Economic History Association
Taxes and Agrarian Life in Early Modern France: Land Sales, 1550-1730 Author(s): Philip T. Hoffman Source: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Mar., 1986), pp. 37-55 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Economic History Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2121266 Accessed: 17-03-2016 23:46 UTC
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This content downloaded from 131.215.23.115 on Thu, 17 Mar 2016 23:46:07 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Taxes and Agrarian Life in Early
Modern France: Land Safes, 1550-1730
PHILIP T. HOFFMAN
Between 1550 and 1730, privileged investors in France-nobles, officers, and
wealthy merchants-bought up enormous quantities of land from peasants. The
transfer of property has attracted considerable attention from historians, but it has
never been satisfactorily explained. The paper invokes the tax exemptions the
privileged enjoyed to account for the transfer-an explanation that fits both the
chronology of the land sales and the identity of the purchasers. The paper then
examines how the tax system throttled growth in the agricultural sector.
SOCIAL historians of early modern Europe have by and large ignored
taxation. The neglect is perhaps understandable: social history itself
arose as a revolt against traditional political history and all that it
entailed, including the operations of the fisc. Yet taxation had a large
effect on the common people of early modern Europe, an effect far
beyond the seizure of coins from their pockets. Those who were
supposed to pay taxes strove to escape the fiscal burden, and people
caught in the tax collector's grip sought to manipulate the system. When
the Muscovite government imposed a household tax in the seventeenth
century, for example, families "doubled up to cut their taxes." The
result, one historian claims, was the birth of the extended family in
Russia. In sixteenth-century France the taxes levied on Parisian meat
and livestock drove butchers, consumers, and livestock dealers to trade
in towns outside the capital; and Parisian students worked their way
through school by placing their personal exemptions from wine taxes at
the service of vineyard owners.1 Moreover, the structure of taxation
can inform broader issues, such as the shape of social stratification, the
persistence of communal property rights, and the causes of economic
stagnation. By ignoring taxes, then, the social historian overlooks their
direct impact and blinds himself to a major influence on society.
One such influence was the great wave of land sales in France. From
approximately 1550 to the early 1700s nearly every region of the
kingdom saw merchants, lawyers, royal officials, and noblemen buy up
Journal of Economic History, Vol. XLVI, No. 1 (March 1986). ? The Economic History
Association. All rights reserved. ISSN 0022-0507.
The author is Associate Professor of History and Social Science at the California Institute of
Technology, Pasadena, California 91125. He wishes to thank the following individuals for their
suggestions and criticisms of earlier drafts of this paper: Philip Benedict, John Benton, James
Collins, Lance Davis, Jonathan Dewald, Jack Goldstone, Donald McCloskey, Kathryn Norberg,
James C. Riley, Hilton Root, and Ken Sokoloff.
' Richard Hellie, Slavery in Russia, 1450-1725 (Chicago, 1982), pp. 413, 419, 705-6; Martin
Wolfe, The Fiscal System of Renaissance France (New Haven, 1972), pp. 318, 323.
37
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land from debt-ridden peasants, either by purchasing the peasants'
fields outright or by foreclosing on mortgages. The records of the great
exchange fill page after page of notarial registers, and it was obvious
enough to have attracted the attention of contemporaries. In Lyon, for
instance, the local historian and minor humanist Guillaume Paradin
described in 1573 how the city's wealthy merchants and bankers had
been buying land from peasants at bargain prices:
The poor laboureurs, lacking enough to eat, were constrained to put their lands up for
sale at rock bottom prices to rich people, who thereby acquired good lands and
vineyards for a morsel of bread. In this way, many have built beautiful farms and villas,
constructing their country houses upon the misery of paupers.2
Evidence from Saint-Genis-Laval, a small market town south of Lyon,
exemplifies what Paradin observed in the Lyonnais and what his
contemporaries observed in other regions of France. In Saint-Genis,
peasant land passed into the hands of bourgeois from Lyon; the
purchasers from Lyon were the sort of merchants and bankers whom
Paradin had in mind.3 In 1388, citizens of Lyon owned a mere 4.1
percent of the land in Saint-Genis, and in 1493 they owned not much
more-only 12.4 percent. But their ownership increased to 33.0 percent
by the late seventeenth century-a transfer of close to 300 hectares
(Table 1).
Although they began a bit earlier than in other places, the land sales
and the rush to invest in land in Saint-Genis-Laval were in fact
symptomatic of what was happening throughout France. In Dauphine,
for instance, ecclesiastics and nobles (including noble officeholders)
were buying up peasant land. South of Paris, in the community of
Avrainville, it was Parisians-chiefly royal officials. They increased
their share of the land from 19 percent in 1546 to 57 percent in 1664-
1674. Peasants in Avrainville went from owning 47 percent of the land in
1546 to 20 percent in 1664-1674 and under 17 percent in 1688. In the
nearby villages of Antony and Monteclin the story was similar: peasant
ownership dropped from 26 and 27 percent in the middle of the sixteenth
century to 15 percent or less in the late seventeenth century. The same
story can be told of numerous other regions, from Picardy in the north
to Languedoc in the south, and from Burgundy in the east to the Gatine
Poitevine in the west. Nearly everywhere, the French peasant, who had
2 Quoted Richard Gascon, Grand commerce et vie urbaine au XVIe siecle: Lyon et ses
marchands, 2 vols. (Paris, 1971), vol. 2, p. 841. For additional instances of contemporary
complaint, see Archives municipales de Bourg-en-Bresse (Ain), AA 11; and Llewain Scott Van
Doren, "War Taxation, Institutional Change, and Social Conflict in Provincial France-The Royal
Taille in Dauphin6, 1494-1559," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 121 (1977), p.
84.
3 It should be stressed that urbanites were not the only outside buyers in Saint-Genis-Laval. Nor
were all the purchasers of peasant land wealthy.
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TABLE 1
PERCENT OF LAND IN SAINT-GENIS-LAVAL OWNED BY RESIDENTS OF LYON
Hectares Percent of Total
Date Owned Land in Saint-Genis
1388 54 4.2
1493 160.44 12.4
1517-1518 265.11 20.5
1687 * 33.0
1787 * 25.0
* not available
Source and Note: Archives municipales de Lyon, CC 49-50; Marie Thdrese Lorcin, Les
campagnes de la region lyonnaise aux XIVe et XVe sieles (Lyon, 1974), pp. 382, 395; Georges
Durand, Vin, vigne, et vignerons en lyonnais et beaujolais (Lyon-Paris, 1979), p. 439.
Figures for 1388, 1493, and 1517-1518 were taken from Lyon tax records, which give the area of
holdings belonging to residents of Lyon. For 1687 and 1787, Phad to rely upon terriers, as reported
in Durand. The terriers concern only land that was subject to the seignior-a major portion of the
community but not all of it. Hence, acreage totals for the terriers are not directly comparable to the
earlier area totals. The figures for 1493 and 1517 differ slightly from those given in Lorcin, p. 395
(135 hectares in 1493), and Richard Gascon, Grand commerce et vie urbaine au XVIe siecle, 2 vols.
