NATO's Parlamentariske Forsamling 2010-11 NPA alm. del Bilag 27 Offentligt

142 NRPC 11 E Original: English

NATO- PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE

NATO Parliamentary Assembly

SUMMARY

of the meeting of the NATO-Russia Parliamentary Committee

Ballroom, Melia Grand Hermitage Hotel Golden Sands, Varna, Bulgaria

Friday 27 May 2011

International Secretariat June 2011

Assembly documents are available on the website www.-pa.int 142 NRPC 11 E i

ATTENDANCE LIST

President Karl A. LAMERS (Germany)

Vice-Presidents Jean-Michel BOUCHERON (France) Petras AUSTREVICIUS (Lithuania) Hugh BAYLEY ()

Treasurer Pierre Claude NOLIN (Canada)

Secretary General David HOBBS

MEMBERS AND ALTERNATE MEMBERS Albania Not represented Belgium Not represented Bulgaria Dobroslav DIMITROV Canada Raynell ANDREYCHUK Jane CORDY Croatia Not represented Czech Republic Not represented Denmark John Dyrby PAULSEN Estonia Marko MIHKELSON France Loïc BOUVARD Germany Karl A. LAMERS Ulla SCHMIDT Greece Vassilios TOGIAS Hungary Mihály BALLA Mátyás FIRTL Iceland Ragnheidur E. ARNADOTTIR Italy Sergio DE GREGORIO Latvia Imants LIEGIS Lithuania Petras AUSTREVICIUS Andrius MAZURONIS Luxembourg Norbert HAUPERT Netherlands Not represented Marit NYBAKK Poland Marek OPIOLA Portugal Not represented Sever VOINESCU-COTOI Russian Federation Victor A. OZEROV Lubov SLISKA Slovakia Not represented Slovenia Branko GRIMS Spain Ramon ALEU Turkey Vahit ERDEM United Kingdom Sir Menzies CAMPBELL Lord JOPLING Not represented 142 NRPC 11 E ii

COMMITTEE CHAIRS Defence and Security Joseph A. DAY (Canada) Economics and Security Hugh BAYLEY (United Kingdom) Political Raynell ANDREYCHUK (Canada) Science and Technology (Norway) Mediterranean and Middle East Vahit ERDEM (Turkey) Special Group

SECRETARIES OF DELEGATION

Albania Not represented Belgium Frans Van MELKEBEKE Bulgaria Not represented Canada Not represented Croatia Not represented Czech Republic Iva MASARIKOVÁ Denmark Flemming Kordt HANSEN Estonia Tanja ESPE France Frédéric TAILLET (Assemblée nationale) Germany Claudia RATHJEN (Bundestag) Annemarie BÜRSCH (Bundesrat) Greece Vassiliki IOANNIDOU Hungary Károly TÜZES Iceland Arna Gerdur BANG Italy Alessandra LAI Latvia Sandra PAURA Lithuania Snieguole ZIUKAITE Luxembourg Isabelle BARRA Netherlands Arjen WESTERHOFF Norway Henrik MALVIK Poland Michal GARGANISZ Portugal Patricia GRAVE Romania Irina BOJIN Slovakia Not represented Slovenia Tamara GRUDEN-PECAN Spain Mercedes ARAÚJO Turkey Yesim USLU United Kingdom Jyoti CHANDOLA United States Not represented

ACCOMPANYING THE DELEGATIONS

Germany Harald BERWANGER Yvonne BOLLOW Italy Pia CALIFANO Elena di PANCRAZIO Poland Natalia JASKIEWICZ Spain Josefina MENDEZ United Kingdom Sarah CRANDALL 142 NRPC 11 E iii

SPEAKERS H.E. Mr Todor CHUROV Permanent Representative of the Bulgarian mission to NATO H.E. Mr Dmitry ROGOZIN Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Russian mission to NATO, Special Envoy for Cooperation with NATO on Missile Defence

INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT Andrius AVIZIUS Anne Laure BLEUSE Henrik BLIDDAL Sébastien BOTELLA Patrick BURY Helen CADWALLENDER Rebecca CHANDLER Paul COOK Youri CORMIER Christine HEFFINCK Michael HENNESSY Dominique GINS Dwight GRISWOLD Susan MILLAR Ruxandra POPA Ted REINERT Daniela RICHTEROVA Steffen SACHS Svitlana SVYETOVA Alex TIERSKY Vincent VIVES Claire WATKINS 142 NRPC 11 E 1

I. Opening of the proceedings

II. Adoption of the draft Agenda [151 NRPC 11 E]

1. The draft Agenda [151 NRPC 11 E] was adopted.

III. Adoption of the Summary of the Meeting of the NATO-Russia Parliamentary Committee held in Warsaw, Poland, on Friday 12 November 2010 [157 NRPC 10 E]

2. Summary of the Meeting of the NATO-Russia Parliamentary Committee held in Warsaw, Poland, on Friday 12 November 2010 [157 NRPC 10 E] was adopted.

