"Against Match Fixing - European Research & Education Program"

Project Number: 590606‐ EPP‐1‐2017‐1‐PL‐SPO‐SCP

"AGAINST MATCH FIXING - EUROPEAN RESEARCH & EDUCATION PROGRAM"

"REPORT ON THE ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES IN FIXING ACTIVITIES IN THE EU AND IN THE WORLD"

Intellectual Output IO1 of the Project ‘Against match‐fixing – European Research & Education Program’, Project Number: 590606‐ EPP‐1‐2017‐1‐PL‐SPO‐SCP 2

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION: Match-fixing as an international problem……………………...…………3 SECTION I. Overview of match-fixing……...…………………………………………….…..4 Chapter 1. What is match-fixing?...... 4 Chapter 2. Known match fixing methods, with the division Into corruptive activities and other………………………………………………….…………6 SECTION II – The research on the field………………………………………………………9 Chapter 1. Cases of match-fixing in international football (total cases-20)…………………...9 ANALYSIS………………..……………………………….………………………..………..32 Comments and conclusions…………………………………………………………….……..35 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………..36

INTRODUCTION: MATCH-FIXING AS AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM

Sport is played according to the values of integrity and fair competition. However, integrity in sports competitions, and the integrity of sport in a more general sense, has come under increasingly serious threat from match-fixing. A combination of factors has allowed this threat to grow, including personal greed, weak governance structures of sport as a sector, easily accessible global betting markets that are open to exploitation, low prioritization of match-fixing as a threat by law enforcement agencies and the use of sport by organized criminals to advance their own interests (Resource Guide on Good Practices in the Investigation of Match-Fixing, 2016). Moreover, match-fixing often involves organized criminal networks active on a global scale who see it as a low-risk high-profit activity. It is a problem that has now become a priority for public authorities, the sport movement and law enforcement agencies worldwide (EU Work Plan for Sport 2014-2017). In the case of many countries and sports, fixing the results of sports events has become a key problem. Doubts about the fairness of the results achieved sporting have violated the trust in sport, and corruption scandals in sport have repeatedly been topics covered on the front pages of newspapers in many European countries (A mapping of criminal law provisions in EU 27, 2012). The problem of match-fixing is not a problem of one country or one sport – it is a global problem for both developed and developing countries, professional and amateur sport, youth and senior competitions, and both team and individual sports. This heterogeneity defines the aim of this report, to look at the different understandings and definitions of "match-fixing" and what types of corruption are found in sports. In addition, the reports use the sports football as an example to first present 20 match-fixing cases of different nature in different contexts and afterwards reviewing the cases for re-occurring patterns and tendencies.

SECTION I. OVERVIEW OF MATCH-FIXING

CHAPTER 1. WHAT IS MATCH-FIXING? Sport is a global phenomenon engaging billions of people and generating annual revenues of more than US $145 billion (Global Corruption Report: Sport - Transparency International, 2016). It is well known that the prestigious, spectacular and advertising potential of the Olympic Games, World, European Championships and other tournaments inevitably binds the sport with huge financial investments. Under the influence of these factors, the specific profile of sport is used, both nationally and internationally. In parallel, there are a number of psychological, moral and health problems that need to be addressed on a strictly scientific basis, as a necessary prophylaxis against some deforming tendencies in its development. This creates a precondition for the positive impact of sport as well as for the emergence of different corrupt practices. Corruption in sport is not a new phenomenon. The earliest recorded case, at the Olympic Games in 388 BC, details how Eupolos of Thessalia bribed three of his competitors in a fighting tournament allowing him to win a gold medal (Hill D, 2013). In today's society, there are many different understandings of what "match-fixing" is. The constant commercialization of sport and the enormous economic importance requires to make a concerted effort to build a single policy and strategy that brings together a wide range of educational, preventive and severely punitive measures at all levels in the sport system. The different levels of corruption in sport leads to the destruction of the moral foundations of sport, as a standard for gentlemanly behavior and fair sportsmanship and as criteria for the natural capabilities of man in the field of motor activity. In the following part of the report examples of different definitions of "match-fixing" are presented. On this basis, we will make a generic definition of the needs of this project.

Definition 1: “Match-fixing occurs ‘when a player or referee deliberately underperforms during a sporting contest to ensure that one team loses or draws the match” (Hill D, 2013).

Definition 2:

‘The deliberate fixing of the result of a contest, or of an occurrence within the context or of points spread; deliberate underperformance; withdrawal (also known as "tanking", "manipulation" and "experimenting"); an official’s deliberate misapplication of the rules of the contest; Interference with the play or playing surfaces by venue staff; and abuse of insider information to support a bet placed by any of the above or placed by a gambler who has recruits such people to manipulate an outcome or contingency” (Australian Sports Minister’s Council, 2015).

Definition 3: “In sport, corruption may take the form of behaviour by athletes who refrain from achieving the level of performance normally required in the sport in question to win the competition and instead intentionally permit others to win, or behaviour by sporting officials who consciously perform their allocated tasks in a manner at variance with the objectives and moral values of the relevant club, association, competitive sports in general and/or society at large (Maennig W, 2005).

Definition 4: “Corruption in sport involves any illegal, immoral or unethical activity that attempts to deliberately distort the result of a sporting contest for the personal material gain of one or more parties involved in that activity” (Gorse, S. & Chadwick, S, 2010)

Definition 5: “Manipulation of sport competitions means an intentional arrangement, act or omission aimed at an improper alteration of the result or the course of a sport competition in order to remove all or part of the unpredictable nature of the aforementioned sport competition with a view to obtaining an undue advantage for oneself or for others.” (Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions, 2016)

Generic definition: Match-fixing covers any act or omission – inconsistent with the spirit of sport – which leads to an influence on the outcome of a sporting encounter.

CHAPTER 2. KNOWN MATCH FIXING METHODS, WITH THE DIVISION INTO CORRUPTIVE ACTIVITIES AND OTHER Match-fixing in sport is often associated with manipulation of a sporting outcome for financial gains through the means of usually unregulated sports betting operators and linked to criminal gangs. However, there are also other forms of match-fixing, which are not just related to a financial gain. The UNODC Resource Guide on Good Practices in the Investigation of Match-Fixing distinguishes between two principal forms of match-fixing: betting-related forms of match- fixing, with the aim of making an ‘illicit financial gains’ and sporting-motivated form of match-fixing ‘that are not related to betting and are less likely to have criminal involvement’, it is also noted that ‘in general, the investigation of sporting-related match-fixing is more challenging because without betting evidence it is more difficult to prove that a criminal offence has taken place ’ (Resource Guide on Good Practices in the Investigation of Match- Fixing-United Nations, 2016) Because of the lack of evidence, there is the risk that the focus is just on betting- related forms of match-fixing, while ‘there is a danger that stakeholders neglect to properly address a significant part of match-fixing which has no betting element but which equally impacts on the integrity of sport’, as warned in the study ‘Sports betting: commercial and integrity issues’.