(Paris, 1971), vol. 2, p. 818 (200 hectares in 1517-1518). The differences may result from their
having excluded pasture land from their totals.
emerged from the Middle Ages in a relatively strong position, with
effective ownership of large amounts of land, found himself falling into
debt and selling his property to merchants, royal officers, and nobles.4
Marc Bloch called the influx of money into land "the most decisive
event in French social history," and Fernand Braudel made it figure
prominently in the "defection of the bourgeoisie," whereby early
modern merchants abandoned commerce in favor of land, offices, and
the trappings of nobility. Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie described the land
transfer as changing "completely the structure of villages, of land
holding, and of rural society." The land sales, he and others argued,
undermined the independence the French peasantry had achieved at the
end of the Middle Ages and helped create a dominant class of noble and
upper bourgeois landlords. The landlords consolidated their holdings,
and although the consolidation and the concomitant losses by small
4 Bernard Bligny, ed., Histoire du Dauphine (Toulouse, 1973), pp. 196-98, 206-9, 242-48; Van
Doren, "War Taxation," pp. 70-96; Jean Jacquart, La crise rurale en Ile-de-France, 1550-1670
(Paris, 1974), pp. 104-34, 724-52; idem, "Immobilisme et catastrophes," in G. Duby and A.
Wallon, eds., Histoire de la France rurale, vol. 2 (Paris, 1975), pp. 251-75; Emmanuel Le Roy
Ladurie, "De la crise ultime a la vraie croissance," in Duby and Wallon, Histoire, vol. 2, pp. 424-
39; idem, "Les masses profondes: la paysannerie," in E. Labrousse and F. Braudel, eds., Histoire
economique et sociale de la France, 4 vols. (Paris, 1970-82), vol. 1, pt. 2, pp. 622-32, 786-99;
idem, Les paysans de Languedoc, 2 vols. (Paris, 1966), vol. 1, pp. 459, 567-81; Gaston Roupnel,
La vile et la campagne au XVIIe siele: Etude sur les populations des pays dijonnais (Paris, 1922;
2nd ed., 1955); Louis Merle, La metairie et revolution agraire de la Gdtine poitevine de lafin du
Moyen Age d la Revolution (Paris, 1958); Pierre Deyon, Amiens, capitale provinciale: Etude sur la
society urbaine au 17e sicle (Paris, 1967), pp. 323-38. For more on the peasants' effective
ownership of land at the end of the Middle Ages, see Marc Bloch, French Rural History: An Essay
on its Basic Characteristics, trans. by Janet Sondheimer (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1970), pp.
106-49; and Robert Brenner, "Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-
industrial Europe," Past and Present, 70 (1976), pp. 46, 59, 68-72.
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peasants were never carried to the extremes of engrossment in England,
they did undeniably alter the face of French agriculture.5
Historians agree on the chronology of the land sales and on the
identity of the buyers. Give or take a decade or two, most would concur
with Le Roy Ladurie that "the great epoque of massive peasant
expropriation near Lille, Paris, Dijon, Macon, and even Montpellier
was . . . the difficult period from 1560 to 1720." Near Paris and Lyon it
started rather earlier. Everywhere the land sales accelerated after the
middle of the sixteenth century. They ceased about 1730, except
perhaps in the region about Toulouse, where land sales may have
continued well into the eighteenth century.6 The purchasers were men
of privilege: nobles, royal officials (often ennobled or on their way to
ennoblement), and wealthy urban lawyers and merchants.7
Yet historians have not devised a satisfactory explanation for the land
sales. Indeed, most of the reasons offered fail to account for the
chronology or the identity of the purchasers. Often, for example, the
transfer of property is explained by the poverty of the peasants. Real
though it was, the poverty was merely a symptom, not a cause. We need
to know precisely what it was that reduced the peasants to poverty,
forcing them to sell their land. Why did they not sell before 1550 or after
1730? The mauvaise conjuncture, or unfavorable economic conditions
particularly during the "crisis" of the seventeenth century, seems
equally vacuous as an explanation. If mauvaise conjuncture meant
reduced profits from farming, why did nobles, officers, and merchants
continue to buy farms? It is by no means clear in any case that returns
from agriculture did fall during the land sales. Agricultural lease rates,
which provide a good index of the expected profits to be derived from
farming, actually rose in many parts of France in the first half of the
early seventeenth century, when enormous quantities of land were
5Bloch, French Rural History, p. 125; Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterra-
nean World in the Age of Philip II, trans. by Sian Reynolds, 2 vols. (New York, 1972-1973), vol. 2,
pp. 725-34; Le Roy Ladurie, "La paysannerie," p. 795. For an argument that tends to downplay
the ultimate significance of the land sales, see Brenner, "Agrarian Class Structure," pp. 73-75.
6 Jacquart, "Immobilisme," pp. 259-75; Le Roy Ladurie, "Vraie croissance," pp. 424-29, 594;
idem, "La paysannerie," pp. 622-32, 786-99; Bernard Chevalier, Les bonnes villes de France du
XIVe au XVIe sihce (Paris, 1982), pp. 129-49. For the exceptional case of Toulouse, see Le Roy
Ladurie, "Vraie croissance," pp. 428-29, 594; and Georges Freche, Toulouse et la region midi-
pyrenees au siecle des lumieres (vers 1670-1789) (np, 1974), pp. 164, 187-209, 457-89. The
evidence for continued land sales near Toulouse after 1730 is less than conclusive. Freche (whose
work Le Roy Ladurie refers to) relies almost exclusively upon tax records from the 1680s or 1690s
on the one hand, and from the late eighteenth century on the other, and despite his assertions about
greater sales after 1730, such tax records say nothing about the detailed chronology of transfers.
After all, the land could have changed hands in the years 1680-1730. Furthermore, the figures
Freche does have for loss of peasant land are often strikingly small.
7 Jacquart, Ile-de-France, p. 733; idem, "Immobilisme," pp. 259-75; Le Roy Ladurie, "La
paysannerie," pp. 786-99; idem, "Vraie croissance," pp. 424-29; Chevalier, Les bonnes villes, pp.
129-49; Georges Huppert, Les Bourgeois Gentilshommes (Chicago, 1977), pp. 39-50.
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changing hands.8 Profits did decline during the crisis years later in the
seventeenth century; but we are left without an explanation of the
earlier sales.
If on the other hand the mauvaise conjoncture means an abnormal
succession of crop failures, then we must somehow demonstrate that
the fluctuations of agricultural revenues were greater between 1550 and
1730 than in other years. It would be possible to do this (one could
imagine a world in which a higher variation in agricultural revenues
favored large investors who could spread risks more effectively, and
one could test for a higher variance of revenues using tithe or lease
records). But the available quantitative evidence suggests that revenues
did not vary more than normally between 1550 and 1730.9
A related explanation involves population growth and diminishing
returns in agriculture. Le Roy Ladurie and others have argued that
increases in population fragmented peasant holdings and reduced many
farms to such an extent that they were no longer profitable.'0 Left with a
pitiful existence on a tiny scrap of land, many a peasant was forced to
sell. The problem with this argument is that the land sales continued and
even accelerated when the national population was stagnant or falling
(in 1628-1638, for example, or during the years around 1700) and in
regions that suffered persistent population decline (Ile-de-France, Bur-
gundy). In such times and places one would presume that the size of
farms would stabilize and that peasants would have no reason to sell.
But the sales of land continued."
