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Yale-UN OralOral HistoryHistory

Interview with MikeMike BerlinBerlin

April 15,15, 20020055 New YorYorkk Interviewer: Jameslames SutterliSutterlinn YALE - ORAL HISTORY PROJECPROJECTT MIKE BERLIBERLINN APRIL 15, 20052005,, UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORYORKK INTERVIEWER- JAMES SUTTERLISUTTERLINN

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Aime, JJean-Claude.ean-Claude. . 20

Arafat, Yasser. . 11

Archbishop Makarios III. • 7

Baker, JJames.ames. • 7

Bork, Robert. . 4

Bunche, Ralphe Johnson . 7 Bush, George Herbert Walker (President of the United States of 14, 16 America: 1989-1993). •

.Cordovez, Diego. 3,20

·Cyprus.-Cyprus. • 3,9

De Soto, Alvaro. . • 19,20

Denktash, Rauf. • 3

El Salvador. • 18

Falklands Crisis. • 13 Finger, Max (Fanner(Fonner Ambassador of the United States of America to 1,6, 7 the United Nations). •

Fredrick, Pauline. • 9 Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergevich (President of the leader ofthe Soviet 3 Union: 1985-1991). .

Gromyko, Andrei Andreyevich . 10

Guiliani, Francois. . 11,12,13

Hume,Burne, Cameron. • 6

Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). • 16 Jakobson, Max. .. 2

Jhabvala, Darius. ..

Jonah,Jonah, James.James. .. 55

Kekkonen, Drho.Urho. • 22

Kilometer 101. .. 5

Kissinger, Henry. .. 3,4,5,7,9,20

Koh, TommyTommy.. 77

Lake, Tony. .. 77

Lesiovsky, Victor. .. 22

Malik, Jacob. • 4

Moynihan, Daniel Patrick. .. 9, 10

Nassif,Nassif, Ramses. • 11

Nicaragua. .. 17,17, 1818

Nixon, Richard (President ofthethe United States: 1969-1974) •• 44

Papandreou, Andreas. .. 3

.Pardo, Arvid. • 11 . Perez de Cuellar,Cu611ar, Javier(Secretary-GeneralJavier(Secretary-Genera1 ofthethe United NationsNations:: 3, 11, 12,12, 13, 14,14, 15, 15, 1982-1991). .. 16,16, 17, 18,18, 1919

Powell, Bill. •. 1111 Reagan, RonaldRona1d (President of the United States of America: 19811981­­ 15, 17 1989). .

ROsenstock, Bob. .. 6

Saturday Night Massacre (October 20, 1973). •• 4

Sherry, George. .. 6,206,20

Sonnenfeld, Hal. .. 77

Suez Canal Crisis. .. 5

U Thant, Maha Thray Sithu (Secretary-General ofthethe United NationsNations:: 10 1961-1971).1961-1971). ..

United Nations Emergency Force IIII (U1~E(U1,{EFF II).11). •. 4,5,64,5,6 ." Urquhart, Sir Brian (Former Under-Secretary-GeneralUnder-Secretary-Genera1 ofofthe the United 4,5,6,4, 5,6, 13,2013, 20 Nations). ..

Vance, Cyrus. . 7

Waldheim, Kurt(Secretary-GeneraloftheKurt(Secretary-General of the United Nations: 1972-1981) 2,4,8,10,112,4,8, 10,11 Yitzhak, Shamir (Former Prime Minister ofIsrael).oflsrael). . 10 YaLe-UnitedYale-United Nations Oral HistorHistoryy InterviewInterview with Mike BerliBerlinn April 15, 20020055 United Nations, New York City, New YorYorkk Interviewer:Interviewer: Jameslames SutterliSutterlinn

James Sutterlin: Thank you very much, Mike, forfor agreeing toto participate inin this project. If II can, I'dI'd likelike toto begin by asking you toto discuss a little bit about how well you were prepared toto taketake over thethe assignment here at thethe United Nations as a correspondent, II believe inin 1967?

Mike : r carnecametoto thethe United Nations on May 3131stst 1967. II was totallytotally unprepared.. ..I I was supposedsupposed toto go out toto Riker's Island, which isis thethe Municipal Prison inin New York City, and do a feature story about thethe first drug program inin a municipal prison, drug treatmenttreatment program. They called me at my home and said don't go there,there, go toto thethe United Nations, our UN man isis sick today.today. So II came toto UN Headquarters not even knowing where thethe men's roomroom was, or unfortunately, not having readread thethe firstfirst 12 pages of thethe New York Times ininthethe preceding couple ofyears because II had focusedfocused on domestic news and was totallytotally unaware thatthat therethere was about toto be a war inin thethe Middle-East.

I ranran intointo 2 people who were absolutely essential toto me inin thosethose firstfirst days, one was DanusDmus IhabvalaJhabvala who was an Indian,Indian, a Parsi and was at thatthat timetime thethe UN Bureau Chief ..for thetheBoston GLobe.Globe. Previously I had known him because he was thethe UN Bureau Chief foi'for thethe New York Herald Tribune, which II worked forfor when he was therethere .. covering thethe UN forfor them.them. He was very kind toto me, he became my mentor at thethe UN and toldtold me what toto looklook forfor~~ what toto ask about, who toto speak with and who all thesethese people were thatthat I should be approaching.

The second person was Max Finger, who was one of thethe American ambassadors, whom II bumped intointo at thethe press releaserelease rackrack thatthat firstfirst day, doing something about definition of aggression, which he was on a committee thatthat was tryingtrying toto negotiate a definition of aggression. He was very kind toto me and would always Looklook out forfor me and when he saw reportersreporters therethere and ask me if!if! understood what was going on. With people Like that,that, therethere were many people of a similar disposition thatthat I encountered here, I was able toto Learnlearn quickly on thethe jobjob and not make tootoo much a fooLfool of myself writing about thethe war thatthat began several days later.later.

JS: Well thilt's precisely what II wanted toto ask next. What were your main reportinreportingg responsibilitiesresponsibilities so toto speakspeak??

ME: Well II came here forfor thethe New York Post, which was thenthen a serious, liberalliberal newspaper with real news inin itit and a very small staff which was very thinlythinly spread. So I became thethe internationalinternational news staff of thethe New York Post. They had no correspondents abroad on staff. They had one person inin Washington who didn't cover State Department or internationalinternational affairs. So fromfrom UN Headquarters II was writing reactionreaction stories about various events thatthat tooktook place abroad, using as my base thethe UN and thethe contacts ii could have throughthrough thethe UN with representativesrepresentatives ofvarious governments

1 involvedinvolved inin thosethose internationalinternational thingsthings thatthat we did not have staff out covering inin thethe field.

JS: And thatthat worked from here inin New York?

MB: ItIt worked toto a degree inin thethe sense thatthat theythey used wire services for breaking news and theythey used me for thethe analytical pieces and thethe background and second day stories about what itit all means and why itit happens, how thethe Americans are going toto react toto this,this, how thethe Russians are going toto react toto this,this, and stories of thatthat kind. So very often thethe Associated Press would have thethe leadlead story and II would have a secondary story on a largelarge internationalinternational event thatthat was takingtaking place.

IS: Had you known about Kurt Waldheim before you came here or anything about him as Secretary-General or was thatthat also tabulatabula rosa?

..MB: II knew him of course because since II came inin '67,'67, he was thethe Austrian ambassador at one point and thenthen Foreign Minister before he became Secretary-General and II covered very intensivelyintensively thethe election campaign for Secretary-General as a reporter here. I remember thethe chief Soviet KGB operative at thethe UN Victor Lesiovsky tellingtelling myself and 2 other journalistsjournalists inin thethe Delegates Lounge, we will never allow a Finnish candidate named Max Jakobson toto become Secretary-General even ifif thethe President of Finland Urho Kekkonen gets down on his knees inin Red Square. He said itit and we all went with that;that; itit was public; itit was quite clear at thatthat point thenthen thatthat Waldheim would be thethe victor.

