In the Supreme Court of Canada (On Appeal from the Court of Appeal of Alberta)

File Number: 32865

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF ALBERTA)

BETWEEN:

CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, EDMONTON JOURNAL, a Division of CanWest Media Works Publication Inc., Bell Globemedia Publishing Inc., carrying on business as The Globe and Mail and CTV Television Inc. Appellant (Respondents) - and -

THE EDMONTON SUN, a Division of Sun Media Corporation Appellant (Respondent) - and -

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Respondent (Appellant) - and -

MICHAEL JAMES WHITE Respondent (Appellant)

FACTUM OF THE RESPONDENT HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN PURSUANT TO RULES 36(1) AND 42(1) OF THE RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA

JOLAINE ANTONIO HENRY S. BROWN, Q.C. Counsel for the Respondent Ottawa Agent for the Respondent Her Majesty the Queen/ Her Majesty the Queen/ Attorney General of Alberta Attorney General of Alberta

Appeals and Prosecution Policy Branch Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP Alberta Justice Barristers & Solicitors Criminal Justice Division 2600, 160 Elgin Street 3rd Floor, Centrium Place Ottawa, ON K1P 1C3 300, 332 – 6 Avenue S.W. Tel: (613) 233-1781 Calgary, AB T2P 0B2 Fax: (613) 788-3433 Phone: (403) 297-6005 Email: [email protected] Fax: (403) 297-3453 Email: [email protected] - ii -

LAURA K. STEVENS, Q.C. COLLEEN BAUMAN Counsel for the Respondent Ottawa Agent for the Respondent Michael James WHITE Michael James WHITE

Dawson Stevens Shaigec Sack Goldblatt Mitchell LLP Barristers & Solicitors Barristers & Solicitors 300, 9924 – 106 Street 500 – 30 Metcalfe Street Edmonton, AB T5K 1C4 Ottawa, ON K1P 5L4 Tel: (780) 424-9058 Tel: (613) 235-5327 Fax: (780) 425-0172 Fax: (613) 235-3041 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected]

FREDERICK S. KOZAK, Q.C. K. SCOTT MCLEAN Counsel for the Appellants Ottawa Agent for the Appellants Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and Edmonton Journal, a Division of CanWest Edmonton Journal, a Division of CanWest MediaWorks Publications Inc. and CTV MediaWorks Publications Inc. and CTV Television Inc., and Bell Globemedia Television Inc. , and Bell Globemedia Publishing Inc., carrying on business as The Publishing Inc., carrying on business as The Globe and Mail Globe and Mail

Reynolds Mirth Richards & Farmer LLP Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP Barristers & Solicitors Barristers & Solicitors 3200, 10180 – 101 Street N.W. 1420 – 99 Bank Street Edmonton, AB T5J 3W8 Ottawa, ON K1P 1H4 Tel: (780) 425-9510 Tel: (613) 783-9600 Fax: (780) 429-3044 Fax: (613) 783-9690 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected]

BARRY ZALMONOWITZ, Q.C. K. SCOTT MCLEAN Counsel for the Appellant Ottawa Agent for the Appellant Edmonton Sun, a Division of Sun Media Edmonton Sun, a Division of Sun Media Corporation Corporation

Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP Barristers & Solicitors Barristers & Solicitors 2900, 10180 – 101 Street 1420 – 99 Bank Street Edmonton, AB T5J 3V5 Ottawa, ON K1P 1H4 Tel: (780) 423-7344 Tel: (613) 783-9600 Fax: (780) 423-7276 Fax: (613) 783-9690 Email: [email protected]

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DAVID LEPOFSKY ROBERT E. HOUSTON, Q.C. Counsel for the Intervener Ottawa Agent for the Intervener Attorney General of Ontario Attorney General of Ontario

Ministry of Attorney General of Ontario Burke-Robertson 10th Floor, 720 Bay Street Barristers & Solicitors Toronto, ON M5G 2K1 70 Gloucester Street Tel: (416) 326-4600 Ottawa, ON K2P 0A2 Fax: (416) 326-4656 Tel: (613) 566-2058 Fax: (613) 235-4430 Email: [email protected]

JOHN NORTH AND STEVE COROZA FRANÇOIS LACASSE Counsel for the Intervener Ottawa Agent for the Intervener Director of Public Prosecutions of Canada Director of Public Prosecutions of Canada

Public Prosecution Service of Canada Director of Public Prosecutions of Canada Ontario Regional Office 2nd Floor, 284 Wellington Street Suite 600, 201 County Court Blvd. Ottawa, ON K1A 0H8 Brampton, ON L6W 4L2 Tel: (613) 957-4770 Tel: (905) 454-2627 Fax: (613) 941-7865 Fax: (905) 454-2168 Email: [email protected] Email [email protected]

JONATHAN C. LISUS COLIN S. BAXTER Counsel for the Intervener Ottawa Agent for the Intervener Canadian Civil Liberties Association Canadian Civil Liberties Association

McCarthy Tétrault LLP McCarthy Tétrault LLP Barristers & Solicitors Barristers & Solicitors Suite 5300, Toronto-Dominion Bank Tower 1400 – 40 Elgin Street Toronto, ON M5K 1E6 Ottawa, ON K1P 5K6 Tel: (416) 601-7848 Tel: (613) 238-2000 Fax: (416) 868-0673 Fax: (613) 563-9386 Email: [email protected] - i -

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

PART I – OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS...... 1 A. OVERVIEW ...... 1 B. FACTS ...... 1 PART II – QUESTIONS IN ISSUE ...... 4

PART III – STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT...... 6 A. OVERVIEW OF THE OAKES TEST: A JUSTIFIED LIMIT ...... 6 B. CONTENT AND SCOPE: BAIL PROCEEDINGS AND PUBLICATION DEFERRAL...... 8 B.1. Bail Proceedings...... 8 B.2. The Scope of s. 517 Orders...... 11 C. PRESSING AND SUBSTANTIAL OBJECTIVE: THERE MUST BE NO FORCED SACRIFICE OF FAIRNESS OR FREEDOM...... 12 C.1. An Accused Should Never Need to Choose Between Fairness and Freedom...... 14 C.2. Promoting the Administration of Justice ...... 15 C.3. External Information Threatens Trial Fairness...... 17 C.4. Entwined Objective: Short-Term Freedom Must Not be Sacrificed for Long-Term Fairness, and vice versa...... 23 C.5. Legislative Interpretation Confirms the Entwined Objective ...... 25 C.6. The Entwined Objective is Pressing and Substantial...... 26 D. MANDATORY PUBLICATION DEFERRAL IS RATIONALLY CONNECTED TO THE ENTWINED OBJECTIVE ...... 27 D.1. On Questions Not Susceptible of Proof, a Requirement of Proof Would be Absurd ...... 28 D.2. Bad Evidence is Worse than No Evidence ...... 30 D.3. A Hypothetical Example Shows that s. 517 Achieves its Entwined Objective.... 33 E. PUBLICATION DEFERRAL IS A MINIMALLY IMPAIRING SOLUTION...... 35 E.1. A Discretionary Deferral Order Would Not Achieve the Objective...... 36 E.2. A Content-Oriented Order Would Not Achieve the Objective...... 37 E.3. A “Potential Jury Only” Order Would Not Achieve the Objective...... 38 E.4. After-the-Fact Procedures Do Not Meet the Objective ...... 39 E.5. In Search of an Equally Effective Alternative ...... 41 F. BENEFITS TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE OUTWEIGH THE MINIMAL HARM OF PUBLICATION DEFERRAL ...... 42 G. PREVENTING PROCEDURAL PREJUDICE...... 46 H. CONCLUSION...... 48 PART IV – SUBMISSIONS ON COSTS...... 50

PART V – ORDER SOUGHT ...... 51

PART VI - TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...... 52

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Page No.

PART VII – STATUTES, REGULATIONS, RULES, ETC...... 57

APPENDIX A – ALBERTA, COURT OF QUEEN’S BENCH RULES ...... 57 RULE 6...... 57 RULE 384...... 58 RULE 404...... 58 APPENDIX B – CANADA ACT 1982 (U.K.), 1982, C. 11, S. 52...... 59 SECTION 52...... 59 APPENDIX C – CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS, R.S.C. 1985, APP. II, NO. 44, SCHED. B, PT. I ...... 60 SECTION 1...... 60 SECTION 2...... 60 SECTION 7...... 60 SECTION 9...... 60 SECTION 10(C) ...... 61 SECTION 11...... 61 SECTION 24...... 61 APPENDIX D – CRIMINAL CODE, R.S.C. 1985, C. C-46 ...... 62 SECTION 187(1) ...... 62 SECTION 276.2(1) ...... 62 SECTION 276.3...... 62 SECTION 469...... 63 SECTION 486(1) ...... 64 SECTION 486.4...... 64 SECTION 487...... 66 SECTION 487.3...... 67 SECTION 503(1)(B) ...... 69 SECTION 507(1) ...... 69 SECTION 515(1) ...... 70 SECTION 516...... 72 SECTION 517...... 73 SECTION 518...... 73 SECTION 522...... 75 SECTION 539...... 76 SECTION 542...... 77 SECTION 553...... 77 SECTION 567...... 78 SECTION 599...... 79 SECTION 638...... 79 SECTION 648...... 80 SECTION 649...... 80 - iii -

Page No.

APPENDIX E – JUDICATURE ACT, R.S.A. 2000, C. J-2 ...... 81 SECTION 1...... 81 SECTION 3...... 81 SECTION 5(3)(I) ...... 81 APPENDIX F - STATUTES OF CANADA, 2005, C. 32 ...... 83 SECTION 17...... 83 APPENDIX G – YOUTH CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT, S.C. 2002, C. 1...... 84 SECTION 110...... 84 SECTION 111...... 85 APPENDIX H – CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS ...... 87

Part I – Overview and Statement of Facts Page 1

PART I – OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Overview

1. Expression isn’t always free. Sometimes it comes at a price. With section 517 of the Criminal Code, Parliament has negotiated a minimal limitation on expression, because the price for absolute freedom must not be paid with a vulnerable accused’s liberty.

2. At a bail hearing, a justice primarily hears an overview of the Crown’s case and information about the accused’s character. Much of this information would be too prejudicial to admit at trial and could undermine trial fairness if published. However, bail hearings must be conducted expeditiously and on the basis of limited available information. At this initial stage of the criminal process, it may be impossible to predict or to prove that specific information will undermine trial fairness. Gathering information and discharging an onus of proof would take time – time during which the accused is irretrievably denied liberty.

3. To protect an accused’s right to a fair trial, without sacrificing his right to expedient bail, Parliament enacted s. 517 of the Criminal Code. At an accused’s request, the bail justice must order that publication of bail-related information be deferred until the accused’s trial has concluded. Under this protection, the accused may argue for his release as and when he sees fit. He need neither sacrifice his long-term interest in a fair trial to overexposure, nor his short-term liberty to delay.

4. Section 517 defers, but does not prevent, full scrutiny of court processes. Its interference with free expression is minimal, and is justified by the need to fulfil other Charter guarantees. The Charter promises that trials will be fair and that any deprivation of liberty will be just. Having taken a newly-arrested accused into custody, the state must be seen to keep these promises. Criminal justice procedures must not have the effect of making an especially vulnerable accused sacrifice one Charter right to preserve another.

B. Facts

5. In July 2005, Michael James White was charged with murdering his wife. On October 4, 2005, he applied for judicial interim release before Justice Brooker of the Alberta Court of Part I – Overview and Statement of Facts Page 2

Queen’s Bench, and requested an order deferring publication of the content of the bail hearing until the prosecution had concluded.1 Section 517 of the Criminal Code makes such an order mandatory when requested by the accused; therefore, the order was granted.2 On October 7, Justice Brooker reminded the attending media of the publication deferral order and released Mr. White on bail. He reminded the media of the publication deferral order a second time, after an unnamed media representative asked to see a copy of Justice Brooker’s notes.3

6. The CBC et al and The Edmonton Journal had previously applied for access to sealed search warrants and related information. Coincidentally, reasons for deferring publication of search warrant information were also released on October 7. These reasons contained a third reminder of the s. 517 publication deferral order.4

7. The Crown obtained leave to have Justice Brooker’s bail order reviewed by the Court of Appeal. Mr. White asked for and received an interim order continuing to defer publication of bail-related information.5 After hearing from the Appellants, the Alberta Court of Appeal extended the deferral order further, pending the outcome of the bail review hearing.6 In February 2006, the Court of Appeal ordered Mr. White detained and permitted publication of the appellate bail review. At the appellate review stage, publication deferral is discretionary, not mandatory. Since Mr. White made no effort to justify his request for publication deferral at this stage, he failed to discharge his onus. The Court of Appeal observed that the onus of justifying discretionary publication deferral “presents a tremendous additional burden on an accused who is already overwhelmed.”7

8. In May 2005, two-and-a-half months after the Court of Appeal declined to defer publication, and seven months after Justice Brooker made the original publication deferral order, the Appellants CBC et al filed a notice of motion, returnable before Justice Brooker and styled in the matter of R. v. White. The Edmonton Sun filed a similar notice of motion in July. The two notices contain requests for declarations that s. 517 of the Criminal Code is inconsistent with s.

1 October 4, 2005 Bail Hearing [Respondents’ Joint Record (“RJR”) at p. 21/5-34] 2 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (“Criminal Code”) s. 517 [Appendix D] 3 October 7, 2005 Bail Hearing [Tab T of Appellants’ Joint Record (“AJR”) at pp. 273/12-14, 285/24-286/4] 4 R. v. White, 2005 ABPC [RJR at pp. 8-9, paras. 3-4] 5 R. v. White, 2005 ABCA 403 [RJR at pp. 12-17] 6 R. v. White, 2005 ABCA 435 [Tab B of AJR, Vol. I] 7 R. v. White, 2006 ABCA 65 [Tab C of AJR, Vol. I, at paras. 28-38] Part I – Overview and Statement of Facts Page 3

2(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms,8 and that it be struck in its entirety, or that the mandatory language be struck out, or that limiting words be read in.9

9. The constitutional motion was argued in August 2006. On May 31, 2007, Justice Brooker released reasons declaring s. 517 unconstitutional. The declaration came more than five months after Mr. White had been convicted and sentenced, and after the original publication deferral order had ceased to operate.10

10. The Crown appealed Justice Brooker’s declaration. After sorting out the jurisdictional morass created by the Appellants’ unfortunate choice of procedure, the Court of Appeal declared s. 517 to be valid. The section’s objective is to provide procedural protection to a newly-arrested accused, inter alia by:

(a) insulating trial proceedings from prejudicial information disclosed at the bail hearing;

(b) not imposing on the uninformed accused the impossible onus of proving that such information will undermine future proceedings;

(d) declining to impose procedures that will delay and devalue the accused’s release.

The mandatory provision is a rational, minimally impairing, proportionate means of fulfilling the true, multi-faceted purpose of s. 517. Therefore, its tailored limitation on expression is justified under s. 1 of the Charter.11

8 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 44, Sched. B, Pt. I (“Charter”), s. 2(b) [Appendix C] 9 Notice of Motion of CBC et al filed May 9, 2006 [Tab M of AJR, Vol. II]; Notice of Motion of The Edmonton Sun filed July 5, 2006 [Tab N of AJR, Vol. II] 10 A chart showing the complete procedural chronology can be found at Appendix H to this Factum. 11 Reasons for Judgment filed September 3, 2008 [Tab I of AJR, Vol. I] Part II – Questions in Issue Page 4

PART II – QUESTIONS IN ISSUE

11. The first constitutional question stated by this Court is whether s. 517 of the Criminal Code infringes s. 2(b) of the Charter.

Section 517 enables a bail justice to order that publication of bail-related information be deferred until the end of trial. Because it interferes with the timing of expression, it does infringe s. 2(b).

12. Thus, the appeal turns on the second question: whether the infringement is a reasonable limit as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Charter.

The purpose of the mandatory provision is to ensure that an accused in detention will not need to sacrifice his right to a fair trial to preserve his right to expeditious bail, or vice versa – in short, to ensure that an accused need not choose between fairness and freedom. This objective far outweighs any harm done by deferral of publication. Trial fairness is fragile; liberty is perishable. Information and ideas are not.

13. The Appellants have raised an additional preliminary issue: by what procedure may a person who is not a party to any ongoing proceeding seek a declaration that legislation is invalid?

In Alberta, the correct procedure is to initiate a new action for declaratory relief. Alternatively, a person may seek intervener status in an ongoing proceeding, and if successful, bring a motion in that proceeding. Both of these procedures will prevent the harm of constitutional issues being inappropriately forced on unwilling parties by the actions of outsiders.

14. Having conceded an infringement, the Respondent does not intend to address the first question further. To address the second question, the Respondent will begin by summarizing her position on the Oakes test and articulating the context and scope of operation of s. 517 orders (sections A and B). She will then apply each of the four steps of the Oakes test (pressing and substantial objective, rational connection, minimal impairment and proportionality) to Part II – Questions in Issue Page 5 demonstrate that the minimal limitation on s. 2(b) rights is justifiable in a free and democratic society (sections C to F). Finally, the Respondent will briefly discuss the proper procedure for seeking declaratory relief (section G).

Part III – Statement of Argument Page 6

PART III – STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT

A. Overview of the Oakes Test: A Justified Limit

15. The first phrase of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights contained within it. The second phrase makes those rights subject to such reasonable limits as may be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.12 Together, the two phrases recognize that tension may arise among guaranteed rights and freedoms – that to fulfil the promise of one right, another right may need to be limited.

16. One such tension arises between the freedom to publish information about a bail hearing and an accused’s right to a fair trial. A bail hearing will be focused primarily on two topics: the content of the Crown’s case and the accused’s character (including, for instance, convictions and risk assessments). Much of this information would be too prejudicial to admit at trial. If it were publicly known, therefore, it could undermine trial fairness.

17. Further tensions arise when means of resolving this problem are considered. An outright prohibition of publication would harshly impair freedom of expression. Content-directed prohibitions are invidious to the spirit of s. 2(b), particularly where their effect would be to mislead the public about court processes. Discretionary limits on publication at the bail stage would import unwieldy burdens and procedures, and would lengthen the time that an accused must remain detained pending his bail hearing, irrevocably depriving him of liberty.

18. Parliament’s answer to this problem is s. 517 of the Criminal Code, the impugned portion of which provides that an order deferring publication of certain bail-related information is mandatory at the accused’s request. The accused need not decide whether to hold back information that could assist in obtaining bail but that may threaten the fairness of his trial. He need not decide whether to rush to a bail hearing and hope that publication will not undermine a fair trial, or to remain in detention while he gathers information, seeks advice, waits for the media to receive notice, and argues for a publication ban, all before starting to argue for his release.

12 Charter, s. 1 [Appendix C] Part III – Statement of Argument Page 7

19. Section 517 serves to protect both trial fairness and liberty without sacrificing either. The infringement on free expression is tailored by forum and time, but not by content. This degree of limitation is justifiable, as an application of the Oakes test13 demonstrates.

20. First, the Oakes test asks whether the provision’s objective is a pressing and substantial one. Interestingly, in this case there is general agreement that s. 517’s objective is pressing and substantial, but there is disagreement over what the objective is. As will be shown, the objective of the section encompasses the protection of fair trials and expedient bail, and the relationship between them. Criminal justice procedures must not have the effect of requiring one to be sacrificed for the other.

21. Next, the Oakes test “balance[s] the interests of society with those of individuals and groups.” (Here, the balance runs opposite to its usual direction: the public’s interest in immediate information is being limited to further the individual’s rights to fairness and liberty.) It does so by asking three further questions:

(a) Is the statutory measure rationally connected to its objective? The quick certainty of immediate, mandatory publication deferral is a rational answer to the entwined need to ensure both fairness and liberty.

(b) Does the measure impair freedom of expression as little as it can while still achieving its objective? Other measures would fail to protect the justice-related aims, and would not necessarily result in less interference with expression.

(c) Are the effects of the measure proportional to its objective? Any harm done to the s. 2(b) freedom by the mere deferral of publication is far outweighed by the protection of an accused’s rights under ss. 7, 9, 11(b), 11(c), 11(d), and 11(e) of the Charter.14

22. Section 517 is a considered answer to a complex problem. Members of the public still have access to all bail-related information; those who do not choose to attend court just won’t have access immediately. Meanwhile, the detained accused receives as much procedural

13 R. v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at pp. 138-139 [Tab 22 of CBC et al Authorities (“CBC-Auth”), Vol. II] 14 Charter, ss. 7, 9, 11(b), 11(c), 11(d), and 11(e) [Appendix C] Part III – Statement of Argument Page 8

protection as is realistically possible. The latter aim is particularly important to the administration of justice: the state must be seen to protect individuals who have been placed at its mercy.

23. Balancing competing interests often necessitates value choices. The choice Parliament made in enacting s. 517 was a valid one, consistent with its role “as a significant ally for vulnerable groups. … If constitutional democracy is meant to ensure that due regard is given to the voices of those vulnerable to being overlooked by the majority, then this court has an obligation to consider respectfully Parliament’s attempt to respond to such voices.”15

B. Content and Scope: Bail Proceedings and Publication Deferral

24. To appreciate the operation of s. 517, it is necessary to understand its context – bail proceedings – and its scope.

B.1. Bail Proceedings At the heart of a free and democratic society is the liberty of its subjects. Liberty lost is never regained and can never be fully compensated for; therefore, where the potential exists for the loss of freedom for even a day, we, as a free and democratic society, must place the highest emphasis on ensuring that our system of justice minimizes the chances of an unwarranted denial of liberty.16

25. Liberty is one of Canada’s most valued and strongly-protected rights. The Charter expressly promises freedom from arbitrary detention; ensures that reasonable bail will not be denied without just cause; and guarantees the right to liberty, except as may be denied in accordance with principles of fundamental justice.17 Apart from the broad remedies of s. 52 of the Constitution and s. 24 of the Charter, only one breach carries its own constitutionally- guaranteed remedy: the remedy of habeas corpus for unlawful detention.18

26. The bail procedures established by the Criminal Code recognize the need for expedient bail hearings, since release delayed is liberty irretrievably denied. Section 503(1)(a) requires that

15 R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, 1999 CarswellAlta 1055 (S.C.C.) at para. 58 [Tab 55, Vol. II, at p. 661] 16 R. v. Hall, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309, 2002 CarswellOnt 3259 (S.C.C.) at para. 47 [Tab 45, Vol. II, at p. 540] 17 Charter, ss. 9, 11(e) and 7 respectively [Appendix C]. 18 Canada Act 1982 (U.K), 1982, c.11, s. 52 [Appendix B]; Charter, ss. 10(c) and 24 [Appendix C] Part III – Statement of Argument Page 9

an arrestee whose detention is sought must be brought before a justice “without unreasonable delay” and in any event within twenty-four hours of his or her arrest.19

27. If the parties agree on detention or release, the matter may be dealt with at that first appearance. If they do not agree on detention, release, or the conditions of release, a bail hearing may be held, or may be adjourned, but the adjournment cannot exceed three days except with the consent of the accused.20 If the accused is charged with a s. 469 offence (for instance, murder), the bail justice must detain him in custody until he can be brought before a superior court justice.21

28. The omnipresent time pressure surrounding a bail hearing means that two important resources are usually in short supply: information, and the leisure to strategize. Information is scarce because the accused typically will not have received disclosure. Any disclosure given within the first hours or days after arrest will almost certainly be incomplete; indeed, the Crown’s investigation may well remain incomplete.22 For reasons relating to mental health, intoxication, or unfamiliarity with the system, accuseds may have difficulty instructing counsel. The lack of information, time constraints, and other practical realities will make it difficult to make informed strategic decisions.23

29. In s. 515(10), the Criminal Code sets out the only three grounds on which an accused’s detention may be justified:

(i) where the detention is necessary to ensure the accused’s attendance in court; (ii) where detention is necessary to protect the public, including victims or witnesses, having particular regard to the likelihood of re-offending; or

19 “Without unreasonable delay” has been held to mean “as soon as is reasonably practicable”: R. v. Koszulap, 1974 CarswellOnt 30 (C.A.) at para. 32 [Tab 50, Vol. II, at p. 594]. Criminal Code, s. 503(1)(b), allowing the 24-hour period to be exceeded where a justice is unavailable, is of minimal relevance in an era of telecommunications: see e.g. Criminal Code, s. 515(2.2) [Appendix D]. 20 Criminal Code, ss. 516, 522 [Appendix D] 21 Criminal Code, ss. 515(11), 522 [Appendix D]. These scenarios were listed by Durno J. in Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, 2006 CarswellOnt 4635 (S.C.J.) at paras. 38-39 [Tab 67, Vol. II, at pp. 786-787], as part of his accurate and non-contentious summary of the mechanics of bail hearings. 22 Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, supra, at para. 34 (per Durno J.) [Tab 67, Vol. II, at p. 785] 23 Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, 2009 CarswellOnt 301 (C.A.) at paras. 24-26 [Tab 42 of ES-AF, Vol. II], per Rosenberg J.A., implicitly concurred in by all members of the Court. This non-contentious portion of Rosenberg J.A.’s judgment is relied on as being an accurate and convenient summary of the practicalities surrounding bail hearings. Part III – Statement of Argument Page 10

(iii) for any other just cause, including the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice, having regard to a. the apparent strength of the Crown’s case, b. the gravity of the nature of the offence, c. the circumstances surrounding its commission, and d. the potential for a long term of imprisonment.24

These grounds dictate the content of the information revealed at a bail hearing. Topics of primary relevance include the strength of the Crown’s case, and the accused’s character -- in particular, the risk he poses to the community.