8 Jacquart, "Immobilisme," pp. 250-52.
9 Three tithe series and one series of farm harvest records from various regions of France suggest
that gross revenues were no higher in the years 1550-1730 than before or after. For two of the series
the coefficients of variation of gross revenues were in fact lower in 1550-1730 than before or after,
and in the other two series, although the coefficients of variation were higher, the differences were
so slight that they were not significant, even at the 0.25 probability level. (Here gross revenues are
defined as tithe collections times price for the tithe series and harvest times price for the harvest
series.) Using deviations from a moving average of gross revenues led to similar results. Gross
revenues, of course, are not profits, and tithe records always pose problems. The fluctuations of
gross revenues, though, ought to have accounted for most of the variation of profits, and the tithe
records used are better than most. They were collected annually in kind, and they come from
holdings where the area farmed and the tithe rate did not vary significantly. The source for the three
series of tithe records, the series of harvest figures, and the associated grain prices are: Le Roy
Ladurie, Paysans de Languedoc, vol. 2, pp. 820-22, 844-48 (prices and tithe of wheat at Beziers,
1587-1757); Hugues Neveux, Vie et declin d'une structure economique: Les grains du Cambresis
(fin du XIVe-debut du XVIIe siecle) (Paris, 1980), pp. 396-99, and Joseph Goy and Emmanuel Le
Roy Ladurie, eds., Les fluctuations du produit de la dime: Conjoncture decimate et domaniale de
lafin du Moyen Age au XVIIIe sieuce (Paris, 1972), pp. 58-66 (prices and tithes of wheat and oats at
Cambrai, 1401-1633); Ren6 Baehrel, Une croissance: La basse provence rurale (fin XVIe siecle-
1789) (Paris, 1961), p. 554, and Goy and Le Roy Ladurie, Les fluctuations, pp. 245-53 (prices and
wheat production figures from the farm of Saint-Louis-de-Casau near Arles, 1621-1786).
1O Le Roy Ladurie, Paysans de Languedoc, vol. 1, pp. 261-314, 457, 490-91; Jacquart, Ile-de-
France, pp. 247-53.
" For periods and regions of population decline, see Jacques Dupaquier, La population
franqaise au XVIIe et XVIIIe siecles (Paris, 1979), pp. 11-13, 38-39, 41. For Ile-de-France and
Burgundy, see Jacquart, Ile-de-France, pp. 681-82, 699-701, and Roupnel, La vile et la
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And this line of reasoning neglects the strategies that peasants
adopted in times of population growth. In the countryside around Lyon,
for example, peasants sought work in the city when the population was
rising. They married later, limiting the size of families and bringing
fragmentation to a halt. They shifted to labor-intensive cultivation, such
as viticulture. Since the labor-intensive crops seem to have permitted a
profit even on small plots of land, it is not clear that population growth
and estate fragmentation (even when they occurred) would have forced
peasants to sell.'2 And population growth does not explain why nobles,
officers, urban merchants, and other privileged investors predominated
among the buyers. The market for land in France was fairly well
developed, and peasants could have traded among themselves to avoid
excessive fragmentation. Yet it was outsiders who made the over-
whelming majority of the purchases.
Similarly, it is not enough to invoke the security and prestige that
property ownership conferred to explain the land sales. Owning proper-
ty undoubtedly fulfilled a variety of nonpecuniary desires, but there is
no reason to believe that these became more pronounced after 1550, and
less pronounced after 1730. Furthermore the nobles, officers, and
privileged bourgeois who bought farm land seemed often more con-
cerned about profits than one might have supposed. Consider, for
example, the illustrious Gadagne family from Lyon. Enormously
wealthy, they purchased estates in Saint-Genis-Laval and other parts of
the Lyonnais. They were singled out by Marc Bloch as a banking and
mercantile family which abandoned trade for the greater status (and
eventual ennoblement) that seigniories and rural properties conferred. It
is true that the Gadagnes bought seigniories and chateaux, and filled
their home in Saint-Genis-Laval with expensive furniture and works of
art. Yet they made a great effort to round out their agricultural holdings,
as if they were concerned about economies of scale in administration,
and they invested considerable money in converting grain fields to more
profitable vineyards. To say that the Gadagnes and other officers and
merchants among the land buyers were merely aping the older military
nobility's taste for chateaux is unsatisfactory. Although they did
purchase an occasional chateau, they also bought considerable amounts
of peasant land, which carried none of the honor of a seigniory. And
they paid too much attention to the business of estate management and
campagne. In the Les paysans de Languedoc, vol. 1, pp. 567-81, Le Roy Ladurie abandons
population growth and fragmentation as explanations for purchases of land by urban elites after the
mid-seventeenth century. The reason is that by this time the population was declining in
Languedoc and fragmentation had ceased. By his logic, though, the sales to elites should have
stopped as well.
12 Georges Durand, Vin, vigne, vignerons en lyonnais et beaujolais (Lyon, 1979), pp. 225-50,
363-86, 445-62, 507-10.
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felt too much disdain for the profligacy of military nobles for the charge
to ring true.13
A far better explanation for the land sales-one that fits both the
chronology and the identity of the land buyers-is the French tax
system. The connection between the land sales and taxation is simple.
While peasant farms bore the brunt of increasingly heavy taxes during
much of the period from 1550 to the early 1700s, the nobles and
privileged urbanites who spent money on land generally evaded most of
the taxes on their rural holdings. The peasant had to pay the taille,
which combined features of a land tax and a levy on agricultural income.
If he sold his produce in a urban market he might also have to pay excise
taxes known as aides. In most parts of France, however, a noble or
privileged urbanite did not have to pay the taille, and if he did pay it he
usually escaped at a lower rate. Moreover, he could often sell wine and
produce from his lands in the city where he lived without paying a full
share of the aides. 14
Near Lyon, for example, if an urban merchant purchased a vineyard
from a peasant, the vineyard would in effect be withdrawn from the
taille rolls of the peasant's village. The merchant would in theory pay a
tax on this property as part of Lyon's own levy on real property, but his
assessment would be far less than the portion of the taille the peasant
had originally paid. Furthermore the merchant could bring wine from
his own vineyard into Lyon without paying the aides. Although the wine
he imported was ostensibly for his personal use, he could easily sell it.
As the intendant of Lyon complained in 1687, nearly every bourgeois
landowner in Lyon took advantage of his exemption from the aides to
turn a profit selling wine from his estate.15
Elsewhere in France, privileged city dwellers, officeholders, and
nobles generally enjoyed similar exemptions, despite efforts made in the
13 Bloch, French Rural History, p. 124; Joseph Cartellier, Essai historique sur Saint-Genis-Laval
avant la Revolution (Lyon, 1927; reprint, Saint-Genis-Laval, 1980); Archives departementales du
Rh6ne, 3 BP 1886 (May 12, 1595), 3869, 3872, fols. 92-98, 163. This assessment of the Gadagnes
and their ilk draws upon Huppert, Les Bourgeois Gentilshommes, pp. 24-50, 115-19, 141-44;
Chevalier, Les bonnes villes, pp. 129-49; and Jonathan Dewald, The Formation of a Provincial
Nobility (Princeton, 1980). One could argue that the tightening of the market for government offices
pushed members of the privileged elite to buy land, but the cost of offices did not rise until the end
of the sixteenth century, well after land sales began. Nor do office prices explain the end of the land
sales in 1730. Similarly, the fluctuations in the value of other investments, such as rentes, do not
appear to explain the sales, and it would be difficult to argue that the security of land, albeit
considerable, suddenly increased after 1550 and thereby attracted money into the countryside.
14 In areas of taille reevle, where tax exemptions were tied not to persons but to pieces of land,
privileged persons would (at least in theory) have paid the taille on land purchased from
commoners. In practice, though, they too often escaped with low tax assessments.
'5 Gascon, Grand commerce, vol. 2, pp. 862-66; Durand, Vin, pp. 481-84; Marcel Marion, Les
imp6ts directs sous lancien regime principalement au XVIIIe siecle (Paris, 1910), pp. 187-88. See
also Wolfe, Fiscal System, pp. 312, 325-27.
