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Read Book Greek Warfare: Myth and Realities Kindle GREEK WARFARE: MYTH AND REALITIES PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Hans Van Wees | 144 pages | 30 Sep 2004 | Bloomsbury Publishing PLC | 9780715629673 | English | London, United Kingdom Greek Warfare: Myth and Realities PDF Book In antiquity, even respected historians were willing to believe that this war actually happened. Nina rated it liked it Jun 05, To ask other readers questions about Greek Warfare , please sign up. Finally, as our sources tend to focus on two city states, the book reads more like a study of Athens and, to a somewhat lesser degree, Sparta, than on Greek warfare in general. The wealth that had formerly served a private individual as a means to offer battle could then be directed to common military endeavor. No sites or methods were used to prepare citizen militias for battle. Athenian Democracy Primary sources Dillon, M. Whether it was inspired by a war waged long ago, or was simply an ingenious invention, it left its mark on the world, and remains as such of monumental historic importance. There are no discussion topics on this book yet. Newsletter Sign Up. Much was left to the initiative of the individual soldier. Their entire social hierarchy and political system was that of a more or less typical Greek oligarchy, designed to keep power in the hands of the leisured elite, who devoted themselves to the defence and administration of the community besides the running of their estates, of course. London — NY — you are expected to have studied chapters 1; 8; 10; 12; 13 P. For more information, visit our inspection copies page. Other editions. Thucydides, The Landmark Thucydides with all appendices and introduction. So it goes, too, in modern times. Chris rated it really liked it Jan 14, Three appendices complete the work. Padraig Taaffe rated it it was amazing Mar 25, About Hans van Wees. Average rating 4. Chapters 10; 18 3. Ritual, Rules and Strategies: the structure of campaigns American thinkers now often like to see the US as an inheritor of the great Athenian democratic ideal, but this is a much more recent way of thinking than they may be aware. Specialization and cost demanded hierarchy based on both wealth and skill. Greek Warfare: Myth and Realities Writer Want to Read saving…. The Spartans were unique in this; they were also unique in inflicting it upon their subject allies, who had to fight with them in the battle line. Achilles and Odysseus had inhabited an age of heroes. Please note that print inspection copies are only available in UK and Republic of Ireland. This keeps building right the way through the Classical and Hellenistic periods, and the most incredible tales of Spartan ruthlessness and single-minded obsession with warfare were actually written in the days of the Roman Empire — centuries after Sparta was beaten in war by the city-state of Thebes and reduced to the status of second-rate power. It was not. Reading Lists Ph. Certainly not. Xenophon Ath. In the period of their slow but irrevocable decline, from the fourth century BC onwards, admiration for their methods steadily rose to a fever pitch. While some may doubt the value of such cross-cultural parallels in analyzing ancient epic poetry or ancient warfare, this comparison provides a plausible explanation for the narrative strategies used to relate military engagement. By using our website you consent to all cookies in accordance with our Cookie Policy. London — NY — you are expected to have studied chapters 1; 8; 10; 12; 13 P. Powell ed. When the Thebans broke this cycle with their victories in pitched battle at Tegyra, Leuktra and Second Mantineia, the Greek world largely stopped thinking of the Spartans as particularly fearsome opponents — but by this time there was already enough in the historical record to sustain later authors who idolised Spartan ways and the Spartan state. Were they better for the reasons that a lot of modern people seem to think? In Part III, Amateur Armies , van Wees shows that for the most part — Sparta is the exception — archaic and classical land armies were comprised of ill-trained non-specialists. Regardless of how connected it is to fact, The Trojan War myth had a lasting impact on the Greeks and on us. At Thermopylai, Sparta made its name as a society of warriors. Ritual, Rules and Strategies: the structure of campaigns Make a Gift Online. The Spartan inability to create a more rounded army was a result of the fact that their military methods grew out of their social organisation, rather than the other way around. It would seem that the Spartans of the Classical period doubled down on their reputation as a specifically military power, and gradually started building up the system of customs and institutions that would convince later observers that they must always have been a force to be reckoned with. But some of the idolisation is deeply and