No. 35009

SUPREME COURT OF

(ON APPEAL FROM TWO JUDGMENTS OF THE QUÉBEC COURT OF APPEAL)

BETWEEN:

BANK OF CANADA -DOMINION NATIONAL

APPELLANTS (Appellants) - and -

RÉAL MARCOTTE BERNARD LAPARÉ

RESPONDENTS (Respondents) - and -

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUÉBEC LE PRÉSIDENT DE L’OFFICE DE LA PROTECTION DU CONSOMMATEUR

RESPONDENTS (Mis en cause) - and -

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

INTERVENER (Intervener) - and -

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BRITISH COLUMBIA ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ALBERTA

INTERVENERS

(style of causes continues inside cover page)

RESPONDENTS RÉAL MARCOTTE AND BERNARD LAPARÉ’S FACTUM

Henri A. Lafortune Inc. 2005 Limoges Street Tel. : 450 442-4080 Longueuil, Québec J4G 1C4 Fax. : 450 442-2040 www.halafortune.ca [email protected] L-3595-12

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AND BETWEEN:

RÉAL MARCOTTE BERNARD LAPARÉ

APPELLANTS (Respondents)

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BANK OF MONTREAL AMEX BANK OF CANADA TORONTO-DOMINION BANK CANADIAN IMPERIAL BANK OF COMMERCE BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA LAURENTIAN BANK OF CANADA CITIBANK CANADA

RESPONDENTS (Appellants)

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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA RESPONDENT (Intervener)

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LE PRÉSIDENT DE L’OFFICE DE LA PROTECTION DU CONSOMMATEUR ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUÉBEC

INTERVENERS (Interveners)

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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BRITISH COLUMBIA ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ALBERTA

INTERVENERS

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Mr. Bruce W. Johnston Ms. Moira Dillon Mr. Philippe H. Trudel Supreme Law Group Mr. Andrew Cleland Suite 900 Trudel & Johnston 275 Slater Street Suite 90 Ottawa, Ontario 750 Côte de la Place d’Armes K1P 5H9 Montréal, Québec, H2Y 2X8

Tel.: 514 871-8385 Tel.: 613 691-1224 Fax: 514 871-8800 Fax: 613 691-1338 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]

Counsel for Respondents Agent for Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé

Mr. André Lespérance Lauzon Bélanger Lespérance Inc. Suite 100 286 Saint-Paul Street West Montréal, Québec H2Y 2A3

Tel.: 514 844-4646 Fax: 514 844-7009 [email protected]

Counsel for Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé

Mr. Mahmud Jamal Ms. Patricia J. Wilson Ms. Silvana Conte Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP Suite 1900 Suite 2100 340 Albert Street 1000 de la Gauchetière Street West Ottawa, Ontario Montréal, Québec K1R 7Y6 H3B 4W5

Tel.: 514 904-8100 Tel.: 613 787-1009 Fax: 514 904-8101 Fax: 613 235-2867 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]

Counsel for Appellants the Agent for Appellants the Banks

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Mr. Sylvain Deslauriers Mr. Alberto Martinez Deslauriers & Co., Attorneys s.a. 7th Floor 1100 des Canadiens de Montréal Av. West Montréal, Québec H3B 2S2

Tel.: 514 878-0303 (Mr. Deslauriers) Tel.: 514 878-0305 (Mr. Martinez) Fax: 514 878-0018 [email protected] [email protected]

Counsel for Appellants the Banks

Mr. Bernard Letarte Mr. Christopher M. Rupar Mr. Pierre Salois Attorney General of Canada Mr. Michel Miller Room 1212 Justice Canada Bank of Canada Building – East Tower 5th Floor, East Tower 234 Wellington Street 200 René-Lévesque Street West Ottawa, Ontario Montréal, Québec K1A 0H8 H2Z 1X4

Tel.: 613 946-2776 (Mr. Letarte) Tel.: 613 941-2351 Tel.: 514 283-8733 (Mr. Salois) Fax: 613 954-1920 Tel.: 514 283-3582 (Mr. Miller) [email protected] Fax: 514 283-3856 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]

Counsel for Intervener Agent for Intervener Attorney General of Canada Attorney General of Canada

Mr. Marc Migneault Mr. Pierre Landry Allard, Renaud et Associés Noël & Associés Suite RC 11 111 Champlain Street 100 Laviolette Street Gatineau, Québec Trois-Rivières, Québec J8X 3R1 G9A 5S9

Tel.: 888 672-2556 Ext. 3426 Tel.: 819 771-7393 Fax: 819 371-6489 Fax: 819 771-5397 [email protected] [email protected]

Counsel for Intervener Agent for Intervener Le Président de l’Office de la Le Président de l’Office de la protection du consommateur protection du consommateur

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Mr. Jean-François Jobin Mr. Pierre Landry Mr. Francis Demers Noël & Associés Mr. Samuel Chayer 111 Champlain Street Bernard, Roy et Associés Gatineau, Québec Suite 8.00 J8X 3R1 1 Notre-Dame Street East Montréal, Québec H2Y 1B6

Tel.: 514 393-2336 Tel.: 819 771-7393 Fax: 514 873-7074 Fax: 819 771-5397 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]

Counsel for Intervener Agent for Intervener Attorney General of Québec Attorney General of Québec

Ms. Nancy E. Brown Mr. Robert E. Houston, Q.C. Attorney General of British Columbia Burke-Robertson LLP P.O. Box 9280 Stn Prov Govt Suite 200 1001 Douglas Street 441 MacLaren Street Victoria, British Columbia Ottawa, Ontario V8W 9J7 K2P 2H3

Tel.: 250 356-5597 Tel.: 613 236-9665 Fax: 250 356-9154 Fax: 613 235-4430 [email protected] [email protected]

Counsel for Intervener Agent for Intervener Attorney General of British Columbia Attorney General of British Columbia

Attorney General of Ontario Mr. Robert E. Houston, Q.C. Burke-Robertson LLP Suite 200 441 MacLaren Street Ottawa, Ontario K2P 2H3

Tel.: 613 236-9665 Fax: 613 235-4430 [email protected]

Agent for Intervener Attorney General of Ontario

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Attorney General of Alberta Mr. Henry S. Brown, Q.C. Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP Suite 2600 160 Elgin Street Ottawa, Ontario K1P 1C3

Tel.: 613 233-1781 Fax: 613 788-3433 [email protected]

Agent for Intervener Attorney General of Alberta

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

RESPONDENTS RÉAL MARCOTTE AND BERNARD LAPARÉ’S FACTUM Page

PART I – OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS ...... 1

PART II – QUESTIONS IN ISSUE ...... 5

PART III – STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT ...... 6

A. The Quebec CPA credit regime is constitutionally applicable to regulate bank-issued credit cards ...... 6

(i) Provincial contract law applies to Banks and operates in harmony with the Bank Act ...... 6

(ii) Exclusive of what? ...... 11

(iii) Core banking cannot engulf all aspects of consumer credit contracts ...... 14

B. Federal Paramountcy does not apply because there is no conflict between the FCB and the CPA’s credit regime ...... 17

(i) The same policy considerations that limit the application of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity should prevent the proposed revival of the doctrine of the occupied field ...... 18

(ii) The federal and provincial provisions at issue raise no conflict of purpose ...... 19

(iii) The Banks’ interpretation ignores the relevant legislative history, contradicts Parliament’s intent and would lead to undesirable consequences ...... 20

(a) The Banks’ position ignores that the FCB is part of a broader reform to address the convergence of functions amongst all financial institutions ...... 21

(b) The Banks’ position contradicts Parliament’s intent regarding the FCB and the Bank Act generally ...... 22

(c) The Banks’ position would lead to serious undesirable consequences ...... 24 ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

RESPONDENTS RÉAL MARCOTTE AND BERNARD LAPARÉ’S FACTUM Page

(iv) The 2012 Bank Act preamble is not declaratory and does not replace the interpretation that this Court should give to the sections of the 2001 FCB ...... 26

(a) The 2012 Bank Act preamble is not declaratory ...... 27

(b) No genuine interpretative ambiguity regarding the purpose of the 2001 FCB exists ...... 28

C. The Plaintiffs have standing to bring this class action ...... 30

(i) Standing must be analyzed from the point of view of the whole class ...... 30

(ii) The legality of an industry-wide practice is a common issue that justifies a multiple-defendant class action ...... 32

(iii) The banks suffered no prejudice ...... 32

(iv) The dominant current in Canada shares the position of the courts below ...... 33

(v) The CCP allows a person to act on behalf of others ...... 34

(vi) The Banks’ position would lead to a massive waste of judicial resources ...... 34

D. The CCQ enables consumers to recover currency conversion fees that they paid without an obligation ...... 37

(i) The Respondents had no contractual obligation to pay currency conversion fees ...... 37

(ii) Quantum meruit does not apply to this factual situation ...... 38

PART IV – SUBMISSIONS CONCERNING COSTS ...... 39

PART V – ORDERS SOUGHT ...... 39

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

RESPONDENTS RÉAL MARCOTTE AND BERNARD LAPARÉ’S FACTUM Page

PART VI – ALPHABETICAL TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...... 40

PART VII – STATUTES, REGULATIONS, RULES

Bank Act, S.C. 1991, c. 46 ...... 44

Civil Code of Québec, R.S.Q., c. C-1991 ...... 44

Cost of Borrowing (Banks) Regulation, SOR/2001-101 ...... 47

Jobs, Growth and Prosperity Act, S.C. 2012, c. 19 ...... 48

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Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Overview and Statement of Fact

RESPONDENTS RÉAL MARCOTTE AND BERNARD LAPARÉ’S FACTUM

PART I – OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. This appeal addresses the consequences of the failure of the four Appellant Banks (hereinafter the “Banks”) and Amex Bank of Canada (“Amex”) to mention in their credit card contracts or any related documents the currency conversion fees that they charged consumers during periods covered by this class action. This treatment of consumers runs contrary to the federal Cost of Borrowing Regulations applicable to banks1 (“FCB”) and all other federal financial institutions2 (together, the “federal cost of borrowing regime”) and the Quebec Consumer Protection Act’s (“CPA”) credit regime.3

2. Both levels of government enacted these laws to establish mandatory, uniform disclosure standards that would enable consumers to learn their total obligation under a credit card contract, choose a credit card by easily comparing disclosures, and purge the practice of charging hidden non-interest transaction fees. The Banks nonetheless ask this Court to allow them to charge their consumers a credit card fee without disclosing it to them by rendering the CPA inapplicable or inoperable to banks.

3. With respect, the Banks seek to have the lower consumer protection standard apply despite the existence of complementary provincial provisions that provide additional protection for Quebec consumers. The FCB seeks to protect consumers from the same types of abuses that the CPA’s credit regime seeks to prevent, practices such as hiding transaction fees deep in a credit contract, thereby lowering the apparent credit rate and misleading consumers.

1 Cost of Borrowing (Banks) Regulations, SOR/2001-101 (Exhibit I-7.C, Joint Record, hereinafter “J.R.”, vol. 98, p. 225-236) [FCB]. 2 Cost of Borrowing (Canadian Companies) Regulations, SOR/2001-102 (Appellants Marcotte and Laparé’s Book of Authorities, hereinafter “B.O.A.”, vol. I, tab 5); Cost of Borrowing (Retail Associations) Regulations, SOR/2002-263 (B.O.A., vol. I, tab 6); Cost of Borrowing (Trust and Loans Companies) Regulations, SOR/2001-104 (B.O.A., vol. I, tab 7). 3 R.S.Q., c. P-40.1 (Appellants Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Appeal Factum, hereinafter “Appellants Marcotte and Laparé’s Factum” at par.47-50) [CPA]. - 2 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Overview and Statement of Fact

4. This result would have significant effects on competition in the consumer credit market in each province, and would notably place banks in a more advantageous position than Desjardins, the largest credit card issuer in Quebec. This disruption of the level regulatory playing field between financial institutions would frustrate the standardization of cost of credit disclosure required by both the federal and provincial regimes. It would create confusion and inequality for consumers using credit whose rights would vary according to what kind of financial institution they are dealing with.