30. For expediency, bail hearings must be conducted summarily, and must not “assume the complexities of trials.”25 (This explains why the Crown’s case is to be taken at its highest; requiring the Crown to prove its entire case would turn the bail hearing into a trial.) Rules of evidence are substantially relaxed – for instance, hearsay is admissible. Indeed, bail hearings may consist primarily or solely of submissions by counsel, without evidence being called or allegations being tested.26

31. At this informal level, the Crown will likely advise the court of past convictions and untried charges against the accused. In practical terms, the Crown must indicate the “circumstances of the alleged offence, particularly as they relate to the probability of conviction.” This may include statements of the accused, or of a co-accused, even if they would be inadmissible at trial. It may include evidence obtained as a result of an intercepted communication, without taking the procedural steps that would be necessary to establish admissibility at trial. In the same practical terms, the Crown must alert the Court to any threat posed by the accused to the safety of victims, witnesses or the community at large.27

24 Criminal Code, s. 515(10) [Appendix D] 25 R. v. John, 2001 CarswellOnt 2948 (S.C.J.) at para. 56 [Tab 48, Vol. II, at pp. 566-567] 26 G.T. Trotter, The Law of Bail in Canada, 2nd ed. (Carswell: 1999) at pp. 228-234 [Tab 14, Vol. I, at pp. 149-155]; Re Global Communications Ltd. v. Attorney-General for Canada, (1984) 44 O.R. (2d) 609 (C.A.) at p. 620 [Tab 32 of Edmonton Sun Authorities (“ES-Auth”), Vol. II] 27 Criminal Code, s. 518(1) [Appendix D] Part III – Statement of Argument Page 11

32. The Crown’s allegations and statements of evidence are often not challenged, in part because the accused typically will not have received disclosure by the time of the bail hearing. “What frequently emerges is a one-sided account of the allegations and the circumstances of the accused.”28 The validity of that account can change over time, as investigation continues, witnesses become unavailable, memories fade, and so on. Through no one’s fault, there are “many cases where the strength of the Crown’s case appears, at the pre-trial stage, to be overwhelming only to have it unravel as the trial progresses.”29

33. In most cases, the Crown bears the onus of showing that an accused’s detention is necessary for one of the three purposes in s. 515(10). However, there are circumstances in which the onus is on the accused to show “why his detention in custody is not justified.”30 In other words, many accuseds will be tactically unable to remain silent at their bail hearings. At any bail hearing, the justice has a broad discretion to “make such inquiries, on oath or otherwise, of and concerning the accused as he considers desirable.”31 Although he cannot be forced to do so, an accused may choose to testify regarding the circumstances of the offence with which he is charged. If he does, the Crown may cross-examine.32

34. If an accused is detained after a Crown-onus bail hearing, or is released after an accused- onus bail hearing, the bail justice must give reasons.33 Those reasons must address the s. 515(10) grounds in a meaningful way.34

B.2. The Scope of s. 517 Orders

35. Before applying the Oakes test to s. 517 of the Criminal Code, it is necessary to define the scope of the section – that is, to define what an order made under s. 517 does and does not do.

28 Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, supra, at para. 34 (per Durno J.) [Tab 67, Vol. II, at p. 785] 29 R. v. Blind, 1999 CarswellSask 602 (C.A.) at para. 15 [Tab 28, Vol. I, at p. 337] 30 Criminal Code, ss. 515(5) and 515(6) [Appendix D] 31 Criminal Code, s. 515(1) [Appendix D] 32 Criminal Code, s. 518(1)(b) [Appendix D] 33 Criminal Code, ss. 515(5), 515(6) [Appendix D] 34 R. v. Brooks, 2001 CarswellOnt 1423 (S.C.J.) at para. 45 [Tab 29, Vol. I, at pp. 341-342] Part III – Statement of Argument Page 12

36. A s. 517 order does require the deferral of publication of evidence taken, information given, representations made, and reasons given by the justice at a bail hearing, until either the accused is discharged after a preliminary inquiry, or the accused’s trial has concluded.

37. A s. 517 order does not:

(a) permanently prohibit publication of the above information;

(b) defer or prohibit publication of the accused’s identity;

(d) defer or prohibit publication of the fact that an application for bail has been made;

(e) defer or prohibit publication of the outcome of the bail hearing;

(f) defer or prohibit publication of information acquired from sources other than the bail hearing;

(g) exclude the media or members of the public from attending the bail hearing;

(h) defer or prohibit face-to-face discussion of the bail hearing;

(i) defer or prohibit general discussion of the law on judicial interim release, or of the statutory tests that must have been applied at the bail hearing; or

(j) defer or prohibit any comparison of the outcome of the bail hearing with others not subject to a s. 517 order.

38. Section 517 provides for publication deferral orders. These orders infringe only on case- specific detail, not general laws or concepts; only on publication, not attendance or personal discussion; and do so only for a limited time. After the prosecution has concluded, the specific bail hearing may be subjected to unlimited public scrutiny.

C. Pressing and Substantial Objective: There Must be No Forced Sacrifice of Fairness or Freedom

39. The objective of s. 517 is to ensure the proper administration of justice – to ensure that society can have confidence in just procedures and sound verdicts. The Alberta and Ontario Part III – Statement of Argument Page 13

Courts of Appeal, in this case and in the companion case of Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, have agreed that it does so particularly by protecting both the right to a fair trial and the right to reasonable bail, and by ensuring that an accused in detention need not choose between them.35 Both courts of appeal have also agreed that this objective, in all its breadth, is a pressing and substantial one.36

40. Despite the agreement of the courts of appeal on the nature and validity of the objective, the Appellants argue that the objective is much narrower: to protect the right to a fair trial only. The Appellants CBC et al would narrow it further to the objective of protecting the fair trial right by preventing jury contamination. The Appellants have conceded that their narrowly-framed objectives are pressing and substantial.37 Remarkably, however, they contend that when objectives involving expedient bail and administration of justice are added, the combined objective is not pressing and substantial.38

41. Because the legislative objective permeates the Oakes test, it is necessary to eliminate any question as to the true objective of the section before moving further into the s. 1 analysis.39 After stating the multi-faceted objective of the provision (section C.1.), the Respondent will expand on the ways in which it promotes a strong administration of justice (section C.2.). She will then demonstrate the justice system’s deep-rooted recognition that information external to a trial – pointedly including information from pre-trial proceedings – threatens the fairness of the trial (section C.3.). She will show that, at the bail stage, it is all but impossible to predict which information may undermine trial fairness, and that attempts to do so will result in procedural

35 R. v. White, 2008 ABCA 294 at paras. 35-37 [Tab I of AJR, Vol. I]; Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, supra, at paras. 164, 179-182 (majority judgment per Feldman J.A.). The minority seems to accept a multi- faceted purpose of the section overall, but a limited “fair trial” purpose of the mandatory provision: paras. 39-40 [Tab 42 of ES-Auth, Vol. II]. Re Global Communications Ltd. v. Attorney-General for Canada, supra, at pp. 619- 620 [Tab 32 of ES-Auth, Vol. II]. 36 R. v. White, 2008 ABCA 294 at para. 36 [Tab I of AJR, Vol. I]; Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, supra, at para. 182 (majority judgment per Feldman J.A.) and at para. 40 (minority judgment per Rosenberg J.A.) [Tab 42 of ES-AF, Vol. II]. 37 Edmonton Sun Appellant Factum (“ES-AF”) at para. 49; CBC et al Appellant Factum (“CBC-AF”) at para. 52. 38 ES-AF at para. 50; CBC-AF at paras. 45-50. 39 R. v. Bryan, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 527, 2007 CarswellBC 533 (S.C.C.) at paras. 9, 10-12, 20, 32, 39-40 [Tab 32, Vol. I, at pp. 375, 376, 378, 380, 381-383]; Reference re ss. 193 & 195.1(1)(c) of Criminal Code, (Canada), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 at p. 1190 [Tab 61, Vol. II, at p. 717-718]. Part III – Statement of Argument Page 14

delay and loss of liberty (section C.4.). A brief exercise in statutory interpretation confirms that the objective of s. 517 encompasses the entwined rights to a fair trial and expedient bail, not fair trial alone (section C.5.). The entwined objective is pressing and substantial (section C.6.).

C.1. An Accused Should Never Need to Choose Between Fairness and Freedom

42. Courts have identified at least three significant objectives of s. 517: (a) protection of an accused’s rights to liberty and to reasonable bail;40 (b) protection of the right to a fair trial;41 and (c) promotion of the proper administration of justice and effective enforcement of criminal law42 (which includes but is not restricted to the first two objectives). This Court has found that each of these objectives, standing alone, can be of sufficient importance to outweigh freedom of the press.43

43. However, the whole objective of the section is greater than the sum of its parts. The full objective relates to the interrelated effect of these aims, as they operate at a specific moment in the criminal process: when a newly arrested accused is brought before a justice for a determination of the status of his liberty pending trial.

44. The focus in this case, of course, is on a discrete component of s. 517: the mandatory deferral of publication at the accused’s request. As regards this portion of the section, the Attorney General of Alberta asserts the following specific objective: the justice system should not require an accused in detention to choose between fairness and freedom.

45. As will be illustrated in the following discussion, things said at a bail hearing, if published, may impair the fairness of later steps in the criminal process in ways that cannot be understood or calculated within hours, or even days, of arrest. An accused who is eager to be released may rush to a bail hearing without waiting to understand or to calculate those risks, and

40 Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, supra [Tab 42 of ES-Auth, Vol. II] 41 Re Global Communications Ltd. v. Attorney-General for Canada, supra [Tab 32 of ES-Auth, Vol. II] 42 R. v. Daly, 2003 CarswellBC 1813 (S.C.) at paras. 38-42 [Tab 38, Vol. II, at pp. 463-464]; R. v. Brown, 1997 CarswellOnt 5989 (C.J.G.D.) at paras. 12-14 [Tab 30, Vol. I, at pp. 348-350] 43 Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 at pp. 878-880 [Tab 7 of ES-Auth, Vol. I]; Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 at p. 1383 [Tab 12, Vol. I, at p. 142]; Attorney General of Nova Scotia v. MacIntyre, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175 at pp. 180, 186-188 [Tab 2, Vol. I, at pp. 16, 22-24]; Canadian Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney-General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 122 at p. 129 [Tab 6 of ES- Auth, Vol. I]; R. v. Mentuck, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442, 2001 CarswellMan 535 (S.C.C.) at paras. 32-33 [Tab 54, Vol. II, at p. 626]; Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480 at paras. 45-46, 65-66 [Tab 5 of ES-Auth, Vol. I]. Part III – Statement of Argument Page 15

may find that he has sacrificed later fairness in his quest for immediate liberty. Alternatively, an accused who does wait to obtain information and advice, and to calculate and manage the potential risks, will find that he has sacrificed his short-term liberty for long-term fairness.

46. By mandating deferral of publication of certain bail-related information, s. 517 aims to ensure the practical availability of expedient bail, and to protect long-term procedural fairness against unforeseeable risks. A deferred publication order, mandatory at the accused’s request, means that the accused can have a timely bail hearing without waiting for information, without waiting to develop a complete trial strategy, without bearing additional substantive or procedural burdens, and without fear that the content of the bail hearing could undermine the fairness of his trial. It ensures that an accused need not sacrifice long-term fairness for short-term freedom or vice versa.

47. It also serves the valid aim of showing that the justice system will not tolerate the possibility that an accused may be forced to choose among the rights which are his by constitutional guarantee. At the very least, even if external realities dictate that the accused must make such a choice, he will not be forced to do so by the justice system itself.

C.2. Promoting the Administration of Justice

48. As various courts have recognized, s. 517 promotes the proper administration of justice and effective enforcement of criminal law.44 It does so most obviously by protecting trial fairness and expedient bail.45 Other components of the objective were identified by the Alberta Court of Appeal:46

(i) … [P]lacing any burden on the accused to justify a limitation on publication undermines the presumption of innocence and the right to remain silent. For example, at the bail hearing evidence relating to the character, lifestyle and associates of the accused may be presented. It is inappropriate to expect the accused to rebut this evidence prior to his trial.

44 R. v. Daly, supra, (B.C.S.C.) at paras. 38-42 [Tab 38, Vol. II, at pp. 463-464]; R. v. Brown, supra, at paras. 12-14 [Tab 30, Vol. I, at pp. 348-350]. 45 E.g. Re Global Communications Ltd. v. Attorney-General for Canada, supra, at pp. 619-620 [Tab 32 of ES-Auth, Vol. II] 46 R. v. White, 2008 ABCA 294 at para. 36 [Tab I of AJR, Vol. I] [citations omitted, emphasis added] Part III – Statement of Argument Page 16

(ii) The accused is already pitted against the resources of the Crown, and it is unfair to expect the accused to also defend his entitlement to judicial interim release on fair terms against the interests of the media. The accused is frequently unrepresented at the bail hearing. (iii) Where the Crown has the burden of introducing evidence, it is illogical to expect the accused to be able to identify in advance the specific evidence that would justify a limitation on publication of that evidence. Bail is often applied for before the Crown has made full disclosure. Bail proceedings are informally conducted, the rules of evidence are not strictly applied, hearsay evidence and mere allegations are relied on, and it is unrealistic to expect the accused to anticipate everything on which the Crown might seek to rely. (iv) Numerous bail applications are made every day, usually in a summary fashion, and the expenditure of time and resources that would be required if the accused had to justify a restriction on publication cannot be justified on a systemic basis. Making the restrictions on publication mandatory preserves resources.

49. The Court of Appeal also articulated the interrelationship between the fair trial and expedient bail objectives:47

(v) [I]t will often be impossible for the judge to rule on whether there should be a restriction on publication in a bail proceeding without having first heard the evidence. The bail judge can undoubtedly order a temporary restriction on the proceedings until the final order is made, but this requires the accused to gamble on whether the temporary restriction on publication will be made permanent. This type of situation [has been] called “a ‘bear trap’ for the accused”. If the accused applies for bail he will know that there is at least the possibility that everything said in the bail hearing might potentially become public before his trial. The accused should not have to choose between introducing evidence at his bail hearing, and keeping that evidence private until trial. Making the order mandatory neutralizes these concerns. (vi) A delay in the availability of bail significantly reduces the value of that bail, and undermines the accused’s rights under s. 11(e). Requiring the accused to justify a limitation on publication would require more preparation and thereby delay the time at which the application could be made. If the media were to be given notice of the application, and then elected to participate in the hearing, even further delay would result. (vii) Requiring the accused to justify a restriction on publication would also lengthen the proceedings once they commence. Interventions by third parties such as the media, and the possible need to call expert evidence, would further lengthen the proceedings. All the while the accused

47 R. v. White, 2008 ABCA 294 at para. 36 [Tab I of AJR, Vol. I] [emphasis added] Part III – Statement of Argument Page 17

remains in custody. It is significant that neither the Crown nor White attempted to justify a common law restriction when the Court of Appeal ruled that no statutory restriction applied; the media essentially won by default, in part no doubt because of the resources that would have to be expended to support any restrictions on publication.48

50. The first step of the Oakes test is not an evidentiary contest. Rather, the question is whether the objective asserted by the Attorney General is a pressing and substantial one.49 To be clear, the Respondent asserts the broad objective of promoting a strong administration of justice, which includes the objectives listed above, and the objective of ensuring that the justice system not force an accused to choose between fairness and freedom.50

C.3. External Information Threatens Trial Fairness [One of s.11(d)’s objectives is] to ensure that a person is tried by a tribunal that is not biased in any way and is in a position to render a decision which is based solely on the merits of the case before it, according to law. The decision maker should not be influenced by the parties to a case or by outside forces except to the extent that he or she is persuaded by submissions and arguments pertaining to the legal issues in dispute.51

51. The right “to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal” is enshrined in s. 11(d) of the Charter. Its close companions are the rights to a trial by jury in serious cases, the right to be tried within a reasonable time, and the right not to be deprived of liberty or security of the person, except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.52 The centrality of the fair trial to our system of criminal justice can hardly be overstated.

48 See also Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, supra, at para. 38 (per Rosenberg J.A.) [Tab 42 of ES-Auth, Vol. II] 49 R. v. Bryan, supra, at para. 32 [Tab 32, Vol. I, at p. 381]. Since the section was re-enacted in 2006 (Statutes of Canada, 2005, c. 32, s. 17 [Appendix F]), it is appropriate to assess the objective in light of contemporary Charter values. In any event, legislative goals are not frozen in pre-Charter time; the emphasis of the asserted goal may shift: e.g. R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 at pp. 491-493 [Tab 34, Vol. I, at pp. 407-409]. 50 See for example, the tacitly accepted statement of a defence lawyer acting as a Crown witness in Southam Inc. c. Canada (Procureur général), 1992 CarswellQue 1054 (J.C.S.) at para. 11 [Tab 64, Vol. II, at p. 744]: “[I]l fait … s'attacher davantage à l'apparence de justice qu'au seul fait qu'un procès ait pu avoir été vicié par la publication d'un aveu ou d'une confession. Il se dit rasséréné de savoir qu'il existe une protection comme celle prévue au par. 542(2), pour toute personne accusée devant un tribunal de jurisdiction criminelle.” 51 R. v. Genereux, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 259 at pp. 282-283 (per Lamer C.J.) [Tab 43, Vol. II, at pp. 514-515] 52 Charter, ss. 11(d), 11(e), 11(b), and 7 respectively [Appendix C]. Part III – Statement of Argument Page 18

52. The criminal justice system recognizes, at a bedrock level, that many kinds of information can threaten trial fairness. This recognition is the raison d’être of most rules of criminal evidence. Whole categories of information must be excluded from consideration by a trier of fact (or admitted only for limited purposes, or once very particular tests have been met) because of their ability to undermine the propriety of a verdict.53 Examples include past convictions, similar misdeeds, hearsay, bad character evidence, and statements by co- conspirators.

53. At an even deeper bedrock level, the justice system requires that verdicts be based only on evidence heard in the courtroom – because of the dangers attached to information acquired, with no cross-checks or control, outside the courtroom. Indeed, jurors are routinely told to disabuse their minds of anything they may have heard, seen or read about the case outside the courtroom. These precautions exist because it is accepted that the fairness of a trial may be impaired by inappropriate or extraneous information.

54. As a most pertinent example, “although it is possible that a publication ban will have a total absence of influence on the fairness of the trial, such cases will be rare.”54 That is, it may generally be presumed that publicity will influence trial fairness to some degree. In the words of Cory J. “[t]here is no doubt that extensive publicity can prompt discussion, speculation, and the formation of preliminary opinions in the minds of potential jurors.”55 Lamer C.J. recognized the danger that

Impressions may be created in the minds of the jury that cannot be consciously dispelled. The jury may at the end of the day be unable to separate the evidence in court from information that was implanted by a steady stream of publicity.

Where this subliminal effect exists, the impact of a trial judge’s instructions will be “considerably lessened”.56

53 For example, prior convictions: R. v. Corbett, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670 at pp. 736-738, 740-742 [Tab 37 at pp. 446- 448, 450-452]; R. v. McFadyen, 2002 CarswellOnt 125 (C.A.) at para. 10 [Tab 53, Vol. II, at p. 612] – leave to appeal ref’d [2002] S.C.C. No. 177. 54 Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., supra, at pp. 886-887 (per Lamer C.J.) [Tab 7 of ES-Auth, Vol. I] 55 Phillips v. Nova Scotia (Commissioner, Public Inquiries Act), Phillips v. Nova Scotia (Commissioner, Public Inquiries Act), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 97, 1995 CarswellNS 12 (S.C.C.) at para. 144 (per Cory J. in concurring reasons) [Tab 22, Vol. I, at p. 281]. 56 Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., supra, at pp. 885-886 [Tab 7 of ES-Auth, Vol. I]. See also Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, supra, at para. 175 (majority judgment) [Tab 42 of ES-AF, Vol. II]. Part III – Statement of Argument Page 19

55. Publicity may also undermine a fair trial by influencing witnesses. According to a report of the Working Group on the Prevention of Miscarriages of Justice, “images and names of suspects, together with specific details of crimes under investigation, are routinely published and broadcast. The potential for the tainting of identification evidence is significant.”57 This Court has ordered a new trial where identification was tainted, in part, by a witness having seen the accused on the news. The trial judge instructed the jury to give this evidence “little weight”, but even that instruction was insufficient protection against wrongful conviction.58 The “rights and interests intended to be protected by a publication ban under s. 517 [include] avoiding the contamination of witnesses through publicity.”59

56. Parliament and the courts have developed a long list of prophylactic measures against the damaging effect of extraneous information, including, for instance, evidentiary rules, changes of venue and challenges for cause.60 Some measures, like s. 517, have been designed specifically to insulate the trial from previous court proceedings. Others include:

(a) Criminal Code, s. 53961 – which provides for publication deferral orders on evidence taken at preliminary inquiries. Like s. 517 orders, s. 539 orders are mandatory at the accused’s request and discretionary at the Crown’s request. In a 1983 decision, the New Brunswick Court of Queen’s Bench found the limitation on expression was justified to protect trial fairness.62

(b) Criminal Code, s. 54263 – which imposes mandatory publication deferral orders on admissions and confessions introduced at preliminary inquiries. The Superior Court

57 FPT Heads of Prosecutions Committee Report of the Working Group on the Prevention of Miscarriages of Justice, 5. “Eyewitness Identification and Testimony” http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/dept-min/pub/pmj-pej/p5.html Part V. Suggested Practices and Recommendations [Tab 13, Vol. I, at pp. 143-145]. 58 R. v. Hibbert, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 445, 2002 CarswellBC 847 (S.C.C.) at paras. 46-50 [Tab 47, Vol. II, at pp. 560- 561] 59 R. v. Daly, supra, (B.C.S.C.) at para. 42 [Tab 38, Vol. II, at p. 464]. The B.C. Court of Appeal upheld the Supreme Court’s decision without reference to the quoted passage: R. v. Daly, 2005 CarswellBC 1828 (C.A.) [Tab 39, Vol. II, at p. 472]. 60 Criminal Code, ss. 599, 638 [Appendix D]; the insufficiency of these provisions to fulfil s. 517’s objectives will be discussed in section E below. 61 Criminal Code, s. 539 [Appendix D] 62 R. v. Banville, 1983 CarswellNB 19 (Q.B.) at paras. 23-25 [Tab 27, Vol. I, at pp. 330-331] 63 Criminal Code, s. 542 [Appendix D] Part III – Statement of Argument Page 20

of Quebec held that pre-trial publication of certain types of evidence, particularly admissions and confessions, can create a threat to the fairness of a trial.64

(c) Criminal Code, s. 64865 – which imposes mandatory publication deferral orders on “any portion of the [jury] trial at which the jury is not present.” In a post-Dagenais66 decision, the Nova Scotia Supreme Court found that s. 1 saved the violation of s. 2(b). It noted that, despite the availability of other procedural safeguards, Parliament considered the provision necessary because the jury’s exposure to inadmissible material could jeopardize the foundation of a verdict.67 The Ontario Court of Justice found s. 648 to serve a number of important purposes, notably including “the legitimate interest of the public in a fair trial, both for the Crown and the accused, that is not contaminated by prejudicial publicity of pre-trial proceedings, [and] … avoiding the contamination of witnesses through such publicity.” These important aims outweighed the section’s minimal fettering of the freedom of the press.68

Together, the above provisions create “a legislative framework that provide[s] bans against publication … at the bail hearing, the preliminary hearing and after the selection of a jury.”69 If any one provision is removed, the entire framework is rendered ineffectual.

57. Why bother insulating a trial against the contents of earlier court proceedings, one might ask, when there is no pre-trial restriction on publication of out-of-court information? The answer is twofold.

58. First, an accused has the right to testify at any of the above proceedings, and may have a strategic need to do so at pre-trial Charter motions or reverse-onus bail hearings. Whether from a reverse onus or from the simple need to make his best case for release, the accused may testify at bail on matters such as his criminal history, involvement with co-accuseds, addiction or mental health issues, or his view of the circumstances of the offence. As Parliament and the courts have recognized, the knowledge that an accused has admitted to an inculpatory act stands to be more

64 Southam Inc. c. Canada (Procureur général), supra, e.g. at paras. 35, 39, 41 and 45 [Tab 64, Vol. II, at pp. 745, 745-746, 746 and 747] 65 Criminal Code, s. 648 [Appendix D] 66 Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., supra [Tab 7 of ES-Auth, Vol. I] 67 R. v. Regan, 1997 CarswellNS 567 (S.C.) at paras. 15-16, 31-32 [Tab 56, Vol. II, at pp. 667, 670-672] 68 R. v. Brown, supra, at para. 13 [Tab 30, Vol. I, at p. 349] 69 R. v. Brown, supra, at para. 13 [Tab 30, Vol. I, at p. 349] Part III – Statement of Argument Page 21

damaging than other modes of proof of the act.70 The rules of criminal evidence closely control whether and how prior statements may be admitted through the front door of evidence. There is no control on the back-door effect of pre-trial publicity.

