SCC File No.: 36456

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO)

B E T W E E N:

DIANNA LOUISE PARSONS, MICHAEL HERBERT CRUICKSHANKS, DAVIT TULL, MARTIN HENRY GRIFFEN, ANNA KARDISH, ELSIE KOTYK, Executrix of the Estate of HARRY KOTYK, deceased, ELSIE KOTYK, personally and FUND COUNSEL FOR ONTARIO Appellants (Respondents) -and-

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF ONTARIO Respondent (Appellant) -and-

THE CANADIAN RED CROSS SOCIETY and the ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Respondents (Respondents) -and-

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF ALBERTA, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF SASKATCHEWAN, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF MANITOBA, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF NEW BRUNSWICK, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF NOVA SCOTIA, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES, THE GOVERNMENT OF NUNAVUT and THE GOVERNMENT OF THE YUKON TERRITORY Respondents (Interveners) -and-

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUÉBEC Intervener

Proceeding under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992

A N D B E T W E E N:

JAMES KREPPNER, BARRY ISAAC, NORMAN LANDRY as Executor of the Estate of the late SERGE LANDRY, PETER FELSING, DONALD MILLIGAN, ALLAN GRUHLKE, JIM LOVE, PAULINE FOURNIER as Executrix of the Estate of the late PIERRE FOURNIER, and FUND COUNSEL FOR ONTARIO Appellants (Respondents) -and-

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF ONTARIO Respondent (Appellant) -and-

THE CANADIAN RED CROSS SOCIETY and the ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Respondents (Respondents) -and-

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF ALBERTA, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF SASKATCHEWAN, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF MANITOBA, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF NEW BRUNSWICK, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF NOVA SCOTIA, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES, THE GOVERNMENT OF NUNAVUT and THE GOVERNMENT OF THE YUKON TERRITORY Respondents (Interveners) -and-

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUÉBEC Intervener

Proceeding under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992

FACTUM OF THE RESPONDENT, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO (Rules 42 and 43 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada)

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO BURKE-ROBERTSON Civil Law Division Barristers & Solicitors 720 Bay Street, 4th Floor 200-441 MacLaren Street Toronto, ON M7A 2S9 Ottawa, ON K2P 2H3

Malliha Wilson / Josh Hunter / Robert E. Houston, Q.C. Lynne McArdle / Brent Kettles Tel.: (613) 566-2058 Tel.: (416) 326-4953 / (416) 326-3840 / Fax: (613) 235-4430 (416) 314-2287 / (416) 314-2040 Email: [email protected] Fax: (416) 326-6996 / (416) 326-4015 / (416) 326-4181 Email: [email protected] / [email protected] / [email protected] / [email protected]

Counsel for the Respondent, Agent for the Respondent, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario

TO: THE REGISTRAR

AND TO: SUTTS, STROSBERG LLP SUPREME ADVOCACY LLP 600 Westcourt Place 340 Gimour Street 251 Goyeau Street Suite 100 Windsor, ON N9A 6V4 Ottawa, ON K2P 0R3

Harvey T. Strosberg, Q.C. Marie-France Major Tel.: (519) 561-6216 Tel.: (613) 695-8855 Fax: (519) 561-6203 Fax: (613) 695-8580 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected]

PAPE BARRISTERS Professional Corporation One Queen Street East Suite 1910, P.O. Box 69 Toronto, ON M5C 2W5

Paul J. Pape Shantona Chaudhury Tel.: (416) 364-8755 Fax: (416) 364-8855 Email: [email protected] / [email protected]

Counsel for the Appellants Agent for the Appellants (other than Fund Counsel for Ontario) (other than Fund Counsel for Ontario)

GOWLING LAFLEUR HENDERSON LLP GOWLING LAFLEUR HENDERSON LLP 1 First Canadian Place 2600-160 Elgin Street 100 King Street West, Suite 1600 Ottawa, ON K1P 1C3 Toronto, ON M5X 1G5

John E. Callaghan D. Lynne Watt Alex Zavaglia Tel.: (613) 786-8695 Tel.: (416) 862-7525 Fax: (613) 563-9869 Fax: (416) 862-7661 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] [email protected]

Counsel for the Appellant, Agent for the Appellant, Fund Counsel for Ontario Fund Counsel for Ontario

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CANADA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CANADA 50 O’Connor Street 50 O’Connor Street Suite 500, Room 556 Suite 500, Room 556 Ottawa, ON K1A 0H8 Ottawa, ON K1A 0H8

Robert J. Frater, Q.C. Christopher Rupar Kathryn Hucal Tel.: (613) 670-6290 Tel.: (613) 670-6289 / (416) 954-0625 Fax: (613) 954-1920 Fax: (613) 954-1920 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] / [email protected]

Counsel for the Respondent, Agent for the Respondent, the Attorney General of Canada the Attorney General of Canada

McCARTHY TÉTRAULT CONWAY BAXTER WILSON LLP Suite 5300, TD Bank Tower 401-1111 Prince of Wales Drive Box 48, 66 Wellington Street West Ottawa, ON K2C 3T2 Toronto, ON M5K 1E6

Caroline Zayid Colin Baxter H. Michael Rosenberg Tel.: (613) 780-2012 Tel.: (416) 362-1812 / (416) 601-7831 Fax: (613) 688.0271 Fax: (416) 868-0673 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] / [email protected]

Counsel for the Respondents, Agent for the Respondents, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Alberta, Her Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Alberta, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Saskatchewan, Majesty the Queen in Right of Saskatchewan, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Manitoba, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Manitoba, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of New Her Majesty the Queen in Right of New Brunswick, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Brunswick, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Prince Edward Island, Her Majesty the Queen in Prince Edward Island, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Nova Scotia, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Nova Scotia, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Newfoundland and Labrador, the Right of Newfoundland and Labrador, the Government of the Northwest Territories, the Government of the Northwest Territories, the Government of Nunavut, and the Government of Government of Nunavut, and the Government of the Yukon Territory the Yukon Territory

MINISTÈRE DE LA JUSTICE DU NOËL & ASSOCIÉS QUÉBEC 111, rue Champlain Direction générale des affaires juridiques et Gatineau, QC J8X 3R1 legislatives 1200 route de l’Église Québec, QC G1V 4M1

Dana Pescarus Pierre Landry Manon Des Ormeaux Tel.: (819) 771-7393 Tel.: (418) 643-1477 x 20785 Fax: (819) 771-5397 Fax: (418) 644-7030 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected]

Counsel for the Intervener, Agent for the Intervener, the Attorney General of Québec the Attorney General of Québec

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Tab Document

A. Factum on Appeal

B. Factum on Cross-Appeal

SCC File No.: 36456

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO)

B E T W E E N:

DIANNA LOUISE PARSONS, MICHAEL HERBERT CRUICKSHANKS, DAVIT TULL, MARTIN HENRY GRIFFEN, ANNA KARDISH, ELSIE KOTYK, Executrix of the Estate of HARRY KOTYK, deceased, ELSIE KOTYK, personally and FUND COUNSEL FOR ONTARIO Appellants (Respondents) -and-

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF ONTARIO Respondent (Appellant) -and-

THE CANADIAN RED CROSS SOCIETY and the ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Respondents (Respondents) -and-

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF ALBERTA, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF SASKATCHEWAN, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF MANITOBA, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF NEW BRUNSWICK, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF NOVA SCOTIA, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES, THE GOVERNMENT OF NUNAVUT and THE GOVERNMENT OF THE YUKON TERRITORY Respondents (Interveners) -and-

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUÉBEC Intervener

Proceeding under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992

A N D B E T W E E N:

JAMES KREPPNER, BARRY ISAAC, NORMAN LANDRY as Executor of the Estate of the late SERGE LANDRY, PETER FELSING, DONALD MILLIGAN, ALLAN GRUHLKE, JIM LOVE, PAULINE FOURNIER as Executrix of the Estate of the late PIERRE FOURNIER, and FUND COUNSEL FOR ONTARIO Appellants (Respondents) -and-

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF ONTARIO Respondent (Appellant) -and-

THE CANADIAN RED CROSS SOCIETY and the ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Respondents (Respondents) -and-

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF ALBERTA, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF SASKATCHEWAN, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF MANITOBA, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF NEW BRUNSWICK, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF NOVA SCOTIA, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES, THE GOVERNMENT OF NUNAVUT and THE GOVERNMENT OF THE YUKON TERRITORY Respondents (Interveners) -and-

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUÉBEC Intervener

Proceeding under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992

FACTUM OF THE RESPONDENT, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO, ON APPEAL (Rule 42 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada)

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO BURKE-ROBERTSON Civil Law Division Barristers & Solicitors 720 Bay Street, 4th Floor 200-441 MacLaren Street Toronto, ON M7A 2S9 Ottawa, ON K2P 2H3

Malliha Wilson / Josh Hunter / Robert E. Houston, Q.C. Lynne McArdle / Brent Kettles Tel.: (613) 566-2058 Tel.: (416) 326-4953 / (416) 326-3840 / Fax: (613) 235-4430 (416) 314-2287 / (416) 314-2040 Email: [email protected] Fax: (416) 326-6996 / (416) 326-4015 / (416) 326-4181 Email: [email protected] / [email protected] / [email protected] / [email protected]

Counsel for the Respondent, Agent for the Respondent, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario

TO: THE REGISTRAR

AND TO: SUTTS, STROSBERG LLP SUPREME ADVOCACY LLP 600 Westcourt Place 340 Gimour Street 251 Goyeau Street Suite 100 Windsor, ON N9A 6V4 Ottawa, ON K2P 0R3

Harvey T. Strosberg, Q.C. Marie-France Major Tel.: (519) 561-6216 Tel.: (613) 695-8855 Fax: (519) 561-6203 Fax: (613) 695-8580 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected]

PAPE BARRISTERS Professional Corporation One Queen Street East Suite 1910, P.O. Box 69 Toronto, ON M5C 2W5

Paul J. Pape Shantona Chaudhury Tel.: (416) 364-8755 Fax: (416) 364-8855 Email: [email protected] / [email protected]

Counsel for the Appellants Agent for the Appellants (other than Fund Counsel for Ontario) (other than Fund Counsel for Ontario)

GOWLING LAFLEUR HENDERSON LLP GOWLING LAFLEUR HENDERSON LLP 1 First Canadian Place 2600-160 Elgin Street 100 King Street West, Suite 1600 Ottawa, ON K1P 1C3 Toronto, ON M5X 1G5

John E. Callaghan D. Lynne Watt Alex Zavaglia Tel.: (613) 786-8695 Tel.: (416) 862-7525 Fax: (613) 563-9869 Fax: (416) 862-7661 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] [email protected]

Counsel for the Appellant, Agent for the Appellant, Fund Counsel for Ontario Fund Counsel for Ontario

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CANADA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CANADA 50 O’Connor Street 50 O’Connor Street Suite 500, Room 556 Suite 500, Room 556 Ottawa, ON K1A 0H8 Ottawa, ON K1A 0H8

Robert J. Frater, Q.C. Christopher Rupar Kathryn Hucal Tel.: (613) 670-6290 Tel.: (613) 670-6289 / (416) 954-0625 Fax: (613) 954-1920 Fax: (613) 954-1920 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] / [email protected]

Counsel for the Respondent, Agent for the Respondent, the Attorney General of Canada the Attorney General of Canada

McCARTHY TÉTRAULT CONWAY BAXTER WILSON LLP Suite 5300, TD Bank Tower 401-1111 Prince of Wales Drive Box 48, 66 Wellington Street West Ottawa, ON K2C 3T2 Toronto, ON M5K 1E6

Caroline Zayid Colin Baxter H. Michael Rosenberg Tel.: (613) 780-2012 Tel.: (416) 362-1812 / (416) 601-7831 Fax: (613) 688.0271 Fax: (416) 868-0673 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] / [email protected]

Counsel for the Respondents, Agent for the Respondents, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Alberta, Her Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Alberta, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Saskatchewan, Majesty the Queen in Right of Saskatchewan, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Manitoba, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Manitoba, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of New Her Majesty the Queen in Right of New Brunswick, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Brunswick, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Prince Edward Island, Her Majesty the Queen in Prince Edward Island, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Nova Scotia, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Nova Scotia, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Newfoundland and Labrador, the Right of Newfoundland and Labrador, the Government of the Northwest Territories, the Government of the Northwest Territories, the Government of Nunavut, and the Government of Government of Nunavut, and the Government of the Yukon Territory the Yukon Territory

MINISTÈRE DE LA JUSTICE DU NOËL & ASSOCIÉS QUÉBEC 111, rue Champlain Direction générale des affaires juridiques et Gatineau, QC J8X 3R1 legislatives 1200 route de l’Église Québec, QC G1V 4M1

Dana Pescarus Pierre Landry Manon Des Ormeaux Tel.: (819) 771-7393 Tel.: (418) 643-1477 x 20785 Fax: (819) 771-5397 Fax: (418) 644-7030 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected]

Counsel for the Intervener, Agent for the Intervener, the Attorney General of Québec the Attorney General of Québec i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I – OVERVIEW AND FACTS...... 1

A. Overview ...... 1

B. Facts ...... 4

PART II – QUESTIONS IN ISSUE ...... 10

PART III – ARGUMENT ...... 10

A. Legislation Already Exists Which Permits Judges, Counsel, and Witnesses to Participate in Court Proceedings From Outside the Province...... 10

(1) General Legislation Permitting the Use of Videoconferencing in Civil Proceedings 11

(2) More Specialized Legislation That Applies to Particular Proceedings Where Greater Judicial Discretion Is Required ...... 20

Insolvency Proceedings: ...... 21

Class Action Proceedings: ...... 22

B. The Open Courts Principle Requires a Video Conference Link Back to an Ontario Courtroom Accessible to the People of Ontario ...... 23

C. The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Superior Courts Should Not Be Used to Authorize Out- of-Province Hearings ...... 27

(1) There Is No Need to Resort to Inherent Jurisdiction to Permit Out-of-Province Hearings in Appropriate Circumstances ...... 27

(2) Inherent Jurisdiction Is Not the Appropriate Means to Authorize Out-of-Province Hearings ...... 29

PART IV – SUBMISSIONS ON COSTS ...... 35

PART V – ORDER SOUGHT ...... 35

PART VI – TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...... 36

PART VII – STATUTES AND REGULATIONS ...... 39

1

PART I – OVERVIEW AND FACTS

A. Overview

1. Fifteen years ago, a creative solution was found to a novel problem. Six class actions had been brought in three different provinces seeking compensation for Hepatitis C contracted through blood transfusions. The parties desired one comprehensive national settlement that would resolve all six class actions. The question that had to be solved was which court could administer such a national settlement?

2. The problem was solved by appointing a presiding judge in each jurisdiction where a class action was pending – Ontario, British Columbia, and Québec. The provinces and territories other than British Columbia and Quebec attorned to the jurisdiction of Ontario for the purpose of the settlement and it was agreed that “all matters to be determined by the Courts” under the

Settlement Agreement “will take effect only upon the date when the last judgment or order of the

Courts becomes final without any material differences to the three judgments or orders.”1

3. This creative solution worked well for over a decade. The three presiding judges, each sitting in his or her own jurisdiction, approved the Settlement Agreement and heard motions as needed to administer it.2 Usually all three judges issued orders without any material difference.

On two occasions, the presiding judges, as they were entitled to do as independent judicial

1 Settlement Agreement, para. 10.01(2), Appellants’ Record, Vol. III, Tab 21, p. 128 2 Judgment of Winkler J. dated October 22, 1999, Appellants’ Record, Vol. I, Tab 1, pp. 1-39 2

officers, disagreed and their orders did not take effect.3 That was not, however, a failure of the

process; rather, it was exactly what the parties to the Settlement Agreement intended to happen.

4. In August 2012, a suggestion was raised that the three presiding judges needed to sit

together in one location to decide a motion about extending the deadline for filing claims under

the Settlement Agreement. Three of the four Class Counsel brought motions that purported to be

returnable at an unspecified location in Edmonton, Alberta before the three presiding judges who

were in Alberta for a meeting of the Canadian Judicial Council.4

5. Ontario, like British Columbia and Québec, objected to this proposal because it was

concerned about the ramifications of courts holding out-of-province hearings without any governing framework to determine when such hearings would be appropriate or how they would be conducted. In particular, Ontario was concerned about how the constitutionally protected rights of Ontario residents to access their courts would be protected if Ontario judges were holding hearings outside the province. It also believed that the inability of Ontario courts to make coercive orders (such as issuing warrants or finding persons in contempt) effective outside

Ontario would make it practically impossible for the Superior Court of Justice to act as a superior court outside the province’s boundaries.

6. As this case and the companion cases in British Columbia and Québec progressed through the courts below, many of Ontario’s concerns have been met. The Court of Appeal in

3 Once regarding who should be appointed as Administrator of the Settlement Agreement (a disagreement that was subsequently resolved) and once, as discussed further below, regarding whether the deadline for filing claims should be extended beyond the date to which the parties had agreed. 4 The motions were brought by Class Counsel individually as the fourth member of the Joint Committee appointed under the Settlement Agreement did not agree and the Joint Committee could only act unanimously. Cross- examination of Heather Rumble Peterson, pp. 6-7, qq. 7-14, Appellants’ Record, Vol. II, Tab 20, pp. 292-93 3

British Columbia and Justice Juriansz in the Ontario Court of Appeal gave purposive and flexible

interpretations to existing legislation that permitted out-of-province hearings to be held in a manner that respects the open courts principle and the territorial limitations the constitution imposes on provincial superior courts’ ability to make coercive orders.

7. Ontario therefore now accepts that out-of-province hearings can be held so long as the open courts principle and the inability of courts to make coercive orders effective outside their home province are respected. Legislation that already exists in every province and territory in

Canada provides a sufficient foundation to permit such hearings to take place whenever it is appropriate to do so. As there is no statutory gap that needs to be filled, there is no need to resort to inherent jurisdiction to permit out-of-province hearings.

8. Regardless of the source of a judge’s jurisdiction to participate in a hearing from a location outside the province, the judge’s physical location has no bearing on his or her jurisdiction or powers. Being physically located outside the province does not give the court any greater jurisdiction over persons located and causes of action arising outside the province.5

Similarly, the court’s powers remain the same whether the judge is physically present in the courtroom or participating in a hearing by videoconference from another location in or outside the province. A judge located outside the province can issue all of the same orders he or she can make when located inside the province, but only those orders.

9. In this factum, Ontario will discuss the statutory foundations which already exist to permit out-of-province hearings, the limitations the open courts principle places on such

5 That of course is not an issue in this appeal as the provinces other than British Columbia and Québec have all attorned to the jurisdiction of the Ontario courts and there is no dispute that there is a real and substantial connection between Ontario and the underlying causes of action that were settled by the Settlement Agreement. 4

hearings, and the reasons why it is unnecessary to resort to inherent jurisdiction to allow them. In

its factum on the cross-appeal, Ontario will discuss the other limitations which should apply to

provincial superior courts’ ability to hold out-of-province hearings.

10. Finally, it should be noted that this appeal (like the companion appeal in Endean) only concerns out-of-province hearings that take place within Canada. Allowing hearings to take place outside Canada would raise more complicated questions of international law and sovereignty which should be decided on a full factual record in an appropriate future case.

B. Facts

11. Under the Settlement Agreement, claims had to be filed by the June 30, 2010 first claims

deadline that was negotiated by all the parties, incorporated by mutual consent in the Settlement

Agreement, and approved by the Courts.6 On August 13, 2012, three of the four Class Counsel

brought motions to extend that deadline which purported to be returnable at an unspecified

location in Edmonton, Alberta.7

12. Concerned that the Ontario Superior Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction to hold a hearing outside of the province, Ontario objected to that motion being heard in Edmonton.8 Class

Counsel agreed to adjourn the motion returnable in Edmonton and the Courts directed the parties

to make submissions on whether the Court could hold a hearing outside Ontario. In accordance

6 Transfused HCV Plan, s. 3.08, Appellant’s Record, Vol. III, Tab 27, p. 207; Hemophiliac HCV Plan, s. 3.07, Appellant’s Record, Vol. III, Tab 28, p. 255 7 Moving Party’s Notice of Motion, Appellant’s Record, Vol. II, Tab 8, p. 2 8 Letter from Michele Smith to Chief Justice Winkler dated 10 August 2012, Exhibit 1 to the Cross-examination of Heather Rumble Peterson, Appellants’ Record, Vol. II, Tab 20, pp. 308-09; Email from Michele Smith to Harvey Strosberg dated 17 August 2012, Exhibit 2 to the Cross-Examination of Heather Rumble Peterson, Appellants’ Record, Vol. II, Tab 20, p. 311 5

with that direction, Ontario Class Counsel brought the motion for directions under appeal.9

Similar motions for directions were brought in the British Columbia Supreme Court and the

Québec Superior Court.10

13. On May 24, 2013, Chief Justice Winkler, sitting as a judge of the Superior Court of

Justice, held that the Superior Court had inherent jurisdiction to hold hearings outside Ontario.11

The British Columbia and Québec courts released decisions of similar effect on June 19, 2013.12

14. Ontario appealed Chief Justice Winkler’s decision to the Ontario Court of Appeal. British

Columbia similarly appealed its Supreme Court’s decision to its Court of Appeal. Québec did not

seek leave to appeal its Superior Court’s decision.13

15. While this appeal and British Columbia’s appeal in Endean were pending before the

Ontario and British Columbia Courts of Appeal, Class Counsel asked that the late claims motion

they had originally proposed to have heard in Edmonton be heard at a joint hearing of all three

supervising judges sitting in Toronto on December 3, 2013.14

9 Cross-examination of Heather Rumble Peterson, pp. 9-11, qq. 22-29, Appellants’ Record, Vol. II, Tab 20, pp. 295- 97; Letter from Michele Smith to Randy Bennett dated 22 August 2012, Exhibit 3 to the Cross-Examination of Heather Rumble Peterson, Appellants’ Record, Vol. II, Tab 20, pp. 313-14; Email from Harvey Strosberg to Josh Hunter dated 16 October 2012, Exhibit 4 to the Cross-examination of Heather Rumble Peterson, Appellants’ Record, Vol. II, Tab 20, p. 316; Notice of Motion for Directions dated 31 October 2012, Ontario’s Record, Tab 1, pp. 1-9 10 Endean v. Canadian Red Cross Society, Notice of Motion, Appellant’s Record, Vol. III, Tab 22, pp. 156-63; Honhon c. Canada (P.G.), Requête pour directives, Appellant’s Record, Vol. III, Tab 23, pp. 164-76 11 Reasons of Winkler C.J.O., Appellant’s Record, Vol. I, Tab 2, pp. 40-64 12 Endean v. Canadian Red Cross Society, 2013 BCSC 1074; Honhon c. Canada (P.G.), 2013 QCCS 2782 13 Notice of Appeal dated 3 June 2013, Ontario’s Record, Tab 2, pp. 10-15 14 Notice of Return of Motion dated 5 November 2013, Ontario’s Record, Tab 3, pp. 16-21; Honhon c. Canada (P.G.), Nouvel Avis de Presentation dated 7 November 2013, Ontario’s Record, Tab 4, pp. 22-25; Email from the Monitor to Counsel dated 14 November 2013, Ontario’s Record, Tab 5, p. 26 6

16. On November 14, 2013, however, the British Columbia supervising judge decided not to

participate in the proposed joint hearing while the appeal in Endean was still pending.15

Subsequently, the Québec supervising judge also decided not to participate either. The late

claims motions were therefore brought as separate motions before the three supervising judges

sitting in their own provinces.

