The Rocha Deep Water Port Project in Uruguay: Local and National Environmental Resistance to the Governmental Agenda

The Rocha deep water port project in Uruguay: local and national environmental resistance to the governmental agenda

Germán Bidegain Universidad de la República, Uruguay

Martín Freigedo Universidad de la República, Uruguay

This is a preliminary draft. Please do not cite or circulate without authors’ permission

Introduction

During the last decade, Uruguay has experienced an unprecedented process: the emergence of a significant environmental national social movement that questions the entire partisan system, including the center‐left Frente Amplio which governs the country since 2005. This vibrant environmental movement has accused the Frente Amplio of perpetuating the extractive policies fostered by previous right‐wing administrations. The disputes on extractivism are recent in Uruguay, a country which ‐ in contrast to its neighbors‐ is not used to environmental conflicts and has not received much attention by the academic literature.

This reality contrasts with the historical alliance between the Frente Amplio and the traditional social movements (labour, students, cooperativism, etc.), a peculiarity that has been underlined by the literature as a possible explanatory factor to account for the stability of the country in a region used to social and political turmoil (Filgueira, 1985; Moreira, 2004; Bidegain and Tricot, 2017). How can we explain the rupture of the traditional socio‐political intermediation channels that characterized the country since 1985 democratic transition? What are the factors that account for the emergence of a social movement directly confronted with the historical partisan ally of social organizations?

The environmental movement articulated different organizations and local stakeholders, many of which were related to the productive activities that took place in the potential affected territories. They had very different political backgrounds and in several cases, lacked previous militant experience and ties with the Uruguayan traditional social organizations. Nonetheless, we will show that some unions and student organizations joined the environmental cause, provoking tensions in the traditional social organizations fields.

This paper is divided in three sections. In the first one, we propose a general introduction to environmental conflicts in Uruguay and the specific debate around the Aratirí project, the milestone that sparked the current environmental movement. Secondly, we develop the governmental agenda regarding the Rocha deep water port project and the dynamics of protest that took place to confront it. We characterize the stakeholders involved, their repertoire of actions and highlight the efforts made to connect this conflict with other conflicts in different territories. In this way, we show the interplay between local and national conflict arenas. In the third section, we deal with a peculiarity of the environmental movement in the Uruguayan political context: its relative isolation regarding the traditional alliance between the Frente Amplio and the traditional social movements (labour, students, cooperativism, etc.). This historical alliance has been underlined by the literature as a peculiar feature of the Uruguayan political system (Filgueira 1985; Moreira 2004; Bidegain and Tricot 2017). We will show how the recent turn of events affects the classic sociopolitical intermediation Uruguayan model and brings the country closer to the continental debates on social discontent with the political system (Aylwin et al. 2013; Joignant, Morales, and Fuentes 2017).

To test our argument we focus on a specific territory and campaign: the opposition and mobilizations against the deep water port of Rocha, which was associated to the mega mining Aratirí project. We follow a qualitative approach that combines secondary data analysis with interviews to local political and social actors. Our fieldwork was conducted in Montevideo and Rocha in order to grasp the local and national dimensions of the conflict. We interviewed 18 persons involved with the subject (4 local political actors and 14 environmental activists).

The disputes on extractivism are recent in Uruguay, a country that hasn’t received much attention by the literature due its relative lack of environmental conflicts. In this research we aim to analyze how the recent turn of events question the classic sociopolitical intermediation Uruguayan model and bring this country closer to the continental debates.

I. Uruguay in the Latin American context

Research has remarked the existence of two parallel phenomena related to the economic, political and social reality in Latin America at the beginning of the XXI century. On the one hand, it is observed what has been called a “turn to the left” and, on the other hand, what is known as “Commodities Consensus” (Svampa 2012). With reference to the first phenomenon, throughout the first decade of the XXI century, the vast majority of Latin American governments present a progressive or popular “orientation” known as “turn to the left” as it was previously mentioned. In spite of the differences among countries ‐that have led to a wide academic discussion (Arditi 2008)‐ in 2008 eleven out of eighteen Latin American governments were in the hands of center‐left or left‐wing presidents (Stokes 2009).

The second phenomenon refers to what the academic literature has called “Commodities Consensus” in order to make clearly explicit that Latin America has joined a new political and economic world order due to the increase of the international prices of both raw materials and consumer goods highly demanded by central countries and emerging powers. As a result, Latin American countries have progressively adopted a model of development based on extractivism (Gudynas 2009).

This new development pattern has affected the economies across the whole region irrespective of the political orientation from each government. In fact, “the current situation not only shows a steady combination between extractivist neodevelopment and neoliberalism (Perú, Colombia and México would be the main examples of this phenomenon), but it also casts light on the link between extractivist neodevelopment and progressive governments in a context of strengthening of state capacities (…)”1 (Svampa 2011, 188).

Uruguay has experienced both phenomena. After 150 years of traditional parties governments (Colorado Party and National Party), a left‐wing party, Frente Amplio (FA), won the national elections in 2005. The left‐wing coalition was founded in 1971 and it has governed the country in the last three terms. Since Frente Amplio came into power, several and different projects have been developed based on large‐scale natural resource extraction as a consequence of the arrival of important foreign investment.

To understand the origin of this phenomenon, it is essential to address the Uruguayan economic context during the early years of the XXI century. From 1999 to 2003, Uruguay faced one of the most important economic crises of its history2. It was estimated that the GDP fell approximately by a 15% in those years which negatively impacted on the macroeconomic stability as it caused currency devaluation, rising inflation, a constant

1 Our translation, original in Spanish. 2 In this text the causes of the economic crisis will be not be deepen. For further information about this issue, see Mordecky (2015).

fall of real wages and an increase of public deficit (Mordecky 2015). This crisis, logically, also took a toll on the social welfare of the population. For example, unemployment steadily increased until it peaked at 20, 4% in September 2002 while poverty and destitution also reached historic figures for Uruguay (40% and 4, 7% respectively).

