Running head: CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY

Civil Rights and The Jim Crow Army:

Discrimination and Challenges to Segregation During the Second World War

Robert M. Anderson

University of Tennessee

CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 1

Abstract

In the face of institutionalized discrimination and racism, African American enlistees answered the call of duty during the Second World War. While serving the cause of freedom abroad, these soldiers challenged segregation in the military and on the home front. They fought against the Jim Crow laws of the South and the inaction against inequality in the North. They sought to elevate the status of African Americans beyond that of a second-class soldier and fulfill the promise made by emancipation. These servicemen sacrificed for the nation and demanded the inalienable rights they and their predecessors had been denied for centuries. These efforts culminated with the passing of

Executive Order 9981, which called for an end to segregation in all branches of the armed forces in 1948.1 Their efforts laid the groundwork for the Civil Rights Movement that would follow in the decades after the war.

This paper will look at the cause and effect of discrimination and segregation during World War Two. The research in this work will utilize a variety of primary and secondary sources ranging from newspaper articles, correspondence, and government reports and documents to contemporary academic journals and scholarly books. This paper will focus on the inequities in housing, transportation and duties endured by

African Americans in the military as well as the response from servicemen and advocacy groups such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

(NAACP) and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE). This essay will generally follow a linear chronological structure diverging when necessary to maintain subject cohesion and contextual continuity.

CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 2

Discrimination and Challenges to Segregation During the Second World War

As the United States entered the Second World War, a call to enlist in the armed services issued to all segments of society. African American’s answered this call in numbers far exceeding any previous war.2 These enlistees met with discrimination in the military in step with what they had experienced in civilian life. Prior to the war, many of the traditional African American units had been decommissioned or downgraded to custodial status. Dating back to the American Civil War, soldiers of African descent were organized into regiments separate from their white counterparts. General Order

Number 143, passed by the United States War Department in 1863, established the creation of the Bureau of Colored Troops.3 For nearly a century following, the segregation of the United States armed forces would remain mostly unchallenged.4

Compounding this issue, African American military units were reduced to a diminished status before the Second World War. While this was the standard for all armed forces following the First World War, African American units were especially targeted for reduction. Traditional units such as the 10th Cavalry “Buffalo Soldiers” were demobilized and downgraded to custodial duties. Units that were not outright decommissioned were underfunded and understaffed. Civilian and support jobs, often the only ones available to African Americans, were cut by a full quarter.5 During the war the armed services maintained segregated units that kept African Americans limited to non-combat support roles.6

The diminishing of these traditional regiments did not go without protest. In

1931, the NAACP issued a letter to the War Department following Chief of Staff General

Douglas Macarthur’s recommendation to reduce the size and number of African CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 3

American military units. The NAACP leveled harsh criticism at Macarthur and the

Hoover administration for preferential treatment of white units over those of black units.7

The complaints issued by black leadership met with some results. African American regiments retained their commission, but were relegated to servile, labor status. As a result, many black leaders remained reticent to commit to a war effort abroad while discrimination remained in effect at home. Some called for African Americans to refuse enlistment until military segregation was ended. In an article published by the Topeka

Plaindealer in May of 1939, several prominent black spokesmen were quoted as opposed to war in Europe while segregation remained in effect. Many believed that African

Americans should object “even to a breaking point” at being used as labor more than whites.8

As the war sung into full gear, many African American servicemen voiced their complaints about unequal treatment and usage. A letter from the 938th Quartermaster Plt to the Pittsburgh Courier illustrated the grievance of the African American soldier. The trooper wrote, “Here on the Post, we’re treated like dogs.” He points to double standard in the treatment of white and black soldiers, especially the misuse of skilled blacks.

Often African American troops were used to provide manual labor regardless of skillset of job title, while white units drilled and prepared for combat.9 It was not enough for

African Americans to enlist and then provide menial service; they wanted to prove themselves in combat and in leadership. Another letter from a black volunteer described the dissatisfaction about the limitations of opportunities for African American to become officers. Hopeful candidate Aeron D. Bells wrote to the Negro Adviser to the Secretary of War William H. Hasty that he had been denied the possibility of enlisting as an officer CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 4 and instead must shed his blood as a private, regardless of education or ability.10 Denial to specialization or advanced training was a common complaint.

These soldiers were held back due to quota systems within each field. The military was more concerned with overall numbers of specialists than with equal representation. Rectifying the lack of balance could have jeopardized the continued output of these training facilities.11 Black servicemen suffered from demoralization due to the conditions during the Second World War. The War Department had implemented a secretive policy that called for a reduced number black officers and a limited role in combat. As a result, the majority of African Americans in the armed forces worked as stevedores, road builders, railroad laborers, mechanics or gravediggers. Keeping the War

Department from being embarrassed by the performance of what were considered inferior troops was the justification for this practice.12 This policy was challenged in September of 1940 by a coalition of African American leadership. Walter White, A. Phillip

Randolph and T. Arnold Hill met with President Roosevelt and demanded desegregation of the armed forces. Both the Secretary of the Navy and the Assistant Secretary of War met this demand with resistance. They contended that desegregation would demoralize the mostly white military.13 Thus the policy of military segregation and exclusion went on unabated.

In congruence with the dissent among African Americans within the military, a growing resistance to inequality emerged on the home front. Challenges were issued against the discrimination African American soldiers and veterans faced. Advocacy organizations and black counselors lodged protests and formal objections on behalf of

African American servicemen. The threat of a march on Washington by early civil rights CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 5 leaders A. Phillip Randolph and Bayard Rustin pressured President Roosevelt into issuing an order prohibiting racial discrimination in the national defense industry.14 This small victory had a resounding effect on racial relations in the cities that supplied arms manufacturing.

The inundation of African American workers in the booming defense industry met with some stiff resistance in certain areas of the nation. The new arrival of manufacturing workers in large cities resulted in increased demands on the already limited housing. Ethnic favoritism and exclusionism further exacerbated the claims for the finite lodgings.15 Racial tension peaked when a three-day riot erupted in the streets of

Detroit, Michigan. Set off by a series of escalating skirmishes between black and white residents, the violence that broke out at Belle Isle Park in Detroit on June 21, 1943 resulted in nearly two million dollars in damages, thirty-four deaths and an armed intervention by the National Guard.16 The racial tension in Detroit reflected the general animosity occurring in industrial cities throughout the nation. African American workers encountered housing constraints that were legally justified by restrictive covenants and local zoning ordinances. In the face of this systematic discrimination, challenges to housing restrictions arose from multiple sources. The Congress of Racial Equality

(CORE) first began to dispute housing segregation in 1942 with direct defiance of restrictive covenants in Chicago. CORE continued their efforts to end housing discrimination throughout and after the war.17 From its inception, the NAACP opposed housing constraints in an escalating series of litigious crusades. Letter campaigns led to civil suits that eventually resulted in judicial action and appeals to the Supreme Court.

Despite encouraging legal victories throughout the early part of the twentieth century, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 6

NAACP efforts to fight housing segregation stalled in the 1930’s.18 Aside from a singular, yet significant, Chicago ruling in Hansberry v. Lee that opened up twenty-seven residential blocks to African American tenants, the NAACP did not regain successful momentum during the Second World War.19

As much as Executive Order 8802 did to open up the defense industry to African

Americans, discrimination against black servicemen did not end with the legislation.

Within the armed services, segregation remained the official policy. African American units were transported and housed separately from white units. Black soldiers were shuttled in separate, overcrowded train cars and trucks. While training stateside, black servicemen were often denied shuttle service to and from their posts.20 Northern blacks were exposed, first-hand, to the bigotry suffered by Southern blacks. They were witness to the segregation of transportation and services that was the standard of the region during the era.21 In some cases African American servicemen were outright refused transportation. An article from the Arkansas State Press in 1944 exemplified the discrimination with a report of over fifty servicemen booted from a train in Birmingham

Alabama to make room for white passengers. The response, invariably from the soldiers was, “Is this what we’re fighting for?”22 It was a question often repeated by African

American soldiers when faced with the standardized discrimination of the Jim Crow

Army. Black servicemen found little assistance from military authority when confronted with racism. In a letter published by the Atlanta Daily World, PFC Charlie Mabrey Jr. described his attempt to secure aid from military police when removed from a bus in

Augusta, Georgia. Not only did the M.P.s side with the civilian bus driver, they also CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 7 insulted and threatened the private.23 This account was a common one, recurring from all branches of the military and all regions of the nation.

The housing situation reflected that of transportation, with the needs of black troops coming second to those of white troops. In a letter to President Roosevelt, Air

Corps Private Charles F. Wilson elucidated the prejudice. Not only were the African

American solders billeted separately, their barracks were painted black, so there was no mistaking who lived where.24 Segregated camps were not confined to the Jim Crow regions of the south. The armed services enforced southern-style inequality throughout the country. African American soldiers were shocked to find discrimination as rampant in the North as it was in the South. Segregation at Camp Reynolds Pennsylvania elicited the question, “Why are we segregated?”25 If it was understood that segregation at

Southern military bases was justified as a means to appease local Jim Crow legislation, then that justification fell flat in the North where no such laws existed.