17. On December 17, 2013, the new Ontario supervising judge, Justice Perell, released his

decision on the late claims motion. He held that once a settlement agreement in a class action has

been reached and judicially approved, the Court has no power to change the bargain agreed to by

the parties.16 He went on, however, to find that class members who had not filed timely claims could potentially share in any surplus in the Settlement Fund. As it had not yet been determined whether there in fact was any such surplus, Justice Perell conditionally approved the Late Claim

Requests Protocol Class Counsel had proposed.17 Ontario cross-appealed that aspect of Justice

Perell’s decision on the basis that there should not be any allocation of the surplus in the

Settlement Fund until there had been a determination that there in fact was a surplus and all

interested parties had made submissions as to how it should be allocated.18

18. The British Columbia and Québec supervisory judges both agreed with Justice Perell that

they had no jurisdiction to amend the bargain struck by the parties and approved by the Courts.19

They did not, however, agree that the proposed Late Claim Requests Protocol should be

15 Email from the Monitor to Counsel dated 14 November 2013, Ontario’s Record, Tab 5, p. 26 16 Reasons of Perell J., paras. 89-92, Appellant’s Record, Vol. I, Tab 4, pp. 84-85 17 Reasons of Perell J., paras. 93-102, Appellant’s Record, Vol. I, Tab 4, pp. 85-86 18 Notice of Cross-Appeal dated 8 January 2014, Ontario’s Record, Tab 7, pp. 44-49 19 Endean v. Canadian Red Cross Society, 2014 BCSC 621 at paras. 9-12; Honhon c. Canada (P.G.), 2014 QCCS 2032 at paras. 13-16 7

approved in advance of the surplus determination motion.20 As they did not agree with Justice

Perell, his conditional approval of the Late Claim Requests Protocol did not take effect and

Ontario’s cross-appeal of that approval became moot.21

19. Contrary to the submissions of the Appellants, this disagreement between the three supervising judges did not frustrate the administration of the Settlement Agreement. Exactly what was supposed to happen happened. The three judges all agreed they had no jurisdiction to change the bargain between the parties. One judge wanted to go further and allow parties who had not filed timely claims to nevertheless participate in the allocation of any surplus in the

Settlement Fund. The other two judges believed doing so would impermissibly amend the

Settlement Agreement. In the absence of unanimity, the Settlement Agreement continued to operate as originally intended.

20. Even though the late claims motions that had originally been proposed to be heard outside Ontario had been determined, Class Counsel indicated that joint hearings would likely be proposed for other forthcoming motions in this case, most notably the forthcoming motion to determine whether there was a surplus and, if so, how to allocate it. That motion has now been scheduled to be heard by all three supervising judges at a joint hearing in Toronto to be held on

June 20 to 22, 2016.22

20 Endean, 2014 BCSC 621, supra at paras. 13-29; Honhon, 2014 QCCS 2032, supra at paras. 17-33 21 Class Counsel’s appeal was subsequently dismissed for delay. Order of the C.A. dated 6 July 2015, Ontario’s Record, Tab 9, pp. 56-57 22 Letter from Chief Justice Hinkson to Parties dated 24 June 2015, Ontario’s Record, Tab 10, pp. 58-61 8

21. Ontario therefore sought to proceed with an Application it had brought for a declaration

that Ontario law did not permit other provinces’ courts to hold hearings in Ontario.23 Class

Counsel objected to that Application proceeding but consented to Ontario filing a Supplementary

Notice of Appeal and Supplementary Factum in the Court of Appeal to deal with that issue as well as the impact of Endean and this Court’s decision in Criminal Lawyer’s Assn.24

22. On February 17, 2014, the British Columbia Court of Appeal released its decision in

Endean. Justice Goepel, writing for a unanimous court, held that neither the common law nor

statute permitted the British Columbia Supreme Court to hold a hearing outside of British

Columbia, that the common law should not be changed to permit the Court to do so, but that

existing legislation did permit a British Columbia judge to participate in a hearing held in British

Columbia from a location outside the province by video conference link to a British Columbia

courtroom accessible to interested members of the British Columbia public.25

23. On March 13, 2015, the Ontario Court of Appeal released its decision in this case. The

Court unanimously held that out-of-province hearings could be held in appropriate circumstances

but each judge delivered different reasons for that conclusion. Justice Juriansz accepted that

existing legislation, Rule 1.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, provided authority for a judge

outside Ontario to participate in a hearing held in Ontario by means of video conference. Justice

Lauwers accepted that a video conference link back to an Ontario courtroom was required to

satisfy the open courts principle but based the Court’s ability to hold a hearing outside Ontario

23 Notice of Application issued 25 November 2013, Ontario’s Record, Tab 6, pp. 34-43 24 Supplementary Notice of Appeal dated 29 April 2014, Ontario’s Record, Tab 8, pp. 50-55 25 Endean v. Canadian Red Cross Society, 2014 BCCA 61 9

on its inherent jurisdiction rather than legislation. Justice LaForme also based his decision on

inherent jurisdiction but did not believe any video conference link was required.26

24. Both Class Counsel and Fund Counsel sought and were granted leave to appeal the Court

of Appeal’s decision because they objected to the majority’s requirement that there be a video

conference link back to Ontario to ensure compliance with the open courts principle.27 British

Columbia Class Counsel similarly sought and was granted leave to appeal the British Columbia

Court of Appeal’s decision in Endean.

25. Upon reviewing the decisions of the British Columbia Court of Appeal and Justice

Juriansz in the Ontario Court of Appeal, Ontario’s position evolved. Ontario accepts the broad

and flexible interpretation given to existing legislation to permit out-of-province hearings to take

place in a manner that respects the requirements of the open court principle and the territorial limitations of provincial superior courts’ jurisdiction. In light of that legislative authority, however, Ontario maintained its position that there was no need to rely on inherent jurisdiction to make out-of-province court hearings feasible in the rare cases where they are appropriate.

26. Ontario therefore did not oppose the Appellants’ applications for leave to appeal. It did, however, seek and was granted leave to cross-appeal to ensure that this Court could fully decide the scope of any limitations on courts’ ability to hold hearings outside their home province.28

26 Reasons of the Court of Appeal, Appellant’s Record, Vol. I, Tab 6, pp. 93-170 27 Class Counsel’s Leave Application Memorandum of Argument, Ontario’s Record, Tab 11, pp. 62-91; Fund Counsel’s Leave Application Memorandum of Argument, Ontario’s Record, Tab 12, pp. 92-117; Leave to Appeal Judgment, Appellant’s Record, Vol. II, Tab 15, pp. 262-63 28 Ontario’s Cross-Appeal Leave Application Memorandum of Argument, Appellant’s Record, Vol. Leave to Appeal Judgment, Appellant’s Record, Vol. II, Tab 15, pp. 262-63 10

PART II – QUESTIONS IN ISSUE

27. Ontario submits that the questions to be answered in this appeal are as follows:

a) Does existing legislation permit provincial superior courts to hold hearings outside

their home province in appropriate circumstances?

b) Does the open courts principle require such hearings to be linked by videoconference

to a courtroom in the court’s home province accessible to the public?

c) Is it necessary to resort to inherent jurisdiction to authorize out-of-province hearings?

PART III – ARGUMENT

A. Legislation Already Exists Which Permits Judges, Counsel, and Witnesses to Participate in Court Proceedings From Outside the Province

28. As both the British Columbia Court of Appeal and Justice Juriansz in the Ontario Court of Appeal found, existing legislation already gives parties, counsel, witnesses, and judges the ability to participate in British Columbia and Ontario court proceedings from outside the province by videoconference. Similar legislation exists in every other province and territory as well. There is thus already a nationwide web of legislation which can be used to permit out-of- province proceedings when appropriate.

29. In addition to these general rules permitting videoconferencing in all or most proceedings, more specialized legislation that applies to certain types of proceedings where greater judicial discretion is often required (such as class proceedings and insolvency proceedings) also permits the use of videoconferencing to allow out-of-province hearings.

30. As discussed further below, all of these sources of jurisdiction remain subject to the open courts principle which requires any out-of-province proceeding to remain accessible to residents of the court’s home province. They also remain subject, as discussed in Ontario’s cross-appeal 11

factum, to the territorial limits on provincial superior courts’ ability to make coercive orders with

extraterritorial effect.

(1) General Legislation Permitting the Use of Videoconferencing in Civil Proceedings

31. Every province or territory has legislation that permits parties, counsel, witnesses, and

judges in one location to participate in a court proceeding in another location by means of

videoconferencing.29 In Ontario, the applicable rule is Rule 1.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure:

TELEPHONE AND VIDEO CONFÉRENCES TÉLÉPHONIQUES ET CONFERENCES VIDÉOCONFÉRENCES

Where Available Applicabilité

1.08 (1) If facilities for a telephone or 1.08 (1) Si des installations en vue de la video conference are available at the court tenue d’une conférence téléphonique or are provided by a party, all or part of any ou d’une vidéoconférence sont of the following proceedings or steps in a disponibles au tribunal ou sont fournies proceeding may be heard or conducted by par une partie, tout ou partie de l’une telephone or video conference as permitted ou l’autre des instances ou étapes d’une by subrules (2) to (5): instance suivantes peut être entendu ou mené par conférence téléphonique ou 1. A motion (Rule 37). vidéoconférence comme le permettent les paragraphes (2) à (5) : 2. An application (Rule 38).

29 Evidence Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 124, s. 73; British Columbia, Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009, r. 23-5; Alberta, Rules of Court, A.R. 124/2010, vol. 1, rr. 6.9(1)(b), 6.10, and 8.18; Saskatchewan, Queen’s Bench Rules, r. 6-17; Manitoba, Court of Queen’s Bench Rules, Man.Reg. 553/88, rr. 37.09, 38.08, and 53.02; Ontario, Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, Rule 1.08; Arts. 279 and 497 C.C.P.; Québec, Rules of Practice of the Superior Court of Québec in Civil Matters, C.Q.L.R., c. C-25.01, r. 4, art. 45.2; Québec, Rules of practice in civil matters of the Superior Court (District of Québec), C.Q.L.R., c. C-25.01, r. 5, arts. 18.2-18.5; Nova Scotia, Civil Procedure Rules, rr. 25.02(3), 51.08, 53.05, 56.01(2)(b), 56.03(2), 68.09, and 86.05-86.06; Prince Edward Island, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 1.07; Newfoundland and Labrador, Rules of the Supreme Court, 1986, S.N.L. 1986, c. 42, Sch. D, rr. 47A.01-47A.06; Yukon, Rules of Court, Y.O.I.C. 2009/65, rr. 42(2)(b) and (48), 47(10), and 62(4); Northwest Territories, Rules of the Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories, N.W.T.Reg. R-010-96, rr. 352 and 389; Nunavut, Rules of the Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories, N.W.T. Reg. R-010-96, as inherited by Nunavut pursuant to s. 76.05 of the Nunavut Act, S.C. 1993, c. 28, rr. 352 and 389. The New Brunswick Court of Queen’s Bench has held that its rules permit videoconferencing despite not expressly mentioning videoconferencing in the Court of Queen’s Bench. New Brunswick (A.G.) v. Fern, 2012 NBQB 377 at paras. 2 and 8-16; New Brunswick, Rules of Court, rr. 1.03(2) and 2.04 12

3. A status hearing (Rule 48.14). 1. Une motion (Règle 37).

4. At trial, the oral evidence of a witness 2. Une requête (Règle 38). and the argument. 3. Une audience sur l’état de l’instance (règle 5. A reference (Rule 55.02). 48.14).

6. An appeal or a motion for leave to 4. Lors du procès, le témoignage oral d’un appeal (Rules 61 and 62). témoin et la plaidoirie.

7. A proceeding for judicial review. 5. Un renvoi (règle 55.02).

8. A pre-trial conference or case 6. Un appel ou une motion en autorisation conference. d’interjeter appel (Règles 61 et 62).

7. Une instance relative à la révision judiciaire.

8. Une conférence préparatoire au procès ou une conférence relative à la cause. 30

32. A video conference can be permitted on consent or, if the parties do not consent, directed by the court “on motion or on its own initiative … on such terms as are just.”31 Given the broad

scope of Rule 1.08, virtually any Ontario civil proceeding, including the taking of viva voce

evidence, can in appropriate circumstances be conducted by video conference.

33. Contrary to the submissions of the Appellants, resort to Rule 1.08 does not constitute a

“legal fiction.” Rule 1.08 is a procedural rule that cannot change the substantive location of the hearing. An Ontario hearing conducted by means of videoconference remains a hearing conducted in Ontario even if the parties, counsel, witnesses, or judge are physically present outside Ontario. But that is not a “legal fiction”; it is a legislative recognition of the flexibility

30 Rules of Civil Procedure, supra, Rule 1.08(1) 31 Rules of Civil Procedure, supra, Rules 1.08(2)-(3) 13

modern technology creates to have people located in one place participate electronically in a

hearing taking place in another.

34. Nor is Rule 1.08 meant to be read narrowly as a technical provision designed solely to

facilitate video-conferenced testimony as the Appellants suggest. Rule 1.08 must be interpreted

in keeping with Rule 1.04(1)’s admonition that “these rules shall be liberally construed to secure

the just, most expeditious determination of every civil proceeding on its merits.”32 Rule 1.08

allows the Court to decide cases on their merits when justice requires the use of video

conferencing to permit parties, counsel, witnesses, or the judge to participate remotely.

35. The text of Rule 1.08 also makes it clear that it is more than just an evidentiary provision.

Rule 1.08(1) expressly permits “all or part” of a proceeding to be conducted by video conference, including legal argument at trial and proceedings such as motions, applications, and appeals that generally do not involve viva voce testimony.

36. Similarly, the factors a judge must consider in deciding whether to permit or to direct a video conference include factors that apply to argument as well as to evidence. Rule 1.08(5) sets out the following factors that must be considered:

Factors to Consider Facteurs à prendre en consideration

(5) In deciding whether to permit or to (5) Lorsqu’il décide s’il doit autoriser ou direct a telephone or video conference, the ordonner la tenue d’une conférence court shall consider, téléphonique ou d’une vidéoconférence, le tribunal tient compte des facteurs suivants : (a) the general principle that evidence and argument should be presented orally in open a) le principe général selon lequel les court; témoignages et les plaidoiries devraient être présentés oralement en audience publique; (b) the importance of the evidence to the

32 Rules of Civil Procedure, supra, Rule 1.04(1) 14

determination of the issues in the case; b) l’importance des témoignages pour ce qui est de trancher les questions en litige dans la (c) the effect of the telephone or video cause; conference on the court’s ability to make findings, including determinations about the c) l’effet de la conférence téléphonique ou de credibility of witnesses; la vidéoconférence sur la capacité du tribunal d’émettre des conclusions, y compris des (d) the importance in the circumstances of décisions relatives à la crédibilité des témoins; the case of observing the demeanour of a witness; d) l’importance d’observer le comportement d’un témoin, compte tenu des circonstances de (e) whether a party, witness or lawyer for a l’affaire; party is unable to attend because of infirmity, illness or any other reason; e) la question de savoir si une partie, un témoin ou l’avocat d’une partie ne peut se présenter (f) the balance of convenience between the pour cause d’infirmité, de maladie ou pour tout party wishing the telephone or video autre motif; conference and the party or parties opposing; and f) la prépondérance des inconvénients qu’il établit entre ceux que subirait la partie qui (g) any other relevant matter. souhaite la tenue de la conférence téléphonique ou de la vidéoconférence et ceux que subiraient la ou les parties qui s’y opposent;

g) les autres questions pertinentes.33

37. Rule 1.08(5)(a) expressly refers to “argument” as well as to “evidence.” Rule 1.08(5)(e)

expressly refers to parties and lawyers who are unable to attend as well as witnesses who are

unable to attend. Rule 1.08(5)(g) allows the Court to consider “any other relevant matter,” giving

it a broad discretion to determine when a video conference hearing (including a video conference

hearing where the parties, counsel, witnesses, or the judge are outside Ontario) is appropriate in all the circumstances of the case.

38. Rule 1.08 has in fact been applied in a broad, purposive manner to ensure that justice can be done. Status hearings, case conferences, motions, pre-trials, and appeals are routinely

33 Rules of Civil Procedure, supra, Rule 1.08(5) 15

conducted through telephone and video conference, particularly in Northern Ontario.34 On a

number of occasions, the Superior Court has permitted the use of video conferencing even where

witnesses are testifying viva voce and credibility was at issue.

39. In Davies, the Court considered whether, in a personal injury action, a number of

witnesses could testify via video link from Poland. The defendants argued that under Rule 1.08,

all viva voce evidence must be heard in the jurisdiction where the court is located. The court

rejected that argument, holding:

In my view, the answer to the concerns raised in part by Mr. Regan must be found not only in the discretion that the court is given to allow video conferencing by way of the application of Rule 1.08, but also the guidance that the Supreme Court of Canada has recently given in Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 4. Apart from the specific application of Hryniak to motions for summary judgment, the Supreme Court is clearly signaling that there must be a cultural shift away from the traditional trial in favour of modern procedures that meet the needs of any particular case. …

Applying the principles set forth in Rule 1.08, I am satisfied that the effect of the video conference will not impact on the ability of the court to make findings and determinations about the credibility of a witness. I am also satisfied that the importance of the witnesses in question are such that this court should exercise its discretion in favour of the plaintiff. I am satisfied that the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to establish that the witnesses in question will not attend in Oshawa to give their evidence in court, and that the balance of convenience, therefore, is in favour of allowing the evidence of these witnesses by way of video conferencing.35

34 Ontario Court of Appeal, Practice Direction concerning Civil Appeals in the Court of Appeal, ss. 8, 9, and 11.6; Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Consolidated Provincial Practice Direction, ss. 30 and 51; Ontario Superior Court, Consolidated Practice Direction for the Northwest Region, ss. 8-13; Superior Court of Justice, Video Conferencing Pilot Project – Questions and Answers for Participants 35 Davies v. Clarington (Municipality), 2015 ONSC 7353 at paras. 25-36 [Emphasis added] 16

40. This passage makes clear that Rule 1.08 provides the court with ample discretion to allow

persons outside Ontario to participate in an Ontario proceeding by video conference, without any

need to resort to inherent jurisdiction.

41. In Archambault, the Court considered an appeal from the decision of a Master who concluded that an Austrian witness could testify at trial via video conference. That witness

refused to enter Ontario for fear of attorning to Ontario’s jurisdiction where she had a $9 million

judgment entered against her. She agreed that she would be subject to the sanctions of the

Austrian court for any false evidence she gave. The Appellant plaintiff argued that the court

lacked an inherent discretion to permit video evidence. The court did not need to rely on inherent

jurisdiction because Rule 1.08 governed the use of video conference technology at trial.36

42. In Midland Resources, the Court relied on the broad scope of Rule 1.08 to hold that Rule

34.07(1)(f) should be interpreted to permit an examination for discovery to be held by video conference over the objections of the examining party. The Court rejected a suggestion that video conferencing should be rare or only used in exceptional circumstances:

As stated, it is conceded on behalf of the defendants that rule 34.07(1)(f) gives a court jurisdiction to order that the examination of a person who resides outside of Ontario be held by video conferencing. I agree with this interpretation of the rules.

Master Dash in 1337194 Ontario Inc. v. Whitely 2004 CarswellOnt 2312 agreed that discovery by video conferencing could be ordered under Rule 34.07(1)(f). In that case, he made the following statement which is relied upon by the defendants:

While I agree that discovery by videoconference can be ordered under rule 34.07(1)(f) [as per Guarantee Co. of North America v. Nuytten (1997), 10 C.P.C. (4th) 251 (Ont. Master)] in my view it

36 Archambault v. Kalandi (2007), 40 C.P.C. (6th) 262 (Ont. S.C.J.) at paras. 4, 18, and 29-34, aff’g (2006), 35 C.P.C. (6th) 362 (Ont. Master) 17

should be ordered rarely and only in exceptional circumstances against the wishes of the examining party particularly where as here credibility of the witness to be examined is a key issue. It must also be remembered that Master Polika in Guarantee was concerned with a reattendance and not an initial attendance, and his choice was between videoconferencing and discovery in writing, not discovery by attendance. In my view the importance of counsel directly observing the demeanour of these witnesses in person is of great importance and the evidence these witnesses have to give is of great importance to the issues in the action being two of the factors in rule 1.08(5) which I consider by analogy.

I have some difficulty with the statement of Master Dash that discovery by video conference should be ordered rarely and only in exceptional circumstances. Examinations of witnesses by video conferencing are a normal process in modern international litigation or arbitration. The reason, of course, is that often the time and expense involved in traveling to far distant places is not warranted if there is an alternative. In my view, taken the high costs of modern litigation, it should be encouraged rather than discouraged, so long as the discretion of the judicial officer in deciding whether to order video conferencing is exercised judicially. I see no purpose in starting from the position that it should be ordered rarely and only in exceptional circumstances. There is no basis, in my view, for any such presumption. Each case should be decided on its own facts with a view to determining what is the most just and convenient result in the particular case.

Rule 1.08 provides for video conferencing of a proceeding before a court, such as a motion, a trial and the like. …

This rule is an acknowledgment of the usefulness of taking evidence by way of a video conference. I note that there is no presumption that such an order should be rarely made and only in exceptional circumstances. While it does not deal with steps in a proceeding such as examinations for discovery that are not heard by a judicial officer, it does not preclude an order under rule 34.07(1)(f).37

43. In Chandra, the Superior Court permitted five witnesses to testify at trial from the United

Kingdom by video conference because the cost of flying them to Toronto would be disproportionate to the time they would spend testifying and some of the witnesses had health

37 Midland Resources Holding Ltd. v. Shtaif (2009), 99 O.R. (3d) 550 at paras. 20-24 (S.C.J.) [Emphasis added] 18 limitations or professional obligations that would make it difficult for them to travel. The Court held that video conferencing had progressed to the point where it was not unfair to permit it even at trial where credibility was at issue:

The use of video or similar technologies does not now represent a significant deviation from the general principle favouring oral evidence in court. Such evidence is given orally, under oath or affirmation, and is observable "live" as it would be with the witness present in the courtroom. Questions are asked and answers are given in the usual way. The witness can be closely observed and most if not all of the visual and verbal cues that could be seen if the individual was physically present can be observed on the screen. The evidence is received by the court and heard and understood by counsel and any members of the public who may be present in the courtroom at the time.