In this context, national elections were held in 2004 and the FA achieved the government for the first time by a large margin of votes. This victory allowed the left‐ wing coalition to carry out its development agenda which has been initially marked by the tension between two models: “Uruguay Natural” and “Uruguay Productivo”3 (Santos 2017). The former has its roots in the early 1990s and, thanks to a major boost under Jorge Batlle government (1999‐2004). “Uruguay Natural” has been gradually ingrained in the public discourse and in national and international tourist promotion campaigns that aimed to position the country as a natural destination.

In this regard, Renfrew states that “the Uruguay Natural campaign responds to a United Nations‐inspired form of sustainable development. This is the broad discourse that has its origins in the perceived crisis of nature and development as recognized at the 1972 Stockholm UN Conference on the Environment” (Renfrew 2009, 90). Thus, the model was focused on valuing the authentic natural wealth of Uruguay and, to do so, attempts have been made by different governments to create an environmental regulatory framework since the early 1990s. As a result, Uruguay currently relies on a National Protected Areas System (known as SNAP in Spanish) and on Environmental Protection Law (Law No.17.283).

Nowadays, “Uruguay Natural” coexists with the “Uruguay Productivo” model intended to promote economic growth as well as creating work force. In this sense, it is relevant to consider that the latter model was designed and put into practice by the FA in order to tackle an economic situation back in 2004 that posed several challenges to economic growth. For this reason, the government not only made an effort to attract foreign investment, but it also forged alliances with the private sector to develop it. Among many examples, the building of the Finish pulp plant on the banks of the Río Uruguay has probably been the most internationally known endeavor because of the political conflicts between Uruguay and Argentina on this matter4.

But apart from this well‐known case, Uruguay has also welcomed afforestation, the cultivation of genetically modified rice and soybean for export and a project of open‐pit megamining. To make these investments possible, the Uruguayan State has partnered

3 “Uruguay Natural” (“Natural Uruguay”) is the Country Brand and “Uruguay Productivo” means “Productive Uruguay”. 4 The Finish investment has been particularly relevant owing to the conflict it brought about between Uruguay and Argentina which even led these two countries to resort to the Court of The Hague to refer the matter.

with private capitals for the purpose of enabling the extraction, processing and export of these resources and basic goods. As an example of these partnerships, the government embarked on a project to build a floating regasification plant located in the bay of Montevideo in order to not only provide the aforementioned endeavors with energy, but also to allow the building of roadways, bridges and an Atlantic deep water port (Renfrew and Santos 2017).

After more than a decade, the social and economic situation in Uruguay changed as a consequence of a steady economic growth since 2004 that allowed the government to reduce the poverty rate below 10% as well as unemployment that fell to a historic 6, 2% in 2010. To understand this recent success, it is crucial to heed the big foreign investments.

I.a. The Aratirí project and the deep water port in Rocha

As previously mentioned, within the “Uruguay Productivo” frame, an open‐pit megamining project aiming to take advantage of the international iron ore high price was considered as an opportunity to promote economic development. The origin of this project dates back to 2007 when the Indian investment group Zamini Ferrous introduced their proposal to carry out Aratirí. Even though mining activity was not new in Uruguay, the Aratirí project would mean a turning point if it was finally achieved because of the scale and volume of exploitation that stem from such an extraction endeavor which, at the same time, would also demand large extensions of land and a high level of investment.

From the government perspective, “Zamin Ferrous will become the main exporting company in Uruguay and iron ore will be the principal export product accounting 17,4% of total exports (1.4 billion of dollars)” 5. Finally, the Aratirí project was not executed due to several reasons that will be addressed in the next section. However, it is absolutely necessary to present some aspects of the Aratirí Project to understand the rationale behind the actions of the environmental movement against this kind of investment and their link with the political system, particularly, with the left‐wing government.

In 2012, the Indian company announced that it would settled in the a village called Valentines, located in the Treinta y Tres Department, that presented a low population density (according to the census held in 2011 Valentines was home to only 178 inhabitants). Apart from this village, the project would also include Cerro Chato, another small village more populated than Valentines (3000 inhabitants). Both villages, like each and every rural village in Uruguay, share the same features: an economic activity mainly based on agriculture and livestock, an ageing population because of a strong migration of youngsters in their search for job and education opportunities and, lastly, poor road infrastructure that hinders connectivity. In consideration of these problems, the Aratirí project was widely supported at first by certain actors in these communities who regarded this investment as an invaluable chance to energize and stimulate an economic depressed region lacking jobs.

The project also entailed big investments in satellite infrastructure. In this sense, firstly, the company committed to building an underground pipeline and, secondly, a port terminal (a deep water port in Rocha). The government also fostered the building of a Regasification plant near Montevideo that would satisfy the Aratirí energetic needs. These projects constituted a three sided governmental strategy that combined natural

5 See: https://www.presidencia.gub.uy/comunicacion/comunicacionnoticias/puerto‐aguas‐profundas‐ acuerdo‐gobierno‐zamin‐ferrous [retrieved on May 28, 2019]. Original in Spanish, our translation.

resources extraction (iron ore mine), infrastructure (deep water port, pipelines) and energy supply (regasification plant) (Renfrew and Santos 2017, 34).