Further complicating the housing problems, local Southern populations offered up complaint to the sudden influx of armed African Americans, soldiers or not. The Kansas

City Plaindealer ran an article on the objection arising from Brackettville, Texas, citizens in protest to the proposed quartering of some 1,500 black enlistees.26 The idea of an armed African American was enough to make some Southerners uneasy. The prospect of thousands of armed African Americans set entire communities into clamor. This played into a deep-seated fear, one that sustained racism and prejudice in the South, that African

Americans would take up arms to seek retribution for the Confederate past. These protests did eventually raise the ire of military brass. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson was especially critical of Southern attitudes. The solution was less than satisfying for CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 8

African American troops. Southern black soldiers would be housed in the South, while

Northern black soldiers would remain in the North.27 The thinking behind this decision was that African Americans who had been exposed to the Jim Crow South would be less likely to complain than those who were experiencing it for the first time.

On certain drastic occasions, the military was forced to intervene on behalf of

African American servicemen. A nationwide call for justice followed the lynching of

Pvt. Felix Hall at Fort Benning, Georgia. Leading the charge for action, the NAACP levied criticism and a media campaign to improve protection for African American troops stationed in the South. The association argued such attacks jeopardized the morale of black troops, and thus hampered the war effort. A full investigation followed with charges levied.28 Further instances of violence against black servicemen saw the military bending policy under extreme circumstances. Multiple reports from the Cleveland

Gazette detailed a series of attacks in Arkansas against the African American soldiers of the 94th Engineer Battalion and their white officers. These assaults by local mobs and police led to a mass desertion by the enlisted men after their request for protection was denied. In response the military issued pardons to any of the soldiers that returned to their posts in the following weeks.29 Desertion by black soldiers was often punished severely, so this occasion marked a rare turn in protocol by the military. These instances of redress in favor of African American servicemen came thanks, in no small part, to the efforts by the NAACP’s awareness campaigns and the political pressure that accompanied.

Building on the success of the NAACP’s media blitzes, African American newspaper the Pittsburgh Courier championed a “Double V” campaign, promoting an CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 9 end to fascism abroad and racism at home.30 With a series of scathing articles and letters from soldiers, as well as black leaders such as Walter White and A. Phillip Randolph, the newspaper became an instrument for mobilization. This civilian protest called for

African Americans to fight for a victory against fascists abroad and victory over racism at home.31 Originating with a letter from a disgruntled cafeteria worker James G.

Thompson, the “Double V” Campaign asked the question, “Should I sacrifice my life to live half American?”32 In the ensuing weeks, The Pittsburgh Courier replied by unveiling the “Double V” logo and kick starting a publicity campaign encouraging

African Americans to support the war effort while still demanding equitable treatment.33

Countless letters, articles, editorials and opinion pieces followed in a crusade that challenged segregation policies under the premise that the United States could not in good conscious fight for freedom throughout the world while it lacked racial equality domestically. The popular campaign, which boasted some 200,000 pledges at its peak, helped keep a spotlight on equal rights while providing a voice for protest.34 Emerging

“Double V” clubs and an official affiliation with the NAACP helped the movement gain credibility and momentum.35

One of the main grievances voiced by both the “Double V” clubs and other advocacy groups was the routine denial of the basic right to vote in the South. Chief among these groups, the NAACP filed numerous suits campaigning for voter rights, using the war and public morale as a means to push for an end to poll-taxes in Southern states.36 The influx of Northern blacks into Southern military camps brought about an awareness of the disenfranchisement that was taking place there. While suppression of the black vote was a common occurrence in the region, it largely came as a shock to CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 10

African American servicemen from the North.37 Attempts to register by soldiers and their spouses were often met with threats of violence and even death.38 In a somewhat ironic twist, attempts by Southern states to suppress voting by African American soldiers sparked a nationwide debate on voter’s rights. Southern lawmakers saw proposed absentee balloting legislation as an end around for African Americans to access the polls.

Black enlisted men would be able to cast votes along with white soldiers, thus negating institutionalized Southern disenfranchisement.39 One Mississippi senator declared the

Soldier Vote Bill as a, “threat to white supremacy.”40 Southern congressmen sought to keep control of absentee balloting at the state level in order to maintain voter suppression.

An NAACP letter campaign challenged lawmakers to pass a bill that would protect the rights of both black and white servicemen.41 Several versions of the bill went through committee before a consensus was eventually met. Despite attempts to derail and curtail the effectiveness of the measure, the Soldier Voting Act passed in 1942. The new law, however, proved mostly ineffective as it was implemented too close to the general election for absentee votes to be cast. A second Soldier Voting Act was proposed in

1944. After passage in the Senate, opponents gutted it in the House, replacing it as states-rights oriented bill.42 Not as effective as the earlier legislation, the second Voting

Rights Act still allowed African Americans to avail themselves the opportunity to vote without Jim Crow restrictions.43

While the military was obliged to react on behalf of African American servicemen when prejudice threatened the war effort, it was also quick to react negatively to their grumblings when it benefited the cause. African American servicemen were given a disproportionate amount of “blue” discharges, often without any court martial or CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 11 opportunity to defend themselves from legal action.44 These discharges denied them access to the G.I. Bill and hampered their ability to find civilian work.45 Attempts by

African American troops to challenge bigotry were met with court martial and expulsion.

A letter from Pvt. Milton Adams to civilian aide to the Secretary of War William Hastie epitomized the plight of black conscripts. Adams charged that his Chicago roots made him a target for animosity from Southern white officers. His problems were compounded when he complained of racist language directed at black soldiers. In the end, Adams was railroaded out of the army.46 Another letter printed by the Pittsburg Courier revealed the discrepancy between discharges for black and white soldiers. The communiqué from Pvt.

Marion Hill to editor William G. Nunn called attention to the excessive amount of negative discharges issued to black servicemen when compared to those issued to white servicemen.47 A lack of recourse for court martialed and discharged African American soldiers further complicated the dilemma. Any review would come post-discharge, after the appellant no longer had access to free legal council. Discharged troops with limited means would have a difficult time mounting an appeal.48 This ensured that only a small number of discharges would even be challenged, thus mitigating the assets expended by the military.

The contrasting standard by which black and white soldiers were tried occasionally fell under the scrutiny of press and advocacy groups. The dissatisfying court martial of a drunken white officer who shot a black private elicited a scathing critique by the Negro Star and the Veterans of Foreign Wars. The column questioned the abuses committed by white officers and the military’s willingness to abide these abuses.

The piece called for an end to the double standard that plagued court martial policy CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 12 during the War.49 The officer in question, William Colman, received a relatively light punishment whereas black soldiers routinely received much harsher sentences for much lesser crimes. This was just one of many instances of uneven justice handed down by military courts. A trial reported in The Kansas City Plaindealer highlighted the double standard. An African American private was sentenced to twenty-five years of hard labor for his role in a protest against segregation. After being denied entry into a whites only theater at March Field, a group of African American servicemen demanded access to arms; their plan being to force their way into the show. Clarence A. Richardson was singled out as a ringleader not for his actions during the fracas, but for being, “educated to a state above the average for colored people.”50 This case exemplified the bias held against African American soldiers, especially those who voiced a challenge to the Jim

Crow standards of the military.

Perhaps the most egregious of injustices faced by court martialed African

Americans was the mass trial of the “Port Chicago 50” in 1944. Following a large explosion at Port Chicago California, African American stevedores outright refused to handle munitions. This strike led to mutiny charges against fifty black servicemen and a court martial that brought national attention to the reprehensive treatment of African

American regiments.51 The walkout that followed the munitions explosion at Port

Chicago, California in 1944 culminated with the court martial and imprisonment of fifty

African American Navy stevedores.52 On July 17, 1944, a massive explosion resulted from the mishandling of ammunition on board the Liberty Ship SS E. A. Bryan. Some

320 sailors were instantly killed in the enormous fireball that engulfed the vessel and the pier.53 A Naval Board of Inquiry convened in July of 1944 determined that the white CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 13 officers in charge of the loading operations were inculpable and that the disaster was most likely the result of incompetence among the African American enlisted men handling the munitions. The inquiry failed, however, to take into account the lack of training the stevedores had with live explosives. This lack of experience and the misallocation of resources, chiefly the relegating of African American sailors to manual labor with equipment with which they were not qualified to use, was the real culprit for the conflagration and loss of life.54 While the Navy made restitution to the families of the men killed in the detonation, the ensuing mistrust of white officers by black Naval recruits led to a work stoppage on August 9 of that same year. 55 258 African American sailors of the ordinance battalion refused to stock ammunition, citing a lack of instruction and a concern for safety as their principal grievance. Of these sailors, 208 men were convicted for disobeying orders in summary courts martial, and docked three months pay.

