по поводу рекламной брошюры о Докдо, изданной Министерством иностранных

33 дел Японии. Исследовательский центр Докдо. Сеул, 26.08.2009 г., URL: http://www.dokdohistory.com/ru/ ?stctgr=5&stsqn=185&sopt=&stxt=&page=1&subject=&bmode =view&bidx=4 10. Liancourt islands / «Острова Лианкур», URL: http://subscribe.ru/archive/country.other.japan4russia/2012/08/27 /120044.html 11. Dokdo is the native Korean territory, Russian- Korean Information agency «RusKor» / «Острова Токто – исконно корейская территория», российско-корейское ИА «Рускор», 30.11.2011, URL: http://www.ruskorinfo.ru/ expert_opinion/1171/?print=Y 12. «Official position of the Republic of Korea about Dokdo islands» / «Официальная позиция Республики Корея в вопросе принадлежности островов Токто», URL: http://nbenegroup.com/ territory/tocto_analit.html 13. «Official position of Japan about Takeshima islands» / «Официальная позиция Японии в вопросе принадлежности островов Такэсима», URL: http://www.nbenegroup.com/territory/takesima.html 14. «Position of Japan about Takeshima islands» / «Позиция Японии по островам Такэсима», URL: http://www.kz.embjapan.go.jp/others/takeshima.pdf 15. Potsdam Declaration, July 26, 1945, Chronos, history magazine / Потсдамская Декларация от 26 июля 1945 года, Хронос, исторический портал, URL: http://www.hrono.ru/dokum/194_dok/1945potsdam.php

16. Territorial problems in East Asia and the ways for their solution / Территориальные проблемы в Восточной Азии и пути их решения, URL: http://deita.ru/news/politics/13.03.2008/107290-territorialnye- spory-v-vostochnoj-azii-i-puti-ikh-reshenija/ 17. «Territorial dispute» / Территориальный спор – Википедия, URL: https://ru.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Территориальный_спор 18. The problem of Takeshima islands. Territorial sovereignty of Japan over Takeshima islands / Проблема островов Такэсима. Территориальный суверенитет Японии над островами Такэсима, URL: www.ru.embjapan.go.jp/territory/takeshima/issue.html 19. The problem of Japan’s south territories / Проблема южных территорий Японии, Газета.ру, Интернет- портал, URL: http://www.gazeta.ru/2003/01/09/ vrezterritor.shtml 20. There have been conducted military exercises in defense of Dokdo island with the landing of Navy special forces, October 25 / «Проведены учения по обороне острова Токто с высадкой спецподразделений ВМС», 25 октября 2013 г., URL:http://korean- news.org/index.php?category=army 21. San Francisco Treaty of piece, 1951 / Сан- Францисский мирный договор (1951), URL: http://ru.wikisource.org/wiki/Сан-Францисский договор. 22. Status and prospects for resolving territorial disputes between Japan and its neighbors: the Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China / Состояние и перспективы

35 решения территориальных споров между Японией и ее соседями: Республикой Корея и Китайской Народной Республикой, URL: http://www.perspektivy.info/misl/idea/ sostojanije_i_perspektivy_reshenija_territorialnyh_sporov_mezh du_japonijej_i_jeje_sosedami_respublikoj_koreja_i_kitajskoj_na rodnoj_respublikoj_2012-08-23.htm 23. «The starting point in 1945 – Japan’s surrender» / «Точка отсчета 1945 год – капитуляция Японии», URL: http://histrf.ru/uploads/media/default/0001/06/6c42484d0d6fcb6 cd515893cbbb3b04282ba9fe0.pdf 24. Charter of the United Nations. International Court of Justice / Устав Организации Объединенных Наций. Международный суд. Документы на русском языке, интернет-портал, URL: www.icj- cij.org/homepage/ru/unchart.php 25. The pamphlet of Ministry of Japan «Takeshima’ / Брошюра МИД Японии «Takeshima», URL: www.ru.embjapan.go.jp/territory/takeshima/pdfs/takeshima_pamphlet.pdf 26. «Sea of Japan», «Seas and oceans» / «Японское море», «Моря и океаны», Интернет-портал, URL: http://oceangid.blogspot.ru/2013/04/japonskoe-more.html 27. Treaty of Peace with Japan Signed in San Francisco, 8 September 1951, URL: www.taiwandocuments.org/ sanfrancisco01.htm

PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION IN NORTH-EAST ASIA AND PROSPECTS FOR RUSSIAN- JAPANESE COOPERATION: COMMUNICATIVE ASPECT OF TWO COUNTRIES’ DIALOGUE

Peter Yu. Samoylenko Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok; Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, Moscow

Abstract: Article deals with the problems of modern Russian-Japanese relations. Author researches possible new ways of two countries’ cooperation, which lay beyond the traditional rhetoric in rather cool relations of Russia and Japan. Author proposes to use strategy of reciprocal interests and to develop international relations on the basis of key perspectives, which meet the interests of both countries. The main goal for Russia is widening of economic cooperation in Asia-Pacific region. The main goal for Japan is the settlement of territorial conflicts and contradictions with China and improvement of relations with North Korea. Using their strong features Russia and Japan can help and supplement each other in bilateral relations. Key words: Asia-Pacific, North East Asia, Russia, Japan, China, North Korea, territorial conflicts, international economic cooperation, Russian-Japanese relations, priority development areas, Porto-Franco, mutual interests, mass media.

37 There is a whole number of long-lasting territorial conflicts and political contradictions in Asia-Pacific region, which have negative influence on security architecture and hinder the development of regional economic relations and cooperation. The fact is that key countries here are Russia and Japan, and they have rather complicated bilateral relations. At the same time both countries have serious potential for developing relations at the junction of political and economical interests [3]. Such opportunity is consistent with the spirit of rapprochement between the two countries, which has started in 2016 after bilateral meeting of their leaders [8]. Now Japan in North-East Asia has two main political, military and strategic problems: military and political situation on Korean Peninsula, which is complicated by the factor of North Korean nuclear weapons, and territorial conflicts with China. A clear example of such contradictions is long-lasting Chinese-Japanese sea territorial dispute about Senkaku Islands (Diaoyudao) in East China Sea [6]. Similar sea territorial disputes have essential economical basis – problems of using fishing territories in marine special economical zone, extraction of marine biological resources, opportunities for researching sea shelf, control of close-fitting air space and so on. As the main distinctive characteristic of territorial conflicts and contradictions in Asia-Pacific and North East Asia regions there may be called their «informational character», based on «participation of media». A large role is played by the image of a particular country in such conflicts, and it is very important for

Asian international relations and politics. In fact, countries which take part in such conflicts are not interested in military clashes and war incidents or other power actions, and compensate it by aggressive declarations in international relations – in form of menaces, claims, etc. Moreover, present territorial contradictions in Asia-Pacific region have exact historical basis due to past conflicts between nations and countries. For example, according to sociological poll, carried out by «Financial Times» newspaper, more than a half of Chinese population and about one third of Japanese people are waiting for war conflict between Japan and China in five or six years. At that, in spite of traditional Japanese-Chinese contradictions which are based on historical reasons (Second World War and other war conflicts of 19 and 20 centuries), the definite role in the relations of two countries is played by present conflicts. And the conflict over the Senkaku Islands in 2012–2015 was the main informational cause which caused media discussion about relations between China and Japan and social unrest in both countries. It has illustrated the real level of two countries relations, when each of them tried to create a media picture that the opposite side is to blame. Senkaku (Diaoyudao) Islands is rather small archipelago with the square of about 7 square kilometers. Japan, China and Taiwan are fighting and trying to prove their exclusive right to this piece of land in the ocean.

39 The dispute between these countries over Senkaku Islands has political, economic, image sides and, in addition, demonstrates the flaws in the regional security system. For its part, according to the articles of the so-called political course «Turn to the East» Russia seeks to strengthen the influence in Asia Pacific region, develop and diversify the relations with regional partners. At present, the main partner for Russia in Asia-Pacific is China. Both countries have stable relations and interests for cooperation but in addition Russia considers as valuable the development of relations with other regional countries. And in this regard Japan plays for Russia the primary role. According to the author, the Russian-Japanese relations in present days are sufficiently based on certain stereotypes, which have been formed during Cold War era and in latest periods of present history. Besides, both countries do not have enough mutual interests in foreign policy and economic cooperation [7]. If such factors existed, then bilateral relations probably would get new impulse for quality development. There is an opinion that for Japan it is more important to solve first of all, international problems, for example in relations with North Korea and China, and that can have positive influence on internal moments in social sphere and economics due to rising of Japanese patriotism, self-actualization and other moral dominants, which are typical for rather traditional Japan society. On the other hand, as for Russia, the main priority is the development of economic relations with the regional countries,

40 including Japan. Now Japan is one of the biggest regional and world economics. Taking into account the developing of Far- Eastern Russian strategic initiatives, such as «priority development areas» and «Porto-Franco», Japan can become one of key economical partners for Russia, like China, in Asia- Pacific region [2]. For example, the new prospects for more active cooperation with Japan are being opened by cargo transit from China through North Korea and Primorsky Region of Russia (so called transport ways «Primorye»). Japanese business, in its turn, especially in production areas, can use the territory of Primorsky region with favorable tax and custom regimes in order to organize assembly processes and subsequent export of manufactured goods to neighbor countries and regions through Russian seaports and railways. Although Japan traditionally gets political assistance and support from USA, it really needs, for military and political reasons, to have in the region the other friendly centers of power. One of these centers can be Russia. In fact, Russia today has good potential in relations with China and North Korea. And these countries traditionally have significant problems with Japan in North-East Asia. Accordingly, Russia may have a positive impact on such relations and their content, and thus to reduce the conflict potential in the region and protect its own political and economic foreign interests. In this сonnection, the main goal and perspective for Russian-Japanese relations in North-East Asia is cooperation on two main strategic ways: political and economical.