59. Second, consider the source. It is true that, prior to trial, the media may publish out-of- court information pertaining to the circumstances of the offence or to the accused’s character. Such reports may contain phrases such as “neighbours say” or “police allege” or “witnesses claim.” By contrast, reports of court proceedings may contain phrases such as “the Crown has evidence” or “the victim testified” or, most significantly, “the judge found.”

60. What a judge must find, and in many cases must state in reasons, is dictated by the s. 515(10) factors. Imagine: “the judge found the accused is a danger to the community” or “the judge found the Crown’s case to be overwhelming.”71

61. It may be true, as the Appellants CBC et al have suggested, that adults will read news reports with scepticism.72 It cannot be true that judicial findings will be so lightly dismissed.

62. Cory J. recognized the strength of these two factors in his concurring judgment in Phillips v. Nova Scotia,73 where he considered whether publicity from a public inquiry into a mine disaster would render the related criminal trial unfair. First, the relaxed procedures of the inquiry created a general risk that potential jurors could be influenced by evidence that would not be admissible at trial.74 The compellability of the accuseds at the inquiry created a heightened risk:

Obviously anything said by the accused will have a far greater impact than the evidence of many other witnesses. There is a real possibility that it will be stressed in media reports and well remembered by potential jurors. Yet, as accused, the managers can never be required to testify at their trial. The publication of their evidence at the Inquiry might mean that potential jurors would have been exposed to testimony that they might never hear at the trial.

70 Hence the existence of Criminal Code, s. 542 [Appendix D]. Southam Inc. c. Canada (Procureur général), supra [Tab 64, Vol. II, pp. 736-750]. 71 See, e.g., R. v. Daly, supra, (B.C.S.C.) at para. 7 [Tab 38, Vol. II, at pp. 460-461]; R. v. Daly, supra, (B.C.C.A.) at para. 10 [Tab 39, Vol. II, at p. 472]; R. v. S.(J.), 2008 CarswellOnt 6310 (S.C.J.) at paras. 36-37 [Tab 58, Vol. II, at pp. 683-684]. 72 CBC-AF at para. 63. See also, e.g., unlettered exhibit to the Affidavit of Mary MacDonald [Tab W of AJR, Vol. III, at pp. 400-401]. 73 Phillips v. Nova Scotia (Commissioner, Public Inquiries Act), supra [Tab 22, Vol. I, at pp. 264-283] 74 Ibid. at para. 131 [Tab, Vol. I, 22 at p. 277] Part III – Statement of Argument Page 22

This coupled with the fact that it came from the accused themselves would make it difficult for jurors, despite their good intentions and the best of instructions from the trial judge to set it aside and leave it out of their considerations. In respect of this evidence, then, there is a clearly identifiable and serious risk that the fair trial rights of the two accused will be jeopardized.75

63. Second, part of the mandate of the inquiry was to make findings of fact. Although the questions at the inquiry differed from those at trial, it was

quite possible that some of the findings of fact reached by an inquiry would, if known and accepted by jurors, impair their ability to judge a case impartially… Jurors who have already heard the conclusions of the Commissioner as to the cause of the explosion may reject that defence out of hand rather than examining its merit on the basis of the evidence presented at the criminal trial.76

Cory J. drew a distinction between evidence taken at the inquiry and facts found by the inquiry:

A potential juror watching parts of televised hearings may not be unduly influenced by the testimony of any particular witness or witnesses. Common sense, however, suggests that the potential for lasting impartiality is much less when what is published are the carefully reasoned conclusions of a judge who has heard all the testimony and examined all of the evidence relevant to the inquiry mandate. The publication of these findings of facts and conclusions will create a much greater risk of prejudice to fair trial rights.77

64. Because the inquiry’s findings would pose a serious threat to a fair trial, Cory J. would have required that the publication of the inquiry’s report be deferred until the accuseds could have time to review it and study its effects on their s. 11(d) rights. If, after their study, they felt it necessary, they could “bring an application to ban its publication until such time as the criminal charges had been disposed of after trial or stayed.”78

65. In an August 28, 1760 letter to le Comte d'Argental, Voltaire wrote, “When we hear news we should always wait for the sacrament of confirmation.”79 A court’s findings are that sacrament.

75 Ibid. at para. 173 [emphasis added] [Tab 22, Vol. I, at p. 282] 76 Ibid. at paras. 130, 132-133 [Tab 22, Vol. I, at p. 277] 77 Ibid. at para. 135 [emphasis added] [Tab 22, Vol. I, at p. 278] 78 Ibid. at para. 174 [Tab 22, Vol. I, at p. 282] 79 Quoted in in R. v. White, 2005 ABCA 435 [Tab B of AJR, Vol. I, at para. 17]. Part III – Statement of Argument Page 23

66. The criminal justice system contains innumerable safeguards intended to insulate trial verdicts from extraneous influence. It contains particular safeguards to insulate trials from pre- trial proceedings. The mere existence of so many safeguards shows that our justice system recognizes the threat posed by publication of matters outside the trial, and takes that threat – and its prevention – very seriously. “The potential for jurors to be affected by prejudicial information they have heard outside the trial has been accepted by the courts as something that must be guarded against in order to protect both the accused’s right to a fair trial and the public’s right to be confident that justice is done.”80

C.4. Entwined Objective: Short-Term Freedom Must Not be Sacrificed for Long- Term Fairness, and vice versa [T]he evidence given at a bail hearing may, and often does, include [information] which may prove to be inadmissible at trial but which, if published or broadcast as given at the hearing, could be grossly prejudicial to any expectation of a later fair trial. … [A]t the outset of [a bail] hearing the accused cannot be expected to know what kind of evidence may be later presented, so that it would be quite impractical that he or she should then have the burden of convincing the court, by reference to that evidence, that its publication or broadcasting ought to be restricted.81

67. This much is clear: evidence, submissions, and reasons at a bail hearing present a risk to trial fairness. As one significant example, character evidence is indispensible at a bail hearing, but is generally inadmissible at trial. The improper admission or use of bad character evidence may be enough to render a trial unfair82 – even if corrective instructions are given to a jury,83 or even where a judge sits alone.84

80 See also Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, supra, at para. 175 (majority judgment) [Tab 42 of ES-AF, Vol. II]. 81 Re Global Communications Ltd. v. Attorney-General for Canada, supra, at p. 620 [Tab 32 of ES-Auth, Vol. II] 82 David Watt, Watt’s Manual of Criminal Evidence, 2008 at p. 439 [Tab 9, Vol. I, at p. 101]; R. v. Handy, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 908, 2002 CarswellOnt 1968 (S.C.C.), headnote only [Tab 46, Vol. II, at pp. 541-549]; R. v. B.(F.F.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 697, headnote only [Tab 26, Vol. I, at pp. 319-325] 83 E.g. R. v. Almarales, 2008 CarswellOnt 5924 (C.A.) at paras. 113-124 [Tab 24, Vol. I, at pp. 298-300]; R. v. Vanezis, 2006 CarswellOnt 6992 (C.A.) at paras. 34-35, 47-48 [Tab 60, Vol. II, at pp. 699, 701] 84 E.g. R. v. Rohatyn, 2004 CarswellAlta 1020 (C.A.) [Tab 57, Vol. II, at pp. 674-675]; R. v. L.(S.), 1999 CarswellOnt 3861 (C.A.) at paras. 7-14 [Tab 51, Vol. II, at pp. 598-599]; R. v. Brown, 1999 CarswellOnt 2443 (C.A.) at paras. 1, 40-45 [Tab 31, Vol. I, at pp. 355, 357-359] Part III – Statement of Argument Page 24

68. What will be less clear in any given case is the degree of risk, and how best to reduce or prevent it. If this risk can be assessed at all, it can only be done with time: time to acquire information, to seek advice, to develop a trial strategy, and to appreciate what kind of information could harm it. An accused in detention does not have time.

69. To some relevant questions, even time is not the answer. When making submissions at a bail hearing, the accused will not be able to predict the content of the judge’s reasons, let alone to calculate whether that content will prejudice his position at trial.85 Nor will he be able to prove the likelihood or gravity of damage to a fair trial from pre-trial publicity:

To some degree whether any impairment [of the right to a fair trial] might occur will depend on the nature of the publicity, the extent of the publicity, the duration of the publicity and the likelihood of potential jurors recollecting that publicity and the degree of detail that any such recollections would involve. The first three aspects cannot, of course, be known at this time. On the latter two aspects, there is simply no evidence. Without knowing the bounds of any publicity and without any evidence as to the likely ongoing impact of that publicity, the task of determining whether a publication ban is necessary is rendered a rather difficult one. One is left, in essence, with trying to make an educated guess respecting these central elements of the analysis since the analysis is, to a large extent, an attempt to predict the future.86

The Ontario Superior Court made the above comments on an application to defer publication of information from the first of a series of related, high-profile trials, almost three years after the offence was committed and intense media coverage began.87

70. Absent publication deferral, an accused who seeks his release at the first opportunity will be facing unknowable risks to his right to a fair trial. Absent mandatory publication deferral, an accused who waits to be able to prove that he needs a remedy will be giving up his liberty. Avoiding this “Sophie’s Choice”88 is the specific objective of the impugned portion of s. 517.

85 R. v. Daly, supra, (B.C.S.C.) at para. 69 [Tab 38, Vol. II, at p. 467] 86 R. v. S.(J.), supra, at paras. 34-35 [Tab 58, Vol. II, at pp. 683-684] [emphasis added] 87 R. v. S.(J.), supra, at para. 6 [Tab 58, Vol. II, at p. 680] 88 William Styron, Sophie’s Choice. For a plot summary see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sophie's_Choice_(novel) [not reproduced]. Part III – Statement of Argument Page 25

C.5. Legislative Interpretation Confirms the Entwined Objective

71. As a final illustration of the multi-faceted legislative objective, the mandatory portion of s. 517 may be contrasted with legislation governing other aspects of the criminal process: the search warrant stage, the court of appeal bail review stage, and the discretionary portion of s. 517 itself.

72. At the search warrant stage, police place an Information to Obtain (“ITO”) before a justice on an ex parte basis.89 The ITO will contain the officer’s sworn belief, supported by reasonable grounds, that evidence will be found at a given location.90 The justice will issue the requested warrant, or not, without giving reasons. Criminal Code s. 487.3 gives the justice the discretion to prohibit access to and disclosure of the contents of the ITO, where necessary, to prevent subversion of the ends of justice. Even though there may be some overlap in informational content between an ITO and a bail hearing, significant contextual differences explain the different thresholds for publication deferral and illustrate the different objectives behind those thresholds.

73. First and foremost, no one is in detention pending the outcome of the search warrant application, so no time- or liberty-related issues are engaged. Second, because the future accused is not present (and may not have been identified yet, let alone charged), no issues of testimonial choice are engaged. Third, because the ITO contains only an officer’s stated belief and the justice makes no findings, the impact of the information is reduced. Fourth, the protections of s. 11 of the Charter are guaranteed to persons charged with offences, so although fairness values are (as always) in play, competing Charter promises are not.

74. At the stage of bail review at the court of appeal, publication orders are available as part of the court’s inherent jurisdiction. There is no parallel to s. 517, making publication deferral mandatory at the accused’s request. The Alberta Court of Appeal characterized this lack as a “legislative omission”, since it would be unfair to require an accused to “plead for his liberty” while simultaneously pleading to restrict “pre-trial publication of mere allegations which may be

89 R. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 2001 CarswellOnt 538 (C.A.) at paras. 35-36 [Tab 35, Vol. II, at p. 415]; Vancouver Sun, Re, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332, 2004 CarswellBC 1376 (S.C.C.) at paras. 34-36 [Tab 69, Vol. II, at pp. 815-816] 90 Criminal Code, s. 487 [Appendix D]; though details may differ, the essence of the test is the same for all warrants. Part III – Statement of Argument Page 26

ruinous to his career and standing in the community, and which may, at trial, be found to be unsubstantiated or even false.”91

75. The absence of a s. 517-like provision at the appellate level may be an omission. However, the canons of statutory interpretation impose a presumption that “the legislature does not make slips of the pen.”92 Assuming that the difference was intentional, it can be explained by the observation that, while fairness interests are much the same at bail hearing and bail review, the liberty interests are very different. Obviously, by the time of a bail review, the accused will already have had a bail hearing. His liberty status has already been determined by a judicial officer; he is not languishing in limbo. Another difference is noteworthy: at the appellate level, reasons are not mandatory. A court of appeal therefore has discretion whether to voice potentially prejudicial findings.

76. Because the full complement of entwined s. 517 objectives (fair trial, expedient bail, and proper administration of justice) is not operative at the search warrant or appellate bail review stages, the full protection of mandatory publication deferral has not been legislated. At the bail stage, broader protection is offered. It may be inferred that broader protection was intended, and that broader objectives are served.

77. A similar contrast exists within s. 517 itself. Publication deferral is mandatory at the accused’s request, but discretionary at the Crown’s request. Both parties are equally entitled to a fair trial. If trial fairness were the only objective, s. 517 would provide the same protection to both parties. The fact that different protection is provided shows that Parliament found a meaningful distinction between the parties. The distinction is simple: while both parties deserve a fair trial, only the accused needs a just and expedient determination of his liberty.

C.6. The Entwined Objective is Pressing and Substantial

78. Section 517 does not merely ensure a fair trial, and does not merely ensure the availability of expedient bail. It ensures that the justice system will not cause an accused in custody to sacrifice one to preserve the other. It does so by enabling the accused to act freely in

91 R. v. White, 2006 ACA 65 at paras. 34, 36 [Tab C of AJR, Vol. I] 92 Ruth Sullivan, Construction of Statutes, 5th ed. (LexisNexis Canada 2008) at p. 172 [Tab 62, Vol. II, at pp. 730- 732] Part III – Statement of Argument Page 27 his own defence at a bail hearing, without waiting for disclosure, without waiting to calculate the likelihood that later procedural remedies will be available, without waiting to marshal the resources that would be required to discharge an additional persuasive burden on publication deferral, and without being required to combat the combined resources of the state and the fourth estate. These objectives are pressing and substantial.

D. Mandatory Publication Deferral is Rationally Connected to the Entwined Objective

79. To give effect to the true, multi-faceted objective of s. 517, a publication deferral order must be mandatory at the accused’s request. If it were discretionary, the delay problem would be exacerbated by additional procedures such as giving notice to the media, and by requiring the accused to marshal information and arguments in support of his application. Likewise, the publication deferral order must be immediate at the accused’s request. If a discretionary application were to be determined after the bail hearing (even assuming a temporary deferral in the meantime), the fair trial problem would be unanswered. That is, the accused would still need to run his bail hearing without knowing whether its content may be published. The quick certainty of a mandatory deferral of publication is rationally connected to the objective of eliminating the need to choose between long-term fairness and short-term liberty.

80. The Appellants assert three essential themes against the existence of a rational connection: it is too broad, it is not broad enough, and it has not been proved by evidence.

81. The first theme is overbreadth. The Appellants examine isolated fragments of the objective (such as fair trial alone) and argue that each fragment, individually, could be met by a narrower provision.93 As shown above, the objective is not so narrow, and does not treat only its isolated elements, but all those elements in combination. With the objective correctly understood, the overbreadth argument fails.

82. The second theme is, in effect, underbreadth. The Appellants observe that the provision does not defer publication of information obtained outside the bail court, even where it overlaps information provided in the bail court, and suggest that it is therefore ineffective. This is the

93 CBC-AF at paras. 52, 55-83; ES-AF at paras. 42, 51-60 Part III – Statement of Argument Page 28

choice Parliament made to prevent the harm of having the justice system itself force the sacrifice of one right for another, while not infringing on expression outside the justice arena. This narrowness of focus should hardly weigh against the provision in the s. 1 balance.

83. The Appellants’ third theme is that rational connection has not been proved by any Crown evidence, but has been disproved by the Appellants’ evidence. This claim fails for three reasons: (i) Evidentiary proof is not required in all s. 1 cases. On complex, value-based questions that cannot be scientifically proved, reason and common sense will suffice (section D.1.); (ii) On important social policy questions, constrained reliance on weak or selective evidence is worse than no evidence at all (section D.2.); and (iii) The Appellants’ expert provided logical support (short of proof) for the Crown’s point (section D.3.). There was no need for the Crown to call additional evidence.

D.1. On Questions Not Susceptible of Proof, a Requirement of Proof Would be Absurd

84. The test for rational connection is whether the challenged provision can be said to further, in a general way, an important governmental aim: whether the chosen means “may help to bring about the objective.” If so, it cannot be seen as irrational.94 Scientific proof, or proof to a scientific standard, is not required. A rational connection may be revealed by common sense, reason or logic. On this basis, this court has accepted, for example, a “causal relationship between advertising and tobacco product consumption,” “a causal relationship between obscenity and harm to society,” and “a causal link between anti-Semitic activity by school teachers outside school and discriminatory attitudes within school.” 95

85. Parliament is not required to engage in a “large-scale policy experiment” to prove causality.96 “[S]ome harms are ‘difficult, if not impossible, to measure scientifically’ [therefore]

94 Canada v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892 at pp. 923-926 [Tab 4, Vol. I, at pp. 42-45]; Canada (Attorney General) v. JTI MacDonald Corp., [2007] 2 S.C.R. 610 at para. 40 [Tab 2 of ES-Auth, Vol. I] 95 Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877, 1998 CarswellOnt 1981 (S.C.C.) at para. 39, 88 [Tab 66, Vol. II, at pp. 770, 772], citing respectively: RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 [Tab 28 of CBC-Auth, Vol. II]; R. v. Butler, supra [Tab 34, Vol. I, at pp. 397-410]; and Attis v. New Brunswick District No. 15, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825, 1996 CarswellNB 125 (S.C.C.) at para. 101 [Tab 1, Vol. I, at p. 9]. 96 R. v. Bryan, supra, at para. 29 [Tab 32, Vol. I, at p. 380] Part III – Statement of Argument Page 29

in such cases logic and common sense become all the more important.”97 In freedom of expression cases in particular, this Court has recognized that “traditional forms of evidence … may be unavailable.” To require evidence where there can be no evidence would be nonsensical.98

86. Four factors set the evidentiary threshold in s. 1 cases: the nature of the harm and the inability to measure it, the vulnerability of the group protected, subjective fears and apprehension of harm, and the nature of the infringed activity.99

87. In the case at bar, all four factors favour reliance on common sense and logic. The deferral of publication of certain bail information breaches s. 2(b), but in a minor way. Certainly those affected by the deferral cannot be called “vulnerable.” A detained accused, by contrast, is extremely vulnerable, and may foreseeably experience subjective fears about his short-term and long-term liberty. The harm caused to the accused, and to the administration of justice, by a forced choice between fairness and freedom cannot be measured. Experimental attempts would involve unacceptable sacrifice to individual rights, with potentially concrete adverse consequences.100

88. Even the Appellants’ expert witness seems to acknowledge the inappropriateness of real- life experimentation, for example with small groups of real decision-makers in non-criminal settings: “I can’t imagine that the Ethics Committee would allow such a thing.”101 He also acknowledged that every method used to study jury effects has certain shortcomings. No study can simulate the pressure of a real case, or a realistic time span, and few studies simulate juror interactions in deliberation.102 “[T]here’s no getting around the fact that, in every single instance, [study subjects] are not real jurors charged with deciding on the fate of a real person who is charged with committing a real crime. What effect that has, how that might change things, I don’t know.”103

97 R. v. Bryan, supra, at para. 20 [Tab 32, Vol. I, at p. 378] 98 R. v. Bryan, supra, at para. 28 [Tab 32, Vol. I, at p. 380]; Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827, 2004 CarswellAlta 646 (S.C.C.) at paras. 77 [Tab 16, Vol. I, at p. 186] 99 R. v. Bryan, supra, at para. 10 [Tab 32, Vol. I, at p. 375] 100 cf. Henning v. Calgary (City), 1974 CarswellAlta 181 (S.C.) at para. 20 [Tab 17, Vol. I, at p. 193] 101 Cross-Examination of Dr. Freedman [Tab Y of AJR, Vol. IV, at p. 500/12-23] 102 Cross-Examination of Dr. Freedman [Tab Y of AJR, Vol. IV, at pp. 473/13-20, 474/1-18] 103 Cross-Examination of Dr. Freedman [Tab Y of AJR, Vol. IV, at p. 499/12-18] Part III – Statement of Argument Page 30

89. In 2009, Rosenberg J.A. surveyed some of the psychological literature on the influence of pre-trial publicity on jurors and found it inconclusive.104 Thus, the situation described by Cory J. in 1995 continues to prevail: “Perhaps science will one day be able to prove that in certain situations juror prejudice is inescapable. Until that time, common sense must provide guidance in these decisions.”105

D.2. Bad Evidence is Worse than No Evidence

90. On the types of policy questions that are susceptible to proof, good evidence is desirable, but bad evidence is disastrous.

91. At this highest level of examination of Parliament’s policy choices, this Court is not constrained to accept lower courts’ conclusions if they are based on weak, one-sided or misleading evidence. Particularly in the case of expert evidence, which depends more on methodology than credibility, this Court should examine critically, and assign weight cautiously if the proffered evidence does not provide a proper foundation on which to base a decision that will affect all Canadians.106

92. In the court of first instance, the Appellants filed an affidavit by psychologist Dr. Jonathan Freedman. Dr. Freedman’s essential conclusion was that, subject to some exceptions, “exposure to pre-trial publicity has little or no effect on the verdicts reached by juries.”107 According to Dr. Freedman, many potential jurors will start out believing that an accused is guilty, merely because he is charged. Pre-trial publicity, which most often portrays the accused negatively, will increase the effect. However, one survey showed that those preconceptions were erased or reduced when the potential jurors were presented with a plausible defence. The “no effect” rule does have exceptions: for example, if pre-trial publicity contained a single piece of information that was not led at trial but that would “essentially decide the case.”108

104 See also Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, supra, at paras. 87-88 (minority judgment per Rosenberg J.A.) [Tab 42 of ES-Auth, Vol. II]. 105 Phillips v. Nova Scotia (Commissioner, Public Inquiries Act), supra, at para. 136 (per Cory J. in concurring reasons) [Tab 22, Vol. II, at pp. 264-283] 106 See, e.g. R. v. Corbett, supra, at p. 693 [Tab 37, Vol. II, at p. 443]. 107 Affidavit of Dr. Freedman [Tab X of AJR, Vol. III, at p. 422, para. 8] 108 Affidavit of Dr. Freedman [Tab X of AJR, Vol. III, at pp. 422-423, paras. 8-11); Dr. Freedman Cross- Examination [Tab Y of AJR, Vol. IV, at pp. 449/18-25, 450/25-451/3, 460/1-5] Part III – Statement of Argument Page 31

93. Dr. Freedman states that his conclusions are based on his own research and on his knowledge of research done by others.109 In his view, “all of the studies produce essentially the same effects.”110

94. As a preliminary point, it must be noted that Dr. Freedman’s conclusion has, at best, vague support. He referred to one study that he conducted with a graduate student, but cited no other identifiable studies or articles. His claim to be supported by “all of the studies” cannot be accurate, as Justice Rosenberg found in his cursory survey. Justice Rosenberg cited one study “demonstrat[ing] that pre-trial publicity does have an impact, with the strongest effects being from negative pre-trial publicity about the accused’s character.” He cited another showing that a short delay eliminated the effect of “factually biasing publicity” but not the effect of “emotionally biasing publicity.”111

109 Affidavit of Dr. Freedman [Tab X of AJR, Vol. III, at p. 424/para. 8, p. 424/para. 12] 110 Cross-Examination of Dr. Freedman [Tab Y of AJR, Vol. IV, at p. 501/1-9] 111 Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, supra, at paras. 87-88 (per Rosenberg J.A., dissenting) [Tab 42 of ES- AF, Vol. II], citing respectively [not reproduced]: Amy Otto et al, “The Biasing Impact of Pretrial Publicity on Juror Judgments” (1994) 18 Law and Human Behaviour 453 and Geoffrey P. Kramer et al, “Pretrial Publicity, Judicial Remedies, and Jury Bias” (1990) 14 Law and Human Behavior 409, and G.T. Trotter, The Law of Bail in Canada, 2nd ed. (Carswell: 1999) at p. 197 [Tab 14, Vol. I, at p. 148]. Other sources [not reproduced] show a spectrum of results depending on numerous variables: e.g., CANADA: J.R.P. Ogloff and N. Vidmar, “The Impact of Pretrial Publicity on Jurors: a Study to Compare the Relative Effects of Television and Print Media in a Child Sex Abuse Case” (1994) 18 Law and Human Behavior 507. UNITED STATES: N.M. Steblay, J. Besirevic, S.M. Fulero, B. Jimenez-Lorente, “The Effects of Pretrial Publicity on Juror Verdicts: A Meta-Analytic Review” (1999) 23 Law and Human Behavior 219; J. Bruschke and W.E. Loges, “Relationship between pretrial publicity and trial outcomes” (1999) 49 Journal of Communication 104; L. Hope, A. Memon and P. McGeorge, “Understanding Pretrial Publicity: Predecisional Distortion of Evidence by Mock Jurors” (2004) 10 No.2 Journal of Experimental Psychology 111; Norbert L. Kerr, “The effects of pre-trial publicity on jurors” (Nov-Dec 1994) 78 No. 3 Judicature; Edith Greene, “Media Effects on Jurors” (1990) 14 Law and Human Behavior 5; Ian Cram, “A virtue less cloistered: court, speech and constitutions” (Oxford, England, and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2002); D. Linz and S. Penrod, “Exploring the first and sixth amendments: Pretrial publicity and jury decision making” in D. Kagehiro and W. S. Laufer (Eds.), Handbook of psychology and law, (New York: Springer, 1992); C.A. Studebaker and S.D. Penrod, “Pretrial publicity: The media, the law, and common sense” (1997) 3 Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 428; J.R. Wilson and B.H. Bornstein, “Methodological considerations in pretrial publicity research: Is the medium the message?” (1998) 22 Law and Human Behavior 585. AUSTRALIA: Trevor B. Roydhouse, “Are jury members affected by media reports?” 2001, online: University of New South Wales http://www.sentry.org/~trev/essays/essay01-2.html; NSW Law Reform Commission, Discussion Paper 43, Contempt by Publication, 2000, online: Law Link New South Wales http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/DP43TOC; Australian Law Reform Commission, Contempt, ALRC 35, 1987, online: Australian Law Information Institute http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/35/; Managing Prejudicial Publicity: An Empirical Study of Criminal Jury Trials in New South Wales, M Chesterman; J Chan; S Hampton, Law and Justice Foundation of NSW, 2001, online: Law and Justice Foundation http://www.lawfoundation.net.au/report/prejudicialpublicity/AFB4B93F94D62FC2CA2570B200176FA1.html. NEW ZEALAND: New Zealand Law Commission, Preliminary Paper 37, Juries in Criminal Trials: Part Two, NZLCPP 37, 1999, online: Law Commission of New Zealand Part III – Statement of Argument Page 32

95. Further, Dr. Freedman seems unusually willing to offer opinions that, when examined, turn out to have dubious scientific support. As but one example, he initially claimed to know that as more people are reached by pre-trial publicity, more people will come to believe that the accused is guilty. When pressed, he backed away: “Seems reasonable. I mean, again, we have very little evidence on any of this, but that makes sense.”112

96. Even if one chooses to accept Dr. Freedman’s opinion, it is important to understand what his opinion actually is. He says that generally, but with exceptions, verdicts are unaffected by pre-trial publicity. Exceptions may include things like confessions,113 smoking guns,114 and similar fact evidence.115 Dr. Freedman concedes that a piece of evidence that would be benign in most cases may be lethal in a particular one.116 He concedes that the effect of individual pieces or categories of evidence is largely untested. 117 Thus, the claim of the Appellants CBC et al that the exceptions are “rare and easily identified”118 is simply wrong, even on the evidence of its own witness.

