Atlantic Council RAFIK HARIRI CENTER FOR THE MIDDLE EAST

ISSUE BRIEF BY BASSEM BOUGUERRA Reforming Tunisia’s Troubled Security Sector OCTOBER 2014 The December 2010 self-immolation of twenty-six- year-old itinerant fruit vendor Mohamed Bouazizi Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East sparked popular protests in Tunisia that rippled throughout the Arab world. Like so many of Tunisia’s the Atlantic Council studies political transitions youth, Bouazizi felt disenfranchised by the Zine andThe economicRafik Hariri conditions Center for in theArab Middle countries East at El-Abidine Ben Ali regime. For over twenty-three years, and recommends US and European policies to a corrupt security apparatus allowed Ben Ali to rule encourage constructive change.

criticizing the regime or even mentioning Ben Ali’s examines the numerous security challenges that namethe country for fear with of reprisal. an iron fist.During The the public Tunisian avoided Tunisia faces and the bureaucratic and political revolution, protesters demonstrated their anger at the barriers to reforming the country’s complex security security institutions that perpetuated the regime’s sector. Finally, the author offers policy hold on power by attacking police stations. With the recommendations detailing how the Tunisian fall of the regime, Tunisians began to publicly voice government, civil society, and the international their opinions on previously forbidden issues such as community can work together to implement the politics, corruption, and police abuse. reforms necessary to ensure the success of Tunisia’s transition. Security sector reform (SSR) is one of the important reforms that ordinary Tunisians demanded. Security is Context a precursor to political stability and economic Dispelling Myths about the Security Sector. The 2011 development. A corrupt security sector impedes revolution exposed the truth about the security sector. development, deters investment, and perpetuates As a result of government misinformation, ordinary poverty. As Tunisia contemplates SSR, it is imperative Tunisians believed that the security forces numbered at that the government protect the fundamental human least 150,000.1 However, a 2012 United States Institute rights enshrined in Tunisia’s new constitution. of Peace report put the actual number of “internal security forces…between 40,000 and 80,000,” and Lasting democratic governance must be supported by estimated that about half of these were “part-time public faith in government institutions. SSR is not a augmentation forces or paid informants.”2 During Ben zero-sum game in which democratic reforms come at Ali’s rule, the police force members worked the expense of the system’s effectiveness in combating unsustainably long hours, handling enormous terrorism. As an example, good intelligence is key to workloads to maintain the appearance of a vast network. security sector seriously impedes intelligence gathering.effectively Afighting system terrorism, that operates but publicin the interestsmistrust of the Following the revolution, the police struggled to people can more effectively combat terrorism than an reestablish peace and security with tragic results; the oppressive state that risks spawning extremist reactionaries. number of people shot dead by police officers in the The Tunisian government and the international 1 Querine Hanlon, Security Sector Reform in Tunisia: A Year after the Jasmine weeksRevolution following (Washington, January DC: United 14, States 2011 Institute was five of Peace, times March the 2012), community must prioritize SSR. This issue brief , p. 6. 2 Ibid. http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR304.pdf

Bassem Bouguerra

is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. number of Tunisians killed during the December 2010- Multiple intelligence bodies supported the process of January 2011 upheaval. In the absence of crime data, it surveillance and targeting for purposes of political is impossible to give a clear estimate of the rate of control. Intelligence in Tunisia was divided into two criminal activity in Tunisia. However, Tunisians main bodies: the Directorate General of Special consider security to be the single biggest problem Services (SS), which worked on general intelligence facing the country, according to a study by the information, and the Directorate General of Technical International Republican Institute released in May Services, which provided the same information but 2011. To address this feeling of insecurity and bolster through technical instruments such as phone tapping the security3 sector’s capacity, the Tunisian government or Internet control. The Directorate of State Security (DSE) coordinated the SS and ST. one year. Unfortunately, an expedited scale-up meant thatrecruited training close was to reducedten thousand from newnine policeto three officers months in After the revolution in February 2011, then-Interior for about one thousand of them. Minister Farhat Rajhi announced the suspension of the DSE, essentially dissolving the political police. This decision was well received by ordinary Tunisians. Many security experts, on the other hand, saw it as a major DURING BEN ALI’S RULE, mistake, since the DSE ensured the smooth functioning THE SECURITY SECTOR of the entire intelligence system by mining the torrent of intelligence data. Critics of the decision argue that ENJOYED A CULTURE OF the functioning of the whole system has become