IV. Presentation on NATO – Russia Cooperation after the Lisbon Summit by H.E. Mr Todor Churov, Permanent Representative of the Bulgarian Mission to NATO

3. Ambassador Churov welcomed the opportunity to exchange views on the topic and explained that he would deliver his address in his capacity as a representative of Bulgaria. Recalling the decisions taken at the Lisbon summit, he praised the fact that relations with the Russian Federation had been reset. He went on to address the elements of the joint statement, issued in Lisbon, stressing that its main message was the unity of Europe and the joint security of the European states. Ambassador Churov praised the fact that the NATO-Russia Council had resumed discussions in all areas of work, both in areas of agreement and those in which differences remained. He explained that progress had been achieved on issues such as counter-terrorism, civil emergency readiness, counter-narcotics and border control but added that topics such as conventional weapons, missile defense and sub-strategic weapons posed challenges.

4. As regards progress achieved, Ambassador Churov spoke of the 2008 land transit agreement with Russia and noted that fifty percent of non-lethal goods to Afghanistan were transferred through that route, which was of significant help to the Allied effort. Furthermore, he explained that numerous officers in ANSF had been trained in conjunction with the Russian Federation. On non-proliferation and arms control, Mr Churov noted that NATO was not a disarmament agency, but stressed that it was nevertheless an important area, which had a direct bearing on the security situation in Europe and on the security of NATO member states.

5. Turning to “the more sensitive part[s],” Ambassador Churov stressed that those areas had to be addressed with more patience and noted that it was important to establish what concerns were real and legitimate. The NATO perspective on missile defense, he stated, included two separate, individual, closely-linked and mutually-reinforcing systems. He emphasized that missile defense should cover the whole territory of NATO, in line with the concept of indivisible security. He explained that there were two avenues: the US phased-adaptive approach, which was in the process of execution and the second approach, which had been on the NATO agenda, and which included upgrading the NATO missile defense.

6. On the issue of conventional forces, Mr Churov noted that there was an agreement in place but that agreement had never been enforced. He explained that at the next ministerial meeting, two issues had to be addressed: first, host nation consent, i.e., no forces should be deployed without agreement of the host; secondly, issues of transparency and reciprocity, accompanied by acceptable levels of transparency and coordination. He stressed that a lot of efforts had been invested in that process but little progress had been achieved. Mr. Churov noted that the upcoming NATO-Russia would address Libya and Afghanistan. On the latter, he explained that the 142 NRPC 11 E 2 transition stage had already begun and that ownership would soon be transferred to the local authorities.

7. As regards theatre missile defense, Mr. Churov praised existing co-operation and the ongoing joint exercises. Referring to the newly-created working group, he argued that there were prospects for more cooperation and a better understanding of how the different systems functioned, which could lead to better inter-operability. Turning to the expert-level progress report on missile defense, he explained that little has been achieved but there were no reasons to be dramatic. Missile defense, he explained was not an “end-game” but rather, a “game changer” and had the potential to truly reset relations with Russia. The window of opportunity presented in Lisbon remained opened, he argued.

8. Expressing gratitude for the invitation to visit Russia, Ambassador Churov argued that this was the best political symbol indicating Russian interest in the issue. He also noted that military to military co-operation had been renewed and welcomed the resumption of the NATO-Russia council meeting at ministerial levels.

V. Presentation on NATO – Russia Cooperation after the Lisbon Summit by H.E. Mr Dmitry Rogozin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Mission to NATO, Special Envoy for Cooperation with NATO on Missile Defence

9. Taking the floor next, Ambassador Rogozin focused his speech on missile defense which, in his opinion, was a crucial matter of great ideological, military and technological value and which constituted the major project on the docket of the NATO-Russia Council. The final objective of this partnership, argued Rogozin, was to reach a strategic partnership between the Russian Federation and Western countries and to overcome the historical divides of the 20th century. He pointed out that Russia was a European state which wanted to be part of “single Europe” and stressed that the decisions taken at Lisbon were of great strategic importance. In that context, Ambassador Rogozin underscored the attention given to missile defense by the Russian President and the Russian political class.