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seventeenth century (particularly by Colbert) to reform the aides and to
make the privileged pay the taille on their rural holdings. 6 The taille in
theory would fall upon any tenants who leased land from tax-exempt
owners, but the exempt were often able to spare their tenants from
taxes. In seventeenth-century Normandy, for instance, a noble or a tax-
exempt officer could work one of his farms and all of his meadows
without paying the taille. Although he was supposed to hire wage labor
to do the farming, he could rent the land out and claim that the tenants
were domestics. On his other farms his tenants might have to pay the
taille, but they almost always did so at a lower rate, usually because the
privileged landowner had managed to reduce their assessment. In 1645
in the Norman community of Saint-Ouen-de-Breuil, for example, tenant
farmers (many of whom rented from the tax-exempt owners, holding 75
percent of the land) paid only 35 percent of the taille per acre that
peasant owners did. The same held true in many other regions of
France: tenants of privileged landlords might appear on some taille
rolls, but they generally paid at a lower rate if they paid at all. As the
military engineer and tax reformer Vauban remarked in 1707, tenants of
the privileged were assessed "in name only." Even in many areas of
taille reelle, where exemptions from the taille were attached to particu-
lar pieces of land and not to individuals, members of the elite managed
to reduce their tax burden by manipulating the assessment figures in the
communal cadastres.'7
16 Edmond Esmonin, La taille en Normandie au temps de Colbert (1661-1683) (Paris, 1913), pp.
225-28, 250-56, 271-72; Wolfe, Fiscal System, pp. 310-15; Roland Mousnier, La venalite des
offices sous Henri IV et Louis XIII (Rouen, 1945), pp. 352-56; idem, The Institutions of France
under the Absolute Monarchy: 1598-1789, trans. by Arthur Goldhammer and Brian Pearce, 2 vols.
(Chicago, 1979-84), vol. 1, pp. 125, 172-73; vol. 2, p. 58; Richard Bonney, Political Change in
France under Richelieu and Mazarin (Oxford, 1978), pp. 272-73; Jean-Jules Clamagdran, Histoire
de l'impot en France depuis l'Ppoque romaine jusqu'd 1774, 3 vols. (Paris, 1867-1876; reimpres-
sion, Geneva, 1980), vol. 2, pp. 357-59, 619-20; Marion, Les imp6ts, pp. 9- 1.
17 Esmonin, La taille, pp. 151, 160, 225-28, 250-56, 364-68; Mousnier, Vnalite, pp. 412-15;
idem, Institutions, vol. 1, pp. 172-73; vol. 2, pp. 58, 433-35; Bonney, Political Change, p. 448;
Pierre Deyon, "A propos des rapports entre la noblesse frangaise et la monarchie absolue pendant
la premiere moitid du XVIIe siecle," Revue historique, 231 (1964), pp. 342-43, 354-55; [Sebastien
le Prestre de] Vauban, Projet d'une dixme royale: Suivi de deux crits financiers, ed. E. Coornaert
(Paris, 1933), pp. 27-28, 36-37; Bernard Bonnin, "Un aspect de la society rurale: Les milieux
dominants en Dauphin6 au XVIIe siecle," in J. P. Gutton, ed., Lyon et lEurope: Hommes et
societes: Meanges d'histoire offerts d Richard Gascon, 2 vols. (Lyon, 1980), vol. 1, pp. 60-61;
Clamageran, Histoire de l'imp6t, vol. 2, pp. 357-59, 619-20. For comments made in 1717 that
resemble Vauban's, see [Franqois Vdron de Forbonnais], Recherches et considerations sur les
finances de France depuis 1595 jusqu'en 1721, 6 vols. (Liege, 1758), vol. 6, p. 131. The royal
government tried repeatedly to tax the tenants of privileged landowners, but the repetition of edicts
suggests that the government's efforts were not tremendously successful, at least until the
eighteenth century. Even when tenants of privileged landlords were taxed at the full legal rate in the
seventeenth century, their tax (the taille d'exploitation) fell far below the tax paid by peasant
proprietors (the taille de proprhete). Whether it was this difference in the legal taille rates or simply
underassessment of the tenants of privileged landlords, the evidence from Saint-Ouen-de-Breuil
reveals a huge gap between the taille levied upon rented land and that levied upon peasant-owned
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The disproportionate tax burden drove peasant owners out of busi-
ness. Peasant proprietors fell into debt to pay taxes, which began to rise
in the last half of the sixteenth century and did not level off until after
1730. In real terms the per capita tax rose nearly sevenfold between the
1560s and the 1730s; the tax burden increased from roughly 0.4 bushels
of wheat per person in the 1560s to 2.6 bushels in the 1730s, or from 8
days labor for a Parisian construction worker and his family in the 1560s
to over 40 days labor by the 1720s (Table 2, columns 4 and 5).18
Crushed by the higher taxes, peasant proprietors sold out to privi-
leged investors. They in turn were willing to purchase the land (and
willing to pay more for it than any peasant) because it allowed them to
exploit their tax exemptions. As Vauban remarked in 1707, the exemp-
tions raised the value of the privileged investors' property relative to
land held by tax-paying peasants-which presumably dropped in price
every time the taille was raised.
land. A regression of taille assessments from the year 1645 (TAILLE, in livres tournois) on the
acres of land each peasant owned (OWN) and the acres he rented (RENT) yielded the following:
TAILLE = 11.80 + 0.57 OWN + 0.20 RENT
R2 = 0.91 n = 78 t = 17.44 t = 19.65
The hypothesis that peasant property in Saint-Ouen-de-Breuil was assessed at less than twice the
rate of rental property can be firmly rejected (t = 4.01 with 75 degrees of freedom). It is therefore
clear that renters in Saint-Ouen-de-Breuil did not pick up the tax for privileged landlords. The
source for the individual taille assessments, acres rented, and acres owned in Saint-Ouen-de-Breuil
comes from an unusually complete 1645 taille roll in Archives dept. de la Seine-Maritime, C 2108
(1645). I thank James Collins for furnishing me a copy and for the information that 75 percent of the
land was in the hands of the exempt.
18 Rough estimates suggest that taxes also increased as a fraction of agricultural output: Michel
Morineau, "La conjoncture ou les cernes de la croissance," in Labrousse and Braudel, Histoire
economique, vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 980. Peter Mathias and Patrick O'Brien, in "Taxation in Britain and
France, 1715-18 10: A Comparison of the Social and Economic Incidence of Taxes Collected for the
Central Governments," Journal of European Economic History, 5 (1976), pp. 601-50, arrive at
similar figures for the wheat equivalent of per capita taxes in the eighteenth century. The labor
equivalent of the tax burden was derived using figures in Micheline Baulant, "Les salaires des
ouvriers du batiment a Paris de 1400 a 1726," Annales, 26 (1971), pp. 463-83. The calculation
assumes that the Parisian worker is the sole support for a family of four. The 40 days he spends
working for the fisc amounts to approximately 16 percent of the labor year. See also Charles Tilly,
As Sociology Meets History (New York, 1981), p. 203. It should be pointed out that the central
government's tax receipts, which form the basis of Table 2, actually understate the weight of royal
taxation in the provinces, for they ignore collection costs and omit tax revenues that were spent
directly in the provinces without being remitted to Paris. On this and related matters, see Van
Doren, "War Taxation," p. 70; William Beik, "Etat et society en France au XVIIe siecle: La taille
en Languedoc et la question de la redistribution sociale," Annales, 39 (1984), pp. 1270-98; and
James B. Collins, "Sur l'histoire fiscale du XVIIe siecle: Les impots en Champagne entre 1595 et
1635," Annales, 34 (1979), pp. 325-47. Still, despite the problems with the central government's
tax figures, the few long-term series of local tax receipts that we have do sketch the same
chronology for the rise in real taxes: see, for example, Le Roy Ladurie, Paysans de Languedoc,
vol. 2, p. 1026, and Beik, "Etat," pp. 1281-83. One might wonder whether Table 2, which includes
all tax levies, might misrepresent the size of the taille and the aides, the taxes of greatest interest to
us. The answer is no. Although the per capita taille apparently peaked in the 1670s (separate taille
and aides figures are not available for all years), aides receipts were increasing, and the sum of the
two levies probably followed the total tax receipts curve fairly closely.
