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												  Cornell 2002, DraftDRAFT: PLEASE DO NOT CITE OR DISTRIBUTE WITHOUT PERMISSION Brain Circulation and Chinese Chipmakers: The Silicon Valley-Hsinchu-Shanghai Triangle Professor AnnaLee Saxenian University of California at Berkeley March 2002 Howard Yang was among the first "returnees" to China in 1994. Yang was from Beijing but had spent more than a dozen years in the U.S., first obtaining a doctorate in electrical engineering from Oregon State University and then working for Silicon Valley companies like National Semiconductor, Chips & Technologies, and start-up Pericom Semiconductor. He returned in part to contribute to the growth of the Chinese IC industry. After working worked for two years at Shanghai Beiling, China's leading state- owned semiconductor company, Yang joined two colleagues to start a firm to design ICs for telecommunications. One of the co-founders, Hau Ming, was from Taiwan and the other, Ying Shum, from Hong Kong. Both also had graduate degrees from the U.S. and many years of work experience in Silicon Valley. This common background informed their decision to create a private Silicon Valley style company with venture capital funding and stock options for workers--rather than the following the Chinese model of state ownership or a joint venture. Yang and his co-founders tapped their professional networks in the U.S. and Taiwan as well as China to start the company. NeWave Semiconductor Corp. began operations in 1997 with venture financing of $5.4 m. from Silicon Valley and Taiwanese investors, Hua Hong Microelectronics (a state-owned enterprise in Shanghai), and several individual investors. The firm's headquarters is in Silicon Valley but most of the company's employment, including R&D and design as well as marketing, sales and administration, are in Shanghai.
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												  Brain Circulation and Overseas Chinese EngineersTHE CENTER FOR ECONOMY AND SOCIETY CORNELL UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY CSES WORKING PAPER SERIES PAPER # 8 “Brain Circulation and Capitalist Dynamics: The Silicon Valley-Hsinchu-Shanghai Triangle” AnnaLee Saxenian 2 Brain Circulation and Capitalist Dynamics: The Silicon Valley-Hsinchu-Shanghai Triangle Professor AnnaLee Saxenian University of California at Berkeley Department of City and Regional Planning and School of Information Management and Systems [email protected] August 2003 Paper prepared for forthcoming volume: Richard Swedberg and Victor Nee, eds. The Economic Sociology of Capitalism under review at Cambridge University Press. Please do not cite or circulate without permission. 2 3 Howard Yang was among the first "returnees" to China in 1994. Yang was from Beijing but had spent more than a dozen years in the U.S., first obtaining a doctorate in electrical engineering from Oregon State University and then working for Silicon Valley companies like National Semiconductor, Chips & Technologies, and start-up Pericom Semiconductor. He returned in part to contribute to the growth of the Chinese IC industry. After working worked for two years at Shanghai Beiling, China's leading state- owned semiconductor company, Yang joined two colleagues to start a firm to design ICs for telecommunications. One of the co-founders, Hau Ming, was from Taiwan and the other, Ying Shum, from Hong Kong. Both also had graduate degrees from the U.S. and many years of work experience in Silicon Valley. This common background informed their decision to create a private Silicon Valley style company with venture capital funding and stock options for workers--rather than the following the Chinese model of state ownership or a joint venture.
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												  Putting Reins on the Dragon: Explaining China's ExportPUTTING REINS ON THE DRAGON: EXPLAINING CHINA’S EXPORT CONTROL DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1992 by TODD MACEGAN WEST (Under the Direction of Professor Gary K. Bertsch) ABSTRACT Chinese nonproliferation export controls have dramatically changed since 1992. Before then, China regularly defied and mocked international efforts to control strategic exports. Since 1992, however, Beijing has been rigorously engaged in modernizing and internationalizing its export controls. That China’s export controls, then, are steadily improving is a recognized fact. What accounts for this trend, however, remains to be determined. This thesis analyzes nine possible explanations for China’s extensive export control development since 1992. INDEX WORDS: China, Export controls, International regimes, Nonproliferation, International security, Weapons of mass destruction, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Wassenaar Arrangement, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, Center for International Trade and Security PUTTING REINS ON THE DRAGON: EXPLAINING CHINA’S EXPORT CONTROL DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1992 by TODD MACEGAN WEST B.A., Elon University, 2000 M.A., Georgia Southern University, 2002 A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree MASTER OF ARTS ATHENS, GEORGIA 2007 © 2007 Todd MacEgan West All Rights Reserved PUTTING REINS ON THE DRAGON: EXPLAINING CHINA’S EXPORT CONTROL DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1992 by TODD MACEGAN WEST Major Professor: Gary K. Bertsch Committee: Thomas Ganschow Han Park Electronic Version Approved: Maureen Grasso Dean of the Graduate School The University of Georgia May 2007 iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I want to thank Dr. Gary K. Bertsch for introducing me to proliferation politics and letting me write on China. I extend thanks to Dr.