10. Turning to the contemporary threats facing the international community, Ambassador Rogozin pointed out Russian skepticism regarding the “realities of missile threats,” arguing that the long-feared challenges had not turned into impending dangers. He noted that Iran did not have the capacity to develop inter-continental missiles and explained that for a country to develop such, it had to span on a huge territory in order to conduct the requisite tests, adding that only five countries—the United States, the Russian Federation, China, the United Kingdom and France, but not Iran, had such a potential.

11. Turning to the specifics of missile-defense, Ambassador Rogozin stressed that it was NATO that had invited Russia in a joint project for the development of common defense and expressed Russia’s consternation upon discovering that, in fact, two separate systems were being planned. In effect, he argued, Russia had been invited to develop its own missile defense system. Moreover, Rogozin claimed that Europe could not develop such a capacity but would rather “hide behind the Americans” who would develop the system but situate it in Europe. Rogozin expressed further consternation for the fact that the interception capacity was planned to cover the northern regions of Europe, near the Russian border, when, according to him, the threats were likely to originate from the south. He argued that the interception of ballistic missiles should be done close to the origins of a potential missile launch and thus, they had to be placed in the south. While articulating serious concern regarding phases 3-4 of the US plans for missile defense, Ambassador Rogozin argued that NATO had no right or place to be ensuring Russian security or to be encroaching on Russian territory. He requested legal and binding guarantees that the shield would not be targeted against Russia. The criteria for such guarantees, he added, should include the territorial range and 142 NRPC 11 E 3 speed of interception, in order to provide assurances that the interceptors would be aiming at hypothetical threat states and not at Russia.

12. Finally, Ambassador Rogozin maintained that the Russian Federation had the capability and the requisite armed forces to intercept any potential threats, adding that any anti-missile system had to be under national control. He expressed that Russia did not want to share its system with NATO and understood well NATO’s unwillingness to share with non-NATO members. However, he argued that the means used in their respective anti-missile systems could be shared. Thus, he elaborated that launches could be jointly identified and tracked, which would give it greater accuracy. Stating that Russia had the potential and the ability to establish a single system alongside with NATO, Rogozin went to explain why devising two separate systems would be bad. He explained that the Russian system would, by default, identify a missile launch and an interceptor in the same way and thus the Russian leadership would conclude it is an attack or a sign of war. Instead, connecting separate defenses under a single system, he maintained, would remove such risks and would make the world a safer place. Finally, Mr Rogozin concluded by stressing that Russia wanted a legitimate relationship with NATO.

VI. Discussion

13. The discussion began with Sir Menzies Campbell (United Kingdom) voicing his disappointment with Ambassador Rogozin not mentioning issues of dispute, such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Lord Jopling (United Kingdom) joined his colleague’s disappointment and emphasized that such disagreements should be openly discussed. Lord Jopling also reminded the members that the NATO PA had previously passed a very critical report on Russia and its relation to these territories. He characterized Russia’s behavior as ‘neocolonial’ and asked the speaker to explain his country’s behavior. In reaction to the British MPs comments, Mrs Spiska (Russia) suggested that at the next meeting the NATO PA can invite representatives dealing with the issues of Caucasus who can discuss these issues with the Assembly. She, however, emphasized that Russia does not want to get involved in another Cold War. Following Mrs Spiska’s comments, Ambassador Rogozin denied that discourse on the Caucasus was a taboo for Russia. He also suggested that the Assembly should not devote this much time to issues of territorial sovereignty since it failed to recognize the importance of sovereignty in the case of Serbia. Ambassador Churov also contributed to this debate and emphasized that NATO does not recognize these new entities. In addition to that he pointed out that negotiations taking place in Geneva need to continue and that all partners need to be constructive and patient.

14. On the issue of Iran, Sir Menzies Campbell and Sergio De Gregorio (Italy) questioned Ambassador Rogozin’s confidence about Iran not having sufficient capability to launch an attack. Both of the speakers also maintained that their countries do consider Iran a threat – both conventional and nuclear. Sergio De Gregorio also mentioned that some Iranian representatives have expressed interest in discussing this issue with the NATO PA. In his reaction to these comments, Ambassador Rogozin argued that even if Iran had nuclear weapons and missiles that could reach Europe then it is not the means, the missiles, which we should worry about, but rather their nuclear potential. He also pointed out that the Iranian leadership does not want to use these weapons as an offensive tool but has developed them for defensive purposes.