97. Despite acknowledging that he is not an “expert on what kind of evidence matters more than other kinds of evidence,” and noting that “[t]his has not been studied in [a] systematic way,”119 Dr. Freedman chooses to use phrases like “insignificant” and “pretty weak” to describe the impact on verdicts. However, significance is very much a matter of perspective, as Dr. Freedman agreed: Q: Well, pretty weak unless perhaps you’re the accused. It’s significant. What you’re saying is that 99 percent of those people, they didn’t say “Convict him.” But a significantly greater number did. A: Yes, that’s true.120

http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/UploadFiles/Publications/Publication_76_159_PP37Vol2.pdf; New Zealand Law Commission Report 69, Juries in Criminal Trials, NZLC R69, 200, online: Law Commission of New Zealand http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/UploadFiles/Publications/Publication_76_161_R69.pdf. 112 Cross-Examination of Dr. Freedman [Tab Y of AJR, Vol. IV, at pp. 450/25-451/3]. See also, e.g., at pp. 450/15- 24, 459/17-25, 472/19-23, 475/5-479/12, 483/12-484/13, 497/10-23 [Tab Y of AJR, Vol. IV]. 113 Cross-Examination of Dr. Freedman [Tab Y of AJR, Vol. IV, at pp. 480/13-481/14] 114 Cross-Examination of Dr. Freedman [Tab Y of AJR, Vol. IV, at pp. 483/12-484/13] 115 Cross-Examination of Dr. Freedman [Tab Y of AJR, Vol. IV, at p. 481/15-25] 116 Cross-Examination of Dr. Freedman [Tab Y of AJR, Vol. IV, at pp. 460/24-463/14, 469/24-470/2, 471/13-15] 117 Cross-Examination of Dr. Freedman [Tab Y of AJR, Vol. IV, at pp. 482/6-22] 118 CBC-AF at para. 55 119 Cross-Examination of Dr. Freedman [Tab Y of AJR, Vol. IV, at pp. 482/6-22] 120 Cross-Examination of Dr. Freedman [Tab Y of AJR, Vol. IV, at pp. 473/4-13]. Apparently any effect will be most strongly felt in moderate cases: pp. 487/5-21; 490/19-491/6 [Tab Y of AJR, Vol. IV]. Part III – Statement of Argument Page 33

In sum, Dr. Freedman is unable to list the exceptions to his rule, and is unable to quantify the frequency of their occurrence or the force of their impact. His opinion comes down to this: “Verdicts are not affected except for when they are.” This is cold comfort to an accused.

98. Finally, it must be noted that Dr. Freedman’s opinion pertains to verdicts. But trial fairness is about more than verdicts. It is about fair process before an unbiased tribunal. It is about protecting the vulnerable, and about showing that the vulnerable are protected. This Court should not feel bound to accept Dr. Freedman’s opinion, and should not interpret it as disproving a connection between pre-trial publicity and trial fairness.

D.3. A Hypothetical Example Shows that s. 517 Achieves its Entwined Objective

99. Where social science evidence is contradictory or inconclusive on proof of harm, the court may rely on “a reasoned apprehension of that harm.”121 The Respondent does not concede that Dr. Freedman’s “Bernardo survey” constitutes scientific proof, but it does provide a useful illustration of some of the harms that s. 517 apprehends and aims to prevent.

100. In his “Bernardo survey,” Dr. Freedman and a student approached people at the Ontario Science Centre and asked them to imagine that they were jurors in Paul Bernardo’s murder trial, which had not yet taken place. To simulate different amounts and types of pre-trial publicity, participants were given varying information and asked to rate the likelihood of guilt on a scale of one to seven. (No attempt was made to track what information the participants already possessed as a result of real pre-trial publicity.) Initial ratings indicated strong initial belief in guilt. Participants were then presented with a hypothetical defence, designed to make the Crown’s case seem weak, and asked to reassess the likelihood of guilt. The question Dr. Freedman set out to answer was, “if we presented a plausible case, a plausible argument for the defence, would people … give up their initial opinions that he was probably guilty?” His conclusion was that “[j]ust getting this information about the trial eliminates the effect of pretrial publicity.”122

101. In other words, pre-trial publicity may increase jurors’ initial belief in guilt, but may be overcome by a strong defence that makes the Crown’s case look weak. On a factual level, this

121 Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), supra, at para. 77 [Tab 16, Vol. I, at p. 186] 122 Cross-Examination of Dr. Freedman [Tab Y of AJR, Vol. IV, at pp. 452/2-456/11] Part III – Statement of Argument Page 34

seems to add little to Dr. Freedman’s opinion that pre-trial publicity has negligible influence in cases that are either very strong or very weak. It subtracts little from the concomitant opinion that “it’s really only in cases where the Crown’s case is moderate and it leaves open the possibility of either guilt or innocence … that’s where you see the effects.”123

102. On a legal level, the Bernardo survey’s findings are all but irrelevant to the concept of trial fairness. To state the obvious, a trial should be fair even to accused persons who cannot present a strong defence or who choose not to present a defence at all.

103. The Bernardo survey purportedly discovered one other effect linked to the content of pre- trial publicity. Some participants were told that, in addition to the murders, Bernardo was charged with dozens of rapes. Others were not told. Dr. Freedman found a slight difference in results. Although it was “pushing things scientifically to talk about it,” he proposed an explanation: “this one piece of information in this particular trial might have been especially damaging because the defense that we proposed is that Bernardo is a totally innocent, sweet- looking guy” who was framed by his murderous wife. “That particular defense pretty much breaks down if it turns out that he’s guilty of 23 rapes in Scarboro.” The Scarboro charges might not have been damaging in another case, but they were particularly damaging in this hypothetical one. “[A]mong all of the other pieces of information contained in pretrial publicity, only this one seems to produce bias that persists after trial.” Dr. Freedman’s speculative conclusion was that “any given piece of information has to be seen in the context of what the trial is. … A particular piece of information that may be innocuous in one case will be extremely damaging in another and vice versa.”124

104. Along with other applications of reason and common sense, the Bernardo hypothetical helps to show that the impugned portion of s. 517 is rationally connected to its objective. Deferring publicity of a bail hearing can reasonably be anticipated to protect trial fairness, at a time when no one can predict which piece of evidence may be damaging in the long term.

123 Cross-Examination of Dr. Freedman [Tab Y of AJR, Vol. IV, at pp. 487/5-21; 490/19-491/6] 124 Cross-Examination of Dr. Freedman [Tab Y of AJR, Vol. IV, at pp. 460/24-463/14, 469/24-470/2, 471/13-15] Part III – Statement of Argument Page 35

E. Publication Deferral is a Minimally Impairing Solution

105. The minimal impairment branch of the Oakes test inquires whether the impugned provision infringes the right no more than is necessary to accomplish its objective – in this case,

the entire multi-faceted objective of s. 517. It is not enough to protect fair trial with onerous, time-consuming procedures. It is not enough to protect expedient bail with procedures that leave open unknown risks to fair trial. The provision must serve the entwined purpose of showing that one right need not be sacrificed for the other.

106. A law will not fail the minimal impairment test merely because one may conceive of a more closely-tailored infringement. Rather, the requirement of minimal impairment is satisfied where the provision falls within a range of reasonable solutions to the problem.125

107. The range of reasonable solutions may be broadest in cases of multi-dimensional contests among rights, where legislators must “strike a balance without the benefit of absolute certainty concerning how that balance is best struck.” Particular regard should be had to the rights of vulnerable groups in need of government protection, as against the laissez-faire claims of others in a position of relative strength. Section 1 must not “simply become an instrument of better situated individuals to roll back legislation which has as its object the improvement of the condition of less advantaged persons.”126

108. Thus, the question at this stage of the s. 1 inquiry is not merely whether some other measure might infringe less on s. 2(b). It is whether another measure would, on a reasonable view, reduce the impairment of press freedom, without reducing the intended protection of detained accuseds. Other measures will not be viable alternatives if they

… raise their own Charter problems and give no guarantee as to whether they will achieve the objective. … the Charter does not require Parliament to “roll the dice” in its effort to achieve “pressing and substantial” objectives in order to adopt the absolutely least intrusive legislative provision.127

125 R. v. Chaulk, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303 at p. 1341 [Tab 36, Vol. II, at p. 429]; Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), supra, at para. 110 [Tab 16, Vol. I, at pp. 187-188]; Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 at pp. 992-994 [Tab 18, Vol. I, at pp. 209-211]; RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), supra, at para. 138 [Tab 28, Vol. I, of CBC-Auth, Vol. II] 126 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), supra, at pp. 992-994 [Tab 18, Vol. I, at pp. 209-211], quoting R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 at p. 779 [Tab 41, Vol. II, at p. 491]. 127 R. v. Chaulk, supra, at p. 1344 (majority decision, per Lamer C.J.) [Tab 36, Vol. II, at p. 432] Part III – Statement of Argument Page 36

109. As discussed above, a mandatory deferral of publication at the accused’s request is required to attain certainty of result without sacrifice of rights. The point is perhaps best illustrated by showing how the Appellant’s proposed alternatives fail to serve s. 517’s objective.

E.1. A Discretionary Deferral Order Would Not Achieve the Objective

110. The Appellants’ dominant theme is that the objective of s. 517 would be as well served by making the publication deferral order discretionary at either party’s request. Of course, their theme hinges on their erroneous framing of the objective as relating solely to trial fairness. As discussed above, the true objective of the mandatory order is to ensure that the justice system will not require a detained accused to choose between fairness and freedom. A discretionary provision would deny tactical security, or timeliness, or both. It would also place the newly- arrested accused in the overwhelming position of fighting two distinct battles against two institutional opponents.

111. A true Dagenais-style128 discretion would be particularly damaging to the objective of s. 517. The onus would be on the accused to establish that publication deferral is “necessary to avoid a real and serious risk to the fairness of the trial,” and that there is no reasonable and effective alternative. As discussed above, this onus is essentially impossible to discharge at the bail stage. The accused would also need to establish that the limitation he seeks is as limited as possible, in scope and content. 129 In effect, the accused would need to argue over each individual piece of bail-related information. The unrealistic onus and time-consuming procedures of a Dagenais hearing would not achieve the objectives of s. 517. It would actively undermine them.

112. The Appellant The Edmonton Sun argues that an accused need not feel he is gambling with his fair trial right, because he should be content to assume that a justice will permit immediate publication only in appropriate cases.130 This argument assumes that enough information is available to the presiding justice to make a sound decision. As discussed above, this assumption will rarely be accurate. The result of a discretionary ban would be to sacrifice

128 Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., supra [Tab 7 of ES-Auth, Vol. I] 129 Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., supra, at pp. 890-891 [Tab 7 of ES-Auth, Vol. I] 130 ES-AF at paras. 67, 71 Part III – Statement of Argument Page 37

time and liberty in the hope of preparing a proper application for publication deferral and bail, or to gamble a fair trial with a timely but ill-prepared application.

113. The Appellant The Edmonton Sun’s suggestion of an interim deferral order, pending a Dagenais hearing,131 is no solution. An accused must know the extent of his protection before he embarks on his bail hearing or his rights remain vulnerable. Further, this suggestion is difficult to reconcile with the Appellant’s core argument that the mere deferral of publication occasions a deleterious effect on the s. 2(b) right. If true (which, as will be discussed in section F below, is not conceded) then an interim deferral long enough to allow for a properly contested application may not impair the right any less – or at least not by enough of a margin to merit the complete undermining of Parliament’s objective.

114. The Appellants CBC et al have argued that procedural delay can be reduced by procedural discretion on a Dagenais application.132 Presumably this means that a judge could tailor notice, scheduling and evidentiary requirements to suit the need for expediency in any given case. First, it must be observed that arguing about notice, scheduling and evidentiary requirements may well consume as much time as is saved. Second, how is the judge to decide when the media should have notice: if the case is serious? if it is violent? if it is unusual? if the accused is famous? To what extent should a judicial officer be placed in the role of screening stories for the media?

E.2. A Content-Oriented Order Would Not Achieve the Objective

115. The Appellants propose that a content-oriented provision would be a less impairing alternative – that is, that the provision would be less impairing if it applied only to selected content, such as confessions or information prejudicial to the accused.133 This proposal fails from two perspectives: it would not achieve the objective, and it would not be less impairing.

116. First, given the early stage of the proceedings, an accused cannot know with any certainty what information will prejudice his position at trial (as the Bernardo hypothetical has illustrated). If the accused is hesitant to speak freely at his bail hearing, for fear of publication, then the

131 ES-AF at para. 66 132 CBC-AF at para. 93 133 ES-AF at paras. 56, 63-64; CBC-AF at para. 92 Part III – Statement of Argument Page 38

justice will be even less informed and less equipped to prevent prejudice. Limiting any publication order to confessions would be a necessary but insufficient first step. Limiting any

order to “prejudicial” information rewords the problem but does not answer it, since long-term prejudice may not be initially apparent. Therefore, this solution cannot achieve the legislative objective.

117. Second, a content-oriented infringement is surely more offensive to free expression than a forum-oriented but content-neutral infringement. Reporting on partial information would do a grave disservice to the public interest. For example, if only exculpatory or non-prejudicial information may be reported, it may appear that courts are routinely detaining individuals when all visible factors favour release.134 This would hardly foster understanding or relevant critique. Further, media stories containing disclaimers such as “the court also heard other information but forbade us from publishing it” are unlikely to quell the speculation that the Appellants fear. A time-limited, forum-oriented, but content-neutral publication deferral order creates a less invidious kind of impairment, and better serves the values embodied in s. 2(b).

E.3. A “Potential Jury Only” Order Would Not Achieve the Objective

118. Since they have focused only on the sub-objective of ensuring a fair jury trial, the Appellants suggest that s. 517 could be restricted to cases that might be heard before a jury.135 This suggestion neglects the danger of witness contamination.136 It neglects the possibility that charges may be elevated or added as investigations progress.137 It neglects the fact that on hybrid offences the Crown may re-elect from summary conviction to indictable, even after months have passed.138 It neglects the reality that an accused who has elected a judge alone trial may re-elect a jury trial later, or be drawn into a jury trial by a co-accused’s election or re- election.139

134 R. v. S.(J.), supra, at para. 56 [Tab 58, Vol. II, at pp. 688-689] 135 ES-AF at para. 55; CBC-AF at para. 122 136 E.g. R. v. Daly, supra, (B.C.S.C.) at para. 42 [Tab 38, Vol. II, at p. 464], R. v. Hibbert, supra, at paras. 46-50 [Tab 47, Vol. II, at pp. 560-561] 137 R. v. Hall, 1999 CarswellAlta 275 (Q.B.) at para. 3 [Tab 44, Vol. II, at p. 522] 138 R. v. Dudley, 2008 CarswellAlta 261 (C.A.) at para. 1 [Tab 40, Vol. II, at p. 476] 139 Criminal Code, ss. 561, 567 [Appendix D]. Late re-elections require Crown consent, but the Crown’s discretion to give or withhold consent is reviewable on trial fairness grounds: R. v. Ng, 2003 CarswellAlta 613 (C.A.) [not reproduced]. Part III – Statement of Argument Page 39

119. To address just the latter two scenarios, a “potential jury only” order would mean that s. 517 would be discretionary at the accused’s request only in cases involving absolute jurisdiction offences140 and straight summary conviction offences. However, the Appellant The Edmonton Sun has admitted that, in practice, the media will tend to become involved at the bail stage only in serious cases.141 Thus, a “potential jury only” interpretation would create a distinction without a practical difference. Presumably this is why the Appellants do not seek this interpretation by way of remedy.142

E.4. After-the-Fact Procedures Do Not Meet the Objective

120. Finally, the Appellants claim that s. 517 is redundant because any risk to a fair trial may be avoided using later-arising procedures, such as challenges for cause, changes of venue, adjournments, and extended jury sequestration.143 Once again, these procedures do not meet the objective of s. 517, since at the bail stage an accused would need to gamble on their availability and effectiveness.

121. To inject these after-the-fact procedures into the s. 517 problem is to inject even more competing interests and Charter values.

 Challenges for cause: Assuming an accused could pass the threshold of proving that challenges for cause are necessary,144 it is hard to see how any challenge could be effective. For instance, asking a potential juror “Are you aware that the accused made an out-of-court confession?” only puts a spotlight on the confession.145 Asking, “Will that knowledge affect your judgment?” is only as useful as the juror is self-aware (the juror may be influenced even if she thinks she will not146) and honest (the juror may want to present herself as capable of fairness even if she is not). Theoretically, one could subject

140 Criminal Code, s. 553 [Appendix D] 141 ES-AF at para. 86 142 ES-AF at paras. 113, 115; CBC-AF at para. 128 143 ES-AF at paras. 63-64; CBC-AF at para. 90 144 See Criminal Code, s. 638 [Appendix D] 145 cf. Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., supra, at p. 868 [Tab 7 of ES-Auth, Vol. I]; Southam Inc. c. Canada (Procureur général), supra, at para. 9 [Tab 64 at p. 744] 146 cf. Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., supra, at pp. 884-886 [Tab 7 of ES-Auth, Vol. I]; Southam Inc. c. Canada (Procureur général), supra, at para. 49 [Tab 64, Vol. II, at p. 749] Part III – Statement of Argument Page 40

jurors to more invasive questioning, but this would represent a major change to the Canadian jury system.147

 Changes of venue: Venue changes offer uncertain benefit at high cost. Members of the community directly impacted by the crime will effectively be prevented from attending the trial. The Crown and accused would incur costs of travel and accommodation for their witnesses. Witnesses would experience additional inconvenience and disruption. Trials may run less smoothly, as flexibility is lost in the calling or re-calling of witnesses. And for all this, in some cases no venue change will outrun media coverage.148

 Adjournments: In theory, adjourning trials may reduce jurors’ conscious memories of media coverage. It may also reduce witnesses’ memories of events, which is itself a form of threat to trial fairness. Most concerningly, adjournments threaten an accused’s guaranteed right to be tried within a reasonable time.149

 Extended jury sequestration: Although mentioned as an alternative, even the Appellants do not press this as a serious option. Lengthy sequestration of jurors “imposes a heavy burden on those citizens who offer the greatest contribution to the right to a fair trial.150

122. Every one of these procedures imports yet another burden for the accused to discharge. Some place burdens on other participants in the justice system: jurors who must be interrogated or sequestered, witnesses who must spend time traveling to a new trial venue, the Crown and the courts who must expend time and resources on the applications and the remedies. Only the media would bear no burden; only from their perspective could these alternatives look attractive.

123. That these complex procedures are the alternative solutions illustrates the multi- dimensionality of the problem. The mandatory aspect of s. 517 is not only the most effective of

147 Re Global Communications Ltd. v. Attorney-General for Canada, supra, at pp. 623-624 [Tab 32 of ES-Auth, Vol. II] 148 R. v. Shrubsall, 2000 CarswellNS 299 (S.C.) at para. 33 [Tab 59, Vol. II, at p. 693]; R. v. S.(J.), supra, at para. 47 [Tab 58, Vol. II, at p.687] 149 Charter, s. 11(b) [Appendix C]; R. v. Shrubsall, supra, at para. 24 [Tab 59, Vol. II, at p. 692]; R. v. S.(J.), supra, at para. 46 [Tab 58, Vol. II, at p. 686] 150 R. v. Shrubsall, supra, at para. 35 [Tab 59, Vol. II, at pp. 693-694]; One Yellow Rabbit Theatre Assn. v. R., 1992 CarswellAlta 52 (C.A.) at para. 17 [Tab 21, Vol. I, at p. 262]; Re Global Communications Ltd. v. Attorney- General for Canada, supra, at p. 624 [Tab 32 of ES-Auth, Vol. II] Part III – Statement of Argument Page 41

a range of reasonable (if imperfect) solutions. It is also the solution that best protects the interests of the detained accused: the party who is in the most vulnerable position, and who on any view has the most to lose.

E.5. In Search of an Equally Effective Alternative

124. To meet the true objective of s. 517, an alternative discretionary provision would need to permit a bail justice to order deferred publication, in whole or in part, where:

(i) on available information, trial fairness may be undermined by publication; OR

(ii) a confession has been mentioned; OR

(iii) other information that may be singularly prejudicial has been mentioned; OR

(iv) allowing for ongoing investigation and potential increase or adding of charges, the trial may be heard by a jury; OR

(v) publication deferral is necessary to guarantee the appearance of fairness.

Such discretion would need to be exercised using onuses, burdens and procedures that:

(i) realistically reflect the amount of information available; AND

(ii) realistically reflect the parties’ ability to foresee future effects; AND

(iii) provide a fair, content-neutral means of determining when and to whom notice must be given; AND

(iv) schedule publication hearings on a reasonable timeline for permitting the selected media parties to become involved; AND

(v) follow a timeline that will not result in prolonged detention of the accused.

The resulting provision would need to ensure that the entire combination of tests and procedures does not pla ce the accused in the position of:

(i) having his bail expeditiously determined but risking the revelation of damaging information; OR

(ii) concealing information because it may harm his interest in the long term, but which might have assisted in obtaining his release; OR Part III – Statement of Argument Page 42

(iii) consenting to remain in detention while he determines how best to protect his long-term interest in trial fairness.

125. The resulting provision may look discretionary, but to accommodate all the uncertainties and time pressures, it will in practice be very close to mandatory.

126. In reality, no alternate provision can serve all relevant interests: substantive fairness, procedural fairness, time, and respect for all relevant Charter rights. Mandatory deferral, at the accused’s request, of information elicited at a bail hearing, truly is the minimally impairing way of serving the objectives of the provision.

F. Benefits to the Administration of Justice Outweigh the Minimal Harm of Publication Deferral

127. The pressing and substantial objective of s. 517 encompasses at least two guaranteed rights: fair trial and reasonable bail. The fundamental importance of these rights outweighs the infringing effect of deferred publication.151

128. The existence of some infringement on a right is a given by this stage of the analysis, and is conceded in this case. However, in assessing proportionality the magnitude of the infringement is relevant.152 Here, that magnitude must be measured in units of s. 2(b)’s core values: truth-seeking, nurturing human expression, and social and political decision-making.153

129. Of all the court orders that justifiably infringe on s. 2(b), s. 517 publication deferral orders are the most benign. Unlike in camera proceedings, they do not prohibit public attendance in the courtroom.154 Unlike sealing orders, they do not prohibit public access to information.155

151 R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at p. 139 [Tab 22 of CBC-Auth, Vol. II]; Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., supra, at pp. 889-890 (per Lamer C.J.) [Tab 7 of ES-Auth, Vol. I] 152 R. v. Oakes, supra, at pp. 139-140 [Tab 22 of CBC-Auth, Vol. II]; Reference re ss. 193 & 195.1(1)(c) of Criminal Code (Canada), supra, at pp. 1197-1199, 1200-1201 [Tab 61, Vol. II, at pp. 724-726, 727-728] 153 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), supra, at pp. 976-977 [Tab 9 of CBC-Auth, Vol. I] 154 Criminal Code, ss. 276.2(1), 486(1) (upheld as constitutional in Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), supra, at paras. 65-66 [Tab 5 of ES-Auth, Vol. I]), Criminal Code, s. 507(1) (upheld as constitutional in Southam Inc. v. Ontario, 1990 CarswellOnt 952 (C.A.) at paras. 25, 38 [Tab 65, Vol. II, at pp. 754, 756]). Part III – Statement of Argument Page 43

They are not permanent.156 They do not prohibit face-to-face conversation, or inquiry into the decision-making processes.157 Their effect relates only to timing, not to content.158

130. Section 517’s closest counterparts are s. 539 (deferring publication of evidence taken at preliminary inquiries) and s. 648 (deferring publication of voir dires during jury trials). Both these provisions have been upheld as constitutional.159 On the magnitude of infringement, there is only one distinction between s. 517 and these provisions: duration. A s. 517 order may be in effect for a longer time period than a s. 539 or s. 648 order. The time distinction lies at the heart of the Appellants’ attempt to bring s. 517’s infringement within the core values of s. 2(b). Their claim of severe deleterious effect depends on this equation: timeliness lost = audience lost = discussion lost.