МATCH-FIXING WITH FINANCIAL GAINS ● Deliberate under Performance (Players from one team involved) or Collaborative Performance (Players from both teams involved) Less common, but a higher chance of success in arranging: It is a specific kind of corrupt sport in which an athlete is promised money in exchange for an assurance that the team will not cover the point spread. The corruptor then bets on that team’s opponent and pays the corrupt player with proceeds from a winning wager. Also, the gamblers could persuade athletes (favorites) to miss a couple of shots but still, the team must win its match to escape from the detection radar. ● Bribery of or threats against another person to influence a sports competition in a particular direction: Key players drugged before a game to reduce performance, energy and wellbeing. ● Betting on your own races/matches and competitions

Is covered by and prohibited according to the statutory rule as similar unethical conduct. Betting on your own competition, even if you bet on your own victory. This applies whether you are an athlete, referee, official, coach or another support person, or if you otherwise can directly or indirectly affect the outcome of the competition. ● Barter corruption: buying a sport win without cash 1. In such barter corruption, an athlete or team A on the brink of being relegated downward in the sporting hierarchy, and thus in absolute need of a win, offers an athlete or team B a bribe to win; this bribe is not paid in cash but later on with some planned losses accepted by A in further matches against B. Barter corruption is difficult to detect since there is no money flow or material indices (Andreff W., 2016) ● Corruption at the level of sport Governing bodies Corrupt sport insiders may belong to governing bodies. A major case in point happens to emerge when allocating mega-sporting events such as the Olympics and FIFA World Cup or appointing someone to an honorary VIP position in a sport governing bodies (Maennig W., 2005) ● Abuse of inside information: For example, by passing on information that can be exploited in connection with betting. That is information that a person acquires as a result of the person’s relationship to the sports competition, which is not generally known and which can be exploited in connection with betting. ● Receiving gifts that are not naturally connected to the sports competition. This prohibition applies regardless of whether you are an athlete, referee, official, coach or another support person, or if you can otherwise directly or indirectly affect the outcome of the competition. ● Asymmetry in evaluation of gains As mentioned before, when one team is still struggling to survive in the competition and another team is already secure, the first team has far more to win than the other team has to lose. The presence of this asymmetry allows match-fixing, although there are also certain cases where a huge asymmetry does not allow rigging and both teams will create a higher payoff from simply playing the game with full dedication. It is also possible that the low-evaluation team does not want to rig the game but the high- evaluation team wants to put a lot of effort into fixing the match. And there are also cases where both teams are willing to cooperate for their own benefit.

MATCH-FIXING FOR NON-FINANCIAL GAINS  Obtaining a favourable draw When a team deliberately decides to lose or fix a match to avoid to play against a strong team in the following round, obtaining a more favourable draw.  Give advantage to a teammate This practice consists of deliberately sabotage a race/match by the least favoured teammate to provide an advantage to the favoured teammate.  Fixing a match to the detriment of a rival team When two teams agree beforehand the outcome of a match, given the draws results, to make sure other teams in the same draw do not advance in the tournament.  Cheating A deliberate pretended act by one of the players which would give a competitive advantage/disadvantage, not performed by sporting competition act (e.g. scoring a point), to a specific team. According to the study ‘Sports betting: legal, commercial and integrity issues’ this kind of match-fixing used in those sports whose commercial revenue streams are at risk.

SECTION II – THE RESEARCH ON THE FIELD Chapter 1. Cases of match-fixing in international football (total cases-20)

CASE 1: GERMANY – “HOYZER” (2005) Background In 2005, German football faced its biggest match-fixing scandal in almost three decades. The betting-related case was centered around referee Robert Hoyzer and the three Croatian brothers Ante, Filip, and Milan Sapina. Hoyzer who was at this time a referee of the second division was offered money to fix the results of games by making certain referee decisions. The other three would place enormous bets with Asian bookmakers on the outcome of those games. The first fixing attempt took place in May 2004 were one of the brothers offered Hoyzer €8,000 if he is able to manipulate the football match between Chemnitz FC and FC Paderborn. Although the attempt failed, it marks the starting point of overall 23 games from the second and third division and the DFB-Cup. The most famously fixed match, in this case, took place in August 2004 during the opening round of the DFB-Cup between the first division team Hamburger SV and the second division team SC Paderborn. Hoyzer awarded two unjustified penalties against the Hamburger SV and sent off HSV striker Emil Mpenza with a red card for protesting those calls. The final fixed match took place in December 2004 where another referee, Dominik Marks who was recruited by Hoyzer, received money to influence the outcome. However, afterwards, no significant influence could be identified. In January 2005, three fellow referees went to the DFB with their suspicion that Hoyzer is involved in a match-fixing scandal. After hearing from the accusations Hoyzer stepped immediately down as a German referee and started to cooperate with the investigators from this point on. Type of corruption With referees and players involved, the corruptive actions can be classified as deliberate underperformance or collaborative performance. The underperformance of the referee has been for example the awarding of false penalties. The underperformance from players, in this case, is defined by losing a match with conceding goals. Legal consequences In the following criminal proceedings, Robert Hoyzer was convicted for aiding fraud in six cased and sentenced to 29 months in prison. Ante Sapina was sentenced to 35 months in prison for ten cases of fraud by the Federal Supreme Court Justice. The other two brothers received suspended sentences. The referee Dominik Marks received an 18-month sentence

due to his involvement. During the criminal proceedings difficulties in applying the fraud provision of the German Criminal Code on persons responsible for the fraud as active participants on the pitch occurred which was used as an argument by prosecutions to overturn Hoyzers conviction. The Federal Supreme Court ruled in December 2006 that fraud has taken place and refused to reduce the sentences. However, due to the difficulties, the German government decided in 2017 to amend the German Criminal Code to make it more applicable to betting fraud and other kinds of manipulation of sports events. Financial consequences The Sapina brother made a total profit of around €2 million. For example, for the famously fixed game between SC Paderborn and Hamburger SV bets of around €83,000 were placed through 175 betting slips. After Paderborn won the game, the total profit amounted to €778,502.10. Hoyzer received in total €67.000 for all manipulations. After the judgment, Hoyzer agreed to pay €750,000 compensation fee to the DFB which helps him to avoid a lawsuit where the DFB would have requested a total compensation of €8 million. In the end, Hoyzer only had to pay around €126,000 in exchange for giving up the rights of making any money through the scandal by for example publishing a book. The Hamburger SV received compensation worth up to €2 million for its forced early exit from the DFB-Cup. The team got a compensation of €500,000 and were allowed to host a game from Germans national team which generated additional revenues of around €1.5 million. Consequences in sport (athletes, society /fans) As a result of the scandal, two games were replayed. The match in the second division between LR Ahlen and Wacker Burghausen was replayed since Robert Hoyzer has admitted manipulating the game by awarding Ahlen a questionable penalty. The outcome did change with Ahlen winning the first game 1:0 and Burghausen winning the second 3:1. The match in the third division between the second team from Hertha BSC Berlin against the second team from Arminia Bielefeld was replayed since Hoyzer has testified that the referee Dominik Marks has received a payment to manipulate the outcome. Berlin was able to repeat their win from the first game. For the other games either no manipulation could be identified, the attempt to manipulate did not affect the outcome or the match could not be replayed since the season was already over. The referees Robert Hoyzer and Dominik Marks were banned for life from any role in football and the referee Torsten Kopp was suspended for three months since he did not report Hoyzer immediately after he approached him.