The deep water port project was not new in the Uruguayan political agenda since, for years, different governments had studied this possibility that would hopefully allow Uruguay to trade with the Asian market and, therefore, the port would position the country in the region through a stronger participation in international trade. But it was under the presidency of José Mujica (2010‐2015) that due to the iron ore high prices in the international markets the negotiations between the Indian company and the Uruguayan government speeded up, bringing the deep water port project to the forefront of public debate.

Figure 1 Map of the Aratiri project

Source: own elaboration based on López Echagüe (2017, 12)

I.b. The social response to the new projects

As mentioned above, the public policy to attract large investments resulted in an increase of social environmental conflicts which were new and unfamiliar to Uruguay. These unknown conflicts were “related to the access and control of natural resources by different actors that divergently value them in a context marked by an asymmetry of power” (Svampa 2011, 186)6. For this reason, several social groups and actors, who had been historically poorly organized to collectively participate in these kinds of matters, strongly reacted to oppose to some of the projects already mentioned.

6 Original in Spanish, our translation.

The first important milestone for the environmental movements was the conflict arising from the authorization given by the FA to a Finish company to build a pulp plant on the banks of the Río Uruguay. This conflict involved several actors due to its complexity and its geopolitical relevance (many actors intervened: governments, companies, social movements and international agencies). But, above all, this conflict empowered social movements that had not been visible before and that became gradually stronger thanks to the participation of some national NGOs which had previous experience in questioning government environmental decisions such as the eucalyptus tree afforestation plan in the 1990s (Reboratti and Palermo 2007).

However, as noted by Reboratti and Palermo (2007), the environmental movements had to cope with the massive endorsement the Uruguayans showed towards the pulp plant not only based on a collective expectancy of a local industrial modernization, but also triggered by the drive to defend the national autonomy in a context of a sharp dispute with Argentina. Despite the overwhelming social acceptance of the investment, the environmental movements made a great breakthrough during this conflict because they were able to establish the foundations of a pioneering, bigger and national environmental movement.

The announcement of the Aratirí project was a second milestone for the environmental movement. According to a referent of the environmental movement: “Aratirí (the mine, the underground pipeline and the port) originated what we call a social‐environmental movement for the first time in Uruguay which is not new in the region but, in our country, was completely sui generis.7” In this sense, as a result of the arrival of foreign investments, the environmental movements enhanced their organization and grew in number which enabled them to speak out to raise environmental issues. On the following pages, we will focus on the deep water port case.

7 Personal interview with an environmental referent.

II. The deep water project and its contestation

II.a. The governmental agenda (2007‐2018).

The construction of a deep water port in the Uruguayan oceanic coast is a long lasting project. The first studies date back to the decade of the sixties (CIPAP 2012b), and since then, the idea has been considered by several Uruguayan governments. However, it was not until the arrival of the Aratirí open‐pit megamining project to the country in 2007 that this idea gained traction and became a real possibility (Elizalde, Menéndez, and Sosa 2013, 47). That same year, a Spanish investment group, the Benel Group, presented a deep water port project in La Paloma to the Tabaré Vázquez government. This project defined the deep water port as a regional hub, and considered the potential production of the Aratirí mine as part the goods that would be transported through the port. The Benel Group plan received some political and media attention, but did not make much progress. When José Mujica assumed the presidency in 2010, the idea of a deep water project gained force, but the Benel Group plan lost relevance in the new government (Buere 2017, 39).

During Mujica’s government, several actions were undertook to nail down the deep water port project, and other private proposals were presented. For instance, the Compañía Oriental de Desarrollo e Inversiones (CODIN), a foreign investment group, presented the Aurora Project, to be located in La Angostura (80 kilometers away from La Paloma).

According to the government, the deep water port and the Aratirí open‐pit megamining projects were deeply intertwined. On one hand, the viability of the deep water port was explicitly tied to the confirmation of the Aratirí open‐pit megamining project: “Exports of iron ore could become the platform to make the construction of the deep water port a reality (…)”8. On the other hand, a deep water port was necessary to export the open‐ pit mining production: “The export of 18 million tons of iron ore per year will require a deep water port capable of receiving vessels up to 19 meters draft”9. Furthermore, even if Aratirí’s original did not involve the construction of a deep water port, the Uruguayan government talks with the group in charge of the megamining project led it to consider this possibility (Bacchetta 2015, 80).

In November 2011, the Executive created an Interministerial Commision in charge of “(…) analyzing the options for the installation of a deep water port to be built on the

8 See: https://www.presidencia.gub.uy/comunicacion/comunicacionnoticias/puerto‐aguas‐profundas‐ acuerdo‐gobierno‐zamin‐ferrous [retrieved on May 9, 2019]. 9 See: https://www.presidencia.gub.uy/comunicacion/comunicacionnoticias/puerto‐aguas‐profundas‐ acuerdo‐gobierno‐zamin‐ferrous [retrieved on May 9, 2019].

east coast of the country (…)”10. The location of the port was not clear, since several possible locations had been publicly managed by the authorities. In fact, one of the tasks of the Commission, publicly knew as CIPAP for its initials in Spanish11, was to determine the most suitable location for the project.

It is very interesting to note that one of the working hypotheses of the Commision was that “Uruguay has defined that the realization of a deep water port, for so many decades desired, is strategic, viable and necessary (…)”(CIPAP 2012a, 3). We will show in the next section that this definition was not consensual at all. Five possible locations, all of them in the Rocha department, were considered as potentially suitable: La Paloma, El Palenque, Puerta del Sol, La Esmeralda y La Angostura.