5. This result would also create an incentive for non-bank credit providers such as retailers to obtain a charter as a bank in spite of their core business having little to do with traditional banking activities, in order to avoid complying with provincial consumer protection laws. It would thus erode the comprehensiveness of consumer protection schemes set up by the provinces and thereby their ability to effectively regulate property and civil rights.

6. When they interact with the citizens of a province, banks are not only subject to that province’s laws and courts but also depend upon its contract law to conduct activities authorized under the Bank Act.4 The federal power over banking under section 91(15) of Constitution Act, 1867 does not confer upon banks a special status that allows them to pick and choose the private law rules of general application that best suit them and ignore those that inconvenience them.

7. The Respondents accept the trial judge’s detailed and comprehensive factual findings.5 They draw this Court’s attention to their breakdown of the facts most relevant to the issues in this appeal in their September 16, 2013 appeal factum.6

8. The following factual findings of the trial judge are relevant to the question of the standing of the Respondents to bring a class action against multiple defendants when their practice violates the same provisions of the law:

4 S.C. 1991, c. 46. 5 Banque de Montréal c. Marcotte, 2009 QCSC 2764 (J.R., vol. 1, p. 5) [Banks QCSC]. 6 Appellants Marcotte and Laparé’s Factum at paras 6-8. - 3 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Overview and Statement of Fact

- A few months after Respondent Réal Marcotte filed a Motion for authorization to institute the class action,7 the Appellant Banks and several other banks, including the remaining Respondent Banks in SCC #35009, filed a Motion for declaratory judgment against the Attorney General of Québec8 in which they sought an order declaring several provisions of the CPA constitutionally inapplicable and inoperable to Banks.9

- On January 21st, 2004, after the Attorney General of Québec and Mr. Marcotte filed declinatory motions,10 the Superior Court dismissed the banks’ Motion for a declaratory judgment prior to a hearing on the merits, concluding that the Motion constituted an inappropriate attempt to short-circuit the class-action.11

- On May 9th, 2006, the Banks asked the Superior Court to postpone the trial on the merits of the related Desjardins class action (SCC #35018) so that it could be heard with the Banks class action (SCC #35009).12

- The Banks argued that a joint hearing was necessary since both class actions presented identical questions regarding the interpretation of the CPA and similar constitutional questions. They further submitted that both files would share an important portion of the evidence.13

- The Chief Justice of the Superior Court granted these requests on the condition that

7 Requête pour autorisation d’exercer un recours collectif et pour être représentant, April 17, 2003, J.R., vol. 4, p. 1. 8 Jugement ordonnant la réunion des dossiers 500-06-000202-032, 500-06-000203-030, 500-06- 000205-035, 500-06-000197-034, 500-06-000221-040 et 200-06-000033-038 pour fin d’audition au stade des demandes d’autorisation d’exercer un recours collectif (l’honorable Lagacé, J.C.S.), Jan. 21, 2004, (J.R., vol. 4, p. 9) [Lagacé Judgment]. 9 Ibid. at para 2. 10 Ibid. at para 1, 36-37. 11 Ibid. at para 27. 12 Requête au juge en chef pour que le juge Jean-Yves Lalonde soit autorisé à entendre le recours collectif de Réal Marcotte contre les banques et ce, malgré les dispositions des articles 234 et 235 C.p.c. et, subsidiairement, que le juge Jean-Yves Lalonde soit autorisé à entendre la requête des Banques en intervention et ce, malgré des dispositions des articles 234 et 235 C.p.c., May 9, 2006, J.R., vol. 4, p. 19 [Requête au juge en chef]. 13 Banks QCSC, supra note 5 at paras 26-27; Requête au juge en chef, ibid. at paras 26-30. - 4 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Overview and Statement of Fact

the Banks did not contest the authorization of this class action.14

- In 2006 and at all relevant times, Mr. Marcotte did not hold a credit card issued by any of the Banks in SCC #35009 other than BMO.15

- Before the joint trial on the merits began, Amex presented a Motion for dismissal alleging Mr. Marcotte’s lack of standing. This Motion resulted in the addition of Mr. Laparé, who held a credit card issued by Amex, as a class representative.16

- No other Bank presented a similar Motion.17

- The Banks examined Mr. Marcotte on discovery but none of them asked under article 1019 CCP to examine a class member that held a credit card with them.18

- At trial, all parties, including Desjardins, agreed that the trial judge should decide the issues on the basis of the evidence as a whole and not on evidence specific to each party.19

- Neither Desjardins nor any Bank called any class members to testify at trial.20

- The Banks had ample opportunity to file documentary, testimonial and expert evidence on each of the collective questions raised by the class action and did so during the trial which lasted 34 days.21

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14 Banks QCSC, ibid. at paras 29-31; Jugement donnant acte à l’engagement des intimées de se désister de la contestation de la requête pour exercer le recours collectif (l’honorable François, J.C.C.S.), 18 May 2006 at paras 22-23; J.R., vol. 4, p. 35 [Rolland Judgment]. Some banks indicated that they reserved their right to challenge the standing of the representatives. 15 Banks QCSC, ibid. at para 106. 16 Ibid. at paras 41-46. 17 Ibid. at para 191; Marcotte v. Banque de Montréal, 2012 QCCA 1396, at para 26 (J.R., vol. 3, p. 1) [Banks QCCA]. 18 Banks QCSC, ibid. at para 191. 19 Ibid. at paras 210-211. 20 Ibid. at para 191. 21 Ibid. at para 195. - 5 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Questions in issue

PART II – QUESTIONS IN ISSUE

9. The Banks’ factum presents four questions for this Court to answer:

A. Are ss. 12, 66-72, 83, 91, 92, 126, 127, 219, 228, and 271-272 of the Consumer Protection Act, R.S.Q., c. P-40.1, and ss. 55-61 of the Regulation respecting the application of the Consumer Protection Act, R.R.Q., c. P-40.1, r. 3, constitutionally inapplicable in respect of bank-issued credit cards by reason of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity?

B. Are ss. 12, 66-72, 83, 91, 92, 126, 127, 219, 228, and 271-272 of the CPA, and ss. 55-61 of the Regulation respecting the application of the Consumer Protection Act, R.R.Q., c. P-40.1, r. 3, constitutionally inoperative in respect of bank-issued credit cards by reason of the doctrine of federal paramountcy?

C. If the impugned provincial provisions are constitutionally inapplicable or inoperable, are the plaintiffs entitled to restitution under the Civil Code of Québec?

D. Do the representative plaintiffs have standing to bring an industry-wide class action without a cause of action against certain defendants?

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Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

PART II – STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT

A. The Quebec CPA credit regime is constitutionally applicable to regulate bank-issued credit cards

10. The doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity has never been applied in situations where, as in this case, there is overlapping valid legislation over a broad and amorphous subject like consumer protection.22

11. For the reasons outlined in their appeal factum23 and in the factum of the Attorney General of Québec, the Respondents submit that the Banks have not met their burden under the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine. They further draw this Court’s attention to the following responses to the Banks’ submissions.

(i) Provincial contract law applies to Banks and operates in harmony with the Bank Act

12. The Banks’ interjurisdictional immunity argument rests on the sweeping assertion that only federal law applies to banks.24 Yet, when they interact with the residents of a province, banks are not only subject to that province’s regulations and courts but also dependent upon its contract law to conduct authorized Bank Act activities.

13. The Banks quote the author Bradley Crawford for the proposition that over the last 40 years, “it has generally been understood that only the federal law applied to banks”.25 To begin with, this quote is taken out of context as in it, Crawford is referring specifically to cost of borrowing disclosure, not, as the Banks’ factum would have the reader believe,

22 Québec (Attorney General) v. Canadian Owners and Pilots Association, 2010 SCC 39 at para 53 (B.O.A., vol. V, tab 62) [COPA]; Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, 2011 SCC 44, [2011] 3 SCR 134 at para 60 (B.O.A., vol. II, tab 31) [PHS]. 23 Appellants Marcotte and Laparé’s Factum at paras 61-67. 24 Appellant Banks’ Joint Factum at para 14. 25 Appellant Banks’ Joint Factum at para 14, referring to Bradley Crawford, Q.C., The Law of Banking and Payment in Canada (2013, loose-leaf) at 13-48 (Appellant Banks’ Joint Book of Authorities, hereinafter “B.A.”, vol. V, tab 100). - 7 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

to all of the CPA’s substantive standards, regulatory enforcement provisions and civil remedies.26

14. In addition, Crawford did not refer to any time frame and could not have been referring to a period of 40 years, as the Banks assert, given that the first federal cost of borrowing regulation was enacted 30 years ago, in 1983.27

15. Moreover, the quotation is truncated mid-sentence to exclude the words “and other federally incorporated or regulated financial institutions” such that Crawford in fact asserts that it is generally understood that only federal law applies to cost of borrowing disclosure by federal financial institutions.28

16. This statement is contrary to Canadian constitutional law under which there is no doubt whatsoever that non-bank federal financial institutions must comply with provincial regulation.29

17. Crawford in fact writes that in his view it is not clear whether provincial legislative powers apply to credit granting activities of banks, as appears from the following excerpt relative to the regulation of credit card agreements:

However, as that law is still developing, the limits of the valid exercise of provincial legislative powers over the terms of the contracts granting credit are not entirely clear or universally agreed. In theory, they ought not to apply to the credit granting activities of banks, but the Consumer Protection statutes of many provinces appear to apply to banks as well as other credit grantors by reason of the fact that those statutes apply to person described only as “lenders” or “credit card issuers” and do not expressly exclude banks.30

26 Appellant Banks’ Joint Factum at para 13. 27 Banks QCSC, supra note 5 at para 849; Cost of Borrowing Disclosure Regulations, SOR/DORS/83-103 (Exhibit I-7A, J.R., vol. 98. p. 199). 28 Crawford, supra note 25 at 13-48 (B.A., vol. V, tab 100). 29 Canadian Pioneer Management Ltd. et al. v. Labour Relations Board of Saskatchewan et al., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 433 (B.O.A., vol. III, tab. 33); Hogg, Peter W., Constitutional Law of Canada, loose-leaf, 5th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2007) at 24-9 (B.O.A., vol. VII, tab 78) [Hogg]. See Appellants Marcotte and Laparé’s Factum at para 105. 30 Crawford, supra note 25 at 13-10 (B.A., vol. V, tab 100). - 8 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

18. Crawford’s view as expressed above that provincial legislative power should not apply to the credit granting activities of banks, although much more nuanced than how the Banks present it, still fails to recognize the obvious fact that there exists no body of federal contract law, property law, securities law, law of civil liability or corporate securities law. In these and other areas, the contracts and legal relationships entered into daily by banks with their shareholders, suppliers and customers are governed by provincial law, to the extent that such is not inconsistent with the specific provisions of the Bank Act.

19. Canada’s constitutional division of powers does not confer upon banks a special status that allows them to pick and choose the private law rules of general application that best suit them and ignore those that inconvenience them.