We ha.d, ~ourtes~ourtesyy of thethe United Nations, a press release with his biography, which said ..thatthat he was injuredinjured on thethe Soviet front early inin thethe war and spent thethe rest of thethe war years as a lawlaw student inin Vienna. We didn't challenge it,it, nobody thoughtthought toto challenge it.it. ItIt was his malleability inin dealing with thethe big powers thatthat was a controversial aspect ofhischaiacter whenWhen he was running for Secretary-General. We all wrote at thethe timetime thatthat thatthat was what endeared him toto thethe big powers.

JS: Even then?then?

MB: Even then,then, even before he tooktook thethe office. We knew, we were told thatthat theythey likedliked him because he would be malleable and not make troubletrouble for them.them.

IS: And did you find thatthat he made himself available toto thethe press fairly early inin his tenure?tenure?

MB: He was available toto thethe press and he was much more available toto me when, starting in1973,in1973, I also became thethe part-time correspondent at thethe United Nations for thethe W~shingtoW~shingtonn Post, and thenthen of course he would seek me out and occasionally ask me toto come upstairs for an exclusive interviewinterview on-the-record. I had no need toto speak with him off-the-record. The problem was inin his press conferences and his interviews,interviews, he seldom produced anything worth writing about. As I said at this conference we attended yesterday, very often I had troubletrouble even writing notes inin my notebook about what he was tellingtelling me, which was justjust thethe most obvious information thatthat was perfectly available and had no insightinsight or exclusivity toto it.it. He was available but not of much use

2 journalistically.joumalistically.

JS: He was involved in a number of the so-called crises that were going on at that time. He did make an effort to bring about, not being the first or the last, a settlement of Cyprus. Was there any particular press briefing or background briefing or anything else done about Cyprus in those years?

MB: In those years if you wanted to find out about Cyprus you would go speak to George Sherry who was the Cyprus man among the peacekeepers. He was, to an extent available, he would sit and have lunch with us in the UNCA Club all the time and talk most entertainingly about his days as an interpreter, which is what he started out here at the United Nations as. To some extent he would tell us about what was going on in Cyprus but not the inside stuff about who messed up, who was at fault except on one occasion I remember, when Perez De Cuellar was the Secretary-General in 1986, they came very close to a deal on Cyprus and he was brutally frank about the fact that the Greek-Cypriots, pressured by the Papandreou government in Athens, had sunk the deal which was in their interest, although perhaps not in Papandreou's interest.

JS: That's interesting, that point because certainly later Perez De Cuellar, as I'm sure you'll tell me in a little while, considered that Denktash was largely to blame for 1986.

MB: George Sherry did not, and he was angry to beat the band about, it and he blamed itit directly on the Cypriots being foolish enough to bow to Greek interests rather than their own.

JS; What about Afghanistan?

MB:ME: Afghanistan ofcourse was much later,bothlater, both in its inception and its resolution. But it was the first item ofofintemationalinternational business on which it became apparent that this man Gorbachev in Moscow was playing things quite differently and had a different strategic approach to regional; bilateral problems that were irritants to American-Soviet relations and it was on Afghanistan that it became clear that the Soviets wanted out. And it was Diego Cordovez, who was a showman ofgreat spirit and a publicity seeker as one of the Under-Secretaries-General for Peacekeeping, Special Political Affairs, who wanted the correspondents to be aWare that he was making this fantastic progress toward an agreement on Afghanistan and ultimately he achieved it. I don't think that it was just because the Soviets and the Americans were ready to deal. He had to create the deal that they would sign on to and I think he did that with great brilliance and tenacity, whatever his other personality quirks.

JS; Yes, and that of course gets us well into the Perez De Cuellar period because Perez De Cuellar was...

ME: But I want to tell you that I was at a conference of American specialists on Afghanistan covering for the Washington Post, when one of the Reagan people got up and said what was the truth ofReagan administration policy towards Afghanistan. That was that the Reagan administration did not want the Soviets out of Afghanistan. It wanted to bleed them and he said publicly, he was taped by Voice ofAmerica, what he shouldn't have said, which in other words he revealed the reality of the Reagan

3 administration's policy, which was thatthat "we won't letlet thethe Soviets out of Afghanistan until theythey bleed first."

JS: There was during Waldheim's tenure,tenure, thethe war inin 1973 inin thethe Middle-East and how was thatthat played out, did Waldheim have a certain rolerole inin that,that, largelylargely ceremonial.

MB: II don't rememberremember Waldheim having any rolerole whatever. II rememberremember thatthat itit was after Kissinger went toto Moscow and negotiated thethe end of thethe war with thethe Russians he came back and was putting itit throughthrough thethe UN Security Council. A problem arose because thethe Egyptian Army was cut off inin thethe Sinai and thethe Russians threatened to send para-troops toto relieverelieve thethe Egyptian Army and landland actually inin thethe Sinai and engage inin part of thethe battle.

The United States respondedresponded and unfortunately thisthis was confused inin history with thethe Saturday Night Massacre inin which President Nixon fired Archibald Cox and Elliot Richardson and others until he got somebody named [Robert] Bark toto taketake over and fire thethe Special Prosecutor. So itit was thethe same night thatthat thethe United States called a red alert about thethe incipientincipient Soviet trooptroop movement toto thethe Middle-East. At thatthat point thethe United Nations intervened,intervened, not at thethe behest of thethe United States, not at thethe behest of thethe Russians, but because somebody saw thatthat therethere was a dreadful disaster looming.looming.

On-the-record at leastleast itit seems thatthat itit was thethe Yugoslav ambassador toto thethe United Nations, who as Chairman of thethe Non-Aligned group at thatthat moment and representativerepresentative on thethe Security Council requested formally thatthat thethe Security Council taketake up a proposal toto interPoseinterPose a new UNEF between thethe Egyptians and thethe IsraelisIsraelis and forcibly create a capacitytoto relieverelievethethe Egyptian army trappedtrapped inin Sinai. That was put toto thethe Russians and thethe Americans on thethe night ofthethe Saturday Night Massacre and finally Jacob Malik, thethe Russian Ambassador, came back with acceptance fromfrom Moscow and thethe Americans letlet out a big sigh ofreliefrelief because theythey could accept that.that. ItIt was fromfrom thatthat point on, on-the­ recordrecord at least,least, thatthat Brian UrquhartUrqo:hart and his peacekeeping teamteam tooktook thethe ball and within 24 hours had units fromfrom Cyprus air-lifted toto become thethe first operative elements of UNEF II.n.

So II didn't ever feelfeel thatthat itit was Kurt Waldheim, himself, who had any rolerole inin thatthat operation, thatthat itit was a diplomat who proposed itit and thethe peacekeeping specialists who carried itit out.

JS: Right, but therethere was a rolerole forfor thethe Security Council and II believe thatthat therethere was at one point thatthat Kissinger had arranged thatthat therethere should be a Geneva conference toto reachreach a final signed agreement and Waldheim was supposed toto Chair that,that, which he did but therethere was no conference.

MB: There was a firstfirst session ofit,it, II attended thethe firstfirst session. ItItwas inin Geneva.

JS: But nothing happened there.there.

ME: The Syrians did not show up, but you did have thethe Egyptians and thethe Jordanians, not thethe Lebanese, theythey were not involved,involved, sitting down with thethe Israelis around thethe

4 same table and you did have a mechanism agreed uponupon forfor futurefuture negotiations,negotiations, andand thatthat mechanism was never used.

JS: It was never used.

MB: But what happened afterwards was thatthat thethe UNEFUNEF IIII representatives,representatives, thethe GeneralGeneral of UNEF II started meeting with thethe General ofof thethe EgyptianEgyptian ArmyArmy andand thethe GeneralGeneral ofof the Israeli Anny at Kilometer 101. James Jonah,Jonah, oneone ofofBrian's Brian's peacekeepingpeacekeeping deputies,deputies, was sitting there with themthem and theythey came very closeclose toto reachingreaching anan agreementagreement byby which the 2 armies would be pennanently disengaged andand therethere wouldwould bebe atat thethe SuezSuez Canal, they would both mutually draw back fTomfTom thethe SuezSuez CanalCanal andand thethe EgyptiansEgyptians who were still at the Sinai, although theythey were beingbeing equippedequipped byby thethe UNEFUNEF II,II, wouldwould be withdrawn over the Suez Canal and thisthis disengagement waswas veryvery closeclose toto finalization when Henry Kissinger steppedstepped inin andand pre-emptedpre-empted bothboth thethe GenevaGeneva Conference mechanism and thethe UN Ad-Hoc Negotiating mechanismmechanism atat KilometerKilometer 101101 by flying between Cairo and Jerusalem, actually AswanAswan andand JerusalemJerusalem becausebecause thethe President of Egypt was thenthen at Aswan and II waswas therethere withwith KissingerKissinger onon thatthat trip.trip.

