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Notice of Proposed Amendment 2018-03 Recorders Installation and Maintenance Thereof – Certification Aspects

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Notice of Proposed Amendment 2018-03 Recorders Installation and Maintenance Thereof – Certification Aspects European Aviation Safety Agency Notice of Proposed Amendment 2018-03 Recorders installation and maintenance thereof – certification aspects RMT.0249 (MDM.051) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The objective of this Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) is to improve the availability and the quality of data recorded by flight recorders, in order to better support safety investigations of accidents and incidents. This NPA proposes to enhance and modernise the specifications for the installation of flight recorders on board large aircraft, and addresses the following subjects: — cockpit voice recorder (CVR) power supplies; — automatic stopping of the recording after a crash; — combination recorders; — deployable recorders; and — performance specifications for flight recorders. The proposed changes are expected to: — increase the level of safety; — address safety recommendations; — save costs; — transpose International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards into EU rules; and — achieve greater harmonisation with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations. A second NPA that provides a proposal for further issues identified in the Terms of Reference (ToR) for rulemaking task (RMT).0249 will be published at a later stage. Action area: Aircraft tracking, rescue operation and accident investigations Affected rules: Annex IV (Part-CAT) of Regulation (EU) No 965/2012, CS-25, CS-29 Affected stakeholders: — Operators — Type certificate (TC) holders and applicants for TC / supplemental type certificate (STC) of large aeroplanes and large rotorcraft required to be equipped with flight recorders — Competent authorities Driver: Safety Rulemaking group: No Impact assessment: Light Rulemaking Procedure: Standard 27.01.2016 (Issue 2) 27.3.2018 2018/Q1 2019/Q1 2018/Q1 18.01.2014 (Issue 1) TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 1 of 49 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-03 Table of contents Table of contents 1. About this NPA ..................................................................................................................................... 3 1.1. How this NPA was developed ................................................................................................................... 3 1.2. How to comment on this NPA ................................................................................................................... 3 1.3. The next steps ........................................................................................................................................... 3 2. In summary — why and what ............................................................................................................... 4 2.1. Why we need to change the rules — issue/rationale ............................................................................... 4 2.2. What we want to achieve — objectives ................................................................................................... 7 2.3. How we want to achieve it — overview of the proposals ........................................................................ 7 2.4. What are the expected benefits and drawbacks of the proposals ........................................................... 9 3. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail .................................................................................... 10 3.1. Draft regulation (Draft EASA opinion) ..................................................................................................... 10 3.2. Draft acceptable means of compliance and guidance material (Draft EASA decision) .......................... 11 3.3. Draft certification specifications (Draft EASA decision) .......................................................................... 12 3.4. Draft acceptable means of compliance and guidance material (Draft EASA decision) .......................... 23 4. Impact assessment (IA) ....................................................................................................................... 32 4.1. What is the issue ..................................................................................................................................... 32 4.2. Safety risk assessment ............................................................................................................................ 32 4.3. Who is affected ....................................................................................................................................... 32 4.4. How could the issue/problem evolve ..................................................................................................... 32 4.5. What we want to achieve — objectives ................................................................................................. 32 4.6. How it could be achieved — options ...................................................................................................... 33 4.7. What are the impacts .............................................................................................................................. 34 5. Proposed actions to support implementation...................................................................................... 37 6. References ......................................................................................................................................... 38 6.1. Affected regulations ................................................................................................................................ 38 6.2. Affected decisions ................................................................................................................................... 38 6.3. Other reference documents ................................................................................................................... 38 7. Appendix ........................................................................................................................................... 39 7.1. Annex 1 ................................................................................................................................................... 39 7.2. Annex 2 ................................................................................................................................................... 46 TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 2 of 49 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-03 1. About this NPA 1. About this NPA 1.1. How this NPA was developed The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) developed this NPA in line with Regulation (EC) No 216/20081 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Basic Regulation’) and the Rulemaking Procedure2. This rulemaking activity is included in the EASA 2017-2021 Rulemaking and Safety Promotion Programme3 under RMT.0249 (MDM.051). The text of this NPA has been developed by EASA, based on the input of the European Flight Recorder Partnership Group4. It is hereby submitted to all interested parties5 for consultation. 1.2. How to comment on this NPA Please submit your comments using the automated Comment-Response Tool (CRT) available at http://hub.easa.europa.eu/crt/6. The deadline for submission of comments is 27 June 2018. 1.3. The next steps Following the closing of the public commenting period, EASA will review all the comments received. Based on the comments received, EASA will develop: — a decision amending the certification specifications (CSs) and the related acceptable means of compliance (AMC) for large aeroplanes (CS-25) and large rotorcraft (CS-29); — an opinion proposing amendments to Regulation (EU) No 965/20127 (‘AirOPS regulation’) and a decision with the related AMC and GM. The opinion is addressed to the European Commission, which will use it as a technical basis in order to develop the amending Regulation. The comments received and the EASA responses will be reflected in a comment-response document (CRD). The CRD will be annexed to the respective decision and to the opinion. 1 Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Council Directive 91/670/EEC, Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 and Directive 2004/36/EC (OJ L 79, 19.3.2008, p. 1) (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/?qid=1467719701894&uri=CELEX:32008R0216). 2 EASA is bound to follow a structured rulemaking process as required by Article 52(1) of Regulation (EC) No 216/2008. Such a process has been adopted by the EASA Management Board (MB) and is referred to as the ‘Rulemaking Procedure’. See MB Decision No 18-2015 of 15 December 2015 replacing Decision 01/2012 concerning the procedure to be applied by EASA for the issuing of opinions, certification specifications and guidance material (http://www.easa.europa.eu/the-agency/management- board/decisions/easa-mb-decision-18-2015-rulemaking-procedure). 3 http://easa.europa.eu/rulemaking/annual-programme-and-planning.php 4 The EFRPG is a voluntary group of experts dedicated to evaluating issues related to the design, operation and serviceability of flight recorders. It is composed of delegates from
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