20. Thus, even where Parliament enacts rules that affect property and civil rights in the Bank Act, provincial laws complete the federal provisions unless specifically excluded. This is illustrated by this Court’s recent decision in v. in which a unanimous Court held that the Bank Act must interact with Saskatchewan’s Personal Property Security Act (“PPSA”)31:

[30] In determining what interest the debtor may have already conveyed to another creditor and, in such circumstances, what interest he or she had left to convey to the bank at the time of execution of the Bank Act security agreement, it becomes necessary to resort to the provincial property law, either at common law or under applicable provincial statutes. It is at this point that resorting to the PPSA becomes relevant. It is true that the internal priority rules of the PPSA cannot be invoked to resolve the dispute. However, it does not follow that the provincial security interest created under the PPSA does not exist outside these priority rules. Nor can the fundamental changes brought about by the PPSA be ignored in determining the nature of the prior competing interest. Far from being irrelevant under the Bank Act, provincial property law plays a complementary role in defining the rights granted under the Bank Act: […]32

21. In Innovation Credit Union, the Court further states that in determining the nature of any competing provincial security interest, resort has to be made to the relevant provincial

31 S.S. 1993, c P-6.2. 32 [2010] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para 30 (Respondents Marcotte and Laparé’s Book of Authorities, hereinafter “R.B.O.A.”, Vol. I, tab 6) [Innovation Credit Union]. - 9 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

statute, that the Bank Act has to read in harmony with it and that such an approach is in accordance with the Federal Law—Civil Law Harmonization Act, No. 133 and section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act:34

[31] While the provinces cannot legislate in order to oust the bank’s rights, they can alter the law as it relates to property and civil rights in the province. […] Thus, in determining the nature of any competing provincial security interest, resort has to be made to the relevant provincial statute and the Bank Act has to be read in harmony with it. This approach is reflected in the preamble to the Federal Law— Civil Law Harmonization Act, No. 1, S.C. 2001, c. 4 (“Harmonization Act”):

WHEREAS the harmonious interaction of federal legislation and provincial legislation is essential and lies in an interpretation of federal legislation that is compatible with the common law or civil law traditions, as the case may be;

. . .

WHEREAS the provincial law, in relation to property and civil rights, is the law that completes federal legislation when applied in a province, unless otherwise provided by law;

Section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, as amended by s. 8 of the Harmonization Act specifically provides for the application of the “rules, principles and concepts in force in the province at the time the enactment is being applied”.35

22. Likewise, in Attorney General (Ontario) v. Barfried Enterprises this Court ruled that provincial regulation of the reasonability of non-interest fees charged to a borrower were valid under section 92(13) of the Constitution and thus applied to credit contracts despite an incidental effect on interest.36 Writing for the majority, Justice Judson distinguished between interest and non-interest fees as follows:

33 S.C. 2001, c. 4 (R.B.O.A., vol. I, tab 2). 34 R.S.C., 1985, c. I-21 (R.B.O.A., vol. I, tab 3). 35 Innovation Credit Union, supra note 32 at para 31 (emphasis added) (R.B.O.A, vol. I, tab 6). 36 [1963] S.C.R. 570 (B.O.A., vol. I, tab 18) [Barfried]. The provincial law at issue, the Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 410, enabled a court to provide a borrower with relief if it found the “cost of the loan” to be excessive and the transaction harsh and - 10 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

The day-to-day accrual of interest seems to me to be an essential characteristic. All the other items mentioned in The Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act except discount lack this characteristic. They are not interest. In most of these unconscionable schemes of lending the vice is in the bonus.37

23. He went on to conclude that any effect that the provincial law had on interest was incidental: “it is not the rate or amount of interest which is the concern of the legislation but whether the transaction as a whole is one which it would be proper to maintain as having been freely consented to by the debtor”.38

24. The Respondents submit that Barfried establishes that the federal and provincial legislatures have concurrent jurisdiction over the regulation of non-interest fees charged under a credit contract. Parliament’s power to legislate in matters involving interest is no less exclusive than its power over banking and as such, Respondents submit that the result in Barfried would not have been any different had the lender been a bank.

25. The Banks thus neglect the complementary role that the Constitution enables the provincial and federal legislatures to play in defining property and civil rights.

26. When it refused to apply the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine in v. Alberta, this Court cautioned against granting Parliament exclusive authority to regulate the market conduct of banks:

[89] The appellants also then rely on this Court’s holding in Bank of Montreal v. Hall in which it was held

. . . beyond dispute that the federal banking power empowers Parliament to create an innovative form of financing and to define, in a comprehensive and exclusive manner, the rights and obligations of borrower and lender pursuant to that interest. [p. 150]

unconscionable. The Act defined “cost of the loan” to include the interest and a variety of non- interest charges such as “the discount, subscription, premium, dues, bonus, commission, brokerage fees and charges”. 37 Ibid. at 575. 38 Ibid. at 577-578. See also 579-580 (Cartwright J., concurring). - 11 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

However, it must be repeated that just because Parliament can create innovative forms for financing does not mean that s. 91(15) grants Parliament exclusive authority to regulate their promotion. If provincial legislation were held to be inapplicable to all forms of security held as collateral by banks, then the application of provincial legislation such as the Personal Property Security Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. P-7 (“PPSA”), would also be in jeopardy. The appellants claim that the Insurance Act differs from the PPSA because the Insurance Act may lead to a prohibition of the activity (promoting insurance), whereas the PPSA deals only with how the creditor realizes on a security. However, the Insurance Act does not prohibit the promotion of insurance any more than the PPSA prohibits realization on a security provision. In both cases, compliance with provincial rules is a pre-condition to obtaining the benefit of the statute. The rigid demarcation sought by the banks between federal and provincial regulations would not only risk a legal vacuum, but deny to lawmakers at both levels of government the flexibility to carry out their respective responsibilities.39

27. If compliance with provincial rules by banks is the precondition of obtaining the benefit of those rules, and each province is free to modify property and civil rights in its jurisdiction, it follows that there can be no uniformity in such matters. In these matters, the principle of federalism must therefore prevail40 to ensure that the different regulatory schemes chosen by provinces are not declared inapplicable wholesale.

(ii) Exclusive of what?

28. In Canadian Western Bank this Court rejected the Banks’ position on interjurisdictional immunity in part because it would render inapplicable to them provincial laws of general application in relation to many activities:

The appellants cannot plausibly argue that banks are immune from provincial laws of general application in relation to “any” financial service, as this would not only render inapplicable elements of the Insurance Act but potentially render inapplicable provincial laws relating to mortgages, securities and many other “services” as well.41

39 2007 SCC 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 at para 89 (B.O.A., vol. III, tab 34) [Canadian Western Bank]. 40 Ibid. at paras 35-37; 114957 Canada ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), 2001 SCC 40, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241 at para 3 (B.O.A., vol. I, tab 13) [Spraytech]. See Banks QCSC, supra note 5 at paras 554-557, 616. 41 Canadian Western Bank, ibid. at para 65. - 12 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

29. The Banks again ask this Court to retain a sweeping and imprecise notion of interjurisdictional immunity that fails to distinguish between banking activities and core banking.

30. While the Banks have avoided challenging the constitutionality of any provision of the CCQ they do not explain how this Court can distinguish between contractual norms included in the CPA and others contained in the CCQ. In fact, when combined with their definition of what constitutes impairment, the Banks’ notion of core banking would render inapplicable to banks an undetermined number of fundamental contractual rules contained in the CCQ.

31. For example, in Hall, the provincial provision at stake was of the same nature as article 2778 CCQ which requires authorization from the Court before the hypothecary creditor can take in payment the property given as security when the debtor has discharged more than half of the obligation secured by the hypothec.

32. The FCB applies to mortgage loans to consumers42 and thus, according to the logic advanced by the Banks, it should render inapplicable provincial legislation such as article 2778 CCQ regulating banking contracts.43 Yet no bank ever argued that the provincial PPSAs should not apply in Hall or Innovation Credit Union where the provincial provisions interacted uneasily with the Bank Act security.

33. Likewise in CIBC Mortgage Corp. v. Vasquez, the Appellant did not argue that article 2778 CCQ should not apply to banks.44 The Banks’ position fails to explain how a provision such as 2778 CCQ, which limits the contractual freedom of credit merchants in order to protect consumers who have paid more than half of their obligation, is on a fundamental level different from limits on contractual freedom included in the CPA for the same purpose. This is particularly striking when one considers that article 2778 CCQ

42 FCB, supra note 1 at s. 2. See also ss. 5(2)(h), 7(1)(a) and 14. 43 Appellant Banks’ Joint Factum at para 81, which questions the province’s power to regulate bank contracts. 44 2002 SCC 60, [2002] 3 SCR 168 (B.O.A., vol. III, tab 36) [Vasquez]. - 13 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

is modelled on article 142 CPA and shares a common purpose with it, as this Court noted in Vasquez:

[27] As we noted earlier, art. 2778 C.C.Q. is a new provision which creates equitable measures designed to protect a debtor who has already discharged a substantial portion of his or her obligations against loss of the hypothecated property. That article is modelled on s. 142 C.P.A., which reads as follows:

142. If, upon his default, the consumer has already paid at least one half of the amount of the total obligation and of the down payment, the merchant cannot exercise his right of repossession unless he obtains the permission of the court. [Emphasis added.]

[28] The common purpose of art. 2778 C.C.Q. and s. 142 C.P.A. is to prevent a creditor from becoming the owner of property the value of which is much greater than the balance owing on the debt to the creditor. (…)45

34. The Banks also argue that the ability of a consumer to ask for the nullity of the contract under article 272 of the CPA impairs the core of the banking power because it destroys the uniform regulation of bank-issued credit cards under the national banking system.46 Under this same reasoning, articles 1435 to 1438 of the CCQ would also not apply to bank-issued credit cards. These CCQ provisions protect consumers and adherents against various types of abuse and allow the nullity of the offending clause or of the contract itself.

35. Are banks immune from the most basic rules of contract law such as valid consent? Can a bank induce a consumer into error and remain immune from the application of article 1399 of the CCQ? Surely not. Yet their position fails to provide any guidance as to where one should draw the line and on what basis.

36. The Respondents respectfully submit that this failure underscores a major deficiency in the Banks’ position which is its sweeping and imprecise nature. They do not identify the rationale behind the federal banking power or explain how market conduct regulation,

45 Ibid. at paras 27-28. 46 Appellant Banks’ Joint Factum at para 67. - 14 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

like the CPA, affects an area vital or essential to this power. They ask this Court to render regulation of broad and amorphous spheres of activity exclusive to Parliament, but point to no valid precedent and provide no constitutional rationale for the competitive advantage that banks would thereby obtain over all other market participants. They merely offer general references to the need for a uniform, national banking system, without specifying what kind of regulation should be reserved to Parliament to create this system.

37. In so doing, the Banks once again seek to “render the ‘basic, minimum and unassailable’ content of the banking power more or less co-extensive with what bankers are authorized to do”.47 In this context, the Respondents submit that the present case is clearly not one where this Court should create a new precedent for the recourse to interjurisdictional immunity and that the constitutional issue should be resolved by the doctrine of paramountcy.