The United Nations officials always feltfelt thatthat theythey couldcould havehave achievedachieved thethe samesame results,results, not in Syria but in Egypt without Kissinger. But hehe wantedwanted toto dodo itit soso thatthat hehe couldcould embark at that stage, after having ignoredignored thethe Middle-EastMiddle-East forfor thethe firstfirst 55 yearsyears ofofhishis tenn as National Security Advisor and Secretary ofofState,State, hehe couldcould 'embark'embark onon thethe Middle-East peace process thatthat he did embark on.on. AndAnd byby doingdoing itit unilaterallyunilaterally ratherrather than through Geneva, he made thethe Geneva mechanism,mechariism, whichwhich hadhad beenbeen setset upup byby thethe , Security Council resolution, moot -- useless -- andand thereforetherefore itit becamebecame anan AmericanAmerican operation, rath~thanaUniterath~thanaUnitedd Nations operation oror aa Soviet-AmericanSoviet-American operation.operation.

JS; And naturally Waldheim had no role.role.

ME: And Waldheim as a result ofthatthat had no role.role. OneOne doesn't,doesn't, sittingsitting atat thethe UnitedUnited Nations, look at Waldheim's role per se,se, one lookslooks atat Jonah'sJonah's rolerole oror Urquhart'sUrquhart's rolerole and to the degree that theythey needed support fromfrom thethe Secretary-GeneralSecretary-General toto bebe forcefulforceful inin enforcing the demands for what theythey needed. II amam suresure thatthat hehe was,was, youyou know,know, absolutely essential.

JS: But that's an important point you've made therethere becausebecause thatthat waswas II thinkthink emblematic ofthe Waldheim period. As we werewere justjust mentioning,mentioning, JJamesames JonahJonah prettypretty much independently, as II understand it,it, worked outout withwith thethe agreementagreement withwith thethe Syrians.

ME: That's correct

JS; And he I am sure he was accessible toto thethe press.press.

MB: Well he was~'was~'tt accessible toto thethe press whenwhen hehe waswas onon KilometerKilometer 101.101.

JS:1S: Well no.

MB: Except in a desul~ordesul~oryy way because he wanted toto leaveleave itit forfor thethe EgyptianEgyptian andand

55 Israeli generals toto make thethe running.running. But whenwhen hehe waswas atat headquartersheadquarters ofof coursecourse hehe waswas accessible to the press.

JS: Yeah.

MB: And I must admit one does need thethe Secretary-GeneralSecretary-General andand thethe Secretary-GeneralSecretary-General must go out ofhis way toto imposeimpose demands onon thethe membermember states,states, toto actuallyactually staffstaff upup the contingent necessary toto make UNEF IIII workwork onon aa permanentpermanent basisbasis ratherrather thanthan justjust on a temporary basis with troopstroops stolen fromfrom Cyprus,Cyprus, whichwhich isis howhow itit began.began.

JS: Yes in the sense thatthat the Secretary-General hashas toto personallypersonally almostalmost gogo toto ......

MB: Browbeat the Canadians and thethe Swedes andand whoeverwhoever itit waswas toto provideprovide thethe troopstroops necessary.

JS: Even though inin thesethese days itit isis my impressionimpression thatthat BrianBrian UrquhartUrquhart diddid aa lotlot ofofthatthat also right?

MB: Yes there were some delegations which wouldwould bebe moremore thanthan willingwilling toto dodo thatthat because they recognized how close thethe world hashas comecome toto disasterdisaster andand thatthat howhow necessary that that operation was. Other delegations neededneeded thethe Secretary-General'sSecretary-General's intervention.

JS: What would you say were your principal sourcessources availableavailable inin thethe UnitedUnited NationsNations inin the Waldheim period?

MB: By the time of thethe Waldheim period andand thethe time.time. shortlyshortly afterafter hehe began,began, whenwhen II started working for thethe Washington Post, sourcessources wouldwould comecome toto me.me. PeoplePeople wouldwould saysay please my Foreign Minister isis visiting thethe UnitedUnited NationsNations HeadquartersHeadquarters cancan youyou dodo anan interview with him and put itit inin thethe Washington Post.Post. ButBut byby thatthat timetime II hadhad alsoalso developed my own sources and theythey were alwaysalways thethe juniors;juniors; theythey werewere thethe juniorsjuniors ofof the US Mission, not thethe ambassadors, except II includeinclude MaxMax FingerFinger inin there,there, whowho waswas the 4th ranking ambassador. But itit was thethe LegalLegal Counsel,Counsel, BobBob Rosenstock,Rosenstock, andand thethe Middle East specialist whoever itit was, thethe Iran-IraqIran-Iraq specialistspecialist therethere atat oneone pointpoint waswas just fantastic. I once tradedtraded him forfor thethe IranianIranian Ambassador,Ambassador, therethere waswas aa LebaneseLebanese Shiite journalist who wanted very much, I'mI'm tryingtrying toto rememberremember hishis name,name, dodo youyou remember it?

JS:No.

MB: Cameron Hurne.Hume. I tradedtraded Cameron BurneHume forfor thethe IranianIranian Ambassador,Ambassador, aa LebaneseLebanese Journalist wanted access toto Cameron BurneHume andand II wantedwanted accessaccess toto thethe IranianIranian .Ambassador and II got him access toto Cameron BunieHunie byby promisingpromising toto HurneHume thatthat thisthis guy was ~ reliable trustworthytrustworthy person and hehe diddid thethe samesame forfor meme andand II waswas thethe onlyonly American Jourrialist who had access directly toto thethe IranianIranian MissionMission atat aa timetime whenwhen thethe Iran-Iraq War was going on. And that'sthat's thethe kindkind ofofsourcingsOUTcing oneone had.had. ButBut itit waswas thethe juniors who were the best. ItIt was thethe Canadian specialistspecialist onon HumanHuman RightsRights inin thethe 3rd3rd Committee who was thethe appropriate source,source, thethe CanadianCanadian AmbassadorAmbassador waswas notnot asas knowledgeable. It was James Jonah and George SherrySherry eveneven moremore thanthan BrianBrian UrquhartUrquhart

66 really,reaUy, although II was a foolfool not toto have used Brian because laterlater II leamedleamed when he came toto me thatthat he was available all thisthis time,time, although Ralph Bunche had not been, which was why II never even tried.tried. So Ralph Bunche, of course, Brian's predecessor, was very inaccessibleinaccessible toto media as farfar as being a source. He would converse very genially with you but never provide information.information.

IS: He was very punctilious about that II believe.

MB: And similarly inin other delegations my experience was thatthat unlike Washington where a reallyreally good Secretary of State ---- Henry Kissinger, James Baker, Colin Powell ­ -- could control thethe flowflow of informationinformation so thatthat only he and his immediateimmediate aides knew what was really going on and thereforetherefore journalistsjournalists depended on him. If you wanted to speak toto Hal Sonnenfeld he would have toto give thethe green lightlight toto Hal Sonnenfeld toto speak toto you and you knew thatthat what Sonnenfeld was saying was going toto be coming fromfrom thethe Kissinger perspective, or Tony Lake at thethe same year.