Due to the scandal, the DFB put a number of measures into action in order to prevent similar incidents in the future. For example, before referees achieve promotion there are observed for a longer period of time and the responsibility for selecting the referees for the games shifted from the individual leagues to the DFL. Also, the warning system “Betradar” has been installed which should help to identify unusual betting patterns early.

CASE 2: EUROPE – “BOCHUM” (2009) Background The two Croatian brothers Ante and Milan Sapina were responsible for attempting to fix more than 200 matches from nine European countries. In 2005, Sapina already has been sentenced to prison for three years after being one of the leaders of the match-fixing scandal in 2005 in Germany. After being released he restarted his match-fixing network and established a link to an illegal gambling ring in Asia. His main focus was on leagues outside Germany were players earn lower salaries. Their match-fixing activity focused mainly on “in-game” bets where gamblers can bet in real-time on events happening during the game such as the number of red cards. Sapina later admitted the fixing of 20 games. The fraud was detected through wire-tapping of unrelated organized crime activities by the Prosecutorial Office in Bochum Type of corruption The criminal network masterminded by the Sapina brothers offered money to players and referees to create certain match events through deliberate underperformance. Legal consequences In April 2011, three persons of Sapinas Network were sentenced to prison time. Tuna A. and Stevan R. were sentenced to three years and eight months and three years and eleven months. The betting office operator Nürretin G. was given a three-year prison sentence on the account of fraud. Milan Sapina was sentenced to ten months imprisonment and his brother Ante Sapina was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment by the District Court of Bochum. Financial consequences Overall, the network made approximately €8.5 million of profit. There are no reports on the financial consequences for the teams involved. Consequences in sport (athletes, society /fans) The Ukrainian referee Oleg Orijchow was suspended after personal contact between him and the network was identified during the investigation. In 2009, the UEFA revealed that they bring charges against the Macedonian club FK Pobeda. Pobeda was found guilty of match- fixing in a tie against the Armenian club Pyunik in 2004. The club received an eight-year ban

from all European competitions and the president and the former team captain were given lifetime European football bans.

CASE 3: EUROPOL ACTION IN SLOVENIA AND CROATIA Background At the end of December 2017 in Slovenia, 11 people dismantling an international crime syndicate involved in sports corruption and illegal betting, with the assistance of Croatian police and Europol were arrested. That probe started when Slovenian police realized that an organized crime group had created different websites as part of an online illegal betting platform used to place bets on manipulated sport events that took place in multiple European countries. The organized criminal group behind these activities has been betting primarily on the Asian market, where they were guaranteed considerable financial gains by knowing the end result of the matches. The money earned through illegal betting was transferred to an Internet-operated bank and then transferred to different off-shore shell companies used to disguise the proceeds of crime from the real beneficiaries. The criminals are suspected of being involved in attempts to fix professional football matches in at least Serbia, Macedonia and the Czech Republic. The organized criminal group behind these activities has been betting primarily on the Asian market, where they were guaranteed considerable financial gains by knowing the end result of the matches Type of corruption Potential types of corruption are deliberate underperformance if a match was purposely lost. Legal consequences The criminals are suspected of being involved in attempts to fix professional football matches in at least Serbia, Macedonia and the Czech Republic. The arrests were carried out on December 18, alongside 13 house searches and 15 vehicles searches in different locations in Slovenia and Croatia, and were the culmination of an investigation that began in March, Europol said. The law enforcement agencies seized 35 computers and IT devices, 32 mobile phones, 19 650 euro in cash, 38 500 euro in counterfeit euro banknotes and two vehicles. Financial consequences The process in the court is still not finished. There are no clear information about financial consequences. The money earned through illegal betting was transferred to an Internet- operated bank and then transferred to different off-shore shell companies used to disguise the proceeds of crime from the real beneficiaries.

Consequences in sport (athletes, society /fans) This case, if it is going to be finished with effective sentences, will prove that sports in the Balkan region is infected with corruption which could dismantle the hope of players and also fans.

CASE 4. GERMANY/AUSTRIA – “WILLIAM BEE WAH LIM” (2008) Background William Bee Wah Lim was considered to be part of an Asian betting syndicate. The match- fixing scandal was revealed by the Canadian journalist Declan Hill and includes football games in Austria, Germany and one match of the FIFA World Cup 2006. In 2005, Lim betted €2.8 million on the match between FC Kaiserslautern and Erzgebirge Auge (split into subtotals) with Asian bookmarkers and won, in the end, €2.2 million. Lim also wagered €4 million that Karlsruhe SC would beat Sportfreunde Siegen in a second-division match on Aug. 7, 2005. There were indications that he had personal contacts with players from Kaiserslautern, Karlsruhe and Sportfreunde Siegen but all the players insisted they were innocent. In November 2005, the player Ousseynou Dione informed the police about match- fixing attempt of regional games of his team FC Eschborn. Afterward, Lim was under surveillance for two weeks. During this time he attempted to fix 10 games. In 2006 he was arrested. Type of corruption William Bee Wah Lim contacted numerous players and asked them to deliberately underperform in order to influence the results of the matches. Legal consequences After William Bee Wah Lim has been arrested, he confessed bribery of German football players. In June 2007, a court in Frankfurt sentenced two years and five months of prison after he was convicted of attempting match-fixing in the German regional league and Austria’s first division league. However, the court has released Lim on €30,000 bail during the trial and Lim disappeared shortly after. Financial consequences There is no information on the financial consequences available. Consequences in sport (athletes, society /fans) None of the games who have been allegedly fixed were replayed and all results of the games in Austria and Germany stand. However, the case served as an example that the warning

Systems of DFB and DFL in Germany were deemed to be successful since they noticed unusual betting patterns.