(iii) Core banking cannot engulf all aspects of consumer credit contracts

38. The Banks assertion that credit is core banking relies on Hall’s supposed holding that the Bank Act security is core banking.48 Seeing as security is accessory to the granting of credit, they posit that if the accessory is core banking, the principal activity, credit, must therefore also be core.49

39. However, this Court decided Hall on paramountcy, not on interjurisdictional immunity.50 It did not in any way conclude that core banking includes Bank Act security for the purposes of interjurisdictional immunity. The Banks’ argument incorrectly equates the effects of the paramountcy accorded to Parliament’s valid exercise of its power in the

47 Canadian Western Bank, supra note 39 at para 85 (B.O.A., vol. III, tab 34). 48 Appellant Banks’ Joint Factum at para 41. 49 Appellant Banks’ Joint Factum at para 42. 50 Bank of Montreal v. Hall, [1990] 1 R.C.S. 121 at 130, 150 ss. (B.O.A., vol. II, tab 21) [Hall]; Hogg, supra note 29 at 16-7 and 16-8 (B.O.A., vol. VII, tab 78). The trial judge erroneously described the Bank Act security in Hall as “core” (Banks QCSC, supra note 5 at para 628). - 15 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

event of a conflict between specific laws, with the “basic, minimum, unassailable content” of that federal power.51

40. Even if the Bank Act security is core banking, its accessory relation to credit in no way implies that core banking includes all aspects of contracts involving credit. It is unhelpful to generally state that the CPA affects a lending contract without providing any precision as to what elements of that contract are vital to Parliament’s banking power.

41. Respondents submit that the concurrent jurisdiction of the federal and provincial governments over consumer protection demands a more nuanced approach than the Banks’ syllogism which posits that credit is core banking, credit cards are credit, and therefore credit cards are core banking.52 Again, even if some aspects of credit might be core banking, this in no way demonstrates that all aspects of credit are.

42. Such imprecision in areas of concurrent jurisdiction does not do justice to the division of powers or the fundamental principles that underlie it. As mentioned, it also neglects a bank’s dependence upon provincial contract law to conduct activities authorized under the Bank Act.

43. This Court has posited that the “basic, minimum, and unassailable content” of a legislative power must be intimately tied to the purpose for which that exclusive power was conferred.53 The Respondents submit that while the definition of core banking presents many challenges,54 there is no evidence that the rationale behind this federal power was to enable Parliament to exclusively regulate every aspect of credit contracts involving banks.

51 For instance, one surely cannot employ the recognition of federal paramountcy in Law Society of British Columbia v. Mangat, 2001 SCC 67, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 113 (B.O.A., vol. IV, tab 50) to argue that the core of Parliament’s jurisdiction over naturalization and aliens under s. 91(25) of the Constitution Act, 1867 includes the representation of aliens in courts and tribunals. 52 See Banks QCSC, supra note 5 at para 661. 53 Canadian Western Bank, supra note 39 at paras 50, 77; COPA, supra note 22 at para 35. 54 See M.H. Ogilvie, Bank and Consumer Law in Canada (2nd ed., 2013) at 10 (B.A., vol. V, tab 115). - 16 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

44. The Respondents submit that the purpose behind granting Parliament exclusive power over banking could not have been to avoid regional contractual and consumer protection regulation of the relationships between banks and consumers given that banks have always had recourse to provincial contractual law. In fact, such matters are far removed from the prudential and macroeconomic aspects of banking which are closer to what the Respondents submit constitute the true purpose of the banking power.

45. Prudential regulation works to promote the safety and soundness of Canadians’ deposits and the institutions that hold them. Macroeconomic regulation addresses the overall integrity of the Canadian financial system and its ability to support a healthy and dynamic economy via standards that minimize systemic risk and encourage banks to allocate capital to productive investments.

46. The Banks’ repeated insistence on the need to protect Parliament’s ability to create a uniform, national banking system from regional regulation neglects to mention that this system first and foremost involves prudential and macroeconomic standards and not consumer protection standards.

47. Parliament can and does enact consumer protection regulation that pursues an objective accessory to its banking power. Moreover, prudential and macroeconomic objectives may demand that Parliament enact standards with market conduct implications. However, the rationale behind the banking power does not demand that Parliament have exclusive authority to regulate all aspects of banking credit contracts.

48. The privilege that the Banks seek here is unjustified. The competitive advantage that banks would obtain over all other credit card issuers has no constitutional basis. It in no way constitutes an evolution of the original exclusive grant of power to the federal legislator.55

55 See Banks QCSC, supra note 5 at paras 630-652. - 17 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

49. In Canadian Western Bank, this Court recognized that no constitutional rationale exists for excluding banks from provincial market conduct regulation of an activity authorized by the Bank Act.

If a bank were to misrepresent the amount of a policy premium, or wrongfully disclose confidential information to third parties, or engage in other market practices considered by the Alberta Legislature to be unfair, there is no reason why it should escape the regulatory discipline to which all other promoters of insurance in the province are subject.56

50. Despite the acknowledgement by both Parliament and this Court of the importance of provincial contractual law to the Bank Act, the Banks seek to extend the scope of the national banking system and special privileges afforded to Banks thereunder well beyond their constitutional basis and limits.

51. The division of powers and the underlying principles of subsidiarity and flexible federalism demand the rejection of a legal vacuum of such undetermined and unjustified scope.

B. Federal Paramountcy does not apply because there is no conflict between the FCB and the CPA’s credit regime

52. Compliance with the CPA would not only conform to the requirements of the FCB, but also complement its purpose. If banks refrained from charging non-interest fees on a transaction basis and instead charged only annual fees and a percentage rate, consumers in Quebec would receive a simpler disclosure that would enable them to comparison shop on a level playing field among all credit merchants operating in the province.

53. For the reasons outlined in their appeal factum and the factum of the Attorney General of Québec, the Respondents submit that the Banks have not met their burden under the

56 Canadian Western Bank, supra note 39 at para 88. See also para 2 (“we are required to consider whether and to what extent the market conduct rules enacted for consumer protection in Alberta’s Insurance Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. I-3, govern the promotion of credit-related insurance by banks as now permitted under the Bank Act as amended”). - 18 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

federal paramountcy doctrine. It further draws this Court’s attention to the following responses to the Banks’ submissions.

(i) The same policy considerations that limit the application of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity should prevent the proposed revival of the doctrine of the occupied field

54. In the absence of any conflict between the federal-provincial cost of credit provisions at issue, the Banks attempt to satisfy their burden under the paramountcy doctrine by asserting that the Bank Act, FCB, and Financial Consumer Agency of Canada Act57 constitute a complete consumer protection code whose mere enactment implies the inoperability of all provincial laws on the same subject. This position attempts to revive the occupied field theory rejected by this Court58 and diverts this Court’s attention from the true question of whether the provisions at issue reveal an operational conflict or a conflict of legislative purpose.

55. As they argue that the Bank Act is comprehensive and exclusive, the Banks in fact seek an even more expansive protected dome than they pursue under interjurisdictional immunity, namely wholesale immunity from provincial contract and consumer protection legislation, without even the necessity to show impairment of the federal power. As such, the policy considerations raised by this Court to limit the application of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity such as the desirability of avoiding legal vacuums, preserving flexible federalism, and promoting subsidiarity, should equally apply to the Banks’ paramountcy position.59

56. This Court has recently stated that the standard for the incompatibility required under the frustration of federal purpose test is high and that mere permissive federal legislation will

57 S.C. 2001, c. 9 (B.O.A., vol. I, tab 9). 58 Canadian Western Bank, supra note 39 at para 74 (B.O.A., vol. III, tab 34); Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan, 2005 SCC 13, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 188 at para 21 (B.O.A., vol. VI, tab 70). See generally Hogg, supra note 29 at 16-11 to 16-14 (B.O.A., vol. VII, tab 78). 59 Canadian Western Bank, ibid. at paras 44-45; Spraytech, supra note 40 at para 3 (B.O.A., vol. I, tab 13). - 19 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

not satisfy such a standard.60 The Respondents submit that this Court should impose an even higher standard where the party invoking paramountcy attempts to revive the discarded doctrine of the occupied field to obtain exclusivity.

(ii) The federal and provincial provisions at issue raise no conflict of purpose

57. The only provincial provisions at issue in the Banks’ appeal are articles 12 and 272 of the CPA. Article 12 is to the same effect as 452(2) of the Bank Act and cannot therefore create any conflict of purpose: the purpose of both provisions is the same. As this Court decided in Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon, in a case where the provincial legislation merely duplicates the federal without contradicting it, “[t]he fact that a plaintiff may have a of remedies does not mean that the provisions of both levels of government cannot “live together” and operate concurrently.”61

58. Article 272 provides civil remedies for breach of statutory contractual rights in Quebec and could just as well be in the CCQ.62 In this regard, the Banks argue, for the first time before this Court, that a conflict of purpose exists because section 988 of the Bank Act provides that a violation of the Bank Act or its regulations does not invalidate any contract entered into by a bank.63

59. With respect, the fact that a violation of the Bank Act cannot lead to the nullity of a contract does not imply that the violation of valid provincial legislation governing contracts cannot lead to contractual nullity.

60. In addition, the Respondents are not asking for nullity of their contracts and never have. As such, the issue is not raised by the facts of the case.

61. The Banks do not otherwise posit that the operational effects of the provincial provisions at issue frustrate the purpose the federal cost of borrowing provisions themselves.

60 COPA, supra note 22 at para 66 (B.O.A., vol. V, tab 62). 61 [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161 at 189 (B.O.A., vol. IV, tab 52). 62 See for example article 1384 CCQ which defines consumer contract by reference to legislation respecting consumer protection. 63 Banks’ factum paras 84-92. The banks also invoke 16(a) which refers to an act of the bank. - 20 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

Unsurprisingly, they do not argue that the ability to charge a non-interest transaction fee constitutes an important means by which the 2001 federal cost of borrowing regime pursues its purpose of protecting consumers from hidden fees and enabling them to make a sound financial decision amongst the various credit cards on the market. They further do not assert that CPA article 12’s prohibition on charging for a fee without disclosing it frustrates the purpose of the FCB or section 452(2) of the Bank Act.

62. The Banks instead argue that a conflict of purpose lies in Parliament’s supposed intent to create exclusive and comprehensive federal cost of borrowing standards. To support this position, they neglect the relevant federal cost of borrowing provisions and their purpose, and rely on the regulatory and penal provisions of the CPA which are not at issue, the oversight mandate of the FCAC which is not at issue, Bank Act provisions not at issue, and the general, suggestive language of the post-enactment preamble to the Bank Act.

(iii) The Banks’ interpretation ignores the relevant legislative history, contradicts Parliament’s intent and would lead to undesirable consequences

63. The Banks’ position flies in the face of the clear purpose of the federal cost of borrowing regime. Neither the provisions nor the legislative history of the FCB or the overall federal cost of borrowing regime contain a single indication that Parliament intended for consumers to receive a different cost of credit disclosure when dealing with a bank than when dealing with other credit merchants. In fact, they reveal precisely the opposite.

64. In its 1998 report that laid the foundation for the 2001 reform of the Bank Act and the rest of the Federal sector, the Task Force on the Future of the Financial Services Sector (“Mackay Task Force”) notably formulated “[t]o the extent that institutions perform similar functions, they should be regulated in similar ways, regardless of what they are called or what statute they fall under”.64

65. The Respondents submit that with this formulation, the Mackay Task Force captured a fundamental principle of modern federal financial services regulation. As this Court

64 Report of the Task Force on the Future of the Canadian Financial Services Sector, Sept. 1998 at 69-70 (Exhibit D-AMX-19, J.R., vol. 82, pp. 3-4) [Mackay Report]. - 21 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

stated in Canadian Western Bank, Parliament has sought since 1985 to maintain a level playing field for all market participants selling a particular product.65 The standardization at the heart of all of cost of borrowing consumer protection legislation demands nothing less.