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TABLE 2
PER CAPITA ROYAL TAX RECEIPTS
Average
Annual
Average Per
Annual Capita Index of Real
Taxes' Taxes2 Grain Per Capita
Decade (nominal) (nominal) Equivalent3 Taxes4
1560/69 10.22 0.60 0.38 100
1570/79 23.12 1.36 0.67 174
1580/89 30.39 1.79 0.78 204
1590/99 24.80 1.46 0.44 114
1600/09 24.90 1.44 0.65 169
1610/19 30.37 1.71 0.73 191
1620/29 43.47 2.39 0.79 207
1630/39 92.16 4.91 1.59 414
1640/49 114.64 5.95 1.64 428
1650/59 126.79 6.42 1.49 388
1660/69 91.72 4.49 1.23 321
1670/79 108.95 5.20 1.83 477
1680/89 119.28 5.59 1.85 482
1690/99 145.83 6.78 1.66 434
1700/09 117.99 5.74 1.52 398
1710/19 130.82 6.23 1.39 362
1720/29 198.00 9.21 1.95 509
1730/39 211.00 9.34 2.56 669
1740/49 223.00 9.61 2.19 572
1750/59 230.00 9.80 2.25 587
1760/69 319.00 12.97 2.69 703
1770/79 362.00 14.03 2.35 612
'Millions of livres tournois, uncorrected for inflation and devaluation.
2 Livres tournois, uncorrected for inflation and devaluation.
3Average annual grain equivalent of per capita taxes (in bushels of wheat).
4 Constant value livres, with 1560/69 = 100. This column represents the numbers of column 4
divided by 0.38, the grain equivalent for 1560/69, and then multiplied by 100.
Source: Unless otherwise noted, figures for total annual tax receipts were taken from Alain Gudry,
"Les finances de la monarchie franqaise sous l'ancien regime," Annales, 33 (1978), pp. 216-39,
whose chief source is J. R. Mallet, Comptes rendus de administration desfinances du royaume de
France (London and Paris, 1789). As Richard Bonney points out in The King's Debts: Finance and
Politics in France, 1589-1661 (Oxford, 1981), pp. 304-6, Gudry fails to include revenue from a
source known as the parties casuelles in his tax figures for the years 1611-1656. I have corrected
Gudry's totals for these years by adding the parties casuelles figures given in Mallet. For 1661 and
1672-1681, Gudry gives no tax receipts; I therefore relied upon Mallet for these years. Tax figures
for 1716-1717 come from [Franqois VWron de Forbonnais], Recherches et considerations sur les
finances de France depuis 1595 jusqu'en 1721, 6 vols. (Liege, 1758), and those for the years after
1717 are taken from Peter Mathias and Patrick O'Brien, "Taxation in Britain and France, 1715-
1810: A Comparison of the Social and Economic Incidence of Taxes Collected for the Central
Governments," Journal of European Economic History, 5 (1976), pp. 601-50. On the basis of
figures in Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, "Les masses profondes: La paysannerie," in F. Braudel and
E. Labrousse, eds., Histoire economique et sociale de la France (Paris, 1977), vol. 1, pt. 2, pp. 485,
560-61, 730, and Jacques Dupaquier, La population fran!aise au XVIIe et XVIIIe siecles (Paris,
1979), p. 11, I assumed that France had a population of 17 million in 1560 and 17 million in 1600
within contemporary frontiers. Population figures after 1600 were taken from Dupaquier, pp. 11-
12, 34-37, 81; to correct them for the size of contemporary frontiers, I used figures on the area of
France given in Roland Mousnier, The Institutions of France Under the Absolute Monarchy, 1589-
1789, trans. Arthur Goldhammer and Brian Pearce, 2 vols. (Chicago, 1979-1984), vol. 1, pp. 682-
86. The grain equivalent of per capita taxes and the index of real per capita taxes were calculated
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The exemptions were large enough to affect land prices appreciably.
As early as the fifteenth century the annual exemptions from the aides
enjoyed by a typical magistrate of the Parlement of Paris might be worth
a quarter of his yearly salary, and they would have been worth more
under the higher taxes of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 9 The
tax exemptions, further, could account for the land sales even if a
privileged buyer was concerned only about his social status: a tax
exemption would make a prestigious estate less costly to operate.
A bit of economics will explain why the land sales finally came to a
halt. In the long run one would expect a peasant to pay for land an
amount equal to the net revenue it brought in. For a given piece of land
he would pay the discounted value of the net pre-tax revenue he
received from the land, minus the taxes he had to pay. The same would
hold for a privileged landlord, but he would face different costs and
much smaller taxes, if indeed he paid taxes at all. As an absentee, the
privileged landlord bore the additional cost of overseeing the land and
its tenants-disposing of crops from afar, supervising laborers, and
ensuring that tenants paid their rent and did not abuse buildings, trees,
or animals. The costs of supervision, which an owner-occupier such as a
peasant did not have to pay, were of great concern to contemporaries,
and they could loom large enough to make a distant plot of land
worthless for an absentee owner.20
As long as the supervisory costs were low a privileged investor would
pay more for a piece of land than a peasant because of his lower taxes,
'9 Vauban, Projet, pp. 27-28; Frangoise Autrand, Naissance d'un grand corps de 1'e'tat: Les
gens du Parlement de Paris, 1345-1454 (Paris, 1981), pp. 210-43, 351. For additional contemporary
perceptions of the effect exemptions had on land values, see de Forbonnais, Recherches, vol. 6, p.
131. In Saint-Genis-Laval in the early eighteenth century, taille exemptions held by three officials
from Lyon (none of them owners of huge estates) cost the community 700 livres annually, a
considerable sum: Archives dept. du Rh6ne, I C 51, "Etat du nombre des privildgids." An arret
from 1734 in the same bundle of documents reveals that an attempt in 1705 to limit tax exemptions
to contiguous pieces of property caused privileged landlords to consolidate their holdings-further
evidence of the effect tax exemptions had.
20 On costs of supervision, see Olivier de Serres, Le theatre de agriculture (Paris, 1600), pp.
45-54; Dewald, Formation, pp. 183-201. It would be relatively easy to change this simple model to
include risk aversion, subsistence farming by peasants, or the nonpecuniary benefits that
landownership conferred.
Table 2, Sources (continued):
using as a deflator a nine-year moving average of wheat prices in Paris, derived from Micheline
Baulant, "Les prix des grains a Paris de 1431 a 1788," Annales, 23 (1968), pp. 520-40.