15. Further on, US domination of the anti-missile system became a matter of debate. MP Campbell argued that Europe is not hiding behind the US, but that the US’s centrality to European security is undeniable. In a further debate on this issue, however, Ambassador Rogozin maintained that the anti-missile shield will indeed not be a NATO, but an American project. He continued by explaining that the US will be in charge of operating the system and that an American commander will be put in charge of the system. Also, he stressed, that the US will make profit from this system because it will not be Europe but the US who will supply its technology for the project. So Europe will not profit from this project financially. 142 NRPC 11 E 4

16. Subsequently, Petras Austrevicius (Lithuania) raised the issue of tactical nuclear weapons and the way this issue has been addressed by both NATO and Russia. In his answer, Ambassador Rogozin pointed out that the US has deployed its nuclear weapons all around Europe. Russia also has such weapons but has decided to deactivate them. So far, the US has not taken their weapons from alert. When this happens, then Russia will start talking about disarmament.

17. NATO-Russia co-operation became another issue discussed at the meeting. The former President of the NATO PA, Loïc Bouvard (France) inquired about how different NATO’s and Russia’s perceptions of the anti-missile shield really are. He also pointed out that NATO member states from Eastern Europe feel deep mistrust towards Russia and would not welcome the idea of having Russia responsible for their defense. In reaction to these questions, Ambassador Rogozin explained that the anti-missile defense shield is essentially made of high-precision missiles, which can be both offensive as well as defensive and it is due to their potential use as offensive weapons that Russia refuses accept their placement on its boarders. Nevertheless, Ambassador Rogozin expressed his belief that these differences can be overcome. He also pointed out that there are substantial differences of opinion also among European NATO members on the missile defense system (for example the French do not want to implement this system because they prefer using their own nuclear potential to protect themselves). Finally on this point, Ambassador Rogozin expressed Russia’s interest in participating in this project, but only if all parties are serious about it. Since the system cannot be tested (except for having an all-out war) it is essentially a political and ideological project. Subsequently, Ambassador Churov challenged Ambassador Rogozin’s remarks concerning the fragmentation of European attitudes towards the anti-missile defense shield. He explained that at the Lisbon Summit, all 28 NATO member countries decided to be a part of the system.

18. Loïc Bouvard also inquired about Russia’s potential membership in NATO despite the two parties having to face common threats. In response to these questions, Ambassador Rogozin emphasized that NATO is a useful organisation for defence co-ordination. Nevertheless, he asserted that Russia’s membership in the organization is not very probable due to two reasons: probably not too many NATO members would be prepared to accept Russia as a member and, at the same time, Russia would not want to restrain itself and bind itself to an Alliance of this sort. It would also disagree and not participate in some of NATO’s operation, such as the ones in Afghanistan or Libya.

19. In the following question, Mrs Nibak (Norway) inquired about NATO-Russia cooperation on counter-terrorism following the assassination of Osama bin Laden. In his reaction, Ambassador Rogozin emphasized that killing Osama bin Laden does not mean that our fight against terrorism is over. In his opinion, by the time Bin Laden had been killed, he had no longer served as the operational head of al-Qaeda. Russia views this development positively and also appreciated the fact that the US included the name of a Northern Caucasus leader into the terrorist list. He also pointed out that in July there will be a NATO-Russia meeting in Sochi where the parties will discuss technical cooperation in respect to counter-terrorism, spotting and neutralizing suicide bombers, as well as other issues. He also mentioned Afghanistan as another area of close co-operating between Russia and NATO. Russia recognizes the fact that threats coming from this region have an effect on all international players. Thus, Russia has agreed with NATO to transport a wider array of good to/from Afghanistan. Russia is also training Afghan military cadets and providing military components for the Afghan Army. This cooperation is a result of agreements reached within the NATO-Russia Council.

20. Finally, Mr Agov (Bulgaria) raised the issue of Russia building a military basis and placing missiles in the Black Sea region. Bulgaria expressed its concern about this issue especially in the light of Russia having “walked out” from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The Bulgarian member also inquired whether there is a possibility of renegotiating this treaty in the 142 NRPC 11 E 5

NATO-Russia Council. In reply, Ambassador Rogozin emphasized that Russia did not withdraw from the CFE Treaty but that it introduced a moratorium on it due to the fact that the new version of this treaty was not ratified. With respect to Russia’s military presence in the Black Sea region, Ambassador Rogozin pointed out that NATO’s military capability is much stronger than Russia’s and refused to engage in further debate on the issue.

VII. Closing remarks

21. The Chair thanked all the participants and closed the meeting.

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