(a) The Banks’ position ignores that the FCB is part of a broader reform to address the convergence of functions amongst all financial institutions

66. After concluding that Canadians are not as well served as they should and can be, particularly with regard to disclosure and transparency66, the Mackay Task Force presented a strategy to increase competition among financial institutions. This strategy notably recommended “enhancing the ability of existing institutions, particularly life insurance companies, credit unions and caisses populaires, and mutual fund companies to compete with the chartered banks” and “empowering consumers so that they can act as a disciplining force in the market and make competition more effective”.67

67. The Task Force recognized that the convergence of functions amongst financial institutions called for a reform of the public policy framework that no longer granted banks preferential treatment over all other market participants offering the same financial service or product:

One implication of convergence is that the Task Force expects banks to continue to become less special. At the present time, the public policy framework treats banks differently from insurance companies and trust companies with regard to ownership and some business powers. We believe that such differences in public policy are less sustainable as functions continue to converge and financial conglomerates become more prevalent.68

65 Canadian Western Bank, supra note 39 at paras 105, 108. 66 Mackay Report, supra note 64 at 127 (Exhibit D-AMX-19, J.R., vol. 82, p. 60). 67 Ibid. at 15 (Exhibit D-AMX-19, J.R., vol. 81, p. 177). 68 Ibid. at 35 (Exhibit D-AMX-19, J.R., vol. 81, p. 196). See also Canadian Western Bank, supra note 39 at para 1 (“there has been a blurring of the traditional “four pillars” of the Canadian financial services industry, which formerly were neatly divided into banks, trust companies, insurance companies, and security dealers, the first under federal regulation and the last three regulated by the provinces”). - 22 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

68. Having acknowledged that the distinctions between the four pillars of the financial system were becoming less and less relevant, Parliament enacted a series of reforms since 1985 to remove competitive advantages that a type of financial institution might have over others offering a similar service or product.69

69. In this context, it enacted the four regulations that make up the federal cost of borrowing regime to establish virtually identical mandatory cost of credit rules for all federal financial institutions. These standards ensure that consumers receive the same disclosure when they consider a particular financial product or service regardless of the nature of the financial institution.

70. In 2009, Parliament reaffirmed its commitment to uniform, consumer protection credit card standards when it enacted the Credit Business Practices (Banks, Authorized Foreign Banks, Trust and Loan Companies, Retail Associations, Canadian Insurance Companies and Foreign Insurance Companies) Regulations.70 These regulations create a single set of credit card rules for all federal financial institutions with regards to grace periods, allocation of payments, over-the-limit fees, credit limit increases, and debt collection practices. Like the rest of the federal regime, they demonstrate that Parliament sought to provide consumers with the same consumer protection standards, regardless of the nature of their credit card issuer.

(b) The Banks’ position contradicts Parliament’s intent regarding the FCB and the Bank Act generally

71. Contrary to the Banks’ suggestion, the Mackay Task Force’s 1998 report does not reveal that the federal government sought to exert exclusive jurisdiction over consumer protection for banks:

Consumer protection responsibilities are shared between the federal and provincial governments. The federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over banks and regulates some consumer protection aspects of banking. The federal government also regulates some

69 See for example Canadian Western Bank, ibid. at para 105, 107-108. 70 SOR/2009-257. - 23 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

consumer protection aspects of federally incorporated trust and insurance companies through its power to incorporate these institutions. […]

Provincial governments regulate the standards of competence and behaviour of financial intermediaries, all aspects of provincially incorporated financial institutions, and market conduct and consumer protection in respect of financial institutions. Their constitutional authority to regulate consumer protection for banks is not fully defined, but many banks comply with provincial regulations.

Our recommendations are intended to fit within the current framework of responsibilities. […] With regard to consumer protection issues, we have focussed our concern on what works best for consumers regardless of jurisdictional responsibilities. Our emphasis on best practice derives from our view that the fundamental interests and needs of consumers do not vary a cross jurisdictional boundaries.71

72. The Mackay Task Force also recommended that federal and provincial governments should cooperate to harmonize regimes in areas where regulatory duplication between governments could not be eliminated.72 As discussed in the Respondents’ appeal factum, the FCB emerged in a spirit of cooperation between the provinces and Parliament to harmonize the regulation of the cost of credit so that consumers would receive a uniform disclosure regardless of the type of credit merchant that they considered offers from.73

73. In matters such as consumer protection, the primary standards are created by the provinces under their property and civil rights power and therefore vary from province to province. As discussed, these provincial standards form the jus commune which underlies and completes any valid federal consumer protection standard. As this Court concluded in Canadian Western Bank, the same proposition holds true for provincial market regulation as well as regulations that protect workers and the environment.74

74. Given that Parliament clearly lacks the constitutional power to regulate federal financial institutions other than banks and provincial financial institutions, uniformity among

71 Mackay Report, supra note 64 at 122 (Exhibit D-AMX-19, J.R., vol. 82, p. 55) 72 Ibid. at 70 (Exhibit D-AMX-19, J.R. vol. 82, p. 4) 73 Appelants Marcotte and Laparé’s Factum, at paras 99-103. 74 Canadian Western Bank, supra note 39 at para 45 (B.O.A., vol. III, tab 34). - 24 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

federal institutions necessarily implies that banks, like other federal financial institutions, are subject to provincial regulation unless a specific conflict exists.

75. Beyond this legislative history, both the Bank Act and FCB reveal that when Parliament intends to modify property and civil rights in the provinces, or exclude a provincial standard, it does so explicitly.

76. For example, section 437 of the Bank Act allows a bank to accept a deposit “from any person whether or not the person is qualified by law to enter into contracts”.75 The law being referred to and modified is necessarily provincial law relative to the capacity to contract, which has an obvious consumer protection component.

77. By expressly establishing that a contractual standard designed to protect the vulnerable party in a contract should be inoperable to banks when they accept a deposit, the Bank Act reveals that Parliament did not intend for its standards to automatically exclude the operation of provincial law. It follows that Parliament intended provincial standards to supplement the Bank Act standards, unless they are incompatible.

78. Furthermore, section 16(3) of the FCB recognizes that Parliament intended for the normal rules of federal paramountcy to determine the operability of provincial laws unless a specific provision indicates otherwise. This section makes the standard at 16(1) regarding the cancellation of optional services to a credit agreement, subject to the relevant provincial law. Thus, not only does provincial law apply, Parliament makes it paramount in that instance.

79. Section 437 of the Bank Act and section 16(3) of the FCB thus seriously call into question the Banks’ assertion that Parliament intended for the Bank Act and FCB to provide comprehensive and exclusive cost of borrowing standards.

(c) The Banks’ position would lead to serious undesirable consequences

80. The Banks’ invoke the federal paramountcy doctrine to pursue a privileged position in the Quebec credit marketplace just as they did in Canadian Western Bank. They would

75 Bank Act, s. 437(1)(a) (infra p. 44). See also 437(3) and 437(4). - 25 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

have the lower standard apply only to them, despite the existence of complementary provincial provisions that provide additional protection for Quebec consumers when dealing with all other credit card issuers.

81. Contrary to the argument of the Banks, the operability of the CPA would not confuse consumers, weaken federal consumer protection, or fragment the national banking system. It would not require consumers to deal with the confusing task of comparing two separate disclosures under provincial and federal law. If the CPA credit regime is operable to bank issued credit cards, all consumers in Quebec will receive meaningful disclosure from all credit merchants of a credit rate which conforms to both the CPA and the FCB.

82. In fact, only if the Banks succeed and the CPA is held to be inoperative to banks would consumers have to compare two different types of disclosures when they select a credit card: one for banks under the federal law and one for all other financial institutions, including federal financial institutions, under provincial law. It is thus hard to imagine that Parliament sought to protect consumers from confusion by excluding the operation of provincial law to banks given that cost comparison underlies all cost of borrowing regulation.

83. Neither a concern for the capacity of banks to compete in the marketplace nor the rights and interests of consumers supports the immunization of banks from provincial cost of credit rules that all credit merchants must respect. Firstly, in order to enable consumers to compare the cost of using credit and make sound financial decisions, they must receive the same disclosure for each credit card they consider, regardless of the nature of its issuer. Secondly, the FCAC itself cautioned that a financial institution’s failure to obey the FCB has serious effects on competition among financial institutions:

If an institution fails to disclose the information required by law, the institution gives itself an unfair advantage in the marketplace. This is - 26 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

against the principle of maintaining a level playing field for all financial institutions.76

84. The immunization of Canadian banks from this level playing field would also have an impact on other types of competitors active on the market and could only incite them to seek a charter so as to benefit from a similar exemption.

85. Moreover, accepting the Banks’ position would imply a huge legal vacuum in provincial legislation of general application to banks. It would also invite banks to re-litigate cases such as Canadian Western Bank and Innovation Credit, a result that this Court has stated is undesirable.77

(iv) The 2012 Bank Act preamble is not declaratory and does not replace the interpretation that this Court should give to the sections of the 2001 FCB

86. The Banks rely on the post-enactment Bank Act preamble to assert that Parliament always intended for the FCB to be exclusive and comprehensive. The Banks do not allege that the preamble changes the purpose of the federal cost of borrowing regime. They rather submit that it confirms that Parliament always intended to establish exclusive and comprehensive standards.78 Their interpretation must thus always have been open to the courts below. As we have seen, neither the letter of the federal cost of borrowing regime, its spirit or its legislative history supports such an interpretation.

87. As this Court recognized in United States of America v. Dynar the relevant intent is that of the enacting Parliament or legislature :

[45] What legal commentators call “subsequent legislative history” can cast no light on the intention of the enacting Parliament or Legislature. At most, subsequent enactments reveal the interpretation that the present Parliament places upon the work of a predecessor. And, in matters of legal interpretation, it is the judgment of the courts

76 Financial Consumer Agency of Canada, Confirmation of Violation, File 29470-281Q206, (Exhibit D-AMX-14, J.R., vol. 81, p. 70). 77 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at 334-335 (R.B.O.A., vol. II, tab 24) 78 Appellant Banks’ Joint Factum at paras 10, 75-76. - 27 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

and not the lawmakers that matters. It is for judges to determine what the intention of the enacting Parliament was.79

a. The 2012 Bank Act preamble is not declaratory

88. If Parliament intended to retroactively exclude the operation of Quebec’s public order consumer protection credit regime, it would have used clear language in the corresponding federal provisions to express this intent and not have employed the general, suggestive language found in the post-enactment preamble.

89. As this Court recognized in Dynar, absent a clear indication of retroactive intent, a court should not accept a post-enactment amendment as a declaration of the law as it has always been:

[46] Parliament itself recognized as much, when, in the Interpretation Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I‑21, s. 45(3), it declared:

The repeal or amendment of an enactment in whole or in part shall not be deemed to be or to involve any declaration as to the previous state of the law.

Moreover, to consult “subsequent legislative history” as an aid to the interpretation of prior enactments would be to give the subsequent enactments retroactive effect; and, as this Court has often observed, statutes are not to be given retroactive effect except in the clearest of cases:

The situation is completely different with respect to a statute subsequent in time to the facts which gave rise to the action. The construction of prior legislation is then exclusively a matter for the courts. In refraining from giving the new enactment retroactive or declaratory effect, the legislator avoids expressing an opinion on the previous state of the law, leaving it to the courts.