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												  Asiaweek.Com | the United States of China | 7/6/2001Asiaweek.com | The United States of China | 7/6/2001 REDEFINING BUSINESS Home JULY 6, 2001 PROMOTION The United States of China Magazine How business is moving Taipei and Beijing together By ALLEN T. CHENG Current Issue Magazine archive ALSO Education: Teaching Taiwanese students the Taiwan curriculum - in China Celebrity: A Shanghai-born singer wows her island-born cousins Special Sites Opinion: The Hong Kong model is no answer to the Taiwan question Power 50 2001 Two years ago, Peter Yu was a soldier in Taiwan's Asiaweek 1000 army, patrolling the beaches to guard against Financial 500 invasion from mainland China. He marched to Best Cities songs extolling battlefield valor and the re-conquest of the mainland. Today, Yu, 25, is one Salary Survey of 300,000 Taiwanese entrepreneurs leading an Best Universities assault on China's markets instead. With $100,000 in capital, Yu and his father last year founded Bo Best MBA Bo Steakhouse in Kunshan, a Taiwanese industrial Program enclave on the edge of Shanghai. Last month, the More... Yus opened a second Bo Bo in Suzhou, another Taiwanese outpost near Shanghai. "I was so surprised to see the fast economic growth that I decided to make my career on the mainland," says Jim Tsinganos. Other News Yu. "I'm telling all my friends in Taiwan that their TIME Asia future is in China." TIME.com Sound the alarms. Taiwan's political leaders officially gave up the goal of retaking CNN Asia the mainland in 1987, but an economic assault by its businessmen is now in full swing.
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												  Seizing the Transnational – Ideology, Hegemony, and the Doubling of China- Taiwan Relations André BeckershoffSpectrum Journal of Global Studies Vol.6, No. 1 Seizing the Transnational – Ideology, Hegemony, and the Doubling of China- Taiwan Relations André Beckershoff ABSTRACT The condition of possibility of the recent rapprochement between China and Taiwan lies in the de-politicisation of economic relations, which in turn is facilitated by a doubling of Cross-Strait relations into apparently separate spheres of civil society and politics. What drives this increasing separation, in what terms can we describe this process, and what are its consequences? This Neo- Gramscian approach traces the bifurcation across the level of ideological production to the underlying social relations. Social forces emerging from transnational relations of production forge a hegemonic project, promoting the formal separation of China-Taiwan relations into seemingly independent social realms. To achieve a critical understanding of this dynamic, the article reconstructs the strategies pursued by these forces and the mechanisms through which they operate. This historical materialist re-conceptualisation of Cross-Strait integration as a contested project rather than a quasi-natural process allows unveiling the inner contradictions and the crisis-prone nature of the specific transnational arrangement that the hegemonic project has assumed. The major internal contradiction of the project lies in the fact that its success to promote the separation of both spheres ultimately rests on an ever closer co-operation of forces from these spheres, undermining the appearance of independent spheres. Keywords: Hegemony, Cross-Strait relations, Transnational Historical Materialism, Gramsci, China-Taiwan relations Introduction Until less than a decade ago, the Taiwan Strait was regarded as one of the potential flashpoints in Asia.
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												  Accounting for Taiwan's Economic Policy Toward China SZU-YIN HO and TSE-KANG LENG*Journal of Contemporary China (2004), 13(41), November, 1^ Carfax Publishing 733-746 Accounting for Taiwan's Economic Policy toward China SZU-YIN HO AND TSE-KANG LENG* This article explores the ideas, institutions, and interests in which Taiwan's economic policy toward China is embedded. The authors indicate that the ideas behind Taiwan's economic policy toward China are as vibrant as ever, the political foundation for a coherent and feasible policy is eroding, and commercial interests are digressing from the Taiwan government's policy goals. Political forces around ideas have strong hearing on the formation of Taiwan's economic policy toward China. The truthfulness or falseness of the security argument is of intrinsic value to Taiwan's decision makers. The authors also point out that in order to have a complete picture of cross-Strait economic relations, we need to specify how trade and investment with China influence Taiwan's distribution of political interests. Introduction In early April, Japanese consultant-turned-management guru Kenichi Ohmae and American lawyer-turned-China observer Gordon Chang sparred in Taipei over the future of China and, hence, Taiwan.' Ohmae makes it clear that China is to become an economic power and Taiwan should make good use of China's potential to develop itself. On the other hand, Chang believes that China now harbors high political and commercial risks and Taiwan should diversify its reliance on the Chinese market. These two opposing views epitomize the two lines of thinking in Taiwan's perennial policy debate regarding its economic relations with China. We will examine in this paper the ideas, institutions, and the interests in which Taiwan's economic policy toward China is embedded.