41 In the first case, Russia can play the role of mediator or, as minimum, influential player in territorial conflicts and political contradictions among Japan, China and North Korea. A significant role can belong to military cooperation, various formats of joint training exercises, for example, in terms of counter-terrorism, border cooperation etc. This strategy of cooperation will help to bridge the gap between the two countries and to become an evidence of regional cooperation’s development. In the second case, it will be necessary to find mutually acceptable formats of economic cooperation between Japan and Russia. Such role can be played by above mentioned logistic projects of cargo transit or projects that include development of joint manufacturing, especially in high-tech areas. Such business projects will require adequate support in military and security ways – counter-terrorist protection, guaranteeing the safety of commercial maritime communications and so on. Also, one of extra ways of probable cooperation may be joint concession business, for example, in such areas as sea fishing, and for its successful development it will also be necessary to protect maritime communications against terrorists, criminal etc. The next problem in today’s Asia-Pacific region is the growth of military capabilities of key countries: China, South and North Korea, Japan, Vietnam, India, who gradually increase their armed forces, in particular, missile capacity and military fleets. With regard to stable territorial and other contradictions, such circumstances can lead to the local war conflicts in the Pacific seas.

Therefore, Russia also needs now to implement the Pacific policy taking into account two above mentioned strategic factors. It can be concluded that Russia has equal military means and enough experience to solve these problems. For example, some years ago light missile cruisers of Russian Pacific fleet «Marshal Shaposhnikov» and «Admiral Panteleev» participated in escorting trade ships near African Horn and North-East coast of Africa, thus protecting them from Somalia pirates. Also Russia periodically conducts joint naval exercises with the fleets of India, China and other Asian countries. They are often devoted to the clashes with terrorist threats and are quite successful. It should be admitted that the development of Russian- Japanese relations in regime of such multilateral dialogue will most likely influence positively on security in Asia-Pacific and North East Asia regions, and will let to go beyond the standard regional schemes of political and economic cooperation, which are based on traditional triangles: «USA–Japan–South Korea» and «Russia–China–North Korea». The promotion of international economic projects with Russian participation in Asia-Pacific and North East Asia regions can exert a good impact on security system in the region and reduce the possibility for territorial conflicts. For example, cargo transit from China through North Korean Rajin to Russia and further on to Asia Pacific, first of all to Japan. Consequently, economical cooperation will reduce political contradictions and territorial conflicts.

43 In order to summarize it can be said that possibly the best way which can prevent and solve territorial maritime problems in Asia-Pacific is economic cooperation between the regional countries. The use of the disputed territories on the basis of mutual economic interests, through joint ventures and concessions in different areas, including oil, gas and mining industry, extraction of fishery resources etc. can play a positive role in resolving territorial conflicts. It is important to emphasize that the development of Russian-Japanese relations in the form of such a dialogue should have an adequate humanitarian and informational support. The primary problem is the absence of mutually beneficial media projects and appropriate expert analysis of relations between the two countries as well as the perspectives of cooperation in North-East Asia. For example, only a few of these topics find the coverage in the media of the Russian Far East. Meanwhile, it is directly related to the search of new opportunities in the relations of Russia and Japan. Therefore, it is desirable for both partners to use actively the mass media in order to avoid traditional contradictions and to find new ways for successful and fruitful interdependence [1]. Subject to the foregoing, we can say that Russian-Japanese dialogue may be based on the following main principles: – Rapprochement of positions of Japan and Russia in problems of economical cooperation and security More close interaction, including widening of real economic cooperation between Russia and Japan. In connection with that, the use of traditional and new mutual interests and opportunities in such

44 areas as: oil and gas extraction, fishing, Porto-Franco, priority development areas; – Possible mediation assistance in resolving political differences with other regional countries; – Mutual assistance in resolving security and defense questions, typical for globalization era. First key problems are counter-terrorist protection, the struggle with extremism, mutual marine exercises and so on. – Avoidance of traditional conflict rhetoric (for example, about so called problem of «northern territories») in the process of implementation of the various formats of bilateral dialogue; – Convergence of both countries positions on the basis of cooperation and similar views on the problems, important for both countries.

REFERENCES

1. Kolegova E.A. Reflection of the problem of the disputed Senkaku Islands (Diaoyudao) in Japanese mass media // Rossiya I ATR, 2014, №3, p. 14 / Колегова Е.А. «Отражение в японских средствах массовой информации проблемы спорных островов Сёнкаку (Дяоюйдао)» // Россия и АТР, 2014 г., №3, c. 14. 2. Krichevsky N. Priority development areas: the format problem/Кричевский Н. «Территории опережающего развития: проблема формата». URL: http://www.regcomment.ru/articles/territorii-operezhayushchego- razvitiya-problema-formata/

45 3. Kuzminkov V. The prospects of development of Russian-Japanese relations / Кузьминков В. «Перспективы развития российско-японских отношений» // «Свободная мысль». URL: http://svom.info/entry/472-perspektivy-razvitiya- rossijsko-yaponskih-otnoshen/ 4. Kurile problem in Russian-Japanese relations / «Курильский вопрос в российско-японских отношениях». URL: https://www.foreignpolicy.ru/analyses/kurilskiy-vopros-v- rossiysko-yaponskih-otnosheniyah/ 5. International terrorism in Asia-Pacific region / «Международный терроризм в Азиатско-Тихоокеанском регионе». URL: http://www.center-bereg.ru/m506.html 6. Problems of strengthening security in Asia-Pacific region / «Проблемы укрепления безопасности в АТР». URL: http://idetperformance.com/sovremennye-mezhdunarodnye- otnosheniya/671-problemy-ukrepleniya-bezopasnosti-v-atr.html 7. Russian-Japanese relations yesterday and today / «Российско-японские отношения: вчера и сегодня». URL: http://www.ifes-ras.ru/massmedia/21/262-rossijsko-yaponskie- otnosheniya-vchera-i-segodnya 8. Russian-Japanese Relations: what lies ahead? URL: http://valdaiclub.com/opinion/highlights/russian_japanese_ relations_what_lies_ahead/

CONSIDERING THE CHANGING NATURE OF MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTES IN SOUTH EAST ASIA

Sergey M. Smirnov Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University, Vladivostok

Abstract: The roots of maritime boundary disputes in SE Asia are not an easy subject for analysis. Originating from colonial rule, the situation in disputed areas deteriorated after the discovery of huge oil and gas reserves on the sea shelf. Today the climax of hydrocarbon race has passed but, new challenges appear urging ASEAN, China and other actors to take moves to protect vital interests and exercise sovereignty rights over strategically important maritime areas and sea routes of communications. Keywords: maritime disputes, sovereignty, drone ships, terrorist threat.

Traditional approach to maritime boundary disputes in South East Asia mainly addresses three aspects – complicated territorial and sea delimitation issues dating back to colonial ruling, access to natural resources in EEZ and national sovereignty over disputed areas. Let’s take a brief overlook of this before moving to new dimensions of a general problem. The first one is ‘objective’ by nature. Luckily, the inland [8] state boundaries in SE Asia is not a source of major confrontation. The Philippines Sabah Claim is more rhetoric than

47 practical legal dispute. The Pedra Branca case was resolved with 2008 ICJ resolution. The Ligitan and Sipadan ICJ ruling of 2002 left some controversy but has effectively excluded the possibility of conflict there. Remaining is the Paracel and Senkaku / Dyaoyuidao disputes each including PRC as one of opposing sides. The possibility of serious escalation exists for both hotspots, but the chances of attempts to forcefully overtake the islets from the opponent are very low. Owing to significant progress in economic collaboration and growing interdependency SE Asia in 2016 is definitely different geopolitically from what it looked like in 1974 when the Battle of the Paracel Islands [1] occurred. Maritime boundaries, especially overlapping EEZs is another and more complicated issue. Despite the fact that all regional countries have signed and ratified [9] the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) frictions and controversies in its implementation still exist among regional powers. Spratly Archipelago is one of the examples of confused and potentially threatening situation with six parties involved. Secondly, providing access to natural resources in EEZ and on the continental shelf, especially to oil and gas deposits has been a top priority goal for many regional economies where demand is much higher than domestically available reserves [10]. South China Sea with its huge potential hydrocarbon deposits [11] is considered ‘a pearl’ among the seas maybe next to the Persian Gulf only [3]. While it is a correct and rational explanation of the reasons for maritime boundary disputes in the region, the situation is not as clear today as it was before the

‘Shale Revolution’. The high cost of hydrocarbon drilling at substantial depths in South China Sea combined with the risks of staging full scale industrial activities in disputed water areas keeps major outside companies from entering this market. Without foreign investments, regional states alone will supposedly slow down the exploration of new deposits, at least until petroleum prices soar again. To the contrary, fishery in the disputed areas will remain a powerful driving factor for political tensions. The amount of fish caught each year in Spratly Islands is appr. five million tons which is roughly equal to the volume of fish catch in Russia and Japan [2]. Fishery is critically important for the food security of SE Asia nations which prevents the chances for the fast and easy political and legal settlement in disputed water areas of South China Sea and East China Sea as well. Thirdly, the problem of sovereignty that naturally arises from unresolved historic and legal issues described earlier, is permanently fed with economic factors but, has more to do with political, ideological or propaganda considerations. The latter often dominates national sovereignty agenda or simply uses it as a noble cover for cynically pragmatic moves. At the same time, the emerging challenges of the XXI century make grounds for renewed attention of regional states to the problems of exercising sovereignty rights well beyond their territorial sea limits. More on this later. July 12th, 2016 ICJ decision rejecting China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea [4] raised a lot of concerns and speculations. Rather unexpectedly, opposing parties preferred to