The remaining fifty were identified as leaders of the strike and charged with mutiny.56

The ensuing trial garnered national media attention and the interest of the

NAACP. African American newspapers provided continuous coverage of the proceedings and clemency campaigns following the sailor’s convictions.57 Coming to the aid of the fifty African Americans charged with mutiny, the NAACP urged the Secretary of the Navy to dismiss the charges, claiming that resentment among black enlistees was at an all time high and that a trial would only further demoralize blacks. This plea fell on deaf ears and the military continued with what would become the largest court martial in

Naval history.58 Following the trial, which lasted little over a month, the court found all

50 men guilty of mutiny. They were each reduced in rank and given a fifteen-year sentence, with a dishonorable discharge waiting at the end. In response, special council CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 14 for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Thurgood Marshall began a publicity campaign demanding the release of the convicted African American sailors and filed an appeal for each individual.59 Although unsuccessful in overturning the convictions, Marshall was able to obtain further reduced sentences for the mutineers. Following the surrender of

Japan, the Navy began reducing sentences and granting clemency to imprisoned sailors.

Among those pardoned, forty-seven of the “Port Chicago 50” were released and given honorable discharges.60 The “Port Chicago Mutiny” had a catalyzing effect on the U.S.

Navy. Along with race riots and hunger strikes, the highly publicized court martial of the

African American stevedores galvanized the Navy’s efforts to address and eliminate racial bias.61

Discrimination did not end with the conclusion of the Second World War. As the nation celebrated victory in Europe and the Pacific, black soldiers and servicemen returned home to continued degradation and humiliation. African American veterans returning from war were often provided second-rate lodging, where white veterans were given preferential accommodations.62 Once black veterans were discharged of their duties they often came home to open hostility and aggression in their civilian lives.

African American servicemen returning to the South were assaulted and even killed by white mobs enraged at the upward mobility and status that black veterans were afforded.

In April of 1944, the NAACP filed a report with the Adjutant General’s Office of the

War Department citing numerous attacks on African American soldiers and veterans.63

Of all the forms of inequity African American veterans suffered, however, the broken promise of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act was perhaps the most insulting and infuriating. CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 15

When he signed the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act into law on June 22, 1944,

President Roosevelt declared that it would provide returning soldiers loans for homes and businesses; the means to obtain an education; job counseling; and unemployment allowances.64 These benefits were not readily available to black servicemen. Jim Crow standards of segregation and discrimination applied to the Veteran’s Administration offices that regulated the allocation of GI Bill funds and services. Only a miniscule number of counselors were African American, and white counselors, especially those in the South, often refused to aid black veterans. White officials justified rejecting African

American servicemen’s applications for aid based on discharge status.65 When black veterans refused to work for substandard wages, their unemployment allowances were denied. This forced many returning soldiers to accept low paying unskilled labor jobs for which they were often overqualified.66

This systematic discrimination led to a despondent attitude toward the

Servicemen’s Readjustment Act among black veterans. Few availed themselves of the housing and business loan provisions of the program. The promise of Servicemen’s

Readjustment Act, which had been labeled the single greatest piece of social legislation, failed to address the restrictive covenants that sustained housing discrimination against

African Americans throughout the nation.67 Even in Northern regions, African American veterans were reluctant to take on investments. This was not only due to the poor reputation that the GI Bill had amongst black soldiers, but also was due to an excessive amount fraud and unscrupulous dealings targeted at African Americans. Shoddy construction by dishonest contractors and inflated mortgages offered by exploitative lenders were a common occurrence in black communities.68 Housing discrimination CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 16 related to the GI Bill was not just limited to the Jim Crow South. Throughout the nation, restrictive covenants and “redlining” kept African American veterans separated from exclusively white neighborhoods.69 These restrictions often prevented black servicemen from obtaining housing in the newly emerging communities that were funded by the GI

Bill.

In addition to restrictive covenants, exclusionary zoning ordinances intended to target lower income families, disproportionately affected African American veterans.

This resulted in limiting the suburban spread of black servicemen to already existing

African American communities.70 That is not to say that African American servicemen did not challenge housing restrictions, just that those efforts did not meet with results until after a coordinated endeavor was orchestrated at the NAACP’s 1945 Chicago

Conference. The attendees of this meeting, including William H. Hastie, Thurgood

Marshal and a host lawyers and consultants, hammered out an organized political and legal strategy to attack restrictive covenants.71 Armed with a detailed agenda, the

NAACP, CORE and other advocacy organizations began to chip away at the legal foundation of housing discrimination. This in turn would open the door for African

American veterans to gain housing outside of segregated neighborhoods and communities using financial backing from the GI Bill.

Whether in the form of civilian crusades or soldier’s protests, challenges to discrimination in the military during the Second World War helped to drive the desegregation movement. Involvement by press, advocacy groups and the enlisted men themselves in campaigns for improvement in racial relations in the military resulted in the re-evaluation of military policy in the years following the war’s conclusion. CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 17

Relentless work by African American newspapers such as The Pittsburgh Courier and

The Kansas City Plaindealer and advocacy groups such as the NAACP pressured the

War Department to consider desegregation. These efforts, along with a burgeoning respect for African American service and sacrifice, led to the change in outlook toward the prospect of desegregation of the military.72

Following the end of the Second World War, African American leadership dedicated themselves to the integration of the military. In late September of 1947, Black activist A. Phillip Randolph founded the Committee Against Jim Crow in Military

Service and Training with the intent of pressuring the President and Congress to include provisions for desegregation in upcoming draft legislation.73 Bolstered by the findings of the President’s Committee on Civil Rights, African American leadership recognized that the time to demand change had at last arrived. As such, Randolph authored a series of letters pressing for a meeting with President Harry S. Truman.74 Truman eventually acquiesced and granted an audience to Randolph’s delegation on March 22, 1948. At first cordial, the meeting turned tense as Randolph pushed for an answer on the problem of discrimination in the military.75 The session concluded without any agreed upon resolution on the issue. Randolph and the other black leaders were not deterred by

Truman’s hesitation. On March 30 1948, Randolph and fellow activist Grant Reynolds appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee and threatened to lead a civil disobedience movement aimed at forcing the integration of the military and ending discrimination base upon race in the armed services. Randolph’s committee would encourage young African Americans to boycott the draft and avoid enlistment if their demands were not met.76 Eventually Truman relented to the combined pressure of CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 18

African American leadership and issued an executive order calling for an end to military discrimination.77 Signed into effect on July 26, 1948, the order to end racial discrimination in the United States military evoked an almost immediate response from both supporters and opponents of desegregation. Those who advocated the order saw it as a bold step in breaking down color barriers throughout the nation. Those who opposed the order saw it as the weakening of the military; in their view African American soldiers were not fit for combat.78 Whether supporting or opposed, most agreed that the desegregation of the armed forces served as a means for social evolution.79 If successful, the policy could provide a powerful argument for the end to racial discrimination on a national level. If the policy failed, however, segregationists could use it as a justification for continued Jim Crow laws in the South. As a result, the eyes of the nation were on the armed forces and these newly integrated servicemen and women.

Truman’s order did not immediately curtail segregation in the armed forces. The language of the law was considered ambiguous and required clarification to the public.

When further pressed on the issue, Truman affirmed that the end goal of the order was the desegregation of the military.80 Truman’s stance was not entirely shared by military personnel. Resistance to integration disseminated from top to bottom throughout the military chain of command.81 In response, Truman formed the President’s Committee on

Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, later known as the Fahy

Committee. The Fahy Committee’s role was to review and recommend changes to ensure the compliance of all branches of the armed services to Executive Order 9981.82

Following testimonies from the Secretaries of the Air Force, Navy and Army, a conflict erupted over the use of quotas in enlistment. Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall, and CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 19 his successor Gordon Gray, argued that the Army drew a lesser quality recruit than other branches of the military, and therefore should be allowed to limit subpar enlistees. After over a year of back and forth between the Fahy Committee and Secretary Gray, an understanding was reached. The Army would integrate without racial enlistment restrictions with the condition that the Army could enforce quotas if the racial balance became glaringly disproportionate to the rest of the armed services.83 While this compromise was not the desired result, it was agreed that integration of the military would be achieved and that the Fahy Committee had accomplished its stated goal.

The Fahy Committee had cleared up the legalities and logistics of Executive

Order 9981; however, the enforcement of military desegregation presented an entirely different set of hurdles. While the military admitted and assigned African American soldiers without prejudice, promotion and specialization of these enlistees was still restricted by preceding notions of racial inferiority. African American troops who did receive advanced training were continuously designated to segregated units.84 It would require the onset of the Korean War to force the issue of integration on the Army.

