Airport Terrorism:

A Change in Responsibilities for ARFF Personnel

Points of Discussion

• Evolution of the Fire Service

• Instituting Change

• Airport Security: A Fire Service Perspective

• Recognition of Potential Indicators of Terrorist Activity

Points of Discussion

• Cloned Vehicles and Uniforms

• Personnel and Apparatus Identification

• This Is The Fire Service? Non-Traditional Training

Evolution of the Fire Service

• 1960s – Emergency Medical Services, Air Rescue

• 1970s – Hazardous Materials

• 1980s - Water Rescue, Technical Rescue

• 2000s - Terrorism Response

Instituting Change

• Recognition of Potential Indicators and Warnings

• Multi-agency, Multi-disciplinary Training

• Situational Awareness

• What to Do, What Not to Do

Airport Security: A Fire Service Perspective At Risk Population Areas

• Terminals

• Restaurants, Shops

• Parking Garages

At Risk Population Areas

• Drop Off, Pick Up Points

• Shuttles

• Taxi Stands

Airport/Aircraft Related Incidents

(Case Examples) The

Manila, 1995 • Assassination of Pope John Paul II on 1/15 during visit to Manila

• Assassination of President Clinton

• Detonate time-delayed bombs on 11 transatlantic flights over Pacific on 1/21 and 1/22

• Cessna filled with explosives into CIA HQ in Langley, Virginia

The Bojinka Plot

Mohammed Jamal Khalifa

• International Islamic Relief Organization The Bojinka Plot

• Minor apartment explosion and fire • Maps of Manila with routes • Rosary, photograph of Pope, bibles, crucifixes, papal confessions • Priest clothing (including robes and collars)

• Fingerprints confirmed • 1993 World Trade Center bombing

Millennium Plot

December 31,1999

• Jordan • Radisson Hotel • Border crossing between Jordan and Israel • Two Christian holy sites

• LAX

• The Sullivans

• Space Needle

• Disneyland Recognition of Potential Indicators of Terrorist Activity

Indicators and Warnings

Eight Signs of Terrorism

1. Surveillance 5. Acquiring Supplies

2. Elicitation 6. Suspicious Persons

3. Test of Security 7. Dry Run/Trial Run

4. Finance/Funding 8. Deploying assets

Surveillance

Recording or Monitoring Activities

• Cameras • Notes • Diagrams • Map Annotations • Binoculars / Other Vision-Enhancing Devices

Surveillance

• Inside Terminal • Before Checkpoint • Baggage Claim Area Surveillance

• Outer Perimeter • Drop Off/Pick Up • Cell Phone Lots Elicitation

The strategic use of conversation to extract information from people without giving them the feeling they are being interrogated.

• Asking Questions • Requesting Information Via: • Mail • Survey • E-mail • Suspicious Phone Calls • Eaves-Dropping • “Friendly” Conversation

Tests of Security

Attempts to Measure Reaction Times To: • Assess Strengths and Weaknesses • Learn Response Procedures • Penetration of Physical Security Barriers • Security breaches • Piggybacking

A Test of Security?

Abdullah Hassan Talea’ Asiri Muhammed bin Nayef The Result Finance / Funding

• Cash • Other • Hawala

Acquiring Supplies

• Purchasing or Stealing: • Explosives/Weapons/Ammunition

• Service/Government Uniforms

• Flight Manuals/Schedules

Acquiring Supplies

• Purchasing or Stealing: • Flight Training

• Decals, Passes or Badges

Ziad Jarrah Acquiring Supplies

• Blueprints and/or evacuation plans

• Prohibited CBRN agents or materials

• Other sensitive or military materials

• Hoax IED or dispersal device

In Possession Of

• Coded literature or correspondence

• Multiple large event schedules

• VIP appearance, itinerary or travel schedules

• Multiple forms of identification items from multiple governments

• Security schedules and/or plans

Suspicious Persons/Activity

• Offices

• Neighborhood

• Special events

• Ports, Airports

• Designated parking areas

Dry / Trial Run

• Key players in place

• Multiple false alarms

• Mapping of routes

• Timing traffic flow

• Monitoring radio frequencies

• Recording response times Deploying Assets

• People, equipment and supplies get into position

• Last chance to stop the terrorist act

Miami International Airport, 2010

• Dr. Thomas Butler • Bubonic plague researcher

• 2003 - 30 vials of plague samples removed from Texas Tech University lab

• Sent to Tanzania

• Convicted of fraud and theft Possible Pipe Bomb/Plague

• • London (Heathrow) • Miami • San Juan Puerto Rico

Potential Terrorism-Related Behavior

• Recruiting

• Materials storage

• Acquisition of expertise

• Sector-specific incidents

Potential Terrorism-Related Behavior

• Theft, Loss, Diversion, Sabotage, Tampering, Vandalism

• Expressed or implied threat

• Espouses extremist views or brags about affiliation or memberships

• Displays overt support of known terrorist networks

Cloned Vehicles and Uniforms Kabul,

Ambulance used by suicide bomber Secondary Targets • (U) March 2010, Russia: VBIED detonated at checkpoint Second suicide bomber in police uniform approached police/responders and detonated; both attacks killed 12