But at thethe United Nations thatthat did not happen, nobody controlled thethe flow of information.infonnation. There were 150 delegations ofwhich at leastleast half-a dozen on every conceivable topictopic were well informedinformed and motivated toto whisper inin your ear and blow whatever itit was out ofthe water. And so your sources were infiniteinfinite and thethe intelligentintelligent members of thethe US Mission or thethe UN Secretariat would recognize this"realitythis"reality and -would speak with you as well because theythey wanted toto get theirtheir perspective across. So people likelike thethe Ambassador of Singapore, by thethe way, Tommy Koh, who was thenthen thethe --Ambassador--Ambassador of Singapore, always felt thatthat the United Nations grea,test contribution toto world peace illill itsits history-was not thethe Cuban Missile Crisis but was 1973 and --preventirigtheSoVietAnierican confrontation inin Sinai.

JS: InIn thatthat connection, did you fromfrom thesethese various sources get much informationinformation thatthat "- " " you couldn't use because ofitsits classification and because ititwas offthethe recordsrecords and so forth. ­-

MB: I had a very bad experience when II was very young with Max Finger again on thethe night thatthat Cyrus Vance was flyingflying between Athens and Ankara tryingtrying toto get an agreement forfor thethe Turks toto forbearforbear fromfrom invadinginvading Cyprus despite thethe factfact thatthat thethe Greek Junta, thethe colonels, has caused a coup toto be staged inin Cyprus dispensing with thethe Government ofArchbishop Makarios. "

JS: Right.

MB: And thethe Security Council was meeting latelate intointo thethe night, past midnight, toto trytry toto provide thethe languagelanguage thatthat <;yrus Vans would ask itit toto provide, which would formform thethe basis upon which thethe Greek and Turkish Governments would acquiesce toto thethe United Nations Security Council and say ok we will not go toto war. And at one point II asked Max Finger why are we waiting around thisthis longlong and he said II will telltell you on condition thatthat itit isis off- the-re<:ordthe-re<:ord and thatthat you don't ask anybody else about itit and you don't use, no matter who else tellstells you about it,it, whatever II am about to telltell you. And II said ok and he said Cyrus Vance has failed,failed, he isis flyingflying home from Ankara tonight,tonight, tomorrowtomorrow moming thethe Turks will invadeinvade Cyprus. II triedtried toto weasel out of itit but II couldn't inin all conscience without losinglosing my reputationreputation and my honor so II didn't write thethe story

7 although II was thethe only one who had it.it. And ever since thenthen II learnedlearned my lessonlesson never toto accept infonuationinfonuation reallyreally off-the-record. When somebody says, and theythey still do, II will telltell you something off-the-record, II say you mean on background which means, inin journalisticjournalistic tenus,tenus, thatthat you can use thethe information,information, you can use thethe quotations, you justjust can't make your audience aware of who said it.it. You can say itit was a West European source, you can say itit was a British diplomat, perhaps, but not toto thethe extent of losinglosing thethe deniability of thethe source.

JS: And so you reallyreally didn't seek thatthat kind ofinfonnation.

MB: II never sought thatthat infonnationinfonnation and ifif ever II had information thatthat was damaging toto somebody II [gap][gap] inin thethe factfact thatthat II was about toto revealreveal it.it.

JS: Yeah. The Secretary-General toto a celiain extent gives thethe character of thethe UniteUnitedd Nations itselfitself because he representsrepresents itit inin so many waysways..

MB: Yes.

JS: What was your assessment ofWaldheim's success or failurefailure inin thisthis respect?respect? How did he inin thethe eyes of thethe press corps inin particular, what imageimage did he cOllveyconvey of thisthis organization?

MB:He conveyed thethe imageimage of a postman, inin which people would provide him with .. theirtheir positions and he would relayrelay thosethose positions as requestedrequested toto thethe people with whom thethe providers would have difficulty being inin contact. Therefore he was a central bank of infonnatioIl,infonnatioIl, which governments respectedrespected and appreciated and made great use of. II don't thinkthink he ever initiatedinitiated great policies thatthat would either serve world peace or serve thethe UN as an institution.institution. Buthe was a caretaker arid itit was quite clear he worked very hard and he always talkedtalked about doing his duty, and by gosh he reallyreally did his duty as he saw it.it. II thinkthink he was conscientious about that.that.

JS: So inin effect you are saying that he reallyreally did not convey a negative impressionimpression ooff thethe Organization. The Organization was fairlyfairly well regardedregarded inin thosethose days, rightright??

MB: ItIt was an organization of governments and he didn't challenge thatthat inin thethe least,least, and toto thethe extent thatthat thatthat was regardedregarded highly by outsiders thanthan itit was well rewarded.rewarded. ItIt was also an era, however, inin which at leastleast thethe General Assembly and toto some extent thethe United Nations Secretariat was takentaken captive by a militant Thitd World. That damaged thethe reputationreputation of thethe General Assembly and ofthethe Secretariat, and toto thethe extent thatthat Kurt Waldheim, always thethe servant ofgovernments, reflectedreflected that,that, itit damaged his reputationreputation as well.

JS: Then II believe thatthat itit resultedresulted inin a substantial increaseincrease inin thethe size ofthe Secretariat at thatthat time.time.

MB: So thatthat theythey could write all thesethese reportsreports about thethe New InternationalInternational EconomiEconomicc OrderOrder..

JS: Right. What was thethe quality of thethe Journalists who were here inin thatthat era, inin thethe

8 Waldheim years?

MB: When II came here inin 1967, thethe quality of thethe joumalistsjoumalists was still extremely high; not justjust thethe American but thethe correspondent forfor Le Monde, correspondents forfor thethe British papers and thethe BBC, who were actually prominent people inin thethe journalismjournalism fieldfield inin theirtheir countries and internationally.internationally. People likelike Pauline Fredrick ofofNBCNBC was Bureau Chief here, somebody who was thethe firstfirst woman toto be a political correspondent forfor a major American network. That began toto erode not because of thethe Cold War II suspect, because itit had been going on longer,longer, before II got here, but because a) thethe Russians and Americans started doing business together.together. They weren'tat each other as much except on certain specific issuesissues where therethere was no common ground, b) thethe Third World tooktook over not only thethe General Assembly but thethe agenda of thethe UN Security Council, and thethe UN Security Council became a place where you couldn't do business on thethe Middle East, you couldn't do business on Southern Africa, you could still do business on Cyprus and new topicstopics were not being brought toto thethe Security Council after thethe NonNon~~ Proliferation Treaty inin 1970. So therethere wasn't as much toto cover as farfar as political news as opposed toto economic issues.issues.

Certainly when Kissinger came toto thethe United Nations toto negotiate a deal with thethe Third World about defining some languagelanguage with respectrespect toto thethe New InternationalInternational Economic Order thatthat was heavily covered because Kissinger was here. But thenthen when he leftleft thethe furtherfurther promulgation of Third World opinion was not [covered].[covered]. The epitome of thatthat unrealistic era was when Zionism was defined as racismracism and itit became impossibleimpossible for any discussions on thethe Middle East toto be takentaken at thethe UN. Not evetithe fivefive Pennanent Members would talktalk about it.it. In an earlier era, "the fivefive Pernianent Members would sit down togethertogether and negotiate thethe termsterms ofa treatytreaty between IsraelIsrael and Jordan at thethe United Nations. That treatytreatydid not come intointo fruitionfruitibnbutbut ititwas thethe state ofplay on thethe Middle East at thethe time.time. The state ofplay on thethe Middle East moved outside thetheUnited Nations; thethe state of play on Southern Africa moved outside thethe United Nations. These elite journalistsjournalists disappeared and theythey were replacedreplaced by journalistsjournalists who were covering thingsthings thatthat American audiences, audiences and probably even French audiences didn't care much about, which was thethe fulminationsfulminations of thethe radicalradical elements within thethe Third World not thethe entire Third World.

IS:IS: How did you understand thethe background of Zionism as racismracism resolution?resolution?

MB: Well of course itit was a great American political issueissue because thethe American "Ambassador, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, made itit one, both before itit was adopted. He heralded the dire threat thatthat itit posed and because he made great capital out of itit and won himself a senate seat possibly on thatthat basis although he was such a reallyreally isis a popular guy he would have won itit anyhow. But he used itit forfor thatthat purpose among other things.things. So that'sthat's thethe way thethe press lookedlooked at it.it. As far as impactimpact on IsraelIsrael and thethe politics of Middle East, it had no impactimpact whatsoever.