Debate on the effectiveness of integration, which was generally deemed as the best use of

African American servicemen, coincided with a shortage of manpower on the battlefield.

As a result, the Army integrated ninety-five percent of its forces by October of 1953. By the war’s end, the entire military was well on the way toward total integration.85

Executive Order 9981 not only met with opposition from within the armed services, the African American leaders who had pushed for its enactment also challenged it. While some factions of black leadership were encouraged and contented with the order, others felt it did not do enough to end discrimination in the military. Civil rights CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 20 advocates A. Phillip Randolph and Grant Reynolds voiced limited support for the

President’s executive act. Both men were concerned that the measure would only provide lip service without enforcing integration.86 Even as Randolph and Reynolds backed down from their opposition, prominent members of their Campaign to Resist

Military Segregation maintained the civil disobedience movement refusing induction into the military until discrimination was completely eliminated.87 Workers Defense League secretary Rowland Watts argued that the armed forces could not completely desegregate as long as Jim Crow laws remained in effect at Southern military bases.88 Initial criticism of Executive Order 9981 within the African American community would eventually subside as branches of the military began to institute integration. At first met with little enthusiasm, the order was considered one of the most successful a pieces of civil rights legislation by the end of Truman’s presidency. Discrimination in the military still persisted, however. The government had difficulties in enforcing the new desegregation law. Military institutions in the South were forced to accept the regional customs of segregation. White army officers used the policies of the local business and government to justify continued bias against black soldiers. While the military could eliminate segregation, it could not control the practices of the private companies that provided essential services to military bases.89 It would take years of additional protest and outcry to rectify these grievances.

Conclusion: The Emergence of the Civil Rights Movement

During the Second World War, African American volunteers faced discrimination in varied forms and from multiple sources. Prior to the war, demobilization and demotion of traditional black regiments limited African American servicemen to CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 21 custodial and support roles. Segregated housing and transportation relegated black soldiers to second rate accommodations and travel. An excessive amount of unfavorable discharges hindered African American veteran’s ability to gain equitable employment.

Black soldiers stationed in and returning to the South were treated to forms of Jim Crow hostility that included denial of voting rights and access to GI Bill benefits. Despite these hardships, African Americans provided exemplary service and sacrifice. Black servicemen were awarded with thousands of Purple Hearts and Bronze Stars; hundreds of

Silver Stars and Flying Crosses; dozens of Distinguished Service Crosses and Medals90; and, in a ceremony in 1997, seven Medals of Honor.91

The Second World War not only saw an increase in advocacy for black soldiers and an end to military segregation, it also helped bring about a socially aware class of

African Americans. A rise of black leadership followed the war. Men who had served abroad returned to the United States no longer satisfied to accept the status quo of white supremacy. These soldiers challenged segregation in the military and on the home front.

They fought against the Jim Crow laws of the South and the inaction against inequality in the North. They pursued voting rights and adequate housing. They sought to elevate the status of African Americans beyond that of a second-class citizen and fulfill the promise made by emancipation. These servicemen had sacrificed for the nation and now demanded the inalienable rights they and their predecessors had been denied for centuries. Their efforts laid the groundwork for the civil rights movement that would follow in the decades after the war.92 Some of the most prominent leaders of the civil rights movement emerged from military service. Medgar Evers, who took part in the

Battle of Normandy, was a driven activist and boycott organizer. He became the CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 22

NAACP’s first field officer in Mississippi. His public investigations into the murder of

Emmitt Till brought national attention to segregation in the South, and made him a target for white violence and threats. Evers was given full military honors and buried at

Arlington National Cemetery following his assassination in 1963. SCLC leader Hosea

Williams was awarded the Purple Heart after a beating left him near death. He was still in his uniform when a group of whites attacked him for drinking from a water fountain.

Williams relied upon his service in the military to give him strength in his recovery and newfound cause. He referred to the attack as calling, “to be a general in the war for human rights.”93 Deacons for Defense and Justice co-founder Charles Sims relied on his training while organizing armed protection for SNCC and CORE activities in Louisiana.

SCLC leader Ralph Abernathy was a platoon sergeant in the Second World War.

National Urban League powerbroker Whitney Young’s experience mediating between white officers and black soldiers propelled him into a career of race relations following the war. Each of these men contributed to the cause of civil rights, and each one gained leadership skills, courage and a sense of duty from their military service.94

CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 23

End Notes

1 Executive Order 9981: Desegregation of the Armed Forces (1948) states, “There shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin. This policy shall be put into effect as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to effectuate any necessary changes without impairing efficiency or morale” (Exec. Order No. 9981, C.F.R. pp. 1, 1948). This order effectively ended federally sanctioned segregation in all branches of the U.S. military.

2 “Negroes were an important source of manpower for the armed forces in World War II as is shown by the fact that a total of 1,056,841 Negro registrants were inducted into the armed forces through Selective Service as of December 31, 1945 . . . Negroes, who constituted approximately 11.0 percent of all registrants liable for service, furnished approximately this proportion of the inductees in all branches of the service except the Marine Corps” (Selective Service, D. (1948). Selective service and victory: The 4th report of the director of selective service. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. p. 187).

3 This order states, “A Bureau is established in the Adjutant General’s Office for the record of all maters relating to the organization of Colored Troops.” The language of the order clearly delineates a separation of white and African American troops (U.S. War Department. Adjutant General's Office. (1863, May 22). General Order (143). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Retrieved October 6, 2013 from the World Wide Web: ourdocuments.gov).

4 Often such complaints came as part of larger protests against segregation. In Breaking the Color Barrier, Robert J. Schneller Jr. writes of the protests against the overall effects of segregation “A. Phillip Randolph, one of the twentieth century’s most prominent black labor leaders and spokesmen, pointed out the black sailors and soldiers had fought in all previous American wars, but their collective sacrifices had never earned equal rights for their race” (Schneller, R. (2005). Breaking the Color Barrier: The U.S. Naval Academy’s First Black Midshipman and the Struggle for Racial Equality. (1st ed., p 52). New York, NY: New York University Press).

5 “The War Department, in 1919, argued for a force of 500,000. Instead, Congress steadily reduced the Army from 175,000 to 125,000, and by 1924 to 111,000 . . . Economy measures cut deeper into the Army than reducing numbers of soldiers. The Army eliminated nearly 21,000 civilian jobs, a reduction of about 25 percent” (Thompson, G. (1989). Army Downsizing Following World War I, World War II, Vietnam, and a Comparison to Recent Army Downsizing. (Master's thesis).). CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 24

6 Nat Brandt in his work Harlem at War: The Black Experience in WWII writes, “They wanted to serve their country on the same terms as other Americans. But except for a few combat units, they were relegated to play a secondary role, and even then they were treated – to use their words – as “second-class citizens” (Brandt , N. (1996). Harlem at War: The Black Experience in WWII. (1st ed., p. xiii). Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.).

7 African American newspaper the Topeka Plaindealer reprinted the letter along with an editorial commenting on the outrage at the potential loss of these units, many of which served as a point of pride within the black community (Demobilization of Negro Troops Brings Protest from NAACP (1931, Sept. 18) Topeka Plaindealer p. 1).

8 The article, “Leaders Oppose Interference in Europe Negro Regiment Favored by Majority If War Comes; Race Advised to Go Along with Rest of Nation,” was mostly an opinion piece. It did, however, contain multiple quotes from scholars and leaders in the African American community. To a man they all supported resistance to war if it meant a continuation of segregation policy. (Leaders Oppose Interference in Europe Negro Regiment Favored by Majority If War Comes; Race Advised to Go Along with Rest of Nation. (1939, May 12). The Topeka Plaindealer).

9 Part of a compilation of letters, this particular entry expressed the dissatisfaction of skilled African American servicemen at the misallocation of resources (938th Quartermaster Plt., “No One's Fools.” Taps for a Jim Crow Army: Letters from Black Soldiers in World War II. Comp. Phillip McGuire. 1st. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 26 Apr 1943. 64-65. Print).

10 (“Not Accepted as Volunteer Officer Candidates.” Taps for a Jim Crow Army: Letters from Black Soldiers in World War II. Comp. Phillip McGuire. 1st. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 26 Apr 1943. 9. Print).

11 Retrieved from the Report of Board of Officers on the Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Post-Was Army. The report makes several references to the lack of training for African American servicemen during the Second World War, mostly out of convenience. (“Report of Board of Officers on Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Post-War Army,” Alvin C. Gillem Jr., to George Marshal, March 4, 1966, Military Personnel Division, General Staff, p. 165; Bernard C. Nalty and Morris J. MacGregor, Blacks in the Military; Essential Documents (Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1981), p. 207-244).

12 (Brandt, pp. 61-63).