CASE 5. BELGIUM – “ZHEYUN YE” (2005) Background In 2004 in Belgium the Chinese businessman, Zheyun Ye, approached numerous low ranking Belgian football clubs with an offer of €250,000-€500,000 for shirt sponsoring deal and more money if he gets full control over the club. He also offered money to individual players and coaches if they throw games enabling him to win bets. For example, three players of Germinal Beerschot Antwerp admitted that Ye offered him €25,000 to lose a match. Six Lierse SK players and the coach Paul Put received bribes between €5,000 - €10,000 to fix games. All the games were fixed during the season 2004/2005 and 2005/2006 in the 1st division in Belgium. In 2006, a television documentary revealed the match-fixing of at least seven games with 14 persons and 5 clubs involved. Moreover, Ye was arrested for assaulting a woman who reported that he has bragged about manipulating games. As a consequence, Ye and his personal assistant Olivier Suray and the player agent Pietro Allatta were questioned. However, there was not enough evidence to keep them into custody and all were released in a couple of days. Afterward, Ye immediately returned to China. Type of corruption At least three different types of corruption can be identified. The player from Germinal Beershot Antwerp and Lierse confessed they purposely have lost matches which classifies as deliberate underperformance. With coaches and players involved from different teams, collaborative performance to manipulate the outcomes took also place. The player from Lierse Sk was also threatened after they refused to continue fixing matches by Zheyun Ye who reportedly pointed with at a gun at players (Moriconi, 2018). Legal consequences The investigation by the police was finished in 2008. However, the case was taken to court only in 2014. Overall, there were 31 suspects. Zheyun Ye, Pietro Allata, the Lierse SK coaches Paul Put and Patrick Deman, and the La Louviére coach Gilbert Bodart were found guilty of active corruption by offering the players money to manipulate games during the 2004/2005 season. Zheyun Ye received a 5-year prison sentence in absence and Pietro Allata received 30 months term. The three coaches got a probationary prison sentence. In addition, the former Lierse SK player Laurent Delorge, Laurent Fassotte, Igor Nikolovski, Yves Van

Der Straeten, Marius Mitu, Cliff Mardulier, Hasan Kacic and Ninoslv Milenkovic were also found guilty of passive corruption as they all accepted the money. Financial consequences There are no precise numbers about the overall financial damage the scandal created. However, supporters from Lierse SK filed a €1.9 million compensation lawsuit against the former coach. They demand their money back after paying to watch fixed matches. Consequences in sport (athletes, society /fans) The club Lierse SK who was in the center of the scandal fired the players and the coaches involved. Afterward, the club could not avoid relegation and in 2018 the club announced bankruptcy. The former coach Paul Put was banned for three the years by the Royal Belgian Football Association and the coach of La Louviere, Gilbert Bodart, was forced to resign as well.

CASE 6: PORTUGAL – “APITO DOURADO” Background In 2004, the investigation called Apito Dourado (Golden Whistle) started looking at match- fixing in the first division in Portugal. The criminal proceeding was commenced after media allegations that referees had received bribes or favors from FC Porto and Boavista F.C. in order to influence the outcome of matches during the 2003/04 season. In 2008, the chairman of FC Porto, Pinto da Costa, was found guilty of attempting to bribe referees of two matches. The former Boavista F.C chairman and Portuguese League for Professional Football president, Valentim Loureiro, was not found guilty of corruption but guilty of abuse of power. Type of corruption The type of corruption can be considered as bribery of another person to influence a sports competition in a particular direction. In this case, referees were bribed by the chairmen of FC Porto and Boavista F.C. Porto in order to make favorable decisions for the teams. Legal consequences In June 2007, Pinto da Costa was found guilty and convicted to three years of suspended penalty. Two years later, da Costa was declared innocent in all allegations relating to bribery due to a lack of evidence. Valentim Loureiro was sentenced to three years and two months of suspended penalty for abuse of power. Financial consequences FC Porto was originally fined €150,000 and their chairman, da Costa, had to pay a fine of €10,000. Boavista F.C. was fined €180,000.

Consequences in sport (athletes, society /fans) In 2008, after a non-criminal process, the Portuguese League of Football decided that Boavista F.C. were relegated to the second division and FC Porto were docked six points for the season 2003/2004. Further FC Porto was banned from the 2008/09 Champions League. This later decision was later annulled. Da Costa and Loureiro received a four-year suspension. The ruling was later upheld by the Federação Portuguesa de Futebol Justice Council although neither the president nor the vice-president were present. Due to these irregularities in this panel’s conduct, da Costa and Loureiros’ suspension and the six points taken by FC Porto were taken back by the Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional Disciplinary Committee.

CASE 7: MAKIS PSOMIADIS GREECE (2011) Background In Macedonia 2011 Makis Psomiadis, owner of FC Kavala was arrested. He was extracted to Greece latter. There he was accused of fixing matches and money laundering along with Thomas Mitropoulos, Dionisis Kostoulas, Konstantinos Riavoglou and Periklis Amanatidis guilty of the football match-fixing. UEFA was involved in the Greek match-fixing scandal that involved several Greek Cup and second division games. Greek investigators considered Psomiadis to be the "de facto chairman" and to be in financial control of Kavala, though his son Stavros held the official title of chairman. Ex Greek prime minister, Costas Simitis, in 2003 ordered a crackdown on malpractice in the game - dispatching tax officials to scrutinize each team's books. The culture minister, Evangelos Venizelos, referred to "godfathers" in the game and hinted that corruption was so rife that the nation's professional league might be scrapped altogether. Type of Corruption These are more types of corruption and blackmails. Also Greek state sued him for money laundering and tax evasion. Legal consequences Psomiadis was found guilty of the felony charges of bribery and extortion, while he was chairman of Kavala F.C., while Mitropoulos, Riavoglou, Kostoulas and Amaanatidis faced misdemeanor charges of bribery and illegal gambling. Psomiadis was sentenced to a non-suspended and non-redeemable 10-year imprisonment. Charilaos Psomiadis, the cousin of Makis Psomiadis and former CEO of AEK FC, was also sentenced to suspended 5-year imprisonment, along with Filio Georgiou, AEK FC’s former

accountant, who was sentenced to a suspended 4 years in prison. Both defendants were found guilty of embezzlement, conspiracy and money-laundering. Moreover, another defendant, Antonis Katsaros, who had been recently arrested, was also sentenced to 8 years in prison. Makis Psomiadis died in prison in 2016. Financial Consequences AEK's business offices were raided and the club's financial records seized. As a result, AEK was ordered to pay more than €18 million in back taxes or face expulsion from the Greek league. Consequences for the sport (athletes, society /fans) No consequences

CASE 8: BULGARIA- “PFC BEROE” (2013) Background On July 11, 2013 Naiden Kirov initiated and held meetings in a restaurant in Stara Zagora and in the village of Bogomilovo. Nayden Kirov offered four players of PFC Beroe's under 19-team to participate in regular matches by promising to give them between € 500 and € 1,000 per match if they influence the outcome of the matches. Stara Zagora District Prosecutor's Office has reached a condemnation sentence against Nayden Kirov . for committing a crime against sport. Type of corruption Nayden Kirov offered money to players and the coach to create certain match events through deliberate underperformance. Legal consequences (clubs, owners, players, managers) There are no legal consequences for the club. The man tried to settle the matches received a suspended sentence of two years’ imprisonment conditionally with probationary period of three years. Financial consequences There are no financial consequences for the club. Only the person who tried to settle the matches gets a fine of 5 000 euro. Consequences in sport (athletes, society /fans) There are no legal consequences for the athletes. This is the first lawsuit for a crime against sport in the area of the Plovdiv Appellate Prosecutor's Office, where a conviction has been reached.