Note: Extrapolation was used to fill in population figures for each of the years after 1560. For any
given decade, the figures in columns 2 through 5 represent averages for the years in the decade in
question. Tax figures are available in the sixteenth century only for the years 1567, 1574, 1576-
1577, 1581-1582, 1586, 1588, 1596-1597, and they are missing for 1657-1660 in the seventeenth
century. In the eighteenth century, figures are given for the following years only: 1700-1703, 1705-
1715, 1725, 1730, 1734, 1740, 1742, 1751, 1756, 1763, 1768, and 1775 (actually an average for 1773-
1776). For the difficulties of finding figures for French taxes in the eighteenth century, see Mathias
and O'Brien, "Taxation," pp. 601-50. For an important word of caution about all these figures, see
William Beik, "Etat et socfetd en France au XVIIe siecle: La taille en Languedoc et la question de
la redistribution sociale," Annales, 39 (1984), pp. 1270-98.
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and as a result the privileged would buy up all land for which
supervision cost little. His purchases would stop once the costs of
administering distant estates outweighed the advantages of a tax exemp-
tion. Since the supervisory costs would increase with distance, privi-
leged landlords would tend to buy land lying within a certain number of
miles of their homes; at greater distances they would tend to have no
holdings. If the privileged landlords all lived within a city-a reasonable
assumption-then their holdings would therefore tend to cluster, all
other things being equal, near the city's walls. This is precisely what
happened in the vicinity of Lyon and Paris.21
Given the structure of exemptions, the taxes peasants faced were
bound to increase more than the taxes levied on the privileged, and each
tax increase would therefore encourage the privileged to buy more land,
until the costs of administering distant estates once again balanced the
tax exemptions. The process would come to a halt only when taxes
ceased to grow, or when the government limited exemptions. In real
terms, per capita taxes dropped temporarily after 1690, and after
reaching a peak again in the 1730s they leveled off until late in the
eighteenth century (Table 2, column 5).22 A campaign against tax
exemptions enjoyed by privileged landlords and their tenants also
contributed to halting the land sales. Colbert had taken steps against the
exemptions but without effect. It was not until the end of the seven-
teenth century and the early decades of the 1700s that intendants, now
able to raise flagrantly low tax assessments in individual villages, began
to crack down in earnest on privileged landlords and their tenants. In
Saint-Genis-Laval and surrounding communities in the Lyonnais, for
example, the intendant began as early as 1687 to take steps against
privileged landowners (in this region, chiefly bourgeois from Lyon), and
in 1734 the royal government sharply restricted their rights to claim tax
exemptions for rural holdings. Previous legislation had attempted the
same thing, but this time the law was enforced. By the 1730s numerous
bourgeois in the Lyonnais found their property listed on the taille rolls,
and their tenants paid the taille on the same footing with peasant
owners. Intendants in other parts of France launched a similar campaign
against nobles, officers, and other privileged persons. The effectiveness
of this campaign prevented the land sales from resuming when taxes
finally rose again late in the eighteenth century.23
21 Gascon, Grand commerce, vol. 2, pp. 817, 848-51. In Jacquart's study, the one community
where the peasants retained their land was far from Paris and from the other cities where privileged
landlords usually resided (Jacquart, Ile-de-France, p. 724).
22 Mathias and O'Brien, "Taxation," pp. 608-11, reach similar conclusions about the trend of
per capita real taxes in the eighteenth century. The leveling off of taxes also helped quell endemic
tax revolts.
23 For tax reform and the campaign against exemptions, see Marion, Les imp6ts, pp. 6-11, 127,
129, 131, 187-88, 190-94; Deyon, "Rapports," pp. 354-55; Bonney, Political Change, pp. 424-25,
433, 437-38; Mousnier, Institutions, vol. 1, p. 172, vol. 2, pp. 433-35; Clamagdran, Histoire de
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Taxes (and tax inequities) increased considerably in the middle of the
sixteenth century, at just the time that the money began to flow into
land. There was not much relief until the early eighteenth century.
Furthermore, the transfer of peasant land peaked during the periods of
the greatest tax increases-during the Thirty Years War, for example-
when the gap widened between what the privileged would pay for land
and what peasants would accept. One can explain the apparently
premature transfers of land near Lyon and Paris: the tax exemption for
rural property owned by the bourgeois of Lyon dated back to 1462, and
the magistrates of the Parlement of Paris won their exemption from the
aides as early as the fifteenth century.24
This is not to say that the inequities of the tax system were the only
cause. There is for instance an anomaly in the countryside about
Toulouse. Here population increase might have played a role, and
elsewhere agricultural crises might have been a contributing factor,
alongside the tax increases. There may also be some merit to Bloch's
assertion that the peasants sold their land because they lacked cash
(unlike the nobles, officers, and other privileged buyers). According to
Bloch, rising royal taxes forced peasants to come up with hard currency
to pay their taxes. Without any reasonable source of credit the peasants
simply had to sell their fields. Bloch's argument assumes, of course,
that credit markets were imperfect. Most historians would probably
agree, although the assumption certainly deserves further investigation.
The risks of agricultural lending were high. It is not enough merely to
cite evidence of high interest rates in order to conclude that moneylend-
ers were monopolistic usurers or that credit markets had failed. In
Saint-Genis-Laval, for example, where many peasants themselves
engaged in money lending, the market for loans was fairly competitive,
I'imp6t, vol. 2, pp. 357-59, 619-20, vol. 3, p. 41. Marion contains examples from regions other than
the Lyonnais where intendants used taxes d'office and other techniques to attack exemptions in the
late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. In the Lyonnais, a royal arret of 1734 concerning
the bourgeois of Lyon restricted their taille exemption to one contiguous piece of property of less
than 10 hectares, including woodlands and vineyards. This represented a far more serious limit than
did seventeenth-century legislation, which did not cover woods and vines and which granted
bourgeois of Lyon exemptions covering a far more liberal 45-60 hectares. Nobles and officers
enjoyed even more liberal privileges under seventeenth-century law. Archives dept. de Rh6ne, 1 C
51, contains the arret of 1734 plus evidence that it was being enforced and that tenants were being
taxed equitably. See also Archives dept. du Rh6ne, 3 C 96 (1756, 1759), where bourgeois from
Lyon claim only the limited protection of the 1734 arret. The shift to indirect taxes late in the
seventeenth century and the new taxes imposed in the eighteenth century (especially the vingtieme)
further restricted exemptions, for, whatever their failings, these indirect taxes and the vingtieme
were less riddled with loopholes than the taille. Taille rolls from Normandy also suggest that by the
eighteenth century, tenants of privileged landlords no longer evaded the taille; see, for example,
Archives dept. de la Seine Maritime, C 2108, Nossonville (1727).
24 For an example of land purchases when taxes were high, see Deyon, Amiens, pp. 332-38. For
Lyon and Paris, see Gascon, Grand commerce, vol. 2, pp. 862-67, and Autrand, Naissance, pp.
210-43.
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and it is therefore difficult to trace the loss of peasant land in Saint-
Genis back to failures of credit markets.25
In the few areas of France where the privileged could not readily
exploit tax exemptions, the transfer of peasant land into their hands
should be insignificant. Lower Provence is one such area. Cheating on
taille assessments was uncommon there, and the peasants did not
usually sell their land.26 There is more dramatic evidence of this sort in
Venissieux, a village south of Lyon, across the Rhone River from Saint-
Genis-Laval. Although Venissieux was no further from Lyon than
Saint-Genis, the privileged investors from Lyon behaved differently in
Venissieux than in Saint-Genis, where they had been acquiring property
throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (see Table 1). The
only way to explain the contrast between the two communities is to
invoke differences between the local tax systems. Venissieux lay just
over the border of Dauphine, and in Dauphine tax exemptions worked
differently, at least for absentee landlords from Lyon. Although tax
exemptions for the privileged existed in Dauphine (exemptions there
provoked a long legal battle in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries),
the citizens of Lyon did not enjoy firm immunities for the property they
owned in the province. In 1545, it is true, the monarchy did exempt
residents of Lyon from the taille for land they owned in Dauphine, and
like other local urbanites they undoubtedly possessed similar exemp-
tions earlier in the century as well. But as early as 1543 the residents of
villages such as Venissieux placed landlords from Lyon on the taille
rolls for their local holdings. Though the royal exemption undoubtedly
kept the villagers from collecting the taxes they had assessed in 1543-
1544, the same was not true later. By the 1550s, in fact, villages in
Dauphine had begun to tax the holdings of non-noble urban landlords.