Available technologies include not only the ability to examine a witness but, also, to put to that witness in a contemporaneous way documents and other exhibits.

Arbitrations and other private forms of dispute resolution already routinely use video conferencing and, indeed, video testimony can be and is often used in criminal cases in Canadian courts, even where credibility is a central issue and the stakes are high. In Paiva v. Corpening, 2012 ONCJ 88, 9 R.F.L. (7th) 203, the court observed, at para. 31: It is worth noting that there are other criminal cases decided under s. 714.1 [of the Criminal Code] in which video conference evidence was permitted because of a complainant's personal circumstances, including the cost of travelling to trial. These were cases of domestic assault and sexual assault in which assessment of the credibility of the complainant was crucial; judges in those cases found that they were not hampered in any substantial way in making credibility assessments.

The suitability of video conferencing in cases where credibility needs to be assessed was also commented on in R. v. Allen, [2007] O.J. No. 1353 (O.C.J.), at para 26:

The defence further submits that it will be more difficult to get a sense of the witness's credibility without him being present. I don't think that can be assumed to be so. In some respects there are advantages in that the court will presumably have the benefit of a full face on-view of the witness as opposed to the profile seen in court. The testimony will be taped and be replayed at will. It is worth noting that video-linked evidence of children is routinely received in our courts and the credibility assessments are not hampered by the procedure. Further, some of the cases...dealing 19

with s. 714.1 have commented that video-linked evidence has been found to be superior in these respects: see for example [R. v. Hannen, 2000 Y.T.T.C. 502, [2000] Y.J. No. 6 (Terr. Ct.) at paras.] 315, 327.

Although none of the proposed video conference witnesses are peripheral, in the sense of being fringe witnesses, their attendance in court can not be compelled because of their residence outside Canada.

While each request will necessarily turn on its own facts and circumstances, provided that there is a reasonable explanation for a witness not being able to attend in court to give evidence, and provided also that the technology is available and can readily be deployed, a court should be reluctant to deprive itself and the parties of the opportunity to receive the testimony of a non-party witness through video conferencing.38

44. In the end, only two of the five witnesses gave evidence by video link. Two were able to

attend in person and one did not testify. Justice Mew nevertheless commented on how well the

process worked for those who did participate remotely:

The picture and sound quality were excellent. Counsel and the court registrar were able to efficiently manage the process. The flow of testimony was not markedly less spontaneous than it would have been if the witness had been present in court. The entire experience was, from the perspective of this trial judge, entirely satisfactory. The fears expressed by the plaintiff in opposing the CBC's motion were, in my view, entirely unfounded.39

45. As these cases demonstrate and as Justice Juriansz held in the Court below, Rule 1.08

provides a broad, flexible legislative mechanism by which courts may, in appropriate cases,

conduct civil proceedings even though parties, counsel, witnesses or the judge are physically

situated outside the province. Rule 1.08 would permit the very arrangement that Class Counsel proposed in this case. The Ontario presiding judge, together with those counsel who wished to

travel to Edmonton, could have participated in the Ontario sufficiency motion hearing by means

38 Chandra v. C.B.C., 2015 ONSC 5385 at paras. 20-25 [Emphasis added] 39 Chandra, supra at para. 32 [Emphasis added] 20 of videoconference back to an Ontario courtroom where counsel, witnesses, and members of the public who did not wish to leave Ontario could participate in the proceedings.40

46. The British Columbia Court of Appeal unanimously came to the same conclusion in

Endean. The Court held that the British Columbia Supreme Court Civil Rules and Evidence Act permitted an out-of-province hearing to be held by video conference to a British Columbia courtroom where those counsel, witnesses, and members of the public who did not wish to leave

British Columbia could participate in the proceedings.41

47. Ontario’s Rule 1.08, British Columbia’s Supreme Court Civil Rules and Evidence Act, and the similar provisions that have been enacted by the other provinces and territories therefore provide ample foundation for out-of-province hearings to be held by way of videoconference whenever they are appropriate to ensure that justice is done. As discussed further below, the use of a videoconference back to an open courtroom in the court’s home province also satisfies the constitutional requirement that the courts be open to the citizens of the court’s home province.

(2) More Specialized Legislation That Applies to Particular Proceedings Where Greater Judicial Discretion Is Required

48. In addition to these general rules that can be used in all civil proceedings when the criteria set out in the applicable legislation are satisfied, certain kinds of proceeding where greater procedural flexibility is warranted are governed by legislation which grants the court a broad discretion to determine the applicable procedure. So long as the open courts principle and the territorial limitations on the court’s substantive jurisdiction are respected, such legislation allows the Court to permit the participation of parties, counsel, witnesses, or judges by video

40 Reasons of the Court of Appeal, paras. 217-26, Appellants’ Record, Vol. I, Tab 6, pp. 161-64 41 Endean, 2014 BCCA 61, supra at paras. 78-83 21 conference from a location outside the province even if the requirements of general legislation like Rule 1.08 are not met.

49. Two examples of types of proceeding where such procedural flexibility may often be required are insolvency proceedings under the federal Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act

(“CCAA”) and class proceedings under the various provincial Class Proceedings Acts.

Insolvency Proceedings:

50. Section 11 of the CCAA gives the Court a broad statutory discretion to “subject to the restrictions set out in this Act … make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.”42 In cases where the Court has recognized a foreign proceeding involving the same debtor company, s. 52(3)(e) more specifically permits the Court to make orders concerning

“the coordination of concurrent proceedings regarding the same debtor company.”43

51. The degree to which video conferencing can be a useful tool in resolving the complicated multi-jurisdictional issues that can arise in insolvency proceedings is demonstrated by the Nortel allocation trial, one of the most complicated cases ever heard in Ontario. Using the discretionary statutory authority provided by the CCAA and analogous US legislation, Justice Newbould of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice and Justice Gross of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware conducted a 21-day joint trial simultaneously in two cross-border courtrooms linked by what Justice Gross called “remarkable and effective technology.”44

42 Companies Creditors’ Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11 (“CCAA”) 43 CCAA, supra, s. 52(3)(e) 44 Re Nortel Networks Corp., 2015 ONSC 2987 at paras. 3-10, 27 C.B.R. (6th) 175; In re Nortel Networks Inc., 532 B.R. 494 at 499-500 (Bkrtcy. D. Del. 2015). See also Re Nortel Networks Corp., 2013 ONSC 1757 at paras. 5, 14(e), and 37-38, 2 C.B.R. (6th) 1, leave to appeal denied 2013 ONCA 427 at paras. 1, 5, and 9, 5 C.B.R. (6th) 254; Re Nortel Networks Corp., Cross-Border Insolvency Protocol, para. 12(d), Schedule “A” to the Fifth Amended and Restated Initial Order 22

Lawyers and witnesses could and did appear in either courtroom and communicate with a

lawyer, witness, or the judge in the other courtroom. Together, the two courts heard from

numerous witnesses and received over 2,000 exhibits. They then rendered independent decisions

that agreed how $7.3 billion in assets should be allocated between the various bankruptcy estates.

Class Action Proceedings:

52. In class action proceedings like this one, section 12 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992

and its analogues in most other provinces can also be used to permit parties, counsel, witnesses,

or judges to participate in a hearing from outside the province by means of videoconference.45

Section 12 provides that “the court, on the motion of a party or class member, may make any

order it considers appropriate respecting the conduct of a class proceeding to ensure its fair and

expeditious determination and, for the purpose, may impose such terms on the parties as it

considers appropriate.” It gives the Court broad scope to make the procedural motions needed to

properly manage a class proceeding, including permitting persons who are outside the province

to participate in a hearing by means of video conferencing.46

53. In the courts below, Ontario argued that s. 12 could not be used to authorize an out-of-

province hearing due to the presumption against extraterritoriality. That concern would continue

to apply if a court were to attempt to use s. 12 to make an order with true extraterritorial effect

45 Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, s. 12. See also Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 50, s. 12; Class Proceedings Act, S.A. 2003, c. C-16.5, s. 13(1); Class Actions Act, S.S. 2001, c. C-12.01, s. 14; Class Proceedings Act, C.C.S.M., c. C130, s. 12; Class Proceedings Act, R.S.N.B. 2011, c. 125, s. 14; Class Proceedings Act, S.N.S. 2007, c. 28, s. 15; Class Actions Act, S.N.L. 2001, c. C-18.1, s. 13. Prince Edward Island and the Territories have to date not passed class action legislation and Title III of the Québec Code of civil procedure which contains special rules for class actions does not contain any provision analogous to s. 12. The general rules permitting parties, counsel, witnesses, and judges to participate from outside the province by means of videoconferencing would, however, continue to apply. 46 Fantl v. Transamerica Life Canada, 2009 ONCA 377 at para. 42; 1250264 Ontario Inc. v. Pet Value Canada Ltd., 2013 ONCA 279 at para. 40; Peter v. Medtronic, Inc., 2010 ONSC 3777 at para. 17, 97 C.P.C. (6th) 392 (Div. Ct.) 23

such as a coercive order which purported to take effect outside Ontario of its own force. The

reasons of Justice Juriansz and the British Columbia Court of Appeal make clear, however, that permitting parties, counsel, witnesses, or judges to participate in an Ontario hearing from outside

Ontario by means of video conference does not violate the presumption against legislation

having extraterritorial effect. The hearing remains an Ontario hearing and technology is merely

being used to allow persons outside the province to participate in that Ontario hearing. Ontario

therefore now accepts that, subject to compliance with the open courts principle and the

territorial limitations on Ontario courts’ substantive jurisdiction, s. 12 of the Class Proceedings

Act, 1992 allows an Ontario court to decide that parties, counsel, witnesses, or judges outside

Ontario can participate in an Ontario class proceeding hearing by means of a video conference.

B. The Open Courts Principle Requires a Video Conference Link Back to an Ontario Courtroom Accessible to the People of Ontario

54. Regardless of the authority a Court relies on to permit it to hold an out-of-province hearing, it must ensure compliance with the constitutionally protected principle that the courts of a province must be open to the people of that province. As both the British Columbia and the

Ontario Courts of Appeal held, when a judge sits outside his or her home province, a link to that home province is necessary to protect the right of the citizens of that province to have access to proceedings in their courts:

Endean:

Allowing judges to sit outside their territorial jurisdiction also endangers the open court principle. The open court principle has been described as a hallmark of a democratic society whose vital importance cannot be over-emphasized: Re Vancouver Sun, 2004 SCC 43, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332 at para. 23. As a general rule, 24

any member of the public interested in a hearing should be able to attend in a courtroom in British Columbia to do so. If British Columbia judges are allowed to conduct hearings outside the province the ability of the public and the local media to monitor such proceedings is clearly compromised.47

Parsons per Juriansz J.A.:

The legislature has stipulated that “all” court hearings “shall” be open to the public. No matter the extent and nature of the court’s jurisdiction, the court must comply with this provision. The court can only exclude the public when there is a possibility of “serious harm or injustice to any person.” This exception does not apply in this case. …

Given that the Courts of Justice Act is an enactment of the Ontario legislature, I consider it evident that s. 135 applies to the Ontario public. The obvious intent of the Ontario legislature is to guarantee the Ontario public the prima facie right to attend all court hearings of Ontario courts. In my view the statute does not contemplate that the Ontario public must travel to another province in order to exercise the right to attend the hearing. For the statutory right to be meaningful, it is necessary that the Ontario public be able to attend the hearing at an Ontario courtroom.48

Parsons per Lauwers J.A.:

On the open court issue, I largely agree with the reasoning of Juriansz J.A. In my view, s. 135 of the Courts of Justice Act requires a “video pipe” between the room or rooms outside Ontario in which the hearing is held and a reasonably accessible Ontario courtroom.49

55. This Court has repeatedly held that “the ‘open court principle’ … ‘has long been recognized as a cornerstone of the common law.’” With the advent of the Charter, that long- standing common law right became a constitutionally protected right “to have access to court

47 Endean, 2014 BCCA 61, supra at para. 69 [Emphasis added] 48 Reasons of the Court of Appeal, paras. 213-16, Appellants’ Record, Vol I, Tab 6, pp. 160-61 49 Reasons of the Court of Appeal, para. 234, Appellants’ Record, Vol I, Tab 6, p. 167 25

proceedings.”50 In Ontario, like in several other provinces, the open courts principle is now also

expressly embodied in statute – s. 135 of the Courts of Justice Act.51

56. Both the British Columbia and Ontario Courts of Appeal were correct when they held

that the open courts principle means that members of the public in the province where an action

is brought must be able to have access to court proceedings unless the requirements of the

Dagenais/Mentuck test are met.52 Contrary to the Appellants’ submissions at paras. 134 to 136 of

Class Counsel’s factum and paras. 66 to 67 of Fund Counsel’s factum, provincial boundaries do

matter. Unless there is a legitimate reason to close a hearing, interested members of the Ontario

public should be able to have access to any Ontario proceeding they wish without having to

travel to another province.53

57. The one province to have legislated expressly concerning out-of-province hearings to date has reaffirmed that it is the citizens of the Court’s home province who have a right to access that Court’s proceedings. The Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rules expressly permit out-of- province joint hearings but only if “the hearing is transmitted to a courtroom in Nova Scotia” and

“the courtroom is open to the public.”54

50 Named Person v. Vancouver Sun, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 253, 2007 SCC 43 at paras. 31-37. See also C.B.C. v. New Brunswick (A.G.), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480 at paras. 17-66; Re Vancouver Sun, 2004 SCC 43 at paras. 22-31, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332; Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario, 2005 SCC 41 at paras. 1-9 and 24-30, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188; Nova Scotia (A.G.) v. MacIntyre, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175 at 185-87; R v. N.S., 2012 SCC 72 at paras. 75-76, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 726; C.B.C. v. Canada (A.G.), 2011 SCC 2 at paras. 28-29, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 19; C.B.C. v. The Queen, 2011 SCC 3 at paras. 12-13, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 65; A.B. v. Bragg Communications Inc., 2012 SCC 46 at paras. 11-13, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 567 51 Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 135; Court of Queen’s Bench Act, C.C.S.M., c. C280, s. 76; Arts. 11-16 C.C.P.; Judicature Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. J-2.1, s. 61 52 Dagenais v. C.B.C., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 at 878; R. v. Mentuck, 2001 SCC 76 at paras. 22-39, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442 53 It is the citizens of Ontario who have the right to access their own courts in their own province. Members of the national class who do not reside in Ontario have chosen to sue in Ontario by their decision not to opt out of the class. Choosing to sue in Ontario necessarily implies choosing to access the courts in Ontario. 54 Nova Scotia, Civil Procedure Rules, supra, r. 86.05(4) 26

58. Furthermore, contrary to the Appellants’ submissions at para. 140 of Class Counsel’s

factum, the open courts principle does not only apply to those who indicate their interest in a

court proceeding in advance. Nor does it require ordinary citizens to delegate their right of access

to the media. The open courts principle is not just about society’s interest in ensuring that

“justice be done in the light” as the Appellant’s suggest. It is also about the individual citizen’s

right to be informed about matters of public importance.55

59. In many cases, and particularly in class actions which by their very nature often serve

“public purposes that go beyond the immediate interests of the parties, including members of the

putative class” and “frequently attract public attention due to their relative novelty, the public

interest in the issues involved, the size of the proposed class and the large sums at issue,”

members of the public and local media may decide to attend court proceedings at short notice.56

There has never been any requirement that interested members of the public give advance notice that they wish to attend court proceedings. This Court should not impose one.

60. It is true that the open courts principle is not unlimited. The open courts principle itself allows courts to be closed if the requirements of the Dagenais/Mentuck test are met. Where the application of the open courts principle would “make the administration of justice unworkable” such as where the available facilities cannot safely accommodate all those who wish to view a proceeding in person, the open courts principle must yield.57 Other competing public interests

may also justify limitations on the open courts principle if the requirements of the Oakes test are

55 C.B.C. v. New Brunswick (A.G.), supra at paras. 23 and 26; Named Person v. Vancouver Sun, supra at paras. 86- 88 56 Fairview Donut Inc. v. The TDL Group Corp., 2010 ONSC 789 at paras. 50-51, 100 O.R. (3d) 510 57 C.B.C. v. New Brunswick (A.G.), supra at paras. 27 and 29 27

met.58 But no evidence has been led to show that requiring a video conference link back to the

court’s home province in the rare cases where a judge decides that justice requires participating

in the hearing from a location outside the province would “make the administration of justice

unworkable.” Absent such evidence, the presumption should remain that, as both Courts below

found, a video conference link should be provided to permit citizens of the Court’s home

province to access their court in their own province.

C. The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Superior Courts Should Not Be Used to Authorize Out-of-Province Hearings

(1) There Is No Need to Resort to Inherent Jurisdiction to Permit Out-of-Province Hearings in Appropriate Circumstances

61. Given the broad scope Rule 1.08 and its analogues in the other provinces and territories

give to permit out-of-province hearings by means of video conference (as well as the even broader discretion granted by provisions such as s. 12 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 and s.

11 of the CCAA in proceedings to which they apply), there is no need to resort to the superior courts’ inherent jurisdiction.

62. As set out in more detail at paras. 25 to 31 of Ontario’s cross-appeal factum, inherent jurisdiction cannot be invoked if its use would conflict with a statute or Rule. Even if there is not a direct conflict, however, the law is clear that courts should be cautious in resorting to inherent jurisdiction when legislation has been enacted in the same area. Inherent jurisdiction is by its very nature a residual source of power to which resort should only be made when the Court does not already have the means to make the order sought. As I.H. Jacobs noted in his seminal article on inherent jurisdiction:

58 Named Person v. Vancouver Sun, supra at paras. 35-43 28

In this light, the inherent jurisdiction at the court may be defined as being the reserve or fund of powers, a residual source of power, which the court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do so, and in particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to prevent improper vexation or oppression, to do justice between the parties and to secure a fair trial between them.59

63. Where the Legislature or Rules Committee has provided the court with a broad discretion

to see that justice is done, there is no need to resort to inherent jurisdiction. As this Court held in

Century Services, courts should rely first on statutory grants of discretion, turning to inherent

jurisdiction only if the statutory power is insufficient.60 As this Court held in Caron, “the very plenitude of this inherent jurisdiction requires that it be exercised sparingly and with caution.” In that case, the Court found that superior courts could use their inherent jurisdiction to assist inferior tribunals “but only in circumstances where the inferior courts are powerless to act and it is essential to avoid an injustice.”61

64. Here, for the reasons set out above, there is no “functional gap or vacuum” which

inherent jurisdiction is required to fill.62 The general rules of court permitting video

conferencing, together with the specialized legislation governing specific kinds of proceedings

like insolvency proceedings and class actions where more discretionary judicial control of

procedure is required, provide all the authority a court needs to permit out-of-province hearings.

59 I.H. Jacob, “The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court” (1970) Current Legal Problems 23 at 51 [Emphasis added] 60 Century Services v. Canada (A.G.), 2010 SCC 60 at paras. 63-68, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379 61 R. v. Caron, 2011 SCC 5 at para. 30, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 78 62 Re Stelco Inc. (2005), 75 O.R. (3d) 5 at paras. 33-38 (C.A.); Danso-Coffey v. Ontario, 2010 ONCA 171 at paras. 26-35, 99 O.R. (3d) 401; Kovach (Litigation guardian of) v. Kovach, 2010 ONCA 126 at paras. 15-43, 100 O.R. (3d) 608, leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed 8 July 2010; Maynes v. Allen-Vanguard Technologies Inc., 2011 ONCA 125 at para. 43; Re Richtree Inc. (2005), 74 O.R. (3d) 174 at paras. 7-8 (S.C.J.) 29

As Justice Juriansz correctly found in the Court below, since “it is possible to satisfy the dictates

of s. 135 of the Courts of Justice Act [the statutory embodiment of the open courts principle in

Ontario] by employing rule 1.08, the resort to inherent jurisdiction is unnecessary.”63

(2) Inherent Jurisdiction Is Not the Appropriate Means to Authorize Out-of-Province Hearings

65. Not only is it unnecessary to resort to inherent jurisdiction to authorize out-of-province hearings, it is inappropriate to do so. The Appellants claim that inherent jurisdiction can be used to authorize out-of-province hearings because there is no express statutory prohibition on courts using their inherent jurisdiction to do so. The fact that there is no express statutory prohibition does not automatically mean that recourse to inherent jurisdiction is appropriate. Allowing courts to hold out-of-province hearing is the type of fundamental procedural change that should be made by the Legislature or its delegates, not through exercise of the court’s inherent jurisdiction.

66. Contrary to the Appellants’ submissions, Ontario is not arguing that court procedure should be frozen as it was in 1867 or that inherent jurisdiction can never be used to make procedural reforms. The common law can and should evolve as conditions change. But that evolution must be an incremental one. Courts should carefully consider whether they have the institutional competence to foresee the complex policy ramifications of making fundamental changes to long-standing procedural rules before such changes are made through the exercise of inherent jurisdiction rather than legislative reform.

67. As this Court held in Criminal Lawyers’ Assn., “even when there are no legislative limits, the inherent jurisdiction of the court is limited by the institutional roles and capacities that

63 Reasons of the Court of Appeal, para. 226, Appellants’ Record, Vol. I, Tab 6, p. 164 30 emerge out of our constitutional framework and values.” Even in the absence of express statutory limitations, the proper scope of inherent jurisdiction must be determined in light of “our constitutional framework” that “prescribes different roles for the executive, legislative and judicial branches”:

I would add, however, that the powers recognized as part of the courts’ inherent jurisdiction are limited by the separation of powers that exists among the various players in our constitutional order and by the particular institutional capacities that have evolved from that separation. …

Accordingly, the limits of the court’s inherent jurisdiction must be responsive to the proper function of the separate branches of government, lest it upset the balance of roles, responsibilities and capacities that has evolved in our system of governance over the course of centuries.

Indeed, even where courts have the jurisdiction to address matters that fall within the constitutional role of the other branches of government, they must give sufficient weight to the constitutional responsibilities of the legislative and executive branches, as in certain cases the other branch will be “better placed to make such decisions within a range of constitutional options” (Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44, at para. 37).64

68. This Court has repeatedly held that it is the proper function of the Legislature (or its delegate the Rules Committee), not the courts, to make “complex changes to the law with uncertain ramifications”:

The more recent decision of this Court in Watkins v. Olafson, supra, provides some indication of the proper limits on the power of the judiciary to change existing law. …

McLachlin J. … held that the courts should not effect major changes to the law with complex ramifications (at pp. 760-61):

64 Ontario v. Criminal Lawyers’ Assn. of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43 at paras. 26-31, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 3 [Emphasis added] 31

This branch of the case, viewed thus, raises starkly the question of the limits on the power of the judiciary to change the law. Generally speaking, the judiciary is bound to apply the rules of law found in the legislation and in the precedents. Over time, the law in any given area may change; but the process of change is a slow and incremental one, based largely on the mechanism of extending an existing principle to new circumstances. While it may be that some judges are more activist than others, the courts have generally declined to introduce major and far-reaching changes in the rules hitherto accepted as governing the situation before them.