CASE 9. CROATIAN FIXING FROM 2011 Background This case was held 2011 in Croatia. In this case, 15 players were arrested for fixing matches in the first Croatian league. The case is interesting because some of the players were part of campaigns against fixing matches between young football categories. These 15 players fixed several matches. There was an anonymous declaration about more cases of fixed matches, so Croatian police start to wiretap them. They were victims of the mafia because as players they have not received salary for more than one year. According to them, this was the reason for receiving the bribe for fixing. In this case also former Croatian national team players Jasmin Agić and Miljenko Mumlek were involved. They are sentenced on 9 and 7 months in prison. Two of the football players were members of Varteks from Varazdin, 3 from Medumurje football club from the same city and 8 Croatia Sesvete near Croatian capital Zagreb. They are accused of fixing 680 matches. Among those 680 matches are also matches with English football clubs. Type of corruption Fixing matches and betting in the Asian bet companies. Receiving bribe. Legal Consequences All 15 accused were sentenced to 123 months in prison total. One group of accused fixers of the match was ban to work in the football forever. Mario Čižmek - 10 months in prison and have to return 20.500 euros. Dario Sušak - 8 months in prison and have to return 15.500 eura. In the moment of this sentence, Dario was in detention for rubber. Zoran Ivančić - 8 months. Miljenko Mumlek - 7 months’ prison. Andrija Balajić - 7 months’ prison. Neven Vuljanko - 6 months’ prison. Nikola Melnjak - 7 in prison and have to return 6.000 euros. Ivan Banović - 9 in prison and have to return 28.500 euros. Ante Pokrajčić - 9 in prison and have to return 10.500 euros. Miljenko Bošnjak - 9 in prison and have to return 10.500 euros. Goran Jerković - 10 in prison and have to return 25.000 euros. Marko Guja - paroled 7 in prison and have to return 12.500 euros. Jasmin Agić- 9 in prison and have to return 26.500 euros. Saša Mus - 8 in prison and have to return 10.000 euros.

Tomislav Zubak - 9 months. Six years ago FIFA ban three of the organizers of the group Dinko Saka, former goalkeeper of Varazdi, Medjumurje and polish club Zaglebie Lubin, Daniel Madaric and Mario Darmopilu. Financial Consequences All 15 involved in the case had to return 1,2 million Croatian kunas (160.000 euros) in 15 days after the final sentence of the Supreme court.

CASE 10: BULGARIA-NATIONAL FOOTBALL TEAM U19 (2014) Background On July 16, 2014, three men met two athletes from the national football team U19. They tried to settle the outcome of the match between the youngsters of Bulgaria and Germany in 2014. The defendants promised players 10,000 euros if the upcoming match with Germany on 19 July ended with three or more goal difference. The players told their coach the proposal, then informed the police. As proof, the recordings of security cameras are applied near the meeting point. Type of corruption Offered money to players to create certain match events through deliberate underperformance. Legal consequences (clubs, owners, players, managers); There are no legal consequences for the club. The mans tried to settle the matches received one year suspended sentence with a three-year probationary period Financial consequences There are no financial consequences for the club. Only the person who tried to settle the matches gets a fine of 500 euro each. Consequences in sport (athletes, society /fans) There are no legal consequences for the athletes. The three defendants have been subject to a one-year prison sentence, which has been postponed for a probationary period of three years and a fine of 1000 levs. Despite the players' refusal, the Bulgarian national team loses the qualification by 3:0.

CASE 11. FC POBEDA MACEDONIA - FC PJUNIK ARMENIA Background Ex Macedonian champion Pobeda was sentenced to a 8 years ban by UEFA for fixing the match between Pobeda and Armenian football club Pjunik in 13 July 2004. The match

finished with 1:3 in Macedonia and 1:1 in Armenia. Pjunik advanced to the next round. This was the biggest sentence by UEFA till March this year. Pobeda or close persons to the management of Pobeda owned a betting Company. Types of Corruption Pobeda rose the quotas in the betting companies. Fixing the matches for betting proposes. Legal Consequences Aleksandar Zabrcanec, president of Pobeda and their Capitan Nikolce Zdraveski have a life ban for working in the field of football. Macedonian authorities didn’t start legal investigation in Macedonian courts. Financial Consequences There is not news for financial Consequences. Consequences in sport (athletes, society /fans) Pobeda was forced to relegate

CASE 12: BULGARIA-ANATOLI TANOV AND KRASSIMIR MECHEV (2016/2017) Background The Disciplinary Commission of the Bulgarian Football Union suspended the rights of two football coaches Anatoli Tanov and Krassimir Mechev for an investigation against them for match-fixing. They are accused of participating in a criminal group for manipulation of matches. Tanov is a coach of First Atomic (Kozloduy) FC. Mechev is a senior coach of the junior men of Spartak Pleven. The indictment indicates that there are doubts about the settlement of more than 10 matches with Levski, Neftochim, Chernomoretz, Pirin, Ludogorets, Litecs, CSKA. Type of corruption Deliberate underperformance. With coaches and players involved from different teams, collaborative performance to manipulate the outcomes took also place. Legal consequences (clubs, owners, players, managers); Indictment filed with the Specialized Criminal Court against Krassimir Mechev. After completion of the case, the coach is justified. No legal consequences for the cluband the coach Financial consequences: There are no financial consequences for the club and the coach.

Consequences in sport (athletes, society /fans) There are rumors that players who refuse to play coaching instructions for a weak game are threatened to remain on the bench even they could be excluded from the team.

CASE 13. FC SKENDERBEU ALBANIA Background A leaked Uefa report has recommended that the six-times national champions Skenderbeu, who competed in the Europa League group stage this season, is banned from its competitions for an unprecedented 10 years. Document from UEFA outline that Skenderbeu has been fixing football matches as nobody has ever done before in the history of the game, alleging the club have essentially operated as a vehicle for organized crime, and shines a light on the detail that underpins Uefa’s match- fixing inquiries. Uefa did not confirm or deny the document’s authenticity. Skenderbeu has previously received punishment for match-fixing, a year-long suspension from European competition served in 2016-17. That was upheld by the court of arbitration for sport (Cas), as an “administrative measure” in a two-step Uefa process; the current investigation forms the second stage and is part of a more serious disciplinary measure. The suspension came after Uefa’s betting fraud detection system (BFDS) identified 53 matches involving Skenderbeu – spanning friendlies, domestic fixtures and European club competitions – allegedly manipulated for betting purposes between November 2010 and April 2016. The case focused on four games: two from the 2015-16 Champions League qualifying rounds and two from that season’s Europa League group phase. Skenderbeu were, based largely on the BFDS’s processes, banned. The new report adds fresh evidence from a panel of coaches while employing an external company to reconfirm its findings in an effort to press the case for a more severe punishment. The report argues two group games, at Sporting Lisbon and at home to Lokomotiv Moscow, are of particular concern. Skenderbeu lost 5-1 and 3-0 respectively, both matches’ outcomes following rapidly escalating betting patterns almost to the letter. The former saw bets made for six or more goals to be scored with Sporting 4-0 up late on; the latter, according to the report, became subject to a rush of highly suspicious, and accurate, bets when Skenderbeu were a goal down with five minutes left. There is no suggestion of wrongdoing from Skenderbeu’s opponents. The best-known of the ties is a Champions League second qualifying round, second leg against Northern Irish side Crusaders on 21 July 2015. Skenderbeu had won the home fixture