IMPUNITY. ACCORDING providing analysis. erratic, with no liaising entity filtering information and TO THE UN SPECIAL In addition to SS and ST, smaller units within the RAPPORTEUR, FROM General Directive for Public Safety—an umbrella 1999 TO SEPTEMBER safety police, crowd control police, and others—still reportorganization on the thatpolitical includes activities the traffic of citizens, police, as public well as 2009, ONLY 245 POLICE daily activities of diplomats and foreign journalists.4

OFFICERS WERE SSR Challenges PROSECUTED FOR A Culture of Impunity and Human Rights Violations. During Ben Ali’s rule, the security sector enjoyed a MISTREATMENT AND culture of impunity. According to the UN special MISCONDUCT. rapporteur, from 1999 to September 2009, only 245 misconduct, and “reportedly, only seven criminal convictionspolice officers for were acts ofprosecuted torture and for ill-treatment mistreatment were and Mapping the Security Apparatus. The “political police” handed down against law enforcement and prison force was Ben Ali’s greatest weapon, used to terrorize 5 and intimidate his political opponents. Unlike in Egypt, After the fall of Ben Ali’s regime, the public expected arbitrary torture, scenes of police violence, officials.” the “political police.” Instead, Ben Ali’s political police and police impunity to end. A week after Ben Ali’s forcethere iswas perhaps no specific best understoodbody that could as a networkbe identified of as ouster, Tunisians were pleasantly surprised by the organizations and individuals, inside and outside the government, working together to collect information countrymen for forgiveness, claiming that they had televised scene of police officers asking their on anyone who could potentially threaten the regime. merely carried out their superiors’ orders out of fear of Members of Ben Ali’s political party, Constitutional reprisal. This created a wave of public compassion, and Democratic Rally, played a key role, intimidating political opponents by closely monitoring them and reporting back to the Ministry of Interior (MoI).

4 http://nawaat.org/portail/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/ConfMartyrs2. pdf (in Arabic). 5 Juan E. Mendez, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, 14-27, 2011,” Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment on His Mission to Tunisia (15 3 International Republican Institute, “Survey of Tunisian Public Opinion: May to 22 May 2011), United Nations, February 2, 2012, http://www.univie.ac. http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2011%20July%20. at/bimtor/dateien/tunisia_unsrt_2012_report.pdf. 12%20Survey%20of%20Tunisian%20Public%20Opinion,%20May%20 14-27,%202011(1).pdf

2 ATLANTIC COUNCIL most Tunisians anticipated a whole new relationship Yemen, and those involved in the December 2006- with the police would be forged.6 January 2007 armed battle with security forces in the Tunisian Soliman region. According to media sources,9 Regrettably, many instances of police abuse were an estimated three hundred of the released prisoners 7 reported after February 2011. Most, if not all, of these were charged with terrorism. confrontations were not recorded by the police, perpetuating the culture of impunity. Even though the government opened internal investigations, they were lengthy, lacked transparency, and were never CONCERNS ABOUT published. It became evident that there was no adequate external mechanism to check abuse within BOTH DOMESTIC the MoI. AND INTERNATIONAL The National Constituent Assembly (NCA), established TERRORISM MEAN parliamentary oversight commission for the security THAT SOME WITHIN THE sector.in October The 2011commission to write was a new formed constitution, in response created to a a violent police attack on demonstrators during the GOVERNMENT ARE WARY infamous April 9, 2012 protest, which was fueled by OF SSR, FEARING THAT IT dissatisfaction with the performance of the interim Ennahda government. The commission, headed by a MIGHT HINDER ROBUST member of the ruling party, was responsible for investigating police misconduct and publishing a report COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTEREXTREMISM was created, many of its members resigned citing a lack ofwith MoI its responsiveness, findings. A few andmonths the commissionafter the commission report MEASURES. never saw the light of day.