131. The first half of this equation depends on the assumption that consumers of news are only interested in receiving information about an event as soon as it happens. It seems more realistic to assert that news audiences are primarily interested in receiving information as soon as it becomes available (see paragraphs 136 and 137 below). Further, in discussing audience loss, it is important to distinguish between the audience of the medium and the audience of the idea. If audience depended solely on immediate reporting, we would have newspapers but no books, The National but not The Fifth Estate.

132. The second half of the Appellants’ equation asserts that audience lost is discussion lost. Without this equivalency, infringement by the content-neutral deferral of publication is

155 Criminal Code, ss. 187(1), 487.3 [Appendix D]. Where the circumstances of the case dictate, a sealing order will be a justifiable infringement of Charter s. 2(b): Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188 [Tab 32 of CBC-Auth, Vol. II]. 156 Unlike the permanent bans on publishing identity in Criminal Code, ss. 276.3, 486.4 (upheld as constitutional in Canadian Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney-General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 122 at p. 133 [Tab 6 of ES-Auth, Vol. I], and Youth Criminal Justice Act ss. 110, 111 [Appendix G] (the former was held to violate Charter s. 7 to the extent that it imposed a burden on a young person to justify banning publication of his identity; Charter s. 2(b) was not discussed: R. v. B.(D.), [2008] 2 S.C.R. 3, 2008 CarswellOnt 2708 (S.C.C.), headnote only [Tab 25, Vol. I, at pp. 330-331). 157 Unlike the prohibition on disclosure of jury proceedings in Criminal Code, s. 649, which has not been subject to constitutional challenge. 158 Unlike the ban on publication of evidence relating to a complainant’s sexual history in Criminal Code, s. 276.3, or the ban on publication of confessions led at a preliminary inquiry in Criminal Code, s. 542 (upheld as constitutional in Southam Inc. c. Canada (Procureur général), supra, at paras. 51-52 [Tab 64, Vol. II, at pp. 749- 750]. 159 R. v. Banville, supra, at paras. 23-25 [Tab 27, Vol. I, at pp. 330-331]; R. v. Regan, supra, at paras. 15-16, 31-32 [Tab 56, Vol. II, at pp. 667, 670-672]; R. v. Brown, supra, at para. 13 [Tab 30, Vol. I, at p. 349] Part III – Statement of Argument Page 44 essentially technical. The mere loss of audience would weigh negligibly in the proportionality balancing, since s. 2(b) does not guarantee the right to be listened to; it “prohibits gags, but does not compel the distribution of megaphones.”160 Audience loss may be of commercial concern to the daily media (long-term media such as books and documentary films being essentially unaffected by publication deferral), but it is not a Charter-protected right.

133. For the above equation, so vital to their argument, the Appellants have offered precisely no evidential support: no evidence of the duration of audience attention; no evidence of what discussion-provoking articles would have been written but for the deferral order; and no evidence of how the core values of s. 2(b) suffered by the delay. There is no evidence that either audience or discussion would have been lost to deferral.161

134. What have the Appellants offered in support of their equation? One line of obiter: “News is perishable.”162 This comment appears in Justice Berger’s decision on Mr. White’s application for publication deferral pending his bail review hearing in the Alberta Court of Appeal. The Appellants have omitted to mention that Justice Berger ruled in Mr. White’s favour and granted the interim deferral order. Nonetheless, the bald assertion that “news is perishable” is, it seems, meant to be taken as sufficient support for the equation of impact on s. 2(b) values.

135. What appears to contradict the Appellants’ equation? First, the fact that meaningful discussion may be present even where case-specific details are absent. According to their own evidence, Mr. White’s release on bail “sparked a debate on the justifiability of Canada’s bail laws.”163 An October 24, 2005 article in The Edmonton Journal explained the constitutional guarantee of reasonable bail, the criteria for bail, the availability of bail on reverse onus in murder cases, and the presumption of innocence. It did not reveal the specifics of Mr. White’s

160 R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 at pp. 831-832 (per McLachlin J., dissenting) [Tab 49, Vol. II, at pp. 587- 588]; Haig v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995 at pp. 1035-1036 [Tab 15, Vol. I, at pp. 168-169]. 161 The Respondent makes these points rhetorically, since she does not assert a trial-like standard of evidence in Charter s. 1 cases. However, should this Court accede to the Appellant’s view of evidentiary requirements, the Respondent asks that those requirements be applied with equal rigour to both sides of the issue. 162 ES-AF at para. 74; CBC-AF at para. 85, citing R. v. White, 2005 ABCA 435 at para. 6 (per Berger J.A.) [Tab B of AJR, Vol. I]. 163 Affidavit of Allan Mayer [Tab V, Vol. III of AJR at p. 322/para. 16] Part III – Statement of Argument Page 45

hearing, but did provide a comparison to another high-profile case.164 Clearly, social and political debate is not significantly hindered by deferred publication.

136. The second contradiction of the Appellants’ equation exists in the fact that they continued to seek permission to publish information about the bail hearing for many months after its occurrence in October 2005.165 In November 2005, December 2005, and again in Februrary 2006, the Appellants sought permission to publish information from the appellate bail review.166 They brought their constitutional motions in May and July 2006,167 and pursued them through argument in August 2006, seeking the corollary relief of permission to publish information from Mr. White’s bail hearing.168 Clearly, the Appellants felt the information was still marketable to their audiences.

137. The third contradiction exists in the fact that the media continued to publish articles about Mr. White’s case, and about his bail, for months afterward. A July 2006 internet search revealed that numerous articles were published nation-wide after the Court of Appeal revoked bail and permitted publication.169 As one example, a website called “deadmonton” published a running chronology of events. The February 22, 2006 instalment reported that publication of some bail- related information was now possible; it contrasted the Crown’s case as known in October, 2005 with the more complete picture available in 2006.170 The controversy surrounding Mr. White’s bail was even mentioned in two Edmonton Journal articles, two and a half years after his bail hearing and eight months after the natural expiry of the s. 517 order.171 Clearly, discussion continued.

138. The daily news media are in the business of speed, and daily news headlines serve a purpose in informing a curious public. But real-time, single-case analysis based on limited initial

164 Exhibit B to the Affidavit of Allan Mayer [Tab V of AJR, Vol. III, at pp. 328-330] 165 October 4, 2005 Bail Hearing [RJR at p. 21/19 – p. 22/13] 166 R. v. White, 2005 ABCA 435 (Berger J.A. Reasons for Decision) [Tab B of AJR, Vol. I, at p. 9/paras. 18-21]; R. v. White, 2006 ABCA 65 (Court of Appeal Memorandum of Judgment) [Tab C of AJR, Vol. I, at p. 17/para. 28 and p. 18/para. 31] 167 Notice of Motion filed May 9, 2006 [Tab M of AJR], Notice of Motion filed July 5, 2006 [Tab N of AJR, Vol. II] 168 Transcript of Proceedings in Alberta Court of Appeal, Submissions on Constitutional Question, dated August 28, 2006 [RJR at pp. 75/34-76/27] 169 Exhibits A-H of the Affidavit of Mary MacDonald [Tab W of AJR, Vol. III, at pp. 337, 338, 344, 392, 384, 410- 411] 170 Unlettered exhibit to the Affidavit of Mary MacDonald [Tab W of AJR, Vol. III, at pp. 406-406, 410-411] 171 Exhibit C and G to the Affidavit of Donna Harker [Tab BB of AJR, Vol. IV, at pp. 524-525, 538-540] Part III – Statement of Argument Page 46

information is not the only, and perhaps not the optimal, way to conduct a meaningful democratic debate. Section 517 allows for full discussion of any given bail hearing after the accused’s fate has been determined fairly and after all information can be put in perspective. The deleterious effect on truth-seeking, diversity of expression, and social and political decision- making is slight. News as a commodity is perishable. Information and ideas are not.

139. It has been conceded that s. 517’s impact on the daily media amounts to an infringement of s. 2(b): but that impact, already small, is dwarfed by the objective of protecting the detainee’s rights to fairness and freedom.

140. Mandatory publication deferral of bail information serves the multi-faceted purpose of ensuring that a detained accused has procedural protection, from the start of his bail hearing to the conclusion of his trial. It does so in a rational, minimally impairing and proportional manner. Its limited interference with s. 2(b) is demonstrably justified in our free and democratic society.

G. Preventing Procedural Prejudice

141. More than eight months after an order had issued deferring publication of information revealed at Mr. White’s bail hearing, the Appellants filed notices of motion challenging the constitutional validity of s. 517 of the Criminal Code. They brought their motions within the criminal case of R. v. White,172 even though they were not parties to R. v. White and had not sought intervener status. The Court of Appeal fulfilled its mandate of error correction by pointing out the several ways in which this procedure of convenience was legally wrong.173 What remains for this Court’s consideration is the principled question: by what procedure may a person who is not a party to any ongoing proceeding seek a declaration that legislation is invalid?

142. Procedures exist for seeking declarations of invalidity, and they apply to the Appellants as to any other applicant. In Alberta, the correct procedure for those not party to any related ongoing action is to initiate an action for declaratory relief. This can be done by Statement of Claim, Originating Notice of Motion or Petition.174 Parties to a criminal prosecution have the

172 Indictment dated March 20, 2006 [Tab L of AJR], Notice of Motion filed May 9, 2006 [Tab M of AJR, Vol. II], Notice of Motion filed July 5, 2006 [Tab N of AJR, Vol. II] 173 R. v. White, 2008 ABCA 294 [Tab I of AJR, Vol. I, at p. 71/para. 11 – p. 5/para. 18] 174 Alberta, Co urt of Queen’s Bench Rules, rr. 6 and 404 [Appendix A]. As an example, the action for declaratory relief in Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General) was commenced by Originating Notice of Motion: Part III – Statement of Argument Page 47 option of using a Notice of Motion175 to commence a challenge to legislation within the ongoing proceeding. To the criminal proceeding, which will determine culpability, is added a second, civil proceeding, which will determine constitutionality. If the latter may determine the outcome of the former, the two actions will likely proceed together. If, however, the civil proceeding is not essential to the determination of the ultimate criminal issue, the two actions may proceed separately, and be governed by different rules.176

143. Here, the Appellants obtained only a declaration of invalidity. They sought, primarily, an order that s. 517 be declared unconstitutional; as a corollary, they made improperly-founded, ill- explained requests for a type of retrospective effect that would permit them to publish details of Mr. White’s initial bail hearing.177 Therefore, their action had no valid criminal component, and was not integral to the resolution of the ultimate issue – or of any live issue – in the criminal prosecution. It was a freestanding civil action, and should have been framed as one from its inception.

144. The Appellants claim to find support for their novel procedure in this Court’s statements on media standing. Where a publication order is discretionary, the media may have relevant input and be granted standing to dispute the order. But where a publication order is mandatory by law, the media have no relevant input. Since they cannot challenge the mandatory order

Edmonton Journal (The) v. Alberta (Attorney General), 1985 CarswellAlta 199 (Q.B.) at para. 1 [Tab 11, Vol. I, at p. 132]. 175 Defined as an application in an existing action: Alberta, Court of Queen’s Bench Rules, r. 384 [Appendix A]. 176 R. v. Laba, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 965 at pp. 977-978 [Tab 20 of CBC-Auth, Vol. II] 177 Order of Brooker Q.B.J. filed April 7, 2008 [Tab E of AJR, Vol. I], Notice of Motion filed May 9, 2006 [Tab M of AJR, Vol. II], Notice of Motion filed July 5, 2006 [Tab N of AJR, Vol. II]; Transcript of Proceedings in Alberta Court of Appeal, Submissions on Constitutional Question, dated August 28-29, 2006 [RJR at pp. 54/10- 12, 75/34-76/27, 94/1-3, 156/11-14]. For reasons of functus officio and collateral attack, and of fairness to the accused who had acted in reliance on the s. 517 order for months, the Appellants’ attack on the order itself was entirely improper. On functus officio, see: R. v. Burke [2002] 2 S.C.R. 857, 2002 CarswellOnt 1970 (S.C.C.) at paras. 51-54 [Tab 33, Vol. I, at pp. 395-396]; R. v. Malicia 2006 CarswellOnt 5539 (C.A.) at paras. 14-24 [Tab 52, Vol. II, at pp. 606-609]; Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Department of Education), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3, 2003 CarswellNS 375 (S.C.C.) at paras. 77-80 [Tab 10, Vol. I, at p. 126]; Chandler v. Assn. of Architects (Alberta), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 848 at pp. 860-864 [Tab 6, Vol. I, at pp. 61-65]; R. v. Adams, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 707 at paras. 29-31 [Tab 23, Vol. I, at pp. 189, 290]. On collateral attack, see: Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., [2001] 2 S.C.R. 460, 2001 CarswellOnt 2434 (S.C.C.) at para. 20 [Tab 8, Vol. I, at p. 97]; Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., supra, at p. 871 [Tab 7, Vol. I, at p. 85]; R. v. Domm, 1996 CarswellOnt 4539 (C.A.) at para. 29 [Tab 19 of ES-Auth]; Carpenter Fishing v. Canada, 2002 CarswellBC 2718 (C.A.) at paras. 7-8 [Tab 5, Vol. I, at pp. 51-52]; R. v. Fairchuk, 2003 CarswellMan 146 (C.A.) at paras. 11-20 [Tab 42, Vol. II, at pp. 498- 500]; Bain Insulation & Supply Ltd. v. Ginther, 1988 CarswellAlta 489 (C.A.) [Tab 3, Vol. I, at pp. 26-29]. Part III – Statement of Argument Page 48

itself, their only recourse is to challenge the law that makes it mandatory.178 The latter statement does not grant a carte blanche, procedure-free standing to challenge mandatory legislation, as the Appellants imply. It simply articulates the obvious.

145. Still, the Appellants continue to assert that the shortcut procedure they invented was a proper one. If they were correct, then in any criminal (or, presumably, civil) case, a stranger to the proceedings could by Notice of Motion brought before any justice,179 at any time, with or without a live issue between the direct parties, with or without the parties’ interest or consent, impose a constitutional issue. He or she could then assert the non-existence of any route of appeal from an otherwise non-existent type of action, as the Appellants did in the court below.180

146. The Appellants are not correct, and the above scenario is not a threat, because strangers to a case cannot participate in it unless they have obtained party status. Intervention applications will usually necessitate strict scrutiny of issues such as mootness, functus officio, and collateral attack,181 whether the case provides the proper factual backdrop for the intended argument, whether the constitutional issue should be imposed on parties who have not sought to raise it, and, above all, whether raising it will occasion prejudice to the parties.

H. Conclusion

147. “[T]he administration of justice thrives on exposure to light.”182 But as gardeners know, the timing and intensity of light must sometimes be controlled.

178 Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., supra, at pp. 856-857 [Tab 7 of ES-Auth, Vol. I]; Named Person v. Vancouver, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 253, 2007 CarswellBC 2418 (S.C.C.) at paras. 35-36 [Tab 20, Vol. I, at p. 256]. 179 Recall that the Appellants’ application was brought before the bail justice, whose role had ended months earlier and who had no ongoing involvement in the criminal proceedings. 180 The Appellants CBC et al have chosen not to pursue the issue of appellate jurisdiction in this Court. The Appellant The Edmonton Sun does, by confusing the question of appeal from a particular publication order with that of appeal from a declaration of invalidity: ES-AF at paras. 21-27. The Court of Appeal correctly held that, if the originating action is characterized as a civil proceeding under the Judicature Act, then appellate jurisdiction follows: R. v. White, 2008 ABCA 294 [Tab I of AJR, Vol. I, at p. 74/para. 21 – p. 77/para. 30]. See also Judicature Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. J-2, ss. 1, 3, 5(3)(i) [Appendix E]; Lazar Sarna, The Law of Declaratory Judgments, 3rd ed. (Carswell: 2007) at p. 112 [Tab 63, Vol. II, at p. 735]; Henning v. Calgary (City), supra, at paras. 5-7, 12, 15-17, 20-22 [Tab 17, Vol. I, at pp. 190-194]; United States v. Shulman, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 616, 2001 CarswellOnt 962 (S.C.C.) at paras. 27, 32-33 [Tab 68, Vol. II, at pp. 797, 798]; McNally v. Bass, 2003 CarswellNfld 79 (C.A.) at para. 23-28 [Tab 19, Vol. I, at pp. 218-221] 181 All problems below: see R. v. White, 2008 ABCA 294 [Tab I of AJR, Vol. I, at p. 71/para. 11 – p. 73/para. 18]. 182 Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario, supra, at para. 1 [Tab 32 of CBC-Auth, Vol. II] Part III – Statement of Argument Page 49

148. Parliament has done so with s. 517: Mandatory publication deferral, at the accused’s request, protects the fragile right to fair trial and the perishable right to liberty, and strengthens the administration of justice. Because publication is deferred, not prohibited; because there is no permanent restriction on specific content or comment; because there is no restriction at all on general explanation or critique, s. 517’s infringement of s. 2(b) is minimal. It goes only as far as is necessary to secure an accused’s rights under ss. 7, 9, 11(b), 11(c), 11(d) and 11(e). The limitation is rational and proportional, and is justified in a constitutional democracy.

149. Section 517 of the Criminal Code should remain in force. The appeal should be dismissed.

Part IV – Submissions on Costs Page 50

PART IV – SUBMISSIONS ON COSTS

150. The Respondent makes no submissions regarding costs.

Part V – Order Sought Page 51

PART V – ORDER SOUGHT

151. The Respondent asks that this appeal be dismissed.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

JOLAINE ANTONIO COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT

JA/clk

Part VI – Table of Authorities Page 52

PART VI - TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cited at TAB RESPONDENT’S AUTHORITIES – Volume I Paragraph No. Attis v. New Brunswick District No. 15, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825, 1996 1 CarswellNB 125 (S.C.C.) at para. 101 84 Attorney General of Nova Scotia v. MacIntyre, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175 2 at pp. 180, 186-188 42 Bain Insulation & Supply Ltd. v. Ginther, 1988 CarswellAlta 489 3 (C.A.) 143

4 Canada v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892 at pp. 923-926 84 Carpenter Fishing v. Canada, 2002 CarswellBC 2718 (C.A.) at 5 paras. 7-8 143 Chandler v. Assn. of Architects (Alberta), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 848 at 6 pp. 860-864 143 Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 at 7 p. 871 143 Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., [2001] 2 S.C.R. 460, 2001 8 CarswellOnt 2434 (S.C.C.) at para. 20 143 David Watt, Watt’s Manual of Criminal Evidence, 2008 (Carswell: 9 2008) at p. 439 67 Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Department of Education), 10 [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3, 2003 CarswellNS 375 (S.C.C.) at paras. 77-80 143 Edmonton Journal (The) v. Alberta (Attorney General), 1985 11 CarswellAlta 199 (Q.B.) at para. 1 142 Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 12 1326 at p. 1383 42 FPT Heads of Prosecutions Committee Report of the Working Group on the Prevention of Miscarriages of Justice, 5. “Eyewitness 13 Identification and Testimony” http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/dept- 55 min/pub/pmj-pej/p5.html Part V. Suggested Practices and Recommendations G.T. Trotter, The Law of Bail in Canada, 2nd ed. (Carswell: 1999) 14 at pp. 197, 228-234 30, 94

15 Haig v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995 at pp. 1035-1036 132 Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827, 2004 16 CarswellAlta 646 (S.C.C.) at paras. 77, 110 85, 99, 106 Part VI – Table of Authorities Page 53

Cited at TAB RESPONDENT’S AUTHORITIES – Volume I Paragraph No. Henning v. Calgary (City), 1974 CarswellAlta 181 (S.C.) at paras. 17 5-7, 12, 15-17, 20-22 87, 145 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 18 at pp. 992-994 106, 107

19 McNally v. Bass, 2003 CarswellNfld 79 (C.A.) at paras. 23-28 145 Named Person v. Vancouver, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 253, 2007 20 CarswellBC 2418 (S.C.C.) at paras. 35-36 144 One Yellow Rabbit Theatre Assn. v. R., 1992 CarswellAlta 52 21 (C.A.) at para. 17 121 Phillips v. Nova Scotia (Commissioner, Public Inquiries Act), 22 [1995] 2 S.C.R. 97, 1995 CarswellNS 12 (S.C.C.) at paras. 130- 54, 62, 63, 64, 89 133, 135-136, 144, 173-174

23 R. v. Adams, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 707 at paras. 29-31 143

24 R. v. Almarales, 2008 CarswellOnt 5924 (C.A.) at paras. 113-124 67 R. v. B.(D.), [2008] 2 S.C.R. 3, 2008 CarswellOnt 2708 (S.C.C.), 25 headnote only 129

26 R. v. B.(F.F.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 697, headnote only 67

27 R. v. Banville, 1983 CarswellNB 19 (Q.B.) at paras. 23-25 56, 130

28 R. v. Blind, 1999 CarswellSask 602 (C.A.) at para. 15 32

29 R. v. Brooks, 2001 CarswellOnt 1423 (S.C.J.) at para. 45 34

30 R. v. Brown, 1997 CarswellOnt 5989 (C.J.G.D.) at paras. 12-14 42, 56, 130

31 R. v. Brown, 1999 CarswellOnt 2443 (C.A.) at paras. 1, 40-45 67 R. v. Bryan, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 527, 2007 CarswellBC 533 (S.C.C.) at 32 paras. 9, 10-12, 20, 28-29, 32, 39-40 41, 50, 85, 86 R. v. Burke [2002] 2 S.C.R. 857, 2002 CarswellOnt 1970 (S.C.C.) 33 at paras. 51-54 143

34 R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 at pp. 491-493 50, 84 Part VI – Table of Authorities Page 54

Cited at TAB RESPONDENT’S AUTHORITIES – Volume II Paragraph No. R. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 2001 CarswellOnt 538 (C.A.) 35 at paras. 35-36 72

36 R. v. Chaulk, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303 at pp. 1341, 1344 106, 108

37 R. v. Corbett, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670 at pp. 693, 736-738, 740-742 91

42, 48, 55, 60, 69, 38 R. v. Daly, 2003 CarswellBC 1813 (S.C.) at paras. 7, 38-42, 69 118

39 R. v. Daly, 2005 CarswellBC 1828 (C.A.) at para. 10 55, 60

40 R. v. Dudley, 2008 CarswellAlta 261 (C.A.) at para. 1 118

41 R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 at p. 779 107

42 R. v. Fairchuk, 2003 CarswellMan 146 (C.A.) at paras. 11-20 143

43 R. v. Genereux, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 259 at pp. 282-283 51

44 R. v. Hall, 1999 CarswellAlta 275 (Q.B.) at para. 3 118 R. v. Hall, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309, 2002 CarswellOnt 3259 (S.C.C.) at 45 para. 47 24 R. v. Handy, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 908, 2002 CarswellOnt 1968 (S.C.C.), 46 headnote only 67 R. v. Hibbert, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 445, 2002 CarswellBC 847 (S.C.C.) 47 at paras. 46-50 55, 118

48 R. v. John, 2001 CarswellOnt 2948 (S.C.J.) at para. 56 30

49 R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 at pp. 831-832 132

50 R. v. Koszulap, 1974 CarswellOnt 30 (C.A.) at para. 32 26

51 R. v. L.(S.), 1999 CarswellOnt 3861 (C.A.) at paras. 7-14 67

52 R. v. Malicia, 2006 CarswellOnt 5539 (C.A.) at paras. 14-24 143 R. v. McFadyen, 2002 CarswellOnt 125 (C.A.) at para. 10 – leave 53 to appeal ref’d [2002] S.C.C. No. 177 52 Part VI – Table of Authorities Page 55

Cited at TAB RESPONDENT’S AUTHORITIES – Volume II Paragraph No. R. v. Mentuck, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442, 2001 CarswellMan 535 54 (S.C.C.) at paras. 32-33 42 R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, 1999 CarswellAlta 1055 (S.C.C.) 55 at para. 58 23

N/R* R. v. Ng, 2003 CarswellAlta 613 (C.A.) 118

56 R. v. Regan, 1997 CarswellNS 567 (S.C.) at paras. 15-16, 31-32 56, 130

57 R. v. Rohatyn, 2004 CarswellAlta 1020 (C.A.) 67 R. v. S.(J.), 2008 CarswellOnt 6310 (S.C.J.) at paras. 6, 34-37, 46- 58 47, 56 60, 69, 117, 121

59 R. v. Shrubsall, 2000 CarswellNS 299 (S.C.) at paras. 24, 33, 35 121

60 R. v. Vanezis, 2006 CarswellOnt 6992 (C.A.) at paras. 34-35, 47-48 67 Reference re ss. 193 & 195.1(1)(c) of Criminal Code (Canada), 61 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 at pp. 1190-1191, 1197-1199, 1200-1201 41, 128 Ruth Sullivan, Construction of Statutes, 5th ed. (LexisNexis Canada 62 Inc.: 2008) at p. 172 75 Lazar Sarna, The Law of Declaratory Judgments, 3rd ed. (Carswell: 63 2007) at p. 112 145

Southam Inc. c. Canada (Procureur général), 1992 CarswellQue 50, 56, 58, 121, 64 1054 (J.C.S.) at paras. 9, 11, 35, 39, 41, 45, 49, 51-52 129 Southam Inc. v. Ontario, 1990 CarswellOnt 952 (C.A.) at paras. 25, 65 38 129 Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 1 66 S.C.R. 877, 1998 CarswellOnt 1981 (S.C.C.) at para. 39, 88 84 Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, 2006 CarswellOnt 4635 67 (S.C.J.) at paras. 34, 38-39 27, 28, 32 United States v. Shulman, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 616, 2001 CarswellOnt 68 962 (S.C.C.) at paras. 27, 32-33 145 Vancouver Sun, Re, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332, 2004 CarswellBC 1376 69 (S.C.C.) at paras. 34-36 72 *Not Reproduced Part VI – Table of Authorities Page 56

Cited at APPELLANT’S AUTHORITIES TAB Reproduced by Appellant – CBC et al Paragraph No.

Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 9 128 at pp. 976-977

20 R. v. Laba, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 965 at pp. 977-978 142

19, 21, 35, 41, 50, 22 R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at pp. 138-140 105, 127, 128 RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 28 S.C.R. 199 at para. 138 84, 106

Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188 at 32 129 para. 1

Cited at APPELLANT’S AUTHORITIES TAB Reproduced by Appellant – The Edmonton Sun Paragraph No. Canada (Attorney General) v. JTI MacDonald Corp., [2007] 2 2 S.C.R. 610 at para. 40 84 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v. New Brunswick (Attorney 5 General), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480 at paras. 45-46, 65-66 42, 129 Canadian Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney-General), [1988] 2 6 S.C.R. 122 at pp. 129, 133 42

42, 54, 56, 111, Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 at 7 113, 114, 121, 127, pp. 856-857, 868, 878-880, 884-887, 889-891 144

19 R. v. Domm, 1996 CarswellOnt 4539 (C.A.) at para. 29 143

Re Global Communications Ltd. v. Attorney-General for Canada, 30, 39, 42, 48, 67, 32 (1984) 44 O.R. (2d) 609 (C.A.) at pp. 619-620, 623-624 121

Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, 2009 CarswellOnt 301 28, 39, 42, 49, 54, 42 (C.A.) at paras. 24-26, 38-40, 87-88, 164, 175, 179-182 66, 89, 94, 147

Part VII – Statutes, Regulations, Rules, Etc. Page 57

PART VII – STATUTES, REGULATIONS, RULES, ETC.

APPENDIX A – ALBERTA, COURT OF QUEEN’S BENCH RULES

Rule 6

Part VII – Statutes, Regulations, Rules, Etc. Page 58

Rule 384

Rule 404

Part VII – Statutes, Regulations, Rules, Etc. Page 59

APPENDIX B – CANADA ACT 1982 (U.K.), 1982, C. 11, S. 52

Section 52 Updated on January 25, 2007 R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 44, Schedule B, s. 52 Constitution Act, 1982 1982, c. 11, Schedule B (U.K.) [Reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 44, Schedule B] Part VII General SECTION 52. Primacy of Constitution of Canada

52. (1) The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect.

Constitution of Canada

(2) The Constitution of Canada includes (a) the Canada Act 1982, including this Act; (b) the Acts and orders referred to in the schedule; and (c) any amendment to any Act or order referred to in paragraph (a) or (b).

Amendments to Constitution of Canada

(3) Amendments to the Constitution of Canada shall be made only in accordance with the authority contained in the Constitution of Canada.

1982, c. 11, Schedule B (U.K.), s. 52, effective April 17, 1982.

PARTIE VII DISPOSITIONS GÉNÉRALES Primauté de la 52. (1) La Constitution du Canada est la loi suprême du Canada; elle Constitution du rend inopérantes les dispositions incompatibles de toute autre Canada règle de droit.

Constitution du (2) La Constitution du Canada comprend : Canada a) la Loi de 1982 sur le Canada, y compris la présente loi; b) les textes législatifs et les décrets figurant à l'annexe; c) les modifications des textes législatifs et des décrets mentionnés aux alinéas a) ou b). Modification (3) La Constitution du Canada ne peut être modifiée que

conformément aux pouvoirs conférés par elle. Part VII – Statutes, Regulations, Rules, Etc. Page 60

APPENDIX C – CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS, R.S.C. 1985, APP. II, NO. 44, SCHED. B, PT. I Federal French Statutes reflect amendments current to June 11, 2009 Federal French Regulations are current to Gazette Vol. 143:15 (July 22, 2009)

Section 1 1. Rights and freedoms in Canada 1. Droits et libertés au Canada The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms La Charte canadienne des droits et libertés guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it garantit les droits et libertés qui y sont subject only to such reasonable limits énoncés. Ils ne peuvent être restreints que par prescribed by law as can be demonstrably une règle de droit, dans des limites qui soient justified in a free and democratic society. raisonnables et dont la justification puisse se démontrer dans le cadre d'une société libre et démocratique.

Section 2 2. Fundamental freedoms 2. Libertés fondamentales Everyone has the following fundamental Chacun a les libertés fondamentales freedoms: suivantes : (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and b) liberté de pensée, de croyance, d'opinion et expression, including freedom of the press and d'expression, y compris la liberté de la presse other media of communication; et des autres moyens de communication;

Section 7 7. Life, liberty and security of person 7. Vie, liberté et sécurité Everyone has the right to life, liberty and Chacun a droit à la vie, à la liberté et à la security of the person and the right not to be sécurité de sa personne; il ne peut être porté deprived thereof except in accordance with the atteinte à ce droit qu'en conformité avec les principles of fundamental justice. principes de justice fondamentale.

Section 9 9. Detention or imprisonment 9. Détention ou emprisonnement Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily Chacun a droit à la protection contre la detained or imprisoned. détention ou l'emprisonnement arbitraires. Part VII – Statutes, Regulations, Rules, Etc. Page 61

Section 10(c) 10. Arrest or detention 10. Arrestation ou détention Everyone has the right on arrest or detention Chacun a le droit, en cas d'arrestation ou de (c) to have the validity of the detention détention : determined by way of habeas corpus and to be c) de faire contrôler, par habeas corpus, la released if the detention is not lawful. légalité de sa détention et d'obtenir, le cas échéant, sa libération.

Section 11 11. Proceedings in criminal and penal 11. Affaires criminelles et pénales matters Tout inculpé a le droit : Any person charged with an offence has the b) d'être jugé dans un délai raisonnable; right c) de ne pas être contraint de témoigner contre (b) to be tried within a reasonable time; lui-même dans toute poursuite intentée contre (c) not to be compelled to be a witness in lui pour l'infraction qu'on lui reproche; proceedings against that person in respect of d) d'être présumé innocent tant qu'il n'est pas the offence; déclaré coupable, conformément à la loi, par (d) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty un tribunal indépendant et impartial à l'issue according to law in a fair and public hearing by d'un procès public et équitable; an independent and impartial tribunal; e) de ne pas être privé sans juste cause d'une (e) not to be denied reasonable bail without mise en liberté assortie d'un cautionnement just cause; raisonnable;

Section 24 24(1) Enforcement of guaranteed rights and 24(1) Recours en cas d'atteinte aux droits freedoms et libertés Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as Toute personne, victime de violation ou de guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed négation des droits ou libertés qui lui sont or denied may apply to a court of competent garantis par la présente charte, peut s'adresser jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court à un tribunal compétent pour obtenir la considers appropriate and just in the réparation que le tribunal estime convenable circumstances. et juste eu égard aux circonstances.

24(2) Exclusion of evidence bringing 24(2) Irrecevabilité d'éléments de preuve administration of justice into disrepute qui risqueraient de déconsidérer Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a l'administration de la justice court concludes that evidence was obtained in Lorsque, dans une instance visée au a manner that infringed or denied any rights or paragraphe (1), le tribunal a conclu que des freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the éléments de preuve ont été obtenus dans des evidence shall be excluded if it is established conditions qui portent atteinte aux droits ou that, having regard to all the circumstances, the libertés garantis par la présente charte, ces admission of it in the proceedings would bring éléments de preuve sont écartés s'il est établi, the administration of justice into disrepute. eu égard aux circonstances, que leur utilisation est susceptible de déconsidérer l'administration de la justice. Part VII – Statutes, Regulations, Rules, Etc. Page 62

APPENDIX D – CRIMINAL CODE, R.S.C. 1985, C. C-46 Federal English Statutes reflect amendments current to August 5, 2009 Federal English Regulations are current to Gazette Vol. 143:16 (August 5, 2009)

Section 187(1) 187(1) Manner in which application to be 187(1) Façon d'assurer le secret de la kept secret demande All documents relating to an application made Tous les documents relatifs à une demande pursuant to any provision of this Part are faite en application de la présente partie sont confidential and, subject to subsection (1.1), confidentiels et, sous réserve du paragraphe shall be placed in a packet and sealed by the (1.1), sont placés dans un paquet scellé par le judge to whom the application is made juge auquel la demande est faite dès qu'une immediately on determination of the décision est prise au sujet de cette demande; application, and that packet shall be kept in the ce paquet est gardé par le tribunal, en un lieu custody of the court in a place to which the auquel le public n'a pas accès ou en tout autre public has no access or in such other place as lieu auquel le public n'a pas accès ou en tout the judge may authorize and shall not be dealt autre lieu que le juge peut autoriser et il ne with except in accordance with subsections peut en être disposé que conformément aux (1.2) to (1.5). paragraphes (1.2) à (1.5).

Section 276.2(1) 276.2(1) Jury and public excluded 276.2(1) Exclusion du jury et du public At a hearing to determine whether evidence is Le jury et le public sont exclus de l'audition admissible under subsection 276(2), the jury tenue pour décider de l'admissibilité de la and the public shall be excluded. preuve au titre du paragraphe 276(2).

Section 276.3 276.3(1) Publication prohibited 276.3(1) Publication interdite No person shall publish in any document, or Il est interdit de publier ou de diffuser de broadcast or transmit in any way, any of the quelque façon que ce soit le contenu de la following: demande présentée en application de l'article (a) the contents of an application made under 276.1 et tout ce qui a été dit ou déposé à section 276.1; l'occasion de cette demande ou aux auditions (b) any evidence taken, the information given mentionnées à l'article 276.2. L'interdiction and the representations made at an application vise aussi, d'une part, la décision rendue sur la under section 276.1 or at a hearing under demande d'audition au titre du paragraphe section 276.2; 276.1(4) et, d'autre part, la décision et les (c) the decision of a judge or justice under motifs mentionnés à l'article 276.2, sauf, dans subsection 276.1(4), unless the judge or justice, ce dernier cas, si la preuve est déclarée after taking into account the complainant's admissible ou, dans les deux cas, si le juge ou right of privacy and the interests of justice, le juge de paix rend une ordonnance orders that the decision may be published, autorisant la publication ou la diffusion après broadcast or transmitted; and avoir pris en considération le droit du Part VII – Statutes, Regulations, Rules, Etc. Page 63

(d) the determination made and the reasons plaignant à la vie privée et l'intérêt de la provided under section 276.2, unless justice. (i) that determination is that evidence is admissible, or (ii) the judge or justice, after taking into account the complainant's right of privacy and the interests of justice, orders that the determination and reasons may be published, broadcast or transmitted.

276.3(2) Offence 276.3(2) Infraction Every person who contravenes subsection (1) Quiconque contrevient au paragraphe (1) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary commet une infraction punissable sur conviction. déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire.

Section 469 469. Court of criminal jurisdiction 469. Cour de juridiction criminelle Every court of criminal jurisdiction has Toute cour de juridiction criminelle est jurisdiction to try an indictable offence other compétente pour juger un acte criminel autre : than a) qu'une infraction visée par l'un des articles (a) an offence under any of the following suivants : sections: (i) article 47 (trahison), (i) section 47 (treason), (ii) article 49 (alarmer Sa Majesté), (ii) section 49 (alarming Her Majesty), (iii) article 51 (intimider le Parlement ou une (iii) section 51 (intimidating Parliament or a législature), legislature), (iv) article 53 (incitation à la mutinerie), (iv) section 53 (inciting to mutiny), (v) article 61 (infractions séditieuses), (v) section 61 (seditious offences), (vi) article 74 (piraterie), (vi) section 74 (piracy), (vii) article 75 (actes de piraterie), (vii) section 75 (piratical acts), or (viii) article 235 (meurtre); (viii) section 235 (murder), b) Complicité -- que l'infraction d'être (b) Accessories -- the offence of being an complice après le fait d'une haute trahison, accessory after the fact to high treason or d'une trahison ou d'un meurtre; treason or murder, c) Corruption de la justice -- qu'une (c) Corrupting justice -- an offence under infraction aux termes de l'article 119 section 119 (bribery) by the holder of a judicial (corruption) par le détenteur de fonctions office, judiciaires; (c.1) Crimes against humanity -- an offence c.1) Crimes contre l'humanité -- qu'une under any of sections 4 to 7 of the Crimes infraction visée à l'un des articles 4 à 7 de la Against Humanity and War Crimes Act; Loi sur les crimes contre l'humanité et les (d) Attempts -- the offence of attempting to crimes de guerre; commit any offence mentioned in d) Tentatives -- que l'infraction de tentative subparagraphs (a)(i) to (vii), or de commettre une infraction mentionnée aux (e) Conspiracy -- the offence of conspiring to sous-alinéas a)(i) à (vii); commit any offence mentioned in paragraph e) Complot -- que l'infraction de comploter (a). en vue de commettre une infraction mentionnée à l'alinéa a).

Part VII – Statutes, Regulations, Rules, Etc. Page 64

Section 486(1) 486(1) Exclusion of public in certain cases 486(1) Procès à huis clos Any proceedings against an accused shall be Les procédures dirigées contre l'accusé ont held in open court, but the presiding judge or lieu en audience publique, mais si le juge ou justice may order the exclusion of all or any le juge de paix qui préside est d'avis qu'il est members of the public from the court room for dans l'intérêt de la moralité publique, du all or part of the proceedings if the judge or maintien de l'ordre ou de la bonne justice is of the opinion that such an order is in administration de la justice d'exclure de la the interest of public morals, the maintenance salle d'audience l'ensemble ou l'un of order or the proper administration of justice quelconque des membres du public, pour tout or is necessary to prevent injury to ou partie de l'audience, ou que cela est international relations or national defence or nécessaire pour éviter toute atteinte aux national security. relations internationales ou à la défense ou à la sécurité nationales, il peut en ordonner ainsi.

Section 486.4 486.4(1) Order restricting publication -- 486.4(1) Ordonnance limitant la sexual offences publication -- infractions d'ordre sexuel Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge Sous réserve du paragraphe (2), le juge ou le or justice may make an order directing that any juge de paix qui préside peut rendre une information that could identify the complainant ordonnance interdisant de publier ou de or a witness shall not be published in any diffuser de quelque façon que ce soit tout document or broadcast or transmitted in any renseignement qui permettrait d'établir way, in proceedings in respect of l'identité d'un plaignant ou d'un témoin dans (a) any of the following offences: les procédures relatives à : (i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, a) l'une des infractions suivantes : 153.1, 155, 159, 160, 162, 163.1, 170, 171, (i) une infraction prévue aux articles 151, 152, 172, 172.1, 173, 210, 211, 212, 213, 271, 272, 153, 153.1, 155, 159, 160, 162, 163.1, 170, 273, 279.01, 279.02, 279.03, 346 or 347, 171, 172, 172.1, 173, 210, 211, 212, 213, 271, (ii) an offence under section 144 (rape), 145 272, 273, 279.01, 279.02, 279.03, 346 ou 347, (attempt to commit rape), 149 (indecent assault (ii) une infraction prévue aux articles 144 on female), 156 (indecent assault on male) or (viol), 145 (tentative de viol), 149 (attentat à 245 (common assault) or subsection 246(1) la pudeur d'une personne de sexe féminin), (assault with intent) of the Criminal Code, 156 (attentat à la pudeur d'une personne de chapter C-34 of the Revised Statutes of sexe masculin) ou 245 (voies de fait ou Canada, 1970, as it read immediately before attaque) ou au paragraphe 246(1) (voies de January 4, 1983, or fait avec intention) du Code criminel, chapitre (iii) an offence under subsection 146(1) (sexual C-34 des Statuts revisés du Canada de 1970, intercourse with a female under 14) or (2) dans leur version antérieure au 4 janvier 1983, (sexual intercourse with a female between 14 (iii) une infraction prévue aux paragraphes and 16) or section 151 (seduction of a female 146(1) (rapports sexuels avec une personne de between 16 and 18), 153 (sexual intercourse sexe féminin âgée de moins de 14 ans) ou (2) with stepdaughter), 155 (buggery or bestiality), (rapports sexuels avec une personne de sexe 157 (gross indecency), 166 (parent or guardian féminin âgée de 14 à 16 ans) ou aux articles procuring defilement) or 167 (householder 151 (séduction d'une personne de sexe permitting defilement) of the Criminal Code, féminin âgée de 16 à 18 ans), 153 (rapports Part VII – Statutes, Regulations, Rules, Etc. Page 65

chapter C-34 of the Revised Statutes of sexuels avec sa belle-fille), 155 (sodomie ou Canada, 1970, as it read immediately before bestialité), 157 (grossière indécence), 166 January 1, 1988; or (père, mère ou tuteur qui cause le (b) two or more offences being dealt with in déflorement) ou 167 (maître de maison qui the same proceeding, at least one of which is permet le déflorement) du Code criminel, an offence referred to in any of subparagraphs chapitre C-34 des Statuts revisés du Canada (a)(i) to (iii). de 1970, dans leur version antérieure au 1er janvier 1988; b) deux infractions ou plus dans le cadre de la même procédure, dont l'une est une infraction visée aux sous-alinéas a)(i) à (iii).

486.4(2) Mandatory order on application 486.4(2) Obligations du juge In proceedings in respect of the offences Dans les procédures relatives à des infractions referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the visées aux alinéas (1)a) ou b), le juge ou le presiding judge or justice shall juge de paix qui préside est tenu : (a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform a) d'aviser dès que possible les témoins âgés any witness under the age of eighteen years de moins de dix-huit ans et le plaignant de and the complainant of the right to make an leur droit de demander l'ordonnance; application for the order; and b) de rendre l'ordonnance, si le poursuivant, le (b) on application made by the complainant, plaignant ou l'un de ces témoins lui en fait la the prosecutor or any such witness, make the demande. order.

486.4(3) Child pornography 486.4(3) Pornographie juvénile In proceedings in respect of an offence under Dans les procédures relatives à une infraction section 163.1, a judge or justice shall make an visée à l'article 163.1, le juge ou le juge de order directing that any information that could paix rend une ordonnance interdisant de identify a witness who is under the age of publier ou de diffuser de quelque façon que ce eighteen years, or any person who is the soit tout renseignement qui permettrait subject of a representation, written material or d'établir l'identité d'un témoin âgé de moins a recording that constitutes child pornography de dix-huit ans ou d'une personne faisant within the meaning of that section, shall not be l'objet d'une représentation, d'un écrit ou d'un published in any document or broadcast or enregistrement qui constitue de la transmitted in any way. pornographie juvénile au sens de cet article.

486.4(4) Limitation 486.4(4) Restriction An order made under this section does not Les ordonnances rendues en vertu du présent apply in respect of the disclosure of article ne s'appliquent pas à la communication information in the course of the administration de renseignements dans le cours de of justice when it is not the purpose of the l'administration de la justice si la disclosure to make the information known in communication ne vise pas à renseigner la the community. collectivité.

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Section 487 487(1) Information for search warrant 487(1) Dénonciation pour mandat de A justice who is satisfied by information on perquisition oath in Form 1 that there are reasonable Un juge de paix qui est convaincu, à la suite grounds to believe that there is in a building, d'une dénonciation faite sous serment suivant receptacle or place la formule 1, qu'il existe un motif raisonnable (a) anything on or in respect of which any de croire que, dans un bâtiment, contenant ou offence against this Act or any other Act of lieu, se trouve, selon le cas : Parliament has been or is suspected to have a) une chose à l'égard de laquelle une been committed, infraction à la présente loi, ou à toute autre loi (b) anything that there are reasonable grounds fédérale, a été commise ou est présumée avoir to believe will afford evidence with respect to été commise; the commission of an offence, or will reveal b) une chose dont on a des motifs the whereabouts of a person who is believed to raisonnables de croire qu'elle fournira une have committed an offence, against this Act or preuve touchant la commission d'une any other Act of Parliament, infraction ou révélera l'endroit où se trouve la (c) anything that there are reasonable grounds personne qui est présumée avoir commis une to believe is intended to be used for the infraction à la présente loi, ou à toute autre loi purpose of committing any offence against the fédérale; person for which a person may be arrested c) une chose dont on a des motifs without warrant, or raisonnables de croire qu'elle est destinée à (c.1) any offence-related property, servir aux fins de la perpétration d'une may at any time issue a warrant authorizing a infraction contre la personne, pour laquelle un peace officer or a public officer who has been individu peut être arrêté sans mandat; appointed or designated to administer or c.1) un bien infractionnel, enforce a federal or provincial law and whose peut à tout moment décerner un mandat duties include the enforcement of this Act or autorisant un agent de la paix ou, dans le cas any other Act of Parliament and who is named d'un fonctionnaire public nommé ou désigné in the warrant pour l'application ou l'exécution d'une loi (d) to search the building, receptacle or place fédérale ou provinciale et chargé notamment for any such thing and to seize it, and de faire observer la présente loi ou toute autre (e) subject to any other Act of Parliament, to, loi fédérale, celui qui y est nommé : as soon as practicable, bring the thing seized d) d'une part, à faire une perquisition dans ce before, or make a report in respect thereof to, bâtiment, contenant ou lieu, pour rechercher the justice or some other justice for the same cette chose et la saisir; territorial division in accordance with section e) d'autre part, sous réserve de toute autre loi 489.1. fédérale, dans les plus brefs délais possible, à transporter la chose devant le juge de paix ou un autre juge de paix de la même circonscription territoriale ou en faire rapport, en conformité avec l'article 489.1. Part VII – Statutes, Regulations, Rules, Etc. Page 67

Section 487.3 487.3(1) Order denying access to 487.3(1) Ordonnance interdisant l'accès information used to obtain a warrant or aux renseignements donnant lieu au production order mandat ou à l'ordonnance de A judge or justice may, on application made at communication the time of issuing a warrant under this or any Le juge ou le juge de paix peut, sur demande other Act of Parliament or a production order présentée lors de la délivrance du mandat, en under section 487.012 or 487.013, or of vertu de la présente loi ou d'une autre loi granting an authorization to enter a dwelling- fédérale, de la délivrance d'une ordonnance de house under section 529 or an authorization communication prévue aux articles 487.012 under section 529.4 or at any time thereafter, ou 487.013 ou de celle de l'autorisation make an order prohibiting access to and the prévue aux articles 529 ou 529.4, ou par la disclosure of any information relating to the suite, interdire, par ordonnance, l'accès à warrant, production order or authorization on l'information relative au mandat, à the ground that l'ordonnance de communication ou à (a) the ends of justice would be subverted by l'autorisation et la communication de cette the disclosure for one of the reasons referred to information pour le motif que, à la fois : in subsection (2) or the information might be a) la communication, pour les raisons used for an improper purpose; and mentionnées au paragraphe (2), serait (b) the ground referred to in paragraph (a) préjudiciable aux fins de la justice ou outweighs in importance the access to the l'information pourrait être utilisée à des fins information. illégitimes; b) la raison visée à l'alinéa a) l'emporte sur l'importance de l'accès à l'information.

487.3(2) Reasons 487.3(2) Raisons For the purposes of paragraph (1)(a), an order L'ordonnance interdisant la communication au may be made under subsection (1) on the motif que celle-ci serait préjudiciable aux fins ground that the ends of justice would be de la justice peut être fondée sur les raisons subverted by the disclosure suivantes : (a) if disclosure of the information would a) la communication, selon le cas : (i) compromise the identity of a confidential (i) compromettrait la confidentialité de informant, l'identité d'un informateur, (ii) compromise the nature and extent of an (ii) compromettrait la nature et l'étendue des ongoing investigation, enquêtes en cours, (iii) endanger a person engaged in particular (iii) mettrait en danger ceux qui pratiquent des intelligence-gathering techniques and thereby techniques secrètes d'obtention de prejudice future investigations in which similar renseignements et compromettrait ainsi la techniques would be used, or tenue d'enquêtes ultérieures au cours (iv) prejudice the interests of an innocent desquelles de telles techniques seraient person; and utilisées, (b) for any other sufficient reason. (iv) causerait un préjudice à un innocent; b) toute autre raison suffisante.