4-1 and went 2-1 up in the return. There followed what the report terms some outrageous suspicious live betting totaling a minimum of several hundreds of thousands of dollars; Skenderbeu ran the scant risk of losing the tie at this stage and conceded two goals in the last 10 minutes, with Crusaders also having two goals disallowed. A tweet from Crusaders’ goalkeeper, Sean O’Neill – If there is not a Uefa investigation into our game tonight, then there is something wrong – is among the evidence submitted. The situation allegedly developed after Agim Zeqo was appointed Skenderbeu president in January 2010. At that point, the club risked relegation. They survived, proceeding to win the league five years running; the report shows the first of their games to be escalated occurred in November 2010. Types of Corruption Fixing matches for betting profit. Legal Consequences A 10-year sentence is in practice a capital punishment and 1 million euros fines to pay. Financial Consequences Skenderbeu is accused of manipulation attempts to obtain a criminal betting profit on a stunning global scale, earning millions of dollars. Consequences in sport (athletes, society /fans) The report alleges the club has “no respect for the integrity of the game” and that they contrived a highly organized structure intended to harvest huge sums through gambling. It is an allegation the club have denied.

CASE 14: TURKEY- “FENERBAHCE” Background Turkish football was in 2012 left in disgrace as 93 high-ranked officials were brought to trial due to allegations of match-fixing and bribes. In total, 17 of Fenerbahce’ matches were of suspicious character and therefore investigated. Many of these accusations regarded match-fixing and bribing, and came due to Fenerbahçe winning 16 of their last 17 games in the 2010/2011 season. These victories led to Fenerbahçe securing the title in front of Trabzonspor by goal difference. In the end, 13 of the matches were proven to have been of a corruptive character. (Kuyumcu, 2014). Type of corruption Deliberate underperformance.

With coaches and players involved from different teams, collaborative performance to manipulate the outcomes took also place. Legal consequences (clubs, owners, players, managers) The president of Fenerbahce Aziz Yildirim was convicted of fixing six matches and offering payments to players or club officials. Initially, in 2012, Aziz Yildirim was sentenced to 6 years and 3 months in prison for an organized crime group and a match settlement in the 2010/2011 season. The Fenerbahce president spends a year behind bars, then released, and the process is renewed. Financial consequences Aziz Yildirim also fined 1.3 million lira ($720,000; £460,000) and banned from club management and watching matches. Consequences in sport (athletes, society /fans) Fenerbahçe lost their right to play the UEFA Champions League the following season of 2011/2012. More than two years after the conviction of Fenerbahçe, UEFA had still not made any further actions against them. In addition, Fenerbahçe itself was excused for the actions made by its officials (O'Connor, 2013). Fenerbahçe is still where they have “always” been, at the top of the league. (Kuyumcu, 2014). Simultaneously, the Turkish Football Federation is still directed by the one who was chairman of the convicted clubs, Beşiktaş CASE 15: FINLAND – “WILSON RAY PERUMAL” (2011) Background In 2011, Wilson Raj Perumal, a previously convicted match-fixer, was arrested. He was in the center of an investigation regarding match-fixing in the first division in Finland. Overall, 24 games between 2008 and 2011 have been manipulated and in 11 of the games, the anticipated score was achieved. The focus was on the first division team Rovaniemen Palloseura and Perumal had been suspected to bribe players of the team. On July 19th, 2011 the court found Perumal and six players from Rovaniemen Palloseura guilty. The bribes ranged between €500 offered to one player and €80,000 to eight players. The highest bribe for one individual player was €40,000 Type of corruption Potential types of corruption are deliberate underperformance of the players to influence the outcome of the match after they have been bribed by Wilson Perumal.

Legal consequences Perumal was sentenced to two years in prison. Eight players, six Zambian and two Georgian players received suspended sentences ranging between six months and 20 months. Financial consequences Perumal had to return €150,000 deemed to be match-fixing profits. In addition, the club Rovaniemen Palloseura demanded €213,000 as compensation for a loss of advertising money and salaries for new players. Consequences in sport (athletes, society /fans) In 2012, The Football Association of Finland imposed bans on the six Zambian players: Godfrey Chibanga, Chileshe Chibwe, Steven Kunda, Christopher Musonda, Chanda Mwaba, and Nchimunya Mweetwa. The ban was later extended by the FIFA to games worldwide.

CASE 16: ITALY – “CALCIOPOLI” (2006) Background In 2006, as part of the investigation of the football agency GEA World, the Italian police became aware of potential match-fixing of 39 matches which involves major teams such as Juventus, Milan, Fiorentina, Lazio, and Reggina. The main role in this investigation had Juventus general manager Luciano Moggi who set up a network of team managers, referees, agents, and club executives to influence the designation of referees which were considered as favorable to Juventus. In a similar way, officials from Milan, Fiorentina, Lazio, and Reggina were also involved in a manipulation of referee designation. After phone tapes with evidence were released, the board of directors from Juventus resigned in 2006. Shortly after, the president of the Italian Football Federation (FIGC), Franco Carroro and his vice president Innocenzo Mazzini, resigned since they had received information regarding Moggi’s activities prior to the police investigation. Type of corruption The type of corruption can be classified as bribery of or threats against another person to influence a sports competition in a particular direction since the teams used the network of Moggi to affect the referees designated to the game and to influence the referees to rule in their favor. Legal consequences Luciano Moggi received a life ban from football and an initial sentence to five years and four months in prison. The sentence was later reduced to two years and four months and canceled completely in March 2015 when all charges were temporarily dropped. In September 2015

Italy’s highest court ruled that Moggi was guilty of being the initiator of a system influencing matches in the 2004-05 season but that the statute of limitations has expired. Juventus director Antonio Giraudo also avoided one year and eight months in prison after a similar procedure. Financial consequences Reggina was fined €100,000 and their club president Pasquale Foti was fined €30,000. Antonio Giraudo, former managing director of Juventus, had to pay €20,000. In 2008, Juventus was fined €300,000. Franco Carroro, former president of the Italian Football Federation received a fine of €80,000. Consequences in sport (athletes, society /fans) Juventus Turin was relegated to Serie B and was deducted 9 points in the next season (2006/07). Further, they were stripped of the 2004/05 title and were downgraded to the last place of the 2005/06 season. Milan was deducted 8 points for the 2006/07 season and 30 points for the 2005/06 season. In addition, one home game has to be played behind closed doors. Fiorentina was deducted 15 points in the Serie A in the 2006/07 season and were banned from the 2006/07 Champions League. Also they received two home games behind closed doors. Lazio Rom was deducted 3 Points for the 2006/07 season. Further, they were banned from 2006/07 UEFA Cup and had to play two games behind closed doors. Reggina was deducted 11 points for the 2006/07 season. Referee Massimo de Santis was banned from football for four and a half years. Referee boss Pierluigi Pairetto was banned for three and a half years. Moggi and Giraudo were banned for five years. Lazio president Claudio Lotito received a two-and-a-half-year ban.