• (U) November 2009, Russia: explosion derailed passenger train. Second device exploded, targeted government officials, investigators, and responders

• (U) June 2008, Algeria: two bombs detonated at train station, killing an engineer. Second device exploded after first responders arrived, killing several people

Privately Owned Used Ambulances/Rescues Privately Owned Used Ambulances/Rescues Privately-Owned Legal Clones Legal Rentals Stolen or Illegally Cloned Ambulances

Cloning of stolen ambulances/rescues

• 2008 Republican National Convention St. Paul, MN

• Ambulance with unusual markings

• Weapons cache

• Bags of urine and feces Central Florida Intelligence Exchange (CFIX)

Stolen or Illegally Cloned Ambulances

Goshen, Massachusetts

U/LES Vehicle Identifiers Almost Everybody’s Got One! Potential Results of VBIED With Propane One - 20 lb propane tank explosion • Fireball 40 ft * • Safe distance 160 ft **

40 - 20 lb propane tanks 800 (gallons) explosion • 1520 lbs • Fireball 1600 ft • Safe distance 6400 ft

Type I and III ambulance capacity – 1750 lbs

* Assuming efficient mixing of the flammable gas with ambient air. ** Determined by U.S. firefighting practices wherein safe distances are approximately four times flame height.

National Ground Intelligence Center, U.S. Army, Stand-Off Distances

Personnel and Apparatus Identification Personnel Identification

• Personnel Folder For Rapid Access • Official Government Issued Photo IDs • Current (within three years, any major change) • Badge Number (if applicable) or photo • DL Number • Agency ID Number • Social Security Number Apparatus Identification Apparatus Identification

• Vehicle registrations

• Low vehicle service numbers (i.e., 007, 0025)

• Display of company names that are not contracted

• Old ladders loaded onto newer-looking ladder racks

• Old and worn traffic cones attached to the exterior of an otherwise newer looking vehicle

This Is The Fire Service? Non-Traditional Training Behavioral Pattern Recognition

Suspicion based upon observed behavior

• Wearing unseasonably warm attire

• Protruding bulges seen in clothing

• Sweating, mumbling or fidgeting

Behavioral Pattern Recognition

• Avoiding uniform personnel

• Loitering in terminals without luggage

• Use of a pay phone in area with cell phone reception

• Trying to fit into crowds Terrorism / Intelligence / Fusion Liaison Officer Training TLO/ILO/FLO

• History, Development and Operations of Fusion Centers • International and Domestic Terrorist Groups and Threats • Eight Signs of Terrorism • The Information-Sharing Process • TLO and Individual Agency Roles and Responsibilities • Recognizing and Reporting of Suspicious Activity • Force Multiplier Protection TLO/ILO/FLO

• Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources protection and participation

• Suspicious activity reporting (SAR)

• Information sharing/ Intelligence cycle

• Regional Domestic Security Task Force TLO/ILO/FLO

• TLO responsibilities and Fusion Center expectations

• International/domestic terrorism trends and indicators

• Protection of civil liberties What Not To Do

If you become aware of suspicious activity DO NOT:

• Take direct action

• Confront the individual

• Reveal your suspicions

What To Do

S - Size (number, gender, ages, physical description) A - Activity (what they are doing) L - Location (provide exact location) U - Uniform (what they are wearing, including shoes) T - Time (date, time, and duration of activity) E - Equipment (vehicle make, color etc., license plate, cameras, weapons, etc)

Why?

• Public safety personnel may be targeted

• Emergency response vehicles stolen

• Use of small arms as primary weapons may be expected

• Secure vehicles and stations

• Report suspicious activity

• Expect to be challenged What Now? (cont) • Training for all personnel • VBIED • SAR • Think “Out of the Box” • Command Staff support • Clearance for appropriate personnel • Threat-based SOPs, Policies and Procedures • CBRNE Response

Conclusion

Goals:

• Everyone Goes Home Safe

• Protect the Public Questions?

Bob Palestrant, CEM District Chief Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood International Airport Broward Sheriff’s Office Dept. of Fire Rescue [email protected]