By the 1640s, after a long court battle, they had moved toward a more
equitable tax system, which allowed even nobles to be taxed.27
25 Le Roy Ladurie "Vraie croissance," pp. 428-29, 594; Freche, Toulouse, pp. 140, 164,
187-209, 457-89, 504; Bloch, French Rural History, p. 140. The evidence from Saint-Genis-Laval
comes from research I am doing in local notarial records from Archives dept. du Rh6ne, 3 E. Even
with a number of lenders in Saint-Genis-Laval, the problem of default might have introduced
imperfections into the credit market. Although this matter of peasant debt occupies a large place in
the social history of the period, it is largely irrelevant to my explanation for the land sales. Whether
a peasant owner was driven into debt by taxes or not, the higher price offered by the privileged
would make him sell his land to them instead of to other peasants.
26 Baehrel, Une croissance, pp. 403-6, 476-77. In areas where the privileged could exploit tax
exemptions, the price of land should have remained relatively insensitive to increases in taxes, for
when taxes rose, the amount the privileged would pay for land would have declined slightly, if at
all. In areas like lower Provence, by contrast, land prices should have dropped considerably
whenever taxes increased. The problem with testing this, however, is the nearly insurmountable
one of getting a long time series of land prices or rents that controls for land quality and a matching
series of local tax figures.
27 Gascon, Grand commerce, vol. 2, pp. 862-63; Van Doren, "War Taxation," pp. 82-90;
Bligny, Histoire du Dauphine', pp. 204-9, 227-49, 257-73.
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The residents of Lyon thus lost their exemption for property in
Dauphine in general and in Venissieux in particular. This was probably
the case by the end of the sixteenth century, and it was certainly so by
the 1640s. The loss of this exemption would be expected to affect
residents of Lyon who held property in Venissieux. They should have
sold their plots once they had to start paying taxes, and the proportion
of land held by the Lyonnais should have declined. Other investors-
nobles, for example-might have continued to invest in Venissieux, but
the Lyonnais should. have given up the ghost.
This is precisely what happened, if one can believe the taille figures.
According to the taille roles, the absentee landlords from Lyon owned
less property in Venissieux in 1661 than in 1543-1544 (Table 3). One
hesitates, of course, to translate the taille directly into landholdings, for
elites could manipulate the assessments. The Lyonnais, however,
lacked the political and legal tools to engage in such trickery in
Dauphine (if anything, they were likely to be overassessed), and in any
event they were probably less able to influence the taille rolls as time
went on. In all likelihood, then, the taille rolls from Venissieux probably
understate the decline in property ownership by the Lyonnais. By
contrast, in Saint-Genis-Laval, just across the river, the Lyonnais were
buying up more and more land (Table 1). The explanation is clearly the
tax exemption.
The tax exemptions also shed light on the growing stratification in
peasant communities. The sort who rose in the peasant communities
were in the first place those who had the skills to farm or to manage
estates for the growing number of absentee landlords. They had the
assets, reputation, and experience needed to be an absentee landlord's
agent, or fermier; the relationship they enjoyed with landlords might
bring them lower tax assessments as well. If they were literate they
might also purchase minor tax-exempt offices. Most important, they
usually had a stranglehold over village and seigniorial offices, which
allowed them to manipulate tax assessments and other village affairs in
their favor. The result was that wealthy peasants-the coqs du village,
marchands-laboureurs, or fermiers-receveurs-profited. In particular
they usually paid lower taxes. They acquired farm land and rose in the
village, while most other peasants lost their property and fell.28
28 For the stratification of the rural community, see Le Roy Ladurie, Paysans de Languedoc,
vol. 1, pp. 261-314; Jacquart, Ile-de-France, pp. 248-53, 450-540; idem, "Immobilisme", p. 261;
Bloch, French Rural History, pp. 136-37. For the village elite's ability to gain tax exemptions and
manipulate tax assessments (either on their own or via the patronage of absentee landlords), see
Esmonin, La taille, pp. 151, 160, 225-28, 364-68; and Bonney, Political Change, pp. 181, 446-49.
For the small offices a member of the village elite might buy, see Mousnier, Venalite, pp. 404-15. In
addition to earning a return on their skills and assets, the members of the village elite may have
colluded with the tax-exempt and thus have shared some of the advantages of the tax break. For the
rest of the peasantry, though, the possibility of splitting the benefits of tax evasion does not seem to
have been in the cards politically.
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TABLE 3
PERCENT OF THE TAILLE ASSESSED TO RESIDENTS OF LYON IN VENISSIEUX
Date Percent
1543-1544 37
1598-1599 38*
1661 10
* Figure includes percent of taille assessed to residents of Lyon and all other taille-paying absentee
landlords. The percent of the taille paid by landlords from Lyon is therefore less (and perhaps
considerably less) than the 38 percent figure.
Note: For 1598-1599, three taille rolls were averaged together. For 1661, the area of Feysin was
excluded.
Source: Archives dept. de l'Isere, B 3066, fols. 158-99 (1543-1544); AD Rh6ne, E supplement,
fonds des communes, Venissieux taille rolls (1598-1599, 1661).
The royal government was concerned about the sale of peasant land,
for the sale eroded the government's tax base. In the seventeenth
century the monarchy therefore made an effort to limit tax exemptions,
and although the king often spoke of these tax reforms as a means of
protecting the poor, the desire to increase tax revenues always lay
somewhere near the surface. One example of the monarchy's efforts
was its investigation of titles of nobility-an investigation undertaken in
part to reduce false claims to fiscal exemptions. The crown also
struggled against exemptions and low tax assessments for officers, city
dwellers, and village elites.29
The crown took direct measures to stem the sale of some peasant land
as well. Actually limiting sales by individual peasants was beyond the
government's means, although it had been attempted in similar situa-
tions by governments of small German principalities.30 Indeed, no one
in France appears to have contemplated this alternative, which in any
case would have been prohibitively expensive to enforce. But the
government did place restrictions on the sale of the property rights
belonging to entire villages. Typically, villages in France owned com-
mons such as meadows, forests, or waste lands, where peasants
enjoyed communal rights to graze animals or collect wood; and villages
might possess the vaine pature, the collective right to pasture in
unenclosed fields. Parish vestries in villages also had plots of cultivated
land, which might be leased out to help defray village expenses. Much
of this communal property, though, had to be sold to pay mounting
expenses during the Wars of Religion, the Fronde, and other crises of
the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Throughout France the
villages had to rebuild parish churches devastated by warring religious
factions, lodge marauding troops or bribe them to stay away, and pay
for lawyers and court costs in cases involving higher taxes. Villages had
no alternatives to selling their land and their use rights, such as the vaine
29 Esmonin, La taille, pp. 57-58, 201-2, 271-72; Bonney, Political Change, pp. 437-38, 446-49.
30 Friedrich Ltige, Geschichte der deutschen Agrarverfassung (Stuttgart, 1963), pp. 136-37.
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nature. The communal property ended up in the hands of privileged
buyers.31
The peasants who leased vestry land probably paid some taxes, and
the commons and use rights figured into the assessments for the taille.