IS:IS: ItIt had political impactimpact on thisthis country though.though.

MB: ItIt had political impactimpact about outrage against thethe United Nations and against thethe

9 radical Arab attitude.

IS: But I was thinking about the origin of the resolution. Was anything known abouaboutt who dreamed it up, who was pushing itit??

MB: At the time, it was the Palestinians and the Syrians who dreamed it up and the Russians who were pushing and their friends in the Third World. I don't know if it was in any way useful to them except that it made the Arabs more beholden to the than they might otherwise have been for what that was worth, which wasn't much. Is there something I have missed?

JS: I don't actually know.

MB: That was the assumption at that time. It wasn't a Soviet idea but they picked it up and ran with it with relish for that reason.

JS: And that was during the period oftheir bad relations with Israel. But you know Gromyko, whenever he made the statement on anything relating to the Middle East, would say that he was the one who cast the initial vote for the establishnlent of the State of Israel. •

MB: And the Russians were the first one, who came close to being the first one. ttoo recognize it as a sovereign countrycountry..

JS: Almost before Truman beat them at it. It is perfectly true that the Russians were out ."inin front and the United States held back.

. ME: The 1967 war was the turning point. That's when they broke relations. that's when there was no conversation between the Israelis and the Soviet diplomats even at the United Nations until long after Gromyko left. They held talks in the Indonesian Lounge. Prime Minister Shamir I think it was -­--

JS: That was his name, yes.

MB: held talks in the United Nations Indonesian Lounge, because that was the onlonlyy place he could make contact to re-establish relations between Israel and the SovietsSoviets..

JS: A final question about Waldheim and his period is the one we discussed yesterday really, and that is OPr.OPL Was DPI in any way useful in those days to the journalist core or did you have any impression ofWaldheim utilizing DPI for a contact with the broader media community?

MB: When I first came to the United Nations under U Thant, DPI was much more central to me because I didn't really know these contacts. In that era there were still news stories being written about the meetings of the United Nations committees. In a later era, let's say when Ambassador Moynihan was the American Ambassador, he had to draw the attention of journalists to the actions of UN committees that he didn't like because journalists no longer covered those United Nations committees, with the occasional exception ofthe

10la Human Rights Committee of the General Assembly or the Disannament Affairs, Political Committee of the General Assembly, there wasn't much news in what was being discussed. Occasionally somebody would give a speech that was newsworthy, in the same year Arvid Pardo of gave a speech about the Law of the Sea. That was a very newsworthy speech and that started off an international negotiation or multilateral negotiation. That had overwhelming consequences that were very political. So that speech itself was a newsworthy event delivered in the General Assembly.

JS: And it was picked up?

MB: It was picked up. Immediately everybody paid attention. Even a Maltese Ambassador's speech was something that people noticed. Of course he didn't have the mechanism to advertise it to the news media very widely. But in future years, during Waldheim's years, during the, once the General Assembly voted to expel South Africa, by and large after that there wasn't much that the General Assembly did that was newsworthy. That was the same year of course that Yasser Arafat made his first very militant appearance at the UN General Assembly, and that was very newsworthy. After that the General Assembly, its activities were no longer perceived in the West as newsworthy, not just by Americans but also by other western correspondents.

So, the DPI was absolutely essential in covering all these meetings that were happening' simultaneously so that in the years when those meetings were newsworthy, journalists would have a first alert that something was happening in some corrunittee. And the way ..it..it would be done was sometimes just through the press releases that were put out, but more oftenthrough the DPI staffers who wrote the press releas~sreleas~s.. Before they wrote the 'pres's'pres's releases would go up to the press floor and say to journalists, keep an eye on the thing I am,abolit to write that's happened inin the 4th Committee or the 2nd Committee or the'3rd Committee, because there is some hot stuffthere.

In that senseDPI was useful in the sense oflettingjoumalists know what the Secretary­ General's attitude was about things. DPI was sometimes useful when it was really very important. In that era, Ramses Nassif and amBjU Powell would sometimes whisper inin the ears ofjournalists that the Secretary-Generaltakes this position, the United Nations is about to announce this. So DPI was a conduit, an essential conduit both in its printed material and in its personnel. DPI staff was more attuned to working with journalists and understanding whatjoumalistsneeded to know. So if the DPI staff was sitting in on a meeting in the Secretariat with delegations that would be a good source to go to because they would know what's journalistically significant that happened at that meeting.

JS: And they were willing to alert you?

MB: And they were more willing to talk to the news media than some in the Secretariat. Otherwise, one developed sources in the Secretariat and in the delegations and, of course, the Delegations were eager to alert you to certain things that were in their interest.

JS: Alright, now I want to move on to Perez De Cuellar era and I want to start not with Perez De Cuellar but actually with the Spokesman, Giuliani was a new

11 force, Ir think. How would you describe the change?

MB: Well Ir knew Francois Giuliani when he was a junior reporter for Reuters, and we were friends. We would socialize together -- Ir mean at United Nations diplomatic receptions and other parties. So we had a long personal relationship, and Ir think most people who were long time in the press corps had the same relationship with Francois, he is a very congenial person. As a spokesman he didn't suffer fools gladly. Ir wasn't a fool,fool, it didn't bother me. And even ifI was a fool, he would have suffered me because of long term friendship. But there were people in the press corps who shouldn't have been in the press corps who would ask questions because it kept them from falling to sleep since they had nothing else to do. They weren't real journalists. Those people he did not suffer gladly and he alienated very many of those.

JS: But did you have the impression that he actually did represent the Secretary-General in the sense that it was known that he was very close to the Secretary-General?

MB: It was assumed he was fairly close to the Secretary-General, that he knew what the Secretary-General's attitude was about things and that he would steer you in the correct direction. I remember one story he steered me to wasn't quite the correct direction, he said we are negotiating with the Beatles about a reunion for Sahel Relief, and it became a worldwide sensation. They were in fact negotiating for a Beatles reunion on behalf of the United Nations fundraiser, it just never happened.

JS: The Beach Boys instead.instead.

.MB: But those kinds of things he did know and he was willing to share some information.

Side- B

MB: I think one ofthe reasons that the news media had great respect for Perez de Cuellar was because of Francois Giuliani because Perez de Cuellar really didn't interactinteract directly with the news media in any effective way. So you have toto credit his Spokesman for conveying that image of him which was very positive.

JS: That brings me to the next question. Was therethere a change inin atmosphere inin thethe UN as you perceived it with the change of Secretary-General? If so, I am sure thethe Spokesman has something to do with it,it, but I mean did itit permeate very quickly thatthat Perez de Cuellar was a different type?

MB: Everybody here thoughtthought Waldheim was a littlelittle bit of a joke,joke, nobody thoughtthought thatthat he was a Nazi. I must say thatthat thethe quality ofthe UN press corps, myself included,included, should be judged inin part by thethe fact thatthat inin 10 years when he was thethe Secretary-General nobody even questioned his war record, much lessless thethe details of it.it. So much for thethe press corps at thethe United Nations, includingincluding myself. But Perez de Cuellar was different, he was fresh air; he was somebody who was serious, he had, we thought,thought, great ideas,ideas, although I am toldtold thatthat he didn't have thatthat many great ideasideas thatthat he justjust was a good diplomat But yes, people thoughtthought thatthat therethere was going toto be a second coming ofthe United Nations under Perez de Cuellar and especially when early inin his firstfirst termterm he

12 ~~'_ll:illl_'ll.l\!_' _

startedstarted withwith thethe FalklandsFalklands Crisis,Crisis, andand forfor thosethose ofof usus whowho werewere here oror whowho werewere sentsent herehere toto covercover itit likelike CNN,CNN, peoplepeople fromfrom CNN,CNN, theythey hadhad greatgreat respectrespect forfor thethe wayway hehe waswas dealingdealing withwith it.it. AndAnd partpart ofof thatthat isis FrancoisFrancois andand partpart ofof thatthat isis PerezPerez dede Cuellar,Cuellar, himselfhimself whowho grudginglygrudgingly perhaps,perhaps, II don'tdon't know,know, butbut effectivelyeffectively learnedlearned howhow toto copecope withwith andand satisfysatisfy thethe needsneeds ofof thethe presspress onon oneone ofof the,the, youyou know,know, thethe crucial,crucial, Iraq-typeIraq-type storiesstories ofof itsits era.era.