49 stay calm and have not attempted to capitalize on it or to openly express disagreement. It probably means that the traditional ‘Asian’ way of doing business has prevailed – informal discussions valuing higher than formal agreements, pragmatism and economic considerations dominating over the ideology and policy [5]. And, it possibly means that interrelations and decision driving mechanisms between ASEAN and China are not so obvious and more complex than widely described with a mere ideological cliché «ASEAN nations fear the Chinese expansionist moves and will join forces to oppose it». ASEAN members and other East Asian nations regard the sovereignty issues very seriously. For them, it is an integral part of people’s mentality and consciousness rather than simply political, diplomatic or economic challenges. ASEAN members have plenty of ‘internal’ sovereignty disputes causing mutual suspicions and sometimes breaking into hostilities. To the other side, China is trying to distinctly demonstrate to the region its adherence to peaceful means of conflict resolving and readiness to avoid potentially dangerous course of events. Normalization of relations with Taiwan and successful Hong Kong unification experience are playing in favor of PRC. It would be incorrect to assume that ASEAN countries have ceased to fear China and started to trust every declaration or move coming from Beijing. Rather, they prefer to think and behave rationally, reasonably implying that China will behave rationally and pragmatically, too. Any attempt by involved ASEAN state to gain regional support for its stance in maritime boundary disputes with PRC will hardly be a success, to say

50 nothing about the possibility of creation of some ‘anti-China unified front’ in South China Sea. At the same time, it does not mean that Beijing has managed to split the unity of ASEAN. The power of ASEAN is in its weakness. It is not a supranational organization whose members voluntarily or forcefully delegate part of their sovereignty rights to some higher institution. Western democracies looked down on ASEAN and used to lecture Asians on improperness of their association – its unwillingness to deal with strategic security agenda and denial of collective defense approach. Today, after Kosovo, Arabic Spring and BREXIT the number of Asian supporters of Western model of regionalism has definitely reduced. However, ASEAN members have their own experience of waiving some part of national sovereignty in the interests of regional security. ‘MALSINDO’ anti-pirate and law enforcement operation [6] has effectively wiped out the threat of pirate and criminal attacks on ship traffic in Malacca and Singapore Straits. There are other examples of effective ASEAN supranational mechanisms. But, this one was mentioned as it may be relevant for South China and East China Seas in not so distant future. The threat of terrorist, radicals and pirate attacks in South East Asia has not disappeared. Moreover, since general attention is now primarily focused on Middle East bloodshed the sleeping cells of Islamic radicals and secret criminal gangbangs in the region have acquired time and capacity to choose where and how to strike. Paradoxically, the technological progress facilitates the selection of targets in maritime domain for them.

51 The recent shift to drone operations instead of risking the life of human personnel exercised by military commanders and law enforcement agencies took place fairly unnoticed. Inspired by latest achievements in digital communications and robotics many transnational corporations are actively promoting the concept of drone cars and ships. Global shipping industry leaders are seriously discussing the prospects of crewless ships safely sailing the oceans saving money for their operators who will not have to pay salary, insurances, and compensations for seafarers and their families. This idyllic picture may be not so attractive if we take a look at another angle. Drones, both military and civilian have two principle shortages. They [drones] must be operated distantly by men or, they should be given a capacity to react and take decisions autonomously. In the first case a reliable line of communication between the drone and command center is needed. No technological breakthrough can overcome the laws of Physics limiting the communications performance, and nobody can guarantee the 100% protection against hackers, evil will or components failure. The second option empowers drones with deadly potential which can easily be turned on their creators and masters. The ‘Terminator’ saga is a non-science fiction, for simple reason – men will not be able to create self-organizing artificial intellect for the machines. Those who write megabits of software code for computers controlling the drones understand very little what and how exactly these drones should do. They get algorithms for real life operations modeling from knowledge engineers who are

52 supposed to know how things are done, but the latter are also accustomed to computerized procedures, ABS breaking, e- Navigation etc. As a result the most sophisticated technical systems often fail for stupid software mistakes, which are witnessed by numerous recent incidents with space launches. Basically, it does not matter whether drone aircraft, car, train or ship is malfunctioning because of internal hardware or software failure, communication break or hackers intrusion. The only difference is the potential scale of negative consequences, the time needed for correction, repair or termination of the drone and the presence of necessary resources capable of dealing with the ‘gone – crazy’ machine. And here we come back to maritime boundary disputes in SE Asia. Currently, around 50% of the world’s oil tanker traffic is estimated to flow through the South China Sea. Most disputed sea areas are located very close to strategic shipping routes and to the oil rigs. Merchant ships and rigs are highly attractable targets for terrorist and pirate attacks. The ships sailing near the coast of Somalia still have to take armed guards on board because the decade of extensive naval operation to protect shipping from pirate attacks reduced the threat, but has not eradicated it. Drone ships may appear as early as by 2020, at least major industrial corporations assure that technically everything is ready for it [7]. It is not clear what insurance rates will be applied for such vessels, and what inspection procedures will be needed to ensure its safe exploitation. The author believes that it is just a marketing ploy that will never become commercially profitable.

53 At the same time, the tendency of reducing ship’s crew below rational will probably continue, with simultaneously growing dependence on ‘smart’ electronic systems, more and often taking decisions instead of crewmembers. Accordingly, the vulnerability of new ships to technical failures and / or deliberate attacks will inevitably grow. To counter the emerging threat, neutralize it, come to incident area in proper time and mitigate the consequences the necessary assets must be at hand 24/7. Small islands in South China Sea, especially the Spratly Archipelago are a good option to create a chain of monitoring and fast response facilities. But, the transparency between all coastal states and an adequate level of interoperability between their Navies and Coast Guard is necessary. Giving the legal status for artificial constructions on coral reefs may possibly be needed, without imposing a regime of territorial sea around it as the latter would only increase hostilities instead of improving maritime and regional security.

REFERENCES

1. Thomas J. Cutler, The Battle for the Paracel Islands, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD. 2. FAO. 2016. The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2016. Contributing to food security and nutrition for all. Rome 3. Tim Daiss. Why The South China Sea Has More Oil Than You Think // Forbes, 22/05/2016.

4. PCA Case № 2013-19 IN THE MATTER OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION. Available in PDF: PH-CN-20160712-Award.pdf. 5. Смирнов C. М. Азиатско-Тихоокеанский регион и «западная» модель коллективной безопасности. Владивосток: Морской гос. ун-т им. адм. Г. И. Невельского, 2008. 6. Lloyd's MIU Handbook of Maritime Security. Edited by Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman, Peter Lehr. – CRC Press, Sep 24, 2008 – Law. 7. Tovey Alan. Crewless 'drone ships' will be sailing the seas by 2020 // The Telegraph, 11/04/2016. 8. ‘Inland’ in SE Asia very often means ‘relatively big islands’ or sometimes even small islands and rocks rather than continental territory. Moreover, erection of artificial islands and reefs tends to become an important factor in regional geopolitical environment. 9. Cambodia signed but not ratified UNCLOS so far. 10. Oil rich Brunei, natural gas exporter Indonesia and to some extent, Malaysia are exceptions with China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan being the world’s greatest importers of energy resources. 11. According to a newer USGS study in 2010, there is a 95% chance that there is at least 750 million barrels of oil in the South China Sea Platform.

55 TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA. THE SPRATLY ARCHIPELAGO

Boris I. Tkachenko Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University, Vladivostok; Institute of History of Far Eastern Branch of Russian Academy of Sciences, Vladivostok

Abstract: The article examines the Spratly archipelago as one of the disputed areas of the South China Sea. Physico- geographical and historical essays on the Spratly archipelago are proposed. The current positions of China and Vietnam on the territorial jurisdiction of the Spratly archipelago are considered. The Spratly Islands are characterized as an object of multilateral international territorial dispute between Vietnam, China, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei. Economic and strategic importance of Spratly Islands is shown. The problems of delimitation of marine economic domains in the water area of the Spratly Islands are characterized. Key words: South China Sea, the Spratly Archipelago, territorial dispute, Treaty of San Francisco, China, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, exclusive economic zone, continental shelf, international maritime law

The South China Sea is a marginal sea that is part of the Pacific Ocean basin, located on its western outskirts near the coasts of Southeast Asia between Indochina and the Malay Peninsulas, the islands of Kalimantan (Indonesia), Palawan and Luzon (Philippines), Taiwan and the coast of southern China. In 56 the north, it is connected with the East China Sea by the Taiwan Strait, in the north-east – with the Philippine Sea of the Pacific Ocean via the Straits of Bashi, Luzon and Babuyan, in the south it borders the Javanese sea via the Straits of Kelasa and Karimata, and in the southwest – with the Andaman sea of the Indian ocean via Singapore and Malacca Straits. The area of the sea surface is around 3,500,000 square kilometres [1, p. 573]. The South China Sea contains seamounts – platforms with relatively shallow depths (less than 200 m). Some of them reach the level of the sea surface, forming shoals, reefs and islands. There are such platforms in the South China Sea around the Paracel islands, the Macclesfield Bank, reefs of the Scarborough Shoal (South Rock) and to the south of the Macclesfield Bank. Small island groups – the Paracel Islands (Xisha), the Spratly Islands (Nansha), the Pratas Islands (Dongsha), and other smaller islands are mainly of coral origin and are located on the distance from the coast of the mainland and larger islands. The South China Sea disputed areas include Paracel and Spratly Archipelagoes, the Pratas Islands and the area of the Tonkin Gulf. Three areas of the South China Sea are the objects of international territorial disputes. Two of these disputes concerning ownership of the Paracel Islands (Chinese name – Xisha Qundao, Vietnamese – Kuandao Hoansha) and delimitation of the continental shelf in the Gulf of Tonkin (Chinese name – Beibu, Vietnamese – Bakbo) are bilateral disputes between China and Vietnam. The third territorial dispute involves China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines,

57 Malaysia and Brunei. The possibility of involvement of Indonesia into the dispute should not be excluded. The dispute concerning ownership of many islands in the South China Sea, which involves China and several ASEAN countries, is the source of the potentially most serious conflict in the region. The history of this issue shows that even quite long periods of relative peace in this part of the world's ocean are replaced by tensions and armed confrontation outbreaks. Significant improvement of China's inter-state relations with Southeast Asian countries in 1990s was achieved mainly due to the fact that the explosive issue of these island territories was not raised. The uncertainty of the South China Sea status from the point of international law makes the task of reviewing history of the establishment of effective control over the coastal states particularly urgent. The islets of the South China Sea do not have and have never had permanent population on them, although many of them have been used for centuries by fishermen from the countries of the region for short-term stays and rest. In addition to rich fish resources in the shallow waters around these two groups of islands, there are huge deposits of phosphates in the area.