(Gravel v. City of St-Léonard, 1977 CanLII 9 (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 660, at p. 667)80

79 [1997] 2 SCR 462 at para 45 (R.B.O.A., vol. II, tab 27) [Dynar]. 80 Ibid. at para 46. - 28 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

90. Neither the language of the Jobs, Growth, and Economic Prosperity Act81 nor the preamble itself indicate that it declares the law as it has always been. Unlike the provincial law in Régie des rentes du Québec v. Canada Bread Company Ltd., the Jobs, Growth, and Economic Prosperity Act, which amends the Bank Act, contains no provision that stipulates that the amendment is “declaratory”.82 Moreover, the preamble and its enacting law do not use the past tense (“it is and has always been desirable …”), refer to the first instance decision, or express concern for doubts and uncertainties regarding the current state of the law, as the provincial act did in Western Minerals Ltd. v. Gaumont.83

91. The language of the preamble likewise does not suggest that Parliament sought to definitively resolve a controversy regarding the state of the FCB. The use of the word “desirable” rather indicates that the preamble is suggestive instead of mandatory. The Respondents submit that for each standard contained in the Bank Act, a court must thus consider that Parliament proposes exclusivity and comprehensiveness but acknowledges that it might not always be possible or reasonable in light of the division of powers under the Constitution, the primary objectives pursued by the Bank Act, and each specific regime of standards adopted under the Bank Act its regulations and other federal financial legislation.

92. Ministerial comments cannot render the Bank Act preamble declaratory. Citing Dynar with approval, this Court recently recognized that courts must be cautious when relying on subsequent government statements and documents to determine the intention of the original enacting Parliament.84 The mere statement in extrinsic aids that a preamble “clarifies” does not mean that it rewrites the intent of the 2001 FCB.

b. No genuine interpretative ambiguity regarding the purpose of the 2001 FCB exists

93. The 2012 Bank Act preamble thus cannot “interpret” into existence a conflict between the 2001 FCB and CPA credit regime where none exists. The Jobs, Growth, and Economic

81 S.C. 2012, c. 19 (infra at p. 48). 82 2013 SCC 46 at para 14 (R.B.O.A., vol. II, tab 26). 83 [1953] 1 S.C.R. 345 at 368 (R.B.O.A., vol. II, tab 28). 84 Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 SCC 71, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 660 at para 98 (R.B.O.A., vol. II, tab 22). - 29 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

Prosperity Act does not make any changes to the FCB. It only adds the 2012 Bank Act preamble, which also emphasizes the need to account for the rights and interests of consumers.85

94. While a preamble may help courts to interpret an Act, it does not establish a substantive rule itself. According to Sullivan, it primarily recites the circumstances and considerations that gave rise to the need for legislation or identifies the “mischief” that the legislation is designed to cure.86 Its lack of clarity and specificity should make this Court cautious to give it much weight.87

95. A court must measure the preamble’s language against other indicators of legislative purpose or meaning, which may point in the same or a different direction.88 While Courts may rely heavily on a preamble as an indication of the legislative purpose of the provisions of an act,89 the exercise of interpretation relates to the specific substantive dispositions at issue, in this case the FCB. As Kent Roach writes in “The Uses and Audiences of Preambles in Legislation”:

Courts have frequently been reluctant to give great weight to preambles. La Forest J. has stated that “it would seem odd if general words in a preamble were to be given more weight than the specific provisions that dealt with the matter”. Similarly, a leading English case warns that although preambles may be helpful in identifying the mischief of the act, they are no replacement for the precise words of the enactment. […] Courts are alive to the dangers that preambles can oversell the fine print of the legislation.90

96. The Banks’ interpretation that the FCB establishes exclusive cost of borrowing standards for banks runs contrary to its purpose of establishing uniform cost of borrowing standards so that consumers can easily compare credit card offers. Effective comparison shopping

85 Bank Act, at preamble (Appellants Marcotte and Laparé’s Factum, Part VII) 86 Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed. (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Canada, 2008) at 381 (R.B.O.A., vol. II, tab 31) [Sullivan]. 87 Ibid. at 386. 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid. at 386-387. 90 (2001) 47 McGill L.J. 129 at 153 (R.B.O.A., vol. II, tab 30) (references omitted). - 30 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

means that consumers must receive the same disclosure from all credit card issuers, regardless of the statute that the issuer derives its name from.

97. Respondents therefore submit that the Banks have failed to demonstrate that the doctrine of paramountcy applies to the present case.

C. The Plaintiffs have standing to bring this class action

98. The Banks submit that the Superior Court should not have authorized this class action against banks sharing no contractual link with the representative plaintiffs even though they did not contest the authorization. According to their thesis, when presented with the issue of standing in the context of a class action, even after authorization is granted, a court should assess only the representative’s personal standing to sue the defendants and not the class members’ standing relating to those defendants.

99. The trial judge and Court of Appeal dismissed in detailed reasons each argument put forward by the Banks on this issue. The trial judge identified four main reasons why the Plaintiffs had standing to bring the class action: the lack of standing was raised after the judgment authorizing the class action; the essence of the litigation was to evaluate the legality of an identical practice common to all the defendants; requiring individual actions against each defendant would defeat the purpose of class actions and lead to a massive waste of judicial resources; and the Banks in question suffered no prejudice as a result of the absence of class representatives in a contractual relationship with them.91 Respondents submit that for these reasons and others, Respondents have standing to bring the present class action.

(i) Standing must be analyzed from the point of view of the whole class

100. The trial judge correctly ruled that once a class action is authorized, it exists on a collective basis and the representative takes on a role similar to that of a mandatary of the

91 Banks QCSC, supra note 5 at paras 142-201. The Court of Appeal confirmed those reasons and commented on them: Banks QCCA, supra note 17, at para 30 in which the Court of Appeal summarizes the trial judge’s findings. - 31 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

class.92 Yet, the Banks argue that Bouchard v. Agropur Coopérative, which was rendered before authorization, settles the issue in their favor.93

101. Agropur rests primarily on the finding that:

Il faut garder à l'esprit qu'avant le jugement d'autorisation, «le recours n'existe pas, du moins sur une base collective». Le recours individuel du requérant, à lui seul, doit donc remplir les conditions de l'article 1003 C.p.c., dont celle de l'apparence de droit, puisque tout le reste ne relève encore que du domaine de l'hypothèse.94

102. As mentioned, unlike the facts in Agropur, the Superior Court had already authorized the class action when the Banks challenged the standing of the representatives. After authorization, a court cannot restrict a class action to only the personal action of the representative. For example, even if the personal claim of the representative is prescribed or settled, the class action continues so that all of the members can benefit from the Court’s answers to the common questions.95 It must thus analyze the notion of standing from the point of view of the whole class.96

103. As Dalphond J. mentioned in this case but also in General Motors du Canada ltée c. Billette:

[35] Selon moi, la faiblesse de la thèse des requérantes tient du fait qu’elle confond intérêt juridique et qualité de représentant et ignore que l’existence d’un intérêt juridique suffisant, une fois le recours collectif en marche, s’évalue en fonction des représentés et non du représentant.97

92 Banks QCSC, ibid. at paras 146-149. See para 176. See also art. 2130 C.C.Q. 93 Bouchard v. Agropur Coopérative, [2006] R.J.Q. 2349, (C.A.) (B.A., vol. I, tab 17) [Agropur]. 94 Ibid. at para 109. 95 CCP at art. 1015 (infra p. 46); Banks QCCA, supra note 17 at para 69; Banks QCSC, supra note 5 at paras 162-166, citing the Court of Appeal in Services aux marchands détaillants ltée (Household Finance) c. Option Consommateurs, 2006 QCCA 1319 (B.O.A., vol. V, tab 56). 96 Banks QCSC, ibid. at paras 149-157; Banks QCCA, supra note 17 at paras 71, 79-80. 97 2009 QCCA 2476 (22 décembre 2009) (Dalphond, j.c.a. acted as sole judge on a Motion for leave to appeal a judgment rejecting a motion to dismiss the class action). - 32 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

(ii) The legality of an industry-wide practice is a common issue that justifies a multiple-defendant class action

104. The trial judge also found that a class action of this nature meets the criteria of the exception to Agropur’s general rule recognized in Regroupement des CHSLD Christ-Roy v. Comité provincial des malades.98 This exception applies where a class action seeks to answer a common question regarding the legality of an industry-wide practice under legal provisions that all defendants must respect.99 As indicated by the trial judge, this class action challenges the legality under the CPA credit regime of the currency conversion fees that each defendant charges its credit card holders.100

105. In CHSLD the issue was the evaluation of the legality of an industry-wide practice. The Court of Appeal found that this type of issue ensured that there was a similar cause of action between all members of the group and all defendants.101 In effect, a multiple- defendant class-action will be authorized if a cause of action is shared between all putative class members and all defendants. This requirement corresponds to the 1003(a) CPC authorization criterion and is clearly met here.102 As such, this case qualifies as an exception to Agropur under the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in CHSLD.

(iii) The banks suffered no prejudice

106. The Banks suffered no prejudice from the absence of a contractual relationship with the representatives.103 They had ample opportunity to examine a member with a direct and personal cause of action against them, but did not do so.104

98 [2007] R.J.Q. 1753 (C.A.) (B.A., vol. IV, Tab 78) [CHSLD]; see also Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltée. v. Conseil québécois sur le tabac et la santé, 2007 QCCA 694 (B.A., vol. II, tab 40) [CQTS]. 99 The banks admitted this identical commercial behaviour in their Requête au juge en chef, supra note 12 at para 30 (J.R., vol. 4, p. 19). Banks QCSC, supra note 5 at paras 177-188, relying on CHSLD and CQTS. 100 Banks QCSC, ibid. at para 185. 101 CHSLD, supra note 98 at para 26 (B.A., vol. IV, tab 78) 102 The Court of Appeal in Banks QCCA made a similar finding: Banks QCCA, supra note 17 at paras 77, 79-80. Similar reasoning was adopted in MacKinnon v. National Money Mart Co., 2004 BCCA 472 at para 54 (R.B.O.A., vol. II, tab 18) [MacKinnon]. 103 Banks QCSC, supra note 5 at para 190. - 33 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

107. The Court of Appeal also emphasized that the CCP’s authorization criteria fully addressed any concern that a given multiple-defendant class action would be unmanageable, plaintiff-less or unfounded.105

(iv) The dominant current in Canada shares the position of the courts below

108. As the Court of Appeal recognized, the dominant current in Canadian jurisprudence allows class actions to proceed when the representative does not have a direct cause of action against each defendant.106 The Court of Appeal of British Columbia has taken the same position as the Québec Court of Appeal.107 The courts in Manitoba and Saskatchewan later followed the same course.108 Though they have not clearly decided this issue, Albertan courts lean towards the solution adopted by the Court below.109

109. Only in Ontario have the Courts adopted a position similar to that of the Banks.110 In Ragoonanan, the Ontario Superior Court dismissed a class action before certification after raising the following concerns:

[55] At the earlier point in time of the rule 21.01(1)(b) motion, the representative plaintiff is the only plaintiff party to the pleading. The putative class members cannot be considered parties until certification

104 Ibid. at para 191. 105 Ibid. at paras 76-78. 106 Banks QCCA, supra note 17, at paras 41-42, 47-57. The court also examined American jurisprudence at paras 43-46. 107 Ibid. at para 54; MacKinnon, supra note 102 at paras 50-51 (R.B.O.A., vol. II, tab 18). See also Campbell v. Flexwatt Corp., [1998] 6 W.W.R. 275 (B.C.C.A.) (R.B.O.A., vol. I, tab 9); Furlan v. Shell Oil Co., 2000 BCCA 404 (R.B.O.A., vol. I, tab 13). 108 Banks QCCA, ibid. at paras 56-57. See Bellan v. Curtis, 2007 MBQB 221 (R.B.O.A., vol. I, tab 8); Alves v. Red Seal Vacations Inc., 2011 SKCA 117 (R.B.O.A., vol. I, tab 5) [Alves]; Frey v. BCE Inc., 2006 SKQB 328 (R.B.O.A., vol. I, tab 12); Miller v. Purdue Pharma Inc., 2013 SKQB 193 (R.B.O.A., vol. II, tab 20). 109 Banks QCCA, ibid. at para. 55; Pauli v. Ace Ina Insurance, 2002 ABQB 715 (R.B.O.A., vol. II, tab 21); Gillespie v. Gessert, [2006] A.J. No. 1746 (R.B.O.A., vol. I, tab 14); Condominium Plan No. 0020701 v. Investplan Properties Inc., 2006 ABQB 224 (R.B.O.A., vol. I, tab 10); Alberta Society for Pension Reform v. Alberta, 2008 ABQB 74 (R.B.O.A., vol. I, tab 4); Eaton v. HMS Financial Inc., 2008 ABQB 631 (R.B.O.A., vol. I, tab 11). The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal shared Judge Dalphond’s reading of the Albertan jurisprudence in Alves, supra note 108 at para. 25 (R.B.O.A., vol. I, tab 5). 110 Ragoonanan Estate v Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 51 O.R. (3d) 603 (R.B.O.A., vol. II, tab 25) [Ragoonanan]; Hughes v Sunbeam Corp. (Canada) Ltd., 61 O.R. (3d) 433 (ONCA) (R.B.O.A., vol. I, tab 16). - 34 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

is granted by the court. In addition, in the case at hand there cannot be any certainty that there are any persons with a cause of action against RBH and JTI-M.111

110. This reasoning is similar to the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Agropur, and Respondents submit the same exceptions should apply. Moreover, contrary to the facts in Ragoonanan, in the present case the class action was authorized.