IS:IS: HeHe enjoyedenjoyed itit actually.actually. II thinkthink itit waswas hishis finestfinest hourhour becausebecause thethe realreal diplomatdiplomat waswas active.active.

MB:MB: RightRight andand hehe hadhad finallyfinally somethingsomething toto chewchew on.on.

IS:IS: InIn thethe mediation.mediation. OneOne ofofhishis greatgreat qualitiesqualities waswas hishis capacitycapacity toto gaingain people'speople's trusttrust andand hehe couldcould dodo that.that.

MB:MB: PartPart ofof thatthat waswas thethe presspress corps,corps, becausebecause nobodynobody everever waswas disillusioneddisillusioned byby himhim oror feltfelt thatthat hehe waswas falsefalse oror thatthat hehe waswas misleadingmisleading oror thatthat hehe waswas inimicalinimical toto thethe organization.organization.

IS:IS: ThingsThings diddid notnot happenhappen veryvery muchmuch inin thethe firstfirst 55 yearsyears ofofhishis tenure.tenure. HeHe mademade aa fewfew changeschanges thoughthough andand II don'tdon't knowknow whetherwhether theythey seepedseeped throughthrough oror notnot butbut oneone majormajor changechange inin UnitedUnited NationsNations termsterms was,was, asas youyou knowknow majormajor responsibilityresponsibility ofofthethe Secretary­Secretary­ GeneralGeneral isis toto submitsubmit anan annualannual reportreport toto thethe GeneralGeneral Assembly,Assembly, whichwhich isis supposedsupposed toto summarizesummarize everythingeverything thatthat isis important.important. HeHe insistedinsisted thatthat thatthat bebe cutcut downdown toto aa fewfew pagespages because.because. hehe thoughtthought thatthat itit waswas unreadable andand waswas totallytotally dull,dull, etcetc etc.etc. AndAnd thatthat ,was,was doneimddoneimd actuallyactually BrianBrim UrquhartUtquhart tooktook ordersorders andand wrotewrote acl differentdifferent kindkind ofofreport,report, aVerya Very goodgood one.one. II wonderedwondered ififthisthis aspectaspect ofofPerezPerez dede CuellarCuellar gotgot throughthrough atat all?all?

ME:MB: ItIt gotgot throughthrough onlyonly toto thethe extentextent thatthat thethe newnew reportreport waswas basicallybasically anan essayessay ratherrather thanthan aa tourtour d'horizon.d'horizon.

JS:JS: Exactly.Exactly.

ME:MB: AndAnd itit becamebecame aa newsnews storystory becausebecause hehe waswas expressingexpressing anan opinionopinion aboutabout thethe statestate ofof thethe crucialcrucial eventsevents ofof thethe day.day. ..

IS:IS: ThatThat isis right.right.

MB:MB: AndAnd soso onlyonly toto thethe extentextent thatthat itit waswas oneone moremore newsnews storystory thatthat wewe didn'tdidn't usedused toto havehave andand thatthat itit waswas pungentpungent andand anan attentionattention grabbergrabber waswas itit appreciated.appreciated. II don'tdon't thinkthink thatthat itit waswas appreciatedappreciated inin anan institutionalinstitutional formform byby journalistsjournalists andand II havehave nono ideaidea howhow MissionsMissions feltfelt aboutabout it.it.

IS:JS: SoSo let'slet's gogo onon becausebecause hehe likedliked toto skipskip overover thethe firstfirst fivefive yearsyears prettypretty much.much.

ME:ME: NoNo butbut ififtherethere isis anythinganything inin particularparticular anyany eventevent

JS:JS: WellWell therethere reallyreally wasn't.wasn't. TheThe mainmain problemproblem forfor thatthat beganbegan toto arrivearrive waswas thethe

1313 financial problem, which was tremendous bother to him I mean he was very unhappunhappyy with thisthis..

MB: The financial problem was a big story in American media and of course for . European media it was a big ha ha, the crazy Americans are doing foolish things again story. So it was a story. But it wasn't so much Perez De Cuellar, he wasn't seen as a big player in this but as an unwilling victim, who would raise his eyes to the ceiling and say "what can one expect me to do about this?" The story was carried I think by the friends of the United Nations in Congress and the United Nations Association and by the financial Under-Secretary, who I think a Finnish...

JS: Martti Ahtissaari.

MB: Martti Ahtissaari, who later became the President of Finland. And MarUiMartti Ahtasaari was eminently available to the news media; one didn't have to go to the Secretary-General's office. He was available to the news media, he was frank and he was blunt about the legitimacy of the UN position on these things and the willingness to go as far as he had to go in order to satisfy those idiots in Washington. I'm not calling them idiots, but that was quite clear, his view point. So I think the coverage from the UN was accessible and most ofit was a Washington story.

JS: Although in fact, Perez De Cuellar had to intervene personally,personally, which he did not like to do, but he did.did.

MB: OJ1.e got the impression, not that he did, but rather that he did not like to.

is:Well that's interesting, that's an interesting point, because actually he spoke directly to Reagan about it several times and ...

MB: Well I know, we all wrote about the fact that he visited Washington and met with Reagan, but wl1at went on insideinside those conversations never emerged in UN press access and, ofcourse, for White House press access, they didn't care.

JS: There is one other aspect of this period. A lot depends on the relationship between the Secretary-General and the Secretary of State in Washington. Did thepress have any impression at all of the degree to which Secretary-General Perez De Cuellar was respected in Washington or paid any attention to?

MB: I don't know ifit got through that he was respected in Washington specially. We were inin an era when the American Ambassador was not very friendly to United Nations. I don't think that the US mission to the United Nations conveyed a great deal of respect for Perez De Cuellar, except obviously he was their candidate and he did serve 2 terms.terms. So they had to be satisfied with him but their disrespect for the institution was palpable.

IS: Right, George Bush senior was a factor there; he and Perez De Cuellar had beenbeen friends, so itit did come through,through, actually.actually.

ME: ItIt did, but as Vice President he did not interveneintervene publicly at all on behalfofthe·

14 United Nations and toto thethe extent he might have intervenedintervened inin thethe counsels of thethe innerinner circles of thethe Reagan White House, thatthat was invisible.invisible. ItIt was known thatthat he and Perez De Cuellar were friends,friends, he made itit known, Bush made itit known thatthat he and Perez De Cuellar had been close when he servedserved at UN Headquarters.

JS:JS: As you saysay thisthis was a period when thethe Third World became extremely importantimportant inin UN tenus;tenus; Perez De Cuellar considered himself toto be a person of thethe Third World. Did you have thethe impressionimpression thatthat he was especially active or interestedinterested inin African issues,issues, inin faminefamine and thingsthings likelike that?that?

MB: No, he was not perceived by journalistsjournalists as a person of thethe Third World. He was more European thanthan thethe Europeans toto somesome extent, inin his persona, inin his cultural tastes.tastes. Everybody knew thatthat he listenedlistened toto classical music because he would talktalk about it.it. And everybody thoughtthought of him as more Spanish thanthan Peruvian.

JS:JS: Which isis true.true.

MB: And therethere was no common ground between him and you know thethe Algerians and thethe militants inin thethe Third World and therethere hadn't been between thethe Peruvian Government and thosethose elements when he was ambassador......

JS:JS: Let me move justjust a minute fromfrom Perez De Cuellar, therethere was inin thatthat period a Director General inin thethe Secretariat, he was thethe secondsecond rankingranking person and was responsibleresponsible forfor economic policy. Did thatthat have any impactimpact or was anybody aware ofthethe ·official'-·official'- he was French at thethe time-ittime-it was thethe seniorsenior 'French'French position.