10 Article 2 of the Executive Decree number 395/011, November 11, 2011. 11 Comisión Interministerial Puerto de Aguas Profundas (Interministerial Commission Deepwater Port, in english).

Figure 2 Deep water port locations considered by the CIPAP in the Rocha department

Source: own elaboration based on CIPAP (2012a)

The conclusions of the CIPAP were presented on May 2012. The commission established that a deep water port in the oceanic coast was necessary and convenient for the country. According to the report, the government should promote the construction of one sole multipurpose deep water port in the Roca coast. It should cover 2000 hectares of land between El Palenque and Puerta del Sol, 20 kms to the East of La Paloma (CIPAP 2012c). The CIPAP conclusions were validated by the Executive power in June through an Executive Decree which defined a Public‐Partnership Project scheme to advance with the project, validated the selected location and allowed for the expropriation of the required territory to build de deep water port12. The Decree was considered illegal by several residents of the affected territories, who filed a legal complaint. As a consequence, the Executive retired the Decree and sent a bill to the Congress on July. After some minor adjustments, the bill was unanimously voted in the Senate by the 28 senators present in the flour (out of 31). The bill was finally approved by the House of

12 See: https://www.presidencia.gub.uy/Comunicacion/comunicacionNoticias/puerto‐rocha‐de‐aguas‐ profundas [retrieved on May 9, 2019].

Representatives on December 2012, reaching the support of 65 out of the 73 deputies present in the session (from a total of 99). The bill was voted by the government party, as well as by legislators of all the major opposition parties (Bacchetta 2015, 78–79). On January 2013, the Executive promulgated the law nº 19.046 “Deep water port located in the Atlantic Ocean Coast”.

The government proceeded with its efforts to nail down the deep water port project. The CIPAP called for a data room to provide information on the project to potential investors. According to the authorities, 40 firms from 13 countries showed interest to take part in the public‐private partnership13. The next step should be a competitive dialogue between the government and the bidders. However, there were no visible results from the supposed competitive dialogue, no agreement was signed. Moreover, the representatives of the Aurora project criticized the whole process led by the CIPAP and withdrew their proposal.

Before ending its presidency, Mujica directly promoted important governmental efforts to find investors like sending an official delegation to China to present the project or personally discuss with Vladimir Putin the relevance of the deep water project. Nonetheless, these attempts failed and the only results of the governmental actions were the legislative modifications, several land expropriations and many expenses associated with the functioning of the CIPAP (Bacchetta 2015, 85–87).

In 2015, Tabaré Vázquez became the new Uruguayan President. Shortly after taking charge, he declared that the Aratirí open‐pit megamining project was on hold, and he added: “a deep water port without Aratirí would not be profitable”14. The Aratirí project finally came to an end on April 201815 and the deep water port project seemed to vanish as well, at least as a feasible plan in the short term. The government continued to declare that the deep water port was a strategic project for the country, but acknowledged that it ceased to be a priority one16.

13 See: https://www.presidencia.gub.uy/comunicacion/comunicacionnoticias/puerto‐aguas‐profundas‐ dataroom [retrieved on May 9, 2019]. 14 See: https://ladiaria.com.uy/articulo/2015/4/plan‐de‐cierre/ [retrieved on May 14, 2019]. 15 See: https://www.teledoce.com/telemundo/nacionales/ministerio‐de‐industria‐informo‐que‐el‐ proyecto‐aratiri‐ya‐no‐cuenta‐con‐permiso‐para‐extraer‐hierro/ [retrieved on May 14, 2019]. 16 See: https://www.elpais.com.uy/informacion/puerto‐rocha‐dejo‐prioridad.html [retrieved on May 14, 2019].

II.b. The main features of the social movement against the deep water project

a) The reaction: local actors, regional and national articulations

The government’s efforts to promote direct foreign investment projects with severe environmental consequences were opposed by the upsurge of an unprecedented environmental movement characterized by original features regarding the Uruguayan social mobilization recent history.

Elizalde et al. (2013) highlight the following peculiarities. In the first place, the traditional leading social actors, like labor unions or student federations, were displaced by heterogeneous groups with local roots (producers and residents). Secondly, the movement diverged from the classic centralist orientation of most national movements. Usually, the protests, actions and meetings concentrate in Montevideo. In this case, most of them took place around the locations that would be affected by the different projects, in several departments of the national territory. Thirdly, and associated with the previous point, the movement had a very local and reactive logic. Local actors started to organize and protest following private companies and governmental actions that were considered threatening. Regarding the deep water project, several Rocha department coastal villages reacted to the different projects that were presented.

It is important to highlight the capacity that the movement had to connect the local concerns related to specific projects to other projects that would take place in distant locations. Our fieldwork makes clear that this important connection between the local, the regional and the national dimensions was achieved through organization networking, the creation of a national coordination stance and a master framework that labeled the governmental development model as extractivist and underlined the interrelation between several projects that would take place in different territories.

The Confederación de Pueblos Costeros17 (CPC) was born as a reaction to the deep water project and quickly became a very relevant actor of the movement. Its path exemplifies many of the dynamics presented above.

This organization was created in 2011, after a meeting between neighborhood councils and organizations of several coastal communities that were worried about many projects promoted by the government (the deep water port project was the most ambitious one). The constitutive meeting took place in La Paloma and reunited people from different villages of the Rocha and Maldonado departments (Punta del Diablo, La

17 Coastal Villages Confederation in English.

Esmeralda, Valizas, Aguas Dulces, La Pedrera, Punta Rubia, Piriápolis, José Ignacio y La Paloma)18.

