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Turkey's Constitution of 1982 with Amendments Through 2017

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Turkey's Constitution of 1982 with Amendments Through 2017 PDF generated: 26 Aug 2021, 16:51 constituteproject.org Turkey's Constitution of 1982 with Amendments through 2017 Some of the 2017 amendments have not yet entered into force; see the final article for more information. This complete constitution has been generated from excerpts of texts from the repository of the Comparative Constitutions Project, and distributed on constituteproject.org. constituteproject.org PDF generated: 26 Aug 2021, 16:51 Table of contents Preamble . 9 PART ONE: General Principles . 9 I. Form of the State . 9 II. Characteristics of the Republic . 10 III. Integrity, official language, flag, national anthem, and capital of the State . 10 IV. Irrevocable provisions . 10 V. Fundamental aims and duties of the State . 10 VI. Sovereignty . 10 VII. Legislative power . 11 VIII. Executive power and function . 11 IX. Judicial power . 11 X. Equality before the law . 11 XI. Supremacy and binding force of the Constitution . 12 PART TWO: Fundamental Rights and Duties . 12 CHAPTER ONE: General Provisions . 12 I. Nature of fundamental rights and freedoms . 12 II. Restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms . 12 III. Prohibition of abuse of fundamental rights and freedoms . 12 IV. Suspension of the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms . 13 V. Status of aliens . 13 CHAPTER TWO: Rights and Duties of the Individual . 13 I. Personal inviolability, corporeal and spiritual existence of the individual . 13 II. Prohibition of forced labour . 14 III. Personal liberty and security . 14 IV. Privacy and protection of private life . 15 A. Privacy of private life . 15 B. Inviolability of the domicile . 15 C. Freedom of communication . 16 V. Freedom of residence and movement . 16 VI. Freedom of religion and conscience . 16 VII. Freedom of thought and opinion . 17 VIII. Freedom of expression and dissemination of thought . 17 IX. Freedom of science and the arts . 17 X. Provisions relating to the press and publication . 18 A. Freedom of the press . 18 B. Right to publish periodicals and non-periodicals . 18 C. Protection of printing facilities . 19 Turkey 1982 (rev. 2017) Page 2 constituteproject.org PDF generated: 26 Aug 2021, 16:51 D. Right to use media other than the press owned by public corporations . 19 E. Right of rectification and reply . 19 XI. Rights and freedoms of assembly . 20 A. Freedom of association . 20 B. Right to hold meetings and demonstration marches . 20 XII. Right to property . 20 XIII. Provisions on the protection of rights . 21 A. Freedom to claim rights . 21 B. Principle of natural judge . 21 C. Principles relating to offences and penalties . 21 XIV. Right to prove an allegation . 22 XV. Protection of fundamental rights and freedoms . 22 CHAPTER THREE: Social and Economic Rights and Duties . 22 I. Protection of the family, and children’s rights . 22 II. Right and duty of education . 22 III. Public interest . 23 A. Utilization of the coasts . 23 B. Land ownership . 23 C. Protection of agriculture, animal husbandry, and persons engaged in these activities . 24 D. Expropriation . 24 E. Nationalization and privatization . 24 IV. Freedom of work and contract . 25 V. Provisions relating to labour . 25 A. Right and duty to work . 25 B. Working conditions and right to rest and leisure . 25 C. Right to organize unions . 25 D. Activities of unions . 26 VI. Collective labour agreement, right to strike, and lockout . 26 A. Rights of collective labour agreement and collective agreement . 26 B. Right to strike, and lockout . 26 VII. Provision of fair wage . 27 VIII. Health, the environment and housing . 27 A. Health services and protection of the environment . 27 B. Right to housing . 27 IX. Youth and sports . 28 A. Protection of the youth . 28 B. Development of sports and arbitration . ..
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