The lack of accountability that was pervasive before Despite subsequent legislation to help reintegrate the the revolution appears to continue within the ranks of the MoI. Although a military tribunal on April 11, 2014, for employment in the public sector10 and social gave Ben Ali a life sentence in absentia for his role in beneficiaries of this11 there amnesty are widespreadby making them fears eligible that the the killing of protesters during the uprising, his top arbitrary release of detained terrorists without an immediatesecurity benefits, reintegration plan meant that many of them For example, Ali Sariati, head of presidential security undersecurity Ben officials Ali, was were released given after extremely serving light only sentences. three these released prisoners is Seifallah Ben Hassine, also years, reduced from a twenty-year sentence. Despite a knownlapsed backas Abou into Ladh, extremism. the founder One prominent of Ansar al-Sharia example in of tenure marred by multiple police violations and the political assassination of prominent opposition leader by both the Tunisian and US governments. Chokri Belaid, Ali Larayedh, the interior minister Tunisia, which is classified as a terrorist organization Terrorism. Concerns about both domestic and the position of prime minister during the second international terrorism mean that some within the Ennahdaduring the administration. first Ennahda government, was promoted to government are wary of SSR, fearing that it might hinder robust counterterrorism and counterextremism General Amnesty. In February 2011, under popular measures. The weakened state of the Tunisian pressure from Tunisians across the political spectrum, government following the revolution, combined with then-Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi signed a the general amnesty decree and political polarization decree granting general amnesty for the country’s between secularists and Islamists, allowed for a political prisoners.8 Among those released were resurgence of jihadist groups. Despite multiple Tunisians who fought in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, instances of violence attributed to these groups, the 6 Delphine Minoui, “Tunis: quand un policier demande «pardon» à la foule ” Le Ennahda government was only startled into action Figaro, January 24, 2011,

http://www.lefigaro.fr/ (in French). 9 http://goo.gl/0TzRtV (in Arabic). 7 Asmainternational/2011/01/23/01003-20110123ARTFIG00244-tunis-quand- Ghribi, “Tunisia’s Terms of Abuse,” Transitions (blog), Foreign Policy, 10 http://www.legislation.tn/fr/detailtexte/Loi-num-2012-4-du-22-06-2012- un-policier-demande-pardon-a-la-foule8230.phphttp://transitions.foreignpolicy.com/ jort-2012-050__2012050000041?shorten=lmTI (in French). . 11 8 http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/29086November 20, 2013, (in French). (in French). posts/2013/11/20/tunisias_terms_of_abuse http://www.legislation.tn/fr/detailtexte/D%C3%A9cret-num-2013-3304- du-12-08-2013-jort-2013-069__2013069033043?shorten=lQa1

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 3 following an attack on the US Embassy on September mechanisms, these illegal and dishonest procedures 12, 2012, and clashes at Mount Chaambi in December went under the radar, and the system projected an

were killed. 2012, in which over twenty military and police officers appearanceAt home and of abroad, effectively many fighting expected crime. police

can point to some progress: the judiciary, for example, THE JUDICIARY IS isperformance asserting a tomore improve independent following role the vis-à-vis revolution. the One executive branch and no longer routinely accepts ASSERTING A MORE coerced confessions when reviewing cases. However, INDEPENDENT ROLE expectations, as policemen lack the training and VIS-À-VIS THE EXECUTIVE necessaryofficer performance equipment falls to conduct short of the meeting thorough, rigorous transparent investigations that are now required by BRANCH AND NO LONGER law.

ROUTINELY ACCEPTS SSR Efforts COERCED CONFESSIONS Legal Framework. Between 1956 and 2011, the Tunisian government passed 1,700 legislative texts, of which WHEN REVIEWING CASES. 1,200 are still in force. A large proportion of these were promulgated in the form of presidential decrees, a way to legally bend the security forces and shape their main Tunisia’s neighborhood complicates matters. The functions to protect the regime instead of the people. Algerian terrorist organization al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is active in Tunisia. Independent After the revolution, Tunisian human rights rogue groups are engaged in smuggling arms across organizations called for a new legal framework to help North Africa, especially from Libya, creating friction reshape the relationship between security forces and with existing cartels (namely those in Tunisia’s southeastern region of Ben Guerdan), and inciting apparatus known for its cruelty. In response, the the public and to redefine the priorities of a security violent upheaval in the area.12 The MoI estimates that interim government ratified the Optional Protocol to civil war. The government claims to be monitoring the Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 1,800 Tunisians13 are currently fighting in the Syrian whether the government is doing so effectively. For Civil and Political Rights, and the International return of these fighters, but there are doubts as to Conventionfirst Optional for Protocol the Protection to the International of All Persons Covenant from on was connected with the assassination of NCA deputy example, one of the returned fighters,14 Furthermore, Mohamed Melki, Court.Enforced Disappearance. On June 24, 2011, Tunisia also ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal networks,Mohamed 15Brahmi propagating on July what 25, 2013. the MoI calls a culture of videos of these fighters are flooding social media extremism, something the government, in its current the creation of the National Commission against state, has little capacity to address.16 Restoring public On October 9, 2013, the NCA adopted a law establishing trust in the security forces with effective SSR could Treatment or Punishment.17 Members of this bolster intelligence efforts. commissionTorture and Otherare granted Cruel, accessInhuman, to all or detention Degrading facilities to document cases of torture or mistreatment Inadequate Training. During the Ben Ali era, the (which they have begun to undertake), to instigate commonly accepted as evidence confessions obtained penal or administrative investigations, and to offer underexecutive torture, firmly and controlled forensic assessmentsthe judiciary. were Judges generally recommendations on how to stop police violations. Despite these steps, members of the NCA, under constant pressure from police unions, failed to provide either absent or falsified. Without any accountability 12 effective regulations and guidelines for the security Libyan Border,” Working Paper 17, Small Arms Survey, http://www. Moncef Kartas, “On the Edge? Trafficking and Insecurity at the Tunisian- sector in the new constitution. The only mention of the . security sector relates to the security forces in Article http://goo.gl/yrh4gusmallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-WP17- (in Arabic). 14 hTunisia-On-the-Edge.pdfttp://goo.gl/0TzRtV (in Arabic). 18, which reads: 1513 (in Arabic). 16 http://goo.gl/yrh4gu (in Arabic). 17 (in Arabic). https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?v=640028562737002 http://www.legislation-securite.tn/ar/node/32693