There are sound reasons supporting this judicial reluctance to dramatically recast established rules of law. The court may not be in the best position to assess the deficiencies of the existing law, much less problems which may be associated with the changes it might make. The court has before it a single case; major changes in the law should be predicated on a wider view of how the rule will operate in the broad generality of cases. Moreover, the court may not be in a position to appreciate fully the economic and policy issues underlying the choice it is asked to make. Major changes to the law often involve devising subsidiary rules and procedures relevant to their implementation, a task which is better accomplished through consultation between courts and practitioners than by judicial decree. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is the long-established principle that in a constitutional democracy it is the legislature, as the elected branch of government, which should assume the major responsibility for law reform.

Considerations such as these suggest that major revisions of the law are best left to the legislature. Where the matter is one of a small extension of existing rules to meet the exigencies of a new case and the consequences of the change are readily assessable, judges can and should vary existing principles. But where the revision is major and its ramifications complex, the courts must proceed with great caution. …

Judges can and should adapt the common law to reflect the changing social, moral and economic fabric of the country. Judges should not be quick to perpetuate rules whose social foundation has long since disappeared. Nonetheless, there are significant constraints on the power of the judiciary to change the law. As McLachlin J. indicated in Watkins, supra, in a constitutional democracy such as ours it is the legislature and not the courts which has the major responsibility for law reform; and for any changes to the law which may have complex 32

ramifications, however necessary or desirable such changes may be, they should be left to the legislature. The judiciary should confine itself to those incremental changes which are necessary to keep the common law in step with the dynamic an evolving fabric of our society.65

69. Permitting the judges of one province or territory to sit in another province or territory is exactly the type of decision with complex ramifications which should be left to the Legislature to govern. Permitting out-of-province hearings could have significant political and economic implications for the jurisdictions involved. Especially in the case of an out-of-province hearing of long duration, allowing such extra-provincial proceedings could impact court resources, staffing and budgets, as well as the judiciary in the jurisdictions involved. That is not to say that such hearings should not be permitted – they should in appropriate circumstances. It is merely to suggest that the appropriate institutional branch should manage and implement the change.

70. The fact that the Ontario Legislature and its delegate, the Rules Committee, have chosen

to start by making modest reforms such as enacting Rule 1.08 and s. 12 of the Class Proceedings

Act, 1992 does not give the Courts the institutional competence to make broader and more far- reaching reforms. If a matter is within the institutional competence of the Legislature, then it is for the Legislature to decide how far – and if – it should legislate concerning that matter.

71. Similarly, the lack of an express statutory prohibition on the use of inherent jurisdiction is no reason for the courts to assume the task of making fundamental changes to court procedure in

65 R. v. Salituro, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654 at 666-70, citing Watkins v. Olafson, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 750 at 760-61 [Emphasis added]. See also Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1210 at para. 93; Porto Seguro Companhia De Seguros Gerais v. Belcan S.A., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1278 at para. 26; Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437 at paras. 76-79; Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Vulnerable Minority Women v. M.N.R., [1999] 1 S.C.R. 10 at para. 150; Friedmann Equity Developments Inc. v. Final Note Ltd., 2000 SCC 34 at para. 42, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 842; British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2005 SCC 49 at paras. 50-53, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473; Pro Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf Inc., 2006 SCC 52 at para. 85, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 612; A.Y.S.A. Amateur Youth Soccer Assn. v. Canada (Revenue Agency), 2007 SCC 42 at para. 28, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 217; WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, 2008 SCC 40 at para. 36, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 420 33

a manner that exceeds their institutional competence. As the United Kingdom Supreme Court has

recently held:

In proceedings which are not regulated by statute or statutory rules, it might be thought that there are no limits to the inherent power of the court to regulate its own procedure and that it has an untrammelled power to manage litigation in whatever way it considers necessary or expedient in the interests of justice. …

But even in an area which is not the subject of statute or statutory procedural rules, there are limits to the court’s inherent jurisdiction to regulate how civil and criminal proceedings should be conducted. In my view, there is considerable force in what Professor Martin Dockray said in “The Inherent Jurisdiction to Regulate Civil Proceedings” (1997) 113 LQR 120, 131:

“….a matter which is procedural from the position of an applicant may be constitutional in the eyes of the respondent. The fact that procedural law can be described as subordinate or adjectival because it aims to give effect to substantive rules should not conceal the truth that procedures can and do interfere with important human rights, while the means by which a decision is reached may be just as important as the decision which is made in the end. Where procedure is as important as substance, procedural change requires the same degree of political accountability and economic and social foresight as reform of an equivalent rule of substantive law. Major innovations in procedural law should therefore be recognised as an institutional responsibility, not a matter on which individual judges should respond to the pleas of particular litigants. Procedural revolutions should appear first in statutes or in the Rules of Court, not in the law reports. ”66

72. In Ontario’s submission, allowing courts to hold out-of-province hearings without any statutory authority is the type of fundamental procedural change that should not be made through the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. As the British Columbia Court of Appeal correctly held in

66 Al Rawi and others v. The Security Service and others, [2011] UKSC 34 at paras. 18-22, 48, 67-69, 72, 74, 78, 88, and 192, [2012] 1 A.C. 531. See also Siskina (Cargo Owners) v. Distos S.A., [1979] A.C. 210 at 260 and 262-63 (H.L.); State Government Insurance Commission v. Trigwell, [1979] HCA 40, 26 A.L.R. 67 at 70, 73, 74-75, 78, and 94; Barclay v. Penberthy, [2012] HCA 40, 291 A.L.R. 608 at paras. 27, 80-84, and 178 34

Endean and as Ontario set out in detail in its Factum in the Court below, neither the English

superior courts nor the pre-Confederation colonial courts from which our modern-day provincial

superior courts are descended could sit outside their territorial jurisdiction.67 Other than

Fontaine, a case in which there is no evidence anyone raised any objection to the courts sitting

outside their jurisdictional boundaries and the issue of the courts’ ability to do so accordingly did

not arise, the Appellants have not provided any example of a provincial superior court using its inherent jurisdiction to hold a hearing outside its home province.68

73. Determining whether and in what circumstances out-of-province hearings should be allowed is precisely the kind of “complex changes to the law with uncertain ramifications” that this Court has held should be made by legislation, not judicial ruling.

74. As discussed above, legislation in every province and territory of Canada already permits parties, witnesses, counsel, and judges to participate in court proceedings from a location outside the province by means of video conferencing. That legislation already permits out-of-province hearings to take place in a flexible manner that complies with the open courts principle and respects the territorial limitations on the courts’ jurisdiction. No resort to inherent jurisdiction is required or warranted.

67 Endean, 2014 BCCA 61, supra at paras. 43-56; Ontario’s Court of Appeal Factum, paras. 29-53, Appellants’ Record, Vol. II, Tab 10, pp. 99-109 68 Cross-examination of Heather Rumble Peterson, pp. 15-17, qq. 43-55, Appellants’ Record, Vol. II, Tab 20, pp. 301-03. At paras. 32 and 106 of its factum, Fund Counsel refers to referees and arbitrators holding hearings outside Ontario. But neither referees nor arbitrators are a Court. Rule 54.03 expressly allows a reference to be directed to a person agreed on by the parties with no requirement that person be located in Ontario. Arbitrators draw their authority from contract and the parties are of course free to agree to appoint someone located outside Ontario. 35

PART IV – SUBMISSIONS ON COSTS

75. Ontario does not seek its costs and asks that no costs be awarded against it.

PART V – ORDER SOUGHT

76. Ontario asks that the Appellants’ appeal be dismissed.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 7TH DAY OF APRIL, 2016

______Malliha Wilson

______Josh Hunter

______Lynne McArdle

______Brent Kettles

Counsel for the Respondent, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario

PART VI – TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Paras. CASES

1250264 Ontario Inc. v. Pet Value Canada Ltd., 2013 ONCA 279 52

A.B. v. Bragg Communications Inc., 2012 SCC 46, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 567 55

A.Y.S.A. Amateur Youth Soccer Assn. v. Canada (Revenue Agency), 2007 SCC 42, 68 [2007] 3 S.C.R. 217

Al Rawi and others v. The Security Service and others, [2011] UKSC 34, [2012] 1 71 A.C. 531

Archambault v. Kalandi (2007), 40 C.P.C. (6th) 262 (Ont. S.C.J.), aff’g (2006), 35 41 C.P.C. (6th) 362 (Ont. Master)

Barclay v. Penberthy, [2012] HCA 40, 291 A.L.R. 608 71

Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 68 1210

British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2005 SCC 49, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 68 473

C.B.C. v. New Brunswick (A.G.), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480 55, 58, 60

C.B.C. v. Canada (A.G.), 2011 SCC 2, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 19 55

C.B.C. v. The Queen, 2011 SCC 3, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 65 55

Century Services v. Canada (A.G.), 2010 SCC 60, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379 63

Chandra v. C.B.C., 2015 ONSC 5385 43, 44

Dagenais v. C.B.C., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 56

Danso-Coffey v. Ontario, 2010 ONCA 171, 99 O.R. (3d) 401 64

Davies v. Clarington (Municipality), 2015 ONSC 7353 39

Endean v. Canadian Red Cross Society, 2013 BCSC 1074 13

Endean v. Canadian Red Cross Society, 2014 BCCA 61 22, 46, 54, 72

Paras. Endean v. Canadian Red Cross Society, 2014 BCSC 621 18

Fairview Donut Inc. v. The TDL Group Corp., 2010 ONSC 789, 100 O.R. (3d) 510 59

Fantl v. Transamerica Life Canada, 2009 ONCA 377 52

Friedmann Equity Developments Inc. v. Final Note Ltd., 2000 SCC 34, [2000] 1 68 S.C.R. 842

Honhon c. Canada (P.G.), 2013 QCCS 2782 13

Honhon c. Canada (P.G.), 2014 QCCS 2032 18

In re Nortel Networks Inc., 532 B.R. 494 (Bkrtcy. D. Del. 2015) 51

Kovach (Litigation guardian of) v. Kovach, 2010 ONCA 126, 100 O.R. (3d) 608, 64 leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed 8 July 2010

Maynes v. Allen-Vanguard Technologies Inc., 2011 ONCA 125 64

Midland Resources Holding Ltd. v. Shtaif (2009), 99 O.R. (3d) 550 (S.C.J.) 42

Named Person v. Vancouver Sun, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 253, 2007 SCC 43 55, 58, 60

New Brunswick (A.G.) v. Fern, 2012 NBQB 377 31

Nova Scotia (A.G.) v. MacIntyre, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175 55

Ontario v. Criminal Lawyers’ Assn. of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 3 67

Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437 68

Peter v. Medtronic, Inc., 2010 ONSC 3777, 97 C.P.C. (6th) 392 (Div. Ct.) 52

Porto Seguro Companhia De Seguros Gerais v. Belcan S.A., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1278 68

Pro Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf Inc., 2006 SCC 52, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 612 68

R. v. Caron, 2011 SCC 5, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 78 63

R. v. Mentuck, 2001 SCC 76, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442 56

R v. N.S., 2012 SCC 72, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 726 55

R. v. Salituro, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654 68

Paras. Re Nortel Networks Corp., 2013 ONSC 1757, 2 C.B.R. (6th) 1, leave to appeal 51 denied 2013 ONCA 427, 5 C.B.R. (6th) 254

Re Nortel Networks Corp., 2015 ONSC 2987, 27 C.B.R. (6th) 175 51

Re Nortel Networks Corp., Cross-Border Insolvency Protocol, para. 12(d), Schedule 51 “A” to the Fifth Amended and Restated Initial Order

Re Richtree Inc. (2005), 74 O.R. (3d) 174 (S.C.J.) 64

Re Stelco Inc. (2005), 75 O.R. (3d) 5 (C.A.) 64

Re Vancouver Sun, 2004 SCC 43, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332 55

Siskina (Cargo Owners) v. Distos S.A., [1979] A.C. 210 (H.L.) 71

State Government Insurance Commission v. Trigwell, [1979] HCA 40, 26 A.L.R. 67 71

Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario, 2005 SCC 41, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188 55

Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Vulnerable Minority Women v. M.N.R., [1999] 68 1 S.C.R. 10

Watkins v. Olafson, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 750 68

WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, 2008 SCC 40, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 420 68

TEXTS

I.H. Jacob, “The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court” (1970) Current Legal Problems 62 23

PRACTICE DIRECTIONS

Ontario Court of Appeal, Practice Direction concerning Civil Appeals in the Court 38 of Appeal

Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Consolidated Provincial Practice Direction 38

Ontario Superior Court, Consolidated Practice Direction for the Northwest Region 38

Superior Court of Justice, Video Conferencing Pilot Project – Questions and 38 Answers for Participants

PART VII – STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

1. Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 135

2. Ontario, Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, Rules 1.04(1), 1.08, and 54.03

3. Companies Creditors’ Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, ss. 11 and 52(3)(e)

4. Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, s. 12

5. Evidence Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 124, s. 73

6. British Columbia, Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009, r. 23-5

7. Alberta, Rules of Court, A.R. 124/2010, vol. 1, rr. 6.9(1)(b), 6.10, and 8.18

8. Saskatchewan, Queen’s Bench Rules, r. 6-17

9. Manitoba, Court of Queen’s Bench Rules, Man.Reg. 553/88, rr. 37.09, 38.08, and 53.02

10. Arts. 11-16, 279, and 497 C.C.P.

11. Québec, Rules of Practice of the Superior Court of Québec in Civil Matters, C.Q.L.R., c. C-25.01, r. 4, art. 45.2

12. Québec, Rules of practice in civil matters of the Superior Court (District of Québec), C.Q.L.R., c. C-25.01, r. 5, arts. 18.2-18.5

13. New Brunswick, Rules of Court, rr. 1.03(2) and 2.04

14. Nova Scotia, Civil Procedure Rules, rr. 25.02(3), 51.08, 53.05, 56.01(2)(b), 56.03(2), 68.09, and 86.05-86.06

15. Prince Edward Island, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 1.07

16. Newfoundland and Labrador, Rules of the Supreme Court, 1986, S.N.L. 1986, c. 42, Sch. D, rr. 47A.01-47A.06

17. Yukon, Rules of Court, Y.O.I.C. 2009/65, rr. 42(2)(b) and (48), 47(10), and 62(4)

18. Northwest Territories, Rules of the Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories, N.W.T.Reg. R-010-96, rr. 352 and 389

19. Nunavut, Rules of the Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories, N.W.T. Reg. R-010- 96, as inherited by Nunavut pursuant to s. 76.05 of the Nunavut Act, S.C. 1993, c. 28, rr. 352 and 389

20. Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 50, s. 12

21. Class Proceedings Act, S.A. 2003, c. C-16.5, s. 13(1)

22. Class Actions Act, S.S. 2001, c. C-12.01, s. 14

23. Class Proceedings Act, C.C.S.M., c. C130, s. 12

24. Class Proceedings Act, R.S.N.B. 2011, c. 125, s. 14

25. Class Proceedings Act, S.N.S. 2007, c. 28, s. 15

26. Class Actions Act, S.N.L. 2001, c. C-18.1, s. 13

27. Court of Queen’s Bench Act, C.C.S.M., c. C280, s. 76

28. Judicature Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. J-2.1, s. 61

Français Courts of Justice Act

R.S.O. 1990, CHAPTER C.43

Consolidation Period: From December 3, 2015 to the e-Laws currency date. Last amendment: 2015, c. 27, Sched. 1, s. 1.

CONTENTS 1. Definitions 1.1 References to former names of courts PART I COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO 2. Court of Appeal 3. Composition of court 4. Assignment of judges from Superior Court of Justice 5. Powers and duties of Chief Justice 6. Court of Appeal jurisdiction 7. Composition of court 8. References to Court of Appeal 9. Meeting of judges PART II COURT OF ONTARIO 10. Court of Ontario SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE 11. Superior Court of Justice 12. Composition of Superior Court of Justice 13. Assignment of judges from Court of Appeal 14. Chief Justice, Associate Chief Justice and regional senior judges of Superior Court of Justice; Senior Judge of Family Court 15. Judges assigned to regions 16. Composition of court for hearings 17. Appeals to Superior Court of Justice DIVISIONAL COURT 18. Divisional Court 19. Divisional Court jurisdiction 20. Place for hearing 21. Composition of court for hearings FAMILY COURT 21.1 Family Court 21.2 Composition of Family Court 21.3 Transitional measure 21.7 Composition of court for hearings 21.8 Proceedings in Family Court 21.9 Other jurisdiction 21.9.1 Certain appeals 21.10 Orders of predecessor court 21.11 Place where proceeding commenced 21.12 Enforcement of orders 21.13 Community liaison committee 21.14 Community resources committee 21.15 Dispute resolution service SMALL CLAIMS COURT 22. Small Claims Court 23. Jurisdiction 24. Composition of court for hearings

1 (5) The powers conferred by this section may be exercised even if the appeal is as to part only of an order or decision, and may be exercised in favour of a party even though the party did not appeal. R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 134 (3-5). New trial (6) A court to which an appeal is taken shall not direct a new trial unless some substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred. R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 134 (6); 1994, c. 12, s. 46 (1). Idem (7) Where some substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred but it affects only part of an order or decision or some of the parties, a new trial may be ordered in respect of only that part or those parties. R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 134 (7); 1994, c. 12, s. 46 (2). PUBLIC ACCESS Public hearings 135. (1) Subject to subsection (2) and rules of court, all court hearings shall be open to the public. Exception (2) The court may order the public to be excluded from a hearing where the possibility of serious harm or injustice to any person justifies a departure from the general principle that court hearings should be open to the public. Disclosure of information (3) Where a proceeding is heard in the absence of the public, disclosure of information relating to the proceeding is not contempt of court unless the court expressly prohibited the disclosure of the information. R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 135. Prohibition against photography, etc., at court hearing 136. (1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), no person shall, (a) take or attempt to take a photograph, motion picture, audio recording or other record capable of producing visual or aural representations by electronic means or otherwise, (i) at a court hearing, (ii) of any person entering or leaving the room in which a court hearing is to be or has been convened, or (iii) of any person in the building in which a court hearing is to be or has been convened where there is reasonable ground for believing that the person is there for the purpose of attending or leaving the hearing; (b) publish, broadcast, reproduce or otherwise disseminate a photograph, motion picture, audio recording or record taken in contravention of clause (a); or (c) broadcast or reproduce an audio recording made as described in clause (2) (b). R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 136 (1). Exceptions (2) Nothing in subsection (1), (a) prohibits a person from unobtrusively making handwritten notes or sketches at a court hearing; or (b) prohibits a lawyer, a party acting in person or a journalist from unobtrusively making an audio recording at a court hearing, in the manner that has been approved by the judge, for the sole purpose of supplementing or replacing handwritten notes. R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 136 (2); 1996, c. 25, s. 1 (22). Exceptions (3) Subsection (1) does not apply to a photograph, motion picture, audio recording or record made with authorization of the judge, (a) where required for the presentation of evidence or the making of a record or for any other purpose of the court hearing; (b) in connection with any investitive, naturalization, ceremonial or other similar proceeding; or (c) with the consent of the parties and witnesses, for such educational or instructional purposes as the judge approves. Offence (4) Every person who contravenes this section is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $25,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than six months, or to both. R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 136 (3, 4).

72 English Loi sur les tribunaux judiciaires

L.R.O. 1990, CHAPITRE C.43

Période de codification : du 3 décembre 2015 à la date à laquelle Lois-en-ligne est à jour. Dernière modification : 2015, chap. 27, annexe 1, art. 1.

SOMMAIRE 1. Définitions 1.1 Mention des anciennes appellations des tribunaux PARTIE I COUR D’APPEL DE L’ONTARIO 2. Maintien de la Cour d’appel 3. Composition de la Cour 4. Affectation des juges de la Cour supérieure de justice 5. Pouvoirs et fonctions du juge en chef de l’Ontario 6. Compétence de la Cour d’appel 7. Composition de la Cour 8. Renvoi à la Cour d’appel 9. Réunion des juges PARTIE II COUR DE JUSTICE DE L’ONTARIO 10. Cour de l’Ontario COUR SUPÉRIEURE DE JUSTICE 11. Cour supérieure de justice 12. Composition de la Cour supérieure de justice 13. Affectation des juges de la Cour d’appel 14. Juge en chef, juge en chef adjoint et juges principaux régionaux de la Cour supérieure de justice; juge principal de la Cour de la famille 15. Affectation des juges à des régions 16. Composition de la Cour pour les audiences 17. Appels portés devant la Cour supérieure de justice COUR DIVISIONNAIRE 18. Cour divisionnaire 19. Compétence de la Cour divisionnaire 20. Lieu d’audition 21. Composition de la Cour pour les audiences COUR DE LA FAMILLE 21.1 Cour de la famille 21.2 Composition de la Cour de la famille 21.3 Mesure transitoire 21.7 Composition du tribunal pour les audiences 21.8 Instances devant la Cour de la famille 21.9 Autre compétence 21.9.1 Certains appels 21.10 Ordonnances d’un tribunal précédent 21.11 Lieu d’introduction de l’instance 21.12 Exécution des ordonnances 21.13 Comité de liaison avec les collectivités 21.14 Comité des ressources communautaires 21.15 Service de règlement des différends COUR DES PETITES CRÉANCES 22. Cour des petites créances 23. Compétence 24. Composition de la Cour pour les audiences

1

Idem (7) Si le préjudice grave ou l’erreur judiciaire n’a d’incidence que sur une partie de l’ordonnance ou de la décision ou sur certaines des parties au litige, le nouveau procès ne peut être accordé que relativement à cette partie de l’ordonnance ou de la décision ou à ces parties au litige. L.R.O. 1990, chap. C.43, par. 134 (7); 1994, chap. 12, par. 46 (2). AUDIENCES PUBLIQUES Audiences publiques 135. (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2) et des règles de pratique, les audiences des tribunaux sont publiques. Exception (2) Le tribunal peut ordonner le huis clos si la possibilité qu’une personne subisse un préjudice important ou une injustice grave justifie une dérogation au principe général de la publicité des audiences des tribunaux. Divulgation de renseignements (3) La divulgation de renseignements concernant une instance à huis clos ne constitue pas un outrage au tribunal, à moins que le tribunal ne l’interdise formellement. L.R.O. 1990, chap. C.43, art. 135. Interdiction de prendre des photographies, etc. à l’audience 136. (1) Sous réserve des paragraphes (2) et (3), nul ne peut : a) faire ou tenter de faire une reproduction susceptible de donner, par procédé électronique ou autre, des représentations visuelles ou sonores, notamment par photographie, par film ou par enregistrement sonore : (i) à une audience judiciaire, (ii) d’une personne qui entre dans la salle où se tient ou doit se tenir l’audience, ou en sort, (iii) d’une personne qui se trouve dans l’édifice où se tient ou doit se tenir l’audience, s’il existe des motifs valables de croire que la personne se rend à la salle d’audience ou la quitte; b) publier, diffuser, reproduire ou distribuer autrement les photographies, les films ou les enregistrements sonores ou autres reproductions faits contrairement à l’alinéa a); c) diffuser ou reproduire un enregistrement sonore fait de la manière décrite à l’alinéa (2) b). L.R.O. 1990, chap. C.43, par. 136 (1). Exceptions (2)Le paragraphe (1) n’empêche pas : a) une personne de prendre discrètement des notes par écrit ou de faire des croquis discrètement, à l’audience; b) un avocat, une partie qui agit en son propre nom ou un journaliste de faire, discrètement et de la manière approuvée par le juge, un enregistrement sonore au cours de l’audience destiné uniquement à compléter ou à remplacer des notes manuscrites. L.R.O. 1990, chap. C.43, par. 136 (2); 1996, chap. 25, par. 1 (22). Exceptions (3)Le paragraphe (1) ne s’applique pas à la photographie, au film, à l’enregistrement sonore ni à l’autre reproduction établie avec l’autorisation du juge : a) aux fins de l’audience, et notamment pour la présentation de la preuve ou pour servir d’archives; b) dans le cadre d’une cérémonie d’entrée en fonction ou de naturalisation ou d’une cérémonie de caractère semblable; c) aux fins éducatives approuvées par le juge, avec le consentement des parties et des témoins. Infraction (4)Quiconque contrevient au présent article est coupable d’une infraction et passible, sur déclaration de culpabilité, d’une amende d’au plus 25 000 $ et d’un emprisonnement d’au plus six mois, ou d’une seule de ces peines. L.R.O. 1990, chap. C.43, par. 136 (3) et (4). Documents publics 137. (1)Quiconque a acquitté les droits prévus peut examiner un document déposé au greffe dans une instance civile devant un tribunal, à moins qu’une loi ou une ordonnance du tribunal ne l’interdise. Documents confidentiels

75 Français Courts of Justice Act

R.R.O. 1990, REGULATION 194 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Consolidation Period: From January 1, 2016 to the e-Laws currency date. Last amendment: O. Reg. 193/15.