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487.3(3) Procedure 487.3(3) Procédure Where an order is made under subsection (1), Tous les documents relatifs à une demande all documents relating to the application shall, faite en application du paragraphe (1) sont, subject to any terms and conditions that the sous réserve des modalités que le juge de paix justice or judge considers desirable in the ou le juge estime indiquées dans les circumstances, including, without limiting the circonstances, notamment quant à la durée de generality of the foregoing, any term or l'interdiction, la communication partielle de condition concerning the duration of the tout document, la suppression de certains prohibition, partial disclosure of a document, passages ou la survenance d'une condition, deletion of any information or the occurrence placés dans un paquet scellé par le juge de of a condition, be placed in a packet and sealed paix ou le juge auquel la demande est faite by the justice or judge immediately on dès qu'une décision est prise au sujet de cette determination of the application, and that demande; ce paquet est gardé par le tribunal, packet shall be kept in the custody of the court en un lieu auquel le public n'a pas accès ou en in a place to which the public has no access or tout autre lieu que le juge de paix ou le juge in any other place that the justice or judge may peut autoriser et il ne peut en être disposé que authorize and shall not be dealt with except in conformément aux modalités fixées par le accordance with the terms and conditions juge de paix ou le juge dans l'ordonnance ou specified in the order or as varied under dans l'ordonnance modifiée conformément au subsection (4). paragraphe (4).

487.3(4) Application for variance of order 487.3(4) Modification An application to terminate the order or vary La demande visant à mettre fin à l'ordonnance any of its terms and conditions may be made to ou à en modifier les modalités peut être the justice or judge who made the order or a présentée au juge de paix ou au juge qui l'a judge of the court before which any rendue ou à un juge du tribunal pouvant être proceedings arising out of the investigation in saisi de la poursuite découlant de l'enquête relation to which the warrant or production dans le cadre de laquelle le mandat, order was obtained may be held. l'ordonnance de communication ou l'autorisation a été délivré.

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Section 503(1)(b) 503(1) Taking before justice 503(1) Prévenu conduit devant un juge de A peace officer who arrests a person with or paix without warrant or to whom a person is Un agent de la paix qui arrête une personne delivered under subsection 494(3) or into avec ou sans mandat, auquel une personne est whose custody a person is placed under livrée en conformité avec le paragraphe subsection 163.5(3) of the Customs Act shall 494(3) ou à la garde de qui une personne est cause the person to be detained in custody and, confiée en conformité avec le paragraphe in accordance with the following provisions, to 163.5(3) de la Loi sur les douanes la fait be taken before a justice to be dealt with mettre sous garde et, conformément aux according to law: dispositions suivantes, la fait conduire devant (b) where a justice is not available within a un juge de paix pour qu'elle soit traitée selon period of twenty-four hours after the person la loi : has been arrested by or delivered to the peace b) si un juge de paix n'est pas disponible dans officer, the person shall be taken before a un délai de vingt-quatre heures après qu'elle a justice as soon as possible,unless, at any time été arrêtée par l'agent de la paix ou lui a été before the expiration of the time prescribed in livrée, elle est conduite devant un juge de paix paragraph (a) or (b) for taking the person le plus tôt possible, à moins que, à un moment before a justice, quelconque avant l'expiration du délai prescrit à l'alinéa a) ou b) pour la conduire devant un juge de paix :

Section 507(1) 507(1) Justice to hear informant and 507(1) Le juge de paix entend le witnesses -- public prosecutions dénonciateur et les témoins -- poursuites Subject to subsection 523(1.1), a justice who par le procureur général receives an information laid under section 504 Sous réserve du paragraphe 523(1.1), le juge by a peace officer, a public officer, the de paix qui reçoit une dénonciation faite en Attorney General or the Attorney General's vertu de l'article 504 par un agent de la paix, agent, other than an information laid before the un fonctionnaire public ou le procureur justice under section 505, shall, except if an général ou son représentant, autre qu'une accused has already been arrested with or dénonciation faite devant lui en application de without a warrant, l'article 505, doit, sauf lorsqu'un accusé a déjà (a) hear and consider, ex parte, été arrêté avec ou sans mandat : (i) the allegations of the informant, and a) entendre et examiner, ex parte : (ii) the evidence of witnesses, where he (i) les allégations du dénonciateur, considers it desirable or necessary to do so; (ii) les dépositions des témoins, s'il l'estime and utile; (b) where he considers that a case for so doing b) lorsqu'il estime qu'on a démontré qu'il est is made out, issue, in accordance with this justifié de le faire, décerner, conformément au section, either a summons or a warrant for the présent article, une sommation ou un mandat arrest of the accused to compel the accused to d'arrestation pour obliger l'accusé à attend before him or some other justice for the comparaître devant lui ou un autre juge de la same territorial division to answer to a charge même circonscription territoriale pour of an offence. répondre à l'inculpation.

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Section 515(1) 515(1) Order of release 515(1) Mise en liberté sur remise d'une Subject to this section, where an accused who promesse is charged with an offence other than an Sous réserve des autres dispositions du offence listed in section 469 is taken before a présent article, lorsqu'un prévenu inculpé justice the justice shall, unless a plea of guilty d'une infraction autre qu'une infraction by the accused is accepted, order, in respect of mentionnée à l'article 469 est conduit devant that offence, that the accused be released on his un juge de paix, celui-ci doit, sauf si un giving an undertaking without conditions, plaidoyer de culpabilité du prévenu est unless the prosecutor, having been given a accepté, ordonner que le prévenu soit mis en reasonable opportunity to do so, shows cause, liberté à l'égard de cette infraction, pourvu in respect of that offence, why the detention of qu'il remette une promesse sans condition, à the accused in custody is justified or why an moins que le poursuivant, ayant eu la order under any other provision of this section possibilité raisonnable de le faire, ne fasse should be made and where the justice makes an valoir à l'égard de cette infraction des motifs order under any other provision of this section, justifiant la détention du prévenu sous garde the order shall refer only to the particular ou des motifs justifiant de rendre une offence for which the accused was taken before ordonnance aux termes de toute autre the justice. disposition du présent article et lorsque le juge de paix rend une ordonnance en vertu d'une autre disposition du présent article, l'ordonnance ne peut se rapporter qu'à l'infraction au sujet de laquelle le prévenu a été conduit devant le juge de paix.

515(5) Detention in custody 515(5) Détention Where the prosecutor shows cause why the Lorsque le poursuivant fait valoir des motifs detention of the accused in custody is justified, justifiant la détention du prévenu sous garde, the justice shall order that the accused be le juge de paix ordonne que le prévenu soit detained in custody until he is dealt with détenu sous garde jusqu'à ce qu'il soit traité according to law and shall include in the record selon la loi et porte au dossier les motifs de sa a statement of his reasons for making the order. décision.

515(6) Order of detention 515(6) Ordonnance de détention Unless the accused, having been given a Malgré toute autre disposition du présent reasonable opportunity to do so, shows cause article, le juge de paix ordonne la détention why the accused's detention in custody is not sous garde du prévenu jusqu'à ce qu'il soit justified, the justice shall order, despite any traité selon la loi -- à moins que celui-ci, provision of this section, that the accused be ayant eu la possibilité de le faire, ne fasse detained in custody until the accused is dealt valoir l'absence de fondement de la mesure -- with according to law, if the accused is charged dans le cas où il est inculpé : (a) with an indictable offence, other than an a) soit d'un acte criminel autre qu'une offence listed in section 469, infraction mentionnée à l'article 469 : (i) that is alleged to have been committed while (i) ou bien qui est présumé avoir été commis at large after being released in respect of alors qu'il était en liberté après avoir été libéré another indictable offence pursuant to the à l'égard d'un autre acte criminel en vertu des provisions of this Part or section 679 or 680, dispositions de la présente partie ou des Part VII – Statutes, Regulations, Rules, Etc. Page 71

(ii) that is an offence under section 467.11, articles 679 ou 680, 467.12 or 467.13, or a serious offence alleged (ii) ou bien qui est prévu aux articles 467.11, to have been committed for the benefit of, at 467.12 ou 467.13 ou qui est une infraction the direction of, or in association with, a grave présumée avoir été commise au profit criminal organization, ou sous la direction d'une organisation (iii) that is an offence under any of sections criminelle, ou en association avec elle, 83.02 to 83.04 and 83.18 to 83.23 or otherwise (iii) ou bien qui est une infraction prévue à is alleged to be a terrorism offence, l'un des articles 83.02 à 83.04 et 83.18 à 83.23 (iv) an offence under subsection 16(1) or (2), ou une infraction de terrorisme présumée 17(1), 19(1), 20(1) or 22(1) of the Security of avoir été commise, Information Act, (iv) ou bien qui est une infraction prévue aux (v) an offence under subsection 21(1) or 22(1) paragraphes 16(1) ou (2), 17(1), 19(1), 20(1) or section 23 of the Security of Information Act ou 22(1) de la Loi sur la protection de that is committed in relation to on offence l'information, referred to in subparagraph (iv), (v) ou bien qui est une infraction prévue aux (vi) that is an offence under section 99, 100 or paragraphes 21(1) ou 22(1) ou à l'article 23 de 103, cette loi commise à l'égard d'une infraction (vii) that is an offence under section 244, or mentionnée au sous-alinéa (iv); that is an offence under section 239, 272 or (vi) ou bien qui est prévu aux articles 99, 100 273, subsection 279(1) or section 279.1, 344 or ou 103, 346 that is alleged to have been committed (vii) ou bien qui est prévu à l'article 244 ou, with a firearm, or s'il est présumé qu'une arme à feu a été (viii) that is alleged to involve, or whose utilisée lors de la perpétration de l'infraction, subject-matter is alleged to be, a firearm, a aux articles 239, 272 ou 273, au paragraphe cross-bow, a prohibited weapon, a restricted 279(1) ou aux articles 279.1, 344 ou 346, weapon, a prohibited device, any ammunition (viii) ou bien qui est présumé avoir mis en jeu or prohibited ammunition or an explosive une arme à feu, une arbalète, une arme substance, and that is alleged to have been prohibée, une arme à autorisation restreinte, committed while the accused was under a un dispositif prohibé, des munitions, des prohibition order within the meaning of munitions prohibées ou des substances subsection 84(1); explosives et avoir été commis alors qu'il était (b) with an indictable offence, other than an visé par une ordonnance d'interdiction au sens offence listed in section 469 and is not du paragraphe 84(1); ordinarily resident in Canada, b) d'un acte criminel autre qu'une infraction (c) with an offence under any of subsections mentionnée à l'article 469 et qui ne réside pas 145(2) to (5) that is alleged to have been habituellement au Canada; committed while he was at large after being c) soit d'une infraction visée à l'un des released in respect of another offence pursuant paragraphes 145(2) à (5) et présumée avoir to the provisions of this Part or section 679, été commise alors qu'il était en liberté après 680 or 816, or qu'il a été libéré relativement à une autre (d) with having committed an offence infraction en vertu des dispositions de la punishable by imprisonment for life under présente partie ou des articles 679, 680 ou subsection 5(3), 6(3) or 7(2) of the Controlled 816; Drugs and Substances Act or the offence of d) soit d'une infraction -- passible de conspiring to commit such an offence. l'emprisonnement à perpétuité -- aux paragraphes 5(3), 6(3) ou 7(2) de la Loi réglementant certaines drogues et autres substances ou d'avoir comploté en vue de commettre une telle infraction.

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515(10) Justification for detention in 515(10) Motifs justifiant la détention custody Pour l'application du présent article, la For the purposes of this section, the detention détention d'un prévenu sous garde n'est of an accused in custody is justified only on justifiée que dans l'un des cas suivants : one or more of the following grounds: a) sa détention est nécessaire pour assurer sa (a) where the detention is necessary to ensure présence au tribunal afin qu'il soit traité selon his or her attendance in court in order to be la loi; dealt with according to law; b) sa détention est nécessaire pour la (b) where the detention is necessary for the protection ou la sécurité du public, protection or safety of the public, including notamment celle des victimes et des témoins any victim of or witness to the offence, having de l'infraction, eu égard aux circonstances, y regard to all the circumstances including any compris toute probabilité marquée que le substantial likelihood that the accused will, if prévenu, s'il est mis en liberté, commettra une released from custody, commit a criminal infraction criminelle ou nuira à offence or interfere with the administration of l'administration de la justice; justice; and c) sa détention est nécessaire pour ne pas (c) if the detention is necessary to maintain miner la confiance du public envers confidence in the administration of justice, l'administration de la justice, compte tenu de having regard to all the circumstances, toutes les circonstances, notamment les including suivantes : (i) the apparent strength of the prosecution's (i) le fait que l'accusation paraît fondée, case, (ii) la gravité de l'infraction, (ii) the gravity of the offence, (iii) les circonstances entourant sa (iii) the circumstances surrounding the perpétration, y compris l'usage d'une arme à commission of the offence, including whether feu, a firearm was used, and (iv) le fait que le prévenu encourt, en cas de (iv) the fact that the accused is liable, on condamnation, une longue peine conviction, for a potentially lengthy term of d'emprisonnement ou, s'agissant d'une imprisonment or, in the case of an offence that infraction mettant en jeu une arme à feu, une involves, or whose subject-matter is, a firearm, peine minimale d'emprisonnement d'au moins a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a trois ans. term of three years or more.

515(11) Detention in custody for offence 515(11) Détention pour infraction mentioned in s. 469 mentionnée à l'article 469 Where an accused who is charged with an Le juge de paix devant lequel est conduit un offence mentioned in section 469 is taken prévenu inculpé d'une infraction mentionnée à before a justice, the justice shall order that the l'article 469 doit ordonner qu'il soit détenu accused be detained in custody until he is dealt sous garde jusqu'à ce qu'il soit traité selon la with according to law and shall issue a warrant loi et décerner à son sujet un mandat rédigé in Form 8 for the committal of the accused. selon la formule 8.

Section 516 516(1) Remand in custody 516(1) Renvoi sous garde A justice may, before or at any time during the Un juge de paix peut, avant le début des course of any proceedings under section 515, procédures engagées en vertu de l'article 515 on application by the prosecutor or the ou à tout moment au cours de celles-ci, sur accused, adjourn the proceedings and remand demande du poursuivant ou du prévenu, Part VII – Statutes, Regulations, Rules, Etc. Page 73

the accused to custody in prison by warrant in ajourner les procédures et renvoyer le prévenu Form 19, but no adjournment shall be for more à la détention dans une prison, par mandat than three clear days except with the consent of selon la formule 19, mais un tel ajournement the accused. ne peut jamais être de plus de trois jours francs sauf avec le consentement du prévenu.

Section 517 517(1) Order directing matters not to be 517(1) Ordonnance de non-publication published for specified period Si le poursuivant ou le prévenu déclare son If the prosecutor or the accused intends to intention de faire valoir des motifs justificatifs show cause under section 515, he or she shall aux termes de l'article 515 au juge de paix, so state to the justice and the justice may, and celui-ci peut et doit, sur demande du prévenu, shall on application by the accused, before or avant le début des procédures engagées en at any time during the course of the vertu de cet article ou à tout moment au cours proceedings under that section, make an order de celles-ci, rendre une ordonnance directing that the evidence taken, the enjoignant que la preuve recueillie, les information given or the representations made renseignements fournis ou les observations and the reasons, if any, given or to be given by faites et, le cas échéant, les raisons données the justice shall not be published in any ou devant être données par le juge de paix, ne document, or broadcast or transmitted in any soient ni publiés ni diffusés de quelque façon way before such time as que ce soit : (a) if a preliminary inquiry is held, the accused a) si une enquête préliminaire est tenue, tant in respect of whom the proceedings are held is que le prévenu auquel se rapportent les discharged; or procédures n'aura pas été libéré; (b) if the accused in respect of whom the b) si le prévenu auquel se rapportent les proceedings are held is tried or committed for procédures subit son procès ou est renvoyé trial, the trial is ended. pour subir son procès, tant que le procès n'aura pas pris fin. 517(2) Failure to comply 517(2) Omission de se conformer Every one who fails without lawful excuse, the Quiconque, sans excuse légitime, dont la proof of which lies on him, to comply with an preuve lui incombe, omet de se conformer à order made under subsection (1) is guilty of an une ordonnance rendue en vertu du offence punishable on summary conviction. paragraphe (1), est coupable d'une infraction punissable sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire.

Section 518 518(1) Inquiries to be made by justice and 518(1) Enquêtes devant être faites par le evidence juge de paix et preuve In any proceedings under section 515, Dans toutes procédures engagées en vertu de (a) the justice may, subject to paragraph (b), l'article 515 : make such inquiries, on oath or otherwise, of a) le juge de paix peut, sous réserve de l'alinéa and concerning the accused as he considers b), faire, auprès du prévenu ou à son sujet, desirable; sous serment ou autrement, les enquêtes qu'il (b) the accused shall not be examined by the estime opportunes; justice or any other person except counsel for b) le prévenu ne peut être interrogé par le juge the accused respecting the offence with which de paix ni par aucune autre personne, sauf son Part VII – Statutes, Regulations, Rules, Etc. Page 74 the accused is charged, and no inquiry shall be avocat, quant à l'infraction dont il est inculpé; made of the accused respecting that offence by aucune question ne peut lui être posée en way of cross-examination unless the accused contre-interrogatoire relativement à cette has testified respecting the offence; infraction à moins qu'il ait déjà témoigné à ce (c) the prosecutor may, in addition to any other sujet; relevant evidence, lead evidence c) le poursuivant peut, en sus de toute autre (i) to prove that the accused has previously preuve pertinente, présenter une preuve en been convicted of a criminal offence, vue : (ii) to prove that the accused has been charged (i) soit d'établir que le prévenu a with and is awaiting trial for another criminal antérieurement été déclaré coupable d'une offence, infraction criminelle, (iii) to prove that the accused has previously (ii) soit d'établir que le prévenu a été inculpé committed an offence under section 145, or d'une autre infraction criminelle et attend son (iv) to show the circumstances of the alleged procès à cet égard, offence, particularly as they relate to the (iii) soit d'établir que le prévenu a probability of conviction of the accused; antérieurement commis une infraction aux (d) the justice may take into consideration any termes de l'article 145, relevant matters agreed on by the prosecutor (iv) soit d'exposer les circonstances de and the accused or his counsel; l'infraction présumée, particulièrement en ce (d.1) the justice may receive evidence obtained qu'elles ont trait à la probabilité de la as a result of an interception of a private condamnation du prévenu; communication under and within the meaning d) le juge de paix peut prendre en of Part VI, in writing, orally or in the form of a considération toutes questions pertinentes sur recording and, for the purposes of this section, lesquelles se sont entendus le poursuivant et subsection 189(5) does not apply to such le prévenu ou son avocat; evidence; d.1) le juge de paix peut admettre en preuve (d.2) the justice shall take into consideration par écrit, de vive voix, ou sous forme any evidence submitted regarding the need to d'enregistrement, une communication privée ensure the safety or security of any victim of or qui a été interceptée au sens de la partie VI, le witness to an offence; and paragraphe 189(5) ne s'applique pas au (e) the justice may receive and base his présent article; decision on evidence considered credible or d.2) le juge de paix prend en considération trustworthy by him in the circumstances of toute preuve relative au besoin d'assurer la each case. sécurité des victimes ou des témoins de l'infraction qui lui est présentée; e) le juge de paix peut recevoir toute preuve qu'il considère plausible ou digne de foi dans les circonstances de l'espèce et fonder sa décision sur cette preuve. Part VII – Statutes, Regulations, Rules, Etc. Page 75

Section 522 522(1) Interim release by judge only 522(1) Mise en liberté provisoire par un Where an accused is charged with an offence juge listed in section 469, no court, judge or justice, Lorsqu'un prévenu est inculpé d'une infraction other than a judge of or a judge presiding in a mentionnée à l'article 469, aucun tribunal, superior court of criminal jurisdiction for the juge ou juge de paix, autre qu'un juge d'une province in which the accused is so charged, cour supérieure de juridiction criminelle ou may release the accused before or after the un juge présidant une telle cour, de la accused has been ordered to stand trial. province où le prévenu est inculpé ne peut mettre le prévenu en liberté avant ni après le renvoi aux fins de procès.

522(2) Idem 522(2) Idem Where an accused is charged with an offence Lorsqu'un prévenu est inculpé d'une infraction listed in section 469, a judge of or a judge mentionnée à l'article 469, un juge d'une cour presiding in a superior court of criminal supérieure de juridiction criminelle ou un juge jurisdiction for the province in which the présidant une telle cour dans la province où le accused is charged shall order that the accused prévenu est inculpé doit ordonner que ce be detained in custody unless the accused, dernier soit détenu sous garde à moins que le having been given a reasonable opportunity to prévenu, après en avoir eu la possibilité, ne do so, shows cause why his detention in démontre que sa détention sous garde au sens custody is not justified within the meaning of du paragraphe 515(10) n'est pas justifiée. subsection 515(10).

522(2.1) Order re no communication 522(2.1) Ordonnance de s'abstenir de A judge referred to in subsection (2) who communiquer orders that an accused be detained in custody L'ordonnance de détention visée au under this section may include in the order a paragraphe (2) peut en outre ordonner au direction that the accused abstain from prévenu de s'abstenir de communiquer, communicating, directly or indirectly, with any directement ou indirectement, avec toute victim, witness or other person identified in the personne -- victime, témoin ou autre -- order except in accordance with such identifiée dans l'ordonnance, si ce n'est en conditions specified in the order as the judge conformité avec les conditions qui y sont considers necessary. prévues et que le juge estime nécessaires.

522(3) Release of accused 522(3) Mise en liberté du prévenu If the judge does not order that the accused be Si le juge n'ordonne pas la détention sous detained in custody under subsection (2), the garde du prévenu prévue au paragraphe (2), il judge may order that the accused be released peut, par ordonnance, faire mettre le prévenu on giving an undertaking or entering into a en liberté sur remise de la promesse ou de recognizance described in any of paragraphs l'engagement visé aux alinéas 515(2)a) à e) et 515(2)(a) to (e) with such conditions described à celles des conditions prévues aux in subsections 515(4), (4.1) and (4.2) as the paragraphes 515(4), (4.1) et (4.2) qu'il judge considers desirable. considère souhaitables.

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522(4) Order not reviewable except under s. 522(4) Ordonnance non sujette à révision, 680 sauf en vertu de l'article 680 An order made under this section is not subject Une ordonnance rendue en vertu du présent to review, except as provided in section 680. article n'est sujette à révision que dans le cas prévu à l'article 680.

522(5) Application of ss. 517, 518 and 519 522(5) Application des art. 517, 518 et 519 The provisions of sections 517, 518 except Les dispositions des articles 517, 518, à subsection (2) thereof, and 519 apply with such l'exception de son paragraphe (2), et 519 modifications as the circumstances require in s'appliquent, compte tenu des adaptations de respect of an application for an order under circonstance, à l'égard d'une demande subsection (2). d'ordonnance en vertu du paragraphe (2).

522(6) Other offences 522(6) Autre infraction Where an accused is charged with an offence Lorsqu'un prévenu est inculpé à la fois d'une mentioned in section 469 and with any other infraction mentionnée à l'article 469 et d'une offence, a judge acting under this autre infraction, un juge agissant en vertu du section may apply the provisions of this Part présent article peut appliquer les dispositions respecting judicial interim release to that other de la présente partie relatives à la mise en offence. liberté provisoire à cette autre infraction.

Section 539 539(1) Order restricting publication of 539(1) Ordonnances restreignant la evidence taken at preliminary inquiry publication de la preuve recueillie lors Prior to the commencement of the taking of d'une enquête préliminaire evidence at a preliminary inquiry, the justice Avant qu'il ne commence à recueillir la holding the inquiry preuve lors d'une enquête préliminaire, le juge (a) may, if application therefor is made by the de paix qui préside l'enquête peut, à la prosecutor, and demande du poursuivant ou doit, à la (b) shall, if application therefor is made by any demande d'un prévenu, rendre une of the accused, ordonnance portant que la preuve recueillie make an order directing that the evidence taken lors de l'enquête ne peut être publiée ou at the inquiry shall not be published in any diffusée de quelque façon que ce soit avant document or broadcast or transmitted in any que chacun des prévenus ne soit libéré ou, s'il way before such time as, in respect of each of y a renvoi aux fins de procès, avant que le the accused, procès de chacun d'eux n'ait pris fin. (c) he or she is discharged, or (d) if he or she is ordered to stand trial, the trial is ended.

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539(2) Accused to be informed of right to 539(2) Le prévenu doit être averti qu'il a le apply for order droit de faire une demande d'ordonnance Where an accused is not represented by Lorsqu'un prévenu n'est pas représenté par counsel at a preliminary inquiry, the justice avocat lors de l'enquête préliminaire, le juge holding the inquiry shall, prior to the de paix qui tient l'enquête doit, avant qu'il ne commencement of the taking of evidence at the commence à recueillir la preuve à l'enquête, inquiry, inform the accused of his right to faire part à l'accusé de son droit de faire une make application under subsection (1). demande en vertu du paragraphe (1).

