Colin Dueck. The Obama Doctrine: American Grand Strategy Today. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. 336 pp. $24.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-19-020262-0.

Reviewed by Adam Quinn

Published on H-Diplo (February, 2016)

Commissioned by Seth Ofenbach (Bronx Community College, The City University of New York)

Over the last ffteen years, Colin Dueck has system of the strategic approaches he thinks are steadily built a deserved reputation within the available, including retrenchment, , academy as his generation’s leading scholar of the regime change/, engagement, accommo‐ ideological and political-cultural dimension of US dation, and ofshore balancing. grand strategy. In this latest book, we fnd him In a trajectory familiar to those acquainted drawing upon that background, in combination with Dueck’s past literature that slices and dices with a parallel strand of contemporary policy US policy and policymakers into distinct schools, analysis in his oeuvre, to make an early start on he moves seamlessly from sharply delineating what will no doubt be an extended process for these alternatives to conceding that no actually historians and political scientists: to ascertain, existing policymaker fts cleanly into any such cat‐ taxonomize, and evaluate the foreign policy strat‐ egory. Rather all—Obama included—pursue “hy‐ egy and legacy of President . brid” strategies that mix and match elements Obama is generally given credit for present‐ from several. In these taxonomical sections— ing a calm and moderate-sounding account of there are others later on the strands of the domes‐ whatever his policy might be at any given time. tic foreign policy debate and opposition—the When it comes to the substance of the underlying book is reminiscent of a less populist spin on Wal‐ strategy, however, he has at some point or other ter Russell Mead’s Special Providence (2002), or a been labeled in every way imaginable, from a more contemporary rif on a similar tune to that pseudo-liberal front man for the American impe‐ of Henry Nau in his recent Conservative Interna‐ rial project to a borderline-treasonously weak tionalism (2013). Individual readers’ enthusiasm agent of retreat. With due sobriety, Dueck lays the may vary when it comes to these sorts of catego‐ table for his own analysis by noting this diversity ry-mapping exercises, which seem to fall back on of diagnoses, then mapping out a classifcation diagnoses of blend and crossover when defed by H-Net Reviews reality. But as an example of its type, this one is taken communicated weakness and inconstancy. certainly well executed. Between this and his perceived aloofness towards When it comes to his evaluation of the Obama security allies, Dueck considers Obama to have presidency, Dueck’s account begins, as befts a ma‐ sent bad signals about the solidity of American ture critique that aspires to provide the defnitive commitments and its value as an alliance partner. analysis (at least for the time being), with an out‐ Such apparent missteps make more sense, line of the major planks of Obama strategy of the however, Dueck argues, if one understands that sort a relatively sympathetic analyst might give. Obama’s strategy did not really prioritize provid‐ His core thesis is that Obama was a president ing a consistent framework for efective delivery whose overriding priority was a transformational of the objectives articulated. Rather, the primary domestic agenda. We must therefore see his for‐ goal was simply to pull the United States back eign policy in this context, refecting a desire to from its entanglements, redirect resources home‐ keep costs down, sidestep decisions liable to trig‐ ward, and seize upon whatever policies and nar‐ ger division within his painstakingly assembled ratives would allow most progress in that direc‐ Democratic constituency, and above all avoid get‐ tion while staving of rows that might fracture the ting embroiled in anything sufciently large and support base necessary to sustain the president’s controversial to distract and detract from the domestic agenda. Dueck is also rather critical of overriding priority of “nation-building at home.” Obama as a manager of the policy process. He In Dueck’s telling, Obama’s strategy combined gives the president due credit for being personal‐ elements of almost all the options in the typology, ly calm, refective, and deliberative. His process, but with the emphasis on retrenchment and ac‐ however, has been highly centralized, entrusting commodation. His policies saw the United States an inner circle of White House loyalists with sig‐ draw down on regretted overseas ground opera‐ nifcant infuence while keeping the holders of se‐ tions in Iraq and Afghanistan, while restricting nior Cabinet ofces at arm’s length, and also, new interventions such as that in Libya strictly to some have claimed, more swayed by domestic po‐ a light-footprint model. In dealing with hostile litical considerations than the previous adminis‐ powers such as or great power rivals such as tration. or , he preferred a conciliatory ap‐ Having surveyed the main schools of conser‐ proach which seemed to assume that by being vative critique of Obama—these come in anti-in‐ considerate regarding what others perceived as terventionist, internationalist, and nationalist fa‐ their interests and displaying openness to conces‐ vors—the fnal part of Dueck’s book is given over sions, relationships based on good faith and mu‐ to advocacy for Dueck’s own favored approach, tual compromise might be available. Viewed in what he calls “conservative American realism.” isolation as a strategy for achieving US objectives Like most of the strategies ultimately advocated in the world, Dueck rates this “Obama doctrine” by the author in books of this genre, this has a as a disappointment: too many pre-emptive con‐ touch of Goldilocks about it: intervene, but pru‐ cessions without ensuring reciprocity and too dently and only when interests are in play; main‐ much false optimism about the behavior of rival tain American credibility through robust and con‐ powers based on a shaky understanding of the fdence-inspiring commitment to appropriate al‐ rules of international politics. Meanwhile, in his lies; and do not overreach or get drawn into costly handling of the political and strategic turbulence conficts unnecessarily. Still, with its emphasis on of the Middle East, the gap between Obama’s ob‐ a more explicit and hard-nosed transactional bar‐ jectives as articulated and the concrete actions gaining with great powers, and a “say what you

