The Conceptual Priority of the Perfect
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Marquette University e-Publications@Marquette Dissertations (2009 -) Dissertations, Theses, and Professional Projects The onceptualC Priority of the Perfect Matthew etP er Zdon Marquette University Recommended Citation Zdon, Matthew Peter, "The oncC eptual Priority of the Perfect" (2015). Dissertations (2009 -). Paper 598. http://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu/598 THE CONCEPTUAL PRIORITY OF THE PERFECT by Matthew Zdon A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School, Marquette University, in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Milwaukee, Wisconsin December 2015 ABSTRACT THE CONCEPTUAL PRIORITY OF THE PERFECT Matthew Zdon Marquette University, 2015 The doctrine of the conceptual priority of the perfect (CPP) is the claim that the concept of the perfect is prior to that of the imperfect insofar as possessing the latter presupposes a grasp of the former, but not vice versa. The goals of this study are to provide an account and defense of the Cartesian argument for CPP, to determine the consequences of this priority for the relationship between our concepts of human and divine properties, and to explore its implications for bottom-up accounts of theological concept formation. I argue that the predicates “perfect” or “infinite” in Descartes’ version of CPP are equivalent to “true” or “genuine” and thus function in the same way they would in geometrical examples where the perfection at issue is definitive of the kind and where imperfection constitutes falling short of the kind. I can thus be said to have the idea of a “perfect” circle (of that which is “infinitely” circular, as it were) merely by virtue of having the idea of a circle, yet I cannot apprehend something as imperfect or finite insofar as it resembles but fails to be a circle unless I already possess a concept of the kind in question— a true or perfect circle. CPP thus implies a qualitative distinction between the perfect and imperfect that, when applied to God and creation, is consistent with a theory of analogy. Unlike traditional ‘bottom-up’ theories of analogy, however, CPP entails a ‘top-down’ order of derivation in which concepts of creaturely perfections are derived (via a sort of ‘partial negation’) from concepts of divine ones. The ‘top-down’ order of derivation yields epistemological advantages over the traditional approach, which had always struggled to explain how we can derive analogical concepts of God from creatures. Further, CPP enables its proponents to address the classic anthropomorphism critiques leveled at practitioners of Perfect Being Theology. Though I acknowledge that CPP is not without its own weaknesses, I present a largely sympathetic account of the argument and its relevance for contemporary philosophy of religion. i ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Matthew Zdon I would like to thank Dr. Wreen, my advisor, for shepherding me through the dissertation process; Dr. South for initiating the dissertation and helping me to select and refine my thesis; Dr. Crockett, whose classes on Descartes and other Rationalists inspired my initial interest in the topic; members of my dissertation committee—Drs. Adams, Taylor and Prendergast—for devoting their valuable time and energy; my parents for their support; and my wife, Molly, for her patience. This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of Frank Reilly, radical theologian, teacher and friend. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS………………………………………………………………………………………………………………i INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………1 CHAPTER I. CPP AND THE ARGUMENT FROM NEGATION…………………………………………9 Contemporary Reception of Cartesian CPP………………………9 The Correlative Concept Critique………………………………………11 CPP and the Perfect Triangle…………………………………………………22 Perfect as ‘True’…………………………………………………………………23 Resolving an Ambiguity in CPP…………………………………25 The Standard of Perfection…………………………………………33 Cartesian CPP and Platonism……………………………………………………42 Why Must the Narrator Compare Himself to God?……52 The Criteria of True Substance……………………………………………58 II. CPP AND THE AMPLIFICATION ARGUMENT……………………………………68 Amplification and Innateness…………………………………………………76 Divine Perfections as Indefinite………………………………………82 The Infinite as the Absolute…………………………………………………94 Amplification and the Qualitative Difference……107 The Nature of the Qualitative Difference………………123 Conclusion: The Recognition of Imperfection………127 iii III. THE POSITIVE RELATION BETWEEN THE PERFECT AND THE IMPERFECT………………………………………………………………………………………………………………132 The Modal Relation and Resemblance………………………………133 The Image-Model Metaphor and Resemblance………………145 Adams on Leibniz and Resemblance by Comparative Properties………………………………………………………………………………………………155 Denial of