Fig. 1. Territorial claims in the South China Sea

Fig. 2. Territorial claims in the South China Sea

Physical geography of the Spratly Archipelago The Spratly Islands (Chinese: Nánshā Qúndǎo, Vietnamese: Quần đảo Trường Sa Filipino: Kalayaan) is the atoll archipelago in the South China Sea, consisting of small land areas and reefs. Previously, the area of these islands were known as the «Coral Islands». The archipelago is located in the south-western part of the South China Sea between the territories of Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia, about 500 km south from the Paracel archipelago. Coordinates are 3° 40' – 11° 55' N 109° 33' – 117° 50' E. Land area of the archipelago is spread over an area of more than 400,000 km2 in the South China Sea. The center of the area containing these islands and reefs is located about 400 km north-east of the northern coast of Kalimantan and Palawan Islands and 500 km from the southern coast of Vietnam. The distance between Kalimantan and Palawan and some of the islands and reefs is 30–60 km. The 60 distance between the Spratly and the Paracel Islands is 700 km, and between the Spratly archipelago and Hainan Island is 1000 km. From the point of physical geography the archipelago consists of more than 230 small islands, reefs, rocks, shoals and atolls scattered over a vast arc with length of more than 1 thousand km on the southern edge of the South China Sea. Total area is 5 km2 without island formations temporarily appearing on the surface of the sea and 10 km2 with them, i.e. land area of the archipelago is equal to that of the Paracel Islands. Many parts of the archipelago appear above the water only during low tides. Their total number increases to about 400. According to general classification, the islands, reefs and shoals of the Spratly archipelago, separated at a distance of tens and even hundreds of kilometers, are divided into the following 12 groups: 1. North Danger group of islands and reefs, including the North East Cay (Parola) Island with area of 0,12 sq km, controlled by the Philippines, and the South West Cay (Song Tu Tay), occupied by Vietnam. 2. Thi Tu group of islands and reefs. The largest island of the archipelago (about 1.5 km long, 0.6 km wide, total area of 0.37 square km), the Thi Tu Island, is located here. 3. The West York (Likas) group with the West York Island having an area of 0,18 sq. km. 4. Loai Ta (Kota) group of islands and reefs. 5. Irving Cay (Balagtas).

61 6. The Nanshan Island (Lavak). Islands and island formations liste in paragraphs 2–6 are occupied by the Philippines. 7. Tizard group of islands and reefs. The second largest island of the archipelago, the Itu-Aba (Thai Binh) Island covering nearly 0.46 square km is included in this group and controlled by the Taiwan authorities. The Gaven Reef, occupied by China and the а Namyit Island, Sand Cay and Petley Reef occupied by Vietnam are also located here. 8. Union banks and reefs where an armed incident between China and Vietnam sailors occurred in 1988. 9. Spratly Island (Truong Sa) — is the most important of Vietnam-controlled islands in the South China Sea. It has dimensions of 750 x 400 m and area of 0.13 square km, which made it possible to build a runway. The Cuarteron and Fiery Cross Reefs, located close to it, are controlled by China. 10. Commodore Reef, controlled by the Philippine, which is actively challenged by Malaysia, China and Taiwan. 11. Amboyna Cay — Vietnamese well-fortified island, which is also claimed by Malaysia, China and Taiwan. 12. Mariveles Reef. Occupied by Malaysia and disputed by the Philippines, China and Taiwan. To the south of this island are also located controlled by Malaysians Swallow, Ardasier, and Dallas reefs. Almost all islands of the archipelago are covered with tropical vegetation, but until recently had no permanent population. Four airports are located on the islands. Currently the archipelago is used as a fishing area.

Fig. 3. The Spratly Archipelago

Historical background According to Chinese historians, in ancient times the islands of the Spratly area were known to Han Dynasty (206 BC – 220 AD) geographers. China provided numerous documents proving its right to the territories as far back as the 1st century. Many chronicles, records and books related to the South China Sea of Tang (618–907) and Song (960–1279) Dynasties historical periods have been preserved. According to Chinese historians, during the Song Dynasty not only traditional

63 economic activities were carried out in the South China Sea, but also Chinese naval patrols were deployed there. During the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) Dynasties periods the islands around the Hainan Island were under the administrative control of Hainan as a part of Guangdong province. Vietnam collected more than 30 maps, proving that Chinese Ming and Qing Dynasties had not recognized their authority over the islands in the South China Sea. These maps show that the Hainan Island was the border of China's territory and there were no references to Xisha and Nansha archipelagoes. According to Vietnamese historians, the Vietnam’s presence and control over the islands started in the 15th century. These islands were referred to in the «Collection of maps of ways to the Southern Lands». Nguyen Lords (1558–1777), the rulers of the southern part of Vietnam, sent 18 ships to the islands annually to collect valuable resources there. Some western islands of the Spratly area were visited by Spanish sailors in 1530. In 1606 they discovered the Spratly Island or an atoll, located to the southeast. In 1816, the Emperor of Vietnam officially proclaimed Vietnam's sovereignty over Paracel and Spratly Islands. Article 3 of the Treaty of Paris, signed between Spain and USA in Paris on December 10, 1898, stipulates that the western border of the Philippines passes 118 degree meridian, so their territory does not include any of the Spratly Islands. In late 1920s, the French authorities paid more and more attention to the Spratly Islands and sent ships to explore the islands of the Paracel (1925) and Spratly (1927) archipelagos.

French military ship was also sent to adjacent water area with the task to constantly cruise in this area in 1930. Armed forces of the Union of Indochina aboard three French ships took control of the seven main islands of the Spratly group in 1933, and on 25 June a decree was issued with a notice of these islands annexation. The archipelago was declared a French territory and a part of its colonies in Indochina. No protests followed that action. France built meteorological station on the Spratly Islands and adjacent water area was patrolled constantly by French warships since 1937. In 1939, Japanese troops occupied all islands of the South China Sea and maintained control over them until the end of the World War II. Given Tokyo plans of further expansion in the Pacific and Indian oceans, Japanese Navy was extremely interested in the Spratly Islands, having great strategic importance. After having occupied them, the Japanese immediately started military construction on those islands, which size and geographical position made them convenient supporting bases. Japanese built military monitoring, preliminary detection and warning stations, runway on the Itu Aba Island, and the port for seaplanes and submarine base on the Spratly Islands. Japanese garrisons were deployed on these two islands and monitoring and warning stations were built on a number of other smaller islands. Using these supporting bases Japanese naval and air forces caused significant damage to military and merchant fleet of allies in the beginning of war in the Pacific. Japanese evacuated from the islands in 1945. After the war French authorities focused on overall development of the

65 situation in Indochina, caring little about the small islands of the South China Sea, especially since these islands issue did not influence (neither in economic nor in military-political terms) the course of the colonial war against the people of Vietnam, who proclaimed the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on September 2, 1945. After the war in the Pacific finished, Chinese government, having taken advantage of France's difficulties, sent two naval expeditions consisting of four warships to the Spratly and Paracel Islands in December of 1946. The Chinese destroyed all signs of belonging built by Japanese troops on the islands and replaced them with Chinese signs. The expedition to the Spratly Islands finished. The banner was raised on the Itu Aba Island, which was considered the most important in the Spratly group, and a stele with the emblem of the Republic of China was erected there. As for the Japanese garrison on the islands, it had evacuated from the islands at least one year prior to the arrival of Chinese vessels. In fact, the Spratly Islands were unilaterally accepted under the jurisdiction of the Kuomintang government of the Republic of China after their abandonment by Japanese armed forces. It resulted in a one-time demonstration: expedition was sent there to destroy Japanese symbols and raise Chinese banner on one of the islands scattered in a range of 500–700 km. After completing this demonstration, Chinese vessels left the area with all staff of the expedition. Islands remained uninhabited. In December of 1947 the Kuomintang government of the Republic of China drew a map, showing its territorial claims in

66 the South China Sea. The map showed the sea border of China and so-called «U-shaped eleven-dash line». The Spratly and Paracel islands were marked as Chinese territories. None of the countries, including USA, expressed objection against the map at that time, i.e., the United States recognized China's sovereignty over these territories [7, p. 18]. The only Chinese garrison on the Spratly archipelago was deployed on the Itu Aba (Taiping) Island in mid-1960s, and presence of the armed forces of the Republic of China (Taiwan) was found by the Philippines for the first time in 1956. Decisions of the Allied Powers in respect of the Spratly Islands after the end of the Second World War were as follows. According to the Memorandum of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to the Imperial Japanese Government No. 677, January 29, 1946, «Japan is defined to include the four main islands of Japan (Hokkaido, Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku) and the approximately 1,000 smaller adjacent islands» (paragraph 3), excluding the Spratly Islands» [6, p. 212]. Article 2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 states that: «Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands» (paragraph f) [2, p. 339], but the country to own these territories was not specified. Nothing was said about all of the Spratly Islands. The first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the Soviet Union, Andrei Gromyko, proposed the following amendments to the draft peace treaty introduced by USA and GB at the San