4 ATLANTIC COUNCIL “The national security forces are republican forces Union of Interior Security Forces. However, these three assigned the duty of maintaining security and syndicates often end up undermining their overall public order, ensuring the protection of individuals, mission through petty competition, including publicly institutions, property, and law enforcement while accusing each other of being driven by hidden political ensuring that freedoms are respected and within agendas. the frame of total impartiality.”18 Civil Society and Media. Civil society is actively engaged The drafting of Tunisia’s constitution was a missed opportunity to learn from the experience of other Tunisia Institutional Reform, Democracy Laboratory, nations with histories of oppressive security in advocating for SSR. There are at least three NGOs— apparatuses that implemented a system of checks and balances during their democratic transitions. For and publications,Republican Police, advocacy established and awareness, by police police officers— example, South Africa’s constitution devotes an entire training,focused strictly and police on SSR. monitoring. These NGOs Among work the on more research section on security oversight and accountability. creative projects is Soccer for Reform, which organizes

The Ministry of Interior. Successive post-revolution order to create new channels of communication governments in Tunisia have lacked the political will betweensoccer games them. between police officers and citizens in and capacity for a comprehensive SSR program. They have worked on a top-down SSR approach, through As with the syndicates and the MoI, civil society and

calling for truth commissions, justice for previous interiorwhich MoI ministers, leadership two has successive been reshuffled secretaries multiple of state casesSSR activists of torture have and their ill-treatment, own definition civilian of SSR. oversight They areof intimes. charge Since of SSR,2011, and the one country minister has withinhad five the different MoI in the police, and an overhaul of the whole security charge of security. apparatus so that it is more transparent, democratic, and professional. Police Unions. Police unions were created in January The media, despite criticism for its lack of persecuted by the public. When interviewed, founding professionalism in addressing important issues, is members2011, during of these a period syndicates in which highlighted police officers the felt putting a spotlight on the security sector by reporting importance of enhancing the police-citizen relationship news on police work and airing debates between MoI representatives and human rights activists. public.19 and the significance of rebuilding trust with the Notably absent from the discussion are political parties, whose platforms lack any SSR element because differently from Tunisian civil society and SSR most lack knowledge about the issue and hesitate to activists.Police unions They advocate argue that for reform SSR, yet entails they define highly reform challenge the MoI. equipped security forces enjoying good socioeconomic status, along with legislation that protects them at International Community. The international community work. After pressuring the executive branch and is playing a major role in SSR in Tunisia. The Tunisian members of the NCA for months, they succeeded in government has signed partnerships with Spain (to 22 24 helping pass legislation that increased hazard pay20 and train prison guards), Turkey, Qatar, and the United indemnity for work injuries21 and reversed work States, which committed $24 million23 in criminal justice 25 termination decisions. reform assistance. Japan, Belgium, and Norway

Today, there are over thirty syndicates representing project to create six model police stations and to virtually every sector in the MoI. Just like the MoI, most establishfinanced acommunity United Nations policing. Development26 The German Program of these unions function with little transparency, government spent millions of dollars on another train-

MoI negotiates only with the three largest syndicates— Directoratemaking it difficult General to of assess Intervention their real Units, influence. National The 22 (in French).