539(3) Failure to comply with order 539(3) Défaut de se conformer à Every one who fails to comply with an order l'ordonnance made pursuant to subsection (1) is guilty of an Est coupable d'une infraction punissable sur offence punishable on summary conviction. déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire quiconque fait défaut de se conformer à une ordonnance rendue en conformité du paragraphe (1).

Section 542 542(1) Confession or admission of accused 542(1) Aveu ou confession de l'accusé Nothing in this Act prevents a prosecutor La présente loi n'a pas pour effet d'empêcher giving in evidence at a preliminary inquiry any un poursuivant de fournir en preuve, à un admission, confession or statement made at enquête préliminaire, tout aveu, confession ou any time by the accused that by law is déclaration fait à quelque moment que ce soit admissible against him. par le prévenu et qui, d'après la loi, est admissible contre lui.

542(2) Restriction of publication of reports 542(2) Restriction visant la publication de of preliminary inquiry rapports sur l'enquête préliminaire Every one who publishes in any document, or Est coupable d'une infraction punissable sur broadcasts or transmits in any way, a report déclaration de culpabilité par procédure that any admission or confession was tendered sommaire quiconque publie ou diffuse de in evidence at a preliminary inquiry or a report quelque façon que ce soit un rapport portant of the nature of such admission or confession qu'un aveu ou une confession a été présenté so tendered in evidence unless en preuve à une enquête préliminaire, ou un (a) the accused has been discharged, or rapport indiquant la nature de tout semblable (b) if the accused has been committed for trial, aveu ou confession ainsi présenté en preuve, the trial has ended, sauf si l'accusé a été libéré ou, dans le cas où is guilty of an offence punishable on summary l'accusé a été renvoyé pour subir son procès, conviction. si le procès a pris fin.

Section 553 561(1) Right to re-elect 561(1) Droit à un nouveau choix An accused who elects or is deemed to have Un prévenu qui a choisi ou qui est réputé elected a mode of trial other than trial by a avoir choisi d'être jugé autrement que par un provincial court judge may re-elect, juge de la cour provinciale peut choisir : (a) at any time before or after the completion a) à tout moment avant ou après la fin de son of the preliminary inquiry, with the written enquête préliminaire avec le consentement Part VII – Statutes, Regulations, Rules, Etc. Page 78

consent of the prosecutor, to be tried by a écrit du poursuivant, d'être jugé par un juge de provincial court judge; la cour provinciale; (b) at any time before the completion of the b) à tout moment avant la fin de son enquête preliminary inquiry or before the fifteenth day préliminaire ou avant le quinzième jour following the completion of the preliminary suivant celle-ci, de droit, un autre mode de inquiry, as of right, another mode of trial other procès qui n'est pas un procès devant un juge than trial by a provincial court judge; and de la cour provinciale; (c) on or after the fifteenth day following the c) à partir du quinzième jour qui suit la completion of the preliminary inquiry, any conclusion de son enquête préliminaire, tout mode of trial with the written consent of the mode de procès avec le consentement écrit du prosecutor. poursuivant.

561(2) Right to re-elect 561(2) Droit à un nouveau choix An accused who elects to be tried by a Un prévenu qui a choisi d'être jugé par un provincial court judge or who does not request juge de la cour provinciale ou n'a pas a preliminary inquiry under subsection 536(4) demandé la tenue d'une enquête préliminaire may, not later than 14 days before the day first au titre du paragraphe 536(4) peut de droit, au appointed for the trial, re-elect as of right plus tard quatorze jours avant la date fixée another mode of trial, and may do so after that pour son procès, choisir un autre mode de time with the written consent of the prosecutor. procès; il ne peut par la suite le faire qu'avec le consentement écrit du poursuivant.

Section 567 567. Mode of trial when two or more 567. Mode de procès lorsqu'il y a deux ou accused plusieurs prévenus Despite any other provision of this Part, if two Nonobstant toute autre disposition de la or more persons are jointly charged in an présente partie, lorsque deux ou plusieurs information, unless all of them elect or re-elect personnes font l'objet d'inculpations énoncées or are deemed to have elected the same mode dans une dénonciation, si toutes ne choisissent of trial, the justice, provincial court judge or pas en premier lieu ou comme second choix judge may decline to record any election, re- ou ne sont pas réputées avoir choisi, selon le election or deemed election for trial by a cas, le même mode de procès, le juge de paix provincial court judge or a judge without a ou le juge de la cour provinciale ou le juge jury. peut refuser d'enregistrer le choix, le nouveau choix ou le choix présumé pour être jugé par un juge de la cour provinciale ou par un juge sans jury. Part VII – Statutes, Regulations, Rules, Etc. Page 79

Section 599 599(1) Reasons for change of venue 599(1) Motifs de renvoi A court before which an accused is or may be Un tribunal devant lequel un prévenu est ou indicted, at any term or sittings thereof, or a peut être mis en accusation à l'une de ses judge who may hold or sit in that court, may at sessions, ou un juge qui peut tenir ce tribunal any time before or after an indictment is found, ou y siéger, peut, à tout moment avant ou on the application of the prosecutor or the après la mise en accusation, à la demande du accused, order the trial to be held in a territorial poursuivant ou du prévenu ordonner la tenue division in the same province other than that in du procès dans une circonscription territoriale which the offence would otherwise be tried if de la même province autre que celle où (a) it appears expedient to the ends of justice; l'infraction serait autrement jugée, dans l'un or ou l'autre des cas suivants : (b) a competent authority has directed that a a) la chose paraît utile aux fins de la justice; jury is not to be summoned at the time b) une autorité compétente a ordonné qu'un appointed in a territorial division where the jury ne soit pas convoqué à l'époque fixée trial would otherwise by law be held. dans une circonscription territoriale où le procès aurait lieu autrement, en vertu de la loi.

Section 638 638(1) Challenge for cause 638(1) Récusation motivée A prosecutor or an accused is entitled to any Un poursuivant ou un accusé a droit à number of challenges on the ground that n'importe quel nombre de récusations pour (a) the name of a juror does not appear on the l'un ou l'autre des motifs suivants : panel, but no misnomer or misdescription is a a) le nom d'un juré ne figure pas sur la liste, ground of challenge where it appears to the mais aucune erreur de nom ou de désignation court that the description given on the panel ne peut être un motif de récusation lorsque le sufficiently designates the person referred to; tribunal est d'avis que la description portée sur (b) a juror is not indifferent between the Queen la liste désigne suffisamment la personne en and the accused; question; (c) a juror has been convicted of an offence for b) un juré n'est pas impartial entre la Reine et which he was sentenced to death or to a term of l'accusé; imprisonment exceeding twelve months; c) un juré a été déclaré coupable d'une (d) a juror is an alien; infraction pour laquelle il a été condamné à (e) a juror, even with the aid of technical, mort ou à un emprisonnement de plus de personal, interpretative or other support douze mois; services provided to the juror under section d) un juré est un étranger; 627, is physically unable to perform properly e) un juré est, même avec l'aide technique, the duties of a juror; or personnelle ou autre, ou avec les services (f) a juror does not speak the official language d'interprétation qui pourraient lui être fournis of Canada that is the language of the accused en vertu de l'article 627, physiquement or the official language of Canada in which the incapable de remplir d'une manière accused can best give testimony or both convenable les fonctions de juré; official languages of Canada, where the f) un juré ne parle pas la langue officielle du accused is required by reason of an order under Canada qui est celle de l'accusé ou la langue section 530 to be tried before a judge and jury officielle du Canada qui permettra à l'accusé who speak the official language of Canada that de témoigner le plus facilement ou les deux Part VII – Statutes, Regulations, Rules, Etc. Page 80 is the language of the accused or the official langues officielles du Canada, lorsque language of Canada in which the accused can l'accusé doit, conformément à une ordonnance best give testimony or who speak both official en vertu de l'article 530, subir son procès languages of Canada, as the case may be. devant un juge et un jury qui parlent la langue officielle du Canada qui est celle de l'accusé ou la langue officielle du Canada qui permettra à l'accusé de témoigner le plus facilement ou qui parlent les deux langues officielles du Canada, selon le cas.

Section 648 648(1) Restriction on publication 648(1) Publication interdite After permission to separate is given to Une fois la permission de se séparer donnée members of a jury under subsection 647(1), no aux membres d'un jury en vertu du paragraphe information regarding any portion of the trial at 647(1), aucun renseignement concernant une which the jury is not present shall be published phase du procès se déroulant en l'absence du in any document or broadcast or transmitted in jury ne peut être publié ou diffusé de quelque any way before the jury retires to consider its façon que ce soit avant que le jury ne se retire verdict. pour délibérer.

648(2) Offence 648(2) Infraction Every one who fails to comply with subsection Quiconque omet de se conformer au (1) is guilty of an offence punishable on paragraphe (1) est coupable d'une infraction summary conviction. punissable sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire.

Section 649 649. Disclosure of jury proceedings 649. Divulgation des délibérations d'un Every member of a jury, and every person jury providing technical, personal, interpretative or Est coupable d'une infraction punissable sur other support services to a juror with a physical déclaration de culpabilité par procédure disability, who except for the purposes of sommaire tout membre d'un jury ou toute (a) an investigation of an alleged offence under personne qui fournit une aide technique, subsection 139(2) in relation to a juror, or personnelle ou autre, ou des services (b) giving evidence in criminal proceedings in d'interprétation, à un membre du jury ayant relation to such an offence, une déficience physique et qui, sauf aux fins : discloses any information relating to the a) soit d'une enquête portant sur une infraction proceedings of the jury when it was absent visée au paragraphe 139(2) dont la from the courtroom that was not subsequently perpétration est alléguée relativement à un disclosed in open court is guilty of an offence juré; punishable on summary conviction. b) soit de témoigner dans des procédures engagées en matière pénale relativement à une telle infraction, divulgue tout renseignement relatif aux délibérations du jury, alors que celui-ci ne se trouvait pas dans la salle d'audience, qui n'a pas été par la suite divulgué en plein tribunal. Part VII – Statutes, Regulations, Rules, Etc. Page 81

APPENDIX E – JUDICATURE ACT, R.S.A. 2000, C. J-2

Section 1 Definition 1 In this Act, “Court” means the Court of Queen’s Bench or, on appeal, the Court of Appeal. RSA 1980 cJ-1 s1

Section 3 Jurisdiction of Court of Appeal 3 The Court of Appeal (a) has all the jurisdiction and powers possessed by the Supreme Court of the North-West Territories en banc immediately before the Court’s organization, and (b) has jurisdiction and power, subject to the Rules of Court, to hear and determine (i) all applications for new trials, (ii) all questions or issues of law, (iii) all questions or points in civil or criminal cases, (iv) all appeals or motions in the nature of appeals respecting a judgment, order or decision of (A) a judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench, or (B) a judge of a court of inferior jurisdiction when an appeal is given by any other Act, and (v) all other petitions, motions, matters or things whatsoever that might be brought in England before a Divisional Court of the High Court of Justice or before the Court of Appeal. RSA 1980 cJ-1 s3

Section 5(3)(i) Additional powers of Court (3) For the purpose of removing any doubt, but not so as to restrict the generality of subsections (1) and (2), it is declared that the Court has the like jurisdiction and powers that by the laws of England were, on July 15, 1870, possessed and exercised by the Court of Chancery in England in respect of (a) fraud, mistake and accident, Part VII – Statutes, Regulations, Rules, Etc. Page 82

(b) all matters relating to trusts, executors and administrators, partnerships and accounts, mortgages and awards, or to infants, idiots or lunatics and to the estates of infants, idiots or lunatics, (c) the staying of waste, (d) compelling specific performance of agreements and contracts, (e) compelling discovery of concealed papers or evidence, or such as might be wrongfully withheld from the party claiming the benefit of them, (f) preventing the multiplicity of actions, (g) decreeing the issue of letters patent from the Crown to rightful claimants, (h) decreeing the repeal of and making void letters patent issued by mistake or improvidently or through fraud, (i) the administration of justice where there exists no adequate remedy at law, and (j) a grant of injunction to stay waste in a proper case notwithstanding that the party in possession claims by an adverse legal title. RSA 1980 cJ-1 s5

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APPENDIX F - STATUTES OF CANADA, 2005, C. 32

Section 17 17. (1) The portion of subsection 517(1) of the Act before paragraph (a) is replaced by the following: Order directing matters not to be published for specified period 517. (1) If the prosecutor or the accused intends to show cause under section 515, he or she shall so state to the justice and the justice may, and shall on application by the accused, before or at any time during the course of the proceedings under that section, make an order directing that the evidence taken, the information given or the representations made and the reasons, if any, given or to be given by the justice shall not be published in any document, or broadcast or transmitted in any way before such time as (2) Subsection 517(3) of the Act is repealed.

17. (1) Le passage du paragraphe 517(1) de la même loi précédant l’alinéa a) est remplacé par ce qui suit : Ordonnance de non-publication 517. (1) Si le poursuivant ou le prévenu déclare son intention de faire valoir des motifs justificatifs aux termes de l’article 515 au juge de paix, celui-ci peut et doit, sur demande du prévenu, avant le début des procédures engagées en vertu de cet article ou à tout moment au cours de celles-ci, rendre une ordonnance enjoignant que la preuve recueillie, les renseignements fournis ou les observations faites et, le cas échéant, les raisons données ou devant être données par le juge de paix, ne soient ni publiés ni diffusés de quelque façon que ce soit : (2) Le paragraphe 517(3) de la même loi est abrogé.

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APPENDIX G – YOUTH CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT, S.C. 2002, C. 1

Section 110 110(1) Identity of offender not to be 110(1) Publication interdite published Sous réserve des autres dispositions du Subject to this section, no person shall publish présent article, il est interdit de publier le nom the name of a young person, or any other d'un adolescent ou tout autre renseignement information related to a young person, if it de nature à révéler qu'il a fait l'objet de would identify the young person as a young mesures prises sous le régime de la présente person dealt with under this Act. loi.

110(2) Limitation 110(2) Restriction Subsection (1) does not apply (a) in a case Le paragraphe (1) ne s'applique pas lorsque where the information relates to a young les renseignements :a) concernent un person who has received an adult sentence; adolescent à qui a été imposée une peine (b) subject to sections 65 (young person not applicable aux adultes; liable to adult sentence) and 75 (youth sentence b) concernent un adolescent à qui a été imposed despite presumptive offence), in a imposée une peine spécifique pour une case where the information relates to a young infraction désignée visée à l'alinéa a) de la person who has received a youth sentence for définition de ce terme au paragraphe 2(1) ou an offence set out in paragraph (a) of the pour une infraction visée à l'alinéa b) de cette definition "presumptive offence" in subsection définition à l'égard de laquelle le procureur 2(1), or an offence set out in paragraph (b) of général a donné l'avis mentionné au that definition for which the Attorney General paragraphe 64(2) (avis -- demande has given notice under subsection 64(2) d'assujettissement à la peine applicable aux (intention to seek adult sentence); and adultes), sous réserve des articles 65 (non- (c) in a case where the publication of assujettissement à la peine applicable aux information is made in the course of the adultes à l'initiative du procureur général) et administration of justice, if it is not the purpose 75 (imposition d'une peine spécifique pour of the publication to make the information une infraction désignée); known in the community. c) sont publiés dans le cadre de l'administration de la justice, à condition toutefois que la publication ne vise pas à diffuser les renseignements dans la collectivité. 110(3) Exception 110(3) Exception A young person referred to in subsection (1) Toute personne de plus de dix-huit ans peut may, after he or she attains the age of eighteen publier ou faire publier des renseignements de years, publish or cause to be published nature à révéler son identité et permettant de information that would identify him or her as savoir qu'elle a fait l'objet de mesures prises having been dealt with under this Act or the sous le régime de la présente loi ou de la Loi Young Offenders Act, chapter Y-1 of the sur les jeunes contrevenants, chapitre Y-1 des Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985, provided Lois révisées du Canada (1985), à condition that he or she is not in custody pursuant to qu'elle ne soit pas sous garde en application either Act at the time of the publication. de l'une ou l'autre de ces lois au moment de la publication. Part VII – Statutes, Regulations, Rules, Etc. Page 85

110(4) Ex parte application for leave to 110(4) Demande ex parte d'autorisation de publish publication A youth justice court judge shall, on the ex Sur demande ex parte présentée par un agent parte application of a peace officer, make an de la paix, le juge du tribunal pour order permitting any person to publish adolescents rend une ordonnance autorisant la information that identifies a young person as publication de tout renseignement révélant having committed or allegedly committed an l'identité d'un adolescent qui a commis un indictable offence, if the judge is satisfied that acte criminel ou à qui un acte criminel est (a) there is reason to believe that the young imputé, s'il est convaincu que :a) d'une part, il person is a danger to others; and y a des raisons de croire que l'adolescent est (b) publication of the information is necessary dangereux pour autrui; to assist in apprehending the young person. b) d'autre part, la publication des renseignements s'impose pour faciliter l'arrestation de l'adolescent.

110(5) Order ceases to have effect 110(5) Durée d'application de l'ordonnance An order made under subsection (4) ceases to La durée d'application de l'ordonnance est de have effect five days after it is made. cinq jours suivant celui où elle a été rendue.

110(6) Application for leave to publish 110(6) Demande d'autorisation de The youth justice court may, on the application publication of a young person referred to in subsection (1), Le tribunal peut, à la demande de l'adolescent make an order permitting the young person to concerné, autoriser celui-ci à publier tous publish information that would identify him or renseignements permettant de savoir qu'il a her as having been dealt with under this Act or fait l'objet de mesures prises sous le régime de the Young Offenders Act, chapter Y-1 of the la présente loi ou de la Loi sur les jeunes Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985, if the court contrevenants, chapitre Y-1 des Lois révisées is satisfied that the publication would not be du Canada (1985), s'il est convaincu qu'une contrary to the young person's best interests or telle publication n'est pas contraire à l'intérêt the public interest. de l'adolescent ou à l'intérêt public.

Section 111 111(1) Identity of victim or witness not to be 111(1) Non-publication d'identité (victimes published et témoins) Subject to this section, no person shall publish Sous réserve des autres dispositions du the name of a child or young person, or any présent article, il est interdit de publier le nom other information related to a child or a young d'un enfant ou d'un adolescent ou tout autre person, if it would identify the child or young renseignement de nature à révéler le fait qu'il person as having been a victim of, or as having a été victime d'une infraction commise par un appeared as a witness in connection with, an adolescent ou a témoigné dans le cadre de la offence committed or alleged to have been poursuite d'une telle infraction. committed by a young person.

Part VII – Statutes, Regulations, Rules, Etc. Page 86

111(2) Exception 111(2) Exception Information that would serve to identify a child La victime ou le témoin peuvent, en tout état or young person referred to in subsection (1) as de cause, publier ou faire publier de tels having been a victim or a witness may be renseignements après qu'ils ont atteint l'âge de published, or caused to be published, by (a) dix-huit ans ou, s'ils n'ont pas atteint cet âge, that child or young person after he or she avec le consentement de leur père et mère. En attains the age of eighteen years or before that cas de décès de la victime ou du témoin, leurs age with the consent of his or her parents; or père et mère peuvent publier ou faire publier (b) the parents of that child or young person if ces renseignements. he or she is deceased.

111(3) Application for leave to publish 111(3) Demande d'autorisation de The youth justice court may, on the application publication of a child or a young person referred to in Le tribunal pour adolescents peut, sur subsection (1), make an order permitting the demande de la victime ou du témoin child or young person to publish information concernés, les autoriser à publier tous that would identify him or her as having been a renseignements permettant de savoir qu'ils ont victim or a witness if the court is satisfied that été respectivement victime d'une infraction the publication would not be contrary to his or commise par un adolescent ou témoin dans le her best interests or the public interest. cadre de la poursuite de celle-ci, s'il est convaincu qu'une telle publication n'est pas contraire à leur intérêt ou à l'intérêt public.

Appendix H – Chronology of Events Page 87

APPENDIX H – CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS Unless otherwise indicated, authority for dates and events may be found in the Information dated July 18, 2005 [pp. 2-7 of RJR] or the Indictment dated March 20, 2006 [Tab L of AJR].

Date Event Comment July 18, 2005 Mr. White charged on a 2 count Information.

August 5, 2005 Mr. White elects to be tried by judge and jury.

September 8, 2005 Application in Provincial Court for Decision reserved. unsealing warrants and informations. October 4, 2005 Hearing of application for judicial Publication ban requested by Mr. interim release held in Court of White, and ordered.183 Queen’s Bench.

October 7, 2005 Decision of Provincial Court Applicant media were reminded regarding unsealing released. that a publication ban was in effect in relation to the bail hearing.184

October 7, 2005 Decision to release and Order to Publication ban stated to release. continue.185

Just before a recess is called for counsel to consider terms of release, the Court indicted that a publication ban had been granted and that the press should be aware of that fact, particularly as they wanted a copy of the Justice’s notes.186

November 9, 2005 Oral hearing on the Application for Publication ban requested by Mr. Direction to Review. White granted.187

183 Transcript of Proceedings, Bail Hearing [RJR at pp. 21/19 to 22/13] 184 Reasons for Decision of Caffaro P.C.J., Alberta Provincial Court – R. v. White, 2005 ABPC [RJR at pp. 8-9, paras. 3 and 6] 185 October 7, 2005 Bail Hearing [Tab T of AJR, Vol. III, at p. 273/12-14] 186 Ibid. [Tab T of AJR, Vol. III, at pp. 285/24 to 286/4] 187 Reasons for Decision of Berger J.A., Alberta Court of Appeal – R. v. White, 2005 ABCA 403 [RJR at p. 16, para. 14] Appendix H – Chronology of Events Page 88

November 18, 2005 Order directing that the s. 680 Publication ban continued pending review be heard by a panel of the further oral argument to be given Court of Appeal granted. on that same date, but later in the afternoon.

Additional oral argument re Counsel for the Respondent media publication ban presented. attended and provided argument on the issue of a publication ban, arguing in part that s. 517 was constitutionally suspect.188

December 9, 2005 Court of Appeal reasons for Berger, J.A. held that absent a decision continuing the publication constitutional challenge he could ban issued. not accede to the arguments advanced on behalf of the media.189

February 10, 2006 Oral hearing of the review held. Prior to the hearing of the review, counsel for media outlets advised that they would contest Mr. White’s application for a publication ban of the hearing.190

February 22, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeal in Publication ban requested by Mr. respect of the review application. White not granted.191 Mr. White ordered to be detained.

March 1-14, 2006 Preliminary Inquiry held.

March 14, 2006 Mr. White committed to stand trial on both counts.

May 9, 2006 Notice of Motion re constitutional This motion was filed by the challenge to s. 517 filed, returnable Appellants Canadian Broadcasting before Brooker, J. on May 10, Corporation, The Edmonton 2006. Journal, and CTV Television.192

July 5, 2006 Notice of Motion filed, returnable This motion was filed by the before Brooker, J. on Aug. 28, Appellant The Edmonton Sun.193 2006. August 28-29, 2006 Hearing held on constitutional question.

188 Reasons for decision of Berger J.A., 2005 ABCA 435 [Tab B of AJR, Vol. I, at para. 18] 189 Ibid. [Tab B of AJR, Vol. I, at paras. 18-21] 190 Memorandum of Judgment filed February 22, 2006, 2006 ABCA 65 [Tab C of AJR, Vol. I, at paras. 28, 31] 191 Ibid. [Tab C of AJR, Vol. I, at paras. 37-38] 192 Notice of Motion on behalf of the CBC et al, filed May 9, 2006 [Tab M, Vol. II, of AJR] 193 Notice of Motion on behalf of The Edmonton Sun, filed July 5, 2006 [Tab N, Vol. II, of AJR] Appendix H – Chronology of Events Page 89

October 23-31, 2006 Mr. White arraigned on both counts and pleaded not guilty. Pre-trial motions dealt with.

November 2 to Mr. White re-arraigned before jury. December 7, 2006 Trial before jury starts and continues.

December 7, 2006 Mr. White convicted by jury on both counts.

December 15, 2006 Mr. White sentenced to life imprisonment.

May 31, 2007 Decision of Brooker, J. on S. 517 declared unconstitutional constitutional question released.194

June 26, 2007 Appeal pursuant to s. 676(1)(b) filed by Crown.195

July 17, 2007 Motion pursuant to s. 680 filed by Crown.196

August 24, 2007 Motion pursuant to s. 680 filed by counsel on behalf of Mr. White.197

March 12, 2008 Appeals and motions consolidated by order of Watson J.A.198

September 3, 2008 Alberta Court of Appeal’s decision Appeal allowed; s. 517 saved by on constitutional question s. 1. released.199

194 Reasons for Judgment of Brooker Q.B.J. dated May 31, 2007 [Tab D, Vol. I, of AJR] 195 Notice of Appeal on behalf of the Appellant, Her Majesty the Queen, filed June 26, 2007 [Tab O, Vol. II, of AJR] 196 Notice of Motion on behalf of the Applicant, Her Majesty the Queen, filed July 17, 2007 [Tab P, Vol. II, of AJR] 197 Notice of Application on behalf of Michael White for Review pursuant to Section 680, filed August 24, 2007 [Tab Q, Vol. II, of AJR] 198 Written reasons of Watson J.A. filed March 12, 2008 [Tab F, Vol. I, of AJR]; Order of Watson J.A. filed April 7, 2008 [Tab G, Vol. I, of AJR] 199 Reasons for Judgment Reserved, filed September 3, 2008 [Tab I, Vol. I, of AJR]