67 Francisco Conference on September 5, 1951: «Paragraphs (b) and (f) of Article II should be annulled and replaced with a paragraph as follows: «Japan acknowledges the complete sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China over Manchuria, Taiwan, and adjacent islands, the Penghu Islands (the Pescadores), the Dongsha Islands (the Pratas Islands) as well as the Xisha Islands and Zhongsha Islands (the Paracel Islands [a mu fei te li di] Islands and the Macclesfield Bank) and the Spratly Islands (including Nanwei Island), and renounce all right, title, and claim to all territories stated in this Article» [4], i.e., USSR recognized China's right not only to the Spratly Island, but also to the archipelago bearing the same name. Vietnamese foreign minister, representing government of Bao Dai (1948—1955), the state within French Indochina, announced at the San Francisco Peace Conference on September 7, 1951, that Vietnam had resumed its sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly islands. None of the fifty-one countries attending the conference raised any objections to this statement of the head of Vietnam foreign ministry. The draft Treaty of San Francisco, with relevant parts remaining unchanged, did not mention further state affiliation of archipelagos. Though China did not take part in San Francisco Peace Conference, the issue of sovereignty over the islands of the South China Sea was raised by China’s Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai on August 15, 1951. He noted that draft peace treaty stipulated only that Japan relinquished all rights to «the Nanwei (Spratly) Island and Xisha (Paracel) Islands», but bypasses bypassed the question of restoration of China's sovereignty over

68 these territories. In his statement about the U.S.–British draft peace treaty with Japan he argues that the Dongsha and Zhongsha Islands and Xisha and Nansha archipelagos «have always been Chinese territory» and sovereignty of China over Xisha and the Nansha Islands «is not affected whether or not there are stipulations» [5, p. 32]. In fact, the territorial claims put forward in the statement of Chinese Foreign Minister, were completely deprived of any argument. Nevertheless, the point of the statement containing territorial claims aimed at return of the territories allegedly historically belonging to China became the basis of Chinese position on this issue for many years. In April 1952 the administration of Taiwan, speaking on behalf of the Republic of China, signed Peace Treaty with Japan in Taipei, where the Article 2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 was confirmed and Japan's renunciation of areas, including the Spratly Islands, was recorded. Current positions of China and Vietnam on territorial belonging of the Spratly archipelago, are basically identical and can be summarized as follows. China’s arguments: – Chinese were the first who discovered and named the islands in the South China Sea. – Chinese are the first to exploit the natural resources and carry out management of the archipelagoes. – Chinese ownership of the Paracel Islands and Spratly Archipelago is recognized by other states. Vietnam’s arguments:

69 – Vietnamese have long been aware about the islands of the South China Sea, exploited and managed them. – Vietnamese ownership of the Paracel Islands and Spratly Archipelago is recognized by other states. The Spratly Islands as an object of multilateral international dispute Disagreements over ownership of the islands in the South China Sea took shape of international dispute in 1951. Speaking on May 17, 1951 at a press conference, President of the Philippines said that the northern islands of the Spratly group undoubtedly belonged to the Philippines as they were located near the coast of the Philippines and closely connected with them geographically. On May 19 China's Foreign Ministry protested against the statement of the president of the Philippines, describing it as «groundless attempt on Chinese territory». As for legal aspects of the problem, Vietnam and China should adhere to international legal instruments, which clarify the essence of the territorial dispute. In accordance with the Geneva agreements on Vietnam, which were adopted in 1954 and are recognized globally, two Vietnamese state were formed: Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). The Paracel Islands and the Spratly archipelago belonged to Republic of Vietnam. In 1956 the representative of the Philippines put forward the claims to the bigger part of the Spratly Islands, giving them the name Kalayaan, whereupon other claimant states made protests, and Republic of China and South Vietnam sent naval troops to the archipelago. Taiwan, putting forward the claims to

70 all Spratlys like China, asserted its control over the Itu Aba Island only. Taiwanese garrison was deployed on the island in late 1950s, and was continuously strengthened by increasing its maritime and air defense at the turn of 1950–60s. South Vietnam did not have any permanent garrison in the area, but announced the annexation of the Spratly Islands and included them into the Binh Dinh province. In 1958 China defined its territorial waters, which also included the Spratly archipelago. All maps published in China introduced «maritime boundary» of the country, starting from the east of Taiwan, passing in close proximity to the coast of the Philippines and Malaysia, capturing the part of Indonesian shelf, and continuing further along the coast of Vietnam to the point where the Sino-Vietnamese land border went out to the Gulf of Tonkin. In essence, this «maritime boundary» encompassed the bulk of the South China Sea. In 1961–1963 South Vietnam established signs of belonging on several islands of the archipelago. Basing on the concept of the islands importance for the Philippines national security, the government of this country took steps to assert its control over them in late 1960s – early 1970s. In 1968, Filipino troops landed on three islands with the purpose «to protect residents of the Kalayaan province» and announced annexation of the Kalayaan island group. Military garrisons were deployed on the Thi Tu (Pagasa), Loai Ta (Kota), West York (Likas), Nanshan (Lawak), and Flat (Patag) islands. The posts were built on some reefs and atolls. In 1972, the

71 Filipinos de facto annexed and incorporated the Kalayaan group into Palawan province. Malaysia put forward claims to the part of the archipelago in 1971. In the end of 1974 it expressed concerns that Beijing's territorial claims in the South China Sea extend to the islands, which Malaysians considered theirs. These concerns were caused by industrial extraction of gas they conducted in shallow water areas of Central Luconia Field. As for the government of North Vietnam (Democratic Republic of Vietnam) it did not oppose the sovereignty of China over the islands of the South China Sea for obvious political reasons in the period from 1956 to 1974, since China provided assistance to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in its fight against Saigon administration of South Vietnam (Republic of Vietnam) and its American allies. Later, after Democratic Republic of Vietnam declared its rights to the archipelago, the Vietnamese explained that their agreement with China's claims to the islands of the South China Sea was conditioned by unequal struggle against strong American aggressors, prevented the use of the islands by US military and provided China's support in this struggle. Military garrisons of the Republic of Vietnam on the islands were very weak. The Saigon government was forced to transfer the most of its naval forces from the Paracel and Spratly archipelagoes to the continental ports in order to fight against Hanoi in 1970. However, occupation of the Paracel Islands by China in 1974 led to the growth of militaristic tendencies in South-East Asia and increased military presence of the countries claiming

Spratly Islands. In order to avoid further loss of positions in favor of China, administration of South Vietnam took measures to fortify the islands controlled by them, and asserted control over several new ones, occupied by no one so far. These are the Southwest Cay (Pugad), claimed by the Filipinos, and located two miles from the Northeast Cay (Parola), already occupied by them, the Namyit Island and the Sand Cay, adjacent to the Itu Aba, as well as some others. As a result, the total number of personnel of Vietnamese garrisons on the islands of the Spratly archipelago has reached 300 people. Shortly before the capture of Saigon on April 14–29, 1975 the Democratic Republic of Vietnam retook control from South Vietnam over six islands in the Spratly archipelago (Truong Sa, Son Ca, Namyit, Song Tu Tay, Sinh Ton and An Bang). In late April People's Liberation Armed Forces of the Republic of South Vietnam accepted the surrender of the Republic of Vietnam garrisons on the islands in the South China Sea, leaving their military posts there. After the reunification of Vietnam, the islands came under the jurisdiction of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. In 1975 the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (unified Vietnam) put forward claims on the Spratly archipelago. On February 27 and April 25 of 1976 «Nhan Dan» newspaper, the body of Vietnam Communist Party Central Committee, published schematic maps of the territory of Vietnam, where the Paracel and Spratly Islands were designated under the Vietnamese names – Hoang Sa and Truong Sa respectively. General Directorate of Geodesy and Cartography of

73 the Socialist Republic of Vietnam issued a map of Vietnam on April 8, 1976 with new administrative division of the country including both archipelagos. Representing claims on the map was followed by assertion of real military control of Vietnam over the islands, islets, reefs and atolls of the central and north-eastern parts of the Spratly archipelago. As a result, from 22 to 27 island objects came under its control, including strategically important Spratly and Sin Cowe islands in the Union group, Namyit Island, located not far from the Itu Aba Island of the Tizard group occupied by Taiwan garrison and several others. On May 12, 1977 Vietnam Government issued a statement on territorial waters, adjacent zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the country. The document became a legal basis for the protection of the sovereignty of Vietnam over its maritime zones and continental shelf. It stipulates that the islands and archipelagos included into the territory of Vietnam, but located outside the territorial waters, have their own territorial waters, contiguous zone, a 200-mile exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. Vietnam Government expressed its willingness «to settle with the countries concerned through negotiations on the basis of mutual respect for independence and sovereignty in accordance with international law and practice the problems related to the maritime zones and continental shelves of each side». In 1970s economic considerations became more and more important for the Philippines. Refrigerating chambers were built on the Pagasa Island in the range of development of fisheries in

74 the area. Filipino-Swedish joint venture conducted prospecting drilling of oil and gas on the nearby Reed Bank. Promising oil and gas fields have been discovered in the Reed Bank shoal neighboring Thi Tu. Filipinos began preparations for their commercial exploitation. For this purpose it was decided to strengthen the security of the area of exploitation. In terms of its implementation the Philippines troops occupied the Lamkian Cay (Panata) located on the periphery of the Reed Bank shoal in March of 1978. Territorial claims of the Philippines on the Spratly archipelago were defined by presidential decree of 11 June 1978 on establishing jurisdiction over nearly all islands of the Kalayaan Group of that archipelago. It states that the Kalayaan belongs to the Philippine «by reason of history, indispensable need, and effective occupation», as the islands of this area «do not legally belong to any state or nation» and are located on the continental shelf of the Philippines. The country’s government, in support of its action, relied on the proximity of the islands, security considerations and economic reasons, «vital to the security and economic survival of the Philippines». It was argued that the area was a terra nullius at the time of its occupation, i.e., belonging to no country, and only abandoned territories were occupied. In September 1979, President F.Markos at a press conference confirmed that new territories of the Kalayaan group of the Spratly archipelago belong by right to the Philippines as they had previously been «abandoned». The Kalayaan islands were incorporated in the province of Palawan by decree of the President of the Philippines of the same year.