Indirectly, then, the peasants paid taxes on communal land. But once
this property was in the possession of the exempt, the monarchy lost the
tax revenue.
Under Louis XIV the monarchy forced some of the purchasers of
communal property to return what they had bought, and it squeezed a
little from other buyers. It also placed the villages in a position of
financial tutelage. Henceforth, the royal intendants supervised village
finances, limited communal expenditures and repairs, and prohibited
the sale or mortgage of communal property. The government's motive
was simply to prevent further hemorrhaging of taxable assets. One
consequence of the policy was to make the monarchy one of the main
guarantors of communal property rights and of communal agriculture in
general. Its thirst for taxes had pushed it to support both communal
rights and traditional agricultural practices.32 Communal agriculture in
France was not swept away by a wave of enclosures, as it was in
England. 3
3' See, for example, Jacquart, Ile-de-France, pp. 220-23; Roupnel, La vile et campagne; and
Mousnier, Institutions, vol. 1, pp. 555-61. For sales of rights to vaine pdture, see Marc Bloch, "La
lutte pour l'individualisme agraire dans la France du XVIIIe siecle," Annales, 2 (1930), p. 339; and
Archives nationales, G7 101 (1678). In the late eighteenth century, some 10 percent of the
agricultural land belonged to the villages: Guy Ikni, "Sur les biens communaux pendant la
Revolution franqaise," Annales historiques de la Revolution fran!aise, 54 (1982), pp. 73-74. In
addition to the communal land itself, village use rights such as the vaine pdture could extend (in
regions such as the northeast) over nearly all a community's arable land.
32 See Mousnier, Institutions, vol. 1, pp. 559-61, and Hilton Root, "Crown and Peasantry in
Burgundy, 1661-1798" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1983), the best local study of the
monarchy's takeover of village finances and its effect upon agriculture. A revised version of Root's
dissertation is forthcoming from the University of California Press.
33 For the obstacles to enclosures, see Root, "Crown and Peasantry," and Bloch, "La lutte pour
l'individualisme agraire," pp. 329-83, 511-56. The peculiarities of the tax system were not the only
reason communal agriculture was slow to disappear in France, and in the last half of the eighteenth
century many government officials did push for the passage of enclosure edicts and other measures
against communal farming. But enforcement of these measures often ended up in the hands of
staunch defenders of communal rights like the intendant of Rouen, De Crosne. In 1780, for
example, De Crosne preserved communal rights to a pasture shared by inhabitants of the two
communities of Petit-Quevilly and Grand-Quevilly even though the residents of Petit-Quevilly
acknowledged that sharing rights between the two villages cut productivity and frustrated plans to
improve drainage. De Crosne's reason for his decision was his fear that without these communal
rights, a number of families in each community would be unable to "pay their taxes." See Archives
nationales, Q1 1381 (Nov. 28, 1780).
Since communal land was often marginal, one might ask whether preserving communal rights
really did depress agricultural productivity seriously. Contemporaries thought so, and it is worth
noting that certain communal rights, in particular vaine pdture, reduced every property owner's
incentive to adopt new agricultural technologies. Banning sales of such communal rights to private
individuals, as the French state did, blocked one simple way to restore the proper incentives (a
"Coase theorem" resolution of the externalities), and it saddled most new technologies with
insurmountable free-rider problems. The result was fewer enclosures and fewer agricultural
improvements in general. This topic will be explored more fully in a book I am preparing on the
social and economic history of the French countryside.
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These were not the only costs of the tax system. The taxes drew
money away from peasants and farmers, and thereby reduced agricul-
tural development. Why fence a plot of land or drain a fen when the tax
collector would simply use the improvement as a reason to boost the
taille? As Vauban complained in 1707,
things are reduced to such a state . . . that a man who could use his own talent and skill
in order to ameliorate his life and that of his family prefers to stay as he is without doing
anything. A man who could raise several cows or lambs, which could improve his farm
or his land, is obliged to do without them, lest he be crushed by the taille the following
year, as he most certainly would be if he earned a little something and it was seen that
his harvest was a bit more abundant than usual.
To be sure, French taxes on average may not have borne down so
heavily as some historians once imagined: if the central government's
figures can be believed, per capita taxes were in fact higher in England
than in France by the eighteenth century. But French taxes did penalize
investment, particularly by peasants who lacked exemptions. The net
effect retarded agriculture.3
Equally hurtful were the resources wasted avoiding or manipulating
taxes. Some peasants in Normandy, for instance, paid for fictional
second residences in cities in order to claim urban tax exemptions;
others refrained from erecting new buildings that might increase their
assessment. Time and effort were spent on reducing tax assessments,
influencing the local elu or bribing the village collector. The tax
collectors themselves spent resources in the search for bribes. Contem-
poraries complained that even village tax collectors devoted "all of their
energy, for days and nights without interruption, to the task of seeking
out bribes." The result, as one historian has noted, was a "perversion"
of entrepreneurial talent, a perversion visible even at the village level.
The tax system diverted resources into the task of "redistributing the
34 Vauban, Projet, p. 28. Mathias and O'Brien show that by the eighteenth century the central
government's tax receipts were lower per capita in France than in England, but the central
government's figures may understate the size of French fiscal levies. In any case, Mathias and
O'Brien acknowledge that French taxes did seriously penalize investment. This was particularly
true in agriculture. The French peasant, for example, payed a higher taille if he improved his land;
by contrast, the eighteenth-century British landowner owed what was in effect a fixed (and in real
terms declining) land tax assessment that, as Adam Smith noted, "did not discourage ...
improvements, nor keep down the produce of the land below what it would otherwise rise to."
Similarly, although the excise on beer in England may have reduced the demand for barley a bit, it
was also part of a system of protection that guarded British farmers against foreign competition.
The key here, of course, is not per capita taxation, but the incidence of taxes and their effect at the
margin, and as Adam Smith noted, French taxes, though apparently lower by the eighteenth
century on a per capita basis, were far more oppressive. See Mathias and O'Brien, "Taxation," pp.
614-17, 621-25; Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed.
Edwin Cannan, 2 vols. in 1 (Chicago, 1976), vol. 2, pp. 352-58, 365, 437-38; C. D. Chandaman, The
English Public Revenue, 1660-1688 (Oxford, 1975), pp. 9-76, 188-91; W. R. Ward, The English
Land Tax in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1953), pp. 3-7, 20-22, 34-35, 67, 87-88, 93-97.
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nation's wealth rather than into increasing wealth."35 It was not a
costless transfer from the peasantry to the rest of society.
Did the fiscal system work nothing but harm in the countryside? It
may have helped create larger, more efficient farms, the sort of farms
common in England but rare in France. The failure of French agricul-
ture is traditionally blamed on the lack of such farms, and the exemp-
tions may have offset some of the harm done by the rest of the tax
system. But the privileged might well have exploited their managerial
skills to assemble large, well-run farms without the impetus of tax
exemptions. Furthermore, when privileged landlords attempted to
enclose their fields or to undertake other improvements associated with
English agriculture they faced the obstacle of a government that
protected communal property rights to preserve its taxes. And the fiscal
system in any case blocked improvements by the largest single group in
rural society, the peasants themselves.
3 Esmonin, La taille, pp. 270-71, 354; Wolfe, Fiscal System, p. 249. See also Vauban, Projet,
pp. 27-28, 35-38.
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