Univocity Does not Entail Equivocity………………………………………………………………………………………………163 IV. CPP AND ANALOGY……………………………………………………………………………………179 Aristotle and Analogy…………………………………………………………………183 Aquinas and Analogy………………………………………………………………………189 Ontological Resemblance………………………………………………191 Definitional Priority of the Primary Analogate……………………………………………………………………………………200 Direction of Analogical Derivation…………………208 V. ANALOGY AND ABSTRACTION BY CONFUSION………………………………215 Abstraction by Confusion…………………………………………………………216 Modal Distinction vs. Abstraction by Confusion…………………………………………………………………………………………………222 Modern Accounts of Resemblance…………………………………………233 VI. TOP-DOWN ANALOGY…………………………………………………………………………………241 Top-down Analogy and the Traditional Problem of Religious Language…………………………………………………………………………241 Scotus’ Critique of Bottom-up Derivation………………248 Descartes’ Analogy of Divine Self-Causation………255 Descartes’ Analogy of Causation as Top-down Derivation………………………………………………………………………………………………271 iv Top-down Derivation of Knowledge and Love……………279 VII. CPP AND PERFECT BEING THEOLOGY…………………………………………288 Perfect Being Theology and Univocity…………………………289 Miller’s Critique and CPP………………………………………………………295 The Criterion of Perfection…………………………………………………299 VIII. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF CARTESIAN CPP…………………316 The Plausibility of our Awareness of Absolute Imperfection…………………………………………………………………………………………316 CPP as Transcendental Argument……………………………317 Transcendental Argument Against Amplification…………………………………………………………………………320 Generalizing the Argument from CPP…………………327 The Ontology and Cognition of Primitive Resemblance……………………………………………………………………………………………337 BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………347 1 Introduction The doctrine of the conceptual priority of the perfect (CPP) is the claim that the concept of the perfect is prior to that of the imperfect insofar as possessing the latter presupposes a grasp of the former, but not vice versa. In Descartes’ philosophy, as well as in that of his rationalist successors such as Leibniz and Malebranche, CPP is most often used to show that our idea of God, or infinite being, is conceptually prior to the idea we have of ourselves.1 Despite the fact that Descartes appeals to CPP throughout his philosophical works and even though it plays an important role in his arguments concerning the nature and origin of our idea of God, the Cartesian account 1 Examples from Descartes will follow. Malebranche, in The Search After Truth, quotes Descartes’ statement of the priority in his April 1649 letter to Clerselier almost word for word: “But not only does the mind have the idea of the infinite, it even has it before that of the finite. For we conceive of infinite being simply because we conceive of being, without thinking whether it is finite or infinite. In order for us to conceive of a finite being, something must necessarily be eliminated from this general notion of being, which consequently must come first” (232). In his own statements of the priority, Leibniz prefers to use the term “absolute” to characterize divine infinity. In the New Essays on Human Understanding, a dialogue written in response to Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, the character espousing the Leibnizian position argues that “the true infinite, strictly speaking, is only in the absolute, which precedes all composition and is not formed by that addition of parts” (157) and further that the “idea of the absolute is internal to us, as is that of being: these absolutes are nothing but the attributes of God; and they may be said to be as much the source of ideas as God himself is the principle of beings” (158). Spinoza will also employ something like CPP, but for him the priority seems to be the same as the priority of substance to that of mode. 2 of CPP has been largely neglected by scholars. It is too easy, perhaps, to view it as a relic of Descartes’ religious milieu—as one more regrettable respect in which the Enlightenment philosopher failed to be a fully modern thinker—or to dismiss it as a sop to religious authorities, served to make his less-palatable philosophical innovations more appetizing. Especially when viewed in light of his occasional expressions of apparent fideism, e.g., “I have never written about the infinite except to submit myself to it” (CSMK 172), one might forsake CPP as impenetrable to philosophical analysis. Such interpretations lose much of their appeal when CPP is correctly understood. In the first chapter, I explain how CPP shows that our concept of “perfect” or “infinite” being is not produced by merely negating the qualifications “imperfect” or “finite.” I argue that the predicates “perfect” or “infinite” in CPP are equivalent to “true” or “genuine” and thus function in the same way they would in geometrical examples where the perfection