75 Malaysia actually joined the dispute over the islands by having published map of claims to the continental shelf that included 12 islands of the Spratly archipelago in 1979. The southern boundary of the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone of Malaysia established in mid-1980 was determined by agreement between Malaysia and Indonesia on the delimitation of the continental shelf as early as 1969. As a result interests of the Philippines, Vietnam and Brunei were affected. Vietnam made its claims to the islands public. The objects of the dispute were the Terumbu Laksamana Island occupied by Filipino forces and Vietnamese Pulau Amboyna Kecil, as well as the part of the Brunei fishing zone. It should be noted that by the end of the 1970s Malaysians used only shallow reefs and atolls as places for stay of coast guard and fishing boats. In early 1980s, they organized the border post and installed light beacon on the Swallow Reef (known as Pulau Layang-Layang in Malaysia). The beacons were also built on the Royal Sharlotte and Louise reefs, and a luminous buoy was installed on the Pearson rock that does not reach the water surface. Given the claims of Vietnam to the entire Spratly archipelago, Malaysian interests in the South China Sea overlap with interests of the Vietnamese. Malaysia, in particular, does not agree with Vietnamese occupation of some of the islands that are supposed to belong to Malaysia. We are talking about the An Bang (Amboyna Cay) Island, owned by Vietnam. In 1982 Vietnam issued another document, and then occupied several islands and built military installations there.

Territorially the archipelago was annexed to the Fukhan province (Khanh Hoa province in 1989). The Philippines also occupied several islands and built a runway there. In 1983, Malaysia occupied the Layang-Layang Island and built naval base and resort there. In 1984 Brunei determined its fishery area, which included the Louisa Reef in the south of the archipelago, but put forward no formal requirements. In 1987 China began patrolling the water area of the archipelago and subsequently founded a permanent naval base there. It should be noted that China though putting forward the most extensive claims in the area, did not own any of the Spratly islands until 1988, and the Itu Aba Island was occupied by Taiwan (Republic of China) in 1956. Beijing increased its military presence in the area of the Spratly and began capturing reefs and atolls in 1988. Hanoi, in turn, strengthened the protection of the Spratly Islands. Meteorological station was built on the Fiery Cross Reef of the Spratly archipelago with the support of the Chinese Navy in March of 1988. Disputes over islands in the South China Sea intensified, and resulted in the battle at the Spratly archipelago in 1988. On March 14, 1988 China used armed force to attack naval forces of Vietnam near the Johnson reef and Len Dao and Collins atolls. As a result, 3 Vietnamese ships were sunk, 3 sailors died and 70 others went missing. As a result of the Chinese Navy actions near the Spratly Islands in April of 1988 Chinese control was asserted over 9 reefs and atolls. Chinese control was retained over 6 (Cuarteron,

77 Gaven, Johnson, Collins, and Len Dao reefs, and Daloway atoll). China raised its flag in the region, located far from its coasts, having received the support base for further actions to establish control over the other islands of the Spratly. The most important outcome was not territorial acquisitions, which are scanty themselves, but the very emergence of China in the disputed area. China occupied the Johnson Reef, and Vietnamese successfully retained the Len Dao and Collins atolls. After that the relations between two states have become increasingly tense, and the consequences of these disputes affect the present day. The part of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of Malaysia is claimed by Brunei, which is surrounded by Malaysian territory from three sides. In 1988 the government of Brunei announced the creation of 350-mile continental shelf zone, dividing economic zone and continental shelf of Malaysia into two separate parts. Beijing continued the course at consolidating presence in the disputed area. A contract was signed with the American company «Crestone Energy» in May of 1992 which provided granting it offshore area as a concession located 250 km from the coast of Vietnam, but 1300 km away from the Chinese island of Hainan. In the middle of 1994 Chinese began to conduct reconnaissance of the actual situation in the area, which was the part of the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines. In October 1994, the Philippines coast guard detained and deported from its economic zone 55 Chinese fishermen, who established signs of China's ownership on many reefs and rocks, and even

78 built commercial and military buildings on the Mischief reef. In response, China arrested 35 Filipino fishermen, accusing them of violating Chinese territorial waters. So, the first conflict occurred between China and the member state of ASEAN. In 1995, China seized the Mischif reef and built military infrastructure on it. In 1995, China and Vietnam agreed to start large-scale talks on joint development of the archipelago resources. In 2004, the Philippines Air Force aircraft were fired upon over the water area of the archipelago. Vietnam expanded tourist presence and built an airport on the islands. In 2005, Vietnam reaffirmed its sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. In 2008, the Philippines announced that they would «fight to the last sailor and marine» for the Spratly Islands. Territorial disputes in the South China Sea flared up with particular force after 2009, when Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia, in accordance with the 1982 UNCLOS provisions provided to the United Nations their applications for exclusive economic zones and continental shelf boundaries, and China appealed against them, putting forward claims to the islands of the South China sea and 80% of its water area. In May – June 2011, several incidents occurred between Vietnam and China, such as damage to the cables of Vietnamese research vessels by Chinese, protests near Chinese diplomatic missions in Vietnam, exchanges of statements by politicians and diplomats, Vietnam naval exercises and cyber wars.

79 On July 12, 2016 International Tribunal, established with the mediation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in Hague ruled that China did not have historical rights to the disputed territories in the South China Sea. Decision was made on the complaint of the Philippines, who declared that China violated UNCLOS of 1982, as its two patrol boats prevented the Philippines authorities to arrest Chinese fishermen not far from the Scarborough Reef in the end of 2012. Chinese authorities said they were not going to recognize and fulfill the Tribunal's decision. As a result, except for one and a half-two dozens of atolls, reefs and rocks, located in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, all island items in central and north-eastern parts of the Spratly islands are controlled by different countries of the region, and these items appeared mixed, acquiring mosaic form. The situation in the Tizard group is very typical in this respect. For example, the Gaven reefs controlled by China are 20 km away from the Namyit occupied by Vietnam and about 30 km from the Itu Aba Island having powerful Taiwanese garrison on it. The Loaita Island occupied by Filipinos lies just 10 km from the South West reef, which has Chinese outpost and so on. At the beginning of 1999 Chinese occupied seven islands and reefs, with 260 people of military personnel, Vietnam occupied 27 islands and reefs with 600 soldiers, Philippines – 8 (595), Malaysia – 3 (70), and Taiwan – 1 (112).

Fig. 4. Map of territorial division of the islands and atolls of the South China Sea

Currently, the dispute over the islands of the South China Sea has evolved from a territorial conflict within a particular region into a major international problem. Expansion of the PRC in this area could have a serious impact on the strategic balance in East Asia, which causes anxiety not only in the countries of East Asia – ASEAN and Japan, but also of the United States. Unilateral actions of China even more increased concerns of the Southeast Asian countries. International conflict in the South China Sea has now entered a new phase of development, and this area has become the arena of global contradictions between China, East Asia and the United States. 81 All Southeast Asian countries – participants of the territorial dispute over the Spratly archipelago – are obliged to adhere to international regulations, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, adopted in 1982, and the ASEAN and China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, adopted in Phnom Penh in 2002, which essence is peaceful resolution of conflicts within the South China Sea. It was the first political document between ASEAN and China, related to the problem of the South China Sea. The Declaration is a breakthrough in the maintenance of peace and stability in the South China Sea. The parties agreed to maintain friendly and harmonious environment. The document emphasizes the importance of solving disagreements and disputes peacefully. It proposes to abandon the activities that may lead to increased tensions. The declaration also states that the parties should develop and undertake coordinated measures for protection of the marine environment, search and rescue operations and combating transnational crime. The Spratly Islands are the object of multilateral international dispute involving six countries: Vietnam, China, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei (arranged according to the degree of presence). Currently, China controls 70 islands, Vietnam – 21, Malaysia – 3, Philippines – 10, and Taiwan – just one but the largest island, with their garrison and runway for the aircraft. Brunei, though did not capture any island, put forward claims to the boundaries of territorial waters and continental shelf. Brunei fishing zone includes the Southern reef, but it put forward no

82 official territorial claims. Indonesia does not claim to the island territories, but China claims affect its economic zone. The complexity of the situation is aggravated by the fact that countries claiming to the Spratly archipelago, with the exception of Brunei, have their armed forces on separate islands. About 45 islands are occupied by relatively small military contingencies of China, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan. The largest garrisons on the islands belong to China, which deployed military garrisons on 5 or 6 atolls of the Spratlys, and Vietnam. Troops of the Philippines and Malaysia are placed on some islands. China provides outwardly the most impressive historical substantiation of its rights to the most important archipelagoes of the South China Sea – Paracel and Spratly Islands (Nansha and Xisha). Particular attention in this regard should be paid to the document titled «Undisputed China's sovereignty over the Xisha and Nansha Islands», published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China on January 30, 1980, and circulated as an official document of the 35th session of the General Assembly and UN Security Council. It states that the Paracel and the Spratly islands since ancient times are Chinese territories. It is allegedly evidenced by «numerous Chinese and foreign historical materials, documents, maps and cultural relics of ancient and modern times». «The fact that in the period of modern history, they have been for some time illegally seized by foreign countries, in no way can not change the historical fact and the legal basis of their belonging to China».