':MB:'ME: Who was thatthat again?

is:1S: I am tryingtrying toto rememberremember and thethe factfact thatthat you've forgottenforgotten itit and soso have I iiss indicativeindicative but I mean...... [The[The name was JeanJean Riper.Riper.]]

MB: I don't recognizerecognize thatthat as being thethe fountfount ofnews stories.stories. Perhaps itit shouldshould have been. I don't rememberremember what happened at all with respectrespect toto thethe United Nations and thethe economic realm.realm.

JS:JS: ItIt was a resultresult of one of thethe earlier reformreform movements when itit was decided thatthat therethere shouldshould be a more seniorsenior person who would be responsibleresponsible forfor coordination of ......

MB: Economic issues.issues.

JS:JS: Of economic issues.issues.

MB: Yes, but sincesince therethere weren't any itit didn't matter. I mean journalistically,journalistica11y, I'I'mm talkingtalking about it,it, as farfar as news valuevalue..

JS:IS: As a matter offaet,offact, he didn't have any impactimpact insideinside either. But I was wonderinwonderingg thethe intentintent was toto give thethe UN a higher profileprofile..

MB: I rememberremember going upstairs and speakingspeaking with thethe guy at one point and findingfinding thatthat

15 he was very vague and ineffective and what he talked about was ephemeral. What he talked about as important things were not important journalisticallyjoumalistically and I basically subconsciously said you know that's the end of that.

JS: Ok let's go ahead to some of the more interesting political questions; certainly that's the way Perez De Cuellar viewed it. Starting with the Iran-Iraq War, the previous Secretary-General had not been able to do anything with regard to the Iran-Iraq War; it had gone on for almost 8 years I think. Was it perceived that Perez De Cuellar did, in fact, take any important initiative in that respect and carried out some rather extensive and complex negotiations?

MB: Yes, Perez De Cuellar was seen as the only game in town with respect to the Iran­ Iraq War, because the Security Council was polluted and the big powers were the reason that the Security Council was polluted because they all sided with Iraq. That left globally not just United Nations but globally only the Secretary-General as the mutual interlocutor. It was always perceived that the degree to which he could divorce himself from the Security Council and its resolutions, past resolutions was the degree to which he could be listened to by the Iranians. So he traveledtrave1ed to Iran and Iraq several times and all those trips were seen as the height of the public awareness that something might possibly be done to end the war.

As it turned out what ended the war was, the Americans shot down an Iranian civilian airliner and they really believed, perhaps correctly, that it was an American shot across the bow warning them to, you known agree to make peace. At that point they caved in. Vice President George Bush returned to UN Headquarters and appeared in the Security Council to say he Was 'sorry it was shot down' and after that peace was achieved rather rapidly.

The UN played a very important part in that by this God knows how many point proposal ofofPerez Perez De Cuellar's under which peace would be achieved, including assigning blame for the War. And the UN, not the UN Security Council, but the Secretariat assigned blame for the War. This report came out and I remember vividly [the UN report] saying yes the Jraqis poisoned Iranian troops, yes the Iraqis poisoned their own populations, and they were blatantly at fault for violating the civility of warfare and the Geneva Conventions in what they did. That was the sort of face saving statement by an international authority that the Iranians could grab hold of and say you see we were vindicated in our position on the War.

JS: That's right, that was their final condition.

MB: That was a very well received report and that was a report that had a great news impact. That somebody was actually saying those Iraqis poisoned their own people, that .was what came out in the report was so shocking, although we already knew that they did, but that the international community would say so.

IS: And then we went through a whole series of successful mediations.

ME: That was, of course, the first one on which Perez De Cuellar's role

16 was perceived as eminently successful.

1S:IS: Right, that's true.

MB: Not just by the insiders but by thethe general public. I don't know ifif Perez De Cuellar was the first one who perceived that therethere were deals readyready toto be made on a wide rangerange ofinternational problem issues between thethe super powers. But II thinkthink thethe big powers at first tentatively began to feel one another out on Afghanistan ---- thatthat was thethe firstfirst issueissue -­ .- and it was after that, and after the Reagan policy was modified, that Reagan began toto believe that Gorbachev could be negotiated with thatthat these other issuesissues arose. That isis when Perez De Cuellar, I remember writing the story, leaks to thethe press thatthat he was calling upon the 5 Permanent Members to negotiate not justjust on Afghanistan, not justjust on Central America, not just on Angola, not just on Cambodia but also on thethe Middle East, which they didn't want to negotiate on. And that, in fact, he was calling on thethe 5 Permanent Members, and it became publicly know and a truism thatthat now we have thethe 5 Permanent Members meeting on all these issues to the extent that the 10 non-permanent members were irritated and annoyed that they were now presented with fetesfetes accompli ofresolutions resolving problems that they were not consulted about.

J8:IS: Turning to Central America for a moment and Nicaragua specifically, was therethere a perception at that time outside on the part ofjournalists and others that something new was taking place, that for the first time the United Nations was going in to provide security and actually monitor the elections within a Member State?

.... MB: I think it was El Salvador.

J8:IS: No, it was Nicaragua.

MB: Was it Nicaragua, the human rights component?

J8:IS: Well there was a human rights component but no the first thing really...

MB: Was monitoring the election.

JS:IS: Yes, monitoring the election.

MB: Yes

1S:IS: But this was a Member State, United Nations had.

MB: The United Nations had never done that before.

1S:IS: Never a Member State.

·MB: Yesthat was not a great, the fact that United Nations has never done it before waswa~ not a big deal. I think it probably had it earlyas in the '40s with respect to Indonesia.....

JS: It had with regard to West Irian.

17 MB: Yeah, but before that, the independence of Indonesia from the Dutch was Ul\J monitored.

JS: That was probably before Indonesia was a Member State. Again, I am answering my own questions, but for Perez De Cuellar this was a major thing because it had to be with very strict in terms ofhis interpretations of the Charter and to monitor elections in a Member State was tantamount, in his mind originally, to intervention under Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter

MB: Not if they agreed, I guess.

JS: Well that's the way he was convinced it was all right. After that he was completely ready [to agree to the monitoring of elections in Member States].!

MB: I don't think it was a big deal either journalisticallyjoumalistically or publicly or with the American Government. It may have been for him, a hump to get over, but it was not perceived as a big problem. I mean the Organization ofAmerican States had monitored elections before. In Nicaragua, it's the United Nations instead ofthe Organization of American States, so what? But it was perceived as the most natural thing in the world that theUN become involved because it had become involved in Afghanistan and all these other issues. Central America is not the first ofthe issues to come to fruition.

JS:No.

'MB:'So therefore they had precedent for it tohave United Nation's role in these things.

JS: Yes, Nicaragua was the first one in terms.

MB: In Central America but not the first one of the special reps working out problems between parties.

JS: Oh no, no. Actually El Salvador was the first one in which the United Nations was prepared to deal with the insurgent group as an equal so to speak and it persuaded the Government to accept that and so El Salvador was the first place where this was actually done.

MB: I think El Salvador was seen as a great United Nations triumph whereas in Nicaragua, the UN played a subsidiary role.

JS:Yes

MB: But in El Salvador the United Nations was at least formally, the institution that came up with this innovative formula, a very complicated one for resolving its internal dispute, including the human rights component and human rights monitoring ,component. I think that one of the reasons that was made so clear to the public,pUblic, through the media, was that there was a lot ofbriefing on it at UN Headquarters as opposed to Washington or elsewhere, and that the person who did the briefing, Alvaro de Soto, was very good at it and very credible and very sincere. That was also what the president of

18 CostaCosta RicaRica wonwon hishis NobleNoble PrizePrize for.for. SoSo itit waswas allall partpart ofof thisthis packagepackage thatthat mademade thethe UnitedUnited NationsNations sortsort ofof magicalmagical atat thatthat stage.stage. Then,Then, ofof course,course, itit wentwent onon toto CambodiaCambodia andand AngolaAngola andand ..... ,

JS:JS: Afghanistan.Afghanistan.