Union of Security Forces Syndicates, and National http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/33514 23 http://www.legislation-securite.tn/sites/default/files/Loi%20 (in Arabic). 18 2014 Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia, http://www.aucegypt.edu/ 24 organique%20n%C2%B0%202013-38%20du%207%20Octobre%20 (in Arabic). Gapp/CairoReview/Pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=577. 25 2013%20(Ar).pdfUS Department of State, “US Government Assistance to Tunisia,” December 19 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6hEX78uj24U (in Arabic). 14,http://www.legislation-securite.tn/ar/node/32040 2012, . 20 26 United Nations Development Program, “Model Police States Launched in Tunisia,” Junehttp://www.state.gov/s/d/met/releases/198355.htm 5, 2014, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ http://www.legislation-securite.tn/sites/default/files/files/lois/ (in Arabic). presscenter/pressreleases/2014/06/05/model-police-stations-launched- 21 D%C3%A9cret%20n%C2%B0%202014-889%20du%2028%20Janvier%20 (in Arabic). in-tunisia/. 2014%20(Ar).pdf http://www.legislation-securite.tn/ar/node/32938

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 5 and-equip program.27 The European Union has not yet that include a human rights component. Unfortunately, begun implementing its security assistance project, but countries such as France,28 Finland, and the United human rights trainings for over a decade, many tend Kingdom are providing some assistance unilaterally. notalthough to take Tunisian them seriously police officers because have they received feel the these “imported” values promoted in these trainings are not All of these international efforts are rooted primarily applicable to their daily work. What the current in programs focused on training and equipping programs lack is a focus on the governance aspects of Tunisia’s security forces and antiterrorism units. Such SSR. A locally inspired and creative approach should be an approach provides tangible tools to the forces but is adopted to ensure the effectiveness of such training, completely divorced from addressing endemic and there should be more effort spent on improving problems such as resource mismanagement and lack of security sector governance. budget transparency. This undermines a more comprehensive engagement with the security sector Civil Society and Media. Reforming the security sector and SSR, which would include steps aimed at improving democratic governance and transparency in the Efforts must also focus critically on strengthening the security sector. capacitygoes beyond of Tunisian the walls civil of thesociety MoI groupsand police to engage officers. with the MoI on key SSR reforms. There is also a clear need Recommendations to strengthen civilian oversight bodies and to develop Conditioning Security Aid to Political Will for SSR. Three the capacity of citizens to deal effectively with security years after the 2011 revolution, a comprehensive SSR issues. Such measures would ensure channels of project with clear objectives has yet to be developed. communication between the public and the International assistance is focused mainly on building the security forces’ capacity, not on meeting public culture of cooperation and transparency for a demands for accountability, transparency, and comprehensive,government, which sustained, would build and inclusive confidence approach and a to democratic oversight of the police. As time goes on, the SSR. window of opportunity for SSR is closing. Absent domestic political will for a robust SSR project, Additionally, training programs, for instance training international aid and support to the Tunisian security journalists on how to conduct investigative work on sector should at a minimum be conditioned on security issues, are important to establish new forms of government engagement in SSR. accountability for police work and to assess the effectiveness of SSR projects. Think Regionally. Any attempt at SSR will have to take into account the terrorist threat facing the region as a Finally, in order to maximize the impact of resources whole. After the Arab uprisings, tension surfaced committed by international donors, the United Nations between neighboring countries, such as Libya and and Tunisia’s partners should convene on a regular Algeria, leading to minimal collaboration and sharing basis to think collectively about a more holistic SSR of security information between governments. approach and to work together in a complementary Terrorist groups in the region collaborate, fashion. communicate, and cooperate with each other. If the The threat of terrorism, rapidly changing governments, coordinate effectively, their counterterrorism efforts and the lack of coordination between all parties willgovernments be futile. fighting these terrorist groups do not involved in SSR make it a challenging undertaking. SSR, however, is necessary if Tunisia’s democratic transition The international community should create platforms is to succeed. for countries in the region to meet frequently and to exchange information about challenges and opportunities to combat this transnational threat. There is also a need for independent think tanks in Tunisia and elsewhere in the region that focus on regional security challenges.