13 Politically, Roosevelt had little to gain from desegregation. His administration had backed away from the issue and with the advent of war he could continue to justify the policy. Desegregation at that point could be labeled a distraction. (Taylor, J. (2013). Freedom to Serve: Truman, Civil Rights and Executive Order 9981. (1st ed., p. 15). Marceline, MO: Walsworth Publishing Company). CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 25

14 Executive Order 8802: Prohibition of Discrimination in Defense Industry (1941) states, “There shall be no discrimination in the employment of workers in defense industries or government because of race, creed, color, or national origin, and . . . that it is the duty of employers and of labor organizations . . . to provide for the full and equitable participation of all workers in defense industries, without discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin” (Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. pp. 1, 1941)

15 (Sitkoff, H. (1969). The Detroit Race Riot 1943. Michigan History, 53(3), 183–206.)

16 “Lasting just over 30 hours, from roughly 10:30 in the night of June 20 to the early morning hours of June 22, the riot caused over two million dollars in damage, tok the lives of 34 people, and required the National Guard to bring it to an end. Beginning on or near the bridge to Belle Isle Park, where estimates of the total crowd – mostly non- rioters, of course – was 100,000 people, the disruption quickly spread into various African American and white neighborhoods of the mainland city” (Kapell, M. (2009). "Miscreants, Be They White or Colored": The Local Press Reactions to the 1943 Detroit "Race Riot." . Michigan Academian, 39, 213-243).

17 “The Chicago Committee of Racial Equality – later the congress of Racial Equality – made racial integration one of its causes early in its existence. CORE . . . fashioned an attack . . . through the creation of Fellowship House, ‘an interracial men’s cooperative.’ The organization rented Hyde Park apartments that were covered by covenants. Black and white men moved into these co-operatives and eventually achieved a victory over attempt to evict them” (Plotkin, p. 46).

18 (Vose, C. (1959) Caucasians Only: The Supreme Court, the NAACP, and the Restrictive Covenant Cases. 1st ed. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. p. 50- 56.)

19 (Kamp, A. (1986). The History Behind Hansberry v. Lee. U.C. Davis Law Review. 20(1) 481-499.)

20 Maggi M. Morehouse wrote of the typical treatment of African American soldiers in the South in Fighting in her book Jim Crow Army. She states, “Few enlisted men could afford a vehicle on pay of only $21 per month . . . Eventually, the army provided truck transport if soldiers wanted to travel en masse. (Morehouse, M. (2000). Fighting in the Jim Crow Army: Black Men and Women Remember World War II. (1st ed., p. 48-50). Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield.)

21 Morehouse explains, “The army moved black troops deeper into the South – from South Carolina to an area around Augusta Georgia. This change of venue was supposed to defuse the hostile situation that black troops faced. In fact, the move exacerbated tensions, because the local Georgia farmers did not want armed black men in their fields” (Morehouse, p. 12). CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 26

22 “Significant is the fact that every white person aboard the Frisco, soldier and civilian, was accommodated. The usual Jim Crow car was filled with whites as Negro soldiers watched helplessly” (Transportation To Race Soldier Denied on Southern Rail Road. (1944, May 12). Arkansas State Press, p. 1).

23 “One was rather nice after I had told him of my trouble but the other one spoke up insultingly. He said, ‘You let a nigger talk to you like that?’ He said . . . he would send me to camp foot forward [as if on a gurney from injury or death]” (Black Treatment Southern Style. (1943, July 21). The Atlanta Daily World, p.1).

24 Private Wilson wrote, “Negro soldiers are completely segregated from the white soldiers on the base. And to make doubly sure that no mistake is made about this, the barracks and other housing facilities (supply room, mess hall, etc.) of the Negro Section C are covered with black tar paper, while all other barracks and housing facilities on the base are painted white”. (Wilson, Charles. Letter to President Roosevelt. May 9, 1944. “TS”).

25 Pvt. Bert B. Babero wrote to Truman K. Gibson, “I sometimes wish I could be indifferent, but I can’t. Right is right, and I realize there is no such thing as half way right” (Babero, Bert. Letter to Truman Gibson. May 13, 1944. “TS”).

26 The Plaindealer opined, “This is another instance of bottleneck in our war effort and one of many that is helping to slow up the successful prosecution of the war program” (Texas Protest Negro Soldiers at Fort Clark. (1942, July 3). The Kansas City Plaindealer, p. 1).

27 Stimson wrote of the protests, “We are suffering from the persistent legacy of the original crimes of slavery; the section of the country, they thought, which foisted that crime upon us is that part of the country which now protests most loudly against being subjected to any of the risks which have followed the wrongdoing of their ancestors” (McGuire, p. 184).

28 An editorial run by the Kansas City Plaindealer reprinted the letters to President Roosevelt and Secretary of War Stimson. The NAACP claimed the lynching, “would be a further blow at the morale of colored Americans who are being urged daily to give unstinted support to the national defense effort” (F.D.R., Stimson Asked to Probe Soldier Lynching. (1941, April 25). The Kansas City Plaindealer, p. 1).

29 (Soldiers Beg Ammunition to Fight Mobs. (1941, Aug. 23). The Cleveland Gazette, p. 1) and (Blame War Department!. (1941, Aug. 25). The Cleveland Gazette, p. 1)

30 “Black leaders such as Walter White and A. Phillip Randolph used the pages of the Pittsburgh Courier to argue the merits of victory against fascists abroad, as well as victory against racism at home” (Morehouse, pp. 8).

CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 27

31 “Black leaders such as Walter White and A. Phillip Randolph used the pages of the Pittsburgh Courier to argue the merits of victory against the fascists abroad, as well as a victory over racism at home” (Morehouse, p. 9-16.).

32 “The V for victory sign is being displayed prominently in all so–called democratic countries which are fighting for victory over aggression, slavery, and tyranny. If this V sign means that to those now engaged in this great conflict, then let we colored Americans adopt the double V for a double victory. The first V for victory over our enemies from without, the second V for victory over our enemies from within. For surely those who perpetrate these ugly prejudices here are seeking to destroy our democratic form of government just as surely as the Axis forces” (Should I Sacrifice To Live ‘Half- American?’ (1942, Jan 31). The Pittsburgh Courier, p. 2).

33 Of the response to the logo the Pittsburgh Courier claimed, “The response has been overwhelming. Our office has been inundated with hundreds of telegrams and letters of congratulations, proving that without any explanation, this slogan represents the true battle cry of colored America” (The Courier's Double ‘V’ For A Double Victory Campaign Gets Country-Wide Support (1942, Feb 14). The Pittsburgh Courier, p. 1).

34 “Throughout the war, black people, applying the concept of the Double V, struggled to remove the contradiction between the claims of American democratic ideology and the racial inequalities evident in American life. The attitude of the black community toward the war was based on two considerations; as loyal Americans, they were patriotic and loyal, and expressed their support for the military buildup and war effort; but, at the same time, they were embittered over their treatment by the military and their inferior social status within American society” (Osur, A. (1986). Blacks in the Army Air Forces During World War II: The Problems of Race Relations. Office of Air Force History, p. 11-12).

35 “The local branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People became affiliated with the ‘Double V’ clubs of America last week. Dr. Edna L. Griffin, president of the local branch reported that, ‘We heartily endorse the movement, and we are working hard to accomplish this victory’” (‘Double V’ Club News: ‘Double V’ Water And Beauty Pageant Reveals Beauty And Patriotism Camden ‘Double V’ Girl Of The Week ‘VV’ Campaign Takes Over In Memphis (1942, Sept 12). The Pittsburgh Courier, p. 15).

36 Letters to Senate and Congress from the NAACP clearly identified poll taxes and lynching as detriments to African American troop morale. NAACP secretary Walter White wrote, “Lynching and disfranchisement are two practices which dampen the enthusiasm for the war among those who are their victims . . . the Axis utilizes lynching and disfranchisement in radio broadcasts to prove . . . that our country is not sincere when it declares that it is fighting a war for democracy” (White, Walter. Open Letter to Senate and Congress. March 25, 1943. “TS”).

CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 28

37 “Most African Americans in the South were prohibited from voting by a combination of literacy tests, poll taxes, and voter intimidation. However, when they came north, their votes became politically important because the southern devices used against them were not utilized in the North to restrict their votes” (Taylor, p. 6).

38 The NAACP produced numerous reports of voter intimidation during this era. One letter from association’s secretary Emory G. Jackson to the Legal Redress Committee chairman cited nine separate instances of coercion on one single day in a county in Mississippi (Jackson, Emory. Letter to NAACP Legal Redress Committee. July 2, 1946. “TS”).

39 “The original law, the Soldier Voting Act of 1942 (P.L.712-561), was enacted to guarantee federal voting rights for members of the armed forces during wartime. The law allowed members of the armed forces to vote for presidential electors, and candidates for the U.S. Senate and House, whether or not they were previously registered and regardless of poll tax requirements” (U.S. House of Representatives. Government and Financial Division. The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act: Background and Issues (RS20764). Washington: Government Printing Office, 2003.).