MB:MB: WellWell AfghanistanAfghanistan waswas earlier;earlier; itit waswas thethe first.first. AndAnd that'sthat's whenwhen PerezPerez DeDe CuellarCuellar saidsaid wellwell ififwewe gotgot allall ofof these,these, let'slet's dodo thethe MiddleMiddle EastEast andand thethe AmericansAmericans andand thethe .. RussiansRussians didn'tdidn't likelike himhim interveningintervening andand tellingtelling themthem whatwhat toto dodo aboutabout what.what.

JS:JS: ButBut wouldwould youyou saysay thatthat thisthis period,period, thesethese successessuccesses werewere thethe importantimportant ones.ones.

MB:MB: YesYes andand thethe explosionexplosion ofpeacekeepingofpeacekeeping presencepresence aroundaround thethe world.world.

JS:JS: AroundAround thethe world,world, moremore thanthan itit hadhad beenbeen sincesince thethe Congo.Congo.

1S:JS: ThereThere were moremore journalists,journalists, II think,think, thatthat came.came.

MB:MB: BecauseBecause onceonce thesethese thingsthings beganbegan toto happenhappen youyou hadhad thethe LosLos AngelesAngeles TimesTimes andand other newsnews media,media, andand II thinkthink LeLe MondeMonde asas well,well, andand thethe BritishBritish paperspapers startedstarted returning toto Ul\TUN HeadquartersHeadquarters withwith pennanentpennanent staffstaff

JS:IS: SoSo thisthis is·kindofais·kindofa loadedloaded question,question, butbut thethe imageimage ofofthethe UnitedUnited NationsNations changedchanged inin thisthis period,period? right?right? .

MB: Right-The~ight.The Cold War was ending throughthrough thethe United Nations.

JS:·IS:· But inin thisthis case itit waswas thethe imageimage ofthethe United Nations ratherrather thanthan ofofthethe Secretary­Secretary­ General as representingrepresenting thethe United United Nations would you saysay or not?not?

MB: II thinkthink itit was thethe imageimage of thethe United Nations but alsoalso ofof thethe Secretary-GeneralSecretary-General thatthat was seenseen as a great facilitator.facilitator. ItIt waswas seen,seen, atat leastleast toto knowledgeableknowledgeable people,people, thatthat thethe United Nations has a Secretary-General with whom all thesethese thingsthings are possible. We can rely on Perez de Cuellar toto deal with thethe peacekeeping, we can relyrely on his staffstaff toto deal with thethe peacekeeping, we can relyrely on his specialspecial repsreps toto negotiate thethe technicaltechnical details thatthat thethe big powers now are pushing theirtheir clients toto get ridrid of and solve.solve. So itit was partly Perez De Cuellar and partly thethe capability ofthe United Nations toto make use of all thesethese toolstools thatthat during thethe Cold War were lyinglying fallow,fallow, namely peacekeeping. At thatthat point we had not yet reachedreached peacemaking although thethe concept came up, but itit hadn't actually been done, itit hadn't been imposition,imposition, therethere hadn't been nation-building, therethere hadn't been, you know, humanitarian operations.

JS:IS: Humanitarian interventions.interventions.

MB:·lnterventions.MB: Interventions. So the.the. ideaidea was ok thethe Americans and thethe Russians are ending thethe Cold War. That means anything isis possible throughthrough thethe United Nations right now. If we have a problem we could use thethe United Nations because thosethose guys can talktalk toto each other. So thatthat was thethe perception and thatthat Perez De Cuellar was not an obstacle

19 but he was capable, competent with thethe staffthatthat was appointed, capable and competent toto deal with thesethese individualindividual issues.issues.

JS: That was thethe next question. From outside did you have thethe impressionimpression thatthat Perez De Cuellar had changed thethe internalinternal staff to any extent thatthat he had made a difference there?

MB: For thosethose of us who were at thethe United Nations, no, itit was thethe staffhe foundfound and inin some cases itit was thethe staffhe brought in,in, likelike Alvaro.

JS: Alvaro de Soto, yes.

MB: But Diego [Cordovez][Cordovez] was a UN person, Brian was a UN person, Jean-Claude Aime was a UN person. They were all UN people and thenthen he would appoint special people fromfrom outside thethe United Nations when needed, but thatthat had been done before. So itit was ratherrather thatthat thethe qualified people at thethe United Nations were finallyfinally getting a chance toto do thethe thingsthings thatthat theythey were qualified forfor thatthat thethe Cold War had prevented.

There isis one other thing that that has toto be made clear: therethere was a general perception at thethe United Nations-- and you must be more aware of thisthis thanthan most people ---- thatthat thethe United Nations had successfully insulatedinsulated thethe anti-institution elements who, because of thethe rulerule of geographical distribution, must out of necessity be givenjobs there.there. Namely, thethe Russians and theirtheir satellites and theirtheir sympathizers, had been all put intointo a lockedlocked roomroom and given make-work toto do inin thethe Political Department and thethe Conference Services Department and thatthat thereatthereal work ofInternational Civil SerVice on a neutralized basis was .done.done by thisthis small core of, what one might call gifted amateurs, but,Qf course, one knewbettedhat theythey were not mateurs because theythey have been gifted amateurs forfor 35· years, at thatthat stage.

So one had thisthis sense thatthat here are thesethese people who were leanlean and mean and readyready toto rollroll and unencumbered by thethe ideologyideology of either thethe Americans, because thethe Americans among themthem likelike George Sherry, were not political nor thethe Russians. Now we know that'sthat's not truetrue now, but thatthat was thethe sense then,then, you knew basically thatthat thatthat was an anti~S()vieanti~S()viett operation, thatthat people likelike Brian Urquhart, himself, would say about Henry Kissinger thatthat his big mistake was lettingletting thethe Russians intointo thethe Middle East. So you have toto realizerealize thatthat thesethese people were as anti-Soviet as thethe next person and were simply ..efficient but not reallyreally non-ideological.

JS: That's right.right. II can telltell you thatthat isis absolutely right.right.

MB: But you see at thatthat timetime one didn't have thatthat .sense..sense. It'sIt's only inin retrospect.retrospect. II thinkthink thatthat one got thethe sense thatthat thethe entire special political operation was an anti-Soviet operation toto trytry toto get good governance insteadinstead ofpolitical decision-making intointo thethe internationalinternational process.

JS: That's why what was thenthen PSCA, Political and Security Council Affairs Department never had any rolerole inin peacekeeping. Brian Urquhart prevented thatthat totally.totally.

MB: Not only thatthat but also thethe communications people. The Russians were neveneverr allowed intointo thethe Comrriunications staff, which was not justjust forfor peacekeeping but wawass

20 UNITEDUNITED NATIONS,NATIONS, OAGOAG HAMMARSKJ6WHAMMARSKJ6W LIBRARYLIBRARY l 1I111111111111111111lrlllllllllllllllllllllllll1I111111111 111111111111111//1111111111111111111/1111111 lllllllllii111111fIflllll/ ___------119~j)()1~~LOllL 119~J)()t~~_o-!1L __ universaluniversal forfor thethe entireentire Secretariat.Secretariat. TheyThey werewere aa couplecouple ofof otherother smallsmall depalimentsdepaliments thatthat functionedfunctioned inin thatthat non-ideological/ideologicalnon-ideological/ideological way.way. AndAnd thatthat waswas notnot toto reconcilereconcile thethe EastEast andand thethe WestWest butbut toto isolateisolate thethe EastEast andand allowallow thethe WestWest toto dodo itsits business.business.

JS:JS: Yes,Yes, andand youyou recognizedrecognized fromfrom outsideoutside thatthat thisthis particularparticular Secretary-GeneralSecretary-General diddid relyrely heavilyheavily onon aa relativelyrelatively smallsmall groupgroup ofof peoplepeople andand werewere thethe onesones toto bebe trusted,trusted, right?right?

MB:MB: AndAnd theythey werewere allall westerners,westerners, includingincluding peoplepeople likelike JamesJames JonahJonah whowho waswas moremore OxfordOxford thanthan SierraSierra Leone.Leone.

IS:IS: That'sThat's allall II amam goinggoing toto keepkeep youyou for.for.

MB:MB: II leftleft thethe UNUN atat thatthat time.time.

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