Train and Equip 2.0. There is a strong preference among international donors for “train and equip” programs

27 http://tinyurl.com/orsn2wz (in Arabic). 28 (in Arabic). https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?v=773904635970248&set=vb.192 600677433983&type=2&theater

6 ATLANTIC COUNCIL Atlantic Council Board of Directors

CHAIRMAN *Ralph D. Crosby, Jr. *Jan M. Lodal Karen Tramontano *Jon M. Huntsman, Jr. Nelson Cunningham *George Lund Clyde C. Tuggle CHAIRMAN, Ivo H. Daalder Jane Holl Lute Paul Twomey INTERNATIONAL Gregory R. Dahlberg William J. Lynn Melanne Verveer ADVISORY BOARD *Paula J. Dobriansky *John D. Macomber Enzo Viscusi Brent Scowcroft Christopher J. Dodd Izzat Majeed Charles F. Wald PRESIDENT AND CEO Conrado Dornier Wendy W. Makins Jay Walker *Frederick Kempe Patrick J. Durkin Mian M. Mansha Michael F. Walsh VICE CHAIRS Thomas J. Edelman William E. Mayer Mark R. Warner *Robert J. Abernethy Thomas J. Egan, Jr. Allan McArtor John C. Whitehead *Richard Edelman *Stuart E. Eizenstat Eric D.K. Melby David A. Wilson *C. Boyden Gray Thomas R. Eldridge Franklin C. Miller Maciej Witucki *Richard L. Lawson Julie Finley James N. Miller Mary C. Yates *Virginia A. Mulberger Lawrence P. Fisher, II *Judith A. Miller Dov. S. Zakheim *W. DeVier Pierson Alan H. Fleischmann *Alexander V. Mirtchev HONORARY *John Studzinski Michèle Flournoy DIRECTORS TREASURER *Ronald M. Freeman *George E. Moose David C. Acheson *Brian C. McK. Henderson Laurie Fulton GeorgetteObie L. Moore Mosbacher Madeleine K. Albright SECRETARY *Robert S. Gelbard Thomas R. Nides James A. Baker, III *Walter B. Slocombe *Sherri W. Goodman Franco Nuschese Harold Brown DIRECTORS *Stephen J. Hadley Joseph S. Nye Frank C. Carlucci, III Stephane Abrial Mikael Hagström Robert M. Gates Ian Hague Michael G. Mullen Peter Ackerman John D. Harris II Sean O’Keefe Leon E. Panetta TimothyOdeh Aburdene D. Adams Frank Haun *AnaHilda Palacio Ochoa-Brillembourg William J. Perry John Allen Michael V. Hayden AhmetThomas Oren R. Pickering Colin L. Powell Michael Ansari Annette Heuser Daniel M. Price Condoleeza Rice Richard L. Armitage Jonas Hjelm *Andrew Prozes Edward L. Rowny *Adrienne Arsht Karl Hopkins Arnold L. Punaro George P. Schultz Robert Hormats *Kirk A. Radke John W. Warner Elizabeth F. Bagley *Mary L. Howell Teresa M. Ressel William H. Webster DavidSheila D.Bair Aufhauser Robert E. Hunter Jeffrey A. Rosen HARIRI CENTER ADVISORY COUNCIL Wolfgang Ischinger *Thomas L. Blair ^Bahaa Hariri Reuben Jeffery, III *RaficFrancis Bizri Bouchard Hanan Ashrawi Robert Jeffrey CharlesRobert Rowland O. Rossotti Myron Brilliant ^Shaukat Aziz *James L. Jones, Jr. HarryStanley Sachinis O. Roth *R. Nicholas Burns ^Richard Edelman George A. Joulwan *Richard R. Burt ^Ray R. Irani Lawrence S. Kanarek John P. Schmitz Michael Calvey Wolfgang Ischinger Stephen R. Kappes WilliamBrent Scowcroft O. Schmieder Ashton B. Carter Hisham Kassem Maria Pica Karp Alan J. Spence James E. Cartwright Fredrick Kempe Francis J. Kelly, Jr. James Stavridis John E. Chapoton ^Alexander Kwasniewski Zalmay M. Khalilzad Richard J.A. Steele Ahmed Charai Javier Solana Robert M. Kimmitt *Paula Stern Sandra Charles James D. Wolfensohn Henry A. Kissinger Robert J. Stevens George Chopivsky Peter Kovarcik John S. Tanner * Executive Committee Members Wesley K. Clark Franklin D. Kramer Peter J. Tanous ^International Advisory Board David W. Craig Members Philip Lader List as of September 11, 2014 Tom Craren *Ellen O. Tauscher The Atlantic Council is a nonpartisan organization that ­promotes constructive US leadership and engagement in ­international ­affairs based on the central role of the Atlantic community in ­meeting today’s global ­challenges.

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