Some of these local councils and organizations had previous history, but others were created to confront the threat of the deep water port. As one interviewee points out, the mixed signals of the government regarding the location of the project were very productive in terms of fostering local and regional organization:

“In one year the location changed between La Angostura, La Paloma, Palenque, and they even talked about the Barra del Chuy. They wanted to put it anywhere. So, this was ideal, it made the movement fight together. Since they changed the location of the port every six month, they were alarming everyone.19”

According to this interviewee, the creation of the CPC responded to the necessity of “dealing with the problem at the regional level”. Interestingly, the CPC quickly developed ties at the national level. In this regard, two different organizations were particularly relevant. In the first place, the Movimiento por un Uruguay Sustentable20 (MOVUS). In the second place, the Asamblea Nacional Permanente en Defensa de la Tierra y los Bienes Naturales21 (ANP).

The MOVUS was created in February 2011 as a reaction to the Aratirí project. Several producer organizations and residents of the territories potentially affected by the open‐ pit mine and the deep water port projects united with students and professionals interested in collecting alternative information about the projects and diffuse it to the public opinion (Bacchetta 2015, 139). According to a referent of the MOVUS, it operates as an open group that avoids explicitly the Montevidean centrality characteristic of the traditional social organizations. Another important feature of this group is its technical capacity, the MOVUS count with a network of technical experts that provide expert insights that are shared with the communities. In that sense, the interviewee indicated that “we are not fundamentalists, we are not the environmentalists that oppose to everything. We propose alternative analysis based on the available documentation”22. This informative work of the MOVUS and their relation with local actors were acknowledged by a member of the CPC interviewed for this research. When asked about the first steps of the CPC the activist affirmed: “In 2011 MOVUS had an important role providing information and going public to say some stuff. The coastal meeting of the CPC worked as a possibility to receive the MOVUS, as well as other people, and to generate some networks”23.

18 See: http://www.guayubira.org.uy/2011/07/comunidades‐costeras/ [retrieved on May 15, 2019]. 19 Personal interview with a CPC referent, resident of Punta del Diablo. 20 Movement for a Sustainable Uruguay in English. 21 National Permanent Assembly in Defense of the Earth and the Natural Resources in English. 22 Personal interview with a MOVUS referent. 23 Personal interview with a CPC referent, resident of Punta del Diablo.

Later on, in 2012, the CPC took part of the creation of the ANP. The CPC assisted to the first meeting of the National Assembly, an encounter that took place in August 2012 in Tacuarembó24 (a department far away from Rocha that would be affected by the open‐ pit mining project). The assembly gathered different groups concerned with the environmental impacts of the foreign investment projects promoted by the government. Some of these groups had been involved in the first “National demonstration in Defence of the Land and the Water”, which took place in 2011 in Montevideo but were convoked by organizations of the countryside25. The National Assembly resolved to call for a new “National Demonstration in Defence of the Land and the Water”. The second National Assembly took place in November in Rocha. In this occasion the participants resolved to constitute a Permanent National Assembly, an organization that works until now. This assembly work as a horizontal and decentralized organization. It operates on an itinerating fashion, alternating the location of their meetings all around the national territory.

The MOVUS was integrated to the ANP for a while, but after some months they decided to leave this space. According to a referent of the group, they left the Assembly when it was decided that the decisions would be taken by majority and not anymore by consensus (the original criteria). In order to maintain their autonomy and avoiding being tied by majority decisions that the potentially could not support, the decided to leave the space and maintain sporadic links with the ANP: “We left the space and said ‘if you do something that we consider useful or convenient, we will support you, if not, we will keep with the work we already have’”26.

24 See: https://www.anred.org/?p=25244 [retrieved on May 16, 2019]. 25 See: https://movimientom4.org/2012/12/uruguay‐un‐nuevo‐movimiento‐social/ [retrieved on May 16, 2019]. 26 Personal interview with a referent of the ANP.

b) Repertoire of action

The local actors have resorted to a large repertoire of actions to confront the deep water port project in Rocha. They have combined local demonstrations with the participation in the National Demonstrations that have taken place in Montevideo. They also have interposed legal demands, collected signatures and participated in different institutional spaces promoted by the authorities to discuss local development instruments, as well as some “informative” activities promoted by the companies interested in the consecution of the project.

In January 2011, several groups and neighbors councils of La Esmeralda, Punta del Diablo, Valizas and Cabo Polonio launched a campaign to collect signatures to support a writ of amparo against the deep water port project. In February they organized a signature collection day in Montevideo to diffuse their demands on the capital. In March they undertook several diffusion activities in the capital in alongside some groups of producers that would be affected by the open‐pit mine. They also presented their demands to the Congress (Elizalde, Menéndez, and Sosa 2013, 52).

The first National Demonstration in Defense of the Earth and the Natural Resources was held on May the 13 in Montevideo, convoked by several environmental organizations and groups of neighbors of Rocha as well as residents and producers of Cerro Chato and Valentines (two countryside locations that would be affected by the mine). Later on, the national demonstrations became massive and the most visible collective protest event of the environmental movement. The ANP took in charge the organization of the national demonstrations since its creation, from the second march onwards. In some editions, the National Demonstration in Defense of the Earth and the Natural Resources were massive, gathering around 10.000 persons in the downtown of the capital (Elizalde, Menéndez, and Sosa 2013, 67). The diversity of the people involved in these demonstrations is a particular feature that must be underlined and call the attention of the Montevidean population: groups of horse riders of the countryside marched alongside residents of the coastal villages, students of the capital, rural producers, informal trash collectors of the capital, among others.