83 In February 1992, National People's Congress of China adopted the «Law on the Territorial Sea and adjacent areas», under which Paracel and Spratly Islands were integral part of Chinese territory, included in the province of Hainan. In accordance with this law, China unilaterally declared sovereignty over 80% of the South China Sea water area, having marked U- shaped line (sometimes called «cow tongue» by media) on the map, putting forward as the legal justification of extensive territorial claims the argument that Chinese fishermen discovered and exploited this area for a long time and gave the names to all the islands. However, this 9-dash line has no legal basis. According to the new law, the total area of waters, claimed by China, amounts to 3 million square km. According to China, about one third of this area is illegally exploited by other countries. The new law stipulates right of China to use force in order to prevent what it conciders as illegal fishing in Chinese territorial waters. The whole Spratly archipelago appeared in Chinese claim zone. However, according to the Article 89 of the UNCLOS, «no state may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty» [3, p. 509]. The situation was further complicated in 1995 when China established frontier marks and navigational equipment on one of the reefs of the archipelago which is considered by the Philippines as their territory. Thus, the Chinese are attempting to turn the South China Sea into their «lake». According to the UNCLOS, resources (solid, liquid or gaseous resources, including polymetallic nodules) in the high seas on the seabed or in the subsoil thereof are the common

84 heritage of mankind (Article 136), and «no State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the Area or its resources, nor shall any State or natural or juridical person appropriate any part thereof. No such claim or exercise of sovereignty or sovereign rights nor such appropriation shall be recognized (Article137) [3, 523–524]. Indonesia is not a claimant to the Spratly Islands, but expresses increased alertness with regard to the military plans of Beijing in Southeast Asia. After the Paracel conflict in 1974 Indonesians do not exclude that their island of Natuna may become the next object of Chinese claims, as it is close to the unclear nine-dash line in the South China Sea drawn on Chinese maps.

The economic and strategic value of Spratly Islands

From physical-geographical point of view the South China Sea has such important peculiarity as vast and not deep continental shelf, which covers about half of the Islands’ waters. This determines their significant value from the point of view of presence in the region, because the state, which controls any part of the Archipelago, also has control over relevant economic zone and strategic marine routes in this area of the Pacific. As well, according to the expert assessments, the shelf of South China Sea contains vast fishing resources and huge quantities of oil (up to 213 billion barrels), natural gas (up to 55, 1 trillion cubic meters) and other minerals. On average 1 sq.km

85 of the continental shelf around the Islands provides 3 tons of fish, while the same deep-water area provides only 10 kg. South China Sea is no exception in this regard. Traditionally, the islands in South China Sea and the surrounding waters are used by regional countries as the places of biological resources’ concentration. Here one can meet the small fishing boats from China, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Thailand and Cambodia. The amount of fish extraction in this area is not less than 8% of the global fishery. In the northern part of South China Sea more than 1 thousand, and in the south part – more than 2 thousand of fish kinds are known. The most popular resources are tuna, mackerel, sea bass, shrimp, lobster, sea cucumber, squid, crabs, oysters, various clams, edible seaweed, tortoise shell, pearls. The exploration works in the west and south parts of the continental shelf in South China Sea were carried out since the middle of 1950s, soon after that the test drilling for oil began near the Philippines’ coast. In the end of 1960s the regular extraction of oil and gas began in the offshore zone of Indonesia and Malaysia near Kalimantan Island. As the most promising are considered the shelf areas near the Paracel Islands, as well as the central and south part of the waters that surround the Spratly Islands. According to some assessments, in geological structures under the bottom of Spratly Archipelago there may be the deposits of oil and gas with total cost of 1 trillion dollars. In 1988 Beijing announced that continental shelf only in the area of Spratly contains 105 billion barrels of oil, and total oil deposits in South China Sea are evaluated as 213 billion of barrels.

The exploration works on the western and the south shelf of South China Sea were being performed since the middle of 1950s and soon the test drilling for oil near the coast of the Philippines began. In the end of 1960s the regular extraction of oil and gas on the shelf of Indonesia and Malaysia near the Island of Kalimantan was deployed. The shelf waters near the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands are considered as the most promising. According to some estimates, the geological structures under the bottom of Spratly Archipelago may contain oil and gas reserves with the total coast of one trillion dollars. In 1988 Beijing announced that only continental shelf near the Spratly Islands includes 105 billion barrels of oil and the total oil reserves in South China Sea are estimated as the 213 billion barrels. In September 1992 Beijing declared the plans to turn the shelf area of South China Sea into a «main base of energy resources». The optimistic Chinese estimation of hydrocarbon reserves in South China Sea and in the area of disputed islands is not shared by non-Chinese researchers. For example, the report of US magazine «Geological Survey» indicated in 1993–1994 the figure of 28 billion barrels. And the most optimistic forecast of Western countries determines the unproven oil reserves in the area of the Spratly Islands from 1 to 2 billion barrels. The next regional natural resource – phosphates (salt of phosphoric acid) is located above the sea level and does not require additional expenses for development. They are presented in the form of guano – decomposed excrement of sea birds. Guano has a high content of phosphorus pentoxide (about 27 %)

87 and significant amounts of nitrogen and potassium. In fact, guano is a ready complex fertilizer, natural and ecologically pure. Therefore, it is highly valued on the market of raw resources. The layers of guano on the islands of South China Sea (in the places of mass bird nesting) reach the thickness of several meters. However, although the development of this valuable material on the islands of South China Sea (Islands of Pratas and Paracel Islands) began in the 1910s, the total amount of stocks is still undefined. In 1930s French authorities of Indochina undertook the works to assess the volume of deposits of this raw material but they were not completed. There was made only a preliminary assessment of guano reserves on the Paracel Islands. As for the Spratly Islands, the big volumes of phosphates are located on the islands: Southwest Cay, Amboyna Cay, Itu Aba (layer of guano covers here over 74% of total area), Spratly as well as on the rocks and atolls that are above high water level. However, there is no any information about efforts to assess exactly the phosphates volume in this area. On the other hand, the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands have a big significance for strategic defense of the coastal states. Both archipelagos are situated in the center of South China Sea and may be considered as perfect place for deploying military bases and radar stations, observation points after alien submarines, supplying vessels with food and electricity. Their water areas include a lot of sea routes, which are important for the safety of maritime navigation. Any country who keeps these islands under control may also control sea routes passing through

South China Sea thus creating more favorable conditions for its defense. Given the strategic position of the islands in South China Sea the Japanese had occupied them in the period of the Second World War, built here (on the Spratly Islands) the submarine base and then invaded Indochina and the Philippines in order to cut the sea routes, used by Allied countries. Therefore we can see here the intersection of national security interests of Japan, United States and Russia. After 1983 China has begun to pay special attention to this region. If Beijing keeps South China Sea under control its influence as military and financial regional superpower may significantly increase. Therefore, there are strong concerns in the region about possible Chinese domination similar to Japanese hegemony during Second World War. Thus, the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands have military, economical and strategic importance for all participants of the territorial conflict as well as the other world countries. On the one hand, the developed industrial states make big investments into the economics of the most of the regional countries. On the other hand, it is through the South China Sea there passes one of the most congested global shipping routes connecting the ports of the Far East and West coast of America to South Asia, Africa, the Middle East and southern Europe, the route, which is a significant part of the world trade. The claimants for the islands (China, Vietnam, ASEAN countries) gradually start to rely on specific economic goals, such as: to set control over most of the islands, and thus to

89 provide more significant area of the economic zone in the waters of the South China Sea, which contains rich reserves of oil, natural gas, other mineral resources, fish and seafood. In addition, China as a world superpower has military- strategic reasons and above all – the establishment of full control over sea routes passing through the waters of South China Sea, the blockade of Vietnam from the sea given the constant danger of military confrontation with this country. As for Vietnam, the control over islands (especially the Paracel Archipelago) has also an evident national-patriotic motivation.

The problem of territorial jurisdiction over the Spratly Islands

The invasion of troops to any country and the seizure of territories do not create sovereignty over these territories. In the world they are considered as a poor method of resolving territorial disputes. In fact, the Spratly islands are abandoned and derelict. Therefore, it is most likely that they will belong to the state, which can effectively occupy them before the others. So, in order to analyze the existing problems concerning the Spratly Islands one should take into account the fact of effective occupation of the disputed islands’ territories by one of the parties of the territorial dispute. Only the actual, physical presence of any country on totally inhabited island can be the only legal base for sovereignty over this territory. In other words,

90 all problems can and must be resolved on the principle «each owns what he owns». Currently, the issue of ownership of the majority of the Spratly Islands is actually solved by neighboring states, which established over them their control, by having organized settlements with local administration. So now almost all objects on the islands of the central and north-eastern areas of the Spratly Islands (excepting 15–20 uninhabited atolls, reefs and rocks within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone) are being kept under control of a particular country.

Problems of division of maritime economic ownership within the waters of the Spratly Islands

International Convention on the law of the sea (UNCLOS), adopted in 1982, has made the problem of the islands in South China Sea even more confusing. First, the Convention has introduced new concepts of exclusive economic zone (EEZ), archipelagic state, common heritage of mankind, continental shelf, delimitation of territorial waters etc. As a result of adoption of a new maritime regime we can see the overlapping of EEZ and continental shelf’s parts as well as the rising of disputes about the order of their delimitation. Second, the Convention has given the reasons to the claimants to apply for the full regime of EEZ for every small and remote island and thus has increased their value and the desire to establish control over them.