2 H-Net Reviews mean, mean what you say” approach to allies and fact arguing, but the point is that relative inaction interventions, it is hard to deny the appeal of may not be simply a matter of prioritization as Dueck’s formulation, or that it would make for a much as it is a matter of pessimism about efec‐ bracing change if implemented. Likewise, his rec‐ tiveness. The part of Dueck’s critique that unques‐ ommendation of greater investment in the strate‐ tionably does land hard is that Obama has dis‐ gic planning sections of the main foreign and se‐ played a penchant for talking bigger than he in‐ curity departments, and better structures to draw tended to live up to in concrete policy, and for them together in pursuit of coherence, is hard to crafting narratives around his policy that create a oppose if you believe long-term planning and co‐ misleading veneer of consistency, one that quickly herence matter. falls away when subjected to stress or inspection. There are elements of Dueck’s analysis that With the beneft of hindsight, the strong sus‐ might strike a critic as loose threads worth picion must be that Obama, if given an entirely pulling. Obama’s own description of his domestic free hand, simply wanted no part of the Afghan agenda might ft the bill of being “transformation‐ commitment he inherited, and no part of the Syri‐ al” as advertised here, as might some of the ambi‐ an civil war that came about after he took ofce, tious projects of his frst two years in ofce such even while foreseeing that less American involve‐ as the Afordable Care Act. But with the loss of the ment might be good news for actors distasteful to House of Representative to uncompromising Re‐ the United States. Perhaps he should have been publicans from 2010 onward, liberal legislative more straightforward publicly about these posi‐ proposals have been dead on arrival since then. tions, and more unambiguous in his pursuit of To what extent, then, can we accurately talk of a them. Perhaps, for similar reasons, he should transformational domestic agenda dominating have thought better of intervention in Libya. And that president’s time and attention after that Dueck’s case that policy during the “revolution” in point, unless by that we mean simply fghting to Egypt would have benefted from less naivety is hold onto existing achievements in the face of persuasive. Meanwhile, Obama’s belief that the pressure for rollback? United States should invest in its military options On the rationale for policy, the idea that Oba‐ for hedging against China’s rise at the same time ma might have been more active if his priorities cutting back on misadventures in peripheral had been diferent may understate the extent that states appears both sincere and right. If Dueck is he was genuinely convinced none of the more ac‐ correct that the signals of priority in this direction tivist roads untaken would have actually deliv‐ from the president have not been followed by ered the outcomes the United States wanted. If proportionate resource allocation, the correction there is one lesson Obama learned from his pre‐ truer to Obama’s strategic conviction would be to decessor abroad, it may be that there is at best a follow through more fully on resourcing the pivot limited connection between investment and re‐ to Asia, not to restore spending levels across the sults in foreign policy. When Obama looked at board. Iraq, Syria, or Afghanistan, his reasonable view Of course realist prescriptions such as those may well have been that America’s choice was be‐ with which Dueck concludes lead us to a major tween committing the minimum politically possi‐ political challenge with which he is well acquaint‐ ble and seeing unwelcome events unfold, versus ed: can American leaders craft a strategy that ex‐ committing more resources in exchange for the plicitly cleaves to realist principles while also same results, perhaps very slightly delayed. Per‐ holding in place sufcient and stable domestic po‐ haps this is merely to rephrase what Dueck is in litical support? After all, as noted above and as he