The groups of Rocha combined their participation in the national activities with more local oriented efforts. A specific protest at the local level that was mentioned by several interviewees took place in Punta del Diablo, when the representatives of Aratirí invited the residents of the village to share information about the mine and the port projects. In that occasion, more than 100 persons identified as “Neighbors and Friends of Punta del Diablo” assisted to the meeting. However, when the company representative started to talk he was interrupted by one of the assistants, who read a manifesto while most of the assistants put skull masks on their faces. After the manifesto reading, the assistants left the room leaving the company’s representatives alone. This local performance made

it to the national media and expressed the resistance of these projects at the local level27.

Santos (2017, 12) has correctly pointed out that the ANP and the MOVUS represent two different organizational models of social contestation to the governmental projects. On the one hand, the ANP work as an open, horizontal and diverse space that has preferred a repertoire of action oriented to contentious politics. On the other hand, the MOVUS has favoured a repertoire of action more proximate to the NGO (information diffusion through public actions, press and social networks, participation in institutional spaces, technical and legal tools in environmental impact evaluation processes, etc.). The different approaches regarding institutional spaces were made explicit by a MOVUS referent: “We never said ‘This is controlled by the system, there is no point in participating’ (…) We are not outside the system, we work inside the system. Even if we are a social movement and do not want to create a political party, we act to manage that political actors answer to the citizenship demands”28. The MOVUS has also fostered the use of departmental level direct democracy mechanisms. This has not been the case in Rocha, but they supported several petition campaigns to confront fracking and open‐ pit mines in Tacuarembó, Paysandú, Salto and Lavalleja29.

The debates around the better way to confront the governmental agenda were also present at the local level, and affected both the individual choices of the individuals regarding to which local organization support and the local organizations decisions regarding to what sort of national articulation prefer. For instance, an interviewee from La Paloma stated that a group of neighbours decided to quit the Neighbours’ Union of la Paloma (an organization with an important work at the local level) and create a new organization, the Campana Verde30, due to this type of dilemmas. According to her: “The Neighbours’ Union of La Paloma did not want to integrate the ANP, because they thought that street protest was not good. Thus, there was a division”31. This quote clearly shows the interplay between local and national strategies and networks. At the regional level, the Campana Verde integrates the CPC, a network that also integrated the ANP. For sure, this option doesn’t imply that the CPC stopped coordinating and working with MOVUS in specific activities, but shows the type of activities and organization they prefer.

27 See: https://www.elobservador.com.uy/nota/protestas‐con‐caretas‐contra‐aratiri‐201162918400 [retrieved on May 16, 2019]. 28 Personal interview with a referent of the Campana Verde. 29 Personal interview with a referent of MOVUS. 30 Green Bell in English. 31 Personal interview with a referent of the Campana Verde.

III. The environmental movement challenge to the traditional socio‐political Uruguayan articulation

The environmental movement’s logic of action, form of organization and the type of relationship that it has mantained with other political and social actors are specific features that break with the traditional socio‐political articulation model that Uruguay has developed, at least, since the return to democracy in 1985.

Uruguay experienced a successful democratic transition regarding the reinstatement and consolidation of its democratic institutions32. The party system quickly recomposed. In the 1985 elections the three main parties obtained very similar results to those of the previous democratic elections (1971), the last one before the 1973 coup d'État. From this point of view, the dictatorship froze but did not destroy the political party system (Filgueira 1985, 45–46). When returning to democracy, the 1967 Constitution and the previous electoral regulations were reinstated.

A similar process took place regarding social mobilization. During the regime transition the main pre‐dictatorial social movements were recomposed. Besides, some new expressions of collective action (groups of young people and women for example) that had emerged and gained importance during the dictatorship, in part by the disarticulation of parties and unions due to repression, enriched the popular field (Filgueira 1985, 13).

In terms of the relationship between political and social actors, Uruguay also recovered the historical relationship of closeness between social organizations and the leftist Frente Amplio, which represented the electoral alternative to the two traditional parties that had historically disputed the government. This socio‐political articulation constituted a real opposition block against the governments of the traditional parties that ruled the country between 1985 and 2005 (the Colorado Party in 1985‐1990 and 1995‐2005 and the National Party in 1990‐1995). In these years, the use of direct democracy mechanisms became a privileged strategy to confront the political agenda of the right‐wing governments, especially in relation to the reforms that were framed in the Washington Consensus. The recurrent use of this institutional tool, and its binding nature, is very exceptional in the regional and international context (Altman 2011). In fact, in this period there were several popular consultations, some of which were successful and forced the governments to change their course of action in very important matters. These consultations were promoted by civil society groups (mainly trade unions, but also groups of citizens) and supported by the Frente Amplio, which used the mechanisms of direct democracy as a useful strategy of opposition and accumulation of forces (Moreira 2004).

32 It must be noted that in spite of this, there are very important shortcomings that persists until today regarding the investigation of Human Rights violations during the dictatorship.

In short, and due to the alliance between social actors and the political left, between 1985 and 2004 there was a scenario where the incentives for social collective action were twofold. On the one hand, to promote political alternation through the winning of the elections by the Frente Amplio. On the other hand, in the case of seeking faster changes, to directly promote popular consultations that would force governments to change their policies.

The 2004 presidential electoral victory of the Frente Amplio generated an unprecedented scenario in the country. The inauguration of this new stage implied an important change in the articulation of the political and social world, since the Frente Amplio, a traditional ally of social movements, has been more permeable to its demands than previous governments (Bidegain and Tricot 2017). In addition, there have been representatives of social organizations that have joined the government. Although there have undoubtedly been tensions in the 12 years of government of the left, the Frente Amplio remains the closest political actor to the traditional social actors, such as the trade union, the cooperatives, human rights organizations, the students, feminists, diversity and afro movemetns, among others. For the time being, and in spite of the natural wear and tear that implies being in the government, the relations between the political and the social left actos have shown resilience capacity. This framework of relative stability of the socio‐political relations of the country has been significantly altered by the form of action of the environmental movement.