This is the English version of a bilingual regulation.

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS

GENERAL MATTERS Rule 1 Citation, Application and Interpretation 2 Non-Compliance with the Rules 2.1 General Powers to Stay or Dismiss if Vexatious, etc. 3 Time 4 Court Documents 4.1 Duty of Expert

PARTIES AND JOINDER 5 Joinder of Claims and Parties 6 Consolidation or Hearing Together 6.1 Separate Hearings 7 Parties under Disability 8 Partnerships and Sole Proprietorships 9 Estates and Trusts 10 Representation Order 11 Transfer or Transmission of Interest 12 Class Proceedings and Other Representative Proceedings 13 Intervention

COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS 13.1 Place of Commencement and Hearing or Trial 14 Originating Process 15 Representation by Lawyer

SERVICE 16 Service of Documents 17 Service outside Ontario 18 Time for Delivery of Statement of Defence

DISPOSITION WITHOUT TRIAL 19 Default Proceedings 20 Summary Judgment 21 Determination of an Issue Before Trial 22 Special Case 23 Discontinuance and Withdrawal 24 Dismissal of Action for Delay 24.1 Mandatory Mediation

PLEADINGS 25 Pleadings in an Action

1 “substantial indemnity costs” mean costs awarded in an amount that is 1.5 times what would otherwise be awarded in accordance with Part I of Tariff A, and “on a substantial indemnity basis” has a corresponding meaning; (“dépens d’indemnisation substantielle”) “timetable” means a schedule for the completion of one or more steps required to advance the proceeding (including delivery of affidavits of documents, examinations under oath, where available, or motions), established by order of the court or by written agreement of the parties that is not contrary to an order. (“calendrier”) R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 1.03; O. Reg. 535/92, s. 2; O. Reg. 484/94, s. 2; O. Reg. 69/95, s. 1; O. Reg. 442/97, s. 1; O. Reg. 570/98, s. 1; O. Reg. 292/99, s. 1 (2); O. Reg. 427/01, s. 1 (1); O. Reg. 284/01, s. 2; O. Reg. 14/04, s. 1 (1); O. Reg. 131/04, s. 2; O. Reg. 42/05, s. 1; O. Reg. 260/05, s. 1; O. Reg. 575/07, s. 7; O. Reg. 438/08, ss. 1, 66; O. Reg. 231/13, s. 1. (2) REVOKED: O. Reg. 14/04, s. 1 (2). INTERPRETATION General Principle 1.04 (1) These rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, most expeditious and least expensive determination of every civil proceeding on its merits. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 1.04 (1). Proportionality (1.1) In applying these rules, the court shall make orders and give directions that are proportionate to the importance and complexity of the issues, and to the amount involved, in the proceeding. O. Reg. 438/08, s. 2. Matters Not Provided For (2) Where matters are not provided for in these rules, the practice shall be determined by analogy to them. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 1.04 (2). (3) REVOKED: O. Reg. 231/13, s. 2. “Party and Party” Costs (4) If a statute, regulation or other document refers to party and party costs, these rules apply as if the reference were to partial indemnity costs. O. Reg. 284/01, s. 3. “Solicitor and Client” Costs (5) If a statute, regulation or other document refers to solicitor and client costs, these rules apply as if the reference were to substantial indemnity costs. O. Reg. 284/01, s. 3. ORDERS ON TERMS 1.05 When making an order under these rules the court may impose such terms and give such directions as are just. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 1.05. FORMS Use of Forms 1.06 (1) The forms prescribed by these rules shall be used where applicable and with such variations as the circumstances require. O. Reg. 77/06, s. 1. Table of Forms (2) In these rules, when a form is referred to by number, the reference is to the form with that number that is described in the Table of Forms at the end of these rules and is available on the Internet through www.ontariocourtforms.on.ca. O. Reg. 77/06, s. 1. PRACTICE DIRECTIONS Definition 1.07 (1) In this rule, “practice direction” means a direction, notice, guide or similar publication for the purpose of governing, subject to these rules, the practice for proceedings. O. Reg. 132/04, s. 1. Court of Appeal (2) A practice direction for proceedings in the Court of Appeal shall be signed by the Chief Justice of Ontario. O. Reg. 132/04, s. 1. Superior Court of Justice (3) A practice direction for proceedings in the Superior Court of Justice throughout Ontario shall be signed by the Chief Justice of the Superior Court of Justice. O. Reg. 132/04, s. 1.

21 (4) A practice direction for proceedings in the Superior Court of Justice in a region shall be signed by the regional senior judge and countersigned by the Chief Justice of the Superior Court of Justice. O. Reg. 132/04, s. 1. Filing, Posting and Publication of Notice (5) A practice direction shall be filed with the secretary of the Civil Rules Committee and posted on the Ontario Courts website (www.ontariocourts.on.ca), and notice of the practice direction shall be published in the Ontario Reports. O. Reg. 132/04, s. 1. Effective Date (6) A practice direction does not come into effect before it is filed and posted and notice of it is published as described in subrule (5). O. Reg. 132/04, s. 1. TELEPHONE AND VIDEO CONFERENCES Where Available 1.08 (1) If facilities for a telephone or video conference are available at the court or are provided by a party, all or part of any of the following proceedings or steps in a proceeding may be heard or conducted by telephone or video conference as permitted by subrules (2) to (5): 1. A motion (Rule 37). 2. An application (Rule 38). 3. A status hearing (Rule 48.14). 4. At trial, the oral evidence of a witness and the argument. 5. A reference (Rule 55.02). 6. An appeal or a motion for leave to appeal (Rules 61 and 62). 7. A proceeding for judicial review. 8. A pre-trial conference or case conference. O. Reg. 288/99, s. 2; O. Reg. 24/00, s. 1; O. Reg. 438/08, s. 3 (1). Consent (2) If the parties consent to a telephone or video conference and if the presiding judge or officer permits it, one of the parties shall make the necessary arrangements. O. Reg. 288/99, s. 2. Order, No Consent (3) If the parties do not consent, the court may, on motion or on its own initiative, make an order directing a telephone or video conference on such terms as are just. O. Reg. 288/99, s. 2; O. Reg. 438/08, s. 3 (2). (4) The judge or officer presiding at a proceeding or step in a proceeding may set aside or vary an order made under subrule (3). O. Reg. 288/99, s. 2. Factors to Consider (5) In deciding whether to permit or to direct a telephone or video conference, the court shall consider, (a) the general principle that evidence and argument should be presented orally in open court; (b) the importance of the evidence to the determination of the issues in the case; (c) the effect of the telephone or video conference on the court’s ability to make findings, including determinations about the credibility of witnesses; (d) the importance in the circumstances of the case of observing the demeanour of a witness; (e) whether a party, witness or lawyer for a party is unable to attend because of infirmity, illness or any other reason; (f) the balance of convenience between the party wishing the telephone or video conference and the party or parties opposing; and (g) any other relevant matter. O. Reg. 288/99, s. 2; O. Reg. 575/07, s. 1. Arrangements for Conference (6) Where the court permits or directs a telephone or video conference, the court may direct a party to make the necessary arrangements and to give notice of those arrangements to the other parties and to the court. O. Reg. 288/99, s. 2. VIDEO CONFERENCE — REFERENCES UNDER THE SOLICITORS ACT Application

22 “i” is the average of the value for the last Wednesday in each month of the nominal rate of interest on long-term Government of Canada bonds (Series V121758, formerly Series B113867), as published in the Bank of Canada’s Weekly Financial Statistics for the period starting on March 1 and ending on August 31 in the year before the year in which the trial begins; “d” is, (a) for the 15-year period that follows the start of the trial, the greater of, (i) the average of the value for the last Wednesday in each month of the real rate of interest on long-term Government of Canada real return bonds (Series V121808, formerly Series B113911), as published in the Bank of Canada’s Weekly Financial Statistics for the period starting on March 1 and ending on August 31 in the year before the year in which the trial begins, less ½ per cent, and (ii) zero, and (b) for any later period covered by the award, 2.5 per cent per year for each year in that period. O. Reg. 488/99, s. 2; O. Reg. 263/03, s. 4 (2); O. Reg. 231/13, s. 9 (2). Transition (3) This rule, as it read on December 31, 2013, continues to apply with respect to actions in which the trial commenced before January 1, 2014. O. Reg. 231/13, s. 9 (3). PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RATE FOR NON-PECUNIARY DAMAGES 53.10 The prejudgment interest rate on damages for non-pecuniary loss in an action for personal injury is 5 per cent per year. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 53.10. REFERENCES RULE 54 DIRECTING A REFERENCE APPLICATION OF RULES 54 AND 55 54.01 Rules 54 and 55 apply to references directed, (a) under rule 54.02 or any other rule; and (b) under a statute, subject to the provisions of the statute. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 54.01. WHERE REFERENCE MAY BE DIRECTED Reference of Whole Proceeding or Issue 54.02 (1) Subject to any right to have an issue tried by a jury, a judge may at any time in a proceeding direct a reference of the whole proceeding or a reference to determine an issue where, (a) all affected parties consent; (b) a prolonged examination of documents or an investigation is required that, in the opinion of the judge, cannot conveniently be made at trial; or (c) a substantial issue in dispute requires the taking of accounts. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 54.02 (1). Reference of Issue (2) Subject to any right to have an issue tried by a jury, a judge may at any time in a proceeding direct a reference to determine an issue relating to, (a) the taking of accounts; (b) the conduct of a sale; (c) the appointment by the court of a guardian or receiver, or the appointment by a person of an attorney under a power of attorney; (d) the conduct of a guardianship or receivership or the exercise of the authority of an attorney acting under a power of attorney; or (e) the enforcement of an order. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 54.02 (2); O. Reg. 69/95, s. 7. TO WHOM REFERENCE MAY BE DIRECTED Judge or Officer 54.03 (1) A reference may be directed to the referring judge, to another judge with that judge’s consent, to a registrar or other officer of the court or to a person agreed on by the parties. O. Reg. 570/98, s. 4.

131 Person Agreed on by Parties (2) Where a reference is directed to a person agreed on by the parties, the person is, for the purposes of the reference, an officer of the court directing the reference. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 54.03 (2). (3) The judge directing a reference to a person agreed on by the parties may, (a) determine his or her remuneration and the liability of the parties for its payment; (b) refer that issue to the person to whom the reference is directed; or (c) reserve that issue until the report on the reference is confirmed. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 54.03 (3). ORDER DIRECTING A REFERENCE 54.04 (1) An order directing a reference shall specify the nature and subject matter of the reference and who is to conduct it and may, (a) direct in general terms that all necessary inquiries be made, accounts taken and costs assessed; (b) contain directions for the conduct of the reference; and (c) designate which party is to have carriage of the reference. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 54.04 (1). (2) An order of a master or registrar directing a reference shall not require a report back, and the report or an interim report on the reference shall be confirmed under rule 54.09 (confirmation by passage of time). R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 54.04 (2). (3) A referee has, subject to the order directing the reference, all the powers these rules give to a referee. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 54.04 (3). MOTIONS ON A REFERENCE 54.05 (1) A referee shall hear and dispose of any motion made in connection with the reference, but in the absence of or with the consent of the referee, a motion may be heard and disposed of by a judge or master. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 54.05 (1); O. Reg. 219/91, s. 7. (2) Rule 37.03 (place of hearing of motions) does not apply to a motion made in connection with a reference and heard by the referee. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 54.05 (2). (3) Where a referee has made an order on a motion in the reference, a person who is affected by the order may make a motion to a judge to set aside or vary the order by a notice of motion served within seven days after the order is made and naming the first available hearing date that is at least three days after service of the notice of motion. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 54.05 (3). REPORT ON REFERENCE 54.06 A referee shall make a report that contains his or her findings and conclusions. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 54.06. REPORT MUST BE CONFIRMED 54.07 (1) A report has no effect until it has been confirmed. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 54.07. (2) A report shall be entered immediately after it has been confirmed and rule 59.05 (entry of order) applies, with necessary modifications. O. Reg. 396/91, s. 9. CONFIRMATION ON MOTION WHERE REPORT BACK REQUIRED 54.08 (1) Where the order directing a reference requires the referee to report back, the report or an interim report on the reference may be confirmed only on a motion to the judge who directed the reference on notice to every party who appeared on the reference, and the judge may require the referee to give reasons for his or her findings and conclusions and may confirm the report in whole or in part or make such other order as is just. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 54.08 (1); O. Reg. 288/99, s. 17. (2) Where the judge who directed the reference is unable for any reason to hear a motion for confirmation, the motion may be made to another judge. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 54.08 (2). CONFIRMATION BY PASSAGE OF TIME WHERE REPORT BACK NOT REQUIRED Fifteen-Day Period to Oppose Confirmation 54.09 (1) Where the order directing a reference does not require the referee to report back, the report or an interim report on the reference is confirmed, (a) immediately on the filing of the consent of every party who appeared on the reference; or (b) on the expiration of fifteen days after a copy, with proof of service on every party who appeared on the reference, has been filed in the office in which the proceeding was commenced, unless a notice of motion to oppose confirmation of a report is served within that time. O. Reg. 396/91, s. 10.

132 English Loi sur les tribunaux judiciaires

R.R.O. 1990, RÈGLEMENT 194 RÈGLES DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE

Période de codification : du 1er janvier 2016 à la date à laquelle Lois-en-ligne est à jour. Dernière modification : Règl. de l’Ont. 193/15.

Le texte suivant est la version française d’un règlement bilingue.

SOMMAIRE

DISPOSITIONS GÉNÉRALES Règle 1 Mention, champ d’application et interprétation 2 Inobservation des règles 2.1 Pouvoirs généraux de sursis ou de rejet pour cause de nature vexatoire ou autre 3 Délais 4 Documents de procédure 4.1 Obligation de l’expert

PARTIES ET JONCTIONS 5 Jonction des demandes et des parties 6 Réunion ou instruction simultanée des instances 6.1 Audiences distinctes 7 Parties incapables 8 Sociétés en nom collectif et entreprises à propriétaire unique 9 Successions et fiducies 10 Représentation 11 Transfert ou transmission d’intérêt 12 Recours collectifs 13 Intervention

INTRODUCTION DE L’INSTANCE 13.1 Lieu de l’introduction et de l’audience ou du procès 14 Acte introductif d’instance 15 Représentation par avocat

SIGNIFICATION 16 Signification de documents 17 Signification en dehors de l’Ontario 18 Délai de remise de la défense

RÈGLEMENT SANS INSTRUCTION 19 Défaut 20 Jugement sommaire 21 Décision d’une question avant l’instruction 22 Exposé de cause 23 Désistements et retraits 24 Rejet de l’action pour cause de retard 24.1 Médiation obligatoire

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«intimé» Personne contre laquelle une requête est déposée ou un appel est interjeté, selon les circonstances. («respondent») «jour férié» : a) le samedi et le dimanche; b) le jour de l’An; b.1) le jour de la Famille; c) le Vendredi saint; d) le lundi de Pâques; e) la fête de Victoria; f) la fête du Canada; g) le Congé civique; h) la fête du Travail; i) le jour d’Action de Grâces; j) le jour du Souvenir; k) le jour de Noël; l) le 26 décembre; m) le jour proclamé tel par le gouverneur général ou le lieutenant-gouverneur. Si le jour de l’An, la fête du Canada ou le jour du Souvenir tombent un samedi ou un dimanche, le lundi suivant est jour férié. Si le jour de Noël tombe un samedi ou un dimanche, le lundi et le mardi suivants sont jours fériés. Si le jour de Noël tombe un vendredi, le lundi suivant est jour férié. («holiday») «juge» Juge du tribunal. («judge») «jugement» Décision qui règle définitivement une requête ou une action sur le fond. S’entend en outre d’un jugement rendu par défaut. («judgment») «loi» S’entend en outre d’une loi fédérale. («statute») «mandat à portée limitée» S’entend de la prestation de services juridiques par un avocat pour une partie, et non toute l’affaire d’un client, selon une entente convenue avec celui-ci. («limited scope retainer») «motion» Motion présentée en cours d’instance ou préalablement à l’introduction de l’instance. («motion») «ordonnance» S’entend en outre d’un jugement. («order») «partie intimée» Personne contre laquelle une motion est présentée. («responding party») «personne» S’entend en outre d’une partie à une instance. («person») «remettre» Signifier et déposer avec la preuve de la signification. Le terme «remise» a le même sens. («deliver», «delivery») «requérant» Personne qui présente une requête. («applicant») «requête» Instance introduite par un avis de requête. («application») «tribunal» Tribunal devant lequel une instance est en cours. S’il s’agit d’une instance devant la Cour supérieure de justice, s’entend en outre : a) du protonotaire qui a compétence pour entendre les motions aux termes de la Règle 37; b) du protonotaire chargé de la gestion des causes. («court») «tribunal d’appel» La Cour d’appel ou la Cour divisionnaire, selon les circonstances. («appellate court») R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, règle 1.03; Règl. de l’Ont. 535/92, art. 2; Règl. de l’Ont. 484/94, art. 2; Règl. de l’Ont. 69/95, art. 1; Règl. de l’Ont. 442/97, art. 1; Règl. de l’Ont. 570/98, art. 1; Règl. de l’Ont. 292/99, par. 1 (2); Règl. de l’Ont. 284/01, art. 2; Règl. de l’Ont. 427/01, par. 1 (1); Règl. de l’Ont. 14/04, par. 1 (1); Règl. de l’Ont. 131/04, art. 2; Règl. de l’Ont. 42/05, art. 1; Règl. de l’Ont. 260/05, art. 1; Règl. de l’Ont. 575/07, art. 7; Règl. de l’Ont. 438/08, art. 1 et 66; Règl. de l’Ont. 231/13, art. 1. (2) ABROGÉ : Règl. de l’Ont. 14/04, par. 1 (2). PRINCIPES D’INTERPRÉTATION Principe général

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1.04 (1) Les présentes règles doivent recevoir une interprétation large afin d’assurer la résolution équitable sur le fond de chaque instance civile, de la façon la plus expéditive et la moins onéreuse. R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, par. 1.04 (1). Proportionnalité (1.1) Lorsqu’il applique les présentes règles, le tribunal rend des ordonnances et donne des directives qui sont proportionnées à l’importance et au degré de complexité des questions en litige ainsi qu’au montant en jeu dans l’instance. Règl. de l’Ont. 438/08, art. 2. Silence des règles (2) En cas de silence des présentes règles, la pratique applicable est déterminée par analogie avec celles-ci. R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, par. 1.04 (2). (3) ABROGÉ : Règl. de l’Ont. 231/13, art. 2. Dépens «partie-partie» (4) Si une loi, un règlement ou un autre document mentionne des dépens partie-partie, les présentes règles s’appliquent comme s’il s’agissait de la mention de «dépens d’indemnisation partielle». Règl. de l’Ont. 284/01, art. 3. Dépens «procureur-client» (5) Si une loi, un règlement ou un autre document mentionne des dépens procureur-client, les présentes règles s’appliquent comme s’il s’agissait de la mention de «dépens d’indemnisation substantielle». Règl. de l’Ont. 284/01, art. 3. ORDONNANCES SOUS CONDITIONS 1.05 Le tribunal qui rend une ordonnance en application des présentes règles peut y ajouter des directives et des conditions justes. R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, règle 1.05. FORMULES Utilisation des formules 1.06 (1) Les formules que prescrivent les présentes règles sont utilisées s’il y a lieu et avec les adaptations nécessaires. Règl. de l’Ont. 77/06, art. 1. Tableau des formules (2) Dans les présentes règles, lorsqu’une formule est mentionnée par numéro, la mention renvoie à la formule qui porte ce numéro et qui est mentionnée dans le tableau des formules figurant à la fin des présentes règles et accessible sur Internet via www.ontariocourtforms.on.ca. Règl. de l’Ont. 77/06, art. 1. DIRECTIVES DE PRATIQUE Définition 1.07 (1) La définition qui suit s’applique à la présente règle. «directive de pratique» Une directive, un avis, un guide ou une publication semblable visant à régir, sous réserve des présentes règles, la pratique touchant les instances. Règl. de l’Ont. 132/04, art. 1. Cour d’appel (2) Les directives de pratique touchant les instances de la Cour d’appel sont signées par le juge en chef de l’Ontario. Règl. de l’Ont. 132/04, art. 1. Cour supérieure de justice (3) Les directives de pratique touchant les instances de la Cour supérieure de justice partout en Ontario sont signées par le juge en chef de la Cour. Règl. de l’Ont. 132/04, art. 1. (4) Les directives de pratique touchant les instances de la Cour supérieure de justice dans une région sont signées par le juge principal régional et contresignées par le juge en chef de la Cour. Règl. de l’Ont. 132/04, art. 1. Dépôt, affichage et publication d’un avis (5) Les directives de pratique sont déposées auprès du secrétaire du Comité des règles en matière civile et affichées sur le site Web des Cours de l’Ontario (www.ontariocourts.on.ca), et un avis de celles-ci est publié dans le Recueil de jurisprudence de l’Ontario. Règl. de l’Ont. 132/04, art. 1. Date d’entrée en vigueur (6) Les directives de pratique n’entrent pas en vigueur avant qu’elles ne soient déposées et affichées et qu’un avis de celles-ci ne soit publié comme le prévoit le paragraphe (5). Règl. de l’Ont. 132/04, art. 1. CONFÉRENCES TÉLÉPHONIQUES ET VIDÉOCONFÉRENCES