40 (Mississippi Senator Calls Soldier Vote Bill a Threat to White Supremacy. (1944 Feb. 25). The Negro Star, p.1 and 4.)

41 “Calling the Senate action on the soldier vote bill, which would leave the franchise for servicemen in the hands of the state ‘a shameless legislative fraud,’ the NAACP has urged upon the house leaders the passage of the original Worley bill” (Senate Action on Soldier Vote Bill Called a Fraud. (1943, Dec. 17). The Kansas City Plaindealer, p. 1).

42 “This new bill required states to use the federal ballot only if a state failed to establish effective absentee voting procedures, the federal ballot was certified by the state, and if a military voter had not received a requested traditional absentee ballot. The 1944 law liberally uses the phrase ‘recommends to the states’ as opposed to the word ‘shall,’ which was used consistently through the 1942 law” (Alvarez, M., H, T., & Roberts, B. (2007). Military Voting and the Law: Procedural and Technological Solutions to the Ballot Transit Problem. Fordham Urban Law Journal, 22(1), 1).

43 (Report Southern Negro Voting Strength Growing Since Supreme Court Ruling. (1944, May 12). Arkansas State Press, p. 1.)

44 The blue discharge was a form of administrative discharge created to replace two previous discharge classifications. It was neither honorable nor dishonorable. (Major Bradley J. (1973). The Gravity of Administrative Discharges: A Legal and Empirical Evaluation, 59 MIL. L. REV. p. 2).

45 In his article in the Military Law Review, Major Bradley K. Jones opines that, “There can be no doubt that [an undesirable] discharge . . . is punitive in nature since it stigmatizes the serviceman’s reputation, impedes his ability to gain employment and is in CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 29

life, if not in law, prima facie evidence against the serviceman’s character, patriotism or loyalty (Jones, p. 1).

46 Adams wrote, “Since they can’t very well hang us, they take the next steps, which is court martial” (Adams, Milton. Letter to William H. Hastie May 13, 1942 “TS”).

47 (Hill, Marion. “Discharge That Robs a Man of His Citizenship.” Taps for a Jim Crow Army: Letters from Black Soldiers in World War II. Comp. Phillip McGuire. 1st. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 26 Apr 1943. 22. Print).

48(Jones, p. 6.)

49 The article vilified Col. William Colman, the officer who was tried and found guilty of reckless behavior. This was a minor punishment for the severity of the charge. The resolution issued by the Veterans of Foreign Wars stated of African American soldiers, “a pattern of discrimination and humiliation and violation of every sense of decency toward a people whose trusting faith in the destiny of their country has never been questioned” (Veterans of Foreign Wars Denounce Army Court Martial Policy. (1943, Oct. 29). The Negro Star, p. 1.).

50 (Soldier Gets 25 Year Term After Court Martial. (1943, Aug. 27). The Kansas City Plaindealer, p. 1.)

51 Robert L. Allen writes, “In August 1944, three weeks after the disaster, 328 of the surviving ammunition loaders were sent to load another ship. The men balked . . . and 258 of them were marched to a barge and held under guard for several days” (Allen, R. (1989). The Port Chicago Mutiny. (1st ed., p. xiv). New York, NY: Warner Books Inc.).

52 “Prison sentences ranging from eight to 15 years were meted out to the 50 Navy enlisted men found guilty last month on charges of refusing to load ammunition at the Mare Island naval base following the Port Chicago explosion” (Mutineers Get Stiff Sentences (1944, Nov 24). The Pittsburgh Courier, p. 1).

53 “The E. A. Bryan exploded like one gigantic bomb, sending a column of fire and smoke and debris climbing twelve thousand feet into the night sky, with hundreds of exploding shells making it look like a huge fireworks display” (Allen, p. 63).

54 (Bell, C. (2003). Naval Mutinies of the Twentieth Century: An International Perspective. (1st ed., p. 203). Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers.)

55 “The Navy has been authorized by a bill passed by the House and Senate last week (now pending signature of the President) to settle claims for loss of life and property damage in the Port Chicago explosion in July in which over 200 negroes were killed, up to $3,000” (Port Chicago Victims to Get Cash Payments (1944, Sept 16). The Pittsburgh Courier, p. 4). CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 30

56 (Allen, p. 126.)

57 “The Baptist Ministerial Conference here went on record this week as enlisting their support in the drive to gain a million signatures throughout the Nation on a petition requesting President Roosevelt to grant a new trial to the fifty sailors convicted of mutiny” (Ministers Support Drive To Save Mutineers: Ask FDR To Grant Men New Trial (1945, Feb 3). The Pittsburgh Courier, p. 3).

58 “Warning of bitter resentment over the Navy policy of segregation and assigning negroes exclusively to hazardous jobs of loading and unloading ammunition, the NAACP wired Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal last week, urging that every precaution be taken to prevent increased feeling and possible strife in the mass court-martial of 50 negro enlisted men which started in California last week” (NAACP Hits Mass Trial (1944, Sept 30). The Pittsburgh Courier, p. 3).

59 “Special Counsel Thurgood Marshall of the NAACP spent 12 days investigating circumstances and reviewing testimony of the seamen during the trial. It is his opinion that the men are innocent of the charge of mutiny” (NAACP Fights Navy Convictions (1944, Nov 4). The Pittsburgh Courier, p. 1-2).

60 (Allen, p. 132-133.)

61 “Riots, mutinies and other racial incidents plagued the Navy in 1944 and 1945 . . . Such incidents convinced senior naval officers that further reforms were necessary and hardened [Secretary of the Navy] Forrestal’s resolve to see them through” (Schneller, p. 160.).

62 Another article, this time from the Arkansas State Press in 1944 asserts to outrage by African American leadership following the revelation of planned billeting of black veterans. In the article, two points of contention are expressed. The first regards the inequality of treatment for black servicemen. The second refers to the commandeering of some of the better black hotels, of which there is a short supply (Leaders Protest to FDR About Jim Crow Centers For Returning Negro Soldiers. (1944, Sept 29.) Arkansas State Press, p. 2).

63 The NAACP wrote, “We submit that the War Department owes a duty to men in the armed forces to protect them from abuse and violence when it send them into cams and strange surroundings. An attack on a soldier is an attack on the United States, whether perpetrated by a foreign or domestic enemy” (Soldier Beaten in Mississippi, War Dept. Told. (1944, April 28). Arkansas State Press, p. 1)

64 Roosevelt would go on to assert, “With the signing of this bill a well-rounded program of special veterans' benefits is nearly completed. It gives emphatic notice to the men and women in our armed forces that the American people do not intend to let them down” CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 31

(Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Statement on Signing the G.I. Bill." June 22, 1944. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16525).

65 Onkst wrote, “White counselors often refused to help black veterans who had received ‘general’ or ‘blue’ discharges, which the army had issued disproportionately to black ‘troublemakers’ who had dared to protest their poor treatment and segregated conditions” (Onkst, p. 520)

66 (Herbold, H. (1994). Never a Level Playing Field: Blacks and the GI Bill. The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, 6(Winter), 105. )

67 In an article for the Oxford University Press, David H. Onkst addressed the issue, “Southern black veterans that they would still have to visit local VA and USES centers which were staffed almost exclusively by white employees, to claim their benefits . . . they encountered serious difficulties at such centers when they tried to secure jobs, unemployment compensation and loans under the GI Bill . . .southern racial discrimination would block their access to three of the bill’s four major benefits” (Onkst, D. (1998). ‘First a Negro . . . Incidentally a Veteran’: Black World War Two Veterans and the GI Bill of Rights in the Deep South, 1944- 1948. Journal of Social History, 31(2), 517-543).

68 The Kansas City Plaindealer warned returning soldiers, “No veteran should buy a home or attempt to build until he has had the expert advice and opinion of a competent lawyer. Veterans administration is being flooded with letters from veterans who have been inveigled into signing contracts which they did not read and now find themselves saddled with a burden for the rest of their lives” (Negro Vets Ignore G.I. Bill of Rights. (1947, Jan 24). Kansas City Plaindealer, p. 4).

69 “Racially restrictive deed restrictions and covenants were legally enforceable provisions of deeds prohibiting owners from selling or leasing their residence to members of specific racial groups. Although one of the first covenant court cases resulted in a ruling against their constitutionality in California in 1892, in subsequent years, U.S. and state courts ruled that enforcement of covenants was constitutional” (Plotkin, W. (2001). "Hemmed In": The Struggle Against Racial Restrictive Covenants and Deed Restrictions in Post-WWII Chicago. Journal of Illinois State Historical Society, 94(1), 39-69.).

70 (Stahura, J. (1986) Suburban Development, Black Suburbanization and the Civil Rights Movement since World War II. American Sociological Review. 51(1). 131-144.)