91 It should be kept in mind that artificial islands, installations and structures do not have the legal status of islands, thus the construction of artificial islands on the rocks and reefs, which are flooded by the tide, does not create the international legal base for the rights to territorial waters, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. According to UNCLOS, article 60, around such artificial islands there can be created only security zones, which are extended for not more than 500 meters, measured from each point of their outer edge [3, 495–496].

Fig.5. Mutually overlapping territorial claims to exclusive economic zones and continental shelf between China and the neighboring countries of the South China Sea 92

The current situation creates many difficulties in the delimitation of even relatively narrow strips of territorial waters and adjacent zone around the islands, included in the Spratly archipelago. All participants of the territorial dispute around the Spratly Islands (excluding China) are gradually beginning to understand that the question of legal ownership of objects on the islands and the question of delimitation of exclusive economic zones and the continental shelf are different ones and they should not be mixed with each other. For a long time the disputes regarding the South China Sea, especially its south and west parts, existed as disagreements about the ownership of the islands, located here. Today they have greatly changed their content, having transformed in its essence into the debate about sovereign rights to develop resources on the continental shelf. The uncertainty (from the point of view of international law) of the legal status of the islands in the South China Sea complicates the situation even more and creates difficulties in solving these problems.

REFERENCES

1. Geographical encyclopedic dictionary. Geographical names. Second edition, additional. M., Soviet encyclopedia, 1989. p.573 / Географический энциклопедический словарь. Географические названия. Издание 2-е, доп. М.: Советская энциклопедия, 1989.

93 2. The history of Pacific war. In five volumes. Volume 5. Peace Treaty / Translation from Japanese. M., «Foreign literature» publishing, 1958, p. 339 / История войны на Тихом океане. В пяти томах. Том V. Мирный договор / Перевод с япон. языка. M.: Изд-во иностранной литературы, 1958. 3. International law. A collection of documents. M., «Juridical literature» publishing, 2000 / Международное право. Сборник документов. М.: Юридическая литература, 2000. 4. «Pravda». 1951. September 7 / «Правда». 1951. 7 сентября. 5. A Collection of foreign policy documents of PRC. Issue 2, Beijing, 1958 / Сборник документов внешней политики КНР. Вып. 2. Пекин, 1958. 6. Tkachenko B.I. Kurile Problem: history, legal right, politics, economic life. Vladivostok: Maritime State University, 2009 / Ткаченко Б. И. Курильская проблема: история, право, политика и экономика. Владивосток: Морской гос. ун-т, 2009. 7. Fu In. From historical point of view the islands in South China Sea are Chinese territory//China, Bejing, 2016, №8, p.18 / Фу Ин. Исторически острова в ЮКМ — это территория Китая // Китай. Пекин, 2016. № 8.

CONTRIBUTORS

Anastasia O.Barannikova – Researcher, Scientific- educational Center for Maritime International Studies, Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University. Main scientific interests: all aspects of interactions among the Asia-Pacific countries, the Russian Far East in the system of Russian national interests. Major recent publications: “Trilateral cooperation of RF, PRC and DPRK, as a stabilizing factor in the Korean Peninsula and in NEA” (article, 2015), “Prospects for Eastern Silk Road Economic Belt and Sino-Russian Cooperation” (article, 2015). Phone: +7(423) 230-12-75, +7 924241-4737. E-mail: [email protected]

Vladimir A. Lazarev – Dr.Sc. (Technical Sciences), Senior research fellow, Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University and Institute of Economic Research of Far Eastern Branch of Russian Academy of Sciences. Author of more than 60 scientific publications in such fields as transport management, logistics and finances in transport sphere. Phone: +7 (423) 230- 12-75, e-mail: [email protected]

Nikolai I. Pereslavtsev – Researcher, Head of information and analysis bureau, Scientific-educational Center for Maritime International Studies, Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University. Main areas of research: situation on Korean Peninsula and neighboring countries, the influence of this factor on Russia’s plans and interests, problems of international

95 maritime cooperation and interaction in the Far East. E-mail: [email protected]

Peter Yu. Samoylenko – Ph.D. (Political Sciences), Associate Professor, Department of public relations and advertising, School of Humanities, Far Eastern Federal University (FEFU). An expert of Asia-Pacific Studies Center, Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISS). Scientific interests: international processes in Asia-Pacific, information security and international relations, problems of security and transparency on Korean Peninsula, North-East Asia and modern trends of foreign relations. E-mail: [email protected]

Sergey M. Smirnov – Dr.Sc. (Technical Sciences), Head of the Department of International Affairs at Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University. Scientific interests are maritime security, Arctic exploration, transport and logistics. Author of 45 research publications, including 3 monographs. Phone: +7(924) 239-49-24. E-mail: [email protected]

Boris I. Tkachenko – Ph.D. (Economic Sciences), Arsenyev Prize laureate, Principal Researcher of the Center for Maritime International Studies, Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University. Author of more than 450 scientific works, including 15 individual monographs in such areas of research as international relations, economy and organization of science and modern Russian political science. He is a member of Association de Comptabilite Nationale (France), Russian Geographical

Society and Russian Association of International Studies. Phone: +7(423)2-301-275. E-mail: [email protected]

97 ARTICLE ABSTRACTS IN RUSSIAN Аннотации и ключевые слова

Баранникова, Анастасия Олеговна Спор вокруг Парасельских островов и роль США Статья рассказывает о длительном конфликте вокруг Парасельских островов в Южно-Китайском море, позициях претендентов на них и роли США в решении данного конфликта. Key words: Южно-Китайское море, Парасельские острова, Китай, Вьетнам, США

Лазарев, Владимир Анатольевич Расширение жизненного пространства Китая в Южно-Китайском море В статье обсуждается проблема расширения жизненного пространства Китая. Современная ситуация в Южно-Китайском море, более 90 процентов которого Китай пытается взять под свой контроль, создает глобальную угрозу для стабильности в регионе. Необходимы срочные усилия мирового сообщества для помощи в решении множественных межгосударственных противоречий в Южно-Китайском море. Ключевые слова: политика Китая, Южно-Китайское море, противоречия, оспариваемые территории

Переславцев, Николай Иванович Японо-корейский территориальный спор и перспективы его решения Статья рассказывает о причинах и подоплеке спора между Кореей и Японией вокруг расположенных в Японском море островов Лианкур (Токто/Такесима), анализирует аргументы и позицию каждой из сторон, предлагает пути и способы решения проблемы с учетом интересов международного сотрудничества и безопасности в регионе. Ключевые слова: Токто, Такесима, острова Лианкур, Япония, Корейский полуостров, Международный суд ООН

Самойленко, Петр Юрьевич Проблемы международной напряженности в Северо-Восточной Азии и перспективы российско- японского сотрудничества: коммуникативный аспект диалога двух стран В статье рассматриваются проблемы современных российско-японских отношений. В рамках материала исследуются возможные новые пути сотрудничества двух стран, которые выходят за пределы традиционной риторики в достаточно сдержанных взаимоотношениях России и Японии. Автор предлагает использовать стратегию взаимных интересов, то есть развивать отношения на основании тех узловых перспектив, которые интересны обеим странам. Для России это расширение экономического сотрудничества в АТР. В то время как для Японии – это

99 решение территориальных споров, прежде всего с Китаем и нормализация отношений с КНДР. Используя свои сильные стороны, Россия и Япония могут взаимно помогать и дополнять друг друга в двусторонних отношениях. Ключевые слова: Азиатско-Тихоокеанский регион, Северо-Восточная Азия, Россия, Япония, Китай, КНДР, территориальные споры, внешнеэкономическое сотрудничество, российско-японские отношения, территории опережающего развития, порто-франко, взаимные интересы, средства массовой информации

Смирнов, Сергей Маратович О меняющейся природе морских пограничных споров в Юго-Восточной Азии Корни морских пограничных споров в Юго-Восточной Азии не являются легким предметом для анализа. Обусловленная ими ситуация берет начало в периоде колониального правления и еще более ухудшилась после открытия на шельфе огромных запасов нефти и газа. И, хотя, на сегодняшний день, наивысший уровень гонки за углеводородами уже пройден, появляются новые вызовы, стимулирующие страны АСЕАН и Китай предпринимать шаги по защите жизненных интересов и для демонстрации суверенных прав на стратегически важные морские районы и проходящие через них транспортные маршруты. Ключевые слова: морские споры, суверенитет, беспилотные суда, террористические угрозы

100

Ткаченко, Борис Иванович Территориальные споры в Южно-Китайском море. Архипелаг Спратли В статье рассматривается архипелаг Спратли как один из спорных районов Южно-Китайского моря. Предлагаются физико-географический и исторический очерки архипелага Спратли. Рассматриваются современные позиции КНР и Вьетнама по поводу территориальной принадлежности островов архипелага Спратли. Острова Спратли характеризуются как объект многостороннего международного территориального спора Вьетнама, Китая, Тайваня, Малайзии, Филиппин и Брунея. Показано экономическое и стратегическое значение островов Спратли. Характеризуются проблемы раздела морских экономических владений в акватории островов Спратли. Ключевые слова: Южно-Китайское море, архипелаг Спратли, территориальный спор, Сан-Францисский мирный договор, Китай, Вьетнам, Тайвань, Филиппины, Малайзия, Бруней, исключительная экономическая зона, континентальный шельф, международное морское право

101 Asia-Pacific Journal of Marine Science&Education

VOLUME 6, No. 1, 2016 ISSN 2221-9935 (Print) ISSN 2306-8000 (Online) Website: http://marinejournal.msun.ru

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