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Applicabilité 1.08 (1) Si des installations en vue de la tenue d’une conférence téléphonique ou d’une vidéoconférence sont disponibles au tribunal ou sont fournies par une partie, tout ou partie de l’une ou l’autre des instances ou étapes d’une instance suivantes peut être entendu ou mené par conférence téléphonique ou vidéoconférence comme le permettent les paragraphes (2) à (5) : 1. Une motion (Règle 37). 2. Une requête (Règle 38). 3. Une audience sur l’état de l’instance (règle 48.14). 4. Lors du procès, le témoignage oral d’un témoin et la plaidoirie. 5. Un renvoi (règle 55.02). 6. Un appel ou une motion en autorisation d’interjeter appel (Règles 61 et 62). 7. Une instance relative à la révision judiciaire. 8. Une conférence préparatoire au procès ou une conférence relative à la cause. Règl. de l’Ont. 288/99, art. 2; Règl. de l’Ont. 24/00, art. 1; Règl. de l’Ont. 438/08, par. 3 (1). Consentement (2) Si les parties consentent à une conférence téléphonique ou à une vidéoconférence et que le juge ou l’officier de justice qui préside l’autorise, l’une des parties prend les dispositions nécessaires. Règl. de l’Ont. 288/99, art. 2. Ordonnance en l’absence de consentement (3) Si les parties ne donnent pas leur consentement, le tribunal peut, sur motion ou de son propre chef, rendre une ordonnance prescrivant la tenue d’une conférence téléphonique ou d’une vidéoconférence, à des conditions justes. Règl. de l’Ont. 288/99, art. 2; Règl. de l’Ont. 438/08, par. 3 (2). (4) Le juge ou l’officier de justice qui préside une instance ou une étape d’une instance peut annuler ou modifier une ordonnance rendue en vertu du paragraphe (3). Règl. de l’Ont. 288/99, art. 2. Facteurs à prendre en considération (5) Lorsqu’il décide s’il doit autoriser ou ordonner la tenue d’une conférence téléphonique ou d’une vidéoconférence, le tribunal tient compte des facteurs suivants : a) le principe général selon lequel les témoignages et les plaidoiries devraient être présentés oralement en audience publique; b) l’importance des témoignages pour ce qui est de trancher les questions en litige dans la cause; c) l’effet de la conférence téléphonique ou de la vidéoconférence sur la capacité du tribunal d’émettre des conclusions, y compris des décisions relatives à la crédibilité des témoins; d) l’importance d’observer le comportement d’un témoin, compte tenu des circonstances de l’affaire; e) la question de savoir si une partie, un témoin ou l’avocat d’une partie ne peut se présenter pour cause d’infirmité, de maladie ou pour tout autre motif; f) la prépondérance des inconvénients qu’il établit entre ceux que subirait la partie qui souhaite la tenue de la conférence téléphonique ou de la vidéoconférence et ceux que subiraient la ou les parties qui s’y opposent; g) les autres questions pertinentes. Règl. de l’Ont. 288/99, art. 2; Règl. de l’Ont. 575/07, art. 1. Dispositions relatives à la conférence (6) Le tribunal qui autorise ou ordonne la tenue d’une conférence téléphonique ou d’une vidéoconférence peut enjoindre à une partie de prendre les dispositions nécessaires à cette fin et d’en donner avis aux autres parties et au tribunal. Règl. de l’Ont. 288/99, art. 2. PROJET PILOTE DE VIDÉOCONFÉRENCE — RENVOIS PRÉVUS PAR LA LOI SUR LES PROCUREURS Application 1.08.1 (1) La présente règle s’applique à tout renvoi prévu par la Loi sur les procureurs du mémoire d’un avocat aux fins de liquidation qui doit, par suite d’une ordonnance, se tenir dans un tribunal situé dans l’un ou l’autre des lieux suivants : a) la ville de Cochrane; b) la ville de Fort Frances; c) la cité de Kenora; d) la cité de Sault Ste. Marie; 24

pour la période commençant le 1er mars et se terminant le 31 août de l’année précédant celle où commence le procès, réduite de ½ %, (ii) zéro, b) pendant toute période ultérieure visée par l’indemnité, 2,5 % par année pour chaque année de la période. Règl. de l’Ont. 488/99, art. 2; Règl. de l’Ont. 263/03, par. 4 (2); Règl. de l’Ont. 231/13, par. 9 (2). Disposition transitoire (3) La présente règle, dans sa version du 31 décembre 2013, continue de s’appliquer à l’égard des actions pour lesquelles le procès a commencé avant le 1er janvier 2014. Règl. de l’Ont. 231/13, par. 9 (3). TAUX D’INTÉRÊT ANTÉRIEUR AU JUGEMENT POUR PERTES NON PÉCUNIAIRES 53.10 Le taux d’intérêt antérieur au jugement applicable au calcul des dommages-intérêts pour pertes non pécuniaires dans une action pour lésions corporelles est de 5 pour cent par année. R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, règle 53.10. RENVOIS RÈGLE 54 ORDONNANCE DE RENVOI CHAMP D’APPLICATION DES RÈGLES 54 ET 55 54.01 Les Règles 54 et 55 s’appliquent aux renvois ordonnés : a) en application de la règle 54.02 ou d’une autre règle; b) en application d’une loi, sous réserve des dispositions de celle-ci. R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, règle 54.01. CAS DE RENVOI Renvoi de l’instance ou d’une question en litige 54.02 (1) Sous réserve du droit des parties de faire instruire une question en litige par un jury, un juge peut, à toute étape de l’instance, ordonner le renvoi de l’instance ou d’une question en litige si : a) toutes les parties intéressées y consentent; b) le juge est d’avis qu’un examen prolongé de documents ou une enquête est nécessaire et ne peut être effectué commodément à l’instruction; c) une question en litige importante exige une reddition de comptes. R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, par. 54.02 (1). Renvoi d’une question en litige (2) Sous réserve du droit des parties de faire instruire une question en litige par un jury, un juge peut, à toute étape d’une instance, ordonner un renvoi pour décider une question en litige se rapportant : a) à une reddition de comptes; b) au déroulement d’une vente; c) à la nomination par le tribunal d’un tuteur ou d’un séquestre ou à la nomination par une personne d’un procureur constitué en vertu d’une procuration; d) à la gestion par le tuteur ou le séquestre ou à l’exercice des pouvoirs d’un procureur qui agit en vertu d’une procuration; e) à l’exécution d’une ordonnance. R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, par. 54.02 (2); Règl. de l’Ont. 69/95, art. 7. À QUI ADRESSER LE RENVOI Juge ou officier de justice 54.03 (1) Le renvoi peut être adressé au juge qui l’a ordonné, à un autre juge avec le consentement du premier juge, au greffier ou à un autre officier de justice, ou à une personne dont conviennent les parties. Règl. de l’Ont. 570/98, art. 4. Personne dont conviennent les parties (2) La personne à laquelle les parties ont convenu d’adresser un renvoi est assimilée, pour les besoins du renvoi, à un officier de justice du tribunal qui l’a ordonné. R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, par. 54.03 (2). (3) Le juge qui adresse un renvoi à la personne dont ont convenu les parties peut : a) fixer la rémunération de cette personne et déterminer la responsabilité des parties à cet égard; b) renvoyer cette question à la personne à laquelle le renvoi a été adressé;

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c) reporter la décision de cette question jusqu’à la confirmation du rapport sur le renvoi. R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, par. 54.03 (3). ORDONNANCE DE RENVOI 54.04 (1) L’ordonnance de renvoi précise la nature et l’objet du renvoi ainsi que le nom de la personne qui est chargée de celui-ci. Elle peut : a) ordonner, en termes généraux, les enquêtes nécessaires, les redditions de comptes et la liquidation des dépens; b) comprendre des directives relatives au déroulement du renvoi; c) indiquer quelle partie est responsable du renvoi. R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, par. 54.04 (1). (2) L’ordonnance de renvoi du protonotaire ou du greffier ne peut exiger la remise d’un rapport. Le rapport ou le rapport provisoire est confirmé selon la règle 54.09 (confirmation par écoulement du temps). R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, par. 54.04 (2). (3) Sous réserve de l’ordonnance de renvoi, l’arbitre possède les pouvoirs conférés à un arbitre par les présentes règles. R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, par. 54.04 (3). MOTIONS PRÉSENTÉES DANS UN RENVOI 54.05 (1) L’arbitre connaît des motions présentées dans le renvoi. En l’absence de l’arbitre ou avec son consentement, un juge ou un protonotaire peut connaître de la motion. R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, par. 54.05 (1); Règl. de l’Ont. 219/91, art. 7. (2) La règle 37.03 (lieu de l’audition des motions) ne s’applique pas à la motion présentée relativement à un renvoi et entendue par l’arbitre. R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, par. 54.05 (2). (3) La personne visée par l’ordonnance rendue par un arbitre sur motion présentée à un juge dans un renvoi peut en demander l’annulation ou la modification par voie de motion présentée à un juge qu’elle signifie dans les sept jours suivant la date à laquelle l’ordonnance a été rendue et dans laquelle elle indique la date d’audience la plus rapprochée qui se situe au moins trois jours après la signification de l’avis de motion. R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, par. 54.05 (3). RAPPORT DE L’ARBITRE 54.06 L’arbitre rédige un rapport contenant ses constatations et conclusions. R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, règle 54.06. CONFIRMATION OBLIGATOIRE 54.07 (1) Le rapport de l’arbitre n’a aucun effet tant qu’il n’est pas confirmé. R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, règle 54.07. (2) Le rapport est inscrit dès qu’il a été confirmé et la règle 59.05 (inscription de l’ordonnance) s’applique avec les adaptations nécessaires. Règl. de l’Ont. 396/91, art. 9. MOTION EN CONFIRMATION 54.08 (1) Si l’ordonnance de renvoi exige que l’arbitre fasse rapport au juge, le rapport ou le rapport provisoire ne peut être confirmé que par voie de motion présentée au juge qui a ordonné le renvoi, sur préavis à chaque partie qui a comparu au renvoi. Le juge peut demander à l’arbitre de motiver ses conclusions et il peut confirmer le rapport, en tout ou en partie, ou rendre une autre ordonnance juste. R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, par. 54.08 (1); Règl. de l’Ont. 288/99, art. 17. (2) Si le juge qui a ordonné le renvoi n’est pas en mesure d’entendre une motion en confirmation, celle-ci peut être présentée à un autre juge. R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, par. 54.08 (2). CONFIRMATION PAR ÉCOULEMENT DU TEMPS Délai de quinze jours pour s’opposer à la confirmation 54.09 (1) Si l’ordonnance de renvoi n’exige pas que l’arbitre fasse rapport au juge, le rapport ou le rapport provisoire est confirmé : a) soit aussitôt après le dépôt du consentement de chaque partie qui a comparu au renvoi; b) soit à l’expiration d’un délai de quinze jours après le dépôt, au greffe du lieu où l’instance a été introduite, d’une copie de ce rapport, accompagnée de la preuve de sa signification à chaque partie qui a comparu au renvoi, à moins qu’un avis de motion en opposition à la confirmation ne soit signifié avant l’expiration de ce délai. Règl. de l’Ont. 396/91, art. 10. À qui présenter la motion en opposition à la confirmation (2) La motion en opposition à la confirmation d’un rapport est présentée à un juge différent de celui qui a été chargé du renvoi. R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, par. 54.09 (2). Avis de motion en opposition à la confirmation (3) L’avis de motion en opposition à la confirmation : a) expose les motifs de l’opposition à la confirmation; 140

CANADA

CONSOLIDATION CODIFICATION

Companies’ Creditors Loi sur les arrangements avec Arrangement Act les créanciers des compagnies

R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36 L.R.C. (1985), ch. C-36

Current to March 16, 2016 À jour au 16 mars 2016

Last amended on February 26, 2015 Dernière modification le 26 février 2015

Published by the Minister of Justice at the following address: Publié par le ministre de la Justice à l’adresse suivante : http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca http://lois-laws.justice.gc.ca Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies PART II Jurisdiction of Courts PARTIE II Juridiction des tribunaux Sections 10-11.02 Articles 10-11.02

available to any person specified in the order on any peut être communiqué, aux conditions qu’il estime indi- terms or conditions that the court considers appropriate. quées, à la personne qu’il nomme. R.S., 1985, c. C-36, s. 10; 2005, c. 47, s. 127. L.R. (1985), ch. C-36, art. 10; 2005, ch. 47, art. 127.

General power of court Pouvoir général du tribunal 11 Despite anything in the Bankruptcy and Insolvency 11 Malgré toute disposition de la Loi sur la faillite et Act or the Winding-up and Restructuring Act, if an ap- l’insolvabilité ou de la Loi sur les liquidations et les re- plication is made under this Act in respect of a debtor structurations, le tribunal peut, dans le cas de toute de- company, the court, on the application of any person in- mande sous le régime de la présente loi à l’égard d’une terested in the matter, may, subject to the restrictions set compagnie débitrice, rendre, sur demande d’un intéressé, out in this Act, on notice to any other person or without mais sous réserve des restrictions prévues par la présente notice as it may see fit, make any order that it considers loi et avec ou sans avis, toute ordonnance qu’il estime in- appropriate in the circumstances. diquée. R.S., 1985, c. C-36, s. 11; 1992, c. 27, s. 90; 1996, c. 6, s. 167; 1997, c. 12, s. 124; 2005, c. L.R. (1985), ch. C-36, art. 11; 1992, ch. 27, art. 90; 1996, ch. 6, art. 167; 1997, ch. 12, art. 47, s. 128. 124; 2005, ch. 47, art. 128.

Rights of suppliers Droits des fournisseurs 11.01 No order made under section 11 or 11.02 has the 11.01 L’ordonnance prévue aux articles 11 ou 11.02 ne effect of peut avoir pour effet :

(a) prohibiting a person from requiring immediate a) d’empêcher une personne d’exiger que soient effec- payment for goods, services, use of leased or licensed tués sans délai les paiements relatifs à la fourniture de property or other valuable consideration provided af- marchandises ou de services, à l’utilisation de biens ter the order is made; or loués ou faisant l’objet d’une licence ou à la fourniture de toute autre contrepartie de valeur qui ont lieu après (b) requiring the further advance of money or credit. l’ordonnance; 2005, c. 47, s. 128. b) d’exiger le versement de nouvelles avances de fonds ou de nouveaux crédits. 2005, ch. 47, art. 128.

Stays, etc. — initial application Suspension : demande initiale 11.02 (1) A court may, on an initial application in re- 11.02 (1) Dans le cas d’une demande initiale visant une spect of a debtor company, make an order on any terms compagnie débitrice, le tribunal peut, par ordonnance, that it may impose, effective for the period that the court aux conditions qu’il peut imposer et pour la période considers necessary, which period may not be more than maximale de trente jours qu’il estime nécessaire : 30 days, a) suspendre, jusqu’à nouvel ordre, toute procédure (a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, all qui est ou pourrait être intentée contre la compagnie proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of sous le régime de la Loi sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité the company under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency ou de la Loi sur les liquidations et les restructura- Act or the Winding-up and Restructuring Act; tions;

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, b) surseoir, jusqu’à nouvel ordre, à la continuation de further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding toute action, poursuite ou autre procédure contre la against the company; and compagnie;

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, c) interdire, jusqu’à nouvel ordre, l’introduction de the commencement of any action, suit or proceeding toute action, poursuite ou autre procédure contre la against the company. compagnie.

Stays, etc. — other than initial application Suspension : demandes autres qu’initiales (2) A court may, on an application in respect of a debtor (2) Dans le cas d’une demande, autre qu’une demande company other than an initial application, make an or- initiale, visant une compagnie débitrice, le tribunal peut, der, on any terms that it may impose, par ordonnance, aux conditions qu’il peut imposer et pour la période qu’il estime nécessaire :

Current to March 16, 2016 13 À jour au 16 mars 2016 Last amended on February 26, 2015 Dernière modification le 26 février 2015 Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies PART IV Cross-border Insolvencies PARTIE IV Insolvabilité en contexte international Obligations Obligations Sections 52-53 Articles 52-53

Obligations Obligations

Cooperation — court Collaboration — tribunal 52 (1) If an order recognizing a foreign proceeding is 52 (1) Une fois l’ordonnance de reconnaissance rendue, made, the court shall cooperate, to the maximum extent le tribunal collabore dans toute la mesure possible avec le possible, with the foreign representative and the foreign représentant étranger et le tribunal étranger en cause court involved in the foreign proceeding. dans le cadre de l’instance étrangère reconnue.

Cooperation — other authorities in Canada Collaboration — autres autorités compétentes (2) If any proceedings under this Act have been com- (2) Si une procédure a été intentée sous le régime de la menced in respect of a debtor company and an order rec- présente loi contre une compagnie débitrice et qu’une or- ognizing a foreign proceeding is made in respect of the donnance a été rendue reconnaissant une instance étran- debtor company, every person who exercises powers or gère visant cette compagnie, toute personne exerçant des performs duties and functions under the proceedings un- attributions dans le cadre de cette procédure collabore der this Act shall cooperate, to the maximum extent pos- dans toute la mesure possible avec le représentant étran- sible, with the foreign representative and the foreign ger et le tribunal étranger en cause. court involved in the foreign proceeding.

Forms of cooperation Moyens d’assurer la collaboration (3) For the purpose of this section, cooperation may be (3) Pour l’application du présent article, la collaboration provided by any appropriate means, including peut être assurée par tout moyen approprié, notamment :

(a) the appointment of a person to act at the direction a) la nomination d’une personne chargée d’agir sui- of the court; vant les instructions du tribunal;

(b) the communication of information by any means b) la communication de renseignements par tout considered appropriate by the court; moyen jugé approprié par celui-ci;

(c) the coordination of the administration and super- c) la coordination de l’administration et de la sur- vision of the debtor company’s assets and affairs; veillance des biens et des affaires de la compagnie dé- bitrice; (d) the approval or implementation by courts of agreements concerning the coordination of proceed- d) l’approbation ou l’application par les tribunaux des ings; and accords concernant la coordination des procédures;

(e) the coordination of concurrent proceedings re- e) la coordination de procédures concurrentes concer- garding the same debtor company. nant la même compagnie débitrice. 2005, c. 47, s. 131; 2007, c. 36, s. 80. 2005, ch. 47, art. 131; 2007, ch. 36, art. 80.

Obligations of foreign representative Obligations du représentant étranger 53 If an order recognizing a foreign proceeding is made, 53 Si l’ordonnance de reconnaissance est rendue, il in- the foreign representative who applied for the order shall combe au représentant étranger demandeur :

(a) without delay, inform the court of a) d’informer sans délai le tribunal :

(i) any substantial change in the status of the rec- (i) de toute modification sensible du statut de l’ins- ognized foreign proceeding, tance étrangère reconnue,

(ii) any substantial change in the status of the for- (ii) de toute modification sensible de sa qualité, eign representative’s authority to act in that capaci- ty, and (iii) de toute autre procédure étrangère visant la compagnie débitrice qui a été portée à sa connais- (iii) any other foreign proceeding in respect of the sance; same debtor company that becomes known to the foreign representative; and

Current to March 16, 2016 55 À jour au 16 mars 2016 Last amended on February 26, 2015 Dernière modification le 26 février 2015 Français Class Proceedings Act, 1992

S.O. 1992, CHAPTER 6

Consolidation Period: From June 22, 2006 to the e-Laws currency date. Last amendment: 2006, c.19, Sched.C, s.1(1).

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CONTENTS 1. Definitions 2. Plaintiff’s class proceeding 3. Defendant’s class proceeding 4. Classing defendants 5. Certification 6. Certain matters not bar to certification 7. Refusal to certify: proceeding may continue in altered form 8. Contents of certification order 9. Opting out 10. Where it appears conditions for certification not satisfied 11. Stages of class proceedings 12. Court may determine conduct of proceeding 13. Court may stay any other proceeding 14. Participation of class members 15. Discovery 16. Examination of class members before a motion or application 17. Notice of certification 18. Notice where individual participation is required 19. Notice to protect interests of affected persons 20. Approval of notice by the court 21. Delivery of notice 22. Costs of notice 23. Statistical evidence 24. Aggregate assessment of monetary relief 25. Individual issues 26. Judgment distribution 27. Judgment on common issues 28. Limitations 29. Discontinuance, abandonment and settlement 30. Appeals 31. Costs 32. Fees and disbursements 33. Agreements for payment only in the event of success 34. Motions 35. Rules of court 36. Crown bound 37. Application of Act Definitions 1. In this Act, “common issues” means, (a) common but not necessarily identical issues of fact, or

1 (3) The court, on the motion of a party or class member, may amend an order certifying a proceeding as a class proceeding. 1992, c. 6, s. 8 (3). Opting out 9. Any member of a class involved in a class proceeding may opt out of the proceeding in the manner and within the time specified in the certification order. 1992, c. 6, s. 9. Where it appears conditions for certification not satisfied 10. (1) On the motion of a party or class member, where it appears to the court that the conditions mentioned in subsections 5 (1) and (2) are not satisfied with respect to a class proceeding, the court may amend the certification order, may decertify the proceeding or may make any other order it considers appropriate. 1992, c. 6, s. 10 (1). Proceeding may continue in altered form (2) Where the court makes a decertification order under subsection (1), the court may permit the proceeding to continue as one or more proceedings between different parties. 1992, c. 6, s. 10 (2). Powers of court (3) For the purposes of subsections (1) and (2), the court has the powers set out in clauses 7 (a) to (c). 1992, c. 6, s. 10 (3). Stages of class proceedings 11. (1) Subject to section 12, in a class proceeding, (a) common issues for a class shall be determined together; (b) common issues for a subclass shall be determined together; and (c) individual issues that require the participation of individual class members shall be determined individually in accordance with sections 24 and 25. 1992, c. 6, s. 11 (1). Separate judgments (2) The court may give judgment in respect of the common issues and separate judgments in respect of any other issue. 1992, c. 6, s. 11 (2). Court may determine conduct of proceeding 12. The court, on the motion of a party or class member, may make any order it considers appropriate respecting the conduct of a class proceeding to ensure its fair and expeditious determination and, for the purpose, may impose such terms on the parties as it considers appropriate. 1992, c. 6, s. 12. Court may stay any other proceeding 13. The court, on its own initiative or on the motion of a party or class member, may stay any proceeding related to the class proceeding before it, on such terms as it considers appropriate. 1992, c. 6, s. 13. Participation of class members 14. (1) In order to ensure the fair and adequate representation of the interests of the class or any subclass or for any other appropriate reason, the court may, at any time in a class proceeding, permit one or more class members to participate in the proceeding. 1992, c. 6, s. 14 (1). Idem (2) Participation under subsection (1) shall be in whatever manner and on whatever terms, including terms as to costs, the court considers appropriate. 1992, c. 6, s. 14 (2). Discovery Discovery of parties 15. (1) Parties to a class proceeding have the same rights of discovery under the rules of court against one another as they would have in any other proceeding. 1992, c. 6, s. 15 (1). Discovery of class members with leave (2) After discovery of the representative party, a party may move for discovery under the rules of court against other class members. 1992, c. 6, s. 15 (2). Idem

4 English Loi de 1992 sur les recours collectifs

L.O. 1992, CHAPITRE 6

Période de codification : Du 22 juin 2006 à la date à laquelle Lois-en-ligne est à jour. Dernière modification : 2006, chap. 19, annexe C, par. 1 (1).