71 “From long hours of discussion emerged a clear-cut blueprint for attacking racial restrictive covenants. Every conceivable opportunity of attack was suggested, and the advantages of aggressiveness in and out of the court room were pointed out” (Vose, p. 58). CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 32

72 The boisterous and outspoken General George Patton is quoted to have said of the 761st “Black Panthers” battalion during the Battle of the Bulge, “Men, you're the first Negro tankers to ever fight in the American Army. I would never have asked for you if you weren't good. I have nothing but the best in my Army. I don't care what color you are as long as you go up there and kill those Kraut sons of bitches. Everyone has their eyes on you and is expecting great things from you. Most of all, your race is looking forward to your success. Don't let them down and damn you don't let me down” (Wilson , J. (1999). The 761st “Black Panther” Tank Battalion in World War II. (1 ed., p. 53). Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company). Patton’s views typified that of military brass during and following the war. At first reticent to use African American troops, Patton changed his tune when necessity dictated. His initial impression of black soldiers as less capable than whites softened as the war progressed and he saw first hand the fighting ability and sacrifice of African American soldiers.

73 (McGuire, p. 249.)

74 “To Secure These Rights was a monumental indictment of America’s rights record. Coupled with the President’s Commission on Higher Education report that called for an end to segregation in higher education and the President’s Advisory Commission on Universal Training that called for an integrated military, the President had three important commission reports that recommended fundamental changes going into 194” (Taylor, p. 86).

75 At the meeting, Randolph requested anti-segregation and civil rights amendments in any Universal Military Training or Selective Service bills, an end to segregation by immediate executive order and a guaranteed prevention of future wartime abuses against African American soldiers. (Memorandum of the Committee Against Jim Crow in Military Service and Training, (1948, March 22) Randolph A. P.)

76 “Reynolds took to task Committee Chairman Andrews (R., N.Y.) for his endorsement of ‘limited segregation’ . . . He also spoke about Gen. Eisenhower’s recent comment that ‘you cannot legislate love and morality.’ On that score, he [Reynolds] declared, ‘Negroes are not asking to be loved. For decades we have been smothered with love, yet remain pariahs. On the contrary, Negroes demand respect, full equality, the end of special privilege and treatment as children of a color-blind god” (Randolph-Eastman Statements Before Armed Service Committee (1948, April 30). The Kansas City Plaindealer, p. 2).

77 “On June 26, 1948, after receiving no affirmative pledge of desegregation from either the President or Congress, Randolph created the League for Non-Violent Civil Disobedience Against Military Segregation. This group threatened that if an Executive Order ending military segregation was not issued before August 16, 1948, the date on which the UMT was to take effect, Randolph would actively encourage black youth to refuse to register. One month later, on July 26, 1948, President Truman issued Executive Order 9981” (Newby, p. 105). CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 33

78 “The President's order provoked surprisingly little public opposition . . . the anti- administration majority in Congress quietly sidestepped the President's 27 July call for civil rights legislation. To do otherwise would only have added to the political profits already garnered by Truman in some important voting areas . . . The order was nevertheless a clear signal to the friends of integration and brought with it a tremendous surge of hope to the black community” (MacGregor, M. (1981). Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965. (1st ed., p. 315). Washington D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army).

79 “Military leaders believed that, as long as segregation was the national norm, the Army was not to be a source of racial experimentation” (Newby, J. (2005). Fight For The Right To Fight and The Forgotten Negro Protest Movement: The History of Executive Order 9981 and Its Effect Upon Brown V. Board of Education and Beyond. Texas Journal on Civil Liberties and Civil Rights, 10(1), 83 - 110).

80 “Q: ‘Mr. President, to go back to the first question, does your advocacy of equality of treatment and opportunity in the Armed Forces envision eventually the end of segregation?’ THE PRESIDENT: ‘Yes’” (Truman, H S.: “166 - The President's News Conference.” July 29, 1948. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16525).

81 (MacGregor, p. 318-320).

82 “The President said of the Committee’s assignment, ‘I want it done in such a way that it is not a publicity stunt. I want concrete results’ . . . The Committee took President Truman’s comments literally, not only investigating conditions but also working quietly and diligently with the Army, Navy and Air Force to bring about the desired changes” (Billington, M. (1966). Freedom to serve: The President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces, 1949-1950. The Journal of Negro History, 51(4), 263.).

83 (Taylor, p. 100-103.)

84 “The periodic increase in the number of critical specialties for which Negroes were to be trained and free assigned did not materialize . . . Black specialists continued to be assigned to segregated units in the majority of cases, and in the minds of most commanders such assignment automatically limited black soldiers to certain jobs and schools no matter what the qualifications” (MacGregor, p. 430).

85 (Taylor, p. 109-110.)

86 “Calling attention to his statement of June 21, that if the president issued an executive order outlawing segregation, he would urge the discontinuance of the civil disobedience campaign” (Randolph Says Executive Order Doesn’t Mean Much; Won’t Fight. (1948, Aug. 6). The Kansas City Plaindealer, p. 1). CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 34

87 “Included in this group were A. J. Muste, National Vice-President: Winfred Lynn, Treasurer: Rev. William Lloyd Imes, outstanding churchman and National Committeeman: the League’s former Executive Secretaries and 10 members of the national coordinating committee” (Resist Military Segregation Goes On After A. Phillip Randolph Abandons It. (1948, Aug 27). Arkansas State Press, p. 1).

88 Watts wrote to Truman, “Without such a specification, discrimination can be continued under the ‘separate-but-equal’ plan which not only perpetuates white supremacy, but which in effect never results in equal treatment . . . it remains impossible to end discrimination in the armed forces without outlawing jimcrow” (Truman Urged to Amend Executive Order By WDL. (1948, Aug 13). Arkansas State Press, p. 2).

89 An article printed by the Cleveland Gazette at the end of 1948, exposed the continuing discrimination in the military despite efforts to end segregation. It calls attention to the defiance of orders by white army officers. Fort Benning officials used the policies of the only authorized transportation, Howard Bus Lines, to justify continued discrimination. This story illustrated the difficulties the government had in enforcing the new desegregation policies (Segregation at Benning Continues. (1948, Sept 12.) Cleveland Gazette, Print).

90 (MacGregor, M (1985). Integration of the Armed Forces: 1940-1965. Library of Alexandria.)

91 “Half a century after most of them died in combat, seven men today were awarded the Medals of Honor that they were denied after World War II because they were black. ‘The only thing that I can say to those that are not here with me is, Thank you, fellas, well done,’ Joseph Vernon Baker, the only one of the decorated soldiers who is still living, said after a ceremony at the White House. ‘And I will always remember you.’ Their courage and ability routinely derided by white officers, the soldiers honored today fought in segregated units, protecting freedoms they did not fully share” (Medals of Honor Awarded at Last To Black World War II Soldiers. (1997, Jan 14). The New York Times, p. 1).

92 (Brooks, J. (2004). Defining the Peace: World War II Veterans, Race, and the Remaking of Southern Political Tradition. 1. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, p. 3-9.)

93 (Branch, T (1998). Pillar of Fire: America in the King Years 1963-65. New York: Simon & Schuster. p. 124.)

94 Fredrick O Sargent’s The Civil Rights Revolution: Events and Leaders provides a short, yet informative biography of the civil rights leaders referenced in this conclusion. (Sargent, F. (2004). The Civil Rights Revolution: Events and Leaders, 1955-1968. (1st ed.). Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company. p, 134 – 166. CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 35

Citation

Primary Sources

Letters

938th Quartermaster Plt., “No One's Fools.” McGuire P. Taps for a Jim Crow Army: Letters from Black Soldiers in World War II. Comp. 1st. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 26 Apr 1943. 64-65.

Adams, Milton. Letter to William H. Hastie May 13, 1942 “TS”

Anonymous “Not Accepted as Volunteer Officer Candidates.” McGuire P. Taps for a Jim Crow Army: Letters from Black Soldiers in World War II. Comp. 1st. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 26 Apr 1943. 9.

Babero, Bert. Letter to Truman Gibson. May 13, 1944. “TS”

Hill, Marion. “Discharge That Robs a Man of His Citizenship.” McGuire P. Taps for a Jim Crow Army: Letters from Black Soldiers in World War II. Comp. 1st. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 26 Apr 1943. 22.