How can we account fort the rupture of the traditional socio‐political intermediation channels that characterized the country since 1985 democratic transition? What are the factors that explain the emergence of a social movement directly confronted with the historical partisan ally of social organizations?

In this research we propose three main reasons to explain for this situation. In the first place, we highlight a contextual factor. The Frente Amplio embraced the increasing foreign direct investment propositions related with natural resources exploitation as an opportunity that should be seized to enhance the country’s development. Secondly, the environmental movement has very different characteristics regarding the traditional movements that remain close to the Frente Amplio. It developed an alternative discourse to the Uruguay Productivo frame and articulated different organizations and local stakeholders, from environmental NGO to local actors related to the productive activities that took place in the potential affected territories. They had very different political backgrounds and in several cases, lacked previous militant experience and ties with the Uruguayan traditional social organizations. Thirdly, in contrast with the relevant participative mechanisms promoted by the government to discuss the reforms of several public policy sectors (health, education, labour), the spaces promoted to debate on environmental issues were not perceived by the organizations as truly decisive.

The Frente Amplio engagement with the extractive FDI projects has already been discussed in the previous pages. In what follows, we develop the remaining two factors: the specificities of the environmental movement in the popular field and its perception regarding the participative channels proposed by the government to discuss the projects.

III.a. An isolated social movement?

The direct confrontation of the environmental movement with the Frente Amplio is a noteworthy peculiarity in the national context. While Uruguayan social movements have traditionally entertained close relations with the center left coalition, the emergent environmental movement perceived the ruling party as direct treat and mobilized to confront its foreign investment agenda. This reality affected the capacity of the environmental movement to develop alliances with some traditional movements and social organizations, like the labor movement. In fact, the nature‐intensive resource export model fostered by the FA governments was compatible with many of the traditional social organization’s demands, like wealth redistribution, extensive social policies and poverty reduction. Furthermore, the mega‐ projects were presented as relevant opportunities to create job opportunities. From the environmental movement point of view, these projects were short minded, they offered short term investment at a very high – and long lasting ‐ environmental cost (Renfrew and Santos 2017, 34). The fieldwork conducted confirm these statements. The interviewees highlighted the independence of the movement regarding political parties in general and the Frente Amplio in particular. According to an ANP member, “Since its origins, the ANP is defined as apolitical. It won’t work with partisan politics. Partisan flags are not allowed neither in the demonstrations nor in the assemblies. People with partisan affinities are welcome, but political organizations are not”33. When asked about the specific relation with the Frente Amplio, many interviewees manifested their disappointment. For instance, an activist from La Paloma stated: “It turned to be more of the same, nothing changed, on the contrary. You know what the Blancos and the Colorados [the right wing parties] can do, but the Frente Amplio is the Pandora box, everyday there is a new surprise. They have done the same than the rest, and much worse. And that’s it. In my case, the last time I voted was for Mujica, and arrivederci34”. It is interesting to note that at the local level, the Frente Amplio was perceived in some cases as a potential ally and some collaborations took place. However, at some point these experiences were truncated. According to the interviewees there were central party pressures that conspired against the proliferation of these experiences. For instance, during some time the MOVUS toured in several different Frente Amplio

33 Personal interview with a local activist, resident of Punta del Diablo. 34 Personal interview with a local activist, resident of La Paloma.

Comités de Base (the grassroots’ assemblies of the party) to present their insights regarding the different mega‐projects directly to the party militants. However, this possibility suddenly was curtailed, in the MOVUS point of view due to the will of party actors above the local level35. Another example is the direct implication of the La Paloma Mayor, Alcides Perdomo, against several high environmental projects in the city like the deep water project. The Major was perceived as an important ally by the environmental movement:

“In Rocha the movement started with a lot of strength because there was an affinity with the municipality of La Paloma. Alcides supported the start of the movement (…). It was a very interesting support, in terms of local, infrastructure, dissemination. He publicly took position against the port. All of this gave a tremendous boost to that alliance, which finally vanished because they called him to order”36. The former Major does not acknowledge such a direct central intervention, but he recognizes that “This [his opposition to the projects] came at a personal cost, to be always nervous, to be on the defensive because I always expected that they would run over me. Well, it did not happen, but I was always attentive37”. Besides these specific local efforts, the interviewees manifested that the Frente Amplio endorses a productive model oriented to job creation and poverty reduction, without substantial differences with the rest of the political parties regarding environmental concerns. An activist remembered an encounter with the former Intendente of Rocha to exemplify this type of concerns: “We raised, above all, the issue of the deep water port and the development model involved. The most overwhelming answer, from the Intendente Artigas Barrios was: ‘I there is a project that will leave money, we are going to do it. The port will be made’. Like this, in our face, at a one metre distance. Explicit.38” This quote shows the contradiction between two Frente Amplio political authorities, one at the third tier governmental authority (the Major) and the other at the second tier authority (the Intendente). As we already showed above, at the national level there was an explicit support to the project. This was clearly perceived by the environmental activists “The Frente Amplio, due to its parliamentary majority, did what it wanted at the environmental level”39. A second peculiarity of the environmental movement and its location in the popular field regards its ties vis‐à‐vis the traditional Uruguayan social movements. The PIT‐CNT is the most important social movement organization of the country, the National Labor Union that reunites the quasi‐totality of Uruguay’s labor unions. The PIT‐CNT has been involved in the most important social contestation processes of the last decades, and has deep

