Competitive Landscape: Integrated Risk Management

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Competitive Landscape: Integrated Risk Management Competitive Landscape: Integrated Risk Management Published: 18 December 2019 ID: G00450383 Analyst(s): Elizabeth Kim The integrated risk management landscape has been rapidly evolving. This has created greater urgency for technology and service providers to reevaluate how they are strategically positioned in the market and how to uniquely position themselves for the future. Key Findings ■ Technology provider consolidation has accelerated over the past year. Risk management technology providers will continue to expand their capabilities through acquisitions to support the integrated risk management (IRM) mindset. ■ Risk management technology providers are adopting a more modular approach to IRM implementation by offering scalable product packaging and pricing that allows customers to gradually expand functionalities. The modular approach supports different customers in their respective risk management journeys. ■ For cybersecurity, delivering support for risk quantification models that are traditionally used for communicating operations risk is a short-term opportunity. Growing scrutiny on cyberexposures will drive demand for security-related business risk quantification beyond the banking, financial services and insurance (BFSI) vertical as means for chief information security officers (CISOs) to improve risk communication in the mid to long term. ■ Risk management technology providers focused on providing visibility and assessment of risks in information security, privacy, resilience and new technology are emerging. Recommendations Technology and service providers in the risk management marketplace should: ■ Identify potential partnerships and integrations with technology providers that offer little or no overlap in capabilities, risk domain or the primary buyers of your solution. ■ Align product messaging around the customer’s risk management maturity and the compliance- centric, operation-centric and business-outcome-centric use cases. Additionally, take a modular approach to product pricing and packaging to accommodate the different use cases. ■ Assess your offering against the critical capabilities (including risk quantification and analytics capabilities) and the IRM vision of providing a set of capabilities supporting the integration of strategic, operational and tactical risk to align your product roadmap accordingly. ■ Evaluate current IRM solution in helping customers integrate and utilize data, such as tactical security vulnerability/threat assessment data, more effectively. Table of Contents Strategic Planning Assumption...............................................................................................................3 Analysis..................................................................................................................................................3 Competitive Situation and Trends..................................................................................................... 7 The IRM Market Will Continue to Consolidate as Technology Providers Seek to Provide Support for Multiple Objectives and Risk Domains................................................................................... 7 More IRM Technology Providers Are Adopting a Modular Approach to Support Varying Levels of Customer’s Risk Maturity............................................................................................................9 Risk Quantification Analysis Is a Growing Interest, but the Opportunity Outside the Financial Services Vertical Is More Mid to Long Term.................................................................................9 IRM Vendor Landscape Will Be Impacted by Organizations’ Need for Improved Visibility and Assessment of Emerging Risks.................................................................................................10 Competitive Profiles........................................................................................................................10 CyberSaint................................................................................................................................11 Galvanize..................................................................................................................................11 NAVEX Global...........................................................................................................................12 RiskLens...................................................................................................................................13 SAI Global................................................................................................................................ 14 ServiceNow.............................................................................................................................. 15 SureCloud................................................................................................................................ 16 References and Methodology......................................................................................................... 17 Gartner Recommended Reading.......................................................................................................... 17 List of Figures Figure 1. IRM Objectives and Risk Domains........................................................................................... 4 Figure 2. Magic Quadrant and Critical Capabilities for IRM Solutions, 2019............................................ 5 Page 2 of 19 Gartner, Inc. | G00450383 Figure 3. IRM Software and Consulting Implementation Service Forecast............................................... 6 Figure 4. IRM Global Forecast by Region................................................................................................7 Figure 5. IRM Technology Provider Consolidation, 2019......................................................................... 8 Strategic Planning Assumption By 2021, 50% of large organizations will have two or more IRM use cases that leverage automated workflows through IRM vendors, up from 30% in 2017. Analysis To understand and manage the full scope of risk, organizations require a comprehensive view across business units and risk and compliance functions as well as key business partners, suppliers and outsourced entities. As a result, new technology solutions are emerging to increase the collaborative nature of risk management, inside and outside an organization. Gartner defines IRM as practices and processes supported by a risk-aware culture and enabling technologies that improve decision making and performance through an integrated view of how well an organization manages its unique set of risks. A key distinction in Gartner’s definition of IRM is the integration with enterprise risk management (ERM) relating to strategic risks impacting operational and IT risk management objectives. IRM excludes the broader management of risks beyond operational and IT. Figure 1 shows the current primary IRM objectives and risk domains. As IRM technology providers look to enhance their coverage of these objectives and risk domains, opportunities for consolidation and strategic partnerships continue to emerge (see “Top Use Cases and Capabilities for Integrated Risk Management”). Gartner, Inc. | G00450383 Page 3 of 19 Figure 1. IRM Objectives and Risk Domains Figure 2 shows the IRM scope, critical capabilities and the use cases evaluated by Gartner in 2019 (see “Magic Quadrant for Integrated Risk Management Solutions” and “Critical Capabilities for Integrated Risk Management Solutions”). Page 4 of 19 Gartner, Inc. | G00450383 Figure 2. Magic Quadrant and Critical Capabilities for IRM Solutions, 2019 Gartner forecasts the IRM software market to grow at an 8% compound annual growth rate (CAGR) through 2023 to reach $6.3 billion (see “Forecast: Information Security and Risk Management, Worldwide, 2017-2023, 2Q19 Update”). Additionally, the total IRM solution spending, including consulting services and implementation services, is expected to reach $9.3 billion by 2023, representing a 9% CAGR. Figure 3 shows the IRM spending forecast. While a significant portion of the current IRM spending is coming from North America, the IRM market is ripe for growth in other regions. Figure 4 depicts the current IRM spending and the projected growth by regions. Gartner, Inc. | G00450383 Page 5 of 19 Figure 3. IRM Software and Consulting Implementation Service Forecast Page 6 of 19 Gartner, Inc. | G00450383 Figure 4. IRM Global Forecast by Region The impact of the growing adoption of IRM on the competitive landscape is threefold: 1. Net new technology providers entering the IRM market 2. Consolidation and expansion of IRM providers 3. Technology providers traditionally from outside IRM (and in niche areas such as security rating or privacy management) adopting an IRM use case and approach Risk management technology providers need to closely analyze their existing competitor’s strategic movements and better identify new competitors. Competitive Situation and Trends The IRM Market Will Continue to Consolidate as Technology Providers Seek to Provide Support for Multiple Objectives and Risk Domains Risk management technology providers will continue to expand their capabilities to support IRM, and they will achieve this either organically or through acquisitions. Gartner has already observed Gartner, Inc. | G00450383 Page 7 of 19 technology vendors aggressively acquiring or partnering. This trend has accelerated especially in the past year,
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