CASE 17: 1992/1993. LEGIA-ŁKS CASE. “ALL POLAND SAW…” Background The last round of meetings was to decide who would win the title in the 1992/1993 season. Two teams: Legia Warsaw and ŁKS Łódź, had the same number of points. In the event of their victory, the first place was determined by the goal balance. ŁKS needed to get the title of shooting by 3 goals more than Legia (there was no rule that the balance of face-to-face meetings was decisive). Legia won in the away match in Krakow with Wisla 6: 0, while ŁKS defeated Olympia Poznań 7:1 (Olympia was sure of a drop to the second division). The referees of both meetings decided that the matches were held correctly. Interestingly, the referee of the ŁKS- Olimpia match was Michał Listkiewicz, the best known Polish international referee, later

head of the Polish Football Association, and now the head of the referees in the Czech Republic. Legia coach was Janusz Wójcik. The President of Wisła Kraków (Voigt) promised the players for the win PLN 600,000,000 (before the PLN denomination - today about 150,000 EUR), which was then a significant amount. After the defeat of the match, the president Voigt decided that his players played so poorly, because Legia paid them more. However, he did not have any evidence. Wisła set up a special committee that questioned all the players and the entire staff, but the allegations of President Voigt were not confirmed. Despite this, the President of the Wisła spoke in the media about the fact that his players did not play honestly. It caused a media scandal, newspapers on the first pages wrote about set matches, and the matter was dealt with by the football association. The Presidium of the Polish Football Association (PZPN/PFA) on June 21, 1993 recognized the results of the match as correct (with votes ... 5: 4), however imposed fines on all four clubs (about 120,000 EUR each). Clubs appealed against this decision. PZPN appointed a special Commission, which recognized that the matches were clean, and applied for the cancellation of financial penalties and the maintenance of match results. Unfortunately, this did not convince the General Meeting of the PFA, which after a stormy discussion (which the words “All Poland saw that matches were fixed"), voted for canceling the results of these meetings (bilateral walkover). In this way Lech Poznan became the Polish Champion (3 team in the table). Until today, the case is considered to be controversial. Legia Warszawa was deprived of the title without any evidence and against the conducted explanatory proceedings. The only reason for receiving the title is the "media scandal" caused in principle by the President of the Wisła Kraków. Type of match fixing There is no evidence of a match-fixing or crime, but if there was indeed a match-fixing, there was bribery One can also wonder whether the league result was "fixed" by the Polish Football Association, who, having no evidence of corruption, changed the winner of the championship title “ex officio”. Legal consequences There were no consequences on the basis of criminal law (no people convicted). The proceedings conducted by the prosecutor's office regarding the match Wisła-Legia have been discontinued.

Some of the Wisła Kraków players have been punished by the club (three of them received a 6-month disqualification). Financial consequences Difficult to estimate financial losses, incurred by clubs Legia Warszawa and ŁKS Łódź. Clubs have lost potential benefits (revenues from television rights, match day, bonuses for European cups matches etc.). Estimated financial losses could amount from 1 to 4 million dollars for each club. Consequences in sport (athletes, society /fans) UEFA excluded clubs (Legia and ŁKS) from European cup competitions, considering that they were punished for corruption. The case, however, became the basis for changes in the regulations of the games and anti- corruption laws to avoid similar situations in the future.

CASE18. POLAR WROCŁAW CASE AND POLISH CORRUPTION SCANDAL. Background One of the newspapers in Wrocław wrote in May 2004 that footballers from the Polar Wrocław and Zagłębie Lubin clubs (II division) had contacted each other before the match in order to fix the outcome of this meeting. The match ended with winning 4: 0. The case was taken by the prosecutor's office, which as a result of the investigation has reached testimonies that burden a lot of people from the football community. The result of the Polar case was a police provocation in May 2005: one of the first league referees was given a controlled bribe. The person who significantly contributed to the progress of the investigation, was the President of the club GKS Katowice Piotr Dziurowicz. The dynamically developing procedure involved a much larger number of football referees, observers, and referees 'qualifiers, as well as the head of referee training and chairmen of the referees' colleges at the local football unions. Based on the testimony of accused referees, less than a month later another referee, Krzysztof Zdunka, was arrested. According to the Wrocław prosecutor's office, the group that bought and sold matches in the Polish league was led by the former Amica Wronki activist - Ryszard Forbrich known in the community as "Barber". The prosecutor's office puts him more than 50 allegations of corruption, the main one being the establishment and management of one of the organized criminal groups operating in the Polish football environment since 2000. The group was to arrange football matches in Polish I, II and III league and Forbrich urge, mediate and give bribes, among others football judges and PZPN observers. In this way, he was to influence the

results of over 30 matches. The Sports Review in August 2006 published a list of "Barber" - a list of football referees with whom "Barber" allegedly tried to maintain contacts. The list included half of the 1st division referees. The scale of corruption indicated that basically all players and activists were aware of the existing situation. Proceedings regarding the Zagłębie Sosnowiec club indicated, for example, that the judges were bribed in a variety of ways: they met before matches, they were called and even talked to them directly before the match, offering bribes. What is shocking, the amount of bribes was relatively small: they ranged from PLN 500 to 10,000 (EUR 125-2500) for the main referee (at that time there were no professional referees) Type of match fixing In principle, in every case, bribes were awarded to football referees or players. Legal consequences  Number of convicted persons: 452.  Number of fixed matches: approx. 640 (2000-2006).  Number of clubs punished for corruption: 16 The number of clubs involved in the scandal (suspects, etc.): approx. 80 (I-IV division). Many investigations related to this case continue to this day. In total 452 people were condemned in the "corruption scandal": judges, footballers, presidents of football clubs, masseurs, and even the mayor of one of the cities and the secretary of the Arka Gdynia club. A convicted person is, among others, Janusz Wójcik, former coach of Legia Warsaw (he was convicted of fixing matches for the club Świt Nowy Dwór). Forbrich (the head of the criminal group) was convicted in three proceedings. The maximum penalty he has been awarded is 3,5 years of imprisonment. The last proceeding of Forbrich ended in 2017. Financial consequences  Financial penalties imposed on clubs (10 000 – 100 000 USD);  Loss of sponsors (most of punished clubs);  Loss or reduction of players’ salary; Consequences in sport (athletes, society /fans) In many cases football clubs have been penalized for degrading to a lower division or receiving "negative points" in the next season.The case led to major changes in the football community. Most of the former sports activists have left, professional judges have been introduced, work on creating a professional league began.