35 Personal interview with a MOVUS referent. 36 Personal interview with a local activist, resident of Punta del Diablo. 37 Personal interview with Alcides Perdomo, La Paloma Major (2010‐2015). 38 Personal interview with a local activist, resident of Punta del Diablo. 39 Personal interview with an environmental NGO member.

ties with the student movement, and the cooperative. More recently, it has also developed strong ties with the feminist and diversity movements. The labor movement is, without discussion, the most important movement of the country. Interestingly, its relations with the environmental movement have been cold at least, and tense in many occasions. The PIT‐CNT’s closed ties with the Frente Amplio, as well as its orientation towards job creation politics were determinant to define its support to the mega‐projects fostered by the government, in spite of their potential environmental impact and their global capitalist profile. Environmental activists are aware that the support of the labor movement could be crucial to foster their agenda, but they also know that gaining its support is not an easy task for the precedent reasons. Several efforts were made in this sense and some agreements were achieved with specific unions. However, some interviewees indicate that some of these articulations were curtailed due to the PIT‐CNT influence over these unions. According to an activist: “The same thing happened, I think, with many unions. Yes, let's say that there was an approach at the beginning, an understanding, at least a call to the dialogue. But the same dynamic repeated: the PIT‐ CNT arrived, the conversations diminished, and then a total negative. It’s over40”. Regarding the student movement, some groups of the national University Federation – the FEUU41‐ have been involved in the environmental movement. The interviewees agree there has not been a strong involvement by the FEUU itself (even if it has gained presence progressively), but that there are some collectives that are actively involved. In any case, some sectors of the environmental movement perceive that there is not an active support of the rest of the organizations of the social field, which tend to support each other. An activist of Rocha expressed this concern: “Those movements, the march of Cannabis, the diversity, the movement of March the 8th, all the civil rights ... there they are all in, the Faculty of Social Sciences says to the students: ‘Go! Go to the marches!’ And the FEUU, and everything. But in the march of the water or in that of Aratirí they don’t. (…) When you are not supported by those social collectives that theoretically share… The environmental movement is very lonely.”

III.b. A disappointed movement regarding participatory processes

The strong articulation between the Frente Amplio and the traditional social organizations, as well as the historic participatory discourse of the left wing party, were related to the creation of new institutional channels to boost the Frente Amplio’s reforms. In this sense, the academic literature has recognized that “Frente Amplio

40 Personal interview with a local activist, resident of Punta del Diablo. 41 Federación de Estudiantes Universitarios, University Students Federation in English.

administrations have displayed a governance style that combines aspects of the party democracy of the past—facilitated by the fact that they enjoyed majorities in the legislature—–with old and new modes of participation in the policy process” (Bentancur and Busquets 2019, 146).

There are different types of devices that have been created, depending mainly on the policy arena to which each participatory device is associated. Their success is also associated to the real incidence of social actors in the design of the reforms promoted by the left. Beyond these differences, it seems clear that civil society actors have, to a greater or lesser extent, occupied the participatory spaces in key areas of public policy. An example of this is health reform, which involved the creation of a National Health Board which includes representatives of workers and users; or the implementation of the Salary Councils, a tripartite body where government, employer and worker representatives deal with subjects suchas as minimum wage and working conditions.

In environmental matters, new institutionalized participatory channels were also created. Some examples are contained in the National Water Plan, the Environmental Impact Law, and the Law on Territorial Regulation and the Environment. A crucial difference with the participatory structures of other policy arenas is that environmental spaces are basically consultative. For instance, public hearings limit the capacity of direct impact on the resolution of policies, leaving the final decision completely in the government’s hands. This consultative format has generated a reactive response from social movements, which do not perceive these spaces as real channels of interaction:

"These mechanisms are parodies. They make parodies of public consultation. How can you pretend to label as citizen participation the stance where a common person receives a report, (if he receives it and if he has time to read it..), to go to a to a meeting and dispose 5 or 10 minutes to give an opinion? This is the contribution of civil society to the definition of a government plan? No, that's ridiculous.42"

42 Personal interview to an environmentalist referent.

Final remarks

Socio‐environmental conflicts have a recent history in Uruguay. They have gained prominence with the arrival to the country of large foreign investment mega projects. In spite of some antecedents, the environmental movements has only reached national attention and become a relevant actor in Uruguayan politics in the last decade. Therefore, it is understandable that there is little academic production on this matter. From this point of view, the absence of the Uruguayan case in most Latin‐American debates on extractivism and on the social response to this development model is comprehensive as well. This article aims to make a contribution in that sense. Following an exploratory and descriptive approach, it departs from a local case to show the interface between the local, regional and national dimensions. The paper lays the foundations to discuss the effects of the environmental movement on the traditional political‐social relations that have characterized the Uruguayan democracy since transition, which have been presented as a crucial factor to understand the country’s stability. Firstly, the article has shown the tension that has emerged due to the arrival of extractive mega projects in recent years, describing the large investments that have been made in and focusing mainly on the mega‐mining and deep water port projects that gave rise to the most important mobilization of actors. Secondly, it has sketched the main features of the environmental movement, demonstrating its decentralized, multilevel and horizontal logic, which differentiates it from other actors of the social field. Furthermore, it has analyzed the consequences of these features regarding the relationship of the movement with the political system in general, and the parties in particular. Finally, in the third section, three hypotheses that could account for this situation have been presented. These hypotheses deserve further attention and outline a future research agenda.

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