(v) The CCP allows a person to act on behalf of others

111. The Court of Appeal also noted that the CCP contains several exceptions to the general principle requiring a direct and personal interest in order to act against a defendant.112 For example, article 1048 CCP allows a moral person to act as representative even when it has no personal cause of action.113 Article 1015 CCP provides that “The representative is deemed to have a sufficient interest notwithstanding his acceptance of the defendant's offers respecting his personal claim.”114 These two examples and others suggest that the legislature did not intend for a class action to necessarily have a representative with a direct cause of action against each defendant.

(vi) The Banks’ position would lead to a massive waste of judicial resources

112. The efficient allocation of judicial resources does not favor splitting a multiple defendant class action into several single-defendant class actions with virtually identical evidence and causes of action. The proportionality criterion set out in article 4.2 of the CCP enables judges to adopt procedural solutions that avoid the senseless multiplication of procedures and actions.115 The Banks’ position would clearly lead to an undesirable result of this sort.

113. This inefficient result would also be contrary to the purpose of class action legislation. As the Court of Appeal aptly stated in CHSLD:

111 Ragoonanan, ibid. at para 55. 112 Banks QCCA, supra note 17 at paras 61, 66-68. 113 Ibid. at paras 61, 65-70. 114 Ibid. at para 65. 115 Banks QCSC, supra note 5 at paras 187-189. See also Banks QCCA, ibid. at paras 72-75, 78. - 35 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

“imposer aux usagers […] la contrainte d’intenter autant de recours collectifs qu’il y a d’établissements pourrait avoir pour effet de les dissuader de faire valoir leurs droits en justice […]”.116

114. In Association pour la protection automobile c. Ultramar ltée, the Superior Court reached the same conclusion when it applied the judgment of the Court of Appeal in this case to address a multiple-defendant class action:

[238] Après avoir fait une étude comparative de ce qui se passe ailleurs dans le monde et au Canada, le juge Pierre Dalphond, j.c.a., établit une distinction entre la qualité pour agir comme représentant et l’intérêt pour obtenir une condamnation contre le défendeur (art. 1015 et 1048 C.p.c.). Il ajoute que le code prévoit divers moyens pour parfaire la situation d’un représentant si nécessaire, tel l’interrogatoire des membres.

[...]

[251] On peut difficilement voir quel serait l’avantage d’avoir autant de membres désignés que de groupes proposés. Il n’y aurait, à cet égard, aucune valeur ajoutée au présent recours, car la détermination des questions en litige n’implique que peu ou pas les membres.

[252] Décider autrement aurait également comme conséquence de créer, en quelque sorte, autant de recours collectifs distincts que de groupes. Or, l’économie des ressources judiciaires fait en sorte que nous devons éviter cette voie, surtout parce que la question commune, le tronc commun, est à ce point importante qu’il n’y a pas lieu de créer autant de petits recours à l’intérieur d’un même recours collectif.117

115. The Respondents submit that it obviously makes sense to avoid multiple trials of the same issue. The Banks themselves argued that very point twice in relation to the issues of this case.118

116. When they tried to have the constitutionality of the CPA decided by a declaratory judgment, the Banks argued that it would make sense for a single trial to resolve that issue. When they asked for and obtained the joinder of this class action with the

116 CHSLD, supra note 98 at para 31 (B.A., vol. IV, tab 78). 117 2012 QCCS 4199 (4 octobre 2012) at paras 238, 251-252. 118 Requête au juge en chef, supra note 12 at paras 26-30 (J.R., vol. 4, p. 19); Lagacé Judgment, supra note 8 (J.R., vol. 4, p. 9). - 36 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

Desjardins class action trial on the merits, the Banks acknowledged that each defendant’s behaviour raises the same questions regarding the CPA credit regime and its constitutionality.119 Moreover, at trial, all parties, including Desjardins, agreed that the trial judge should decide the issues on the basis of the evidence as a whole and not based on evidence specific to each party.120

117. Despite having decided not to discover any class member or call any class member to testify, the Banks now plead that the 34 day common trial that they requested should have no effect on resolving the claims of the class members.

118. As the trial judge recognized, it is hard to imagine how the general principles of civil procedure and the rationale for the class action procedure could possibly support such a result:

[187] Comme dans cette affaire toujours, imposer, tel que la position des banques le suggère en dernière analyse, la contrainte d'intenter d'autres recours collectifs envers les banques qui n'auraient pas de membres désignés et connus, irait vraisemblablement à l'encontre des objectifs visés par la procédure de recours collectif.

[188] Sans compter qu'il est indéniable qu'ici, cette approche entraînerait un gaspillage particulièrement troublant des ressources judiciaires, surtout devant l'approche adoptée jusqu'à ce jour dans les deux dossiers.

[189] Le Tribunal ne peut, pour sa part, se rendre à l'argument que proposent les banques et conclure, ni plus ni moins, que des dizaines de journées d'audience ont été consacrées inutilement à cette affaire et qu'il y a lieu de recommencer pour un argument que le juge Dalphond qualifie de technique dans l'arrêt Conseil. Surtout lorsqu'une approche constructive du débat aurait permis une solution simple.121

119. The Respondents thus submit that they have standing.

119 Banks QCSC, supra note 5 at paras 26-27. 120 Ibid. at paras 210-211. 121 Ibid. at paras 187-189. - 37 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

D. The CCQ enables consumers to recover currency conversion fees that they paid without an obligation

120. After concluding that the Banks charged the currency conversion fees in violation of the CPA, the trial judge correctly ordered the restitution of the fees to consumers under article 272 of the CPA.122

(i) The Respondents had no contractual obligation to pay currency conversion fees

121. Although the Respondents focused their argument on the violations of the CPA, it was always clear that they also invoked violations of the CCQ. This appears from the proceedings in first instance.123

122. Article 1554(1) of the CCQ establishes that “every payment presupposes an obligation; what has been paid where there is no obligation may be recovered”.124

123. The trial judge found that the clauses relating to currency conversion in the Banks’ credit card contracts did not indicate to consumers that they would be charged a currency conversion fee. In the related Adams class action (SCC #35033), the trial judge concluded that the credit card contracts misled consumers: “[a]ccording to the evidence, one could not reasonably read or understand the words ‘exchange rate” as including the Commission”.125 This well-founded factual finding applies equally, mutatis mutandis, to all of the Appellant Banks (SCC #35009).126 Consumers thus paid the Banks currency conversion fees without consenting to them and without any obligation to do so.

122 Appellants Marcotte and Laparé’s Factum at paras 44-56; Banks QCSC, ibid. at paras 968, 989. 123 For example, see the Plea of Defendant Bank of Montreal, at para 21, J.R. vol 4, page 70 in which the BMO refers to the Plaintiffs claim that the currency conversion fees violate the CCQ. 124 Infra p. 45 125 Adams v. Amex Bank of Canada, 2009 QCCS 2695 at paras 186, 198 (J.R., vol. II, p. 127) [Adams QCSC]. See also paras 123, 164, 181-184. 126 Banks QCSC, supra note 5 at para 434: «En regard de la preuve particulière administrée quant à chaque banque, le Tribunal considère qu'il y a eu effectivement absence de divulgation des frais de conversion pour les périodes identifiées» and para 461. At paras 438-9: the trial judge found that for a certain period, BMO referred to a mark-up shown on a card carrier, but no mention was - 38 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

124. The Banks misinterpret the ruling of the Courts below as having annulled a synallagmatic currency conversion contract that they had entered into separately with credit card holders.127 Citing sections 16 and 988 of the Bank Act, they argue that restitution is impossible because their violation of section 452(2) of the Bank Act cannot lead to the nullity of this separate contract.128 This is an inaccurate characterization of the issue.

125. The consumers did not enter a separate currency conversion contract with the Banks. The only relevant contract that exists between a Bank and a class member is a credit card contract. Under this contract, each Bank undertook to offer the use of credit cards in foreign currencies, but no clause gave them the right to charge conversion fees. The consumer thus did not promise to pay a currency conversion fee. It is unthinkable that sections 16, 452(2), and 988 of the Bank Act intended to allow a bank to charge consumers fees for a service without their consent.

(ii) Quantum meruit does not apply to this factual situation

126. Article 1699 of the CCQ provides that the Court may, exceptionally, refuse restitution where it would have the effect of conferring an undue advantage on one party.129 In the related Adams class action, the trial judge found that:

[380] […] the evidence submitted by Amex fails to show any undue advantage to the class members. One cannot simply isolate the alleged benefit of the Commission being reimbursed to the class members and ignore the other benefits Amex would have undoubtedly received through the use of its cards by the class members in carrying foreign currency transactions.130

present on the card carrier. At paras 449-451: he found that Citibank’s contract mentioned an undefined “administrative charged”, which according to the judge could not give rise to valid consent. 127 Appellant Banks’ Joint Factum, at para 100. 128 Appellant Banks’ Joint Factum, at para 94. 129 Infra, p. 45 130 Adams QCSC, supra note 125 at para 380. See also Amex Bank of Canada v Adams, 2012 QCCA 1394 at para 48. Banks QCSC, supra note 5 did not address this issue because it was decided on article 272 of the CPA. - 39 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Statement of Argument

127. The trial judge further found that the Banks charged the illegal fees in consideration for the general benefits that the card provides, and not for the currency conversion service.131 Moreover, he found that the international credit card networks, who license the use of their payment networks to the Banks, carried out this service.132 Finally, the fees constituted mostly profit margin for the banks.133

128. The evidence thus reveals that the fees were not charged quantum meruit. Consumers who could not understand from their contract that they needed to pay currency conversion fees had the right to expect that this service came with the credit cards’ other conveniences.

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PART IV – SUBMISSIONS CONCERNING COSTS

129. The Respondents submit they should be awarded their costs before the three courts.

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PART V – ORDER SOUGHT

130. The Respondents respectfully request that the judgment of the Court of Appeal be set aside and that the judgment in first instance be restored.