3 H-Net Reviews seems well aware himself, many of the features of this manner. This has, however, long been an un‐ Obama’s behavior of which Dueck is critical may certainty in debates over US policy: could an stem less from inconsistency or inadequacy in the American populace weaned for decades on relent‐ president’s actual preferences, but from the need less sermons about the necessity and virtue of to keep his coalition together and also speak in American global leadership and the universal va‐ language public opinion recognizes and accepts. lidity of liberal values be induced overnight to Domestic political and ideological constraints are subsist happily on a diet of raw and unvarnished no less real, after all, than the external realities realist narratives about hard bargaining on be‐ with which strategists must contend. half of the national interest narrowly defned? Suppose it were true—as seems quite plausi‐ Even if a president were inclined to try, opportu‐ ble—that Obama’s personal position on nities would be numerous for political rivals to Afghanistan from the outset was that he simply play for advantage by tapping of the reservoirs of wanted the United States to withdraw, and be‐ ideological sentiment thus left unattended. This yond some bare essentials was not especially would be especially the case when the country bothered by what that meant for government of was next inevitably confronted by instances of that country. Such a position—cutting losses and human sufering, calculated terrorist outrages, or escaping a draining ground war in strategically nose-thumbing provocations from a rival great peripheral place—would be eminently reconcil‐ power. able with realist principles. But could a president It may be true that President Obama’s strate‐ simply come out and put it in those terms within gy would have benefted from fewer illusions the confnes of the politics of 2010? Surely not about the likely outcomes of some of his chosen without alienating military leaders, powerful Cab‐ paths. But believing that unvarnished realism inet ofcers, and large swathes of congressional could be established and sustained explicitly as and public opinion. Hence the occurrence of the the guiding framework for US policy may require pattern Dueck identifes: the articulation of a plan a few illusions of its own about the malleability of that appears highly unlikely to achieve its claimed the ideology tendencies prevailing in the polity. objectives, not because the president believes in it Nevertheless, whatever reservations one might but because it basically trends as close as is realiz‐ have about its prospects for imminent adoption as able towards his preferred destination, while presidential doctrine, Dueck’s charted alternative, making the gestures and compromises required to and his critique of Obama, present a bracing and remain viable in the courts of elite and public richly knowledgeable analysis of pressing ques‐ opinion. In this and other instances, a president tions. This book is to be recommended both as free to be entirely honest might simply explain food for thought for those already initiated into what appear to be tensions between the avowed the world of policy and as an accessible primer ends and means of policy by reference to the obli‐ for a more general audience interested seeking gation political reality often imposes to be some‐ context for Obama’s choices and legacy. what disingenuous. In proposing conservative American realism, Dueck believes he can see a way through to an American policy that is all at once clearer in defning the boundaries of US interests, more ro‐ bustly transactional in dealings with others, and transparent about the fact that it is operating in

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Citation: Adam Quinn. Review of Dueck, Colin. The Obama Doctrine: American Grand Strategy Today. H- Diplo, H-Net Reviews. February, 2016.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=44978

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