Sauter le sommaire

SOMMAIRE 1. Définitions 2. Recours collectif du demandeur 3. Le défendeur fait certifier le recours collectif 4. Groupe de défendeurs 5. Recours collectif certifié par le tribunal 6. Questions n’empêchant pas de faire certifier le recours collectif 7. Continuation de l’instance sous une autre forme après refus de certifier 8. Contenu de l’ordonnance 9. Décision de se retirer 10. Inobservation des conditions 11. Organisation du recours collectif 12. Ordonnance relative au déroulement de l’instance 13. Sursis des autres instances 14. Participation des membres du groupe 15. Enquête préalable 16. Interrogatoire précédant l’audition de la motion ou de la requête 17. Avis annonçant que le recours collectif est certifié 18. Avis relatif à la participation de membres à titre individuel 19. Avis relatif à la protection des personnes concernées 20. Approbation de l’avis par le tribunal 21. Remise de l’avis 22. Coût de l’avis 23. Données statistiques 24. Évaluation totale des mesures de redressement pécuniaire 25. Questions individuelles 26. Distribution 27. Jugement sur les questions communes 28. Prescription 29. Désistement et transaction 30. Appels 31. Dépens 32. Honoraires et débours 33. Entente en cas d’issue favorable 34. Motions 35. Règles de pratique 36. Loi liant la Couronne 37. Champ d’application de la loi Définitions 1. Les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à la présente loi. «défendeur» S’entend en outre d’un intimé. («defendant») «demandeur» S’entend en outre d’un requérant. («plaintiff»)

1 Protection du sous-groupe (2) S’il existe au sein d’un groupe un sous-groupe dont les demandes ou les défenses soulèvent des questions communes que ne partagent pas tous les membres du groupe de sorte que, de l’avis du tribunal, la protection des intérêts des membres du sous-groupe demande qu’ils aient un représentant distinct, le paragraphe (1) s’applique, avec les adaptations nécessaires, au sous-groupe. 1992, chap. 6, par. 8 (2). Modification de l’ordonnance (3) Le tribunal peut, sur motion présentée par une partie ou un membre du groupe, modifier l’ordonnance certifiant qu’une instance est un recours collectif. 1992, chap. 6, par. 8 (3). Décision de se retirer 9. Tout membre d’un groupe qui exerce un recours collectif peut s’en retirer de la façon et dans le délai précisés dans l’ordonnance certifiant le recours collectif. 1992, chap. 6, art. 9. Inobservation des conditions 10. (1) S’il semble au tribunal saisi d’une motion d’une partie ou d’un membre du groupe que les conditions relatives au recours collectif qui sont mentionnées aux paragraphes 5 (1) et (2) n’ont pas été respectées, le tribunal peut modifier ou annuler l’ordonnance certifiant le recours collectif, ou rendre toute autre ordonnance qu’il estime appropriée. 1992, chap. 6, par. 10 (1). Continuation de l’instance sous une autre forme (2) S’il rend une ordonnance d’annulation de l’ordonnance certifiant le recours collectif en vertu du paragraphe (1), le tribunal peut autoriser la continuation de l’instance sous forme d’une ou de plusieurs instances entre différentes parties. 1992, chap. 6, par. 10 (2). Pouvoirs du tribunal (3) Pour l’application des paragraphes (1) et (2), le tribunal est investi des pouvoirs énoncés aux alinéas 7 a) à c). 1992, chap. 6, par. 10 (3). Organisation du recours collectif 11. (1) Sous réserve de l’article 12, dans un recours collectif : a) les questions communes du groupe sont décidées ensemble; b) les questions communes du sous-groupe sont décidées ensemble; c) les questions individuelles nécessitant la participation, à titre individuel, de membres du groupe sont décidées individuellement, conformément aux articles 24 et 25. 1992, chap. 6, par. 11 (1). Jugements distincts (2) Le tribunal peut rendre un jugement sur les questions communes et des jugements distincts sur les autres questions en litige. 1992, chap. 6, par. 11 (2). Ordonnance relative au déroulement de l’instance 12. Le tribunal saisi d’une motion d’une partie ou d’un membre du groupe peut, afin de parvenir à un règlement juste et expéditif du recours collectif, rendre une ordonnance qu’il estime appropriée concernant le déroulement de celui-ci et imposer aux parties des conditions qu’il estime appropriées. 1992, chap. 6, art. 12. Sursis des autres instances 13. Le tribunal peut, de sa propre initiative ou sur motion d’une partie ou d’un membre du groupe, surseoir à une instance liée au recours collectif en cours à des conditions qu’il estime appropriées. 1992, chap. 6, art. 13. Participation des membres du groupe 14. (1) Afin de s’assurer que les intérêts du groupe ou d’un sous-groupe sont représentés de façon juste et appropriée ou pour toute autre raison valable, le tribunal peut, en tout temps au cours de l’instance, permettre à un ou plusieurs membres du groupe de participer à l’instance. 1992, chap. 6, par. 14 (1). Idem (2) La participation prévue au paragraphe (1) est conforme à la façon et aux conditions, notamment en matière de dépens, que le tribunal estime appropriées. 1992, chap. 6, par. 14 (2). Enquête préalable

4 SCC File No.: 36456 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO)

B E T W E E N:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF ONTARIO Appellant (Appellant) -and-

DIANNA LOUISE PARSONS, MICHAEL HERBERT CRUICKSHANKS, DAVIT TULL, MARTIN HENRY GRIFFEN, ANNA KARDISH, ELSIE KOTYK, Executrix of the Estate of HARRY KOTYK, deceased, ELSIE KOTYK, personally, FUND COUNSEL FOR ONTARIO, THE CANADIAN RED CROSS SOCIETY and the ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Respondents (Respondents) -and-

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF ALBERTA, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF SASKATCHEWAN, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF MANITOBA, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF NEW BRUNSWICK, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF NOVA SCOTIA, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES, THE GOVERNMENT OF NUNAVUT and THE GOVERNMENT OF THE YUKON TERRITORY Respondents (Interveners) -and-

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUÉBEC Intervener

Proceeding under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992

A N D B E T W E E N:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF ONTARIO Appellant (Appellant) -and-

JAMES KREPPNER, BARRY ISAAC, NORMAN LANDRY as Executor of the Estate of the late SERGE LANDRY, PETER FELSING, DONALD MILLIGAN, ALLAN GRUHLKE, JIM LOVE, PAULINE FOURNIER as Executrix of the Estate of the late PIERRE FOURNIER, FUND COUNSEL FOR ONTARIO, THE CANADIAN RED CROSS SOCIETY and the ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Respondents (Respondents) -and-

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF ALBERTA, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF SASKATCHEWAN, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF MANITOBA, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF NEW BRUNSWICK, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF NOVA SCOTIA, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES, THE GOVERNMENT OF NUNAVUT and THE GOVERNMENT OF THE YUKON TERRITORY Respondents (Interveners) -and-

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUÉBEC Intervener

Proceeding under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992

FACTUM OF THE APPELLANT, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO, ON CROSS-APPEAL (Rule 43 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada)

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO BURKE-ROBERTSON Civil Law Division Barristers & Solicitors 720 Bay Street, 4th Floor 200-441 MacLaren Street Toronto, ON M7A 2S9 Ottawa, ON K2P 2H3

Malliha Wilson / Josh Hunter / Robert E. Houston, Q.C. Lynne McArdle / Brent Kettles Tel.: (613) 566-2058 Tel.: (416) 326-4953 / (416) 326-3840 / Fax: (613) 235-4430 (416) 314-2287 / (416) 314-2040 Email: [email protected] Fax: (416) 326-6996 / (416) 326-4015 / (416) 326-4181 Email: [email protected] / [email protected] / [email protected] / [email protected]

Counsel for the Appellant, Agent for the Appellant, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario

TO: THE REGISTRAR

AND TO: SUTTS, STROSBERG LLP SUPREME ADVOCACY LLP 600 Westcourt Place 340 Gimour Street 251 Goyeau Street Suite 100 Windsor, ON N9A 6V4 Ottawa, ON K2P 0R3

Harvey T. Strosberg, Q.C. Marie-France Major Tel.: (519) 561-6216 Tel.: (613) 695-8855 Fax: (519) 561-6203 Fax: (613) 695-8580 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected]

PAPE BARRISTERS Professional Corporation One Queen Street East Suite 1910, P.O. Box 69 Toronto, ON M5C 2W5

Paul J. Pape Shantona Chaudhury Tel.: (416) 364-8755 Fax: (416) 364-8855 Email: [email protected] / [email protected]

Counsel for the Respondents Agent for the Appellants (other than Fund Counsel for Ontario (other than Fund Counsel for Ontario and the Attorney General of Canada) and the Attorney General of Canada)

GOWLING LAFLEUR HENDERSON LLP GOWLING LAFLEUR HENDERSON LLP 1 First Canadian Place 2600-160 Elgin Street 100 King Street West, Suite 1600 Ottawa, ON K1P 1C3 Toronto, ON M5X 1G5

John E. Callaghan D. Lynne Watt Alex Zavaglia Tel.: (613) 786-8695 Tel.: (416) 862-7525 Fax: (613) 563-9869 Fax: (416) 862-7661 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] [email protected]

Counsel for the Respondent, Agent for the Respondent, Fund Counsel for Ontario Fund Counsel for Ontario

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CANADA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CANADA 50 O’Connor Street 50 O’Connor Street Suite 500, Room 556 Suite 500, Room 556 Ottawa, ON K1A 0H8 Ottawa, ON K1A 0H8

Robert J. Frater, Q.C. Christopher Rupar Kathryn Hucal Tel.: (613) 670-6290 Tel.: (613) 670-6289 / (416) 954-0625 Fax: (613) 954-1920 Fax: (613) 954-1920 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] / [email protected]

Counsel for the Respondent, Agent for the Respondent, the Attorney General of Canada the Attorney General of Canada

McCARTHY TÉTRAULT CONWAY BAXTER WILSON LLP Suite 5300, TD Bank Tower 401-1111 Prince of Wales Drive Box 48, 66 Wellington Street West Ottawa, ON K2C 3T2 Toronto, ON M5K 1E6

Caroline Zayid Colin Baxter H. Michael Rosenberg Tel.: (613) 780-2012 Tel.: (416) 362-1812 / (416) 601-7831 Fax: (613) 688.0271 Fax: (416) 868-0673 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] / [email protected]

Counsel for the Respondents, Agent for the Respondents, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Alberta, Her Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Alberta, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Saskatchewan, Majesty the Queen in Right of Saskatchewan, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Manitoba, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Manitoba, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of New Her Majesty the Queen in Right of New Brunswick, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Brunswick, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Prince Edward Island, Her Majesty the Queen in Prince Edward Island, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Nova Scotia, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Nova Scotia, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Newfoundland and Labrador, the Right of Newfoundland and Labrador, the Government of the Northwest Territories, the Government of the Northwest Territories, the Government of Nunavut, and the Government of Government of Nunavut, and the Government of the Yukon Territory the Yukon Territory

MINISTÈRE DE LA JUSTICE DU NOËL & ASSOCIÉS QUÉBEC 111, rue Champlain Direction générale des affaires juridiques et Gatineau, QC J8X 3R1 legislatives 1200 route de l’Église Québec, QC G1V 4M1

Dana Pescarus Pierre Landry Manon Des Ormeaux Tel.: (819) 771-7393 Tel.: (418) 643-1477 x 20785 Fax: (819) 771-5397 Fax: (418) 644-7030 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected]

Counsel for the Intervener, Agent for the Intervener, the Attorney General of Québec the Attorney General of Québec

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I – OVERVIEW AND FACTS...... 1

A. Overview ...... 1

B. Facts ...... 1

PART II – QUESTIONS IN ISSUE ...... 1

PART III – ARGUMENT ...... 1

A. The Court Cannot Make Coercive Orders Effective Outside Its Home Province Unless Given Power to Do So By the Province In Which The Order Is to Have Effect ...... 2

B. The Court Must Comply With Any Legislative Limitations Imposed By Its Home Province or the Province From Which the Judge Intends to Participate in the Hearing ...... 10

PART IV – SUBMISSIONS ON COSTS ...... 15

PART V – ORDER SOUGHT ...... 15

PART VI – TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...... 16

PART VII – STATUTES AND REGULATIONS ...... 18

1

PART I – OVERVIEW AND FACTS

A. Overview

1. For the reasons set out in Ontario’s main factum, existing legislation allows Ontario

judges to participate in Ontario hearings from a location outside Ontario when it is appropriate to

do so, subject to compliance with the open courts principle.

2. There are, however, two additional restrictions that also apply to out-of-province hearings: (1) An Ontario court cannot make coercive orders effective outside Ontario unless the province where the order is to have effect has granted it the power to do so; and (2) a judge intending to participate in an Ontario hearing from outside Ontario must comply with any legislative limitations imposed by either Ontario or the province where the judge is located.

B. Facts

3. Ontario relies on the facts set out at paragraphs 11 to 26 of its main factum.

PART II – QUESTIONS IN ISSUE

4. Ontario submits that the question to be answered in this cross-appeal is whether, in

addition to the limitations imposed by the open courts principle (discussed at paras. 54 to 60 of

Ontario’s main factum), there are any other limitations on the ability of a superior court judge to

participate in a hearing from a location outside the judge’s home province.

PART III – ARGUMENT

5. In addition to the limitations imposed by the open courts principle, there are two other

restrictions on the ability of a superior court judge to participate in a hearing from a location

outside the judge’s home province:

a) The Court cannot make coercive orders effective outside its home province unless given

the power to do so by the province in which the order is to have effect; and 2

b) The Court must comply with any legislative limitations imposed by either its home

province or the province from which the judge intends to participate in the hearing.

A. The Court Cannot Make Coercive Orders Effective Outside Its Home Province Unless Given Power to Do So By the Province In Which The Order Is to Have Effect

6. Allowing counsel, parties, witnesses, or even the judge to participate in an Ontario

proceeding from outside Ontario does not enlarge the Court’s power to make coercive orders

enforceable outside Ontario. As this Court held in Chevron, a court’s orders have “no coercive

force outside its jurisdiction. Whether recognition and enforcement should proceed depends

entirely on the enforcing forum’s laws.” 1 Absent express statutory authority, “the judicial system of each province controls access to its jurisdiction’s enforcement measures.”2

7. This limitation flows from the territorial limitations on provincial jurisdiction over the

“Administration of Justice in the Province” and the resulting territorial limitations on the

provincial superior courts constituted, organized, and maintained under that power. Ensuring that

provincial superior courts do not make coercive orders effective in other province’s territories

without the consent of that province’s Legislature is also consistent with the federal nature of

Canada’s constitution.

8. Although the judges of the provincial superior courts are appointed and paid by the

federal government, the courts themselves have all been created or continued by provincial

1 Chevron Corp. v. Yaiguaje, 2015 SCC 42 at para. 46, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 69 2 Chevron, supra at para. 49 3

legislation.3 As such, the capacity of those courts to act outside their home provinces’ boundaries

is governed by the territorial limitations on provincial legislative jurisdiction.

9. The authority of the provincial Legislatures to create superior courts and determine their

jurisdiction is set out in s. 92(14) of the Constitution Act, 1867. That section provides:

92. In each Province the Legislature 92. Dans chaque province la may exclusively make Laws in relation législature pourra exclusivement to Matters coming within the Class of faire des lois relatives aux Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; matières tombant dans les that is to say, — catégories de sujets ci-dessous … énumérés, savoir: … (14) The Administration of Justice in the Province, including the 14) L’administration de la justice Constitution, Maintenance, and dans la province, y compris la Organization of Provincial Courts, création, le maintien et both of Civil and of Criminal l’organisation de tribunaux de Jurisdiction, and including justice pour la province, ayant Procedure in Civil Matters in those juridiction civile et criminelle, y Courts; compris la procédure en matières civiles dans ces tribunaux;4

10. This Court has held that the words “in the Province” in s. 92(14) impose territorial

limitations on the jurisdiction of the provincial superior courts created or continued under that

provision. As this Court held in Van Breda:

The interplay between provincial jurisdiction and external legal situations takes place within a constitutional framework which limits the external reach of provincial laws and of a province’s courts. The Constitution assigns powers to

3 Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30&31 Vict., c. 3, ss. 96-100; Supreme Court Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 443, s. 2(1); Court of Appeal Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 77, s. 2(1); Court of Queen’s Bench Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. C-31, s. 2(1); Court of Appeal Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. C-30, s. 2(1); Queen’s Bench Act, 1998, S.S. 1998, c. Q-1.01, s. 3(1); Court of Appeal Act, 2000, S.S. 2000, c. C-42.1, s. 3(1); Court of Queen’s Bench Act, C.C.S.M., c. C280, s. 2; Court of Appeal Act, C.C.S.M., c. C240, ss. 2(1) and 3; Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, ss. 2(1), 10(1)-(2), 11(1), 18(1), and 21.1(1)-(2); Courts of Justice Act, C.Q.L.R., c. T-16, ss. 1-2, 6, 21, and 70; Judicature Act, R.S.N.B. 1978, c. J-2, s. 2(1); Judicature Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 240, s. 3; Judicature Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. J-2.1, s. 2; Judicature Act, R.S.N.L. J-4, s. 3 4 Constitution Act, 1867, supra, s. 92(14) [Emphasis added] 4

the provinces. But these powers are subject to the restriction that they be exercised within the province in question (see P. W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (5th ed. 2007), vol. 1, at pp. 364-65 and 376-77; H. Brun, G. Tremblay and E. Brouillet, Droit constitutionnel (5th ed. 2008), at p. 569; British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2005 SCC 49, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473, at paras. 26-28, per Major J.), and they must be exercised in a manner consistent with the territorial restrictions created by the Constitution (see Castillo v. Castillo, 2005 SCC 83, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 870, at para. 5, per Major J.; Unifund Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, 2003 SCC 40, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 63, at para. 51, per Binnie J.). …

With respect to the constitutional principle, the territorial limits on provincial legislative competence and on the authority of the courts of the provinces derive from the text of s. 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867. These limits are, in essence, concerned with the legitimate exercise of state power, be it legislative or adjudicative. The legitimate exercise of power rests, inter alia, upon the existence of an appropriate relationship or connection between the state and the persons who are brought under its authority. The purpose of constitutionally imposed territorial limits is to ensure the existence of the relationship or connection needed to confer legitimacy.5

This constitutional restriction applies not only to the subject matter jurisdiction that was at issue in Van Breda but to the courts’ ability to function outside their home province’s boundaries that is at issue in this appeal.

11. The territorial restrictions on provincial superior courts’ jurisdiction reflect the federal nature of Canada’s constitution. Although, as this Court found in Morguard, the Constitution intended “to create a single country,” it did not intend to create a unitary one. The Constitution intended to create a federation of provinces each with their own courts. The provinces’ separate legal systems were preserved. The judges of each province had to be appointed from that provinces’ bar. And the provinces, not the central government, were given jurisdiction over the

5 Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17 at paras. 21 and 31, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572 [Emphasis added] 5

“Administration of Justice in the Province, including the Constitution, Maintenance, and

Organization of Provincial Courts.”6

12. Unlike in the United States or Australia, the Constitution does not envision the existence

of nationwide federal courts with broad jurisdiction over civil disputes. Instead, it envisions a

separate superior court in each province.7 As Morguard makes clear, those courts must cooperate with one another to ensure their judgments are effective. But they were never intended to be interchangeable. In each province, it is that province’s superior court which occupies “a position

of prime importance in the constitutional pattern of this country.”8

13. The co-operating but separate nature of the provincial superior courts is emphasized by

the fact that federal statutes which set out a uniform body of law across the country leave the

implementation of that law to each province’s individual courts.9 Where a single matter crosses

provincial boundaries, the provincial courts assist each other rather than make orders directly

effective in each other’s territory. The Constitution’s deliberate choice to grant general jurisdiction to provincial superior courts but have the judges of those courts appointed by the federal government is a reflection of the federal nature of our constitution that is designed to strike an appropriate balance between centralization and decentralization.

6 Constitution Act, 1867, supra., ss. 92(14), 97-98, 101, and 129 [Emphasis added]; Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 at 1099 7 United States Constitution, Art. III, §§1-2; Australian Constitution, ss. 71 and 75-78 8 Canada (A.G.) v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307 at 326-29; MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 725 at paras. 36-37 9 Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, ss. 183, 186, and 188; Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, ss. 2 and 16-17; Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 2, 478-81.3, 513-14, 528, 702- 03.1, 704, and 705(3); Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3, s. (2nd Supp.), ss. 2-6; Winding-up and Restructuring Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-11, ss. 2 and 126-28; Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c. 1, s. 133 6

14. Some authors and decisions have argued that the territorial limitations on provincial

legislative jurisdiction do not apply to the provincial superior courts because they are the

successors to the pre-Confederation colonial courts that were continued in existence by s. 129 of

the Constitution Act, 1867.10 That argument should not be accepted for three reasons. First, s.

129 does not apply to the superior courts of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba which were created post-Confederation.11 Second, all of the other provinces have replaced the court

legislation they inherited under s. 129 by post-Confederation legislation. Section 129 expressly makes such legislation subject to the constitutional division of powers and thus to the territorial limitations on provincial legislative power.12 Thus, regardless of what the courts’ powers may

have been prior to 1867, their powers and procedures are now territorially limited because they

are governed by post-Confederation legislation which is itself territorially limited.