Montréal, November 12, 2013 Montréal, November 12, 2013

______Mr. Bruce W. Johnston Mr. André Lespérance Mr. Philippe H. Trudel Lauzon Bélanger Lespérance inc. Mr. Andrew Cleland Trudel & Johnston Co-Counsel for Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé

131 Banks QCSC, supra note 5 at paras 386-389. 363; Testimony of Robert Wittmann, J.R., vol. 23, pp. 7-8 132 Banks QCSC, ibid. at paras 250-251, 671; Appellants Marcotte and Laparé’s factum at para 6-7, footnotes 3-7, 21. 133 Appellants Marcotte and Laparé’s factum at para 6, footnote 16; Exhibit P-186, J.R., vol. 69, p. 23. - 40 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Alphabetical Table of Authorities

PART V – ALPHABETICAL TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Legislative provisions Paragraph(s)

Bank Act, S.C. 1991, c. 46 ...... 6,12,18,20,21,32 ...... 38,39,40,42,49,50 ....54,55,57,58,59, 61,62 ...... 64,75,76,77,79,86 ...... 90,91,92,93,124,125

Civil Code of Quebec, R.S.Q., c. C-1991 ...30,31,32,33,34,35,121 ...... 122,126

Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C-25 ...... 57,58,102,105,107 ...... 111,112

Constitution Act, 1867, (UK) 30&31 Vict., c. 3 ...... 6,22

Consumer Protection Act, R.S.Q., c. P-40.1 ...... 1,13,30,33,34,36 ...... 40,52,57,58, 61,62 ...... 81,82,93,104,116 ...... 120,121

Cost of Borrowing (Banks) Regulations, SOR/2001-101 ...... 1,32,52,54,61,62,75 .....78,79,81,82,83,86,91 ...... 93,95,96

Cost of Borrowing (Canadian Insurance Companies) Regulations, SOR/2001-102 ...... 1,61,62,69

Cost of Borrowing (Disclosure) Regulations, SOR/DORS/83-103 ...... 14

Cost of Borrowing (Retail Associations) Regulations, SOR/2002- 263 ...... 1,61,62,69

Cost of Borrowing (Trust and Loans Companies) Regulations, SOR/2001-104 ...... 1,61,62,69

Credit Business Practices (Banks, Authorized Foreign Banks, Trust and Loan Companies, Retail Associations, Canadian Insurance Companies and Foreign Insurance Companies) Regulations, SOR/2009-257 ...... 70

Federal Law-Civil Law Harmonization Act, No. 1, S.C. 2001, c. 4 ...... 21

Financial Consumer Agency of Canada Act, S.C. 2001, c. 9 ...... 54,62,69

Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21 ...... 21

Jobs, Growth and Prosperity Act, S.C. 2012 c. 19 ...... 90,93

Personal Property Security Act, S.S. 1993, c P-6.2 ...... 20 - 41 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Alphabetical Table of Authorities

Jurisprudence Paragraph(s)

114957 Canada Ltée. (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), 2001 SCC 40, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241 ...... 27,55

Alberta Society for Pension Reform v. Alberta, 2008 ABQB 74 ...... 108

Alves v. Red Seal Vacations Inc., 2011 SKCA 117 ...... 108

Association pour la protection automobile c. Ultramar Ltée, 2012 QCCS 4199 ...... 114

Attorney General (Ontario) v. Barfried Enterprises, [1963] S.C.R. 570 ...... 22,23,24

Bank of Montreal v. Hall, [1990] 1 R.C.S. 121 ...... 31,32,38,39

Bank of Montreal v. Innovation Credit Union, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 3 ...... 20,21,32,85

Bellan v. Curtis, 2007 MBQB 221 ...... 108

Bouchard v. Agropur Coopérative, [2006] R.J.Q. 2349, (C.A.) .....100,101,102,104,110

Campbell v. Flexwatt Corp., [1998] 6 W.W.R. 275 (B.C.C.A.) ...... 108

Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, 2011 SCC 44, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 ...... 10

Canadian Pioneer Management Ltd. et al. v. Labour Relations Board of Saskatchewan et al., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 433 ...... 16

Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, 2007 SCC 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 ....26,27,28,37,43,49,54, .....55,65,67,68,73,80,85

CIBC Mortgage Corp. v. Vasquez, 2002 SCC 60, [2002] 3 SCR 168 ...... 33

Condominium Plan No. 0020701 v. Investplan Properties Inc., 2006 ABQB 224 ...... 108

Eaton v. HMS Financial Inc., 2008 ABQB 631 ...... 108

Financial Consumer Agency of Canada, Confirmation of Violation, File 29470-281Q206 ...... 83

Frey v. BCE Inc., 2006 SKQB 328 ...... 108

Furlan v. Shell Oil Co., 2000 BCCA 404 ...... 108 - 42 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Alphabetical Table of Authorities

Jurisprudence (suite) Paragraph(s)

General Motors du Canada ltée c. Billette, 2009 QCCA 2476 ...... 103

Gillespie v. Gessert, [2006] A.J. No. 1746 ...... 108

Hughes v Sunbeam Corp. (Canada) Ltd., 61 O.R. (3d) 433 (ONCA) ...... 109

Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltée. v. Conseil québécois sur le tabac et la santé, 2007 QCCA 694 ...... 104

Law Society of British Columbia v. Mangat, 2001 SCC 67, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 113 ...... 39

MacKinnon v. National Money Mart Co., 2004 BCCA 472 ...... 105,108

Miller v. Purdue Pharma Inc., 2013 SKQB 193 ...... 108

Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon,[1982]¸ 2 S.C.R. 161 ...... 57

Pauli v. Ace Ina Insurance, 2002 ABQB 715 ...... 108

Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 SCC 71, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 660 ...... 92

Québec (Attorney General) v. Canadian Owners and Pilots Association, 2010 SCC 39 ...... 10,56

R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 ...... 85

Ragoonanan Estate v Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 51 O.R. (3d) 603 ...... 109,110

Régie des rentes du Québec v. Canada Bread Company Ltd., 2013 SCC 46 ...... 90

Regroupement des CHSLD Christ-Roy v. Comité provincial des malades, [2007] R.J.Q. 1753 (C.A.) ...... 104,105,113

Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan, 2005 SCC 13, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 188 ...... 54

Services aux marchands détaillants ltée (Household Finance) c. Option Consommateurs, 2006 QCCA 1319 ...... 102

United States of America v. Dynar, [1997] 2. S.C.R. 462 ...... 87,89,92

Western Minerals Ltd. v. Gaumont, [1953] 1 S.C.R. 345, at 369 ...... 90

- 43 -

Respondents Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé’s Factum Alphabetical Table of Authorities

Doctrine Paragraph(s)

Bradley Crawford, Q.C., The Law of Banking and Payment in Canada (2013, loose-leaf) ...... 13,15,17

Hogg, Peter W., Constitutional Law of Canada, loose-leaf, 5th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2007) ...... 16,54

Kent Roach, “The Uses and Audiences of Preambles in Legislation” (2001) 47 MCGill L.J. 129 ...... 95

M.H. Ogilvie, Bank and Consumer Law in Canada (2nd ed., 2013) ...... 43

Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed. (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Canada, 2008) ...... 94,95

Government Publications

Report of the Task Force on the Future of the Canadian Financial Services Sector, Sept. 1998 ...... 64,65,66,67,71,72

PART VII

STATUTES, REGULATIONS, RULES - 44 -

PART VII – Statutes, Regulations, Rules

� � ��������������������������� �������������������������������������� � ������������������� ������� � � ������������������� ������� � � ��������������������������������� ������������������������������������� ���������������������������������� ������������������������������������������� �a����������������������������������� ���������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������ ������������������������������������������� ��������������������������������� ������������������������������������������ �b������������������������������������������ �������������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������� ������������� ������������������������������������������� � � � ����������������������������������������� ����������������������������������������������� � � � � ���������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������� � ������������ ������������������� ���������� ����������� � � ������������� ������������ ������������������������������ ������������������������������ ���������� ������������������������� � � ���������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������������ �������������������������������������������� �������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������� ����������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������ ������������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������� ��������������������������������������������� ����������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������� � ���������������������������������������� � ������������������ � � ���������������������� ���������������������� � � - 45 -

PART VII – Statutes, Regulations, Rules

������������ ������������������ ��������������������������� ������������������������������� ������������ ����������� �������� ������������ � � ��������Payment in general� ��������Du paiement en général� � � ����������������������������������� �������������������������������� ������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������������ ����������������������������������� ��������������������������������������� � � ������������������������������������������ ������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������� ����������������������������������������������� ������������������ ��������������������������� � � ���������������������� ���������������������� ������������ ������������������� ��������������������������� ���������������������� � ������������ � � ������������ ����������� ����������������������� ����������������������� ������������������������ ��������������������� � ������������ � � ��������������������������������������������� �������������������������������������������� ����������������������������������������� ��������������������������������������������� �������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������������� �������������������������������������������� ��������������������������������������������� �������������������������������������������� �������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������ ������������������������������������������� ����������������������������������������� ����������������������������������� ����������������������������� ��������������������������������������������� � ��������� � � ������������������������������������� �������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������� ����������������������������������������������� ��������������������������������������� ����������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������������ ����������������������������������������� �������������������������������� ���������������������������������������������� ��������������������� ���������������� � � ���������������������� ���������������������� � � - 46 -

PART VII – Statutes, Regulations, Rules

����������� �������������������� ������������������������ ������������������������� ������� �������������� � � ������������ ����������� ������������������ ������������������������ � � �������������������������������������������� �������������������������������������������� �������������������������������������������� ����������������������������������������� �������������������������������������� ����������������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������� ������������������������������������� ��������������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������������� ����������������������������������������� ����������������������������������������� ����������������������������������������� ����������������������������������������������� ����������������������������������� ������������������������� �������������������������� � � � ���������������������� ���������������������� � �

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PART VII – Statutes, Regulations, Rules

����������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������ ������������������������������������������ ������������������������������������� ������������������������������������ �������������������������������������������� ��������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������� ��������������������������������������������� ������������������� � � � ����������������������������������������������� ����������������������������������������������� ��������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������������ ���������������������������� ������������������������� � � �������������������������������������� �������������������������������� ������������� ������������������������� � ���������������������������������� ���������������������������������� � � ��������������������������������������� �������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������ ��������������������������������������� ��������������������������������������� �������������������������������������� ��������������������������������������������� ������������������������ ������������������������������������������� � ����������� � � �a��������������������������������������� a��������������������������������������� ��������������������������������������� �������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������� �������������������������������������������� ����������������������������������������� ��������������������������������������������� �������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������� ����������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������������� ��������������������������������������������� ��������������������� ����������������������������� � � � �b������������������������������������������� b������������������������������������������ ������������������������������������������ ������������������������������������ ������������������������������������������ ����������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������ ������������������������������������������ ���������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������� ����������������������������������������������� �������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������� ��������������������������� ������������������������������ � � �������� �������� � � ������������������������������������� ��������������������������������������������� ���������������������������������� �������������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������������� �������������������������������� �������������������� � - 48 -

PART VII – Statutes, Regulations, Rules

� � �������������������������������������� �������������������������������������� ������������ ������������������������������������� � ������������ ����������� ������������ ������������� � � ��������� �������������������� � � �������������������������������� ����������������������������������������� ����������������������������������������� ��������������������������������� �������� ����������������������������� � � ��������� ���������� � � � ���������� ��������������������������������������� ��������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������������� ������������ ����������������������������� � � � �������������������������������������� ������������������������������������� ������������������������������������ ����������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������ ����������������������������������� �������������������������������������� �������������������������������������������� ��������������������������������������������� �������������������������������������� ������������������������������������ ������������������������������������������� ����������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������ ������������������������������������������� ����������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������� �������������������������������������� ������������������������������������� ��������� ���������������������� � � � ���������������������������������������� � ����������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������ ��������������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������� ����������������������������������� ����������������� ����������������������������������������� � ��������������������������������������� � �