The Journal for Interdisciplinary Middle Eastern Studies Volume 7, No. 1, Spring 2021, pp. 93-96 DOI: https://doi.org/10.26351/JIMES/7-1/4 ISSN: 2522-347X (print); 2522-6959 (online)

Book Review: The Saudi Perspective of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Tragedy

Nawaf Obaid The Failure of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab World Santa Barbara and Denver: Praeger, 2020, 368pp.

Until recently, much of the academic literature on the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was preoccupied with revealing the secret of the success of the movement and the recipe for its longevity, being a veteran Islamic movement in the Middle East that has survived as an opposition movement longer than any of its Islamic and secular counterparts. Emmanuel Sivan, for example, referred to the clarity of the message of the movement (opposition to Western cultural hegemony) and the marketing skills of the movement’s founder, Hasan al-Banna, the quality of its organizational structure, and the good fortune it had thanks to the mistakes made by the Arab regimes, as factors that provided the MB with political resilience.1 Khalil al-Anani attributes the success of the MB to an internal socialization process of constructing a distinctive Ikhwanist identity that guarantees loyalty and prevents state penetration into the ranks of the organization.2 Alison Pergter attributes the success of the MB to its pragmatism and willingness to compromise in order to survive.3 Recently, the research focus seems to be shifting to the question of the causes of the failures of the MB, the movement’s weaknesses and dysfunctions. However, most of these books were

1 Meir Hatina & Uri M. Kupferschmidt (eds.), The Muslim Brothers: A Religious Vision in a Changing Reality (Tel Aviv: Hakibuuutz Hameuchad, 2012), pp. 286-291 [Hebrew]. 2 Khalil al-Anani, Inside the Muslim Brotherhood: Religion, Identity, and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 3 Alison Pargeter, The Muslim Brotherhood from Opposition to Power (London: Saqi Books, 2013), p. 23.

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written during or near the ouster of the MB from power in Egypt.4 Nawaf Obaid’s new book, The Failure of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab World, is one of the first to be written from the perspective of several years after the events. One clear argument that runs throughout the book is that almost everywhere in the Arab world, the MB has failed to hold onto political power. In Obeid’s view, this colossal failure stems from the revolutionary and violent ideology outlined by al-Banna at the outset, an ideology with no vision of governance and adhered to by most of the movement’s leaders after his death. Since it was a destructive ideology, contrary to pure Salafism, the MB-affiliated movements across the Arab world were unable to integrate into existing political systems, and the Arab regimes and civil society acted to prevent them from reaching high-level political positions, let alone the presidency. For Obeid’s part, the failure of the MB is not only the failure of the affiliate movement in each country, but an explicit collapse of a plot led by Qatar to take over the entire Arab world following the Arab uprisings. An obvious shortcoming of the book is that it does not define what constitutes failure and how it is measured. Based on statements made by Western and Arab diplomats, journalists and Based on statements made by Western and Arab diplomats, journalists and commentators, intelligence documents and other leaked documents collected during his work as an advisor to the royal Saudi government and which serve his thesis, Obeid covers with large brushstrokes a timeline of over a century from the establishment of the organization in 1928 to the present day. At the same time, the book covers tremendous geographical territory, from the Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, , the UAE, and ), through the Levant (Syria, Jordan, Palestine, , and Lebanon) to North Africa (Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, and Sudan), with a detailed overview of the history of the movement in each country, and with special emphasis on the Egyptian mother movement. Its main contribution is in providing rich information on the movement’s affiliates in countries where the scholarly research is poor. Yet, this all-encompassing endeavor seems to be

4 Eric Trager, Arab Fall: How the Muslim Brotherhood Won and Lost Egypt in 891 Days (Washington, DC: Press, 2016); Mustafa Menshawy, Leaving the Muslim Brotherhood: Self, Society and the State (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020); Salem Y. Lakhal, "Morsi's Failure in Egypt: The Impact of Energy-Supply Chains," Middle East Policy Council, vol. 21, no. 3 (2014); Mahmoud Jaraba, "Why Did the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Year- Long Rule Fall?" Zeitschrift für Politik, vol. 61, no. 1 (2014). Book Review 95

primarily intended to serve the generalizing thesis that the MB, at all times and in all places, has advocated a path of violence and revolution that eventually led to its failure. Obeid is aware of the fact that “each of these affiliates and territories has its own unique history” (p. 74), yet he presents them as a monolith in which they share a common failure for one common reason. This deterministic approach runs counter, for example, to Carrie Rosefsky Wickham’s approach in her book, The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement, in which she avoids generalizations as much as possible, presenting the MB instead as a “large umbrella organization encompassing individuals and factions with different and at times conflicting worldviews, values, and opinions.” 5 The book seems to reflect the Saudi government’s perspective on the MB − the rift between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE; and the inter-Islamic conflict between the Saudi-led coalition against Qatar and the pro-MB Qatar-Turkey-Iran axis. Just as the book slanders the MB as a movement that engenders violence, conflict, and instability throughout history, and as a movement that bears the name of Salafism in vain, it praises the Saudi monarchy’s path, its conduct in regional and international affairs, and the way it interprets Islam as a quiet and stable way of life (Ch. 8). Just as Obeid’s stance overlaps with the Saudi position, he seeks to create an overlap between Saudi and American interests, in an attempt to persuade US government decision-makers to back the Saudi effort to wipe out the MB and cut off the support it receives from Qatar. The book corresponds with the ongoing debate in American circles about the possibility of declaring the MB a terrorist organization (p. 198), exacerbating Ikhwanophobia and even urging the international community to address the threat of the MB with the same intensity as al-Qaeda and the ISIS. In other words, Obeid recommends “dead checking” the MB, as the MB “remains the only organized alternative to the ruling governments” of the Gulf states (p. 119). Incidentally, he also clears Saudi Arabia and Muhammad Bin Salman with regard to the killing of the Saudi journalist at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018, and justifies the failure to impose sanctions on Saudi Arabia and its head in this matter (Ch. 9).

5 Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2013), p. 7. 96 Limor Lavie

Therefore, this book can be of benefit to anyone interested in exploring the Saudi perspective on regional realities, the emergence of the inter-Gulf crisis, and those interested in the account of Khashoggi’s assassination from a person close to him. It would be useful to those who, for example, seek to make a narrative study of inter-Arab politics. It can also be of interest to those who want to explore trends in the MB historiography and examine whether the study of the movement suffers from bias, whether a bias on the West-East axis or a bias on the pro- and anti-MB axis. However, as the writing of history should include a multitude of competing narratives and diverse perspectives, this book cannot serve those seeking a balanced analysis of the causes and manifestations of the breakdown of the MB.

Dr. Limor Lavie Bar Ilan University, [email protected]