dubiously political. All Languages. Naval service soon became specialized. Although archaic and classical military conflict was marked by observance of rules of sacrifice and religious truce, it was characterized also by a willingness to ravage land, to besiege, and to destroy cities. Chris rated it really liked it Jan 14, This is unfortunate, because that means the legend it spawned already contaminates our earliest source. Pericles of Athens and the Birth of Democracy. No sites or methods were used to prepare citizen militias for battle. For most ancient Greeks, indeed, the Trojan War was much more than a myth. Other Greeks had neither the training nor the nerve for this; they charged into battle, running and screaming to overcome their fear. No source ever suggests that they were individually superior to other Greeks. Instead, the author aims to read familiar sources with a more discerning eye. No trivia or quizzes yet. Secondary readings A. However, Herodotos is unable to show in his description of the battle that this was actually the case. This fixation on Thermopylai may be a little puzzling, since the battle was a total defeat with terrible consequences for the peoples of Central Greece. Citizens and Soldiers 4. Engels, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian army Error rating book. The Ancient Greeks. Reading List. From the soldier's eye view of combat to the broad social and economic structures which shaped campaigns and wars, ancient Greek warfare in all its aspects has been studied more intensively in the last few decades than ever before. Greek Warfare: Myth and Realities Reviews Friend Reviews. George Sr. Second, about the middle of the sixth century, thrusting spears supplanted throwing spears. This only seems to have happened in response to their reputation — but in hindsight, it must have been hard for Greek and Roman authors to identify cause and effect. Winkler, The Constraints of Desire essays 1, 2, 3, 5. Joseph Roisman ed. It looks like you are located in Australia or New Zealand Close. No sites or methods were used to prepare citizen militias for battle. Qty : Please note there is a week delivery period for this title. The choral songs of Alkman, meanwhile, are full of happy verses about pretty girls and flowers and bees. Myths and Realities. Athenian manpower in and BC 2. McKechnie and S. The book has six parts, each broaching a broad topic in more-or-less chronological order: In Part I, War and Peace , van Wees argues against the views of some scholars that Greeks were always either at war or preparing for war. Students are expected to consult with an advisor and finalize a list which will form the basis of their special field examination. Troy was real. Ozymandias rated it really liked it Oct 30, Daisy Dunn weighs up the evidence. Dover, Greek Homosexuality David M. Latin M. A Byzantine lexicon preserves an Archaic story that the people from Aigiai, a very small state that had just won a victory against its neighbours, arrogantly went to ask the Oracle at Delphi who were the best of all the Greeks, expecting to be told that it was them, the Aigians. The Other Warriors: light infantry, cavalry, body-servants and mercenaries 6. Open Preview See a Problem? Bodies of Men: training and organisation of the militia 8. The sources obscure these divisions, for from Homer through the classical period they generally privilege the privileged. Early Modern European political thinkers saw Sparta as the paragon of responsible government, and Athens as the dire example of what could go wrong if the people were given too much power. Engels, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian army Start your review of Greek Warfare: Myth and Realities. All Languages. In American history, a similar process of redefining political parallels is at work. In his poem, the Aeneid , Virgil described how the hero Aeneas escaped the burning citadel with a group of followers after the Greeks entered in their wooden horse. Other Greeks, when confronted with a Spartan army that had changed its facing or countermarched in good order, rarely stood their ground. Some native Spartan writers survive from this period, and they confirm the sense that Sparta was not really special among the Greek states. When Thebes was under Spartan occupation, ca. Moore ed. You can unsubscribe from newsletters at any time by clicking the unsubscribe link in any newsletter. Common too was border defense, even from the classical period contra Ober or earlier. Boegehold, Pleonexia: structural causes of war Part II. No source ever suggests that they were individually superior to other Greeks. While battle was not some sort of rule-laden game, there seem to have been some commonplaces by the classical period: battle was initiated by responding to a charge; mutilation of bodies was not tolerated; a request to recover the dead amounted to admitting defeat.
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