CASE 19: MALAWI 15 DOLLARS CASE Background Four football referees in the southern African country of Malawi have been banned for life for match-fixing after they received just $20 between them to fix a game and returned $15 to the team doing the bribing because they still lost. Referee Aziz Nyirenda, assistant referees Limbani Chisambi and Stephano Gomani, and fourth official Jimmy Phiri, were all found guilty of fixing a national cup match between lower league team Nchalo United and Chitipa United. The match-fixing was revealed after Nchalo United, the team that bribed the refs, lost in a penalty shootout after a 1-1 draw and demanded their money back. When the referees could only stump up $15, Nchalo went to the authorities. Consequences in sport (athletes, society /fans)  No sanctions have been announced against the team but there is a case against Nchalo pending.  The life ban for the four officials referees was announced by the Malawian referees association. Although the result wasn't what they were aiming for, Malawi National Referees Association general secretary Chris Kalichero said there was still an "element of game-fixing" by the officials and "when you commit such a crime, a life ban is the punishment."

CASE 20: MALTA - PEMBROKE ATHLETA FC CASE Background In the Malta football top division there was an attempt to fix football matches: Pembroke Athleta Fc vs. Mosta FV (11/02/2018) and Mosta FC vs. Birkirkara FC. These activities were aimed at keeping Pembroke in the first division of the competition. The person responsible for carrying out the corruption activities was Uchenna Anyawu, a team manager from Pembroke. In fact, no football match has been fixed, and no other people from the Pembroke club have proven cooperation. Type of match-fixing The case is corrupt: the team manager from Pembroke offered bribes to players and football referees to obtain the results of matches beneficial to Pembroke Athleta FC. Legal consequences Uchenna Anyanwu, manager of the football team Pembroke Athleta, was sentenced by a court for a year of imprisonment in suspension for two years and a fine of 1000 €. He was also

forcibly disqualified by the Malta Association of Football. It should be noted that the real penalty is very low: only 1000 EUR. The Malta Football Association has imposed on the club from Pembroke a penalty 10 negative points in the following season, a fine of EUR 5,000 and a five-year suspension in the possibility of promotion to international matches. The Pembroke team fell into the lower league and therefore it was considered that it would not be punished with additional degradation. Financial consequences The Pembroke team was fined EUR 5,000, and the Uchenna Anway manager was fined EUR 1,000. Consequences in sport (athletes, society /fans) The club from Pembroke received a penalty in the form of a deduction of 10 points in the next season and a ban on participation in international competitions for 5 years.

ANALYSIS A necessary explanation for the analysis is that in many of the considered cases it is not simply about a sports matching but series of matches in various football tournaments. This greatly highlights the determination of the exact number and role of the people involved. The main type of match-fixing corruption in the cases discussed is deliberate under Performancé and Collaborative Performance in 12 of the 20 cases examined. It can also be said that in 12 cases, Abuse of inside Information is also disclosed because the people involved can influence the outcome that directly affects bets. Six cases qualify as "Bribery of or threatens another person to influence a sports competition in a particular direction". In these cases, the people who have been threatened with were athletes from different clubs, and in some cases, club coaches have been threatened by their presidents (Figure 1).

TYPE OF CORRUPTION

Correct score-line, 3 Deliberate under Performance , 12 Abuse of inside information, 12

Betting on your own races, 0

Collaborative Bribery of or threats Performance , 12 against another person , 6

Fig.1: Type of corruption

It should be noted that in the twenty cases examined, quite often there is more than one type of corruption per case. This can largely be the consequence of the people involved (Figure 2).

PEOPLE WHO ARE INVOLVED

Other, 11 Athletes, 11

All teams, 8 Coachs, 7

President of the Referee, 7 club, 5

Fig.2: Number of people involved

As can be seen in Figure 2, 12 of the 20 cases examined directly involve outsiders who are trying to influence the outcome. Quite often these are people who are directly or indirectly connected to different betting companies, through which they gain significant personal financial gain. Most often, they try to influence the outcome of the meeting by offering various cash bribes to competitors (11 cases), judges and coaches (7 cases). In eight of the cases examined, there are whole teams involved and suspected in match-fixing. In 5 of the cases, club presidents are suspected of settling matches. It is noticeable that in cases involving club presidents they have been held accountable (Figure 3). Unfortunately, however, in just one case the sentence imposed is effectively enforced. In other cases, the convictions imposed by the court were appealed and subsequently removed. Some club presidents have been removed from their posts, but in most cases, it is a temporary measure without lasting consequences. Attention should also be paid to the fact that in 11 cases there are players involved, and only 5 of them have athletes being sanctioned. Almost identical is the situation with judges and coaches involved.

PERSONS WITH CHARGES

Athletes, 5 Other, 7

Coachs, 2

Referee, 2

All teams, 8 President of the club, 5

Fig.3: Number of persons charged

SENTENCE Revoked sentence, 4 Prison, 9 No conviction, 3

Expelling the club from the league, 5

Suspended Deprivation of sentence, 6 referee rights, 2 Deprivation of racing/coaching rights, 5 Fig.4: Sentences

Nine cases lead to an effective prison sentence (Figure 4). Basically these are outsiders who have tried to influence sports. In six cases, the conviction is conditional, with the most frequent duration being between 2-4 years. In five cases, racing and coaching rights were suspended. Two suspended judges' rights. And in 5 cases there are teams that have been excluded from their championships or banned from participating in European tournaments.

In four cases, after a conviction has been reached, later it has been overruled. And in three cases, there was no conviction at all.

COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS Despite the great efforts that are made in the fight against match fixing, there are many factors that make this difficult. One of the most serious problems with match fixing is the difficulty in gathering evidence of guilt. Leading causes are corruption, money laundering and various abuses that have no national borders. In many of the cases examined, the plea cases last for years and quite often end with minor penalties. Often times, cases are closed due to a lack of clear evidence and loopholes in the penal code. A drawback of national federations in the fight against match fixing, may be the unclear regulation in sentencing. In some instances, for the same offense, the punishment is different. Unfortunately, the problem of match fixing is often downplayed by the football community. An example is that people convicted of manipulating matches can retain their function without major obstacles. Also, a major drawback in the fight against match-fixing is the uncoordinated activity in the penal code - there are two parallel legal systems for assessing corruption and criminal action: the system in sports federations and the legal system of a country. Often their actions are inconsistent and contradictory.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Andreff Wladimir - Corruption in Sport, 2016 2. Australian Sports Minister’s Council, 2015 3. Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions, 18 September 2014, www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-ist/-/conventions/treaty/215 4. Global Corruption Report: Sport - Transparency International – 2016 5. Gorse, S. & Chadwick, S. (2010) Conceptualising Corruption in Sport: Implications for Sponsorship Programmes, The European Business Review, July/August 2010: 40- 45 6. Gorse, S. & Chadwick, S. (2011) The Prevalence of Corruption in International Sport –A Statistical Analysis, Consultancy Report for the Remote Gambling Association, 7. Hill D.– The Insider's Guide to Match-Fixing in Football, Paperback – November 29, 2013 8. Maennig W. - Corruption in International Sports and Sport Management: Forms, Tendencies, Extent and Countermeasures, European Sport Management Quarterly 5(2), 2005 9. Match-fixing in sport. A mapping of criminal law provisions in EU 27, March 2012 10. Resource Guide on Good Practices in the Investigation of Match-Fixing-United Nations, New York, August 2016 11. State of Play on the fight against match fixing - EU Work Plan for Sport 2014-2017.