15. Finally, none of the pre-Confederation British North American colonies had any more power to legislate extraterritorially than the present Canadian provinces do. Until the passing of the Statute of Westminster in 1931, no colonial legislature (including the Canadian Parliament

10 Constitution Act, 1867, supra, s. 129. See also Newfoundland Act (UK), 12&13 Geo. VI, c. 22, Sch., s. 18(4); Janet Walker, “Are National Class Actions Constitutional?: A Reply to Hogg and McKee” (Spring 2010) 48:1 Osgoode Hall L.J. 95; Meeking v. Cash Store Inc., 2013 MBCA 81 at paras. 83-93, 299 Man. R. (2d) 109, appeal to S.C.C. discontinued 28 July 2015 and 22 February 2016 11 The superior courts of Alberta and Saskatchewan, have their origins in the Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories created by a post-Confederation federal statute, An Act further to amend the law respecting the North- West Territories, S.C. 1886, c. 25, s. 4. See Alberta Act, S.C. 1905, c. 3, ss. 16(1)-(2) and Saskatchewan Act, S.C. 1905, c. 42, ss. 16(1)-(2). The superior courts of Manitoba were created by post-Confederation provincial legislation. Supreme Court Act, 1871, S.M. 1871, c. 2, s. 1; Court of Queen’s Bench Act, 1872, S.M. 1872, c. 3, ss. 1-2 12 Section 129 provides that pre-colonial laws and offices are “subject … to be repealed, abolished, or altered by the Parliament of Canada, or by the Legislature of the respective Province, according to the Authority of the Parliament or of that Legislature under this Act.” Constitution Act, 1867, supra, s. 129 [Emphasis added]. 7

after Confederation) could make any extraterritorial legislation.13 That limitation applied to

legislation governing extraterritorial court proceedings.14 In fact, until 1931, “every Colonial

Legislature” was expressly restricted to establishing and reconstituting Courts “within its

Jurisdiction.”15 The colonial courts continued by s. 129 therefore were subject to as, if not more,

stringent territorial restrictions as modern provincial superior courts are.

16. The fact that provincial superior courts are subject to territorial restrictions does not,

however, mean that they are incapable of carrying on any activity outside their provincial

boundaries. The ancillary powers doctrine permits provincial Legislatures to enact statutory

provisions that would otherwise fall outside their jurisdiction if they are an integral part of a

broader legislative scheme that does fall within jurisdiction.16 As a result, legislation governing

the courts can have valid extraterritorial effects when “what takes place outside [the court’s

home jurisdiction] is only ancillary to practical results which become effective in [the court’s

home jurisdiction].”17 For example, as this Court recognized in Morguard, Hunt v. T&N plc, and

Van Breda, courts can constitutionally take jurisdiction over persons who are not present in the

province and causes of action that arise outside the province where there is a real and substantial

connection to the province.18

13 Statute of Westminster, 1931 (UK), 22 Geo. V, c. 4, s. 3; Peter W. Hogg and S. Gordon McKee, “Are National Class Actions Constitutional? – A Reply to Walker” (2012) 31 N.J.C.L. 183 14 Nadan v. The King, [1926] A.C. 482 at 492 (P.C.); British Coal Corp. v. The King, [1935] A.C. 500 at 516 and 520-22 (P.C.) 15 Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865 (UK), 28&29 Vict., c. 63, s. 5, repealed as it applied to Canada by Statute of Westminster, 1931, supra, ss. 2 and 7(2)-(3) 16 Québec (A.G.) v. Lacombe, 2010 SCC 38 at paras. 32-46, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 453 17 British Coal Corp., supra at 521-22 18 Morguard, supra at 1109; Hunt v. T&N plc, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289 at 325; Van Breda, supra at paras. 21 and 69 8

17. Similarly, as a matter ancillary to the otherwise valid provincial legislation governing

court procedure, the provincial Legislatures can pass laws such as s. 12 of the Class Proceeding

Act or authorize Rules Committees to enact rules such as Rule 1.08 that permit parties, counsel,

witnesses, and judges to participate in a court hearing held in the province by video conference

from a physical location outside the province. Allowing persons outside the province to

participate does not change the fact that the hearing is still being held inside the province.

18. In Ontario, the Legislature has only granted the power to make coercive orders to the

courts of Ontario.19 As a result, except where authorized by federal statute, only the Ontario

courts can make orders that compel the seizure of property or that restrict the liberty of persons

located in Ontario. Similar restrictions apply throughout Canada. Only the courts of a given

province may legitimately order that province’s sheriffs and police to give compulsory effect to

court orders within that province’s territory.20

19. Any practical difficulties the territorial limitations on courts’ ability to make coercive

orders enforceable outside their home province might cause is alleviated by the web of reciprocal

enforcement legislation that exists throughout Canada. Instead of allowing other jurisdictions’

courts to summons witnesses or enforce their own orders directly, the various provincial

Legislatures have instead enacted reciprocal schemes whereby the courts of one province assist

the courts of other jurisdictions by making enforcement orders that are then enforceable in that

19 Courts of Justice Act, supra, ss. 96-97 and 141-42; Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, Rules 1.02, 1.03, 34.04, 34.07-34.08, 34.15, 39.03(5), 53.04-53.06, 60, and 73; Family Law Rules, O.Reg. 114/99, Rules 1(2), 2(1), 20(9)-(10), 23(7)-(8), 26-32, and 37-37.1; Rules of the Small Claims Court, O.Reg. 258/98, Rules 1.02, 18.03, and 20; Creditors’ Relief Act, 2010, S.O. 2010, c. 16, Sch. 4, s. 1 20 Fund Counsel makes reference to summons being issued by referees to compel the disclosure of documents located in other provinces. The validity of such summons has not to date been challenged. As set out below, the proper way to enforce such a summons would be to rely on the reciprocal enforcement legislation that already exists. 9

province.21 None of this legislation would be necessary if the courts of one province could

directly enforce their orders in the territory of another. In addition to these statutory measures, this Court has also expanded the scope of the common law ability to sue for enforcement of a money judgment to include the ability to seek enforcement of non-penal equitable orders.22

20. Within Canada, the scope of reciprocal enforcement is even broader. This Court has held

that “the ‘integrating character of our constitutional arrangements as they apply to interprovincial

mobility’ calls for the courts in each province to give ‘full faith and credit’ to the judgment of the

courts of sister provinces.”23 Given that criminal law falls within federal jurisdiction in Canada,

even a contempt order could likely be enforced by a sister province’s courts.24 At a minimum, a

court in the province where the alleged contemnor was located could compel his or her attendance in the court that made the contempt order.25

21. Finally, if a provincial Legislature wished to do so, it could permit the courts of another

province to make orders directly effective in its province’s territory.26 To date, however, no province has chosen to do so.27

21 Enforcement of Judgments Conventions Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 12, Sch. C; Evidence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.23, s. 60 ; Execution Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.24, s. 1; Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 13; Interprovincial Summonses Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.12; Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. R.5; Application of Act, O.Reg. 322/92, s. 1; Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments (U.K.) Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. R.6 22 Pro Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf Inc., 2006 SCC 612 at paras. 10-31, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 612 23Morguard, supra at 1100-01; Hunt v. T&N plc, supra at 324-25 24 In Pro Swing, supra at paras. 34-39, this Court held that a United States contempt order could not be enforced in Canada because “both the process used to issue a declaration of contempt and the sanction bear the imprint of criminal law.” Within Canada, however, the same concerns do not arise. Contempt of court is a common law offence preserved by s. 9 of the Criminal Code, supra. 25 Criminal Code, supra, s. 528 26 Just as a province can create corporations which have the capacity to act in another province’s territory if the other province’s law permits them to do so, provinces can give their courts the capacity to accept jurisdiction conferred on them by another province’s Legislature. Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Co., Ltd. v. The King, [1916] 1 A.C. 566 at 576 and 583-85 (P.C.) 10

B. The Court Must Comply With Any Legislative Limitations Imposed By Its Home Province or the Province From Which the Judge Intends to Participate in the Hearing

22. As noted in Ontario’s factum on the main appeal, the parties now agree that courts have

the power, in appropriate circumstances, to sit outside their home provinces. The parties

disagree, however, with respect to the source of that power. Ontario and the other provinces

argue that the power derives from statute and the applicable court rules – in this case, Rule 1.08

of the Rules of Civil Procedure and s. 12 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992. The Appellants

argue that the power derives from the court’s inherent jurisdiction to control its processes.

21. In either case, regardless of the source of the power – whether it derives from legislation

or the Court’s inherent jurisdiction – a Court’s power to sit outside its home province can be limited by legislative action, either in the Court’s home jurisdiction or in the jurisdiction in

which the judge will physically be present.

23. If, as Ontario submits in its main factum, a judge’s ability to participate in a hearing from

a location outside the judge’s home province is granted by legislation, then of course the

requirements of that legislation must be complied with. A judge participating in an Ontario

hearing from outside Ontario under Rule 1.08 must consider the factors set out in Rule 1.08(5).

A judge relying on s. 12 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 must make a judicial determination

that participating in the hearing from outside Ontario is appropriate to ensure the fair and

expeditious determination of a class proceeding. A judge relying on s. 11 of the CCAA to

27 An example of how such jurisdiction could be conferred can be seen in the reciprocal legislation enacted by Australia and New Zealand permitting the Courts of one country to sit and make orders effective in the other in certain circumstances. Judicature Act, 1908, Part 1A (NZ); Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010, Part 8 (Cth.) 11

participate from a location outside Ontario must find that doing so is appropriate in the

circumstances of an insolvency proceeding.

24. These legislative provisions may be altered as the Legislature or Rules Committee sees

fit. Courts must comply with the restrictions imposed by the legislation that is in force from time

to time. Similarly, entirely new provisions allowing for judges to sit outside their home provinces

may be enacted. As Nova Scotia has already done, a province may choose to enact general

legislation permitting its courts to hold hearings outside its jurisdiction.28 The requirements of

such legislation, assuming it is otherwise constitutional, must be adhered to by a court seeking to

sit outside its jurisdiction.

25. Even if the power to sit extra-territorially flows from the Court’s inherent jurisdiction,

that discretion can be limited by legislation. Though inherent jurisdiction is linked, to a certain

degree, to the fundamental role of s. 96 courts within Canada’s constitutional framework, it is

important to note that the scope of a court’s inherent jurisdiction (beyond the narrow, protected

core that is fundamental to the very existence of the provincial superior courts) is not, itself,

enshrined in or protected by the Constitution.

26. The ability of the Legislature to shape inherent jurisdiction has always been recognized.

In his seminal article on inherent jurisdiction, for instance, I.H. Jacob noted that “the court may

exercise its inherent jurisdiction even in respect to matters which are regulated by statute or by

rule of court, so long as it can do so without contravening any statutory provision.”29 In keeping with this notion, Dickson J. (as he then was), held in Baxter Student Housing Ltd. that:

28 Nova Scotia, Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rules, r. 86 29 I.H. Jacob, “The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court” (1970) Current Legal Problems 23 at 24 12

“Inherent jurisdiction cannot, of course, be exercised so as to conflict with a statute or Rule.”30

27. In MacMillan Bloedel, however, a case which considered whether Parliament could

remove in its entirety the jurisdiction of the superior court to punish young offenders for

contempt ex facie, Lamer C.J.C., for the first time, appeared to conflate inherent jurisdiction with the constitutionally protected “core” jurisdiction of superior courts under s. 96 of the

Constitution:

The superior courts have a core or inherent jurisdiction which is integral to their operations. The jurisdiction which forms this core cannot be removed from the superior courts by either level of government, without amending the constitution.31

28. In a strongly worded dissent, McLachlin J. (as she then was) pointed to a central weakness in Lamer C.J.C.’s discussion of inherent jurisdiction in MacMillan Bloedel. After noting that the Chief Justice had contended that there was a “core” jurisdiction for s. 96 courts which extended at least to the inherent powers of the s.96 courts, McLachlin J. concluded:

The difficulty which this argument faces is that it has long been settled that under the rules of law Parliament and the legislatures may limit and structure the ways in which the superior courts exercise their powers. These inherent powers of superior courts are simply innate powers of internal regulation which courts acquire by virtue of their status as courts of law. The inherent power of superior courts to regulate their process does not preclude elected bodies from enacting legislation affecting that process…

In fact, the superior courts of this country are controlled by an elaborate matrix of statute and regulation limiting the ways they exercise powers over their own process. Legislation intrudes on a number of areas traditionally within the domain of the court’s inherent power, including matters such as contempt court, testimonial compulsion, the attendance of spectators, hours of sitting and the

30 Baxter Student Housing Ltd. v. College Housing Co-operative Ltd., [1976] 2 S.C.R. 475 at 480, citing Montreal Trust Co. v. Churchill Forest Industries, [1971] 4 W.W.R. 542 at 547 (Man. C.A.) 31 MacMillan Bloedel, supra at para. 15 13

imposition of publication bans…. Parliament and the legislatures routinely make rules limiting the scope for the exercise of the court’s inherent powers in these and other areas. In every province Rules of Court limit and define the ways in which superior courts can exercise their inherent powers….

Parliament and the legislatures can legislate to limit the superior courts’ powers including their powers over contempt, provided that the legislation is not otherwise unconstitutional. If this is so, it is wrong to posit a core of inherent superior court powers to regulate the process of the courts which the legislators cannot touch.32

29. In addition to the concerns raised by McLachlin J. in MacMillan Bloedel, equating

inherent jurisdiction with the “narrow” s. 96 “core” jurisdiction is also problematic because it is

entirely inconsistent with the descriptions of inherent jurisdiction as a power which “may be

invoked in an apparently inexhaustible variety of circumstances”33 and which is “so amorphous and ubiquitous and so pervasive in its operation.”34 As the Appellants have noted, the oft-quoted descriptions of inherent jurisdiction in caselaw and academic texts directly conflict with the

notion that the power is “narrow.”

30. Similarly, it is impossible to equate inherent jurisdiction with the s. 96 “core” jurisdiction

given that new powers or jurisdiction are not part of the core of jurisdiction protected by s. 96.

Section 96 “core” jurisdiction is limited to the jurisdiction the courts had at the time of

Confederation.35 Inherent jurisdiction, on the other hand, is recognized as a residual fund of

powers which evolves over time as the needs of the court change.36

32 MacMillan Bloedel, supra at paras. 78-80 33 Jacob, supra at 23 34 Jacob, supra at 23 35 Reference re Young Offenders (P.E.I), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 252 at 271 36 Jacob, supra at 51 14

31. Though some confusion of “core” with inherent jurisdiction still persists in the case

law,37 for all of the reasons noted above, the better view is that which has prevailed in this court

many times38 and which prevailed in the court below in this matter – most inherent jurisdiction is not part of the constitutionally-protected “core” and thus can be limited by legislation. As

LaForme J. noted succinctly in his decision below, “[t]he concepts of core jurisdiction and inherent jurisdiction are distinct.”39

32. As a final note regarding the power of the Legislature to limit a judge’s ability to participate in a hearing from a location outside the Court’s home province, it is important to remember that it is not just the Legislature in the home province but also the Legislature in the province in which the judge will be physically located which has the authority to legislate with respect to the hearing. Ontario’s ability to permit its judges to participate in Ontario hearings from locations outside Ontario is ancillary to the Ontario Legislature’s jurisdiction over the

“Administration of Justice” in Ontario. It must yield to the primary jurisdiction of other provinces’ Legislatures over the “Administration of Justice” in their own provinces. Thus, whether the source of the power to participate in a hearing from a location outside the Court’s home province flows from legislation or the Court’s inherent jurisdiction, a judge sitting outside his or her home province must comply with any applicable legislation enacted by the jurisdiction where the judge intends to be located.

37 Trial Lawyers’ Assn. of British Columbia v. British Columbia (A.G.), 2014 SCC 59 at para. 30, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 51; Bea v. The Owners, Strata Plan LMS 2138, 2015 BCCA 31 at paras. 23-44, 73 B.C.L.R. (5th) 219 38 Ontario v. Criminal Lawyers’ Assn. of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43 at para. 23, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 3; R. v. Caron, 2011 SCC 5 at paras. 32-34, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 78; Conseil scolaire francophone de la Colombie-Britannique v. British Columbia, 2013 SCC 42 at para. 63, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 774 39 Reasons of the Court of Appeal, paras. 67- 71, Appellant’s Motion Record, Vol. I, Tab 6, pp. 116-17 15

PART IV – SUBMISSIONS ON COSTS

33. Ontario does not seek its costs and asks that no costs be awarded against it.

PART V – ORDER SOUGHT

34. Ontario asks that its cross-appeal be allowed and the first paragraph of the Order of Chief

Justice Winkler dated June 28, 2013 be replaced with the following:

1. THIS COURT DIRECTS that the judge of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice supervising the 1986-1990 Hepatitis C Settlement Agreement has the discretion to participate in the hearing of motions under the 1986-1990 Hepatitis C Settlement Agreement from any location in Canada within or outside Ontario provided that,

a) If the judge participates in the hearing from outside Ontario, there must be a video-conference link to a court room in Ontario;

b) The judge may not make any coercive orders that purport to have effect of their own force outside Ontario; and

c) The judge must comply with any legislation limiting the ability of the judge to participate in the hearing from a location outside Ontario.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 7TH DAY OF APRIL, 2016

______Malliha Wilson

______Josh Hunter

______Lynne McArdle

______Brent Kettles

Counsel for the Respondent, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario 16

PART VI – TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Paras. CASES

Baxter Student Housing Ltd. v. College Housing Co-operative Ltd., [1976] 2 S.C.R. 26 475

Bea v. The Owners, Strata Plan LMS 2138, 2015 BCCA 31, 73 B.C.L.R. (5th) 219 31

Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Co., Ltd. v. The King, [1916] 1 A.C. 566 (P.C.) 21

British Coal Corp. v. The King, [1935] A.C. 500 (P.C.) 15, 16

Canada (A.G.) v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307 12

Chevron Corp. v. Yaiguaje, 2015 SCC 42, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 69 6

Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572 10, 16

Conseil scolaire francophone de la Colombie-Britannique v. British Columbia, 2013 31 SCC 42, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 774

Hunt v. T&N plc, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289 16, 20

MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 725 12, 27, 28

Meeking v. Cash Store Inc., 2013 MBCA 81, 299 Man. R. (2d) 109, appeals to S.C.C. 14 discontinued 28 July 2015 and 22 February 2016

Montreal Trust Co. v. Churchill Forest Industries, [1971] 4 W.W.R. 542 (Man. C.A.) 26

Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 11,16, 20

Nadan v. The King, [1926] A.C. 482 (P.C.) 15

Ontario v. Criminal Lawyers’ Assn. of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 3 31

Pro Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf Inc., 2006 SCC 612, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 612 20

Québec (A.G.) v. Lacombe, 2010 SCC 38, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 453 16

R. v. Caron, 2011 SCC 5, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 78 31

Reference re Young Offenders (P.E.I), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 252 30 17

Paras. Trial Lawyers’ Assn. of British Columbia v. British Columbia (A.G.), 2014 SCC 59, 31 [2014] 3 S.C.R. 51

TEXTS

Peter W. Hogg and S. Gordon McKee, “Are National Class Actions Constitutional? – 15 A Reply to Walker” (2012) 31 N.J.C.L. 183

I.H. Jacob, “The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court” (1970) Current Legal Problems 26 23

Janet Walker, “Are National Class Actions Constitutional?: A Reply to Hogg and 14 McKee” (Spring 2010) 48:1 Osgoode Hall L.J. 95

18

PART VII – STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

1. Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30&31 Vict., c. 3, ss. 92(14), 96-101, and 129

2. Supreme Court Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 443, s. 2(1)

3. Court of Appeal Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 77, s. 2(1)

4. Court of Queen’s Bench Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. C-31, s. 2(1)

5. Court of Appeal Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. C-30, s. 2(1)

6. Queen’s Bench Act, 1998, S.S. 1998, c. Q-1.01, s. 3(1)

7. Court of Appeal Act, 2000, S.S. 2000, c. C-42.1, s. 3(1)

8. Court of Queen’s Bench Act, C.C.S.M., c. C280, s. 2

9. Court of Appeal Act, C.C.S.M., c. C240, ss. 2(1) and 3

10. Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, ss. 2(1), 10(1)-(2), 11(1), 18(1), 21.1(1)-(2), 96-97, and 141-42

11. Courts of Justice Act, C.Q.L.R., c. T-16, ss. 1-2, 6, 21, and 70

12. Judicature Act, R.S.N.B. 1978, c. J-2, s. 2(1)

13. Judicature Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 240, s. 3

14. Judicature Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. J-2.1, s. 2

15. Judicature Act, R.S.N.L. J-4, s. 3

16. United States Constitution, Art. III, §§1-2

17. Australian Constitution, ss. 71 and 75-78

18. Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, ss. 183, 186, and 188

19. Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, ss. 2 and 16-17

20. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 2, 9, 478-81.3, 513-14, 528, 702-03.1, 704, and 705(3)

21. Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3, s. (2nd Supp.), ss. 2-6

22. Winding-up and Restructuring Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-11, ss. 2 and 126-28

23. Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c. 1, s. 133 19

24. Newfoundland Act (UK), 12&13 Geo. VI, c. 22, Sch., s. 18(4)

25. An Act further to amend the law respecting the North-West Territories, S.C. 1886, c. 25, s. 4

26. Alberta Act, S.C. 1905, c. 3, ss. 16(1)-(2)

27. Saskatchewan Act, S.C. 1905, c. 42, ss. 16(1)-(2)

28. Supreme Court Act, 1871, S.M. 1871, c. 2, s. 1

29. Court of Queen’s Bench Act, 1872, S.M. 1872, c. 3, ss. 1-2

30. Statute of Westminster, 1931 (UK), 22 Geo. V, c. 4, ss. 2-3 and 7(2)-(3)

31. Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865 (UK), 28&29 Vict., c. 63, s. 5

32. Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, Rules 1.02, 1.03, 34.04, 34.07-34.08, 34.15, 39.03(5), 53.04-53.06, 60, and 73

33. Family Law Rules, O.Reg. 114/99, Rules 1(2), 2(1), 20(9)-(10), 23(7)-(8), 26-32, and 37- 37.1

34. Rules of the Small Claims Court, O.Reg. 258/98, Rules 1.02, 18.03, and 20

35. Creditors’ Relief Act, 2010, S.O. 2010, c. 16, Sch. 4, s. 1

36. Enforcement of Judgments Conventions Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 12, Sch. C

37. Evidence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.23, s. 60

38. Execution Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.24, s. 1

39. Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 13

40. Interprovincial Summonses Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.12

41. Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. R.5

42. Application of Act, O.Reg. 322/92, s. 1

43. Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments (U.K.) Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. R.6

44. Judicature Act, 1908, Part 1A (NZ)

45. Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010, Part 8 (Cth.)

46. Nova Scotia, Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rules, r. 86 &2167,787,21$&7

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