Jackson, Emory. Letter to NAACP Legal Redress Committee. July 2, 1946. “TS”

White, Walter. Open Letter to Senate and Congress. March 25, 1943. “TS”

Wilson, Charles. Letter to President Roosevelt. May 9, 1944. “TS”

Newsprint

Arkansas State Press

Transportation To Race Soldier Denied on Southern Rail Road. (1944, May 12). Arkansas State Press, p. 1

Report Southern Negro Voting Strength Growing Since Supreme Court Ruling. (1944, May 12). Arkansas State Press, p. 1

Soldier Beaten in Mississippi, War Dept. Told. (1944, April 28). Arkansas State Press, p. 1

Leaders Protest to FDR About Jim Crow Centers For Returning Negro Soldiers. (1944, Sept 29.) Arkansas State Press, p. 2 CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 36

Truman Urged to Amend Executive Order By WDL. (1948, Aug 13). Arkansas State Press, p. 2

Resist Military Segregation Goes On After A. Phillip Randolph Abandons It. (1948, Aug 27). Arkansas State Press, p. 1

The Atlanta Daily World

Black Treatment Southern Style. (1943, July 21). The Atlanta Daily World, p.1

Cleveland Gazette

Soldiers Beg Ammunition to Fight Mobs. (1941, Aug. 23). The Cleveland Gazette, p. 1

Blame War Department!. (1941, Aug. 25). The Cleveland Gazette, p. 1

Segregation at Benning Continues. (1948, Sept 12.) Cleveland Gazette, p. 1

The Kansas City Plaindealer

F.D.R., Stimson Asked to Probe Soldier Lynching. (1941, April 25). The Kansas City Plaindealer, p. 1

Texas Protest Negro Soldiers at Fort Clark. (1942, July 3). The Kansas City Plaindealer, p. 1

Soldier Gets 25 Year Term After Court Martial. (1943, Aug. 27). The Kansas City Plaindealer, p. 1

Senate Action on Soldier Vote Bill Called a Fraud. (1943, Dec. 17). The Kansas City Plaindealer, p. 1

Negro Vets Ignore G.I. Bill of Rights. (1947, Jan 24). Kansas City Plaindealer, p. 4

Randolph-Eastman Statements Before Armed Service Committee (1948, April 30). The Kansas City Plaindealer, p. 2

Randolph Says Executive Order Doesn’t Mean Much; Won’t Fight. (1948, Aug. 6). The Kansas City Plaindealer, p. 1

The Negro Star

Veterans of Foreign Wars Denounce Army Court Martial Policy. (1943, Oct. 29). The Negro Star, p. 1 CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 37

Mississippi Senator Calls Soldier Vote Bill a Threat to White Supremacy. (1944 Feb. 25). The Negro Star, p.1 and 4.

The New York Times

Medals of Honor Awarded at Last To Black World War II Soldiers. (1997, Jan 14). The New York Times, p. 1

The Pittsburgh Courier

Should I Sacrifice To Live ‘Half-American?’ (1942, Jan 31). The Pittsburgh Courier, p. 2

The Courier's Double ‘V’ For A Double Victory Campaign Gets Country-Wide Support (1942, Feb 14). The Pittsburgh Courier, p. 1).

‘Double V’ Club News: ‘Double V’ Water And Beauty Pageant Reveals Beauty And Patriotism Camden ‘Double V’ Girl Of The Week ‘VV’ Campaign Takes Over In Memphis (1942, Sept 12). The Pittsburgh Courier, p. 15

Port Chicago Victims to Get Cash Payments (1944, Sept 16). The Pittsburgh Courier, p. 4

NAACP Hits Mass Trial (1944, Sept 30). The Pittsburgh Courier, p. 3

NAACP Fights Navy Convictions (1944, Nov 4). The Pittsburgh Courier, p. 1-2

Mutineers Get Stiff Sentences (1944, Nov 24). The Pittsburgh Courier, p. 1

Ministers Support Drive To Save Mutineers: Ask FDR To Grant Men New Trial (1945, Feb 3). The Pittsburgh Courier, p. 3

The Topeka Plaindealer

Demobilization of Negro Troops Brings Protest from NAACP (1931, Sept. 18) Topeka Plaindealer, p. 1

Leaders Oppose Interference in Europe Negro Regiment Favored by Majority If War Comes; Race Advised to Go Along with Rest of Nation. (1939, May 12). The Topeka Plaindealer, p.1

Government Documents

Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Statement on Signing the G.I. Bill." June 22, 1944. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16525 CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 38

Gillem Alvin C. Jr., to George Marshal. ( 1966) Report of Board of Officers on Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Post-War Army,”, Military Personnel Division, General Staff, p. 165; Bernard C. Nalty and Morris J. MacGregor, Blacks in the Military; Essential Documents (Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1981)

Jones, Bradley K, Major. (1973) The Gravity of Administrative Discharges: A Legal and Empirical Evaluation, 59 MIL. L. REV.

MacGregor, M (1985). Integration of the Armed Forces: 1940-1965. Library of Alexandria.)

Selective Service, Director. (1948). Selective Service and Victory: The 4th Report of the Director of Selective Service. Washington D.C.: U.S. Center of Military History Government Printing Office.

Truman, H S.: “166 - The President's News Conference.” July 29, 1948. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16525

U.S. House of Representatives. Government and Financial Division. The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act: Background and Issues (RS20764). Washington: Government Printing Office, 2003

U.S. War Department. Adjutant General's Office. (1863, May 22). General Order (143). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Retrieved October 6, 2013 from the World Wide Web: ourdocuments.gov

Misc. Primary Documents

Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. pp. 1, 1941

Exec. Order No. 9981, C.F.R. pp. 1, 1948

Memorandum of the Committee Against Jim Crow in Military Service and Training, (1948, March 22) Randolph A. P.

Secondary Sources

Academic Works and Books

Allen, R. (1989). The Port Chicago mutiny. (1st ed.). New York, NY: Warner Books Inc.

Bell, C. (2003). Naval Mutinies of the Twentieth Century: An International Perspective. (1st ed., p. 203). Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers. CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 39

Branch, T (1998). Pillar of Fire: America in the King Years 1963-65. New York: Simon & Schuster

Brandt, N. (1996). Harlem at War: The Black Experience in WWII. (1st ed.). Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

Brooks, J. (2004). Defining the Peace: World War II Veterans, Race, and the Remaking of Southern Political Tradition. 1. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press

MacGregor, M. (1981). Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965. (1st ed.). Washington D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army

McGuire, P. (1983). Taps for a Jim Crow Army: Letters from Black Soldiers in World War II. (1st ed.). Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio

Morehouse, M. (2000). Fighting in the Jim Crow Army: Black Men and Women Remember World War II. (1st ed.). Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

Osur, A. (1986). Blacks in the Army Air Forces During World War II: The Problems of Race Relations. (1st ed.). Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force History

Sargent, F. (2004). The Civil Rights Revolution: Events and Leaders, 1955-1968. (1st ed.). Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company

Schneller, R. (2005). Breaking the Color Barrier: The U.S. Naval Academy’s First Black Midshipman and the Struggle for Racial Equality. (1st ed.). New York, NY: New York University Press

Taylor, J. (2013). Freedom to Serve: Truman, Civil Rights and Executive Order 9981. (1st ed., p. 15). Marceline, MO: Walsworth Publishing Company

Thompson, G. (1989). Army Downsizing Following World War I, World War II, Vietnam, and a Comparison to Recent Army Downsizing. (Master's thesis).

Vose, C. (1959) Caucasians Only: The Supreme Court, the NAACP, and the Restrictive Covenant Cases. 1st ed. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Wilson , J. (1999). The 761st “Black Panther” Tank Battalion in World War II. (1 ed.). Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company

Journal Articles CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JIM CROW ARMY 40

Alvarez, M., H, T., & Roberts, B. (2007). Military Voting and the Law: Procedural and Technological Solutions to the Ballot Transit Problem. Fordham Urban Law Journal, 22(1), 1

Billington, M. (1966). Freedom to serve: The President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces, 1949-1950. The Journal of Negro History, 51(4), 263

Herbold, H. (1994). Never a Level Playing Field: Blacks and the GI Bill. The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, 6(Winter), 105

Kamp, A. (1986). The History Behind Hansberry v. Lee. U.C. Davis Law Review. 20(1) 481-499

Kapell, M. (2009). "Miscreants, Be They White or Colored": The Local Press Reactions to the 1943 Detroit "Race Riot." . Michigan Academian, 39(1), 213-243

Newby, J. (2005). Fight For The Right To Fight and The Forgotten Negro Protest Movement: The History of Executive Order 9981 and Its Effect Upon Brown V. Board of Education and Beyond. Texas Journal on Civil Liberties and Civil Rights, 10(1), 83 - 110

Onkst, D. (1998). ‘First a Negro . . . Incidentally a Veteran’: Black World War Two Veterans and the GI Bill of Rights in the Deep South, 1944- 1948. Journal of Social History, 31(2), 517-543

Plotkin, W. (2001). "Hemmed In": The Struggle Against Racial Restrictive Covenants and Deed Restrictions in Post-WWII Chicago. Journal of Illinois State Historical Society, 94(1), 39-69

Sitkoff, H. (1969). The Detroit Race Riot 1943. Michigan History, 53(3), 183–206

Stahura, J. (1986) Suburban Development, Black Suburbanization and the Civil Rights Movement since World War II. American Sociological Review. 51(1). 131-144